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Sir Antony Acland, Lord Hannay of Chiswick and Lord Jay of Ewelme 
– Oral evidence (QQ 292-309) 
 
 
Evidence Session No. 18 Heard in Public   Questions 292 - 309 
 
Members present: 
Lord Howell of Guildford (The Chairman) 
Baroness Armstrong of Hill Top 
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock 
Baroness Goudie 
Baroness Hussein-Ece 
Lord Janvrin 
Baroness Nicholson of Winterbourne 
Lord Ramsbotham 
________________ 
Examination of Witnesses 
Sir Antony Acland, former head of the UK Diplomatic Service and Ambassador to 
Washington, Lord Hannay of Chiswick, former UK Permanent Representative to the 
EEC and the UN, and Lord Jay of Ewelme, former head of the UK Diplomatic Service and 
Ambassador to Paris 
 
Q292   The Chairman: Gentlemen, first of all thank you very much for agreeing to come 
before us and share some of your thoughts with us.  The remit of the Committee is soft 
power and British overseas influence, which of course covers a multitude of thoughts.  I 
should formally say that, in front you, you should have a list of the interests that have been 
declared by the Committee, which is I hope of help to you.  I am afraid that if there is a 
Division, we have to break for five minutes.  We cannot avoid that.  I just hope it will not 
happen, but it may.  Again, thank you for coming.  
Let me begin by saying that you have all been at the centre—the very heart—of British 
diplomacy over a considerable number of years.  We have had witness after witness and 
paper after paper asserting that in some way there has been a step change in the nature of 
diplomacy.  It has spread out, and the interface is not just between traditional diplomats, 
heads of government, and high officials.  If we are to secure our interests and persuade 
people of the line we are taking nationally, it now involves a much wider degree of public 
diplomacy.  
I suppose, in the language of the BBC, I ought to start by asking, “True or False?”.  Have 
things changed or not?  Sir Antony, I am going to start with you, because I think you stret 
ceterah over a longer period than anyone else in this room.  You have been at the very head 
of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office over the years and have watched things change.  
Do you think this has happened, or is it really just the old story rewritten? 
Sir Antony Acland, Lord Hannay of Chiswick and Lord Jay of Ewelme – Oral evidence (QQ 
292-309) 
5 
 
Sir Antony Acland: I am sure it has happened.  If one thinks of the past a little, in the 19th 
century and the beginning of the 20th century, diplomacy was really conducted entirely on 
an intergovernmental level.  It was conducted by diplomats.  The interest was the balance of 
power in Europe, or the balance of power with the Ottoman Empire.  I am sure that all that 
has completely changed.  The business of diplomacy and the business of embassies have 
broadened enormously.  This is partly the result of various reports into the Foreign Office, 
such as the Duncan report, which quite rightly said that we had to pay much more attention 
to trade.   
However, it is not only trade.  When I was in Washington, there were representatives of 
every single activity coming through.  Obviously, Ministers and civil servants, but also 
doctors and scientists and religious leaders and journalists, and anaesthetists—
anaesthesiologists, as the Americans call them.  All these groups came to the embassy, partly 
to make contact, partly to be briefed, and partly to be put in touch with their opposite 
numbers.  Then they went off into the States of the Union to pursue their particular 
interests.  As I described it, if you twisted all these different strands of activity into one large 
cable, it was a very significant cable across the Atlantic joining Britain and the United States 
of America.  Through that cable was presented every form of activity that Britain was 
involved in, thereby giving the Americans a feeling of what we stood for and an image of 
Britain.  I think that is very important, and that is what diplomacy is much more about 
nowadays. 
The Chairman: Do you think the information revolution has thickened the cable even 
more?  Schools are talking to schools, universities to universities, doctors to doctors, and 
professions to professions electronically and not necessarily through embassies.  Do you 
think that has changed things? 
Sir Antony Acland: Yes, I think it has to a certain amount.  It has certainly speeded up 
communications tremendously.  I suppose you can put things through the cable more quickly 
electronically.  Yes, I think that is a big change in the way the Foreign Office operates.  
When I was there, we still had incoming and outgoing ciphered telegrams.  It is now 
electronic messages.  It means that diplomacy has to act more quickly.  There are always 
journalists who are ahead of the news, who sometimes complicate things.  However, yes, I 
think that is another very big change that has happened.  
The Chairman: Lord Jay, you have more recently been at the head of the Foreign Office.  
How do you react to those questions?   
Lord Jay of Ewelme: I agree with what Antony has said.  There has been a step change.  
One thing I would like to emphasis is, as Antony has spoken about, the range of people and 
interests that visit embassies.  Embassies themselves are far more aware than the Foreign 
Office ever is of exactly what that range of activities can be.  In some ways it is the embassy 
that can draw together all the various actors in public diplomacy in a way the Foreign Office 
never can, because it inevitably only sees a part of it in London.  
It is one of the things that certainly struck me when I was in Paris.  You had every 
government department represented there, as well as getting everybody coming in.  You 
were a sort of mini-Whitehall; many embassies are mini-Whitehalls.  The amount of pure 
Foreign Office work that an ambassador does these days can be 10% or 20% sometimes in 
some parts of the world.  That is a real change.  From time to time, I have seen that in 
evidence given to your Committee, people have talked about the FCO.  There does need to 
be a real distinction between the FCO in London and what its relations are with other 
government departments in London, and the role of embassies and high commissions 
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abroad.  These embassies see the totality of British interests in a particular country in the 
way that the Foreign Office itself probably never can.   
Q293   The Chairman: That is a very interesting distinction and certainly accords with 
what we have heard from other witnesses.  Lord Hannay, you have been particularly 
involved during your long career with the international institutions, along with other things.  
How does it strike you, this claim that there is a new scene—a new characteristic in 
diplomacy? 
Lord Hannay of Chiswick: Well, I think it is true, as my two predecessors speaking have 
said, that things have changed a huge amount.  There has been an enormous widening of the 
subject matter that you deals with.  A huge range of issues such as climate change or nuclear 
non-proliferation, which probably were not much dealt with by embassies prior to 40 or 50 
years ago, have increasingly to be dealt with.  They have to be dealt with within an 
international framework that is much more rules-based than it has ever been before in the 
history of the world.  Therefore, the interface between bilateral and multilateral 
diplomacy—how to get the country in which you are an ambassador to take a helpful line at 
an international organisation where Britain has an interest in pushing something forward—
has grown very greatly. 
However, I would say a word of caution about this business of a communications revolution, 
internet, et cetera.  The fact is there is not a single pattern in every country in the world.  
Every ambassador still has to work out how the foreign policy of the country he is in is 
formulated, who influences it, and how he can influence them.  That will be completely 
different from country to country.  In autocracies it may be a tight-knit, narrow little body.  
In other countries, particularly democracies, it may have widened out hugely and involve a 
lot of the electronic media and so on.  However, the idea that there is somehow one single 
approach to this is wrong. 
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: Lord Hannay, you just said “he” when you referred to 
ambassadors.  With no disrespect, you are all Oxford graduates.  Two of you are 
Wykehamists and one is an old Etonian.  You are white and you are male.  Robin Cook, 
when he was Foreign Secretary, made a big effort to try to broaden the scope of our 
ambassadors abroad: more women, more people from comprehensive schools, multiracial, 
and maybe even a few from redbrick universities.  How has that succeeded?  What are the 
changes?  Has that happened, and do we have a different kind of ambassador than just a male 
Oxford graduate? 
Lord Jay of Ewelme: Perhaps I can have a go at that, as I was Permanent Under-Secretary at 
the time.  You put your finger on something that is hugely important, because the Foreign 
Office’s, or the country’s, public diplomacy is only going to be successful if what it is trying to 
say is what it does.  If what it does is just us, it is not going to succeed.  Now, I think the 
Foreign Office has made huge efforts over the last 10 years or so and is continuing to do so.  
If you now want to get a work placement in the Foreign Office, there are, quite rightly in my 
view, special schemes for women and ethnic minorities.  If you were like David or Antony or 
me, you would not have much of a chance.  This is a real conscious effort to try to widen 
the intake into the Foreign Office.  I think it is happening more than it did in the past.  There 
are conscious efforts to try to ensure that it does happen.  It has not yet gone far enough.   
Lord Hannay of Chiswick: However, this can be exaggerated.  I would refer to the period 
from 1990 to 1995 when I was at the UN.  Even then, half my councillors—that was one 
step down from me—were women.  The Foreign Office had been recruiting a lot of women 
for many years and many of them have risen very high.  In Brussels, where only half my staff 
Sir Antony Acland, Lord Hannay of Chiswick and Lord Jay of Ewelme – Oral evidence (QQ 
292-309) 
7 
 
came from the Foreign Office, and the other half, or slightly more than half, came from other 
government departments, there was a wide spread of women.  That was the case even in 
1985 to 1990.  It has of course moved further, and ought to.  However, it started from a 
higher base than some people give credit for. 
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: We have had a female Permanent Secretary in other 
departments.  Have we had one in the Foreign Office yet?  
Sir Antony Acland: No, not yet.  However, as Lord Janvrin will remember, if you look in 
the Daily Telegraph or the Times nowadays, the majority of those who go to the Palace on 
appointment as ambassadors to kiss hands, which you do not actually do, are women.  Very 
rightly, it is women with their partners.  When I first joined the Foreign Office, if you got 
divorced, you had to offer your resignation.  In all these respects, socially and as regards the 
sex of the ambassador, there has quite rightly been a very big change.  I would think now a 
third of ambassadors abroad are women.  Do you think so Michael?  
Lord Jay of Ewelme:  I do not know the figure.  
Sir Antony Acland: It is getting up to that amount, I would have thought.   
Q294   Baroness Nicholson of Winterbourne: I return to Lord Jay’s point about the 
necessity, as he perceives it, of a decision being made maybe by the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office as to the lines of command.  This is given that the British embassies 
on the ground now have such a multifaceted bunch of ministries under them in situ.  Could I 
ask how he sees that such a decision could be made, and is this different in actuality from 30, 
40 or 50 years ago?  If it is different, is that because of differing budgetary allocations to 
ministries here, or shifts of power and size of ministries?  What is it that has made the 
change, if there has been a change?  If there has not been a change, how did ambassadors 
manage previously?  
Lord Jay of Ewelme: There has been a change.  The nature of foreign policy has changed a 
lot.  Issues such as immigration, for example, are of major importance in much of the world.  
Education is a matter of foreign policy in much of the world.  Probably 50, even 20 years 
ago, if you were an ambassador, you were dealing mainly through the Foreign Office, and it 
was the Foreign Office’s job to pass things to other government departments.  Your staff 
and you yourself as an ambassador are now in touch regularly with the senior officials and 
with Ministers of pretty well every government department.  That is what an ambassador 
does.  I was in touch with Ministers from other government departments than the Foreign 
Office far more often than I was with Ministers from the Foreign Office.  I was in touch a lot 
with Number 10.  That has changed. 
The role of embassies has changed a lot.  The interesting question is the role of the Foreign 
Office in London, given  the way in which foreign policies and embassies have changed.  
There it is a question, to an extent, of just making other government departments realise 
that there is something that they need to be conscious of.  Maybe they could try some sort 
of—I do not want to put too strong a word on it—co-ordination or something, so that the 
things different government departments do in London are brought together in some way 
and form part of a slightly more coherent whole than can be the case. 
The Chairman: That is fascinating.  We have noticed from witnesses that almost every 
department of state, including some quite surprising ones, feel they are now at the 
spearhead of foreign policy in a way they were not before.  Nevertheless, the embassies, as 
you have described them, are often the key, the hubs, in each country. 
Lord Jay of Ewelme: Yes.  
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The Chairman: Is the implication that contrary to the futurologists’ comments that 
ambassadors and embassies will be bypassed by Skype and instant communication, the 
opposite has happened and in fact the embassies are becoming more important?  
Lord Jay of Ewelme: In a funny way, they have become more important in some ways, 
because they have a much wider range of interests and understanding.  I will not say they will 
be bypassed by Skype, but there will be direct communications between actors in Britain and 
actors abroad who will not go anywhere near an embassy.  Part of the job of the embassy is 
to try to keep in touch with that and see what is happening.  I would argue that, in a way, 
embassies have become more relevant over the last 10 or 15 years, because they are dealing 
with such a wider range of British policy, not just foreign policy, than was the case in the 
past.  
Q295   The Chairman: The next question from that—and I know our colleagues want to 
come in—is: are our embassies adequately staffed and resourced?  Do they have the 
polymaths in place who can deal with this vast new range of issues that are part of the 
international interface? 
Sir Antony Acland: Perhaps I can answer that.  When I was in Washington as an 
Ambassador, we had a representative of every main department from Whitehall there.  The 
embassy had the professional advice from each and every department.  We hoped when I 
was there that we were going to get a royal flush of Cabinet Ministers.  We totted them up.  
There were one or two rare birds like the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster or the 
Lord Privy Seal, who did not have a particular reason for coming to Washington.  However, 
all the others did, and all of them had one of their own people there in the embassy to brief 
them, in addition to whatever briefing I could give them as regards the political situation in 
Washington at the time.  There was a very wide field of activity.  Every department came, 
every department was represented, and every department had its contacts with their 
opposite numbers in Washington.   
Lord Hannay of Chiswick: I was the number two in Washington well before Antony was 
ambassador.  There was always a stovepipe problem in Washington.  The departments in 
London had their stovepipe with the relevant department in the US Government in 
Washington and they had their representative in the embassy.  Co-ordinating that, and 
ensuring that what you were doing on trade policy bore some sort of resemblance to what 
you were doing on climate change, or what you were doing on straightforward foreign 
policy, was quite demanding.  The people who operated in the stovepipes were rather 
resistant to it, and they liked a situation in which they dealt with their home department in 
London and their opposite number in the United States.  The United States is also well 
known for not operating very effective interdepartmental co-ordination.    
There was always a stress to co-ordinate effectively in the United Nations when I was there.  
I used to have a morning meeting every morning to make sure that everyone in the mission 
knew what everyone else was doing that day.  Therefore, the consistency of what we were 
doing in the Economic and Social Committee, what we were doing in the Security Council 
and what we were doing in the Decolonisation Committee, and so on, was kept under some 
sort of review. 
In Brussels with the European Union, it was not such a problem, because the structure in 
London was much stronger.  I did not get my instructions from the Foreign Office when I 
was the ambassador to the European Union.  I got them, effectively, from the Friday 
meetings, in which I participated, at the Cabinet Office.  These were chaired by the Deputy 
Secretary of the Cabinet, who was also the Prime Minister’s adviser on European matters.  
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That meeting virtually agreed the lines that were going to be pursued in the Committee of 
Permanent Representatives and in the various meetings of the Council the following week.  
This was subject, of course, to meetings of ministerial committees when something 
important had to be thrashed out.  However, the EU was very much a separate case in 
which the British bureaucracy had taken quite a few leaps forward from where it was in 
dealing with other posts abroad. 
The Chairman: Lord Ramsbotham, I think you have a question on that very point. 
Q296   Lord Ramsbotham: One of the things that I must say surprised me, and I have 
been reflecting on it ever since we heard it, was that the responsibility for the co-ordination 
of soft power—if there is a responsibility in this country at the moment—rests with the 
NSC.  This seems to me slightly alarming in view of what you have told us about what you 
see as the movement to embassies as it were, with the FCO having a slightly different role in 
this, and bearing in mind that the NSC is involved in soft power.  Thinking about the conduit 
between the NSC and individual embassies and back again, I wonder whether you could 
comment on whether you think that is appropriate and sensible or whether there is 
something missing. 
Lord Hannay of Chiswick: The establishment of the NSC is a major step in the right 
direction.  There was something really missing.  There was the Defence and Overseas Policy 
Committee of the Cabinet, but it did not play quite as sophisticated a role as it is now trying 
to develop for the NSC.  I cannot tell you, because I have no experience, of how the NSC is 
interfacing with ambassadors in Washington, NATO in Brussels, the UN or what have you.  
However, I do think it has within it the capacity to produce a bit more of what we have 
always had on the European Union side since we joined the European Union: a very strong 
secretariat in the Cabinet Office, staffed by people from different departments, including 
from the FCO.  This secretariat advised the Prime Minister, pulled together a whole 
network of Cabinet Committees, and met once a week for three hours every Friday 
morning with the Permanent Representative to work out what we were going to do the 
following week.  Michael Jay was one of the officials of that secretariat, in fact, when I was 
the Permanent Representative.  
Lord Janvrin: The growing role of the embassy is a really interesting thought.   
The Chairman: Yes, we are getting a picture here of the embassies and the Cabinet Office 
being more important.  I am beginning to see the poor old FCO stretched a little thin and 
diluted over this.  However, perhaps I am wrong.   
Q297   Lord Janvrin: My question is whether the power of the overseas mission to 
influence opinion in a country is actually waning because of rolling news, social media from 
diasporas in this country, and the much more pervasive influence of sport, music and 
everything else on the cultural side?  Do you think the ability of the Government to project 
their own public diplomacy agenda is quite tricky in a much wider field of modern 
communication?  
Lord Jay of Ewelme:  I rather agree with that.  If I were high commissioner in Canberra just 
now, I would not be doing much with public diplomacy.  However, it does vary hugely from 
country to country, as was said earlier on.  If, for example, you are the new British chargé in 
Tehran, I think you are going to have a really important task.  This will involve working out 
what, over the next five years, Britain can do through its embassy and other means to 
promote Britain’s influence in Tehran and the knowledge in Iran of Britain.  Nobody else can 
do that other than an embassy, it seems to me, and I think that will be an important job for 
an ambassador.   
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However, that is not going to be everything.  There are going to be channels of 
communication that cut across what an ambassador or an embassy can do, and one has to 
respect that.  When I was Permanent Under-Secretary, I was in Dhaka in Bangladesh and 
gave an interview to a Bengali language newspaper.  I flew back to London overnight and my 
e-mail inbox in London was full of comments from the Bangladeshi community in the north 
of Britain.  They had seen the interview and were commenting to me on it.  There are links 
here that are now part of everyday life, which no government machine can attempt to 
control.  It can attempt to influence—it can get British views across—but it has to be quite 
careful in not trying to do more than it can do.  
Sir Antony Acland: It depends to a large extent on the subject.  If there is a major issue like 
the Falkland Islands, one thinks of the role played by Sir Nicholas Henderson, who was 
ambassador in Washington.  He had an enormous impact, going on television day after day, 
explaining what we were doing, why we were doing it, and why it was right to do it.  I think 
that in the big issues, when the ambassador can have access to the media, he can play a great 
role.  
Lord Ramsbotham: I was hugely impressed two weeks ago in Kenya to see the way that 
the very able high commissioner, Christian Turner, was functioning in a rather egg-shell like 
environment there with extreme skill.  He was contacting many Kenyans who in the longer 
term could be very useful to us.  I thought it was excellent.  
Lord Hannay of Chiswick: Again, you have to be very careful to distinguish different cases.  
I served in two places, the European Union and the UN, where the public diplomacy angle 
was completely and totally different.  While I was in Brussels in the EU, I would have been 
taken out and shot if I had allowed myself to stand in front of a television camera and talk 
about Britain’s European policy.  That was a matter for Ministers and Ministers alone.  It was 
too sensitive.  It is even more sensitive now than it was then, but it was very sensitive then.  
Although I did a lot of background briefing of the press and I knew all the Brussels-based 
journalists pretty well, I never did public diplomacy there or indeed much back at home.  I 
was not encouraged to.  
The minute I went to the United Nations in New York, where there was a five-hour time 
difference, a different tone, and where the Gulf War was brewing up and happening, I was 
urged by Ministers to be on television as often as possible.  I was also urged speak as often 
as possible to the journalists outside the Security Council.  You have these contrasts, which 
it is absolutely crucial for any ambassador to understand and respond to.  However, public 
diplomacy has become much more important, and certainly ambassadors to the United 
Nations are now expected to do a great deal of television work.  This probably would not 
have occurred fifty or sixty years ago. 
Q298   Baroness Hussein-Ece: Just following on, do you think our embassies are 
sufficiently proactive in promoting British foreign policy in terms of the soft power that we 
are interested in, or do you think they can get rather tied up in responding to the wide 
range of demands?  I think it was Sir Antony who mentioned a mini-Whitehall.  The demands 
are getting wider and wider ranging, and perhaps the soft-power element can get rather lost 
in all these demands.  In the Bangladeshi example that Lord Jay gave earlier, you have a very 
large diaspora here in the UK with different demands and different ideas.  This community 
certainly responds very vociferously to a lot of things they think the British Government 
should be doing and perhaps things they think they have not done.  Where does the soft 
power lie in all those different demands?   
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Lord Jay of Ewelme:  The answer to your question of whether embassies are good at this is 
that some embassies are very good at it and some embassies are probably not as good as 
they should be.  However, if you are a young, or even not so young, and bright ambassador 
or high commissioner and you speak the language, you want to be out there.  You want to 
be travelling the country, getting on the airwaves, getting on the television, and promoting 
the British Council, the universities, or those aspects of Britain other than those coming 
from the government departments.  That is what makes the job interesting. At least, that 
was my experience.  I think you will find more and more that is what people do, because 
their motivation is to do that.  Do they all do it?  Not all of them.   
There are some countries in the world where security and other considerations make it 
very difficult to get out in the way people would like to.  You are rather forced into almost a 
laager and tend to be dealing more with what comes from London because that is the most 
important thing for that country.  However, anybody in that position would be longing to get 
out of it and to be getting around the country and promoting soft power.  
Sir Antony Acland: If you define soft power as I have tried to, all these contacts with people 
from different walks of life presenting their image of Britain is soft power that happens.  As I 
said, all these people made contact with the embassy and got some guidance and so on.  
Certainly, when I was in America, I did not aim to go to every State of the Union but I went 
to most of them to talk about what Britain stood for.  I tried to represent Britain in a wider 
sense, on issues such as the rule of law or human rights—all the important things we stood 
for—and present the image of Britain that could be absorbed by people.  In America, of 
course, in the Mid West they had very little idea of what Britain was like, and I think you 
could use a certain amount of soft power with them.   
Baroness Nicholson of Winterbourne: The United Kingdom is one of the rare net 
contributors to the European Union, and is a founder member of the Council of Europe.  
Yet we have at this moment a somewhat diminishing number—almost invisible in one case—
of senior staff there.  Have we decided that it is really not worth the game, not really worth 
bothering, and that we are better putting our limited energies in a different position?  Or is 
that merely something that the Foreign Office should address but maybe does not have the 
capacity or the budget at the moment to deal with?  
The Chairman: That is a question that is going to hang in the air for five minutes, because I 
am afraid we all have to go and vote.  I do apologise, but that is the way things are.  In five 
minutes we will resume. 
 
Sitting suspended for a Division in the House.  
 
Q299    The Chairman: The rest of our members seem to have got lost in their work, so 
we will start again.  Baroness Nicholson’s question is hanging in the air, which is about the 
quality and input of our staff to the EU.  However, there is a broader question behind it, 
which is about the degree of diplomatic penetration into all the new international 
organisations that have sprung up in the last 20 years—or, indeed, in the last 10 years.  How 
do the panel feel about the quality of our current representation in all the new organisations, 
not just the EU? 
Lord Hannay of Chiswick: The situation in the EU is very bad indeed.  In 1973, we started 
with roughly our population share of staff at every level, because they were recruited  from 
outside without the need for competitive exams and such like.  It is quite clear that this was 
sustained for many years by rather good programmes to encourage people, i.e. the Fast 
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Track programme to go to the European institutions and so on.  That seems to have all 
withered on the bough in recent years.  Now we are in a situation where the number of 
people of British nationality in the institutions is far below the population share. 
That is a really serious problem, not just now but far more in the future.  Like all 
bureaucracies, at the EU you go in at the bottom and you hopefully end up at the top.  The 
number of people who get in at the bottom determines the number of people who end up 
at the top some 30 years later.  Not only are we losing influence now, we are storing up 
decades of loss of influence in the future if we do not do something about it. 
I believe the Foreign and Commonwealth Office is trying to do something about it now.  It is 
not entirely their fault.  It is partly, of course, due to the appalling language skills in British 
schools and universities.  To get into the European institutions you are required to speak at 
least one language very well and a second or third language reasonably well.  There are not 
many British people who do that.  That is part of the problem.  The institutions themselves 
are very reluctant to accept that there is a problem in this imbalance.  During this uncertain 
period, when the issue of a referendum in 2017 is hanging over everyone—of course, that 
cannot possibly help recruitment, because who, starting their career, would set off to 
Brussels now, knowing that their career might come to a sudden end in 2017? I have 
suggested and will continue to suggest that at the very least they should provide what 
existed when we first joined, which was a return ticket for any civil servant who went and 
worked in the European institutions.  That is to say that you would be guaranteed to get a 
place in the British Civil Service if your place in the EU Civil Service was terminated for 
reasons totally beyond your control.  That would help a little. 
However, it is a serious problem.  For the other organisations, it is a bit less easy to 
generalise.  There tend to be, in the UN system, a lot of British people who have been there 
for many, many years and have often risen to quite high positions.  We are reasonably well 
represented, but we do not have proper overall sight of these things in Whitehall.  There 
needs to be some better planning and strategising about how we ensure that people of 
British nationality are getting a reasonable proportion of the jobs in these very important 
organisations, which often apply rules-based systems from which we benefit but also to 
which we are subject. 
Q300   The Chairman: I am going to stick with the staffing issue for a moment.  We have 
just heard from Lord Jay that embassies are the thing of the future. There has to be 
tremendous busyness and contacts through embassies.  Do we have enough staff to do that?  
Are we not scattering our embassy firepower through rather small micro-embassies all over 
the place?  It may be a good thing—it probably is a good thing—that everyone is in the 
network, but that means one-man and two-man embassies have to undertake the kind of 
increasingly onerous jobs Lord Jay was describing.  There is a shortage there.  Now we hear 
that we are short of people across the new international institutions, which are springing up 
around where the power and wealth is, which is increasingly Asia and Africa, where we want 
to be involved.  Now we are hearing that we are short of people in the EU.  Are we 
beginning to look at a need for a whole step change upwards in the recruiting and 
mobilisation of our diplomatic resource? 
Lord Jay of Ewelme: There is a risk of our being so short staffed that we cannot properly 
serve all the places we believe we should have our embassies in.  I worry slightly about what 
I understand the policy is at the moment of cutting back on people going out from London 
and depending more on local staff in a lot of our embassies.  You need to have people from 
London there, and they are not going to be good diplomats if they have not had the training 
earlier on in their career in lower positions in embassies.  I worry about that.  There is a 
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genuine question as to whether we have enough staff now involved in the Diplomatic Service 
to carry out the policies the Government would like us to.  That is a very important point to 
focus on. 
If I could follow up on what David was saying, I very much agree with him.  If you take as a 
premise that our interest lies in shaping the international institutions to which we belong to 
further our interest, which I do, we need to have our people in them, helping shape them in 
that way.  There does need to be a more coherent look at this, not just in the EU but across 
the board.  Perhaps that is something which the NSC, which is looking at all this, can do, but 
somewhere in London there needs to be somebody thinking, “Do we have the right people, 
and do we have enough people in the institutions to which we belong so we can shape them 
to our interest?”. 
The Chairman: Lord Janvrin, I know we have rather gone into your question. 
Lord Janvrin: I apologise for the delay.  Did you get on to the Commonwealth? 
The Chairman: No, we have not mentioned the Commonwealth, which I am always happy 
to mention.  There is one more institution that has a very light interface with our own 
personnel.  We have had one or two personnel from Britain in it.  There are those who say 
the Commonwealth network is at least a gateway to all the great, important markets of the 
future.  Is this some other area where we should be encouraging higher quality staff to get 
involved?  Is that something any of you have feelings on? 
Sir Antony Acland: The Commonwealth is important for a whole variety of reasons.  As 
you say, it is some of the largest countries, with huge power for trade and all that.  It is also 
a way in which Britain can influence more countries in a favourable way, which is what the 
Prime Minister has been trying to do at the present Commonwealth Heads of Government 
Meeting, talking about human rights and the rule of law.  If we trade in countries, it is really 
important that traders know there is a legal set-up where, if they get into difficulties, they 
can have recourse to it.  Through something like the Commonwealth, that word can be 
effectively spread. 
Certainly, when I was head of the Diplomatic Service, on the whole the Foreign Office paid 
proper attention to the Commonwealth and the Commonwealth Secretariat.  We were all 
involved in their activities.  Of course, there was a very senior Deputy Secretary-General in 
the shape of Humphrey Maud, who died the other day, who was extremely effective.  One 
should not lose sight of this large grouping of countries where we can use our soft power to 
spread human rights, the rule of law and proper principles around effectively.  
The Chairman: I am going to slightly switch and ask Baroness Armstrong to move from 
machinery to substance, because we have had witnesses telling us the marvellous things we 
are doing in the field of sport and culture, and we have had witnesses telling us we have not 
been so marvellous when it comes to earning our bread and butter or even looking after our 
security.  Particularly on the trade side, other countries seem to have got there first when it 
comes to the new markets.  Are we using our soft and smart-power weapons as we should?  
Baroness Armstrong, do take over. 
Q301  Baroness Armstrong of Hill Top: We were really interested in what you think 
the most important current threats to UK influence abroad are.  Where do you see those 
coming from? 
Sir Antony Acland: I will have a go, but I am sure the others will do it better.  The threat 
comes from our major competitors, particularly in the trading field: Germany, France and 
now, very much, China.  If you think of China operating around the world, particularly in 
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Africa, there they are doing a lot in the way of infrastructure, building roads and so on, and 
gaining enormously as a result—getting their hands on raw materials and oil and so on.  That 
is where our competition is. 
We have to be good enough to compete to earn our bread and butter, as the 
Lord Chairman said, in these countries, particularly the developing countries of Asia.  We 
must pay great attention to India, China and more to Latin America, to Brazil, Argentina and 
to the developing countries, which are developing quite quickly in parts of Africa.  That is 
what I would see as competition. 
There are particular awful threats like terrorism, which could upset a lot of our activities if 
there were a terrible terrorist threat somewhere, but in the broad sense I see it as 
competing with these other large countries, which are trying to do exactly the same as we 
are trying to do: to use their influence, their soft power, to gain rewards for themselves. 
Lord Hannay of Chiswick: Answering your question directly, the greatest threat I would 
see is the threat we might withdraw from the European Union.  You lose two forms of soft 
power that way: the first form of soft power is the soft power we have within the 
European Union: that is to say, shaping the laws and the decisions that are taken in Brussels, 
whether that is for the single market or anything else you might like to think of in the wide 
range of issues that are covered in Brussels. We would lose that.  We might keep our access 
to the single market from outside, but we will have no say in the policy decisions that are 
taken about how that single market is run.  At the moment, we have a big say.  We do not 
have a determining say in all cases, because the decisions are taken by qualified majority.  If 
you look at the statistics, last year Britain was in the majority in 55 decisions and voted 
against five.  On the whole, that is a lot of soft power. 
The other part of soft power we would lose if we withdrew from the European Union is the 
soft power the European Union has in international negotiations.  That could be in trade 
policy, where negotiations with Japan, the United States or Canada are conducted on behalf 
of the European Union, greatly to our benefit.  As you have seen, the Government have 
enormously welcomed the moves in that direction.  However, we would be outside that. 
We would not be involved in that any more.  We would have to look after ourselves and we 
would be lower in importance to the United States, Japan or Canada than the rest of the EU, 
with which they would still be negotiating. 
This also includes other things.  Look at the Ukraine now.  Would we be exercising any 
influence over the rule of law, human rights and democracy in the Ukraine as Britain?  The 
answer is no, not much.  As the European Union, you can see the influence.  Switch on the 
television set and you can see a large number of people in the Ukraine are saying that their 
Government’s policy of looking more towards Russia and less towards the European Union 
is the wrong policy.  Look at the Iranian deal that was done at the weekend.  It was really 
managed by the EU three, supported by the rest of the EU, because it was neither an 
American policy nor a Russian and Chinese policy.  The policy of sanctions plus diplomacy 
was the European policy.  A lot of that would be at risk, frankly, which is why I say that is the 
biggest risk. 
I agree entirely with what Antony has said about how, in the bilateral and commercial field, it 
is our competitors, and of course that includes other members of the European Union. 
Baroness Armstrong of Hill Top: Lord Jay will have a different perspective, I suspect. 
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Lord Jay of Ewelme: I agree entirely with what David and Antony said about the clear 
threats that come from terrorism or from war breaking out somewhere.  Clearly, part of 
our soft power is working to ensure that does not happen. 
Baroness Armstrong of Hill Top: I was going to say it is to stop that, yes. 
Lord Jay of Ewelme: That is hugely important, although it is something we have not been 
talking about.  The other point is that what you have characterised as threats I would regard 
as opportunities.  We can talk about the threat to our trading position from China, Brazil or 
India, but that actually ought to be a huge opportunity for us.  I sometimes worry that the 
focus on the concept of threat shows a lack of confidence about our ability to pursue our 
interests and realise the opportunities that are there.  We need to start looking at it in that 
sense: what do we need to do here or through our embassies to ensure that we can fulfil 
the opportunities there are before us?  That leads us back into some of the things we have 
been talking about: having a strong UKTI and having the right people in international 
institutions in order to pursue our interests.  I tend to look at it as opportunity rather than 
threat. 
The Chairman: That puts it in a very good way and it is not far from our minds either, 
because obviously the EU is our neighbourhood; the bulk of our exports go there and so on.  
The EU has had some problems, as everyone has to concede, but what we keep being told 
by witnesses is that the big growth—the fast generation of wealth and investment funds and 
the big new markets—is shaping up elsewhere.  That has been the language of the American 
rather crude commentary: the rest is catching up with and, indeed, overtaking the West.  
Are we geared into that scene? 
Lord Jay of Ewelme: There is no reason that we should not be.  It is a real mistake to think 
of these as alternatives or options.  We ought to be realising our economic potential within 
the European Union and using our influence within the European Union to ensure that 
markets are opened elsewhere in the world, because that suits our exporters as well, and 
we should be developing links with the big growing economies so that we are exporting to 
them. 
I have never been able to understand the argument one sometimes hears that these are 
somehow in opposition to each other.  There is no reason why we should not fulfil them 
both, it seems to me. 
Q302   The Chairman: I am sure that is the right approach.  We have to get to grips with 
some of the evidence.  We can operate through the great power of Europe—it is a huge and 
powerful bloc—but when we arrive in certain markets we find others have got there first 
and the others are the people who are supposed to be our partners in the European Union.  
How do we catch up with German, Italian, French, Dutch and Belgian competition in these 
new markets? 
Lord Hannay of Chiswick: We have to become more competitive.  In the end, embassies 
and ambassadors do not win contracts, businessmen win contracts.  British business has to 
be competitive to win contracts.  As we know, at various stages in the past 70 or 80 years, 
we have been very uncompetitive and there have often been moments when the 
Government have said, “Why is it that the Diplomatic Service cannot redress this balance?”  
It cannot redress the imbalance of basic uncompetitivity.  Getting the economy right and 
getting the investment going in at home is absolutely essential.  We will not be able to 
redress the balance otherwise.  We will not be able to win a bigger share of the Chinese 
market.  The Germans did not win their share by cheating; they won their share by being 
competitive. 
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Q303  Baroness Nicholson of Winterbourne: Going back to the European Union’s 
influence and particularly the EEAS, there is a window of opportunity, as I perceive it now, 
for Britain to be well further than primus inter pares in respect of Tehran.  Certainly, this 
could be the case with regard to the EU and the wider Europe, most of the world and 
perhaps even, or with the exception of, the USA as well.  We are much closer to the 
Iranians both historically and actually. Therefore, we have an opportunity.  How do you see 
the Foreign Office gearing up to use that opportunity, so that we can get ahead of everybody 
else before they start to try to catch up? 
Lord Jay of Ewelme: I agree with your premise.  When I was in Tehran, I was very struck 
about how, in a curious kind of way, people seem to be looking at the Americans as British 
stooges. It is a very odd feeling.  There are huge potential links and potential assets there.  It 
comes back partly to what I was saying earlier on: we need to have an embassy there as 
soon as we feel it is secure to have one, and I hope that will be very soon.  We need to have 
really good staff there, and through soft power, which is what we are talking about, we need 
to be working really hard to exert our influence and build on what we have had in the past.   
Also, something we have not talked about yet, but I hope we can, that I should mention is 
the role of universities and education.  This is hugely important in getting the young leaders 
of tomorrow into British universities now and getting British universities setting up in 
countries abroad where we have a terrific amount to export.  This seems to me to be a 
market in which we ought to do that. 
Baroness Nicholson of Winterbourne: Narrowing the question a fraction more, as a 
supplementary, how should the Foreign Office do that, given that we are all meant to be part 
of the EU, the G8 and all sorts of different blocs?  How do you see the Foreign Office as 
being able to push Britain first? 
Lord Jay of Ewelme: I do not see any conflict of interest in being a member of the EU and 
putting Britain first, to be honest.  I would have thought we should have an embassy in 
Tehran, it should be properly staffed, and we should be acting on the influence we have 
exerted through the Foreign Secretary, and—through Cathy Ashton, as a Briton, playing her 
role. 
Q304  Baroness Nicholson of Winterbourne: You are suggesting that the FCO is not 
as fully and completely well staffed as you would like to see.  What is the next step? 
Lord Jay of Ewelme: I am not saying it is not sufficiently well staffed to be able to staff a 
really good embassy in Tehran.  That seems to be such a high priority now that it would do 
that.  My concern is the peripheries.  You have embassies that are really not achieving a huge 
amount. You have one or two people and a very high cost for protecting them.  The 
question I ask myself is this: might it not be better not to have those and to have the people 
in the places that really do matter to us, like Tehran? 
Sir Antony Acland: There is a question of priority there, is there not?  Obviously, funds are 
short. Every government department is being cut down and it is very difficult to make ends 
meet.  However, the priority must now be—I think of when Michael and I were there—
seeing the possibilities and openings in the situation in Tehran.  We would have said, “Let us 
get together experts, people who speak Farsi, to go out there and form an embassy, even if 
we have to take them away from somewhere else”.  I think that would happen. I am terribly 
out of date, but I imagine that it would be happening now.   
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Baroness Nicholson of Winterbourne: This is the exact example: is the Foreign Office 
in a position to be able to galvanise and co-ordinate, with strength and authority, UKTI, say, 
DfID and the British Council for Iran?  That is perhaps the key point. 
Lord Jay of Ewelme: There is no reason at all why it should not.  I went to 50 or 60 
embassies around the world when I was Permanent Secretary and I saw some that were 
incredibly effective.  You had someone like Ann Grant, who was our high commissioner in 
South Africa, who was extraordinarily good in getting together the entire British effort there 
in pursuit of British interests.  She was highly effective.  You went to some places where it 
was not as effective.  I would think, however, that Iran is going to be such an important 
embassy for us over the next few years that the Foreign Office should be putting real 
pressure and emphasis on getting the right people there, and there is no reason why it 
should not be able to do that. 
The Chairman: I certainly do not want to get into an in or out argument about the 
European Union, but we need some guidance on how we ride two horses, as it were.  You 
have just said that if things go right, as we hope, Iran is a vast and highly sophisticated 
country with huge resources and we want to be in there.  However, the EEAS will have an 
embassy there as well.  This is quite a tricky business, is it not, to try to make best use both 
of our own interdependent relations and our existence as a member of the EU?  How we do 
it? 
Lord Jay of Ewelme: It should not be difficult.  Perhaps I have been influenced by spending 
nine years in France and going to Paris quite a lot at the moment, but the French do not 
have any hang-ups about being a member of the European Union and promoting their own 
interest, and I honestly do not see why we should either. 
The Chairman: Can we learn from them? 
Lord Jay of Ewelme: We may be able to. 
Lord Hannay of Chiswick: We may be able to learn from them by not making things into 
either/or choices. The French do not. 
Lord Jay of Ewelme: Exactly, we can do both. 
Q305  Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: I want to try something different, a long shot, because 
our witnesses have concentrated on their professional experience, but you have a lot of 
experience in a whole range of other things.  We are looking for something new to suggest, 
some new way of approaching things.  Michael mentioned universities and education. I 
wondered whether each of you had some idea that has not been tried before, which in our 
report we might suggest could be looked at for improving the United Kingdom’s influence 
abroad.  This might not be in your professional capacity but in sport, music, art and the 
whole range of other things you are involved in. 
Lord Hannay of Chiswick: Surely, you do not want to lose sight of the tried and trusted 
instruments we already have: the British Council, the BBC World Service, British 
universities.  These are what you might say are the great export industries of soft power, 
and we are good at them.  In the past, we have proved we are good at them. 
In business terms, surely you would invest in things that you are good at and ensure that 
they have all the resources to make you even better in the future.  I gave the Committee 
some written evidence on this point: I would argue that we need to be looking very carefully 
at the switch of the BBC World Service to not being financed from the Foreign Office vote, 
which in a way is a plus, because you can no longer say it is the tool of the 
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British Government. It never was, of course, but that is what people thought, because it was 
financed on the Foreign Office’s budget. 
Now it is going to be financed on the BBC’s own single budget.  Are they going to provide it 
with enough resources?  I do not know.  I have looked at the arrangements that have been 
suggested and they seem remarkably flimsy to me.  I would have thought it is absolutely 
essential that we have a BBC World Service that is not only good now but is capable of 
reacting rapidly when something like the Arab spring comes along and there is a need to 
double the amount of broadcasting you do to Arab countries. 
The same is true for the British Council and universities.  As you know, there is a tension 
now between the Government’s policy of limiting immigration and making it more and more 
difficult for people to get visas, and the pent-up demand of students from emerging 
countries, which, I entirely agree with Michael, are the seed corn of our future soft power.  
These are people who come here, spend their university time here, go back and never 
forget it.  That is with them for the rest of their lives, and that is very important. 
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: Some British universities and some of the independent 
schools are establishing campuses overseas.  Is that a positive way of enhancing British soft 
power? 
Lord Jay of Ewelme: It can be, very much so.  Last year, I was in a city called Ningbo, which 
is about four hours’ drive south of Shanghai.  It is a city of about 6 million people.  In the 
middle of it, there is a replica of Nottingham University campus—the building.  There are 
very large numbers of Chinese there, many of them affluent, and there are quite a large 
number of people from Nottingham University as well.  If well managed, this seems to me to 
be an extraordinarily powerful model, and there is a similar one I went to subsequently just 
outside Kuala Lumpur.  Other universities are doing the same. 
I do not know whether this would be for the Foreign Office or the 
Department for Education.  If one is looking to the future and saying, “Where do we want 
to be in five, 10 or 15 years’ time?”, we need to ask what our universities are doing in which 
countries of the world.  Where should we be hoping they are going to set up?  How can we 
in some way get them to think about this, not always in competition with each other? How 
that could be a way of promotion British influence?  Answering your question, Lord Foulkes, 
that is one area where I would put my finger. 
Q306  Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: That is very helpful.  We are getting some evidence 
that one of the problems about students coming over here is the difficulty of getting a visa. 
Lord Jay of Ewelme: Yes. 
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: They have to go to other countries to get visas and they are 
finding it very expensive and very difficult.  In your experience, is that creating problems? 
Sir Antony Acland: It has recently been made easier for Chinese people to come here, has 
it not?  That is a very good thing. 
Baroness Armstrong of Hill Top: It is in train. 
Sir Antony Acland: It is not for us to say what you should put in your report, but I would 
hope that you would say that the mechanisms already exist in the British Council.  When I 
was in Spain, for example, the British Council played an enormous part in teaching Spaniards 
English.  They had a huge English-teaching programme, which was enormously appreciated 
and very effective.  Again, because the Spanish learnt English, they adopted British culture 
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and a friendship with Britain.  It is there: the BBC World Service and the universities and the 
schools.  That should be emphasised.  It is not for us to say, but I hope it would be. 
Lord Hannay of Chiswick: Students, researchers and academics coming over here are of 
course where we get the biggest economic benefit.  We get less economic benefit from 
putting campuses abroad than we do from that.  On the first aspect there are plenty of 
reports, including one from my own Committee, the EU Sub-Committee on Home Affairs, 
Health and Education, which you could easily drawn upon.  Four Committees in the House 
of Commons and the House of Lords all recommended that the Government should stop 
treating students as economic migrants for public policy purposes.  They arrive here with 
large amounts of ready cash in their hands and they provide employment in this country, 
often in cities where British universities are the biggest employer.  In places like Birmingham 
or Canterbury, they are the biggest employer.  There is something to be said there. I hope it 
will be said. 
Lord Jay of Ewelme: To answer the question about what other things could be done, it 
would certainly be very helpful if our larger embassies could all be asked, “What do you 
think are the real levers of influence on policy in this country over the next five years?  How 
would you like to see the various levers that you have available to you brought together in 
order to maximise the influence that we can exert?”.  How are those levers going to change?  
How is technology going to change?  There is no reason to suppose that technology over 
the next five years will be any less dramatic in its change than over the last five years.  How 
is this likely to change?  How do we use this to our advantage and, with any luck, get ahead 
of our competitors? 
The Chairman: Your answers really are very useful, because you really have opened up 
the original question that I asked in a most helpful way.  I am going to ask Baroness Goudie 
to ask one question and then Baroness Hussein-Ece.  I am then going to try to bring things 
to a halt. We would like to go on a long way, but we have other things on our schedules. 
Q307  Baroness Goudie: My question really comes from where you see our influence in 
other regions.  We have talked about the big countries and we have talked about the EU, 
both of which, I agree with members of the Committee, are vital.  Where else, however, do 
you see we should be looking to influence for trade?  Could we perhaps look at where we 
should be taking DfID down this road?  I know you are entirely separate, but I also feel the 
Foreign Office’s influence on DfID is quite important.  There is also culture, but I would like 
to see where else you feel we should also be trying to have influence, because they will be 
the further emerging markets.  As we know, there are many more countries that people do 
not even know exist. We should also be looking at those. 
The Chairman: It is a very good question, because obviously in the general political 
discussion there is a feeling of slight imbalance between the enormous resources of DfID 
and the somewhat limited resources of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and other 
internationally involved departments.  Do we have that balance right?  That is the question 
behind that.   
Lord Hannay of Chiswick: As you know, I have spoken in the House many times in support 
of the commitment to 0.7% of GNI and the size of the DfID budget.  That is a major 
development of Britain’s soft power in terms of actual economic development, if the money 
is properly spent and does not go into the wrong pockets.  That is going to have a long-term 
benefit.  It also has benefit, however, in the sense of Britain’s positioning amongst the aid 
donors.  This is reflected in the Prime Minister having been asked to chair the commission 
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that was set up to prepare the next Millennium Development Goals, the post-2015 
Millennium Development Goals. 
That is good, but I do worry a bit about the way in which over the years the separation 
between DfID and the Foreign Office has become too stark.  There has not been enough 
recognition that they are actually working for the same organisation, called UK Inc.  They 
are not working for two different organisations.  I wonder whether enough is done to co-
ordinate.  I know they have done some good things with the Ministry of Defence in building 
up the pool for conflict prevention.  There they have learnt a lot of the lessons of Bosnia, 
Kosovo and so on.  We were not properly co-ordinated and were unable to move quickly 
enough when a situation began to get out of control in a country that mattered.  The 
balance clearly cannot be putting DfID under the Foreign Office. That is not sensible either.  
DfID has very substantial sums of money at its disposal and will continue to have those at its 
disposal as long as the 0.7% target is retained.  We should be thinking a bit more strategically 
about how this is deployed, and I wonder whether that is being done properly. 
Sir Antony Acland: There used to be a Minister of State in the Foreign Office responsible 
for aid.  I wonder whether it would not be a good thing to go back to that. 
Lord Hannay of Chiswick: That was when it was completely subordinate. 
Sir Antony Acland: It should not be completely subordinate, but to have a ministerial link 
might be no bad thing. 
Lord Jay of Ewelme: I have worked in DfID as a separate organisation and DfID as part of 
the Foreign Office, and the Foreign Office when separate from DfID.  I am clear in my own 
mind that they should be separate organisations, but they need to work closely together, 
because they need to be pursuing the same broad overall foreign policy objectives.  That is 
doable.   
The answer I would give to the question is Africa.  If one is talking about how we can get 
ahead of the competition in the future, let us start focusing on Africa not as a basket case, as 
it is sometimes portrayed, but in fact as a continent that is taking a huge amount of British 
exports.  In many countries—in South Africa, Nigeria, Zambia, Tanzania and Malawi—it is 
showing an ability to grow very remarkably.  There is an area of the world on which it would 
be good for the Government as a whole, and not just DfID, to be putting a lot of emphasis. 
The Chairman: Do we have the new diplomatic resources with the new skills and the new 
wider compass of duties and responsibilities to do that?  That is what worries us. 
Lord Jay of Ewelme: Quite possibly we do not.  I am quite certain that the right priority is 
to say, “What do we need to do in order to promote British interests around the world in 
the bits that matter to us over the next five, 10 or 15 years?  In order to do that, what are 
the resources we need?”, rather than saying, “These are the resources, and because the 
resources have been cut we are going to have to cut back on our objectives”. 
Sir Antony Acland: You have to pick the winners, have you not?  You have to focus on the 
countries in Africa that are going to develop.  We cannot be everywhere. We do not have 
the resources for that.  We have to focus on the winners. 
The Chairman: Yes, the likely winners may be shifting, with the vast revolutions in energy 
and in consumer power, with the great growth in markets as large as Europe and in Asia 
now.  It is very hard to pick those winners, is it not? 
Lord Hannay of Chiswick: It is not all that hard in the one you mention, which is energy.  
Once a country clearly has large oil and gas resources, first of all it ought to be British 
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companies that are in there operating and selling all sorts of equipment for the development 
of those; nowadays you are not allowed to own these things.  You can also be quite sure 
that countries like that are going to have more disposable resources to import than 
countries that are not so blessed.  That is quite a long-term prospect.  The fact that, for 
example, vast amounts of gas have been found in Mozambique would seem to point the fact 
that although Mozambique is currently one of the poorest countries in the world, it may not 
be that forever. 
The Chairman: That is very shrewd and very true. 
Q308   Baroness Hussein-Ece: You have already started to answer the question I was 
going to ask.  We have already mentioned Africa and Iran.  The question I was going to ask 
was which countries and regions should be the focus of the United Kingdom’s foreign policy 
and whether this focus has changed over the years during your time at the FCO.  You have 
already started to talk about Africa, quite rightly, and Iran.  Lord Jay mentioned how Africa 
has been considered for many years or decades as a basket case.  That is shifting, is it not?   
Lord Jay of Ewelme: It is shifting, yes.  We need to be thinking about it as a continent that 
has enormous potential in resources and trade in both directions, where we can make a 
difference.  I would put that quite high up our list of priorities. 
Baroness Goudie: We see in parts of Africa that China has bought up parts of Nigeria and 
other countries.  This is not meant to be a trick question: how do you see us forming policy 
about how we could work with China in some of these countries?  They have also been 
buying up food for food security.  There are other issues, as well. 
Lord Hannay of Chiswick: In the area of DfID’s work and development, there is a real 
potential to work with the new emerging countries that are just beginning to become 
donors, like India, Brazil or China.  They do not have huge financial resources in their aid 
budgets.  They often have a lot of experience of pulling large numbers of people out of 
poverty, for example Brazil.  They could very possibly work with us.  I know DfID has done 
some work in this field, but it could be given greater encouragement to do this.  In the 
future, we should be not thinking of an aid budget in mercantilist terms but of how we can 
use the fact that we are providing aid to increase our soft power by working with some of 
the big emerging powers, which may in fact welcome having us work with them. 
Baroness Goudie: Do you mean partnerships? 
Lord Hannay of Chiswick: Yes. 
Baroness Goudie: Partnerships are very good.  It is about having joint resources, rather 
than the same people doing the same thing. 
Lord Hannay of Chiswick: Yes. 
Lord Jay of Ewelme: Sudan is a very good example of that.  It was clear to the British 
Government a couple of years ago that the Chinese had real influence in Khartoum.  They 
also had influence in Juba, and we have been working with them to try to get China not just 
to see North and South Sudan as places from which to extract resources but that it is in 
their interest that there should be a peaceful resolution of conflict there.    
Q309   Lord Ramsbotham: I am reflecting on what you are saying, particularly going back 
to Africa.  In Kenya, they discovered oil up in Turkana.  There have been strikes there.  The 
high commissioner was concerned that DfID was out there and that it was not doing 
anything in contact with him, but it was proposing some small educational development up 
there, which was out of tune with Turkana and nothing, really, to do with the development 
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of oil.  He talked about how much better it would have been if there had been a general 
Kenya policy and the power of DfID’s bank balance, as it were, had been applied to that and 
linked to the development of finding oil in Turkana, which will need help to get it out to a 
place from which it can be exported. 
Lord Jay of Ewelme: That is exactly what should be happening and exactly what a 
head of mission should be ensuring happens, in my view. 
Sir Antony Acland: He must have an aid officer with him in the high commission in Kenya, 
surely. 
Lord Ramsbotham: The director-general of DfID was out there sorting that out. 
Lord Hannay of Chiswick: In recent years, there has been a tendency—Michael will 
probably know this more than I do—for the aid missions to be more and more separate 
from the embassies.  That is probably a tendency that needs to be readjusted back a bit 
without falling into the trap of simply saying that aid is just a way of doing foreign policy. 
That would not be wise either.  There is some happy medium between the two, however, 
and I am actually not sure we have quite got to it yet. 
The Chairman: We have kept you a long time.  I was going to say that it has been hugely 
enjoyable but it has certainly been hugely illuminating.  I am going to end on a slightly more 
trivial note.  There was a mention earlier that the news from Canberra and Brisbane is not 
frightfully good at the moment, but we have had evidence before this Committee about the 
news of cricket mania growing in Shanghai, where the fast bowlers from China are going to 
devastate the world, and in Afghanistan, which is leaping up the cricket league.  It does 
indicate that sport has a soft-power drive behind it, and of course it is a game that we are 
the experts at and we invented.  Maybe we can improve British soft-power influence through 
that as well. 
Thank you very much indeed.  We would like to go on, but as usual we are constrained by 
the time.  We are extremely grateful to you for taking time to come and share your 
experience and wisdom with us.  Thank you very much. 
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Q187   The Chairman: Your Excellencies and Chargé d’Affaires, we are extremely 
grateful to all of you for coming to this Committee this afternoon to share with us some 
thoughts on a very large and important issue but one that is often not fully understood. The 
remit of this Committee, as we are a British Committee and a British Parliament, is to look 
at our own country’s overseas influence and deployment of soft power. A great many books 
have been written on what soft power is, on how it should be deployed, on whether it is 
growing as an element in the whole diplomacy and international relations, and no doubt 
there will be many more books to come.  
If I may, I will first put to each of you the basic question: what is your understanding of the 
concept? How does it fit into your country’s foreign influence? You might have some 
examples of how your own nation is investing in deploying and considering the development 
of its soft power influence. That is the first and basic question.  
Could I start from my left, your right? Your Excellency, I see that Brazil has been described 
in a newspaper article as the first great soft-power nation. Of course, journalists will say 
anything, but how do you feel about that? 
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Mr Roberto Jaguaribe: First of all, thank you very much, my Lord Chairman. It is an honour 
for me to be representing my country here. You have set up, as usual, a very intriguing and 
useful instrument for debating soft power in Parliament, which is, as we were saying outside, 
something that we do not have in our own parliaments but something on which we might 
follow your lead once again, because it can be a useful instrument.  
Coming to your question, I think that Brazil has perhaps been occasionally recognised as the 
first big soft power because we do not have hard power, so it is easier to identify as a 
country that concentrates on one dimension. What do we perceive as the essence of soft 
power? This is a complex issue, but ultimately—of course I run the risk of simplification—it 
is the capacity to generate and to shape perceptions. You are building, either voluntarily or 
through an historical, cultural process, the capacity to generate images that are ultimately 
going to favour decisions that are going to be taken on the basis of the image and the 
perceptions that you generate. This can be carried out by different means. There is the 
attractiveness issue. There is the role model issue. There are a number of areas of impact 
where perceptions are shaped, such as the environment, humanitarian issues, human rights, 
food security, global governance, internal governance, and political behaviour internally. All 
that is helpful in determining the perception that you generate. 
The Chairman: Ambassador, I am going to have to rudely interrupt you for a 
parliamentary reason, which I can only apologise for: we have all suddenly been called to 
vote and I am going to have to suspend the session for five minutes. Then we want you to 
continue exactly where we left off. As I say, I can only apologise; it is the way our Parliament 
works. 
 
Sitting suspended for a Division in the House. 
 
Q188   The Chairman: My apologies Ambassadors, but that is the way it seems to work 
in this place. Your Excellency, Ambassador to Brazil Mr Jaguaribe, you were giving us a very 
lucid explanation. Please continue. 
Mr Roberto Jaguaribe: Thank you very much. As I was saying, for us, the essence of soft 
power is the capacity to generate and to shape perceptions, and ultimately to set agendas. In 
the case of Brazil, this is a forming issue. We have many strengths as well as a number of 
weaknesses in this respect, but ultimately we have been able to increase our visibility 
because, as I said, we are exuberant really only in soft power. As you may know, Brazil has 
been at peace with our neighbours for the past 140 years. We have a very keen interest in 
the inter-integration process in the region, and we have been able to generate good will 
around. This is an issue that we will perhaps pick up a little later during our conversation.  
To focus for now on the issue at hand, we think that essentially this capacity to influence 
derives from a number of issues that are related, as I said, to the attractiveness that you can 
be perceived as having and to being a role model on several important issues. The cultural 
dimension, the sports dimension—all that generates a good impact. 
It is curious to see that many of the important elements of soft power cannot really be 
harnessed by government. If there are attempts to harness them they will probably lose 
some of their effectiveness. Hollywood, for instance, is an enormous source of soft power, 
but if the White House or Congress controlled it it would immediately lose its appeal 
globally. Sometimes it is wise to leave things as they are. At other times there are a lot of 
things to do. 
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I will make one final remark. There has been enormous variation, and the world today is 
much more complex than it used to be. There are more relevant actors. There is the so-
called emerging group of countries, which Brazil is part of. The emerging countries are doing 
very well, but in one thing they are still emerging, and this is where the UK excels. 
Ultimately one of the essences of soft power is generating information. The UK is an 
enormous generator of information that is consumed worldwide. Of course, one must not 
confuse data with information. The UK is a big absorber and processor of data and a 
generator of information. Information, even when it does not try to, always has an 
ideological component. This is spread and consumed throughout the world. The UK has an 
enormous amount of soft power in many dimensions, but this is a fundamental one. Of 
course, this is derived from another point which I have not referred to but which is 
fundamental: the English language, which is the global language of communications today. 
Therefore the UK has a privileged position. This is true not only of the UK, obviously, but it 
does have a privileged position because of that. That is my brief answer, so as not to exceed 
the two minutes that I was supposed to use. 
The Chairman: Your Excellency, thank you very much indeed. That was extremely 
interesting. May I suggest that we go straight on and ask all our visitors to comment in the 
same way? Then we will come on to some questions and ideas.  
May I turn to you, Dr Adam? As the chargé d’affaires, you have to carry the burdens of the 
ambassador, who has sadly gone. He was a great friend of many of us. You represent in 
Britain an enormously powerful country with huge interests around the world. What role 
does soft power play in pursuing those interests? 
Dr Rudolf Adam: Thank you very much. As you are aware, Germany excelled in hard 
power in a rather dubious way in the last century, so we have turned to soft power ever 
since. I do not want to go over the things that the Ambassador has already said, because I 
am in full agreement with him, but they include influencing thinking, forming concepts and 
generating information. These are extremely important.  
Let me just add one or two aspects that are characteristic of our experience. It is extremely 
important - as a nation that has been dominating world trade for such a long time probably 
knows very well - to set standards and norms, not only technically and industrially but 
legally, to generate good will, to generate attention for the way you do things, to invite 
competition in best practices and to set fashions not only in clothing but in thinking. Lastly, I 
would say that it is extremely important to generate the perception that you can make a 
positive difference in solving the world’s problems. That is the big difference with hard 
power: hard power makes a difference by destroying things, whereas soft power essentially 
resides in making a positive contribution.  
Q189  The Chairman: Thank you very much for an excellent and concise opening 
statement. Ambassador Traavik, may I turn to you? Last week we talked to Professor Nye, 
who is a great authority in these matters. He mentioned your country as the perfect 
example of a country with a small population compared with your neighbours but 
nevertheless with fantastic impact. Is there some secret here that we have to learn from? 
Tell us how you see the soft power scene. 
Mr Kim Traavik: Thank you very much, my Lord Chairman. I am a little humbled by being 
asked to appear before this Committee in the British Parliament’s House of Lords, Britain 
being a country that almost always comes out on top of the various indexes and ratings 
carried out on soft power, and being the home of great institutions such as the BBC and the 
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British Council. It would seem that we had little to teach you about soft power, since you 
seem to be cornering the market, as it were. 
Let me start by responding to the question that you asked at the outset and in the list of 
possible queries that you sent to us before coming here. How do we understand the 
concept of soft power? Let me start by making perhaps the obvious point that we do not 
have an official definition of the term “soft power”. We all know what we are talking about, 
but it is hard to arrive at a hard and fast definition that will apply to all countries in all parts 
of the world. You referred in passing to Professor Joseph Nye. His definition would seem to 
us to be a pretty good one to start with when he says that it is, “the ability to shape the 
preferences of others based on the attractiveness of a nation’s institutions, culture, politics 
and foreign policy”. But that is only the beginning. We would add that what is key when you 
are applying efforts to enhance your soft power is credibility. All the other terms used in 
Professor Nye’s definition would come to no avail if the policies on which any given nation 
based itself did not have, in the best cases, considerable credibility, and we try to make use 
of that in the areas where we consider ourselves to have some credibility. 
The second introductory point I would like to make is that although we are flattered to be 
mentioned in these ratings and indexes—in some cases we are fairly high up in them, 
although not as high up as the United Kingdom—we do not have a national policy for the 
creation or buttressing of soft power. Rather, it seems to us that in our case soft power is 
the end result of policies and forms of engagement that we would have pursued in any case. 
A case in point that we might revert to later on is the fact that we are seen by a number of 
people in the international arena as a nation that has been a force for peace. We have 
involved ourselves in a number of processes of conflict resolution and reconciliation all over 
the world. That has been perhaps the most important foundation for whatever soft power 
we have been able to wield in the last 20 years or so. However, that is not something that 
we have set out to accomplish as a means of building soft power. Rather, it has been the 
coincidental result of the fact that we became involved at an early stage in some conflict 
resolution processes. Following that, we have noted that people have come to us, as 
opposed to us coming to people, to ask us for our services, good offices, or whatever the 
case might be.  
Finally—I am aware that I have slightly exceeded the two minutes that you have allowed me, 
but it is dangerous to ask diplomats to speak briefly—we also feel that another asset to us in 
building our soft power has to do with some key characteristics of the society that we have 
created: a stable democratic society that is in all modesty relatively well functioning and 
egalitarian; that is committed to equality, including equality between the two genders; and 
that is a well to do society that is richly blessed by nature but has also made some 
enlightened choices about the management of those resources, which is perhaps most 
clearly seen in the fact that we have a fairly substantial sovereign wealth fund, which has 
become a major investor in many countries in Europe and elsewhere. 
So there are two aspects to this: first, our involvement, our international orientation; and, 
secondly, the character of the society that we have created, which cannot be copied by 
anybody else but that can perhaps inspire other countries embarking upon similar roles in 
development. Thank you, Mr Chairman. 
Q190  The Chairman: Thank you very much indeed. Your Excellency, Ambassador 
Hayashi, you represent a country that in sheer economic power is, I believe, the second 
largest in the world. I know the statistics say the third—these are matters for dispute—but 
nevertheless it is a huge influence on the world economy. We have the impression that 
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Japan has spent a lot of energy and resource on dealing with the deployment of its soft 
power and image and on pursuing its interests by these means. Is that right? Is that how you 
see it? 
Mr Keiichi Hayashi: My Lord Chairman, first of all may I thank you for inviting me to this 
session. In the opening statements, I’m the No.4 batter; In our popular game of baseball, No. 
4 batter is always the most powerful. I am not sure whether that is the case on this 
occasion.  
Concerning the definition of soft power, I do not want to repeat what has already been said. 
We would base Joseph Nye’s definition in our understanding. I would say that in the case of 
Japan, particularly post-war Japan, soft power has always been important, not just recently, 
because of the constitutional restriction on the use of hard power in the form of Article 9. 
Soft power has been given greater attention by the Government in recent years as an 
important tool, or even pillar, for projecting our national interest. The whole concept of 
selling positive images of the country as well as concrete products is now encompassed in a 
policy campaign under the banner of Cool Japan.  
Earlier, Japan’s soft power focused primarily on cultural aspects, with the emphasis perhaps 
on tradition and exoticism. Now, more attention is being paid to contemporary 
manifestations of soft power, often called pop culture, while increasing emphasis is also being 
given to trade and export aspects. But here let me cite a good friend of mine who is an 
expert on Japanese soft power, Dr Yee Kuang Heng of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public 
Affairs at the National University of Singapore. He said, “In light of the increasingly severe 
security situation around Japan, soft power would allow Japan to attract other countries who 
share the same values and interests. Japan has offered co-operation with Vietnam and the 
Philippines on shared interests and norms in maritime security and freedom to oversee lines 
of communication in the South China Sea. Prime Minister Abe’s idea of active pacifism also 
helps make Japan more appealing as a country contributing to peace”. So there are at least 
two kinds of soft power in discussion here. One is a primary focus on economic interests—
the promotion of trade, exports, contents, or even food, fashion and other things. Also, 
there is a normative soft power that is being sought to make Japan an example to others and 
to bring other countries into line with the foreign policy that Japan is pursuing. In general, I 
must say that I feel the same as my Norwegian colleague: that Japan has learnt so much from 
the UK. In that sense, I would rather try to learn from being here than giving much to you. 
The Chairman: Thank you very much indeed. That is a very useful start with four superb 
contributions. I would now like to ask my friends and colleagues on the Committee to ask 
some questions. 
Q191   Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: I have one for the Norwegian ambassador. The 
Nobel prizes are probably the best example of soft power anywhere in the world. When 
they were started, do you know whether they thought of it in those terms or whether they 
have just developed in that way? Were they consciously developed as part of Scandinavian 
soft power? 
Mr Kim Traavik: I think they have become a symbol of that, of sorts, as the years have gone 
by. At the beginning, it was part of the last will and testament of Alfred Nobel. He decided 
that, unlike the other Nobel prizes, he wanted the Nobel Peace Prize to be awarded by the 
Norwegian Nobel Committee. The reason quoted for that was that he considered Norway 
to be a particularly peaceful society, which you have to read in the context of the political 
realities of those days. But, as you said, it has come to symbolise some special quality not 
only of Norway but of the other Nordic countries—an internationalist orientation and an 
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engagement in trying to contribute to the resolution of the problems that face humanity, be 
they in Europe or elsewhere in the world. From that point of view, the process has been as 
you suggested. 
Baroness Nicholson of Winterbourne: This question is for the ambassador for Norway 
and for Dr Adam from Germany. From Norway’s point of view, you stand alone, as my 
colleague has already said, in your excellence in so many fields that could be brought within 
the framework of soft power should you wish to do so. How much do you think that is 
attributable to your independence from the European Union? You can stand alone and make 
your own decisions, and you have a rock-solid democracy, egalitarianism and the qualities 
that you describe. Can you define for us whether that might be harmed if you were part of 
the European Union or whether it has been strengthened by your actual independence—and 
it is not merely that eating a lot of fish puts your brains a little higher up than the rest of us? 
For Dr Adam, I ask the very obvious opposite question. Germany has massive strength these 
days, thank goodness, which is on everybody’s lips. For example, the obvious point of having 
a permanent seat on the Security Council. Has this been helped by your leadership in the 
European Union? Can you attribute it to anything at all or is it merely an outcome of 
Germany’s incredible hard work and great economic success? 
The Chairman: Mr Traavik again first. 
Mr Kim Traavik: Thank you very much. It’s an issue on which I feel a certain compulsion to 
tread a little carefully in the light of the discussions—I am jesting. Indeed, the question is 
very, very important. For a number of years, there has been a discussion in both academic 
and political circles in my country about that issue. The balance of opinion seems to be that 
it can work both ways. As you suggested, there is the fact that we are not bound by the 
rules of collegiality and solidarity that prevail between the members of the EU when it 
comes to the exercise of the common foreign and security policy. That can sometimes place 
constraints that might have made it more difficult to play the sort of informal facilitator’s 
role that we have had the honour to play on a number of occasions. On the other hand, it is 
very clear to us that being part of the European Union gives you an added weight in 
international politics that can also be extremely useful in informal processes such as the ones 
that we are talking about. So I do not think there is a hard and fast conclusion either way. It 
will probably vary from situation to situation whether the fact that you alluded to—that we 
are not part of the European Union formally speaking, although we are close to it—gives us 
an added margin of flexibility or deprives us of the resources and weight that could have 
been useful in a different situation. I hope that that answers your question. 
Q192  The Chairman: Dr Adam, the reverse question: is the EU the secret of Germany’s 
great strength or is it a bit of a burden at times? 
Dr Rudolf Adam: Thank you for that question, because I was going to comment on the 
European Union. From our experience, the European Union has been the most remarkable 
example of soft power. Whatever happened in Europe after 1989-90 was through attraction 
and setting an example that other countries and people wanted to join. That was regardless 
of the fact—and we heard some comments last week—that there is a growing necessity for 
reform. We probably all agree that there is too much bureaucracy in Brussels, but the 
attractiveness of the European Union is unbroken, as you can see by the fact that countries 
are lining up to join and other countries are even in the process of joining the eurozone. On 
the second point, on Germany’s position inside the European Union: when the European 
Union was founded, Germany was in a very particular, very different position from the one 
that we are in now. I think this has sharpened our awareness that fortune’s wheel is still 
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turning. My warning to you is not to overestimate our resources. We are at the moment in 
a position of strength, but more than 10 years ago we were the sick man of Europe and in 
10 years that can happen again. We have taken on a lot of responsibility. We approach the 
European Union not in terms of leadership or hegemony. We are a large country at the 
heart of the European Union. We think that that gives us a particular responsibility for 
making sure that the European Union is a success. But, as I said, we cannot run the show on 
our own. We need people to help and go along with us. We hope that we still have some of 
those people. 
The Chairman: Very wise words. 
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean: Perhaps I misunderstood what Dr Adam said. When you 
referred to the events of 1990, were you referring to the end of the Cold War and 
suggesting that that was a triumph for soft power? I would have thought that it was largely 
an example of hard power that brought about the disintegration of the Soviet Union. 
Dr Rudolf Adam: I was referring not to the period before but to the period after 1990, 
when we inherited a Europe that was divided between free economies and communist 
regimes. Nobody had an idea of what to do with it. I was on the planning staff in our Foreign 
Office in those days and there were a vast number of theories about how Europe could be 
configured. Very very few people, I admit myself included, could imagine that 13 or 14 years 
later all these countries would be stable democracies—market economies—under the roof 
of the European Union. It was a wise decision. 
The Chairman: Can I ask Mr Hayashi what particular objectives Japan is presently 
considering when we read in the newspapers that more money is to be spent on promoting 
Japan’s image? What is the thought behind that? 
Mr Keiichi Hayashi: I should mention that there are two aspects. One is the normative 
side—to try to mobilise support for the Japanese position on international issues in general. 
The other side is, I think, more mercantile or more conscious of the economic benefits that 
soft power can generate. That is called Cool Japan, which is borrowed from Cool Britannia, 
although I must admit that we do not have the tune of “Rule Japan”, so it may sound a little 
strange to you. At any rate, we have put greater emphasis on the potential economic 
benefits that Japanese soft power can generate. In recent months, under the leadership of 
the Prime Minister’s office, we have formulated our Cool Japan promotion organisation, and 
we are going to spend a very large amount of money—¥50 billion or ¥60 billion—on that 
promotion. 
The Chairman: Would it be true to say, Ambassador, that Japan is slightly shifting towards 
a middle position between hard and soft power? You spend a lot on defence and feel that 
you face some dangerous threats in the area, not least from the activities in Pyongyang and 
North Korea. Whereas our American friends are telling us that they think they should move 
more towards soft power in promotion of their interests and defence of their security, you 
might be said to be moving the other way. 
Mr Keiichi Hayashi: Certainly that has very little to do with the Cool Japan aspect. In the 
case of security, the cornerstone of our security policy remains the same under Prime 
Minister Abe’s Administration, which is a solid alliance with the United States. We rely on 
the extended deterrence by US forces deployed in the western Pacific, including Japan. What 
Prime Minister Abe has been saying when he refers to active pacifism is that Japan wants to 
be more active in contributing to peacekeeping and peacemaking. We have been constrained 
very much by the constitutional interpretation, perhaps overly so. As you recall in the case 
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of Iraq, which is perhaps not a very fortunate precedent for you, we sent our forces for 
engineering and water supply services, but they had to be protected first by British and then 
by Australian forces. We would not have been able to reciprocate that protection for 
friendly forces. That constraint on the Japanese contribution to international peace and 
security is something that Prime Minister Abe wants to address. Whether or not that would 
have some bearing directly on the situation in East Asia, it is probably not the case. In my 
view, that is slightly different. 
Lord Janvrin: My question continues on this theme. 
The Chairman: Baroness Nicholson, do you want to come in again? 
Q193   Baroness Nicholson of Winterbourne: I wanted to ask a quick follow-up 
question, if I could. This is really a question to all ambassadors, although I am naturally 
targeting Dr Adam, because this is where it came from. The enlargement process, which 
must have been what you were referring to when you talked about the post-cold war 
collapse, has been such a massive success. The assumption that everyone is making is that 
hard power is only military. Just as the great market shows in Brazil—one of your huge 
strengths—and as the enormous trading power of Japan and of Norway shows, surely hard 
power needs redefinition. Is it not that sort of economic muscle, that sort of drive, that led 
the enlargement process, which was led by Germany and remains led by Germany? When 
we are defining soft power as an aftermath of high-value good work in that sense, is not hard 
power transferred from being heavyweight tanks and guns and so on into economic power 
and, I would suggest, numbers of people? The great market of Brazil is absolutely enormous. 
That is power. Could I ask perhaps for brief comments, Chairman, from the members of the 
panel as to whether they feel my thinking might be going in a relatively sensible direction on 
this? 
The Chairman: Let us start with Mr Jaguaribe, because, as he rightly said to us, Brazil does 
not have hard power at all. Does that affect the way you would answer Baroness 
Nicholson’s question? 
Mr Roberto Jaguaribe: This is a very important issue, because this is a very imprecise and 
somewhat nebulous area and the differentiations are not very clear. You could perhaps 
generate methodologies that would be very precise in their definition, but ultimately if you 
exclude everything that is military, you will still find elements of strength that can be utilised 
in a forceful way without necessarily implying any bellicose attitude. As you suggested, 
closing the market is clearly one of those measures that is not necessarily friendly but can be 
extraordinarily influential. That goes for countries with big markets or big capacities in many 
areas. China, for one, is a very clear case. The United States, with its enormous hard power, 
also has enormous soft power, as we all know. This differentiation will depend on the 
assessment and methodology used, but ultimately, leaving aside everything that is related to 
the use of force or the threat of force, you can generally say that the other thing is soft 
power. I would say that having a big country with a big market is part of soft power. 
The Chairman: Can we pursue this for a moment? We have had some very interesting 
evidence on this question of whether your soft power can work if you do not have hard 
power. You get into a trade dispute, let us say. If the opposite number, the counterparty, 
takes a very tough line and it really begins to affect your interests, is there not a thought 
behind it all that in the end you will have to give way because the counterparty might get 
really rough, interfere with your shipping and start escalating the whole thing into hard 
power? 
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Mr Roberto Jaguaribe: One of the benefits that we witness today is the evolution of global 
governance, despite its enormous imperfections and shortcomings. Today it has become 
increasingly difficult to utilise single-handedly the type of abusive power that was used in the 
19th century and even in the early 20th century. Even for the sole superpower of the world, 
the United States, there are a number of constraints that are imposed both internally from 
their own perception of how things should be done and externally because of the general 
consensus that is necessary for a number of things to be done. As you know, the WTO has 
mechanisms for controversy solutions that are working wonderfully well despite the fact 
that it is not making progress in trade negotiations.  
Just as an example, we had a long-standing issue with the United States in relation to cotton, 
which we have won. We do not want to exercise the authority that was given to us of 
imposing sanctions, because ultimately sanctions are not conducive to benefit to us. We are 
leaning towards other solutions that are generating positive impacts. I do not think that 
today a commercial quarrel would ultimately lead to non-soft power confrontation as it did 
in the past. 
The Chairman: That is a very fair and interesting answer. 
Q194   Lord Janvrin: I come back to a point made by His Excellency the Japanese 
Ambassador about the Japanese Government’s involvement in evolving the soft power 
agenda. There have been some differences about the view that very often—the ambassador 
to Brazil presented this case very well—something is beyond government control. 
Ambassador Traavik, I think you suggested that you had no national policy. I wonder 
whether—this is a question for all four of you—your Governments are increasingly 
beginning to look at ways of developing this, evolving policies, looking at ways in which some 
of the thinking that is going on in this area can be used to greater influence and whether 
indeed there are agencies within your countries that are beginning to look harder at how to 
use soft power in a more organised way. 
The Chairman: What are the instruments that we should all be thinking about building up 
in this new world? Who would like to start? Perhaps Ambassador Hayashi would like to go 
first. 
Mr Keiichi Hayashi: In the case of Japan, there is no single government agency that deals 
with soft power as a whole. I doubt that there is a select or standing Parliamentary 
committee that deals with soft power as a whole. The different committees, the different 
government agencies, deal with different aspects of soft power. Should the cultural aspect be 
dealt with perhaps on the international side, the Foreign Ministry deals with it, together with 
the Ministry of Education’s cultural agency. The promotion of economic interests would be 
dealt with by the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry. This economic aspect is given 
such a high priority that the Cabinet Office is now taking the lead. That is why I mentioned 
the Cool Japan Promotion Council, which was established in March this year under the 
leadership of the Prime Minister. 
It is difficult to say whether we have a coherent single policy to deploy our soft power in 
relation to specific items, but the policy makers in Japan would perhaps look in numerical 
terms at how much we could earn out of this programme and how to enhance the export 
values of fashion, food and our content industry in a certain timeframe. That is one 
approach.  
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In relation to the promotion of the Japanese image and the promotion of good-will towards 
Japan in foreign policy and so on, I think the Foreign Ministry will take the lead and organise 
a number of projects, programmes and events in that direction. 
The Chairman: I will call Lord Forsyth in a moment, but if the name of the game, as the 
Brazilian ambassador suggested, is generating information and language familiarity, could I ask 
the German chargé d’affaires what Germany is doing through its Goethe institutes and its 
other agencies to get into this business? 
Dr Rudolf Adam: We lost tremendously as a result of the wars of the last century because 
the role of the German language has gone down dramatically, and I am afraid it is still going 
down on a global scale. It is by now the language spoken by the largest group of people 
inside the European Union as a native language, but of course it cannot compete with 
English, French or Spanish as a global language. So our answer is twofold. On the one hand, 
we have a large network of cultural institutions such as the Goethe institutes, we have an 
academic exchange programme, we have a programme under which we give scholarships to 
researchers of world excellence to study with us and to spend some time in Germany, but 
most of these things are now increasingly done in English, because we realise that the lingua 
franca of science is English and will remain English. 
The other thing is that we try to teach German not only because of the importance of the 
language but because we are convinced that if you want to have a career in a German 
enterprise, which is quite attractive because German investments are globally quite strong, 
you should know some German, not only because it is a means of communications but 
above all, because only through the language do you come to grips with the mentality that is 
behind the language. There is nothing more fallacious than words if you do not understand 
what is behind the words. 
Q195  The Chairman: Again before I call Lord Forsyth, Ambassador Traavik, what 
agencies is Norway putting its bets on in this new international landscape? 
Mr Kim Traavik: I think the situation in my country seems to be quite similar to what was 
described by my Japanese colleague just a moment ago. We have no overarching agency 
responsible for pursuing Norway’s soft power interests; rather, the responsibilities are 
apportioned out among the various parts of central government. Insofar as the promotion of 
culture is concerned, that means that the Culture Ministry, the Foreign Ministry and the 
Foreign Service will be the main instruments of promoting our image and promoting 
exchanges with other countries. In terms of creating understanding and recognition of our 
policies and engagement activities, the Foreign Ministry will be mainly responsible with, to 
some extent, the co-operation of the Prime Minister’s office. That is the picture that I would 
describe in my country in that regard. A few minutes ago, you may have felt I slightly 
belittled the political priority given to soft power in Norway. I did not mean to leave that 
impression. I was just saying that there is no overarching or master plan, as it were, but we 
all recognise the importance of it. That can be illustrated by the fact that the number of staff 
involved in pursuing these matters has increased substantially in recent years and I expect 
that to continue in the future as well. There is an issue there. It is seen and recognised as 
important but there is no attempt to pull it all together and put it all under one roof. 
The Chairman: Norway House off Trafalgar Square used to be the centre of Norwegian 
influence in London. That has now closed. You do not have agencies such as the Goethe 
Institut, the Chinese Confucius institutes, our British Council or anything like that? 
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 Mr Kim Traavik: No, my Lord Chairman. We have integrated that responsibility into the 
various embassies. For example, in my embassy, I have eight or nine people who are basically 
responsible for promoting cultural exchanges, including language-related activities, music, the 
arts and so forth.  So we do not have a separate branch of the Government responsible for 
that: it is integrated into the Foreign Service under the leadership of the Foreign Office and 
Ministry of Culture. 
The Chairman: Does Brazil have anything like that, Ambassador? Brazil is obviously 
coming into our focus on the sport side because of your handling of the Olympic Games 
next time. You are emerging as one of the giants of the new international order. Have you 
brushed up some agencies to promote the Brazilian image? 
Mr Roberto Jaguaribe: No, I believe not. I believe we have more or less the same 
institutional formation as my Japanese and Norwegian colleagues. We have multiple entities 
and agencies within the Government that have responsibilities that generate soft power. In 
the case of Brazil, one very strong element is associated with technical co-operation for 
developing countries, especially in agriculture and social development where we have had 
enormous success. That generates a lot of good will with our neighbours and in Africa, 
which are essentially the areas where we are doing that work. Because of that, Brazil has had 
the opportunity over the past 30 or 40 years to consolidate the perception of being among 
the leading countries of the emerging, developing world. That generates a lot of positive 
benefits, such as hosting the Olympic Games or the World Cup. We were chosen because 
we generate good will in the people who are choosing. The candidates from Brazil tend to 
be elected. Brazil tends to be elected in all multilateral elections. All that has an effect: there 
is a combination of the elements pointing in that direction. But we do not have a single entity 
that deals with policy in relation to soft power. In our case, we have the social 
communication office of the presidency, which will probably be the single most relevant 
entity in Brazil for that purpose, together with the Foreign Office and the other entities that 
I have mentioned. 
Q196   Lord Forsyth of Drumlean: Whenever I try to think about what soft power is, it 
is a little like trying to put a cloud in a bottle: you touch it and it disappears. Can I just ask all 
of you a very practical question? I am interested in soft power as a means of advancing our 
commercial interests for British jobs and businesses. Could each of you explain how each of 
you would go about doing that from your own country’s point of view? That seems to be 
the essence of why we are all discussing this. 
The Chairman: I am afraid that we must leave that question hanging in the air: we have to 
go away for five minutes. I apologise. We have two or three crucial questions before we can 
let Your Excellencies go. 
 
Sitting suspended for a Division in the House. 
 
The Chairman: Lord Forsyth, can you just repeat your question, and then we must carry 
on? Let us hope we are not disturbed again. 
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean: I will summarise my question. I see soft power as being about 
getting influence for NGOs, jobs and orders for our businesses, and I wondered whether the 
four of you could very briefly talk about how you go about that task in your functions. That 
seems to me to be what in the end soft power is focused on. 
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The Chairman: Inside your embassies, really, just as we are familiar with our embassies. 
There is a lot of commercial activity in them. Indeed, there is an increased emphasis on that 
under the present Government here in London. Is the same sort of sentiment reflected in 
your various embassies? Where shall we start? Mr Hayashi. 
Mr Keiichi Hayashi: First of all, the overall picture is that the Foreign Ministry and its 
agency, the Japan Foundation, spends about £100 million every year to promote public 
diplomacy and to sell a positive image of Japan. On the more economic side, METI leads the 
industrial support for export promotion in the soft power field under the banner of what I 
called Cool Japan, and it was involved in the creation of the Cool Japan promotion 
organisation, which was established by a government contribution of ¥50 billion, plus private 
sector contributions, which made it almost ¥60 billion all together, which is about £400 
million, to provide support for overseas promotion projects for the creative industry and 
media content industry. The ministry also provided ¥15.5 billion, which is about £100 
million, for an export promotion programme to support what is called the localisation of 
media content, because we have the disadvantage of the Japanese language, which you do not 
have. We have to translate our films and animés, among other things.  
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean: I am sorry to interrupt you, Your Excellency, but I was really 
thinking of what you are doing in your job. 
Mr Keiichi Hayashi: I will come to that. There is also tourism promotion, administered by 
the Ministry of Transport, and the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries promotes 
the export of Japanese foods and beverages. In response to all these, we in the embassy have 
organised a number of promotional events. First, we want to promote media contents, 
animé, manga, Japanese films or what is called the media contents industry, which are very 
much promoted in cultural events. I often host different events. Another example is our 
hosting of a railway seminar in the embassy recently, in which Japanese railway companies 
and manufacturers and 150 British guests participated. We also regularly organise tasting 
events for award-winning sake from the International Wine Challenge competition every 
year. We see great potential for sake exports. We also organise business seminars to 
promote Japanese businesses in Africa. A lot of our businesses are based in the UK, in 
London, and are responsible for overseeing the so-called EMEA region, so we are helping 
them to create networks. 
I also co-hosted Japan Matsuri, which has been held every year since 2009 with NGOs such 
as the Japan Society and the Japan Association. As a result, we had 70,000 participants in a 
one-day event, a good response. During this festival, we promoted Japanese food, Japanese 
culture, Japanese products, and tourism.  
The Chairman: So the answer is that you are doing a great deal. I have a problem as 
Chairman. I am very conscious of the time. You are all extremely busy ambassadors and you 
need to get away. I will aim for finishing before 6 o’clock, in fact, but I know that Baroness 
Goudie and Baroness Armstrong would like to ask one more question. You may wish to 
pursue some other points on the agencies that you are using, rather as the Japanese 
ambassador has just described to us. Baroness Goudie, would you like to speak now? 
Q197   Baroness Goudie: Thank you. My question is aimed primarily at the Norwegian 
ambassador and it is on the role that Norway plays in peacekeeping, in particular the role 
that you have played over the last, say, 50 years in assisting countries that have been at war 
and that continue to be at war. You have been able through your channels to work with 
other countries that it would have been unacceptable for these countries to work with, 
which all of us who have been working on this are very grateful for. That is not said in a 
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patronising way. Without you and the other Scandinavian countries, a lot of things that have 
happened in the Arab spring and at other times could not have happened. Do you see this as 
your role as a country, or as part of your influence on peace through soft power? 
Mr Kim Traavik: I think we would see it as engrained in the national outlook on life, shared 
by many Norwegians and endorsed by the full spectrum of political parties, that it is our 
responsibility to try to help where we can—that perhaps sounds pretentious but it is not 
intended as such—to make a difference, for example in crises and conflict situations.  
If you bear with me for a moment, we saw an impetus in the early 1990s when we became 
involved in the process that led to the Oslo agreements. There is this interesting 
phenomenon of seeming to succeed. In the aftermath we came tantalisingly close to 
facilitating a comprehensive agreement between the Palestinians and the Israelis, although we 
did not quite get there. But the fact that we seemed to be succeeding created a lot of 
interest in various countries where conflict situations or crises were under way or evolving, 
which forced us to up our game—you might understand what I have in mind—in the sense 
that we had to professionalise ourselves; we had to establish the necessary units in the 
Foreign Ministry and the necessary research avenues in Norway and abroad, and we had to 
make use of the all the resources at our disposal. We receive many such requests each year, 
many of which we turn down for one or two basic reasons. One is that we take it upon 
ourselves to do something in this area only if all parties want it, because the parties own any 
given conflict and they must own the solution to the conflict. The second is that if we feel 
that we do not have expertise that is commensurate with the demands of that situation, we 
will also turn it down. That happens. But we have become involved in at least 20 such 
situations in recent years. There are others that we cannot refer to, because we have to 
accept that in the initial stages there has to be a secrecy about these things. This is the 
backdrop. It happened in a coincidental way, but it was very much in keeping with basic 
policies that we pursue and with the basic internationalist outlook that most if not all 
Norwegians hold dear. We see it is as a result of soft power on occasions, and that is all 
good because it makes it possible to have a dividend from it, but it was not something that 
we set out to do because we wanted to create soft power for ourselves. There is an 
important distinction here. 
Baroness Goudie: I wanted to check the distinctions. 
Baroness Armstrong of Hill Top: I am very tempted to follow up the business about 
secrecy in our current world, but I do not think we have time for that today. 
I have a general question: how far do you think it is the actions of government that influence 
and improve soft power, and how far is it the actions and activity of civil society in its widest 
sense, or do they have to be linked? 
The Chairman: Who would like to have a go at that? Mr Jaguaribe? 
Mr Roberto Jaguaribe: As I said, I think there are different roles in different instances, and 
if you try to harness everything to the benefit of your vision from government you will 
probably do ill. There are some things that civil society has the strength and dynamism to 
carry out by itself, usually in relation to cultural manifestations and the like, but things that 
relate to global behaviour are usually done through policy and other government agencies 
and through private enterprise, which generates positive perceptions that can be extremely 
beneficial. The Norwegian case in the instance that has been called to mind is very obvious. 
Countries that have a tradition of being responsive to humanitarian requests generate good 
will. For the UK, the policy that is being followed of increasing official development aid 
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obviously generates positive reverberations, and I think many countries follow on that path. 
Overall, the degree to which you are able to use negotiation and persuasion rather than 
imposition also generates good will. Those that have the capacity to impose can do so but 
they generate bad repercussions, not always but many times. So there is a distinction to be 
made between what can be done by government and what can be done by society. Even 
internally, to cite your own example, how you deal with issues of the democracy, 
transparency, human rights, education and cultural benefits can generate perceptions that 
generate role models and increase your capacity to become influential globally.  
Q198  The Chairman: I know that others want to come in, but we are out of time. I want 
to ask the big final question, on which I would value a comment from each of you. You are 
all very senior diplomats indeed. There is an impression around, which is hard to crystallise, 
that the world has changed, we are totally digitally connected, every corner of the earth is 
bombarded with information, and connectivity is everywhere. As senior diplomats, has that 
changed your view of how to pursue diplomacy? Has it changed the whole nature of the 
tasks and profession in which all four of you are deeply involved? Let us have diplomatic 
views from diplomats. Ambassador Hayashi. 
Mr Keiichi Hayashi: Last week I attended the annual ambassadorial conference in Tokyo, 
the conference of Japanese ambassadors stationed in Europe. I recall that maybe a decade or 
two ago we were primarily discussing the security, perhaps hard power, aspect, what to do 
with the threat from the Soviet Union and how to deal with the threat of INFs—all these 
things. Last week we focused very much on public diplomacy, and emphasised the need for 
the ambassadors to come to the fore and keep sending out public messages, including using 
social media. I started tweeting recently. This was probably unthinkable a decade ago. There 
was also a big emphasis on the need to use the embassy facilities of the residence and the 
office for the promotion of specific business interests. Again, that was unthinkable, say, 20 
years ago, because the Government were supposed to be neutral to business activities and it 
was up to the businesses to do their job. Now, things have completely changed. There is 
constant pressure on the public sector to support the private sector in a visible way. That is 
my impression. 
The Chairman: Ambassador Traavik, has it changed your job? 
Mr Kim Traavik: Before I turn to that question, could I say a few words in response to the 
question posed by Baroness Armstrong? It is an important point about the partnership 
between the Government and non-governmental organisations. We have been very attached 
to that idea for many reasons. One is that NGOs have recourse to resources, insights, 
experience and competencies that you do not easily find in the public sector. We have 
established partnerships, including on peace and reconciliation processes, that would 
probably not have been nearly as successful had we not embarked on that sort of 
partnership with NGOs and academic circles. I just wanted to add that brief response to 
what my Brazilian colleague said on that point.  Have the new age and social media changed 
the exercise of the job of senior diplomats? I think that it has. I would broadly agree with my 
Japanese colleague on that score. We are also starting to tweet. To me it seems to be the 
final proof that you can teach old dogs new tricks, with varying degrees of success of course. 
We are very much in that reality. We spend a lot of time on keeping our homepages up to 
date and using Facebook, tweeting and all that.  That will become even more important as 
we move ahead. I am quite certain of that. 
Q199  The Chairman: Has it changed your job Dr Adam? 
Dr Rudolf Adam, Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany, H.E. Mr Keiichi Hayashi, 
Ambassador of Japan, H.E. Mr Roberto Jaguaribe, Ambassador of Brazil and H.E. Mr Kim 
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Dr Rudolf Adam: Of course it has changed, particularly for someone who has been in 
diplomacy for more than 30 years. I would slightly differ from what the ambassadors have 
said. I realise the technical possibilities provided by Facebook and Twitter and we use them, 
but I personally do not think that they will be all that effective. So many facts and figures are 
reported almost instantly all around the globe, but the value added that we can create as 
diplomats is not to report facts and figures: rather, we take a strategic approach and try to 
explain to my Government what is happening in the society and in Parliament in this country 
rather than only within this Government. Conversely, we are trying to explain the reality of 
Germany in its multi-faceted way to this country. We regard ourselves as spokesmen not for 
the Government any more but for the people.  
Let me just come back to one thing because it is important to me. We also believe in 
subsidiarity when it comes to trade promotion. Our Government and embassy are not 
directly involved. We leave it to those who would know it best—our industry. That is why 
we have chambers of commerce. Vince Cable said last week in a public speech that the 
German chambers of commerce network is the envy of the world. We are very proud of it. 
It works very well because we get the people together who actually know the thing and who 
bear the consequences if they make a wrong decision. Our Government only come into 
huge projects such as Airbus and Typhoon that by definition require the involvement of the 
Government either because they are government-run projects or because government 
credits are needed. But we do not intervene in the promotion of BMW, Mercedes, Audi or 
Volkswagen anywhere. Who would we promote at the expense of the other? 
The Chairman: That is a very good point. Ambassador Jaguaribe? 
Mr Roberto Jaguaribe: Of course, it has enormous influence. The internet first and 
foremost had an enormous impact on policy. Over the past 30 years, from the Government 
having almost a monopoly of the foreign service, it has transcended the Government and 
government agencies. Civil society is itself carrying out diplomacy through other means.  It is 
very difficult today to say that we are able to concentrate all the capacities of diplomacy in all 
instances and that they are utilised to maximise general impacts and benefits. Especially with 
the internet, information gathering, which used to be an essential element of diplomacy, has 
practically lost its relevance because the internet does that for you. You do not need to go 
off finding out things that you can find out from your chair at home. Social media in Brazil is 
curious. We have just received a circular instruction to find out what other countries and 
other embassies do in relation to social media. I do not tweet and I do not intend to tweet. I 
do not Facebook either. I certainly do not intend to Facebook, but I might get an instruction 
to tweet, although not to use Facebook. We have found that Facebook is not adequate for 
diplomacy in Brazil, but tweets might be adequate. I might be forced to do that because of 
instructions from home. 
The Chairman: I am very conscious of the time. Frankly, I would have liked another hour 
or two with you all because you have revealed so much to us and made so many profound 
points. However, we do not have that sort of time. It flies by. It remains to me to release 
you to your next duties, which I know stretch out into the evening ahead. Thank you all very 
much indeed for being so frank and illuminating in what you have offered us.  
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Adam Smith International – Written evidence 
 
1. Introduction 
 
1.1 Adam Smith International is a professional services business that delivers real impact, 
value and lasting change through projects supporting economic growth and government 
reform internationally.  The technical assistance that we and other organisations provide is 
an important element of the UK’s soft power, helping achieve UK objectives in a wide 
variety of circumstances. Such technical assistance, when provided effectively, can have a 
hugely positive effect. It is a form of aid that can have a major impact that is out of all 
proportion to its cost and which can help achieve transformational change.  The return on 
investment in well-designed and well-delivered TA can be very high indeed.  
1.2 In conflict environments this technical assistance is very much complementary to 
‘harder’ exercises of UK power such as military force.  We believe it would be most useful 
to the Committee if we set out some examples of the use of technical assistance as an 
effective form of soft power, and below discuss interventions in three countries, Afghanistan, 
Iraq and Nigeria. We first discuss the effectiveness of the primary UK financier of 
development assistance, DFID. 
 
2. DFID, Britain’s main financier of technical assistance 
2.1 DFID (aka UK Aid) is widely considered within the international development 
community to be the leading provider of high quality advice to government in the developing 
world and the delivery of development programmes in these countries. The qualitative view 
of British excellence in development is underpinned in quantitative terms by the UK’s 
commitment to spend 0.7% of GDP on Aid.   
2.2 The quality of DFID’s programmes – best measured in the results of these 
programmes  - and the quantity of money that DFID spends gives the UK significant access 
to policy makers, political actors and other influential actors in the large number of countries 
where DFID is active and achieving significant results.  There are three complimentary ways 
in which UK Aid projects soft power for the UK. 
2.3 Soft power in countries: This access allows the projection of soft power directly 
through the UK’s ability to influence policy in these countries.  This influence is achieved in a 
number of ways: 
I. by DFID officials located in these countries providing advice directly to government 
on matters of policy; 
II. through the provision of technical assistance given to government directly by expert 
advisors funded by UK Aid through contractors such as Adam Smith International;; 
III. by setting conditions on governments that are in receipt of budget support, an 
instrument by which aid is channeled directly into the recipient government’s budget. 
2.4 Soft power on the international stage: the quality and heft of UK Aid gives DFID a 
significant voice in international development forums and multinational development actors, 
although more could be achieved.   
2.5 DFID is arguably one of the most influential voices in world of international 
development, second only, perhaps, to the World Bank and IMF.  International development 
is a rapidly developing, influential and dynamic sector/industry.   Development programmes 
are growing in scale, and complexity.   In this time of exceptional change the UK, through 
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UK Aid, projects significant power in helping frame the agenda, debate and future direction 
of this dynamic sector/industry.  
2.6 Soft power with bilateral Aid Agencies:  DFID also projects power by influencing how 
other bi-lateral aid agencies construct their own development approaches and programmes.  
The best bi-lateral aid agencies – Danish DANIDA, Swedish SIDA, Australian AUSAID and 
New Zealand Aid, inter alia, look to DFID as the leading bi-lateral agency and copy their 
approaches and programmes and often look to co-finance DFID funded programmes. 
 
3. Afghanistan 
3.1 Adam Smith International has been working in Afghanistan since early 2002 when we 
were asked to help rebuild key Ministry of Finance and Central Bank functions. Since that 
time, ASI has implemented over 60 projects in Afghanistan for DFID, USAID, FCO, 
DANIDA, EU, CIDA, World Bank, ADB and SIDA.  
 
3.2 These projects have ranged from small design and review projects to major 
programmes of institutional development such as our ongoing multi-phase multi-year 
programmes of DFID funded support to institutions that include: 
 
• The Revenue Department of the Ministry of Finance 
• The Budget Department of the Ministry of Finance 
• The Ministry of Mines 
• The Ministry of Commerce and Industry 
• The Independent Directorate of Local Government (IDLG) within the President’s 
Office 
 
3.3 These projects all have teams of long term international advisers – for example, a 
team of 2 in the IDLG and a team of 23 currently engaged in the Revenue Department - who 
work full time in the government institutions that we support and make up the bulk of the 
60 or so international advisers we have in country at any one time. These experts from 
around the world work alongside our team of more than 100 Afghan technical advisers. We 
are particularly proud of the contribution that these Afghan colleagues are making to the 
development of their country, and we take care to support their professional development 
as an additional wider benefit to Afghanistan in terms of human resources for the future. 
 
3.4 These programmes have contributed considerably to both creating a viable Afghan 
state and the conditions in which the international community can greatly reduce its 
involvement. If we look at some of the major programmes in turn: 
 
3.5 Results in tax reform We have worked with the Afghanistan Government and 
DFID on innovative tax reform since 2002, initially as part of a broad project to support 
economic development, and since 2004 on dedicated DFID tax reform projects: Tax 
Administration Reform, 2004-08;Strengthening National and Provincial Tax Administration, 2008-
12; and now Tax Administration, 2012-15. 
In summary we have helped the Afghanistan Government achieve the following: 
» Develop a comprehensive tax policy and law that constitute the framework of Afghanistan’s 
tax system.  
» Restructure, reorganise and build capacity of a sustainable modern tax administration in 
Kabul and five priority provinces.   
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» Increase revenue six-fold since 2004.Revenue for the latest financial year was  over $2bn. 
» Increase revenue as proportion of GDP from 4% in 2004 to almost 12% today.  
» Increase tax revenue relative to customs, with tax taking over as the single largest revenue 
source in 2008 and increasing relative to customs at an accelerating rate.  
» Turn non-tax revenue, i.e. royalties, fees and charges raised by line ministries into a major 
revenue source from a close to zero base. 
3.6 Results from DFID’s support to the budget department. The DFID 
programme of support to the Budget department which Adam Smith International delivers 
began in early 2008 and is now in its second phase. Key achievements of that project to date 
include: 
» The rolling out of performance based budgeting reforms across all budget units 
» The development of the budgetary process to an 11 month schedule, that includes defined 
national policy priorities, from a 3-4 month process based on bilateral negotiations between 
ministers 
» The development of a Medium Term Fiscal Framework which is integrated into Pre-Budget 
document and Budget Statement - containing analysis of different fiscal pressures and risks 
» The introduction of a Medium Term Budget Framework containing budget ceilings - specifying 
what priorities the funding is allocated to – over 3 years 
» The raising of development budget execution rates by nearly 15 percentage points  last year 
» The provision of assistance Afghan participation in the Open Budget Index (OBI) as a measure 
of the transparency of the Afghan budget process and raising Afghanistan’s predicted rating to 
nearly 60% this year (from 8% in 2008) – higher than Poland and only slightly less than Italy.  
» The development of a comprehensive Budget statement in three languages and published 
online, containing analysis of historical spending, achievements, medium-term outlook, issues, 
budget and performance targets 
» The first ever presentation of new budget and fiscal policy reforms to the Afghan media 
» The formation of a dedicated capacity development unit within DGB (the Budget Reform Unit 
- BRU) 
» The mapping of all processes. All key budget processes have now been documented and 
training conducted as a means of making the Budget Department a process-centred 
organisation 
» On-budget funding modalities agreed for all donors, enabling donors to meet their Kabul 
Conference commitment to bring 50% of aid on budget 
» Establishment of a database for donors to self-report their projects to Afghan government 
providing greater transparency to the government about what projects are being carried out 
within Afghanistan.  
This work has considerably improved the effectiveness of Afghan Government spending and 
thus has contributed significantly to the viability of the Afghan state. 
 
3.7 Results in the Mining sector. Mining is the best hope for the Afghan economy. In 
2010, a survey carried out by the US Geological Survey identified US$1 to US$3 trillion of 
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mineral wealth in Afghanistan including significant volumes of copper, gold, iron ore, rare 
earth metals, and oil and gas. With ASI assistance the MoM is transiting from an owner-
operator type role to that of a policy-maker and regulator able to attract private sector 
investment. With DFID-funded ASI support, the MoM has developed a five-year business 
plan to oversee its restructuring aims, and is two years into its implementation. Under this 
business plan, key directorates have been staffed, and significant capacity development has 
been undertaken within the policy group, the investment promotion directorate, and the 
legal directorate. The project has supported the ministry in updating the legal environment 
for mining in the country, which was previously outdated and unfriendly to investors. 
3.8 The project has played a critical role in transforming the effectiveness of the MoM, 
catalysing significant private investment and creating new hope for the Afghan economy. If 
the MoM's plans are implemented the Afghan Govt. estimates its revenue from mining will 
increase to $3.5 billion over 15 years which will cover 77.7% of the core budget. Afghanistan 
is on its way to becoming an economically sustainable state. 
 
4. Iraq 
 
4.1 In Iraq we have been helping strengthen centre of government institutions and 
address key finance issues since 2004. Our DFID-funded programme of support to Iraq over 
the period 2004 – 2010 was instrumental in setting up from scratch the central government 
structures in Baghdad, including the Office of the Prime Minister, the Cabinet Office and the 
Presidency, and associated policy analysis and decision-making systems. The effectiveness and 
success of this work was praised repeatedly by senior witnesses giving evidence to the Iraq 
inquiry. Tim Foy was head of DFID Baghdad: 
 
TIM FOY In terms of the quality of consultants which we were able to engage to 
work for us in terms of the machinery of the centre of government, the Prime 
Minister's office, to work within the finance department, I think we would be hard 
pushed to have got better people. They were people that gave us fantastic leverage 
with the Americans, and where we punched genuinely above our weight, it was the 
quality of expertise that we were able to bring in. The Americans might have 
outnumbered us, but in terms of quality, I think there was a great deal of difference, 
and that brought us an awful lot of kudos. It brought us that access that I spoke about, 
the ability to engage at the highest level. I am amazed that it was the UK that basically 
got the standby agreement with the IMF, resolves Iraq's debt problems. It wasn't the 
United States. It was about half a dozen UK consultants that did it. 
THE CHAIRMAN: And that is a very big thing, in terms of the numbers and 
significance. 
TIM FOY: It was a big thing, and we should be quite proud of that. 
 
4.2 Mark Lowcock, then Director of DFID's Bilateral Programmes, now DFID Permanent 
Secretary, described ASI’s work in a personal assessment at the end of his evidence to 
the Chilcot Inquiry: 
 
MR MARK LOWCOCK: I can give you a personal assessment of what are the 
biggest impact things we have done. 
THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, we would like that. 
MR MARK LOWCOCK: My personal assessment is that getting the macro-economy 
right and enabling Iraq to manage its growing budget effectively and enabling Iraqis to 
run their own affairs by better co-ordination at the centre of government level, more 
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effective process in the Council of Ministers, all those things, in my assessment, are, you 
know, perhaps the most important thing to do for the long-term goal of building a 
capable state in Iraq able to, you know, look after itself. 
THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. 
 
4.3 Similarly, when asked by the Inquiry to nominate an example of success, Christopher 
Prentice, who was Ambassador from 2007 to October 2009, cited ASI’s work at the centre of 
government: 
 
SIR MARTIN GILBERT: “Were you able to see specific achievements by November 
when you left? 
MR CHRISTOPHER PRENTICE: Well, certainly the longer-term projects at the 
centre, in particular, as was mentioned this morning, the capacity building in the Cabinet 
Secretariat was really beginning to show results. 
 
This was a very quiet project, which I think was not widely known amongst the Iraqi 
politicians whose interests it was serving, and all the better for being below the surface 
because it was so central to the government machine, and it was one which was very 
much hands-off. It was DFID's working through Adam Smith International, who were 
providing consultancy for the Iraqis and that was confidential to the Iraqis and it was - 
it could have been a delicate matter, but actually was handled quietly and successfully 
and – by the time I left, the Cabinet Secretary had got to the point of being able to -- 
already had started transition planning for the handover of government after the 
elections, now due in March, pulling together deputy ministerial level representatives 
across their equivalent of Whitehall, to draw some lessons from this period of 
government in terms of the structure of government for presentation to the new Prime 
Minister, when elected. That's a fairly sophisticated operation and was really, I think, an 
example of success.”1 
 
4.4 ASI supported several transitions over the period of these years the most recent 
being the transition to the administration of the current Prime Minister Maliki whose 
administration, although not without faults, was robust enough to allow an exit of external 
military forces.   The structures that ASI/DFID established are still in place – indeed a small 
team of ASI advisers remains in place within them funded by Swedish SIDA - and their 
robustness and resilience were key factors in allowing UK and other troops to withdraw and 
Iraq to return to relative stability and to begin the process of reconstruction. The project 
continues to deliver good results. It is very much appreciated by the Iraqi Government. Dr 
Alaaq, Secretary General of the Iraqi Council of Ministers Secretariat (ComSec) has 
commented: 
 
“I have often compared the success of this relatively small project to the much larger 
projects supported by other donors that do not deliver results.  The small team of ASI 
advisors have achieved visible results and have made CoMSec an institution that we are 
very proud of. 
ASI advisors have worked with me personally since 2006 and have provided advice to 
Iraq since 2004. The professional advice they have provided is always in support of our 
specific needs and this advice is provided with the greatest respect.   We particularly 
                                            
1 http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/media/41640/100106pm-prentice.pdf pages 48/49 
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appreciate that they recognize the need to adapt international best practices to our 
environment.   
ASI helps me to focus on the longer term changes that need to be implemented, 
especially when it is so easy to become involved in day to day issues.” 
 
5. Nigeria 
5.1 Nigeria is facing wide range of challenges, including a dangerous Islamist insurgency. If 
it slips into chaos the fallout for Britain and other countries will be significant and costly. 
Moreover Nigeria is facing a demographic bulge which has the potential to transform its 
economic prospects, with benefits not only to Nigeria but also Britain. UK exports of goods 
and services to Nigeria are worth around £3b and rising sharply as the Nigerian economy 
grows. 
 
5.2 Utilising this demographic dividend requires an improvement in Nigeria's stock of 
infrastructure. By a central bank estimate, there is currently an annual shortfall in 
infrastructure investment equivalent to 5% of GDP. The absence of sufficient grid power is a 
huge barrier to economic growth.  In another DFID programme, ASI has been assisting the 
Nigerian Government to tackle these issues. Our recommendations of how to tackle the 
power sector problems have been accepted by the Nigerian government and power sector 
reform is now the Nigerian President’s highest priority.  We are well on the way to 
achieving transformative change with tariffs up hugely, the sector now viable and 
privatization about to occur.  The economic effect will be gigantic. The improved service 
delivery in power resulting from the work of the project has, we estimate, already produced 
savings to Nigeria worth over £1bn in a full year. 
 
5.3 Again the assistance is very much appreciated by the Nigerian Government.  For 
example the Chief Economic Adviser to the Nigerian Government recently commented that 
“DFID through NIAF (the Nigerian Infrastructure Advisory Facility) is our best development 
partner. The contrast between NIAF and others is like day and night in terms of timeliness 
and effectiveness of support. Others will promise help but delay and go through various 
procedures so by the time it is available it has been overtaken by events. I really appreciate 
the assistance. I am very, very pleased. Let me say thank you. My main message is keep it 
going, keep it working in the same way”. 
 
5.4 Of course we are not the only organisation to have made a significant contribution to 
Nigerian stability through the provision of technical assistance.  For example, the work 
financed by DFID and carried out by Crown Agents to establish an effective debt 
management process was critical to ending Nigeria’s status as a pariah state which did not 
pay its debts, and has subsequently saved Nigeria many hundreds of millions of pounds in 
lower interest costs. 
 
6. Conclusion and policy recommendations 
 
6.1 These few examples illustrate how UK development assistance is a critical 
component of this country’s soft power. Our suggestions on policy are as follows: 
 
6.2 Care must be taken to ensure that UK assistance not only remains fast and flexible, 
but is made faster and more flexible.  This is a key element of its superiority over most 
other development assistance programmes and its attraction to recipients. 
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6.3 Similarly, care must be taken to preserve and increase the quality of technical 
assistance provided. Again this is a key point of comparative advantage.  There are concerns, 
as highlighted for example in the Independent Commission on Aid Impact’s recent report on 
DFID’s use of contractors, that recent adjustments to procurement policy may be leading to 
a decline in quality. 
 
6.4 To maximise soft power it is generally preferable for DFID to deliver assistance 
through its own bilateral programme, rather than handing funds over to multilateral 
organisations which tend to be much slower, less efficient and less able to deliver 
programmes that explicitly help the UK extend its soft power. Whilst the use of a 
multilateral organisation may sometimes be preferable, these occasions are relatively rare 
and the direct benefits to the UK less clear. 
 
6.5 A stronger focus on language teaching in schools and universities  would definitely 
help, as we experience a shortage of graduates with skills in languages other than French and 
Spanish, e.g. Arabic, Farsi, Urdu, etc. 
 
September 2013 
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Beyond security: a new age of soft power  
 
SUMMARY 
 
Understanding and developing soft power is the single most important task for the British 
government to master in the 21C. While some of the reasons for this are commonly 
understood, some less so. I hope to give an overview of the rationale for this assertion along 
the following lines: 
 
A: EXTERNALLY: enabling Britain's transition from a global (one world, one message) hard 
power to a transnational (beyond nations) soft power  
 
1. Our success in helping to shape the global community and global society  
2. Our ability to influence outcomes in international (between nations) conflicts 
3. Our ability to stay buoyant in the rapidly changing global economy 
4. The freedom and potential of global citizenship – UK citizens abroad and foreign 
citizens in the UK 
 
B. INTERNALLY: keeping abreast of the changes in public agency and helping politics and 
government to remain relevant in 21C 
 
1. Ability to represent the people of Britain in a meaningful way 
2. Ability to regain / retain influence in the shifting power dynamics of the 21C 
3. Ability to do the work of government more effectively than the media or other 
private initiatives 
4. Make way for a new era of individual and social potential in the UK 
 
I will make the argument that because of the radically changed nature of our global meeting 
space and the very different historical context within which we are operating since Joseph 
Nye first made these distinctions, soft power should be understood not as a commodity but 
as a capacity. Our soft power is our ability to be in the world flexibly and effectively – able 
to make a difference without betraying our bigger picture of a benign transnationalism. It 
implies our relationships with other countries as well as transnational movements, but also 
the internal relationships of community and governance.  
 
For this reason, soft power should not be the remit of the National Security Council but 
have a ministry of its own that draws together all the vehicles of connectivity and influence 
alongside the tools of self development that shape our story of ourself. It would not be in 
the interest of the nation for any government to control our soft power, rather to support 
it and enhance its capabilities as it will be forever developing. In addition, an understanding of 
the balance between soft and hard power should be a principle underpinning all ministries, 
supporting them with research, training, personal and group development. 
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Beyond security: a new age of soft power. 
 
1 In order to justify the scope of this paper, I should first describe my use of the term soft 
power. Joseph Nye agrees that he did not invent soft power: his gift to the world was to 
disaggregate the concept of power, to separate hard 'power over', from soft 'power for' – 
force from attraction. In so doing he named something that has always existed but was not 
distinct, could not be harnessed. 
 
2 Nye did so in a very specific moment in time:  
 
• post the failure of military action in Vietnam 
• at the height of the Cold War - a b/w world of well defined good and evil 
• in the hey day of Hollywood's articulation of the American Dream, before other film 
industries rivalled its domination of our screens 
 
His impact came from being able to maintain America's image of itself as the only global 
super-power. Even if it failed in hard power, it remained unquestionably dominant in soft 
power: both were offered as tools to shape global preferences – to control the world.  
 
3 Twenty years on the context for soft power is very different: 
• fall of Berlin Wall and disappearance of Iron Curtain 
• 9/11, birth of US vulnerability 
• America pivots East and becomes mediator rather than master 
• failure in Iraq, Afghanistan, Middle East: loss of faith in hard power grows 
• rise of BRIC superpowers: idea of control loses power 
• diminution of global appetite for war, awareness of military industrial complex 
• global financial crisis: distrust of financial markets in global capital 
• development of network sensibility in business and personal life 
• growth of social media, rise of non-state actors 
• growth of people power: Avaaz, Facebook, Twitter 
• rise of women in spotlight – as actors and as causes 
• growth of self authoring practice and industry 
 
What this adds up to is a shift in the nexus of power. Whereas up until very recently we 
could identify who was in charge and the rationale for their actions, today everything 
appears to be more fluid.  
 
4. Take for example the recent vote in the House of Commons on whether or not to bomb 
Syria and compare it to a similar vote on Iraq ten years ago when the PM, despite popular 
dissent, was confident of approval. Events played out very differently this time. Polls taken on 
the internet persuaded Ed Miliband to resist the call to war in the UK Parliament > 
Cameron's loss of permission to support Obama causes the US President to hesitate and call 
for a vote on Syria creating a vacuum > Putin steps up to to the mediator role and gives 
Syria a way to step away from chemical warfare > Obama appears to thank Putin for giving 
the US an alternative to the vote (a vote he may have lost). 
 
5. What caused the radical shift in events? Not threats or promises, neither carrots nor 
sticks but a new context for action: each leader was led by their sense of how they would 
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appear to their own domestic audience and to the broader global public. They were trading 
reputations and accumulating soft power – the ability to influence – for the future.  
 
6. Does the British public know where it stands? Shortly after 9/11 George Bush told us 
“you are either with us or against us” and the British government stood with him – clarity  
which the British people did not have an opportunity to accept or reject. Today the waves 
of sympathy towards the Arab rebels flow and retreat; Obama loses and gains popularity; Ed 
Miliband is the darling of the peaceniks but a disappointment to the media. Have we 
managed to see past that crude dualistic position to a more complex, fluid one, that 
nevertheless feels true to our belief in democracy? 
 
7 When Nye first described hard, soft and smart power we were living in the context of 
hard power being supreme. We could all have opinions but we were powerless in the face 
of the men with guns and money. Within that context, soft power was seen as a second 
best, an alternative way for those same men to get their way in the world. Today, in the age 
of the internet, with massive connectivity between state and non-state actors across the 
globe, we are living in the context of soft power shaping outcomes at every level. It's less 
clear what the desired outcomes are and who will deliver them: it's not black and white any 
more. 
 
8. What then should be the aim of any government? Strength is no longer measured by the 
ability to physically dominate others but the ability to draw others into your way of thinking 
and being in the world. As Joseph Nye says, it is not the party with the most weapons but 
the one able who tells the best story. To that end, working to gain soft power in the form 
described by Nye 20 years ago – cultural capital – will always be important. That's the 
garden towards which people are drawn and the space in which they can build relationship. 
However, in an age of soft power our goals must be broader, deeper, smarter.  
 
9. To stay with the metaphor of the garden for a moment, nectar is only attractive because 
the bee's survival depends upon finding it. Knowing and understanding other cultures and 
being able to grasp what would enable a relationship is key. Being able to see the biggest 
possible picture of the dynamics between them makes international relations and strategy 
more important than ever. But being able to do all this in 3D, with actors at multiple levels 
attempting to create new patterns of action and response week by week is more difficult. 
More than a garden, a nation has to be an event, constantly offering evidence and 
experiences of how it is growing and developing in response to the rapidly changing needs of 
the world around it.  
 
10. In this age, soft power will accumulate to those countries who can engage successfully at 
this frequency: whose relationships, both internal and external are strong but flexible, warm 
and accommodating. Who have not only the best understanding of how connection happens, 
but the best skills in turning those connections into relationships.  
 
11. The character of the politicians representing the nation must, above all, be capacious. 
Emotional and spiritual intelligence have always been required, but a less macho approach, 
what the Chinese might describe as more yin than yang, will be more successful. There must 
be a healthy, robust self regard but a ready humility: what some people have mistaken for 
weakness in Obama will prove over time, to have been smart in the face of the advantage 
gained by allowing Putin to act.  
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12. Soft power then, relies on two specific capacities: 1) an active authenticity 2) relationship 
potential. Think of the most charismatic person you know: not only are they being 
themselves confidently but they are also able to pay full attention to you. Those two things 
combined are irresistible: it's no different for countries. 
 
13. A good example here would be Norway, a small country that consistently comes in the 
top 5 of the soft power tables drawn up by Monocle, or Anholt GFK Roper index on nation 
brands. Norway has built its international reputation as the home of peace: the Nobel Peace 
Prize is awarded there each year, tourists visit the Peace Institute and the government 
actively brokers peace partnerships the world over. When I asked Ambassador Mona 
Elisabeth Brøther about this achievement she described how it arose naturally from the 
character of the Norwegian people: they dislike and avoid conflict, teach mediation at school 
and family and relationship is at the heart of their culture.  
 
14. A country can't control its image although it may try: its image arises in the eye of the 
beholder, from what it is perceived to be doing and being in relationship to that country's 
own needs.While China promotes its Confucius Institutes, it also censors what can be 
discussed there: both these actions play a part in how China is viewed in the world, 
negatively for some. Does that mean China is not hard wired for attraction - no: it means 
China has not developed an understanding yet of how to form relationships with other 
countries that allow reciprocity and interdependence while being true to itself – most 
countries after all, are only somewhere on the journey towards that ideal. 
 
15. Seen from this broad perspective, soft power - rather than describe a very specific 
commodity - would be an umbrella term that describes a capacity for everything that is not 
hard power as a means to agency. Under this umbrella we can place all other forms of 
diplomacy on a continuum which reaches from the most passive expressions of soft power – 
authentic being, tending the garden – to more active expressions which come ever closer to 
hard power such as public diplomacy. (For more on this continuum, see 
http://softpowernetwork.ning.com/page/softpower-training-education). 
 
16. Once we acknowledge the bigger picture and the paradigm shift it describes for power 
and influence both locally and globally, we can also see the many other areas of activity that 
are part of this group of interests. All aspects of the media (public and private), social 
networking, aid initiatives, think tanks, NGOs can be added to the sector - currently 
referred to as culture - that creates a narrative not only about Britain but about the future 
of our world, not only over the long term but in real time too. 
 
17. More than a specialism, soft power is a mainstream issue representing the biggest 
opportunities for Britain going into the future: it demands no less than a ministry of its own 
to pull together and serve the activities it implies. But note, unlike hard power, this is not a 
category of interest that can be brought under government control – it is soft, fluid, shape 
shifting. It can, however, and must be better understood and better harnessed: this is our 
world, if we don't shape it, someone else will. 
 
A: EXTERNALLY FOCUSSED SOFT POWER 
 
A1) Our success in helping to shape the global community and global society 
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18. In a world of competing interests and influences, who succeeds not only in holding their 
own ground - ensuring the confidence of their citizens – but also in contributing qualitatively 
to the emergence of our ever more globalised world in the 21C? It is the countries with 
most soft power. 
 
19. To be attractive and have influence, a country must develop a way of being in the world 
which is intelligent at every level – intellectually, emotionally, spiritually – to present an 
authentic, open, global identity that other countries can understand, engage with and trust. It 
must develop a clear moral stance on the future and be consistent rather than opportunistic, 
facing both inwards and outwards. 
 
20. Some of you reading this will think job done: Britain knows where it stands in the world 
and has no trouble projecting that through its many soft power vehicles – the BBC, British 
Council, Arts industries etc. And yes, in many ways Britain is well ahead of other countries 
both small and large and has remarkable stocks of soft power given its size. However, with 
the diminishing of its hard power capabilities, will that always be the same? There will be no 
doubt from the majority of those giving evidence to the Select Committee that we have to 
stop the depletion of our soft power vehicles  - BBC, British Council, Film Institute etc - and 
for that reason I will not make that case here.  
 
21. In this paper I prefer to focus on the power that arises from our story, how we are 
perceived in the world in terms of our values, moral strength, benignity and to what extent 
this gives us relationship potential. Is it clear, authentic, confident in the way I describe 
Norway above? I'm sure the jury will be out on that but let's begin with an assumption that it 
wishes to be so and likes to believe it has an history of behaving with integrity. 
 
22. Being able to see with a global eye view then is crucial and would reveal many 
weaknesses that, if courageously addressed, would not only shore up British identity but give 
it the kind of influence in global society it once had in the global economy. Here is a 
beginner's list of issues that currently cause distrust because of their inconsistent handling, 
but could be a great source of soft power if we could tell a better story about them: 
• Immigration: Britain's past is characterised by its Empire. Today, Britain has 
become the home of many of the citizens of its former colonies. Yet no 
British politician can tell a story of how this is consistent with Britain's global-
centric identity. Instead, Britain's ambivalence about the value of its 
immigrants allows the default story to arise – that Britain's interest in the 
globe was singular and selfish and holds no love of the world and its diversity 
at core. 
• Weapons of mass destruction: Britain went to war with Iraq because it 
believed Saddam Hussein was hiding WMD. However, Britain itself is hugely 
invested in the military industrial complex that manufactures weapons of mass 
destruction, including chemical weapons. It refuses permission to Iran to 
develop even domestic nuclear capabilities, yet is about to invest another 
4billion in replacing Trident. This kind of hypocrisy robs Britain of its influence 
in developing countries as well as amongst transglobal movements – both 
terrorist and peaceful.  
• Women: the British press and politicians appear to take a clear stand on 
female equality around the world. Yet we are 53rd in the globe in achieving 
balanced representation in our Parliament or board rooms – that puts us 
behind Pakistan, Afghanistan, many of the countries whose attitudes to 
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women we challenge.  
• Gap between the rich and poor: this is a consistent trope in British 
politics that we fail to address from a narrative viewpoint. In Holland the King 
and Queen – traditional symbols of privilege -  have a clear objective to 
connect with their people. They ride bikes, have opinions, appear in public 
without pomp. In contrast, the celebrity nature of our Royal Family both 
emphasises and makes light of the evidence that the class system is thriving: 
something more obvious to outsiders than to ourselves. As a result, British 
politicians are left eulogising about the achievements of European countries 
whilst suffering the humiliation of continuing to appear low in the list of 
nations overcoming the gap. 
• Well being: Britain wants to be a leader in the well being industry - a 
combination of mental and physical health practices and products. Yet it is the 
only country in the EU that has opted out of the shorter working weeks 
policy, thereby ensuring that only the wealthy have a choice to create a good 
work life balance. 
 
23. These are all cross party issues whose outcome is as much in the hands of the multi 
media machine as government. However, a better understanding of soft power might 
encourage more cooperation across the sectors to forge new and more positive narratives 
in each of these areas rather than expend the same energy on point scoring against each 
other. Soft power does not arrive from results alone, but from the attention that is being 
paid to issues in the course of governing.  
 
A2) Our ability to influence outcomes in global conflicts 
 
24. As the current conflict in Syria is demonstrating for us, the public appetite for war has 
decreased significantly. There are many reasons for this: 
 
• the cost of war: we can't afford to police the world any more 
• a leap in awareness of the mental and physical damage wreaked by war on those 
taking part and their families 
• disillusion with results delivered by hard power post Iraq, Afghanistan and to some 
extent, Egypt 
• loss of trust in government and the true motives behind going to war 
• globalisation is maturing: once we understood it as the unregulated space that 
multinationals were taking over. Today we are more aware of the dynamics between 
competing nations, religions, cultures.  
• More of us live global lives – not just through travel, but through the virtual global 
community we have constructed as our daily interface 
• A growing global centric view: more people sign up to NGOs that fight for pan-global 
causes such as climate change than sign up for political parties 
 
25. Nevertheless, people – or shall we say voters to give them their influence in government 
– are still clearly affected by the plight of the victims of war and anxious about power shifts 
in the globe. In response they are either retreating from engagement for practical reasons or 
looking for new ways to be influential in the outcome. The million people marching against 
going to war with Iraq proved pointless. Ten years on social media was able to deliver a 
more resounding 87% of people polled against going to war with Syria and it made the 
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difference between a motion being carried or lost. Both Miliband and Cameron showed 
courage in accepting the will of the people over what may have been their own preference 
to support Obama in the call to strikes. Britain caused the US military to pause and today 
we are talking about Syria joining the treaty against the use of chemical weapons. In domino 
fashion, the Presidents of US and Iran are now talking for the first time since 1997.  
 
26. None of this is hard power – it is a demonstration of how the many different elements of 
soft power combine to get an effect hard power can no longer deliver. Soft power as 
cultural capital guaranteed Britain's decisions make an impact. It is the direct use of the 
media, particularly social media, to tell a different story about global dynamics – what the 
people of one country wants for the people of another - rather than the old school 
exchange of political stand offs, that is growing exponentially. 
 
27. How conflict is reported is a crucial instrument of Britain's soft power. While the BBC 
has always believed its own claim that it only reports the facts, no news organisation 
operates without an agenda although it is often unexamined. I took part in 10 years of 
investigation and research into how conflict is reported, much of which is now written up 
and taught by Jake Lynch and Annabel McGoldrick from Sidney University 
(http://bit.ly/1aSAQeT) in countries all over the world. Until recently, reporting global 
conflict has been very closely allied with reporting war: daily news is framed as moving 
towards or away from war. Outbreaks of violence, both small and large are reported 
faithfully while peace initiatives are mostly sidelined. Readers are well informed about the 
history of conflict but know little or nothing about the history of movements to overcome 
those conflicts. Framing news is an important aspect of soft power. Because Britain has such 
an extensive network of news organisations, the active  development of a global story about 
new ways of transforming conflict is in its gift. 
 
A3.Our ability to stay buoyant in a rapidly changing global economy. 
 
28. The rapidly growing ranks of middle-class consumers span a dozen emerging nations, not 
just the fast-growing BRIC countries,1 and include almost two billion people, spending a total 
of $6.9 trillion annually. Our research suggests that this figure will rise to $20 trillion during 
the next decade—about twice the current consumption in the United States. 
 
Despite having strong global brands, multinational companies face challenging competition in 
emerging markets, as these economies already boast aggressive local players that have 
captured a significant portion of spending. Chinese beverage maker Hangzhou Wahaha, for 
example, has built a $5.2 billion business against global competitors such as Coca-Cola and 
PepsiCo by targeting rural areas, filling product gaps that meet local needs, keeping costs 
low, and appealing to patriotism. McKinsey & Company 2010 (http://bit.ly/1bn5ywb) 
 
29. While there is little doubt that China and the BRIC nations will win the battle for  their 
own markets in delivering the staples, there will always be an appetite for overseas products, 
particularly as the middle classes grow and wish to distinguish themselves. The bigger picture 
within which Britain can be a favoured market will depend on its soft power – its capacity 
for relationship: 
 
• whether or not it can respect and understand the BRIC markets on their own terms 
rather than as a passive recipient of traditional British goods 
• the extent to which Britain can remain culturally distinct. From this point of view a 
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good relationship with Scotland, Ireland, Wales remains important. Britain is a rich 
and diverse entity: in my view, a break up of the Union would damage Britain's image 
abroad in a number of ways. 
• to what extent Britain welcomes China into the global arena rather than fears it. 
Britain is not an economic competitor but it does have political and social influence – 
it should put that to good use helping to encourage China's peaceful emergence 
• it is important to challenge the simplistic idea that any country supporting China's 
peaceful emergence into the global arena, has given up on the fight against their 
human rights abuses. It is possible to hold both these goals at the same time but it 
requires a clear narrative – arising from multiple intelligences and some humility - to 
deliver the complexity of the relationship. These are the very skills that a 
commitment to soft power can develop and deliver.  
• Peer to peer relationships, discovered and grown on the internet, will be crucial to 
Britain's overseas markets in the future. The British government's investment in 
technology for British entrepreneurs – particularly smaller businesses delivering 
information and services – will be crucial. 
 
 
A4. The freedom and potential of global citizenship – UK citizens abroad and 
foreign citizens in the UK 
 
30. There are many who look back at the British Empire as a regrettable period of history, 
others as the scene of our greatest triumphs. Both views are irrelevant in the growing 
challenge that globalisation is bringing to everyone: it is already important and will 
increasingly be so that, for the safety and security of your citizens, your country is not 
considered a threat to others. In contradistinction, if your country has a lot of soft power, 
your citizens and their business will be welcome everywhere. If you doubt that compare 
how an Iranian national feels walking in the streets of a Northern British town to how a 
Brazilian feels. 
 
31. Every country must find its place in the world by creating a narrative that binds the past 
and present in a way that confidently serves the emerging reality of rapid globalisation. 
Britain must build on its identity as a global centric nation: having moved out into the world 
in its past, it has now welcomed the world back into its own borders. There is no other 
multicultural city as successful as London in the world. We must build on that. It is quite 
possible that in the future other countries will not be flocking to Britain for its jobs and 
services because the call of the East will be much stronger as their markets grow 
exponentially. It is our task to hold our nerve in this period of transition and continue to 
build and develop our soft power rather than lose our reputation for fairness and boldness 
in the interim.  
 
B INTERNALLY FOCUSSED SOFT POWER  
 
32. The British people have been in a conversation about Britishness for a long time. We 
have a good number of discourses – around class, religion, nationality, history, the Royal 
Family - that divide us, pulling us this way and that. However, when we are faced with an 
opportunity to present ourselves in a global context – what makes us different from other 
countries  - we can rise to it well. Last year's opening ceremony for the Olympics was 
outstanding for that reason: not because director Danny Boyle took one side or another, 
but because he made a virtue of the complexity. Recognising for example, that a struggling 
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NHS is better than no NHS, that we can now own the cruelty of the industrial revolution 
even as we were grateful for the  prosperity it brought was the kind of nuanced message 
that only the arts can deliver.  
 
33. At a recent conference on Chinese and Indian Soft Power hosted by University of 
Westminster, Professor Xong Xin, Deputy Director of the Public Communication Research 
Institute at Renmin University in Beijing presented a study of the messages of the Olympic 
Opening Ceremony as received and enjoyed by onlookers in China. In order of importance, 
here is what they saw: 
 
1) Britain has a long tradition of creativity 
2) British humour is central to its character  
3) British culture is diverse 
4) The spirit of the Olympic Games 
5) British historical contributions  
6) Britain's tradition of humanism 
7) Britain's tradition of non-conformity 
8) Britain's global influence  
 
The conference incidentally was remarkable for the quality and depth of the papers on soft 
power from China and India, both of whom take the subject very seriously. More evidence 
of this on request.  
 
34. The Opening Ceremony was incredibly well received across the world with 
(http://huff.to/Ooz6Ol), many people seeing Britain in quite a new light as a result. Quite 
remarkably, the effect was equally strong domestically; it transformed what at one point 
looked like being a lacklustre story about empty hotels and poor ticket availability into an 
important historic moment when the whole nation pulled together in the excited scramble 
to get to the park at any cost.  
 
35. What is remarkable however, is that no politician has been able to harness that feel good 
factor: that no one has directly drawn on Danny Boyle's remarkable feat to present a 
coherent picture of a powerful nation at ease with itself to itself. Internally Britishness 
remains a thorny issue, exacerbated now by the challenge of Scottish Independence.  
 
36. The British Council would say that this is the natural domain of artists – however many 
artists would argue with that. Art is a neutral space: it must be free to criticise as well as to 
eulogise. Politics does not have the same luxury: while it may be able to absorb the honesty 
of art and artists, it must always have its own purpose trained on gain for the greatest 
number. How can politicians develop the capacity to do this well? What are the  qualities 
they need to be able to 'dance with the public' while leading the country and what are the 
skills and technologies that enable it all? 
 
B1 Ability to represent the people of Britain in a meaningful way 
 
37. What does it say about our democracy that only 32% of people turned out to vote in 
our most recent local elections? That even in the general elections, the IPPR  ( 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-23832607 )estimated that turnout for under-35s earning less 
than £10,000 a year was just 34%, whereas turnout for over-55s with an income of at least 
£40,000 a year was 79%. This describes a disconnect between politicians / government and 
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the people they serve. If soft power grows in proportion to authenticity (see Norway 
illustration above and all references to China) then there is clearly a lot of 'growth potential' 
in politics. 
 
38. It would not be true to say however, that the British are apathetic: participation in civil 
society, which includes  membership of new social movements, non-governmental 
organisations and pressure groups concerned with various new areas of public concern, has 
flourished.   (http://bit.ly/1gyskit)  This is not the place to discuss at length the reasons for 
this, but it is an important issue for Britain that its ability to have a good collective 
conversation is poor . A family that cannot have a meaningful chat around the table, will lack 
confidence in public: the children will not be willing to invite their friends home and the 
parents will hesitate to talk with pride at social gatherings. Inner doubts radiate outwards as 
much as inner confidence. 
 
39. Is it time to seriously question the nature of our representation? Should politics reflect 
the real interests and concerns of its people more? Can a marginal seat, with up to 60% of a 
constituency not voting for the MP, consider itself representative? Any government that is 
aware of the ebb and flow of soft power must concern itself with such questions. 
 
B2) Ability to regain and retain influence in the shifting power dynamics 21C 
 
40. In addition to politics needing to engage with civil society more in order to reflect the 
voters' interests and needs better, government itself must also do more to recognise the 
paradigmatic shift in how society organises and speaks to itself. In the absence of activists' 
front room, town halls, party conferences or rallies, where is the conversation happening? – 
because it would be a mistake to say it is not happening at all. The internet is burgeoning 
with Facebook, Twitter, Linked In, Pinterest covering all subjects from all points of view; 
Mumsnet has become so influential in its own right that politicians queue up to be featured. 
 
41. While the two main political parties differ in significant ways, most of the key 
assumptions that frame the political narrative are common to both. Many of them are 
outdated for example: 
• that a full time job is what everyone wants – not so (http://bit.ly/16y8mmn) 
• that voters are selfish so the economy is more important than the planet – not so 
(http://read.bi/150RcKt) 
• that female equality is a woman's issue – not so (http://bit.ly/15yrfWj) 
 
42. Taking part in the public conversation – rather than trying to manage or manipulate it – 
will enhance the government's relationship with the voters and ultimately deliver more 
domestic soft power. This might require more distribution of power within government, 
even allowing a civil society tier to open up to capture public preferences. Of course this is 
not the place to discuss that other than to say again, that better relationships within the 
country will create more confidence – attraction – going outwards. 
 
B3) Ability to do the work of government more effectively than the media or 
other private initiatives. 
 
43. In a paper titled Communication, Power and Counter-power in the Network Society 
written in 2007, Manuel Castells, Professor of Communication at the University of Southern 
California, says the following: 
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The media have become the social space where power is decided. (This paper) shows the 
direct link between politics, media politics, the politics of scandal, and the crisis of political 
legitimacy in a global perspective. It also puts forward the notion that the development of 
interactive, horizontal networks of communication has induced the rise of a new form of 
communication, mass self-communication, over the Internet and wireless communication 
networks. Under these conditions, insurgent politics and social movements are able to 
intervene more decisively in the new communication space. However, corporate media and 
mainstream politics have also invested in this new communication space. As a result of these 
processes, mass media and horizontal communication networks are converging. The net 
outcome of this evolution is a historical shift of the public sphere from the institutional realm 
to the new communication space. 
44. There will always be a shifting dynamic between politics, mass media and the new 
horizontal networks of communication. However, since the advent of proactive political PR 
professionals such as Bernard Ingham and Alistair Campbell – men who are intent on shaping 
the news on a daily basis – there is a battle for the hearts and minds of British voters that is 
becoming ever more conspicuous. Whereas not so long ago people would be captive to 
their chosen news source, today we mix and match our inputs fully aware that none of them 
are giving us the full picture and some are almost fantastic in their framing of the news. In 
addition many of us are now mixing in reports picked up from Twitter and Facebook, 
without checking their veracity. It seems we are as interested in the feel of a report – how 
much it resonates with our view of the world, or our need to have certain hopes or fears 
confirmed – as we are with the truth. 
 
45. This is an aspect of soft power that government rarely talks about. How a journalist 
frames the news to attract the reader is an important form of influence that has social and 
political outcomes. While some might see this as a subject for the media department, it is 
my contention that it should be served by the same ministry that considers soft power and 
government influence at home and abroad. Not, I reiterate, so that government can have 
more power over people, but so that government can develop more power for and with the 
people – just as greater understanding of how the body operates benefits both doctor and 
patient. 
 
46. Government's ability to communicate with the voters is woeful: there simply is no 
relationship between the rulers and the ruled that is trusted or enjoyed. In the age of infinite 
forms of communication this is an area of potential all governments should aspire to improve 
radically. 
 
B4. Make way for a new era of individual and social potential.  
 
47. To recognise the limitations of hard power and be curious in the face of our growing 
understanding of soft power is all that is required to open the door to a new era of both 
individual and collective agency. With the benefit of hindsight, we are able to look at the 
phenomenon of the internet and laugh at how we could not have seen what a difference it 
was going to make in our lives. Same for every major shift in human agency – from the 
introduction of electricity to the car. And it will be the same for soft power. 
 
48. Hard power – guns, money, force - has always been concentrated in the hands of the 
elite. But soft power can be amassed in a million different ways by almost anyone with the 
ability to communicate. Mohamed Bouazizi did not have his own newspaper – he may not 
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have had his own computer for all we know – but setting fire to himself in a public space 
changed the course of history in the Middle East. This was not accidental: he knew the 
power of spectacle in the age of social media, he understood soft power. 
(http://bit.ly/vlJRUw) Now multiply that awareness by any number you like.  
 
49. A more attractive example might be how Uganda's mobile phone revolution is beginning 
to change the global view not only of their country but of the continent. Now that the 
African people are able to email, tweet and Facebook images of their growing middle class, 
challenging the well meaning but disempowering image of Africa as malnourished, dependent 
and unable to manage, investment is increasing steadily (http://bit.ly/18v6RYH) 
 
50. At this moment we are still socially organised in a triangle, with the poor masses at the 
bottom of a very pointy local and global world. We've heard about the phenomenon of 
horizontalism – how more people are able to connect side to side rather than up and down 
and how this is making a difference to businesses. We are just at the beginning of this making 
a difference in politics, both local and global.  
 
51. This is unlikely to result in an upside down triangle: leadership will always be sought and 
needed – but it is unlikely to stay the shape it is now. Will it look more like an oval with the 
leaders balancing precariously on top? Or might it look more like a circle, with leadership in 
the centre modelling change? The lessons of global soft power suggest that it is the inner 
qualities of authenticity, integrity and consistency are the most effective tools of influence. 
Aren't our most popular global leaders – Mandela, Gandhi, Luther-King – individuals that 
show as much vulnerability as strength?  
 
52. Will Britain embrace this change and be ahead enough of the curve to be able to model 
its successful transition globally? This House of Lords Select Committee is a good start: it 
provides more of a cross party space than the House of Commons and traditionally values 
maturity and perspective over short term gains. Even so, it will be a rare politician that can 
embody the shift from nation centric to global centric to see that Britain's role as an early 
adopter of soft power as a governing principle is as much in the interest of our own islands 
as it is in the interest of the globe.  
 
17 September 2013 
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Health and healthcare:  
A key asset to the UK’s soft power 
 
 
 
Summary 
Good health is vital to everyone around the world and to all nations, whether economically 
rich or poor. Its value in terms of global economics, security and development means that 
those with the knowledge and resources to improve health command a powerful asset and a 
high degree of influence. 
This paper highlights how, as a leader in the science and delivery of healthcare, the UK 
carries significant influence with governments, businesses and local communities worldwide. 
Four categories of global influence through healthcare are outlined below: 
1. Soft power through intellectual capital and expertise 
2. Soft power through partnerships with the NHS 
3. Soft power through improving health in developing countries 
4. Soft power through roles in international governing bodies 
Together, these roles and relationships strengthen the UKs position abroad and create 
opportunities for influence open to few other nations. 
  
The global perspective 
A number of features give the healthcare sector a special status in its potential for soft 
power and influence: 
• Economics: Healthcare is a very big business. Most developed countries spend in 
excess of 10% of their GDP on it every year. This accounts for an annual global total 
spend of around US$6.5 trillion, making health one of the world’s largest and fastest 
growing industries.2 
• Security: Access to quality healthcare is a vital component in every nation’s stability.  
This is particularly evident in states with rapid economic growth such as India, China 
                                            
2 World Health Organisation Global Expenditure Database (figures for 2010) 
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and the Arab nations, where better health systems and services are among the first 
priorities for citizens and governments. 
• Development: Improving health is one of the most effective and common means of 
international development. Health interventions are among the most effective and 
efficient uses of international aid.3 Health is the joint largest area of spending for 
global aid to Sub-Saharan Africa (18%), alongside projects to improve the governance 
and enabling environment of developing countries.4 
• Conflict: Access to healthcare is a vital component in the rebuilding of states in or 
recovering from conflict. Military medicine, control of communicable diseases and 
health systems strengthening are all areas where the UK boasts a substantial 
proportion of the world’s expertise. 
 
 
1. Soft power through intellectual capital and expertise 
The UK is a world leader in the research, development and discovery of advances in 
healthcare. Its thriving biomedical science sector is one of the strongest and most productive 
in the world – spreading new drugs, devices and procedures to patients around the world 
and contributing an estimated £50bn to the UK economy each year5 (or around 9% of total 
UK exports)6. 
As figures 1 and 2 show, UK research institutions out-perform all but the USA in terms of 
the amount of biomedical research published each year and the impact these publications 
have. This dominant share of the world’s life science expertise and intellectual capital 
increases the prestige associated with the UK’s scientific community and academic 
institutions, attracts further investment and talent and creates opportunities for significant 
political and commercial influence in a sector set to continue transforming health and 
healthcare over the next century.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
3 Making Aid Work (2007) Banerjee A; MIT Press 
4 Official Development Assistance: Data and Guides (2012) Development Initiatives report 
5 Department for Business Innovation and Skills Office for Life Sciences current estimate 
6 Office of National Statistics (2009)  
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Figure 1. UK performance by number of health science articles published7 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. UK performance by impact-weighted articles in biology and medicine 
(2011)8 
 
                                            
7 Data on 2012 retrieved from SciVerse Scopus August 2013 
8 The Most Innovative Countries in Biology and Medicine; Forbes Magazine (2011) 
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2. Soft power through partnerships with the NHS 
The modern NHS is one of the best performing and most well-regarded health systems in 
the world. As figure 3 shows, it outperforms most if not all other countries on objective 
measures of safety, fairness and efficiency. Public perception of its strength also bear this out. 
As figure 4 shows, the UK health system has the highest public approval rating of any other 
comparator nation, despite having one of the lowest spending-per-capita rates on healthcare 
in this group. It is not only esteemed among British patients either – in 2010 alone around 
52,000 overseas visitors came to the UK for medical treatment, activity though to have 
generated around £132 million in private income for healthcare providers.9  
 
Figure 3. Rankings of health system performance by country10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
9 A framework for exploring the policy implications of UK medical tourism and international patient flows (2013) Lunt NT, 
Mannion R, and Exworthy M; Social Policy & Administration 47(1): 1-25                    
10 International Comparison Data on Health System Performance (2010) Commonwealth Fund 
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Figure 4. International comparison of public approval rates vs. healthcare 
spending11 12 
 
 
 
 
The NHS actively works to foster international links and partnerships – both capitalising on 
and further increasing the reputation of the service, and the UK, abroad. Two growing 
trends in this area are not-for-profit schemes with low and middle income countries and 
revenue-generating commercial ventures overseas. 
 
Not-for-profit partnerships: Over 200 NHS organisations are thought to operate 
partnerships in low and middle income countries.13 These typically involve NHS staff helping 
to train health workers overseas or directly providing care to patients (for example through 
visiting ‘surgical camps’). In 2010 Department for International Development funded two 
successful schemes to connect NHS organisations and staff with partners overseas. The first, 
the ‘Health Partnerships Scheme’, will by 2015 have resulted in NHS staff spending 50,000 
days working abroad training some 13,000 health workers. The second scheme, ‘Making it 
Happen’, will over four years have trained 17,000 health workers and is expected to save the 
lives of more than 9,500 mothers and 10,000 newborn children. 
These partnerships foster valuable relationships at the governmental, institutional, 
community and individual level. In a recent study of overseas partnerships by the APPG on 
Global Health, NHS organisations reported that their overseas links brought back important 
                                            
11 International Profiles of Health Care Systems (2012) The Commonwealth Fund 
12 OECD Health Data (2012) Organisations for Economic Co-operation and Development 
13 Tropical Health and Education Trust data 
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benefits for them in terms of international reputation, leadership development and 
innovation, as well as meeting critical health needs in their partner country.14 
These NHS partnerships form part of a much wider movement of community-community 
links between the UK and developing countries. Although many are not specifically health 
related, these partnerships are an important part of the grass-roots relationships and 
influence held by the UK. Officers of the APPG on Global Health are involved in several 
types of initiative that may be of interest to the Select Committee: 
• Lord Crisp co-founded the Zambia Health Workforce Alliance to bring together the 
many UK-based organisations with health links to Zambia. The alliance aims to 
provide a focal point for the Zambian host government so that joint work in less 
fragmented and better aligned to the country’s national priorities 
• APPG Vice Chair Kevin Barron MP established the APPG on Connecting 
Communities, which specifically focuses on the issue of linking communities in the 
UK with low income countries for the purposes of development. 
Commercial ventures: There is also growing interest within the NHS to capitalise on 
higher-income countries that look to the UK health system as a model. These initiatives can 
spread British ideas and influence abroad, further enhance the reputation of the UK and 
NHS brands and earn additional revenue to be spent on health services back home. 
One example of this activity is Moorfield’s Eye Hospital, which in 2007 established a branch 
in Dubai’s ‘Healthcare City’. Since then it has treated over 26,000 patients, with steadily 
growing profits currently at £390,000 in 2012/13.15  
An example at a national level is the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence 
(NICE), which in response to growing interest in its resource allocation model and clinical 
guidelines founded an international department to spread these ideas abroad. The 
department provides advice to foreign institutions and governments on clinical and policy 
decisions. They have completed dozens of projects in almost every continent, including 
ongoing partnerships with emerging economies such as India and China.16  
The Government has recently established Healthcare UK, a joint initiative by the Department 
of Health and UK Trade and Industry to help expand and accelerate commercial 
partnerships between the UK health sector and partners overseas. Further examples of 
ongoing and planned ventures can be found on their website.17 
 
3. Soft power through improving health in developing countries 
The UK is the world’s second largest donor of overseas development assistance to low and 
middle income countries (figure 5). As figure 6 shows, national spending on international 
development will, this year, reach its target of 0.7% of Gross National Income, doubling the 
proportion that was spent in 2007. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
14 Improving Health at Home and Abroad: How overseas volunteering from the NHS benefits the UK and the world (2013) 
All Party Parliamentary Group on Global Health 
15 Data from freedom of Information request: https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/international_business_2  
16 http://www.nice.org.uk/aboutnice/niceinternational/projects/NICEInternationalProjects.jsp (accessed 21/8/13) 
17 http://www.ukti.gov.uk/export/sectors/lifesciences/item/429220.html (accessed 21/8/13) 
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Figure 5. Total overseas development assistance contribution by country18 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Growth in UK aid spending 2007-201319 
 
 
                                            
18 Official statistics on Overseas Development Assistance; Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/aidtopoorcountriesslipsfurtherasgovernmentstightenbudgets.htm (accessed 21/8/13) 
19 Development Policy Blog, using figures from Department for International Development http://devpolicy.org/uk-aid-will-
it-hit-0-7-next-year/ (accessed 21/8/13) 
All-Party Parliamentary Group on Global Health – Written evidence 
64 
 
Health projects account for around 18% of spending by the Department for International 
Development (DFID), second only to that given towards government and civil society 
organisations.20 Typical health projects include vaccination programmes, improving access to 
clean water and sanitations, providing new health facilities and training staff.  
DFID is also a major investor in research to improve health in developing countries, 
including work that is now contributing to successes in the control of HIV/AIDS. Ongoing 
studies include establishing the evidence base for effective public health interventions in 
humanitarian crises and large-scale trials into TB vaccines. 
The leading role played by the UK in international development not only gains it influence 
with recipient countries, many of whom are now rapidly growing into major economic 
players for the 21st century, but also standing among all. One recent example of this was the 
invitation by the UN for the Prime Minister to act as one of three co-chairs for the High 
Level Panel to determine the global goals that will replace the Millennium Development 
Goals from 2015 onwards.21 
 
4. Soft power through roles in international governing bodies 
The UK’s presence and prominence in international organisations is a key part of its soft 
power and influence internationally. The strengths in health science, delivery and 
development outlined in the sections above all help to support these roles – and there are 
various examples of the UK influencing on, but also being able to influence through, global 
health issues. 
The UK is a member and major funder of the World Health Organisation (WHO). It plays a 
leading role on several issues, including global responses to pandemics and emerging 
infections such as Swine Flu and the recent novel Coronavirus.  Several UK figures have also 
been invited into positions of significant influence at the WHO, including:  
• In 2005 Sir Michael Marmot was made the Chair of the WHO Commission on Social 
Determinants of Health. 
• In 2006 His Royal Highness, Prince Charles addressed the main assembly of the 
WHO on the achievements of modern medicine. 
• In 2011 Sir Liam Donaldson was made WHO Envoy for Patient Safety, responsible 
for promoting the issue of patient safety as a global health priority. 
• The current Chief Medical Officer Dame Sally Davies is a member of the WHO 
Advisory Committee on Health Research.   
 
Health also contributes to the UK’s position in non-health international governing bodies, 
examples include: 
• Having a key role in the development and introduction of the UN Millennium 
Development Goals in 2000, which have led to significant improvements in health 
worldwide. 
• Leading the EU’s pandemic preparedness during our 2005 presidency. 
• The recent Hunger Summit called by David Cameron alongside the 2013 G8 meeting 
in Northern Ireland, where the UK pledged an additional £375 million of core funding 
                                            
20 The IFS Green Budget 2012; Institute for Fiscal Studies p155  
21 A new global partnership: Eradicate poverty and transform economies through sustainable development. Report of the 
High Level Panel of Eminent Persons on the Post 2015 Development Agenda (2013) United Nations 
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and £280 million of matched funding to fight hunger, donations pledged by all 
delegates as a result of this summit totalled £2.7 billion between now and 2020.  
 
About the APPG on Global Health 
The APPG on Global Health focuses on the underlying, cross-cutting health issues which 
affect us all wherever we live.  
Through research and regular events, it offers recommendations and advice to Parliament 
and the Government on key policies impacting health in the UK and overseas. 
The Group is led by its members, co-chaired by Lord Crisp and Meg Hillier MP and 
supported by academic institutions, the Lancet and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. 
Together, these allow us to connect the interest, impact and knowledge of parliamentarians 
with the expertise and experience of the wider global health community. 
 
6 September 2013 
 
  
Professor Simon Anholt – Written evidence 
66 
 
 
Professor Simon Anholt – Written evidence 
 
The UK is unusually rich in ‘soft’ power: the content, and the instruments for delivering it. 
There is no need for me to list them here, as the enquiry will have produced abundant 
evidence of these riches.  
 
Of course, every such instrument has two functions: an intrinsic function (the World Service 
provides news; museums collect and curate; universities teach and research) and an incidental 
function (they also convey our talents and values to people in other countries, and thus 
increase our moral or ‘soft’ power). How well their intrinsic function operates is incidental 
to this discussion: one assumes that if they don’t perform it well, they won’t stay in business 
very long.  
 
How well their incidental function operates has a lot to do with Government. None of these 
players can achieve a great deal on their own, because the world is too big and too busy, and 
because most people don’t think much about the UK or any other foreign country. The only 
way that ‘soft’ power can become an effective force is if these instruments, instead of being 
just left lying around the place as they habitually are in this country, are inspired and 
informed by a shared, long-term, national strategy. Achieving this without jeopardising their 
independence and integrity is of course a tricky business, but one can rely on the owners 
and managers of the soft power instruments to monitor this risk.  
 
Such a grand strategy is what the United Kingdom lacks. Its absence is the reason why our 
instruments of soft power do so very well on their own account yet achieve only a small 
part of what they could achieve for the country and its standing, if only they were really 
working together. The MARSS model (described in a separate paper) shows that the most 
dependably attractive focus for any national strategy is a moral one: the aim is to prove the 
utility of the country to humanity and to the planet, rather than brag about its assets or 
achievements (which, in the case of the UK, are sufficiently appreciated that further bragging 
is more likely to annoy than impress). To put it simply, people in other countries are much 
more interested in what the UK can do for them than in what it manages to do for itself.  
 
I’ve spent the last fifteen years teaching countries how to corral their soft and hard powers 
around a shared, national, grand strategy, so that their impacts can be combined and thus 
multiplied. This is the task which the UK has failed to seize or even to acknowledge in living 
memory, despite the fact that becoming a paragon of soft power is our country’s only 
remaining strategic option.  
 
The first stage is a complete review of all the country’s instruments of international 
engagement: both those controlled by government and those beyond its influence. The 
second stage is a well-guided national conversation leading to a grand strategy: a strategy 
which attempts to answer the apparently simple but desperately important question, what is 
the UK for? The third stage is to corral our instruments of engagement around the 
execution of this strategy, in order to produce an unbroken, unending stream of dramatic 
evidence that we deserve the standing we desire: this must be done with unfailing courage 
and imagination. The fourth stage is to measure how well we are doing this. The fifth 
stage, having taken the learnings of the fourth well into account, is to carry on forever.  
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The risk of this process being interrupted by changes of government is so great – for these 
things take decades and generations to achieve – that the creation of a cross-sectoral, 
public-private body to manage the task and maintain both quality and momentum will 
probably be essential.  
 
September 2013 
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Lord Howell of Guildford (Chairman) 
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean 
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock 
Baroness Goudie 
Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts  
Lord Janvrin 
Baroness Nicholson of Winterbourne 
________________ 
Examination of Witnesses 
Simon Anholt, policy advisor and author of the Anholt-GfK Roper Nation Brands Index, 
Jonathan McClory, policy and place branding consultant, author of the IfG-Monocle Soft 
Power Index, and Agnès Poirier, commentator on politics and French-British relations 
 
Q200   The Chairman: We are delighted that our witnesses could join us today in our 
inquiries and construction of a report to government on soft power and British overseas 
influence. Thank you very much for coming. There are in front of you the necessary 
declarations of interests, which we are obliged to put before you to tell you who we are. 
We are going to conduct this session between the whole Committee and all three 
witnesses, but I think I am right in saying that Agnès Poirier wanted to make a little opening 
statement first. Is that correct? In fact, you could all make opening statements if you so 
wished, but as you have asked first, Agnès Poirier, you will go first. 
Agnès Poirier: Very good, but we have just discussed it and my neighbours here have not 
prepared a statement as such. It is really up to you.  
Simon Anholt: I am very happy to improvise a statement if Jonathan does not mind either.  
Agnès Poirier: I will keep it brief. I grew up in a country, France, where soft power—or, 
rather, as we once called it, grandeur— 
The Chairman: Grandeur? 
Agnès Poirier: I think you can use that word. We talk about soft power, but you and I used 
to talk about grandeur. It is an ordinary, everyday ambition, I think. Influencing others, 
shaping thoughts and leading the way in arts, fashion, gastronomy and foreign policy is at 
least in theory always the aim in France. You want to share your views with the world, and 
you hope that the world will then adopt your views. I think that is why France and the USA 
have a lot in common.  
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I will give just one example. France has the world’s second largest diplomatic network, 
second only to that of the United States. So why am I talking to you about France, or indeed 
the US, when our topic is the UK’s soft power and influence in the world? Perhaps it is 
because we do most things in opposite ways and perhaps we have a lot to learn from each 
other. British soft power is evident and huge, and along with another 300,000 or so of my 
compatriots I succumbed to British soft power as a student in the mid-1990s when I decided 
to come to London. 
Soft power is about powerful images and potent feelings that one associates with one 
country or one culture. At the time, having studied English, Russian and Spanish, I could have 
chosen those three countries to finish my studies in. If I chose Britain it was not only down 
to the practicality of Eurostar; it had to do with powerful icons. This might surprise you, 
because I was a 22 year-old student, but I chose Britain in no specific order because of 
Shakespeare, Cadbury chocolates, the blitz, the BBC, because I was and still am a raving 
cinephile, Rex Harrison, George Sanders, Laurence Olivier and James Mason—all born 
before 1910; I was born in the 1970s. I also chose London because a young Labour Prime 
Minister was about to end 18 years of Conservatism, while back in France Jacques Chirac 
had just been elected to what felt to me to be seven very long years.  
I will end here, except to say that 17 years later I am still here and I can fairly say that 
Britain, as much as France, has shaped who I am. This is, I think, a personal introduction to 
the UK’s influence in the world. 
Q201   The Chairman: Thank you very much indeed. I should have put the first question 
more clearly to start with, and I will ask your neighbours either side of you to make the 
same sort of comment on it. What do other countries—we have just heard one example—
find attractive about the UK, and maybe on the other side what do they find less attractive, 
and unattractive, about the UK, because we as a Committee will need to suggest to the 
Government that they may be pressing many buttons to promote soft power but perhaps 
are not pressing the right ones or perhaps are not pressing them hard enough. That all fits in 
with what you have just said. Thank you very much. Mr McClory, would you like to go next?  
Jonathan McClory: To address the question just asked?  
The Chairman: To start with, yes. 
Jonathan McClory: Simon will probably be able to say in much greater detail what things 
people find attractive, because he has done a great deal of work in testing exactly what 
people find attractive about countries. The work that I have done looks more at the 
resources that allow countries to engage with international audiences and that ultimately will 
have some positive impact on how people see a country. I think it is worth highlighting that 
those resources are what goes into making the soft power of a country, and they start with 
the political values of a country such as free speech and a free press but also with the 
institutions that uphold those values. Right now, we are sitting in the mother of all 
Parliaments, so this very building is a form of soft power resource. Then there is the culture 
of a country, from high culture to pop culture—so everything from the British Museum to 
Old Trafford through to the English language all the way to Harry Potter.  
The other pillar that Joseph Nye identifies is foreign policy. This is not necessarily just about 
how a country acts, which is very important, but about the diplomatic infrastructure. The 
UK has tremendous resources in that, with the British Council, the Foreign Office and the 
very strong networks which the UK is part of—from the UN Security Council to the 
European Union to the Commonwealth—as well as the BBC World Service.  
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Education is a huge strength of the UK and an important part of soft power. It is not only 
the ability to attract international students but the quality of universities, as well as the 
quality of the academic output, of a country.  
Finally—this can almost drift into the world of hard power but I assure you it is not—is the 
attractiveness of a country’s economic model: its capacity for innovation, its friendliness to 
business, the quality of its regulations and the extent to which corruption exists. These five 
categories really cover what makes for soft power resources. It is very important that we 
have a structured way to think about this. I have listened to people answer the question: 
what is it that is attractive about a country? It can go all over the place, but it is a fairly 
difficult concept to pin down at times and if we can add some sensible structure to it it 
becomes much more useful for policymakers to get to grips with and ultimately to try to 
use. 
The Chairman: I would love to pursue all sorts of questions from that, but shall we just 
ask Professor Anholt to make an entrée to the issue? 
Simon Anholt: Yes. I think it is worth asking why we are discussing soft power today. We 
do not often discuss hard power, because we are reasonably familiar with it as a topic. Soft 
power is a relatively new idea, and it is worth asking why it is new, where it has come from, 
why it has suddenly appeared. The reason is because in the past only hard power really 
mattered, because the only interactions between states that mattered were the interactions 
of statecraft. Hard power is a tool of statecraft; it is the currency that states use between 
each other. Soft power is a currency that comes into being, becomes necessary, when 
populations have to engage with each other. As a result of the spread of democracy in more 
and more countries, people power means that soft power becomes necessary; you cannot 
very easily wield hard power on populations except by invading them, and that does not 
always achieve the result that you want. It is good that we are talking about soft power, 
because it means that the world is a more civilised place than it was before soft power 
became necessary.  
Having said all that, I have never been entirely happy with the term “soft power”. It seems to 
me to be quite a primitive term, and in some respects I object to both parts of it. I object to 
the idea of “soft” because that makes it sound pathetic, and when we talk about the BBC 
World Service or about culture more broadly there is nothing soft about that, and “power” 
suggests that it is an instrument for getting your own way. The moment you start talking 
about using soft power as an instrument for getting your own way, it fails, because people 
immediately realise that you are using it in order to get your own way. So I object to “soft” 
and I object to “power”; it makes the whole thing sound like a pillow fight, and it is does not 
really get us anywhere at all. 
I am very interested in the idea of moral power. It sounds agreeably old fashioned, but there 
is a reason why I like the idea of moral power. I have been researching for nearly 10 years 
now the way in which people around the world perceive other nations in a survey called the 
Nation Brands Index, which every year since 2005 I have used to poll a sample equivalent to 
about 66% of the world’s population—ordinary people in up to 38 countries—on their 
perceptions of 50 other countries. To cut a very long story very short, I have now collected 
164 billion datapoints about what people think about other countries and why. The answer 
is that there are two categories of country. There are the categories that are already 
famous, such as Britain, America and China, which come with their image and their 
attractiveness or otherwise formed by their history and by their past engagements with 
other countries. Whether they are good or bad, beautiful or ugly, they have images, a 
reputation. Of the remaining 192-odd countries, the ones that have a good image have an 
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image because they are good. Moral power is the strongest determinant of an overall 
positive reputation. This is extraordinarily good news. If anybody wants to challenge me on 
this—I would not be at all surprised if you did—I would be very happy to respond, but in the 
meantime you might just want to take my word for it: people like good countries. 
The Chairman: Right. That is a very good starting point. I do not know whether any of my 
colleagues would like to come in with questions.  
Q202   Lord Forsyth of Drumlean: I would just like to ask this. You do not like “soft 
power”. You said moral power, but you rubbished power for very good reasons, so what do 
you think it should be? 
The Chairman: What are we talking about? 
Simon Anholt: The model that I started developing about two years ago is called the MARSS 
model. You have to have an acronym otherwise nobody pays any attention. It is a bit more 
complex than soft and hard. M is morality: the perception that a country is good or bad, 
whatever that means for the subject in question. A is aesthetics: whether a country is 
perceived to be good looking or not. Because we are human beings we tend to see things 
visually; we have a picture postcard in our mind of what we imagine other countries are 
like—beautiful or ugly. R is relevance: does the country have any impact, any influence, to 
actually change my life, or does it not? The first S is sophistication: do I regard this other 
country as being a modern, technologically advanced country or do they still plough the 
fields with oxen. The last S is strong: the equivalent of the soft and hard power dimension. Is 
it a country with power—economic, military, territorial, population and so forth? 
So rather than just the two-dimensional model of hard power or soft power, my model 
looks at those five dimensions which, based on the research, appear to be the ways in which 
people all over the world instinctively in their minds categorise and assess other countries. 
As I say, the moral dimension appears to be the most significant of the five. 
Q203  Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: That is really fascinating, and there are thousands of 
questions to ask about that, but the one I want to ask is this. You are measuring people’s 
perceptions. We are particularly interested in how they come to those perceptions. In other 
words, what are we doing that creates the right perceptions? What are we doing that 
creates the wrong perception? Rather than just measuring the effects of it, can you identify 
the causes? 
Simon Anholt: In a word, it is a great many things over a very long period. It is ultimately to 
do with the amount of engagement that a country has with another country. One of the 
reasons why the United Kingdom has an extraordinarily powerful and positive image—in my 
survey, it is invariably one of the top three most admired countries on the planet—is simply 
the extent of our reach: the number of engagements that we have with many, many 
hundreds of millions of people all over the world over many, many generations. To know 
someone is to love them, and the curious thing is that even if our relationship with one or 
another country might not have been happy in the past, after a generation or two people 
seem to forget the nature of the relationship and all they remember is that they know us. 
The Indians, for example, would have every good reason to curse our memory but they do 
not. They remember that they know us and they think that they like us. It is a million 
different things over an extraordinarily long period. The biggest problem that I have in my 
day job, which is advising Presidents and Prime Ministers on this kind of stuff, is patience. 
They are simply not in office long enough to have any influence over these effects, which 
tend to be over decades and generations. One of the things that my survey has proved 
beyond doubt is that none of us likes to change our mind about countries, and we will resist 
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changing our minds about countries even after the evidence becomes overwhelmingly that 
we ought to. 
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: Why do we always do so badly in the Eurovision song 
contest? 
Simon Anholt: Jonathan? 
Jonathan McClory: I have already named the five major categories of metrics that go into 
creating the soft power index that I compile. One of those metrics covers the global music 
industry and using data that are very helpfully provided by—the International Federation of 
the Phonographic Industry, which represents the global recording industry – it has a great 
deal of data on countries and their respective music markets. The UK has more top five 
albums in foreign countries for which there are data than all other countries put together. 
So to answer your question, the UK has a phenomenal heritage of creating music and selling 
it and is a global success, in many ways head and shoulders above others. The US might 
argue otherwise, but the UK is at the top, certainly.  
Simon Anholt: The Eurovision song contest is about bad music, and that is why the UK 
does not do well. 
Jonathan McClory: Exactly. We do not need the Eurovision song contest, because the 
actual music that the UK makes does very, very well indeed. 
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean: There is a serious point behind the question. It is nothing to 
do with music; it is about people ganging up and forming alliances. So you have not really 
answered Lord Foulkes’s question.  
Jonathan McClory: I think you see that with a few countries. You do not see it with all. 
Yes, Cyprus will always give 12 points to Greece and vice versa.  
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean: I dare say I am getting out of my depth now. 
Jonathan McClory: If we look at some of the noises that are being made politically about 
wanting to be in a club, it sounds as though Britain does not really want to be part of the 
Eurovision club anyway: hence, perhaps, it does not get too many points. 
Q204  The Chairman: Perhaps we could move away from that particular point, although 
it seems vital. Indeed, the whole impact of our creative arts generally and our image in the 
world are important and, we hope, are now securing our prosperity and interests. At one 
end of the spectrum there is old fashioned hard power, or new fashioned hard power: 
lobbing missiles. It used to be gunboats and boots on the ground. Some countries have that 
capacity, including this one to some extent, America obviously to a vastly greater extent, 
France to a considerable extent. Other countries are much more reluctant even to 
contemplate hard power methods. Are they related? Are one’s image, power of persuasion 
and getting other countries to make one feel attractive and beloved, as it were, connected 
with the fact that behind you you have a very big stick? Do hard power and soft power go 
together, and if you separate them do they fall apart? That proposition has been put to us in 
evidence quite strongly. 
Simon Anholt: My own view is that they are really rather separate creatures. I think that 
one has to go to the end of the argument and ask what we are hoping to achieve by the 
exercise of these powers. What do we actually want? Do we want more trade? Do we want 
economic prosperity? Do we want to engage more productively with other countries? If that 
is the end of the argument, I would argue that a different kind of hard power from the 
military is probably essential, and that is a combination of economic, commercial and 
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population power: in other words, the combination of a large number of people, a large 
number of companies, a lot of money and a lot of experience that enables that country to 
expand itself commercially widely around the world. The United Kingdom has this 
commercial hard power to a great degree. Our businesses operate all over the world, our 
business people operate all over the world, our products are sold all over the world, and 
products from all over the world are bought and sold here. Through that process, we have 
many, many engagements. Millions of people every day have an opportunity to engage with 
the United Kingdom in one way or another. That is our commercial hard power. If we did 
not have Trident, I do not think it would make any difference at all to that. The hard power I 
am talking about is economic and commercial. If the ultimate aim is to sell more stuff and to 
make more money, I do not think that military hard power is all that important. Military hard 
power is very important in order not to get yourself pushed into a situation where you 
cannot even trade. I am not saying that military power is unimportant; I am saying that it 
does not produce soft power as a direct consequence. It is not the sine qua non of soft 
power either. 
The Chairman: I suppose I am saying that in history if we got into major trade disputes, as 
we have many times—our goods were halted or chucked in the sea at the Boston tea 
party—and if there was a gross offence to our commercial interests, in history our response 
has been, “Very well, send in the troops”. If our country has decided that it will never use 
that kind of military deployment, are its threats and negotiating powers greatly weakened? I 
think you have just hinted in what you said that you think they might be. 
Simon Anholt: I rather thought I was saying that they are not greatly weakened. I think 
there is every cause for celebration that we live in an age when the use of military power in 
those circumstances is no longer really approved of, not even really tolerated. We are after 
all a member of the European Union, and long may we remain so. In Europe, it is regarded as 
not done to wave military power around in order to achieve commercial or political aims. 
That is the model for global collaboration, and as time passes I hope—I would like to 
think—that military power will become less and less an instrument of achieving one’s aims 
and more and more a backstop. In other words, it is about that word “defence”, which we 
have used for a very long time, and nothing much more than that. 
Q205   Lord Forsyth of Drumlean: Given your earlier remarks about the regard in 
which Britain is held around the world and the networks that we have, such as the 
Commonwealth, why, if you are right about promoting commercial interests, have we been 
so unsuccessful in penetrating markets outside the European Union and the US? 
Simon Anholt: Have we been unsuccessful? 
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean: Half our exports go to the European Union. If we are looking 
at a global marketplace, and if we have this fantastic image around the world and we are in 
the top three countries, and if we have businessmen who operate and are used to operating 
internationally, why have we not been more successful in grabbing a broader share of world 
trade? I do not know whether it is true, but I read it in the newspaper so it must be, that 
China does more trade with Switzerland than with us, for example.  
Simon Anholt: Two things can be said in response to that. First, it is certainly true that our 
reputation is best in the countries where we are historically best known. I am glad you 
mentioned the Commonwealth. One of the dynamics that is absolutely clear from my survey 
is that being a member of the Commonwealth is an enormous advantage from this point of 
view. The Commonwealth countries know each other and trust each other to a remarkable 
degree. In a country such as China, tens of millions of children grow up every year hardly 
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being taught any European history at all and not really knowing very much about the United 
Kingdom. In one sense when we talk about China, all this means is that “branding”, to use 
that awful term, still has to be done because we are simply not very familiar to the Chinese. 
To educated Chinese we exist in a rather superficial way. To the vast majority of Chinese 
we are just another country in Europe, if that. So the task of introducing ourselves to the 
countries with which we are not historically associated still needs to be performed. That is a 
very good reason for us not to rest on our laurels. It is one of the reasons why hosting the 
Olympics in 2012 was certainly a good thing for us to do, but one of the things my survey 
showed was that it did not actually improve Britain’s reputation internationally because our 
reputation was already just about as good as it could be. I do not really see how the 
Olympics could have caused us to be even temporarily more highly regarded than the 
United States. But, as I often say, a reputation is not something you own but something you 
rent, and that rent must continue to be paid. By carrying out operations such as the 
Olympics fairly regularly, we pay our rent and we teach emerging populations outside the 
Commonwealth that Britain is a rather special place and they should know something about 
it. So that is one answer to the question.  
I think perhaps the other answer to the question is that we in this country have never been 
very good at marshalling our soft power. We have a lot of it, and I am sure that during the 
process of this inquiry you have seen abundant evidence of how much soft power we enjoy 
in this country. We are very lucky. But when I compare the UK with the 52 or 53 other 
countries I have advised over the last 15 years on these matters, we are by no means leading 
the pack in the way we marshal, corral and strategise for soft power. We tend to let the 
academic sector, the sporting sector, the private sector—all those other players in soft 
power—do their own thing. They do it very well, but it is nothing to the power that a 
country could have if the thing were better managed, if there were a common national 
strategy that said, “This is what Britain is for. This is our purpose in the world”. 
The Chairman: I would like to bring Mr McClory in, starting with whether hard power has 
to go with soft power but going on to the very point that Mr Anholt has just made about 
whether we need a declared strategy. 
Jonathan McClory: If we are talking about hard power as both military power and 
economic power, then yes, it is a prerequisite. On the military power side, no it is not. 
Russia, Saudi Arabia and India are third, seventh and eighth respectively in the world for 
military budgets. I have seen no index, not Simon’s, mine or any other that exists, that would 
put Russia, Saudi Arabia and India in the top 10 for country reputation or soft power. Having 
said that, a country has to be economically successful and sophisticated. It has to have the 
infrastructure, certainly diplomatic, economically or otherwise, to be able to engage with 
international audiences. In a sense, if a country is not successful economically, which we 
could classify as hard power, then no, they will not have soft power; they simply will not 
have the ability to engage. You have to be good to be liked, so you need to be a successful 
country. 
Could you remind me of the second question? 
The Chairman: We are opening it out into the broader question: should Governments 
have a strategy? But I know that Lord Foulkes wants to come in, and I want to ask 
Mademoiselle Poirier whether France believes that there is some strategic idea of soft 
power that it has developed. Lord Foulkes, did you want to ask a question first on the 
previous item? 
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Q206   Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: I was getting slightly worried that we were getting 
carried away again with thinking how wonderful we are. That is not my experience. I do not 
travel as much as I used to, but I used to be berated regularly about the Iraq war, how 
disgraceful it was and how we should not have done it, and they are still doing it. I was at a 
Commonwealth Parliamentary Association conference recently, and the Members of 
Parliament from other countries said, “You are always lecturing us about morality and 
democracy”. We had a major division about gay rights, and they said, “You are lecturing us 
now, but we do not like gay people now because you taught us this a hundred years ago 
when you ran the country for us”. Is this just the MPs and the leaders of other countries, 
rather than the people in other countries, who are critical and worried about what we are 
doing? 
Simon Anholt: I certainly think there is always a big difference in the response that one gets 
when one talks to elites and when one talks to ministers. My survey very deliberately talks 
to ordinary populations, who do not tend to bother themselves very much or for very long 
about these kinds of issues. One of the great advantages of soft power, in particular cultural 
relations, is that it achieves this marvellous effect that people feel that they know you. As a 
consequence, while they can occasionally hate the things that you do, they cannot quite hate 
you. This is one of the things that we found over and over again in my research. For 
example, where the British Council is particularly active, people can get very annoyed with 
us and the things that we do—what looks to them like our constant interference—but it 
does not make them hate us, because they still feel that fundamentally we are okay.  
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: The other thing is language. We were talking earlier about 
the fact that one of our great advantages is the English language, because so many people 
now speak it. Is that not also a disadvantage in that we do not learn other languages? We 
heard that Agnès speaks Russian as well as Spanish, English and French. Is it not the case 
that, for the typical Brit, if someone does not understand us, we just speak louder in English? 
Does that not create some difficulties? Is this dominance of English not a double-edged 
sword?  
Jonathan McClory: To go back to your first question, different places will react differently 
to what the UK is and what it does. Famously, Joseph Nye said that what attracts in Paris 
might repel in Riyadh. You always have to keep that in mind. The marriage equality Act was 
going to go down well with a lot of countries, but it was not going to go down so well with 
some. That is just a fact of the way this all works. In terms of the English language, it is really 
a question for our education system. Nobody would want to—I certainly would not want 
to—trade the advantages that the UK and the entire Anglophone world have with English as 
our native language and essentially the global lingua franca. That is a fantastic thing to have, 
but it does not mean that we should not be learning other languages. That is probably 
something for the education system. Perhaps it puts the FCO at a disadvantage, as many of 
our diplomats have to start learning languages at a much later age, when, as we know, it 
becomes harder to learn languages. But I would not consider it a disadvantage—it is certainly 
not something that we could not try to mitigate. 
Simon Anholt: It is certainly not a good excuse for not teaching languages properly at 
schools.  
Q207  The Chairman: I want to ask Agnès Poirier whether she feels from her experience 
that her country discusses these matters in terms of a French governmental, national 
strategy for promoting la France. This is perhaps rather controversial, but has it sharpened 
by any degree that sense of rivalry across the Channel and the remembrance of old epithets 
attached to this country such as “perfide”? 
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Agnès Poirier: Yes, it dates back a very long time. I would like to go back to different things 
before answering your question. First, Simon, you said that soft power is very recent. It 
seems to me that it is as old as hard power. I would argue that in history at least—even 
though now it is slightly different—the two went hand in hand together. Let us go back to 
the Renaissance, for instance. I am thinking of the first French king of soft power—François I. 
He was waging wars in Europe but at the same time he invented—at least in France—the 
patronage of arts and even managed to lure Leonardo da Vinci and the “Mona Lisa” to 
France. Perhaps we owe to him the fact that Paris and France are the top tourist destination 
in the world. More recently, in the Second World War, the US managed fantastically to bank 
on its victory, not only with the Marshall Plan but with Hollywood. It was very interesting to 
read the transcript of last week’s session with the ambassadors. I disagree with the 
ambassador from Brazil, who said that the reason why Hollywood is so successful is that 
Washington and central government never interfere with it. Well, this is not the case. It is 
the cultural arm of central government. In the early 1930s, Hollywood was not producing 
films that would irritate Nazi Germany, but then it changed tack, because there was a battle 
for hearts and minds. It was a question of winning the American public for an intervention 
and it produced masterpieces such as “Casablanca” in 1942—and we love it. I do not know 
whether you have noticed but, more recently, American films have had a lot of Chinese 
characters in them. Why is that so? It is because Hollywood is trying to reach a Chinese 
audience. In China, Chinese people have the choice between Chinese and American films.  
The Chairman: Or British television, so we are told. 
Agnès Poirier: Well, I am not quite sure. The films abide by Chinese censorship. There is 
nothing that is controversial—action movies with a lot of Chinese characters. That is 
interesting, because Hollywood sells the American way of life and it will generate products, 
because people will want to consume American products. To finish with Hollywood, let me 
just say that, as you know, the MPAA—the Motion Picture Association of America—which 
is a powerful lobby, is trying through the trade negotiations between the EU and the US to 
get rid of the famous French cultural exception. The head of the MPAA is by tradition 
someone who is very close to the Administration. We had Jack Valenti, who was a close 
adviser to JFK. Christopher Dodd, the current head of the MPAA, is a former Democrat 
Senator. Culture and the arts are very much part of this. You talked about pop music, but 
what are we talking about? We are talking about the market. In France, the view is that 
culture is not only an entertainment; it is also an intrinsic value and a way of reaching out 
and having a cultural reach in the world.  
To go back to the story after this digression, France traditionally has an ambitious cultural 
policy, because that is the way we have done it since the Sun King—I guess France was the 
first. It has served France very well. Why should Paris, which is supposed to be rather a dead 
city compared to London, still be attracting 33 million people from around the world? I think 
it is about soft power, but it is also something that has been building for centuries. France is 
still a tourist destination, which I do not think is due only to the scenery; I think it is to do 
with culture. I will stop there. I am sorry; I have taken rather a long time. 
Q208  Lord Janvrin: I want to come back to a point that you made, Professor Anholt, 
about the need for an overall strategy, which Agnès Poirier touched on. You said that this 
was holding us back. I have two questions. Is anything else holding us back? As my colleagues 
have said, there is a lot of talk about the assets and advantages that we have, but what else is 
holding us back? What else should we be looking at that we could do better in this field? 
Secondly, you identified the lack of a strategy as one thing that is holding us back. Can one 
actually have a soft power strategy when so many different players are involved—
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governmental, non-governmental and civil society? Is this really a practical proposition to put 
to us? I would like to ask that question to all three of you. 
The Chairman: Mr McClory, why not answer that first? 
Jonathan McClory: Sure. On the soft power strategy, I think that it is a terrible idea to 
have a discrete soft power strategy. The Government should perhaps replicate something 
like the strategic defence and security review, which we had in 2010—I think it was a good 
thing to do, but it was only about the military. Where was the strategic diplomatic review, 
or whatever we want to call it? At the same time, in 2010, the US State Department put out 
the QDR—the quadrennial diplomatic review—which looked at the soft power side of 
things. It was a comprehensive overview of “civilian power”, which was the term that was 
used to get away from “soft power”. I would argue that you would want a cross-government 
strategy that takes account of everything that we have been talking about in relation to soft 
power but also connects the dots where they do not seem to have been connected. Let me 
just use one example, to get on to one potentially hot-button topic, I suppose. I am talking 
about a grand cross-government strategy around not just foreign policy or defence policy 
but all aspects of Britain’s international affairs, incorporating all the international economic 
objectives that the country might have—from foreign direct investment, increasing tourism 
and increasing exports through to worrying about security issues. Of course Britain’s 
influence would be crucial to this strategy and how people perceive it. If there had been such 
a strategy, somebody would have joined up the dots on what I think were called on Twitter 
the ‘racist vans’, when the Home Office was going to lock up illegal immigrants and drive 
that van around parts of London. Somebody in No. 10, the Cabinet Office or the Foreign 
Office would have had a phone call from the Home Office, saying, “We’re thinking about 
putting these vans out. Do you think it’s going to be a problem?”. Ideally someone would 
have said, “Maybe we want to think about this again”. I realise that this was a bit of storm in 
a teacup when it happened here in the UK, but the reason why I bring it up is that just last 
week—there was a bit of delay, which shows how long these things can lag—on the front 
page of CNN’s news website the featured story was about the Home Office’s ‘racist vans’. I 
do not know the exact figures—I do not have them with me—but a lot of people 
internationally would look at CNN.com and that was bang in the middle as the main-page 
story. Ideally, if you had a cross-cutting strategy that dealt with all those things, you would be 
able to avoid big mistakes such as that. 
The Chairman: I am just going to make the observation—without defending, supporting or 
attacking what happened—that that is a softer way of telling people to go home than having 
the police knock on their door, dragging people out and chucking them on a ship or 
whatever. It is a soft approach. 
Jonathan McClory: Not in terms of the way people would see it. I suppose that if people 
are not supposed to be there and the police show up at their door, that is fine—it is within 
the limits of the law and the police are doing their job. If the police have reason to believe 
that someone is there illegally and they are following due process of law, that is fine, but the 
issue is broadcasting it in such a way. 
The Chairman: You are right that in the new conditions in which we are operating it came 
out as much worse than it would have been if it was done in the quiet of the night. 
Jonathan McClory: Exactly. 
The Chairman: It is very interesting. 
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Q209  Lord Forsyth of Drumlean: Just on that point, Lord Chairman, I agree that it was 
a daft thing to do, but the idea, given all that happens in government, that somebody rings up 
some central body, perhaps No. 10, is not a strategy or a practical proposition.  
Jonathan McClory: No, it is not a strategy at all, but I think— 
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean: You said that you were going to give us an example of how a 
strategy could work. I follow you up to that point, but it is not clear to me how these things 
are tied together in practical terms. I cannot see your example working of there being 
someone central whom you ring up to ask, “Is this consistent with the strategy?” 
Jonathan McClory: This is a problem that goes back to Fullerton or even to Northcote-
Trevelyan and is about how silo-ed government can be, so maybe it was a bad example to 
use as an overarching strategy, but it is an example of something that government did that 
ultimately has an impact on influence. 
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean: Could you give us an example of the sort of thing that could 
be practically achieved to meet the objective? It is great to say that we should have a 
strategy, but I find it very difficult to see what that would mean in practical terms. 
Jonathan McClory: I think you would have to start by working out what the objectives 
would be. What is the UK for? What does it actually want to achieve internationally, or even 
here at home economically? I do not think we have answered that question really. I realise, 
with respect to the Foreign Office that— 
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean: Let us assume we have done that. We are talking about how 
we can use soft power to achieve it.  
Jonathan McClory: One of the biggest things that government can do is to do no harm, 
which obviously they have not managed to achieve recently, I would say. 
The Chairman: They have not managed to achieve that? 
Jonathan McClory: If we take doing no harm as one example, yes. 
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean: How about doing something positive? How would we 
achieve that? 
Jonathan McClory: How do we achieve something positive? We stop doing what is 
negative, I suppose. I can pull out more examples: cutting funding to the BBC World Service 
or the British Council, or reducing Chevening scholarships, which I think is a big mistake. Let 
us take a look at the GREAT campaign—I am sure we will get on to it eventually. Some £30 
million has been allocated to that campaign for 2013-14, while at the same time we are 
cutting funding for all these other things. I would take that money and invest it in 
relationship-building programmes in a country such as China, which, as Simon has said, we 
have not done that well breaking into because we do not have that much brand recognition.   
We can do something more important around that, deciding where the priority countries or 
the priority markets are that we do not feel we have made the inroads into where we 
should have done and then starting to pursue programmes that help us to build relationships 
and ultimately to build up our reputation and thereby opportunities. 
Q210  Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts: That has shot my fox, really, because it seems 
to me, when I hear you talking about it, that the soft power strategy is like those lovely soap 
bubbles you used to blow when you were a child. They were lovely bubbles, but the 
moment you touched them, they burst. I am still struggling with how you translate this 
bubble, with its lovely colours in the sunshine, into the realities. Professor Anholt, you have 
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talked about this, but I still do not quite get how you move from the fact that it is there and 
it is happening, maybe despite what the Government are doing. 
Simon Anholt: My experience suggests that anything that looks even remotely like a police 
force is unlikely to work. I cannot recall at the moment who asked the very valid question: 
can a large, rich, busy, prosperous, complex country like Britain really adopt happily yet 
another layer of bureaucracy? The answer is almost certainly not. A body that was hoping, 
presuming, to vet policies from a range of different ministries and departments and saying, 
“You cannot do that because it is off brand”, we know realistically would not be very 
popular and would not last very long.  
Can it work? Lord Janvrin’s second question was whether strategy was even possible for a 
country like Britain. My honest answer is that I do not know, because the majority of 
countries that I have advised over the last 20 years have been rather smaller, some of them 
not much smaller and one or two of them even bigger. What seems to work is having some 
sort of central body that owns the grand strategy—the “everything” strategy—that answers 
these questions. What is this country for? What is its purpose in the world? If the hand of 
God should accidentally slip on the celestial keyboard tomorrow and hit delete and Britain 
went, who would notice and why? These questions might sound a little airy fairy, but in the 
age of globalisation we at least have to try to answer them. That central body owns that 
strategy and then it imposes it by providing services to the other branches of government, 
rather than acting as a policeman. In other words, instead of offering to vet people’s policies, 
it suggests actions that they could take that would be cost-effective ways of getting across 
the messages that people want to get across. 
We had something attached to the Foreign Office called the Public Diplomacy Strategy 
Board, which later turned into the Public Diplomacy Board, on which I sat as vice-chair 
throughout its life. One of the things that I tried to initiate on that board was called the PD 
Lab—the public diplomacy laboratory. The idea was that it was a central creative facility that 
would look at the projects and the plans that ministries and agencies of government were 
undertaking and see whether it could come up with some creative twists on things, some 
new ways of doing things that would catch the imagination. The idea was that it would offer 
them as a service to government departments and say, “We know that you are trying to put 
on a trade show in Shanghai next year. We know it is costing you a lot of money. Here is an 
idea, free, if you want to adopt it, which will give more bang for your buck. It is more 
exciting, more original, less boring, less predictable, and it will connect you with a wider 
audience. It will get the social media talking about it, because it is more unusual and more 
unfamiliar to people”. These are not difficult tricks to perform if you know how to do them. 
The trouble is that most people working in government departments are not familiar with 
that kind of creative work. In a word, if one is offering useful value-added services to 
government departments from a central point, that makes it not only much more acceptable 
but also much more possible to steer the entire ship of state in one direction ultimately. 
The Chairman: What happened to that public diplomacy initiative? 
Simon Anholt: We were axed. 
The Chairman: On the grounds presumably that they did not feel it was adding value. 
Simon Anholt: I never found out the reason. This was when the current Government came 
into office, and presumably they decided that they wanted to look at it in a different way. 
The Public Diplomacy Board was dropped at that point. 
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean: What did it achieve? 
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Simon Anholt: We carried out a number of pilot projects where we experimented with 
public diplomacy in Canada, Jordan and one or two other countries. That is all on the 
record; I will not waste the Committee’s time with it now. Some of those were quite 
effective. 
The Chairman: Can we get a note, perhaps? 
Simon Anholt: Yes of course. I will dig that out for you with pleasure. 
Q211  Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts: Just talking about that particular body, the 
Cabinet Office had this behavioural science unit—the nudgers, as they are called. That is to 
say that they tried to show people indirectly how to behave better, live healthier and so on. 
Could one use behavioural science as a way of developing our reputation and our soft 
power? 
Simon Anholt: I think it is a very important part of the discipline. In order to understand 
soft power, one needs to understand quite a number of different disciplines. It is one of the 
reasons why it is such a lovely subject: one has to be a bit of a sociologist, a bit of an 
anthropologist, more than a bit of a psychologist, as you rightly point out. This is complex 
stuff. We are framing this whole debate as though it were a series of enormous challenges 
for the United Kingdom, but actually it is an enormous opportunity for us precisely because 
the United Kingdom may not have very much hard power to wield in the future. It is tending 
to diminish. It is extraordinarily important that we become paragons of soft power. We 
should be leaders in this kind of stuff. That is why it is very important that we develop these 
skills, and it is very good that we are having this inquiry. We need to be better at it than we 
are. One of the reasons why I rather regret that the Public Diplomacy Board was disbanded 
was because we were beginning to have those all important theoretical discussions about 
what soft power consists of.  
In answer also to Lord Forsyth’s question a moment ago, one of the other things that we 
looked at and which I think is extraordinarily important is measurement. I may be old 
fashioned, but if you are spending taxpayers’ money on this kind of stuff it is extraordinarily 
important that you should be able to set and define goals and measure your progress 
towards them. There is a lamentable habit in this area not to bother and just to say, “It 
sounds good so let us carry on doing it”. 
The Chairman: At the beginning you yourself unpicked the concept of soft power and said 
that there were four or five aspects of it. Furthermore, you said that there are millions of 
different contacts with a now empowered populace. It is a people-connected world. It is a 
bit challenging, a further demand, is it not, to ask the government machine somehow to 
bring this all together. You are asking the impossible.  
Simon Anholt: It is impossible to do it using existing structures. That is why, in the paper 
that I submitted to the commission, I argued for a new structure. I know that people’s hearts 
tend to sink at the idea of a new structure, but in my experience with a number of other 
countries I have never come across a country that is correctly configured to manage these 
assets, which we have been calling by various names. It has always been necessary for me to 
invent those structures and for countries to create them and adopt them. It does not 
necessarily have to be a vast additional burden on the bureaucracy, but most Governments 
struggle with systems and structures that frankly were invented in the 19th century, not 
even the 20th century. The world has changed around us, new systems and structures are 
required, and we should be looking into them. 
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Q212   The Chairman: Mr McClory, take us on to the difficult area of how we turn the 
soft power assets that we have—we are connected with almost every conceivable 
international institution, although some new ones we are not connected with—into a real 
benefit for this nation in the form of the ultimate requirements, which are that we can hold 
our head up in terms of prosperity and earning our living, which means the successful 
exports of goods and predominantly more and more services, and how we secure the 
security of our citizens by ensuring that we play our part in trying to prevent the growth of 
terrorism and hostile feelings throughout the world. Those are the two ultimate tasks. How 
do we use this soft power to achieve those? 
Jonathan McClory: I suppose that is the million dollar question. That is gold dust, and 
anyone who can answer that perfectly will have a very good living, I should think. It is quite 
difficult. We hinted earlier that as soon as government overplays its hand, people are quite 
quick to work that out, so trying to achieve tangible benefits has to be done with a very deft 
touch. Is that the Division Bell? 
The Chairman: I am so sorry. I should have warned you at the beginning. I do not know 
whether it is our soft power or just our antiquity, but we have to break for five minutes. 
 
Sitting suspended for a Division in the House. 
 
Q213  The Chairman: I apologise for the interrupted nature of these sessions, but that is 
the way our system works for the moment, until constitutional reform changes it. I would 
like in these last few minutes to come back to the question with which we really began: what 
has changed? We have a sense in this Committee that really massive change has taken place, 
that the interface between nations is of a much more dispersed nature—between 
professions, between peoples, between lobbies and between interests. We would like your 
wisdom, all three of you, on whether that is so. Once you have established clearly that we 
are operating in new conditions, we can focus on the new instruments that we require to 
improve our performance and to hold our head up in an extremely competitive and 
dangerous world. So can I take all three of you back to where you began? Professor Anholt, 
you began with that theme: the hyperconnectivity of the world we live in. 
Simon Anholt: Yes, it is true; things have become much more complex. They have changed 
enormously. It is important not to misrepresent the change that the internet and social 
media have created in this domain. There is a tendency among many Governments to see 
social media as some exciting new medium of communication via which they can somehow 
more effectively communicate their power or extend their influence. That is a 
misunderstanding of what it is all about. The reason why social media are so significant is 
that they have made a journalist of everybody. They enable ordinary people around the 
world to learn about our countries and to make their decisions about where to invest, 
where to go on holiday, which products to buy and so on, on recommendations from 
millions of friends. 
The Chairman: But also to protest on recommendations. 
Simon Anholt: Also to protest. That environment is a friend to Governments who know 
how to use it correctly. Perhaps “use” is a misleading word: you cannot use it; it is just 
there. It means that when countries behave courageously and imaginatively, and do things 
that are moral and helpful to people in other countries, the social media will communicate 
that message for them. One of the messages which I have been trying to get across ever 
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since I foolishly coined the term “nation brand” back in 1998 is that this is not about 
branding. The term that I am accused of having coined is “nation brand”, not nation 
branding. Three letters make a big difference, because “nation brand” is just an observation 
that we live in a world where countries’ reputations are perhaps their most valuable asset. 
That is the basis on which we are judged. People do not know the facts; there are too many 
countries for them to know the facts. So they base their behaviours on perceptions. 
Therefore, when a Government come into power, they inherit a sacred responsibility to 
look after the nation’s good name, because a nation’s good name is its most valuable asset. A 
Government are judged as being good if they hand on that reputation in at least as good 
condition as they received it to the Government who come next in office. The idea that one 
can somehow modify that reputation directly using the tricks of marketing or 
communications is entirely false. I have never seen any evidence that telling people how 
great your country is, or how beautiful, powerful, effective or successful it is, achieves any 
effect whatever. One of the great things about globalisation is that it has made propaganda 
impossible. Propaganda works only when you control all the channels of communication 
reaching your audience. In a closed society such as North Korea, it is still just about possible, 
but in the global environment it is a stark impossibility. However much money we spend on 
sending out a message to people saying that Britain is wonderful or great or super, it will 
immediately be contradicted by 1,000 or 10,000 other messages. Countries are judged by 
what they do, by what they make and by the company they keep, not by what they say about 
themselves. One should steer this image conversation away from bragging about one’s assets 
and asking “What can we say to make ourselves admired or loved?”, which is the wrong 
question. The right question is: what can we do to make ourselves relevant? What can we 
do as a country that will make other people in other countries feel simply glad that the 
United Kingdom exists? That to me is what we should be aiming for. 
Q214   The Chairman: That is a very subtle difference. Mademoiselle Poirier, you 
mentioned earlier that, in a sense, the glory of France has been well projected down the 
centuries—there is nothing new to that. The skill with which France has combined being a 
highly effective centre of the European Union yet at the same time somehow portraying that 
it is all for France is much admired this side of the Channel. Do you feel that, despite what 
you said about your history, things have changed and that France needs to sing a slightly 
different tune? 
Agnès Poirier: In what way? 
The Chairman: That everyone is connected with everyone, that Governments are weaker, 
that connectivity has vastly grown, and that globalisation, communication and the 
information revolution have transformed the language of international relations. 
Agnès Poirier: I totally agree, but it is also a big illusion. We are more connected, but we 
are also more fragmented. As you know, in France, we are quite suspicious of globalisation. 
We have not wholeheartedly embraced it, because we are quite aware of consequences. If 
you talk about the internet or the decline of the French language, it is quite obvious. Despite 
this and despite the fact that France has had economic decline ever since I was born—ever 
since I was born, I heard that the country was going to the dogs—it is still standing. 
Obviously, Germany is the powerhouse of Europe. We have not talked about Europe and 
we have not talked about Britain having greater assets. Britain has huge soft power—if we 
have to use that term. But in the past two years, because of this increasing insularity—that is 
how it is viewed from the continent—and this talk of Britain possibly leaving the EU, I think 
that its reputation has been undermined.  
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The Chairman: You think that Britain’s reputation is undermined by talk of possible 
withdrawal? 
Agnès Poirier: Yes, absolutely, because you have to engage with the world in order also for 
your products to be bought. It has been a bad thing. I do not think that in China France’s 
image is better than Britain’s image. However, Chinese tourists flock to France. Why? It is 
because Britain is not part of the Schengen area and because it has very strict visa policies. 
That also has an influence on British universities, which are centres for shaping the thoughts 
of the future elite in the world, yet a lot of foreigners have difficulties getting visas. At heart 
is the question whether Britain wants to be part of the EU. If it is not part of the EU, it can 
still have access to the single market—like Iceland, for instance—but it will not be within the 
Community and therefore is not going to be part of the decision-making. That would be a 
massive blow to British soft power. That is my personal opinion, but it is also an opinion 
from the continent. 
Q215  Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts: Surely you are projecting the EU as a quasi-
economic powerhouse. That is not part of our soft power; our soft power is something 
quite unique to each country. There is not a European soft power dimension, is there? 
Agnès Poirier: Well, ask the Chinese. They go to Europe and they go to where it is easier 
for them to go. At the moment, they go to Paris. That is a shame, because, if they had a 
choice and if it was as easy, they would flock to London. That has consequences for the 
British economy. 
Simon Anholt: I believe that we have just streamlined our visa policy for the Chinese in 
recent weeks. 
Agnès Poirier: One of the Members—he is not now here—talked about languages. 
Languages are key, too, to Britain’s reputational influence. The English language is the lingua 
franca—there is no doubt about it—but we should not live under the illusion that the whole 
world understands it or speaks it. The teaching of foreign languages is very important. It 
takes two to tango; you need to understand others for others to be interested in you, 
otherwise there is a feeling that there is contempt towards the outsiders. A whole 
generation of linguists will be lost to Britain. Diplomacy is key in soft power. If British 
diplomats start learning a foreign language in their late 20s or early 30s, it is not very good 
for the country. 
I think we are short on time. 
The Chairman: No, we are fascinated. Please feel free to let it out. 
Agnès Poirier: I will take just one example. It is a French institution created in 1946 just 
after the war called the National Centre for Cinema. In Britain, you had the Film Council, 
financed by lottery money—it does not exist any more; its functions are now with the 
British Film Institute. The National Centre for Cinema is an institution that works very well 
in France. I want to debunk a few myths, because in Britain we think that France’s art or 
culture is heavily subsidised and that it would collapse the moment this subsidy was 
withdrawn. That National Centre for Cinema does not rely on taxpayers; it does not rely on 
the state budget. It relies on regulations and on some taxes and levies; for instance, on every 
single cinema ticket sold. TV broadcasters have to invest a percentage of their turnover, and 
the centre manages the redistribution of those revenues. It has a budget of €700 million a 
year, whereas its Spanish counterpart has €43 million. As I think you will know if you go to 
the movies from time to time, French cinema is one of France’s big assets, but behind this 
there is policy. 
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The Chairman: There is a deliberate policy. 
Agnès Poirier: Exactly. It sustains an industry of 400,000 people in France, but it works on 
both an economic and artistic level. It reaps rewards at all international competitions. For 
example, in 2012, “The Artist”, a black and white silent film, scooped five Oscars in America. 
It is a film that Britain would not have made, because unfortunately Britain often leaves it to 
the market to decide and such a film would not have been produced. 
The Chairman: That is an extremely good example. Very interesting. Thank you very 
much. 
Jonathan McClory: I want to pick up very quickly on the EU point. The EU’s eastward 
expansion is one of the examples that are held up as a great soft power success. It was not 
just access to a large single market; it was former Communist countries signing up to 
western values of a capitalist market and western political institutions. It is a good recent 
example of soft power versus hard power. Moldova and Ukraine are just concluding 
association agreements and free trade agreements with the European Union, and they are 
doing this against some pretty hard threats from Russia, which is trying to create a Russian-
driven Eurasian customs union. This is a really great example of soft power triumphing over 
hard power, over coercion.  
To come back to your question about how the world has changed, we could have looked at 
this at the very beginning and we have touched on it. Power moving from the West to the 
East is one of the major shifts that are happening globally. This is both economic and political 
power, but also power shifting away from states to non-state actors. The second big thing 
that is changing is the rise of networks, so now countries have to mobilise other states but 
also non-state actors to get things done. The third shift which we touched on is technology 
and the speed at which information moves. The democratisation of access to information is 
empowering to people, and we see that in all kinds of movements, from the Arab Spring to 
the Occupy movement. The fourth one, which Simon mentioned, is transparency or the 
death of propaganda. You cannot communicate one message to international publics while 
communicating a contrary message to your own people—it just does not work. I would say 
that the fifth—and we have not touched on this at all—is the process of urbanisation. We 
now have more than half the world’s population living in cities, which has big implications for 
the economy and for how innovation happens, how ideas spread, and how political 
movements start and manifest. It is not that soft power is changing the world; it is more that 
soft power is a response to these changes. The states that learn how to deal with these 
challenges through the use of soft power are those that will be more influential in the future. 
Right before we broke for the Division, you put the very difficult question to me of how we 
take soft power to meet objectives. There is no real clear answer to that one, or certainly 
not a straightforward one. There are two answers, I suppose. One is the academic one, 
which is we first ask what our objectives are, we work out what our soft power resources 
are, we identify the targets for these resources and we then deploy and hopefully see some 
kind of an outcome. But that is pretty abstract. I think the real answer is simply to be useful, 
to make good products that people want to buy, to provide good economic opportunities 
that people want to invest in. It is simply about being useful to the rest of the world and 
being good, and that is how you create those opportunities. 
The Chairman: A couple of final questions, because I think that we are going to have 
another vote in a minute. 
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: We are okay.  
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The Chairman: In that case, we can be more relaxed. Jonathan, was the implication of that 
excellent summary of five things that have changed that we are going to see city talking to 
city more? 
Jonathan McClory: We saw it, did we not, with Boris Johnson going to China? 
The Chairman: We are living in a city state in London. Therefore, the international 
interface is going to be between city and city rather than between national Government and 
national Government.  
Jonathan McClory: I think so. People are talking it up a great deal, and it will be interesting 
to see how cities respond to things where they cannot do without the state, visa policy 
being one. We know that Boris Johnson is not happy with visa policies, whether it is in 
respect of students or of skilled immigration, but he cannot do much about that as a mayor. 
Q216  Lord Forsyth of Drumlean: Professor Anholt, you talked about the death of 
propaganda and said how the internet world, Twitter and everything else would form their 
own views. That is the reality, but, certainly in Britain and elsewhere, there is a breakdown 
of trust in institutions, whether they are Governments, the police or whatever. We have 
ambassadors to communicate in 140 characters on very complex subjects. 
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: I have just done it. 
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean: Well, George would no doubt have used each character very 
well. You said something that rather startled me. I forget the exact phrase that you used, but 
you said that they will always get it right. You get media storms—and we have seen it, for 
example, over Andrew Mitchell and the whole plebgate thing, where the whole world 
reached one conclusion that has now been turned upside down. I can see the power of 
social media, of course, but I can also see the negative aspects of social media, particularly in 
a world where people no longer trust institutions. They will take the view of half a dozen 
people whom they do not know but who have expressed an opinion on a website against 
the IMF or Michelin or other authorities that used to have soft power by virtue of their 
reputation. Am I wrong to worry about this? If I am right to worry about it, what is the 
remedy? 
Simon Anholt: You are right to worry about it. Of course, the flipside of social media is 
mob rule, and it is very worrying sometimes. We all have to get better at understanding it; 
we have no choice. We need to get better at understanding what sometimes creates a 
firestorm on the internet and what does not. These things are not beyond understanding; I 
think that we are still a bit unfamiliar with it all. If the traditional voices of authority have lost 
authority, it is probably at least partly their fault. Another part of this examination has to 
look at what that process of loss of authority was and where it came from. Is it that people 
started losing faith in politicians merely because there was something more fun, more 
interesting or more democratic apparently available to them, or was it because those 
politicians too frequently showed themselves as being not worthy of trust and respect? 
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean: Sorry to interrupt you, but it is not just politicians, it is the 
police, the courts, the media—it is everything. 
Simon Anholt: It is all of them, and as we have seen in the recent inquiries about the 
behaviour of the media, it is very easy to see how the media have lost their moral authority. 
It is not quite fair to say “the media” as if it were one thing, but you can equally well see how 
a member of the general public might start thinking, “Clearly we cannot trust the media any 
more, because clearly they have not behaved well. Clearly we cannot trust the politicians any 
more”. People simplify, and this is something that public opinion has always done. There is 
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nothing very new about that. What is new is that these things can catch fire very quickly. 
The fires tend to die down quite quickly as well, but I am afraid the only answer is that we 
just have to get better at understanding it. Some of the work that is being done today 
appears to be making progress. 
The Chairman: That sets a very big task for us. I will give Lord Foulkes the last word on 
this. 
Q217   Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: I am honoured. I think it is one you will expect. Have 
you detected any effect of our constitutional discussions in the United Kingdom, either in 
relation to Scottish independence or withdrawal from the European Union? Have they had 
an effect in any way, either positive or negative? Have we dealt with that question? 
Baroness Goudie: We did not deal with Scotland but we dealt with the European Union.  
Simon Anholt: I have not tried to answer the question on the basis of whether my research 
tells us anything about that. The answer is no, and I have had this discussion with the 
Scottish Government on a number of occasions. In my survey, we have measured the image 
of Scotland as distinct from the rest of the United Kingdom, just to see whether it is 
independently viable in reputational terms. The answer is that it is: Scotland scores about the 
same as New Zealand—in other words, very high. It is a much admired country. If you force 
people to think of it as different from the UK, they do and it is positive.  
I suspect the issue is that in the event of a real dismantling of the union—I should never 
make predictions about my own survey; I should have learnt this by now—it will not have a 
dramatic effect on either, because that is rather a technical issue. One of the things I often 
say about this survey—I know it is politically incorrect—is that when you are dealing with 
public opinion you are dealing with a seven year-old. I have tested this, by the way, with a 
group of psychologists, so to a degree it is scientifically proven that public opinion has a 
mental age of around seven. That seven year-old is not quite clear at the moment what the 
difference is between Scotland, England, Britain, the British Isles, the United Kingdom, 
London. It is all the same thing, as far as they are concerned. If one day they happen to read 
in the news that Scotland has become technically independent of the rest of the United 
Kingdom, the most likely reaction is going to be, “Oh, you mean it was not before?”. Then 
they will forget about it in a week. 
The Chairman: That is a marvellous answer to end on. It raises other questions about 
whether the Republic of Ireland is really part of the United Kingdom as well— 
Simon Anholt: There is a lot of confusion on that point too. 
The Chairman: And other daring thoughts about the British Isles. Perhaps the British Isles 
has a future in a different context. 
We must halt it here because we have kept you a very long time. It has been fascinating. We 
have to distil a lot of what you have said. It is not easy to put a wrapping around all of it very 
neatly, but Professor Anholt, Mademoiselle Poirier and Jonathan McClory, thank you all very 
much for your wisdom. We expected no less, and we have enjoyed the session. Thank you 
very much indeed. 
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This submission addresses the role of new media (the internet and social media) and 
international news in the delivery of the UK’s soft power. The following assessment is based 
on extensive empirical research that has involved interviews with diplomats, officials and 
foreign journalists (Archetti 2014, forthcoming; 2013a; 2013b; 2013c; 2012a; 2012b; 2011). 
 
 
Soft Power, New Media and Diplomacy 
1. ARGUMENT: Despite the strong belief that new media can support public diplomacy in 
establishing a “global conversation,” thereby more effectively delivering the UK’s soft power, I argue 
that this is not necessarily the case. There is no one-size-fits-all strategy to global engagement. 
Influence, even in the communication age, does not depend on the use of interactive technologies. 
The ability to exercise soft power rests rather on understanding the fit between the networks each 
diplomat needs to engage with, the communication tools actually used by these cohorts, and each 
local information environment.  
 
2. Digital communications are widely seen as tools to more effectively deliver the UK’s soft 
power to increasingly diverse and dispersed audiences. The opportunities offered by new 
media—the internet but also social media platforms like Twitter—to directly connect 
governments to worldwide publics are said to be  blurring the distinction between diplomacy 
(negotiation among official actors) and public diplomacy (communication between 
governments and foreign publics).  In this sense, many have started talking about a ‘new 
public diplomacy’—where governments interact with a variety of state-, as well as non-state 
actors and audiences of citizens. One can also easily find references to ‘public diplomacy 
2.0,’ and ‘digital diplomacy,’ not least on the websites of the British Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office and the American State Department.  
 
3. In this highly interconnected world, where communication technologies allow individuals 
who might have never met to build communities of interest (like advocacy networks) across 
national borders, where physical borders and geographical distances appear to have been 
bypassed by the internet, one could be forgiven for thinking that only what is “global” and 
what happens in the ethereal world of cyberspace matters. What happens within countries 
in the very offices and along the corridors of embassies around the world, in the daily life of 
diplomats, is not important. This, however, is a huge mistake. 
 
4. Examining the “local,” the way in which communication technologies are used and 
appropriated on a daily basis, not only by diplomats in the pursue of their countries’ 
interests, but also by those the diplomats interact with, such as journalists, politicians and 
members of the public, in each specific national political and social context is essential to 
understanding how exactly diplomacy is evolving in an age of interconnectedness and how 
soft power actually works. Crucially, by examining the everyday dimension of diplomatic 
                                            
22 Evidence submitted in the author’s capacity as individual. 
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practices we can learn that, rather than being replaced by a generalized “communication of 
everybody anywhere anytime,” the delivery of influence and soft power is becoming 
increasingly multidimensional and, counterintuitively, selective. 
 
5. To understand how the specificity of each local context affects the practices of foreign 
diplomats and  where advances in communication technologies fit within this picture we 
need to understand the place of foreign diplomats, carrying out their functions of 
representation, negotiation, information-gathering and reporting back to their respective 
countries, at the edge between the national and the international dimensions.  
Being able to make sense of what happens in the country they are working in is of 
paramount importance to diplomats. They need information. And they get it not only by 
meeting people, but also by consuming the reports provided by the media. Local media, in 
particular, has always been vital to their daily activities. As Phillips Davison (1974) wrote 
almost four decades ago:  ‘The [national] press serves as the eyes and ears of diplomacy.’ 
Not only this is still very much the case, but through the multiplication of the opportunities 
for interaction (both face-to-face and mediated by technologies), diplomats have come to 
operate in what we could call a much broader “information environment” that they did in 
the past. Such environment is constituted by the networks of contacts spanning both the 
offline and online dimensions across which information is accessed, gathered, processed and 
distributed in the official, media, and public domain. Differently from a natural environment, 
which would be the same for all species living in it—the physical urban space of London, 
Beijing or Washington, for example—the information space is different for every single 
actor, as if each diplomat or embassy office inhabited a parallel dimension. 
 
6. The way each diplomat operates in his/her own information environment thus reflects the 
specific goals and objectives of the respective embassy office. These goals, in turn, are 
becoming increasingly differentiated—an outcome of both developing international relations, 
but importantly also of the ease with which communication takes place among politicians 
across countries. A senior German diplomat in London I interviewed, for example, talked 
about an increasingly ‘ceremonial role’ for European embassies in the British capital over the 
past 30 years at the expense of their traditional hardcore ‘messenger’ functions. This is both 
because of the EU’s consolidation, particularly the fact that political leaders tend to meet 
regularly within the EU’s institutional structures and bodies, and the technical possibility of 
communicating directly: ‘If Germany had a problem with Paraguay, the foreign ministry 
would probably ask our ambassador in Ascension to see the foreign minister or to see the 
president or prime minister [...] and to deliver a strong message [...]. If the German 
government had a problem with the UK government, [...] the head of the Chancellor’s office 
would call the head of Downing Street, Number 10, and would say “look, Angela [Merkel] 
has to talk to David [Cameron]. Could we fix a phone call for two o’clock in the afternoon?” 
And the embassy would perhaps not be even aware of it.’ This explains the increase in public 
outreach activity by European embassies in London: ‘we are compensating for the 
diminishing role of traditional diplomacy by talking about our role in public diplomacy’.  
Non-European countries’ embassies, instead, tend to retain to a greater extent the 
diplomat’s ‘messenger’ role. A Syrian diplomat in London, for example, commented that his 
function consisted mainly in being ‘a tool of [official] communication.’ An Australian source 
also confirmed the increase of an ‘advocacy function’ at the expense of information-gathering 
and relaying: ‘…we weren’t writing cables predicting who was going to win the last election 
[...]  [Instead]  we were saying, you know, if the Conservatives win, this is what foreign 
policy may look like [...] Once upon a time you would have been sending a cable every 
couple of days saying “this is the latest” [...] You wouldn’t do that now because somebody 
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could just go to Guardian Online or The Times Online and get that.’ The advocacy function 
consists of agenda-setting and lobbying through official contacts: ‘going down to Whitehall, 
trying to get the UK government to do things that we want them to do.’ 
 
7. Whether foreign diplomats want at all to engage with local publics, the extent to which 
they pursue such activity in case they do, as well as the communication channels used in the 
process—social media like Twitter, rather than an e-magazine, or a series of lunch 
receptions for selected guests—is thus the unique outcome of the match between each 
diplomat/embassy’s objectives—‘ceremonial’ function rather than ‘advocacy,’ for instance—
with the information environment in which the diplomatic actor operates. 
A pattern observable in the case of the London environment is that the lower the level of 
interest towards a foreign country in the mainstream British media coverage, the greater the 
effort by the respective embassy office at reaching out through alternative means of 
communications (social media, for example). Countries like Australia or India, in this respect, 
tend to receive extensive coverage in the British media because of their membership of the 
Commonwealth, their historical and economic ties to the United Kingdom and their status 
as former British colonies. Among the countries that tend to attract less media attention—
mainly because they are, like Britain, all members of the EU and there are virtually no 
sources of tension among them—are Sweden or Denmark. 
 
8. Such different levels of attention in the mainstream media translate into equally diverging 
outreach strategies and choice of communication platforms by diplomatic actors. The 
Swedish embassy (low visibility in British media coverage) tends to organize few press 
conferences. As a Swedish diplomat put it: ‘there’s too much going on in London and 
journalism is too fast. So, you know, people [journalists] may pop up for a press conference 
or they may not.’ The most important engagement activity, in this context, is rather targeted 
networking through face-to-face contacts at seminars and roundtable discussions led by the 
ambassador. The press office of the Danish embassy, to further illustrate the variety of 
communication channels adopted, among other initiatives, established in February 2010 the 
‘Defence News, Danish Embassy in London’ Facebook page. The purpose was to enable the 
Danish embassy to tell the British public about stories that did not normally make the news 
in the mainstream media: to ‘actively tell the British population about Denmark’s 
international engagements; especially explaining the extensive and mutually respectful 
cooperation between Denmark and the United Kingdom in Afghanistan.’ 
  
9. Countries that tend to receive a great deal of official attention and, as a consequence, 
extensive media coverage, instead, are under less pressure to raise their visibility. This is 
confirmed, among the rest, by the fact that the websites of countries like the previously 
mentioned India, or Russia or Egypt (all identified as public diplomacy ‘geographical priorities’ 
for the UK), are rather basic when compared to those of less influential counterparts. The 
only exception is represented by the United States: despite receiving more coverage than 
any other country because of its ‘special relationship’ with the United Kingdom and its 
superpower status, it also uses alternative communication channels: a sophisticated website, 
a Facebook page, a Twitter feed and a YouTube channel. 
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10. The illustration of the variety of outreach strategies by the 
diplomats/embassies of different countries in London underlines the following 
points: 
 
a)  There is no one-size-fits-all policy when it comes to identifying an effective 
communication strategy to deliver a country’s soft power, whether it is diplomacy (in its 
narrow sense of official negotiation) or understood as public diplomacy.  
 
b) It is all very well to say that social media like Facebook and Twitter are useful tools in 
supporting soft power and a new kind of public diplomacy that is characterized by dialogue 
with foreign audiences. And indeed these platforms—in the right conditions and when used 
by certain actors in specific environments—will support the achievement of such a result. 
The outcome, however, cannot be a simple extrapolation from the characteristics of a 
technology. It is, instead, a product of the flexible appropriation of communication tools by 
each diplomat in adapting to a specific local information environment.  
 
c) British diplomats abroad should be trusted to identify which tools—whether “new” or 
“old” media, Twitter rather than a newsletter, a series of receptions, or even a combination 
of multiple tools—can best serve their purposes within the context of the interactions—
with diplomats, officials, journalists or the broader public—relevant to the local context 
(also bearing in mind that the interlocutors might change over time).  
 
 
Soft Power and International News 
11. ARGUMENT Foreign correspondents shape the image of the UK to the eyes of audiences 
abroad every day through their reports. As shapers of perceptions of the UK in foreign countries, 
these journalists can be considered influential gatekeepers of the UK’s soft power. Because of this 
role, within public diplomacy quarters, there have been calls for officials to actively engage foreign 
journalists through “more access” to “high-level briefings.” I argue that such recommendations, while 
they make apparent sense, are in fact based on a lack of understanding of 21st century journalism. I 
propose different measures. 
 
12. Foreign journalists working in London shape every day the image of the UK to the eyes 
of foreign audiences through their reports. Just as what we see on TV or read in the 
newspapers shapes our understanding of issues and events that exceed the narrow 
boundaries of our direct experience, what foreign journalists report about the UK is often 
all publics abroad know about Britain. In this respect correspondents are veritable 
gatekeepers and possible influential agents of the UK’s soft power.  
 
13. The important role of foreign correspondents in the delivery of UK soft power has to 
some extent been recognized by policy makers involved in public diplomacy. An official 
review of British public diplomacy activities (Wilton et al. 2002 report) pointed out that ‘an 
article written by a foreign correspondent in London has a greater impact than any of our 
other public diplomacy outputs. Feedback from embassies, when asked to give views for this 
review, overwhelmingly identified more attention to foreign correspondents in London as 
the one thing that could improve our public diplomacy work’ (ibid.: 20). A later document 
(Carter 2005) again underlined the ‘multiplier effect’ deriving from the presence of ‘over 
2,000 foreign correspondents based in London (the biggest single concentration after 
Washington) with the potential to reach large numbers of the UK’s public diplomacy 
audiences overseas’ (ibid.: 52). Recommendations to make use of the soft power 
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opportunities offered by foreign journalists revolve around a greater engagement with this 
cohort. The British Wilton report (2002: 47) calls for the establishment of regular ‘high-level 
briefings’ and ‘better access...to ministers of all departments’ to ‘maximise the international 
impact of positive stories in the UK.’ 
 
14. Calls to improve the engagement with foreign journalists for more effectively promoting 
UK’s interests, however, are based on simplistic beliefs rooted in a lack of understanding of 
the dynamics of international communication in the 21st century, let alone developments in 
journalism in a fast-changing information environment. Here are the problems: 
 
a) The first wrong assumption is that there is a defined group of journalists that can be 
targeted and “given access” in order convey the UK “message.” Nobody (including the 
International Press Officers at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office or the London 
Foreign Press Association) knows exactly how many foreign journalists are based in London. 
Full time correspondents who make a living out of journalism (not everyone manages to do 
so) are estimated to be about 500. The inclusion of stringers (occasional reporters) could 
make the number raise to about 2,000 journalists. Beyond the members/contacts registered 
with the London Foreign Press Association and the International Press Office, however, 
through the internet (blogs, Twitter, Facebook…) virtually anybody can nowadays become a 
journalist—a phenomenon referred to as “citizen journalism”—which leads to hypothesize 
the presence of potentially thousands of additional credible and influential communicators 
whose identity and whereabouts are completely unknown (they do not have offices or 
official addresses). Add to this the role of citizens who go about their everyday life and, by 
posting images of the UK or writing about their experiences, further shape the perception of 
the country abroad. 
 
b) The second erroneous belief is that foreign journalists would almost automatically write 
what they are “fed” by governmental sources, as if they were some kind of information 
conveyor-belts. 
The fact that the communication process between political actors, journalists, and the public 
does not take place in such a linear manner is not only related to the fact that, in our age, 
information is ubiquitous and there are myriads alternative sources of information than 
official ones. A linear communication process has never really existed. A study of foreign 
correspondents in London conducted over 30 years ago already observed that 
correspondents in London overwhelmingly relied on local media (not officials!) to write their 
reports. Robert Vansittart, who had the responsibility of dealing with the press during the 
tenure of Lord Curzon as Foreign Secretary in the 1920s remarked almost a century ago 
that ‘Every morning trouble arose on the telephone. “Why did you put that in?” He [Lord 
Curzon] did not understand that the modern journalists had sources of information other 
than the Foreign Office’ (in Taylor 1981: 16).  
My analysis of the way journalism has transformed in the age of global communication 
confirms the tendency of foreign correspondents to re-interpret the information they 
collect. Rather than being driven to “churnalism” (the endless recycling of the same 
information available online, often originating from newsagencies) by tighter deadlines and 
fiercer competition to get first to the news, as many would claim, foreign journalists are 
under pressure to find unique angles for their stories. Gone are the days when foreign 
correspondents, as it did occur 50 year ago, simply translated what they read in the local 
media. Journalists are now aware that the public in their home countries can read The 
Guardian or BBC News online. If foreign correspondents want to keep their job they need to 
provide alternative perspectives.  
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c) The third false assumption is that all journalists somehow report about politics, hence the 
need access to ‘high-level’ ministerial briefings. Not only does the evidence gathered through 
my interviews confirm the reliance by journalists on an extensive range of sources, but also 
the analysis of the content of reporting shows that what ultimately becomes “news” is not 
just politics or foreign policy. What is newsworthy, in fact, depends on several factors. 
Among the rest, it depends on: the country for which a reporter is writing, particularly, in 
the case of this submission, on the country’s relationship with the UK; on the editorial needs 
of the media outlet for which the journalist reports; but it can also vary depending on the 
short-term developments of the domestic situation within the journalist’s home country. I 
could find, for instance, that journalists from EU countries tend not to be interested in UK 
domestic politics because, within the framework of European supranational institutions, this 
does not have dramatic consequences abroad. As a correspondent for a German public 
radio broadcaster put it: ‘American politics are [in this respect] a lot more important for 
Germans than British politics is.’ In addition to this foreign audiences are interested in 
different kind of issues. A Brazilian correspondent, for instance, made the point that the 
main focus of interest for his home readers/viewers is the economy. A Greek 
correspondent, instead, explained how Greek audiences are particularly interested in 
financial and society news. Editorial needs also affect the nature of the topics being reported. 
Magazines, for instance, favour topics that can provide stunning visuals (heritage, 
waterways…). The news agenda further changes along with events in foreign countries. 
Another Greek journalist, for example, described how the student protests of 2012 became 
newsworthy for audiences in Greece because they could be related (rightly or not) to the 
domestic unrest in the Mediterranean. 
 
 
How to engage foreign journalists to support the UK’s soft power? 
15. The main intermediaries between the UK’s Government and the foreign press, the 
International Press Office and the London Foreign Press Association, understand the new 
information environment and have flexibly adapted to communicate effectively with their 
members/contacts. The International Press Office, for example, painstakingly updates its 
mailing list of the transient journalists’ cohort through word of mouth—and old-fashioned 
but effective method. The FPA has recently cut the provision of a press room (which 
‘nobody’ had been using over the last few years),  having recognized that relying on a 
physical meeting place, when newsgathering happens mostly in cyberspace, is no longer a 
priority for its members.   
The problematic issue is how to deal with those journalistic actors, thousands of citizen 
journalists and even members of the public, who are not part of these institutional networks. 
 
16. Both official and non-official actors who want to promote their activities and interests 
should: 
 
a) Bear in mind that they are not talking to “the media”: there is a whole army of citizen 
journalists out there, not only professional journalists. 
 
b) Identify the range of interlocutors they intend to address their communication to: What 
media sources do they consume? Which communication tools are most suitable to reach 
them? Which other actors are the intended target audiences listening to? The key is to think 
in terms of networks (who do my interlocutors talk and listen to?) beyond the more myopic 
linear communication process (who is the receiver of my message?). 
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c) Make promotional/informational materials (possibly in different formats: text, video, 
images…) available online (before or at the same time of live events, not later). Officials still 
need, if appropriate, to be available for interviews and to provide press briefings. However, 
my research reveals a general reluctance of foreign correspondents (even full-time ones) to 
travel to events, especially in London. It is due to the combination of the sheer size of the 
urban centre (correspondents tend to live outside London while events are normally 
centrally located) and hectic routines (London is the most competitive media hub on this 
side of the Atlantic). Perhaps events could be streamed live on the web. 
 
 
Conclusions 
17. My research suggests that the prevailing mindsets both in academia and policy circles are 
based on outdated communication models. The very idea that soft power (mainly in the 
form of ideas or messages) can be “delivered” to foreign audiences indeed reflects simplistic 
assumptions about the way international communication works in the 21st century. 
 
What should be understood is: 
 
a) It is not possible to control the “message” and keep track of it, as a policy maker could 
hope to do in delivering a press briefing to a group of foreign journalists—a sort of 
“international media management.” While briefings are informative and useful, there is no 
guarantee that the desired messages will be picked up and reported in the same way as they 
have been issued. Communication processes in a highly interconnected world are not linear 
(a message being delivered from sender A to receiver B): receivers are simultaneously also 
senders of messages, there are multiple exchanges among many continuously interacting 
interlocutors, and messages are incessantly re-interpreted at each step of the 
communication process as results of such interactions, as in a series of feedback loops. 
 
b) In this context, the basic values of the UK brand— such as rule of law, democracy and 
fairness, respect for human rights, a concern for sustainability and the environment to name 
a few—provide a dynamic framework to loosely (but firmly) guide all national actors’ 
discourse and behaviour. These values constitute the “brand platform” or, just in different 
terms, a national “narrative.” 
 
c) The Government has a role in upholding such dynamic framework. 
 
d) Even in the information age and the era of “soft power” it is not so much messages and 
ideas that matter, but the CONSISTENCY between those ideas (UK brand values/national 
narrative) and policy action. What is absolute key in establishing the UK’s soft power is not 
the effort at sending and controlling messages abroad—which is unfeasible and, as such, not 
the best use of resources—but at making sure that what the UK and its citizens (diplomats, 
businesses, members of the public…) do reflect the country’s values at home and abroad. 
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Shell – Oral evidence (QQ 218-235) 
 
Evidence Session No. 13  Heard in Public   Questions 218 - 235  
 
Members present 
Lord Howell of Guildford (Chairman) 
Baroness Armstrong of Hill Top 
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean 
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock 
Baroness Hussein-Ece 
Lord Janvrin 
Baroness Morris of Bolton 
Baroness Prosser 
________________ 
Examination of Witnesses 
John Barry, Country Chair, Abu Dhabi, Shell, Gilly Lord, Partner, Head of Regulatory 
Affairs, PWC, Stephen Pattison, Vice-President, Public Affairs, ARM, and David Stanley, 
former CEO, the Penspen Group Ltd 
 
Q218   The Chairman: I thank our four witnesses for being with us; it is extremely 
helpful. This Committee is concerned with Britain’s overseas influence and soft power—or 
perhaps it should be the other way round: our soft power deployment and our overseas 
influence. A formality is that you have in front of you a list of the interests that have been 
declared by the Committee, which perhaps helps you a little in knowing where we are 
coming from. We will have about an hour and a quarter of discussion and evidence. Can I 
begin with the brutal and basic question? I understand that Gilly Lord would like to make a 
statement—that is fine; do that—but can I just put a question before your statement, 
because you may all want to make opening remarks? In your opening remarks, give us a 
guide as to whether the soft power that is supposed to be a major asset of this country is 
helping you in your business. Or is there a more brutal pattern in which your efforts and 
merit are the things that decide, and the efforts of this nation to make itself attractive, 
persuasive, contactable and in good dialogue with the rest of the world are only secondary 
or maybe even tertiary? That is the sort of question behind your opening statement. I will 
start with you, Miss Lord. 
Gilly Lord: Thank you for inviting me. I would like briefly to indicate how I might contribute 
to this afternoon’s discussion. I am an accountant and a member of a profession. The 
concept of a profession is something that is unique to the UK and in my experience is 
respected outside the UK. The UK accountancy profession in particular has a great 
reputation around the world. Together, I see that as a very valuable source of soft power for 
the UK which we, the professions and the Government, should work hard to maintain.  
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: I did not quite understand that. Are you saying that 
accountancy is not a profession elsewhere? 
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Gilly Lord: No, I am not, but the concept of a profession arose in the UK, a profession being 
a group of people working together in a common activity with an overarching public interest, 
a code of ethics and education standards that allow entry. So that idea of creating a 
profession was something that we created in the UK. Our professions therefore are among 
the oldest in the world and command some respect because of that. The accountancy 
profession in the UK in particular is the oldest accountancy profession in the world and is 
respected around the world by other accountancy professions in other countries. 
The Chairman: Can I stick to opening statements and ask Mr Barry next to tell us quite 
frankly whether the discovery and production of oil and gas around the world, and the 
processing and the sale of products, are helped or particularly hindered by the soft power 
qualities of this nation? 
John Barry: Thank you, Lord Chairman. For 30 years I have been in the upstream part of 
the industry, the extraction of natural resources. Our clients, if you like, are Governments 
or national oil companies. It is incredibly important that there is a projection of the right 
sort of image beyond the company. In fact, when we think about how to secure new 
business, and these are quite significant deals or access to concessions, we think about 
having a good technical offering—that is the table stake; we think about a good commercial 
competitive offer. But in our analysis we also look to the political and the relationships, 
which are very often nothing to do with Shell but with UK plc aspects. Those relationships 
have been developed between members of Governments and national oil companies, 
through education, through visiting, through having properties in the UK, through admiring 
the BBC and so on, which I think is the definition of soft power that I have read in the 
literature of this Committee.  
The Chairman: Just one codicil to that: is the fact that you are a Dutch as well as a British 
company an advantage or a disadvantage? 
John Barry: My answer to this depends on where I am sitting. Since 2005, Shell has been a 
100% UK plc, but we have a big office in the Netherlands. We are a UK plc. 
Q219  The Chairman: Could I turn to you, Mr Stanley? I was informally telling the 
Committee earlier that I had encountered a great many of your colleagues this morning—or 
your former colleagues, because you have just retired, I think—who were much involved in 
ambitious and forward-looking investment and involvement in Iraq, which is a challenging 
market to put it mildly. What help, if any, are the efforts of this country to deploy its soft 
power in your business? 
David Stanley: Thank you, Lord Chairman. We are a medium-sized business, so we do not 
have a huge interrelation at political levels of dynamics between countries, but using Iraq as a 
particular example, I am also a member of the executive committee of the IBBC and heard 
you speak at the conference there this morning. The Iraq Britain Business Council provides 
soft-power facilitation. That has been very instrumental in us being able to establish a 
foothold in Iraq, both in southern Iraq and Kurdistan, and has provided us with opportunities 
to speak to key people in Iraq, starting with Deputy Prime Ministers, and to develop 
relations. The soft power benefit for us is particularly in relationship development. 
Relationships are at all levels, but they are always personal. The perception of soft power by 
the person with whom you are developing a relationship varies enormously. It can be the 
BBC, it could be the Premier League, it could be all sorts of things. It is a matter of 
establishing common ground with those people, hopefully within the value system that we 
adopt as our company, which are British values. 
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The Chairman: Thank you. Could I just ask Mr Pattison to comment, the fourth in this 
opening scene, perhaps illuminating for us the range of activities and services of ARM, 
because you are a very familiar name as a company, but you cover such a vast range that it is 
difficult to get our heads around it sometimes. 
Stephen Pattison: Thank you very much. Put simply, we design microprocessors. Those 
designs have found their way into a vast number of modern goods, primarily but not 
exclusively mobile phones. Our designs are used all over the world by a great variety of 
companies to build some of the most technological products of our era. Does soft power 
play a role in our winning business? The short answer is no, or at least not a very big role. 
Certainly, if I phrase the question along the lines of whether UK ideals and UK culture are a 
significant or major factor in our winning contracts, I think that the answer to that would 
have to be no. The main reason why our designs are so successful is that they are 
technologically superior and innovatory. We have a business model that respects the clients 
in ways in which some of our competitors might be said not to do. There are of course 
elements which, if you stretch the definition of soft power, might contribute. The English 
language is one: it is a hugely beneficial advantage to us to be able to operate in the English 
language all over the world. There is something around Cambridge; we are based in 
Cambridge. Cambridge is a huge brand when it comes to technology. There is of course 
something around trust and reliability, which is very nebulous. If I come back to whether UK 
ideals and culture are significant factors, I think that I would have to say no.  
The Chairman: That is a very interesting reply, particularly your touching on the brand 
element. As you say, very words like Cambridge thanks to its development in the past 30 or 
40 years have become internationally resonant. I think that on this Committee we are 
somewhat stretching our view of soft power to cover your wider scene, and we do not 
expect you all to answer that you have closed a deal that morning because you are British 
and they like the British; it is not like that. That is certainly very important to us. I do not 
know whether any of my colleagues would like to ask a pursuing question on this opening 
scene.  
Q220   Lord Janvrin: Thank you, Lord Chairman. Could I just explore the key question? 
We have slightly different views among you, which is excellent, about whether there are 
ways in which soft power is useful at the moment. Looking to the future in a very fast 
changing world, partly because of digital phones and all that, do you think that soft power 
may become more useful to you? We are very keen to look forward here rather than 
backwards about how you see the influence of some of these more nebulous factors such as 
national brand, trust, integrity et cetera. In particular, I was very interested in that opening 
statement from you, Miss Lord, about the importance that people attach to the British 
creating standards kitemarks et cetera, which I think lay behind your statement. Looking 
forward to the kind of world we are moving into, do you see soft power being more 
important in the future? That question is to everybody. 
David Stanley: The digital world is a big factor even in straightforward engineering—we are 
in the oil and gas engineering business. We use training and education as one of our great 
tools to penetrate markets around the world. As examples, we put huge work into 
developing the MSc at Newcastle University. In the past two or three years, we have 
developed the first module of an MSc course at Northumbria University. The difference at 
Northumbria is that it is a distance-learning programme. We have been overwhelmed by the 
take-up around the world, by the hunger and desire to get into our education system. The 
digital world is remarkable in how it has provided that access. We do it not because it is a 
marketing exercise; we do it genuinely to share our competency and know-how. It set us up 
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as experts and a reference in our field. As a result, people who study those courses come 
back to you later when they come up against another problem, so it is a feeder of business 
for us. We have a number of cases where a course that we have run in Houston has led to 
an $80 million, 10-year contract in Mexico for us. You do not know where it is going to go, 
but that education platform is enormous. I see the digital age as a massive enhancer of that. 
Stephen Pattison: Your question is whether soft power is likely to play a bigger role in 
future. The answer to that is undoubtedly yes. It will have to play a bigger role if the UK is 
going to succeed. Let me explain. It is a cliché to say that the market is now global, but the 
market is global. Over the next 10 or 15 years, we will see a number of other significant 
countries attaining similar standards of technological development, something which my 
company is particularly interested in, and competing with us in the same marketplace. At 
that point, the UK’s soft power could become a very important factor. It is obviously going 
to be crucial in attracting inward investment into the UK. I think that some of the broader 
things about soft power are hugely relevant: for example, the rule of law and the patent 
protection arrangements in the UK. These are the sorts of things that will attract business 
into the UK. However, I also think that soft power will play a bigger role than hitherto in 
British companies winning orders from overseas. We are a cutting-edge, high-tech company. 
I would like us to be able to say in due course that we come from a cutting-edge, high-tech 
country. That is a kind of soft power that I do not think Governments have entirely realised 
can provide a huge driver for Britain’s economic growth and its continued competitiveness 
on the world stage. 
Q221   Lord Forsyth of Drumlean: I apologise for being late. Could I just follow up on 
that, Mr Pattison? I am not quite sure that I understand what you are saying. In your earlier 
statement, you said that you thought that the fact that our having the English language and 
the brand educational advantage associated with Cambridge may be an advantage, but you 
thought your product was so far ahead of anybody else’s that they would buy it anyway and 
it did not really matter. Is there another country where if you based as a company you 
would do better in tackling the global market than Britain? 
Stephen Pattison: We ask ourselves that question quite often. We have chosen to stay in 
the UK for a whole variety of reasons. Whether some of these are soft power or not I leave 
to you to judge. One is time zone, which is very important to us. The other of course is 
culture. We are a British company. We were formed in Britain, and we remain loyal to 
Britain in all sorts of indefinable ways, but we could have a debate about whether we would 
be better placed to be on the west coast of the United States or even somewhere else. 
Right now, the UK is the best place for us to be headquartered. Looking ahead, I worry a bit 
about us and maybe one or two other companies from the UK surviving as exceptional 
British high-tech companies because the rest of the country is not looking at high-tech in the 
same way. That is what I mean when I say I think there is scope for the British Government 
to focus on how they can develop a soft-power image of the UK as a centre of high-tech 
excellence. That would generate more companies to do work here, which would have a 
snowball effect and drive growth. 
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean: Forgive me for pursuing this. Is not our image as people who 
are frightfully good at being high-tech and producing brilliant ideas out of Oxford and 
Cambridge, which are then developed by the Americans? 
Stephen Pattison: There is certainly that, yes. Part of this will be whether we can devise a 
way of turning some of those ideas into good, home-grown commercial successes. 
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Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: I find your answers very interesting answers, but I am still 
perplexed about why you are here, because this is taking up a lot of your time. Mr Barry has 
come from the United Arab Emirates. I do not know where the rest of you come from. You 
had to come through security, and you are spending an hour and a half sitting here 
answering our questions. Why? When you read that this House of Lords Committee had 
been set up and that this is what we are studying, what said, “I am going to go along to them 
and give them evidence. I want to do this, that and the other”. What motivates you to come 
along and to give us so much of your time? What do you want us to do? What do you want 
us to recommend? What do you want us to tell the Government to do, or other people to 
do? Mr Barry first perhaps; you have come a long way. 
John Barry: If I may have a go at that as the Air Miles man, my day job back in Abu Dhabi is 
as the country manager. Because of the importance of soft power to a natural resources 
company, as I alluded earlier, quite a bit of my time is spent over there working with the 
representatives of Her Majesty, the ambassador and others. It is obvious to me that a 
reflection on how we can do this well into the future, and possibly even better, is worth my 
time—I happened to be here anyway, which was a happy coincidence—so I have no qualms 
in saying that this is important. I accept that there may be areas of industry where 
competition is purely on technical and commercial grounds, although that is certainly not the 
case for my part. What would I like to see done differently? There are many elements in my 
draft preparations for answers here, but in terms of facing the future it is not that we need 
more soft power but that we will need it differently, and it is good to be very self-aware 
going into that.  
In a world that is more connected—one can think of the Arab spring and the demands for 
transparency, which are growing in places that were never there before—the UK can bring a 
lot. Some aspects such as transparency, ethics, and the Bribery Act, if well sold, play to our 
strengths and are easy. Sustaining our image as a high-tech country is going to be very tough. 
I have just come back from Korea, and I can tell you that they are very good at it and they 
are not shy about telling people. It needs self-reflection—I know this goes on in the 
corridors of government—and a way in which industry and government can draw their ties 
closer together so that it is not just me sitting with the ambassador out there but perhaps at 
this end a strategic relationship to help the Government in steering their way forward. Not 
all soft power is to do with government, I appreciate, but we are talking today about what 
can be done differently in this context.  
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: Gilly, what stirred you? 
Gilly Lord: I had a shorter commute here, just 10 minutes, but I was still stirred. My 
business is about selling advice, people and services, so it is intrinsically linked to soft power 
and to reputation. If UK accountants stopped being regarded around the world as good 
accountants, that would be highly detrimental for our business. That is why it is important to 
me. The crisis of 2008, following which my profession among others was criticised, showed 
us how vulnerable our soft power is. In today’s digital world and with Twitter storms, it 
shows us how quickly it can be lost. So, again, why am I stirred by this? It is because, first, it 
is very important and, secondly, it is very vulnerable.  
In terms of what we might do in the future, I talked at the beginning about the accountancy 
profession and about our creation in the UK of standards that are now used around the 
world. We started creating those standards in 1840. They are great and they have worked 
very well. However, the world is now changing, and we as a profession in the UK are 
beholden to allow those standards to evolve. If we do that and are creative and innovative, 
and if we come up with an audit model, say, that still works in today’s world, our profession 
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will continue to be at the forefront of the accountancy profession globally. If we do not, and 
if we stick with the models that we created in 1840, we will dwindle into irrelevance. That is 
really why I am here today. 
The Chairman: That is a really interesting reply.  
Q222  Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: I am terribly ignorant about the Penspen Group, so 
you will have to forgive me. What motivated you this morning? Did you say, “I’m going along 
to tell these Peers what they should be doing”? What did you want to tell us? 
David Stanley: The principal driver for coming to speak to you today is that the 
environment within which we talk to our clients and hopefully win business from them is 
influenced enormously by soft power and the British message that goes across. Similar to the 
accounting profession, the engineering profession is also very well regarded, and British 
engineering is regarded very highly around the world. Endorsing and developing that 
environment—the legal framework, the finance framework, all those elements coming 
together—will make winning business for us much easier. We do not directly influence the 
legal framework of course, but we work within it and depend on it enormously, and it is a 
factor in whether we go into a particular country potentially to undertake business. Similarly, 
there is the ability to get paid. There really are very mundane aspects to it. 
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: They are important though. 
David Stanley: Yes. All those drivers of soft power—the educational side and the cultural 
side—create a much better business environment for us to be able to do business in. That is 
the message that I wanted to pass across. 
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: I do not know whether Stephen wanted to say something, so 
I get a full hand. 
Stephen Pattison: I think my answer has been borne out in the answers of my colleagues, 
but I am also here to try to shake out from the Select Committee’s work any complacent 
reliance there might be on what I would regard as an old fashioned notion of British power. 
We might think that all we have to do is teach English, make sure that we uphold the rule of 
law and we are home and dry, but it is not going to be like that. If you asking me what I want 
government to do, I have a whole list of things which I think not this particular Government 
but any British Government could do to make the UK a cutting-edge high-tech country. 
Some of it starts with using some of the great soft power things that we have. We can have 
a debate about the health service, but let us assume that the health service is embedded as 
part of the UK’s culture and ideals. As we move towards an ageing population, we will need 
financial as well as other drivers to look after the elderly more in their homes than in 
hospitals. That will require investment in remote health monitoring. It is a major challenge if 
you want to describe yourself as a high-tech country: can you actually do remote health 
monitoring for your ageing population? There are simple ways in which the UK could do 
this. The technology is already there, but actually we have been pretty slow.  
I could go on with other examples, but my main message is that we need to think about soft 
power from a future perspective and not rest on our laurels. 
The Chairman: Good. That is what this Committee wants to hear. That is a really useful 
message. I am going to ask Baroness Hussein-Ece to join in the discussion, and then Baroness 
Morris. 
Q223   Baroness Hussein-Ece: Thank you, Lord Chairman. On your last point, I was 
going to preface my remarks by asking you whether you think there is a danger that we are 
resting on our laurels a bit, given what we have already heard and the fact that we have been 
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the world leader historically in key professions and with the English language and the BBC, all 
these things that we know about. Do you feel that we are lagging behind? We have heard a 
lot of evidence, and we hear constantly that when it comes to investment in some of these 
new and emerging markets in places like China we are still lagging behind. I was in Edinburgh 
this weekend at a British-Turkish forum with key businesses, with their Rolls-Royces, PA 
systems and all the rest of it. People had come from Turkey, and I was a bit shocked to hear 
that we are lagging way behind the French, the Germans and the Italians in investing in a big 
market like that. We were confronted with people from the Turkish side who were very 
smart and going around the world doing business in all sorts of areas. There was a feeling 
that we are not quite there. We are not engaging enough, and we are resting on our laurels 
a little, relying a little on things like “Downton Abbey”. All these marvellous things are very 
good, but we are not taking full advantage. I would be interested to hear your comments on 
that. Gilly Lord talked about how the accountancy profession had started off. Many countries 
have now caught up and are perhaps doing better in some of these fields. Are we looking a 
back a bit rather than forward? 
The Chairman: Can I just add to that? Some people say that accountants rule the planet 
anyway, so we have to observe that with respect. Is our position that British accountancy 
standards are at the moment more or less globally accepted but that you feel that, with the 
pace of technology, this is going to change unless we move very quickly? Was that what you 
were saying? 
Gilly Lord: I think that the UK accountancy profession today holds a great reputation 
around the world, but it is vulnerable. On your point, I do not think that we can rely on the 
fact that we have had a good profession for 100-odd years and assume that that will  serve 
us just as well in the future, because it will not. Many of the things that we have done very 
well for the past 100 years are becoming less relevant today. Are we lagging behind? I do not 
believe that today we are. I shall share two examples that provide a counterweight. First, 
one thing that we are exploring at the moment in the world of corporate reporting is 
something called integrated reporting, moving away from pure financial reporting, where you 
reported on last year’s financial results, to something much broader that is forward looking 
and incorporates lots of different ways of measuring performance. The country that is most 
innovative in that space is South Africa, which is renowned for having lots of companies that 
have experimented with their accounts and done really interesting things—we might not like 
them all, but they are much more creative in that area. Secondly, I think about audit, which is 
an important part of the accountancy profession. In relation to audits of 30 September year 
end accounts, the UK was the first country in the world to radically change our auditing 
opinions away from the binary, true and fair view-or-not opinion to something much more 
subjective that tells readers about the audit process and gives them a much more qualitative 
view. In that regard, we are still world-leading, but we have to be if we are to maintain the 
soft power of this profession. 
Stephen Pattison: Perhaps I can give you an example from Turkey of something that we are 
trying to do. Earlier this year, Turkey put out a tender for a large number of tablets to be 
used in Turkish schools—mobile tablets, computer tablets. We are very keen that that 
tender should go to a company that is using our designs. We do not make tablets; we just 
make the chips that go into them. So we are working with a company that makes tablets 
using our designs. In the world debate on using computers in schools, quite a lot of suspicion 
has been raised that companies try to dump a lot of computers on to schools that are not 
ready for them, particularly in developing countries—I am not suggesting that Turkey is a 
developing country. They are dumped on schools where the teachers do not know how to 
use them, where the kids are accessing dodgy material, where the power supply is irregular, 
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and where the thing does not really work. We are trying to put together an offering 
whereby we are able to go and say, “Here’s a company that makes a tablet. It’s great value 
for money. Our chips ensure that it’s very energy-efficient and, by the way, we’re also 
working with educationalists to make sure that the whole offering is coherent from an 
educational point of view”. Now, that would be hugely enhanced if tablets were the order of 
the day in British schools and we could say, “A lot of British schools have been there and 
know what this is like”. As it is, we are drawing on expertise that is Cambridge-based, with 
luck, but the studies have been done elsewhere. I hope that that gives you an example of 
why if we had a modern form of soft power—tablets in British schools—it would strengthen 
our case in trying to get tablets using our technology into schools overseas. 
Baroness Hussein-Ece: Does that mean that you have put a bid in for the tender for 
these tablets? 
Stephen Pattison: We are not bidding at all. We do not sell tablets. It will be a non-British 
company that is making a tablet using our designs—there are several actually—but the 
chances are that we will end up working with a Chinese company that makes tablets trying 
to get this sale in. That is a good example of soft power, if I can put it that way without 
treading on too many toes. If you are the Turkish Minister of Education, you might well think 
this is a good offering: you have a Chinese company making things relatively cheaply with a 
British company in the background bringing in a British expert on education. That suddenly 
looks like a pretty good package.  
Q224   Baroness Morris of Bolton: I, too, apologise for being late. I rather like this idea 
of shaking us out of our complacency about British soft power. It is rather like our whole 
attitude to languages: the rest of the world speaks English so we do not feel that we need to 
learn another language. You said that you wanted to live in a country that is known to be 
high-tech. I take a point that John made: that the Koreans are not shy about telling people 
what they are doing. I wondered, again, whether there is just something in the British 
psyche. We are doing a lot of really exciting things, not just in Oxford and Cambridge but 
throughout the country, and I just wonder whether we do not tell the world enough about 
what we are doing. I have always thought that this is one of the big problems with soft 
power. It is below the radar, you do not tend to shout it, and it is not as visible as the hard 
power. I would like to think that it is not quite as woeful as maybe you think it is and that 
you might not have to relocate to California. 
Stephen Pattison: Let me assure you that we have no immediate intention of relocating to 
California. The point is a very good one. Take, for example, last year. As you probably know, 
the British Government ran a GREAT Britain campaign to coincide with the Olympics. There 
were loads of posters. Some of them had technology pictures on them, but not all of them. 
The GREAT Britain campaign tried to cover the whole waterfront. It had a picture of a 
Cambridge college, and everybody was thinking, “Oh, that’s sweet; that’s exactly what you 
think of about Britain”. It did indeed have a picture of one of our designed chips and a 
picture of a prosthetic arm. These things got hideously confused. I went into a British 
embassy somewhere and said, “Have you got the ARM poster there?”. “Oh, yes,” he said, 
and the bloke showed me it, and it was a picture of the prosthetic arm. People are trying to 
do too much, actually. We need a focus on the technology bit, which is what I am here to 
try to say. There is a good story to tell. You are absolutely right that people are doing very 
good things in Shoreditch, Cambridge, Bristol and all sorts of places, but it still does not add 
up to the popular global image that Britain is a high-tech country. 
Q225   Baroness Prosser: I find this completely fascinating, but the reality in this country 
is that at the moment we are short of some 20,000 engineers. I do not lay the blame entirely 
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at the door of this current Government or even the one before, but the atmosphere in this 
country about that kind of education has not been positive for many years. What can you 
say to us that we should be saying in detail—not precise detail, but rather more meat on the 
bone—about how we are going to get over the kind of snobbish attitude that the country 
has towards the sort of education and training that lead into those fields? There may be a 
lovely picture of Cambridge, but that is academia. People think of Cambridge itself. They do 
not associate it with high technology. So we have this big gap. Everybody talks about the 
need for everything to be smart and new and whatever, but the funding for that kind of 
education is way behind funding for academic learning. 
Baroness Armstrong of Hill Top: That is why they are in Newcastle. In the north-east, 
we still like engineers.  
Baroness Morris of Bolton: And in Bolton 
Baroness Prosser: I will have to shout for Shoreditch in a minute. 
The Chairman: I had better call this meeting to order. These are very interesting themes. I 
do not know whether you would like to elaborate more on them. 
David Stanley: Perhaps I may pick on the engineering source of future resources. It is an 
issue, although recently there has been a bit of a shift back towards engineering as a chosen 
career, at least perhaps more engineers who graduate staying in engineering rather than 
going into financial services or the lure of the City, which was really high. Engineers, being 
pretty numerate, were pretty attractive feedstock for that sector. That having lost some of 
its allure in last five years has made a lot of people think more seriously about what a serious 
career is. I do not mean that financial services are not a serious career, but if you were an 
engineer, that was one of the options. On the masters degree course that we have in 
Newcastle, less than 30% of the students are British, I am sorry to say. I was asked whether 
we are losing our position. In many countries—for example, in Mexico, in Thailand and in 
other countries where we work and have had to develop indigenous engineering 
capabilities—they are extraordinarily proud to be working for a British international 
company. They see it as an aspiration. We find it very easy to recruit engineers in that 
environment—unfortunately, they are not British engineers of course.  
On the language side, we work in Spanish in Mexico and Latin America; we work in Thai in 
Thailand. Although we have to be able to communicate our work, our standards and 
processes in those languages, they adopt British values in the execution of that work and are 
extremely proud to be able to do that. To come back to the question whether we are losing 
our place a little bit, I think the answer is yes, we are falling behind. I am not quite sure how 
to stimulate more engineers to come into, in my case, the oil and gas industry and to get 
over the message that it is a really good career. It does not seem to drive many young 
people. 
Stephen Pattison: On education, I think we all agree that we need more young people 
going into engineering. Statistically, kids who are most likely to go into science come from 
science-y parents. Therefore, if we are going to increase the numbers going down that 
route, we need to create different role models for them, because they are not getting role 
models from their parents. This is particularly true of girls and women going into 
engineering. In order to create role models for them, the key has to be teachers. Teachers 
need to see themselves as role models and champions. The traditional science teacher might 
not necessarily be the best role model. In fact, we are working with an organisation called 
Code Club, the main aim of which is to get kids as young as eight or nine to take an interest 
in computer coding. It does so through a very engaging piece of software designed in the 
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United States. Part of the thought is that you might get other teachers engaged in this, too. 
Suddenly, you have the cool teacher keeping—if I can use an old fashioned metaphor—one 
page ahead of the kids learning coding and bringing a whole lot of kids with him or her and 
being a role model for it. That would help. We should take that thought all the way through 
to university. One idea that needs exploring is more joint honours so that young people 
could go to university and study, for example, media studies with sound engineering, or 
fashion and computer graphics, so that they are not being asked to specialise artificially. 
Okay, at the end, they will not come out with quite such a high degree of knowledge, but 
then we employ people with two degrees in computer science and we still need to train 
them. Companies will always have to do some training. We are not asking for oven-ready 
graduates; we are asking for defrosted graduates at best. I think there are approaches to this, 
but it needs a bit of big-picture thinking. 
Q226   Lord Forsyth of Drumlean: Mr Stanley, I do not mean to be personal or 
provocative, but looking at your CV I see that you are an engineer but have ended up doing 
banking, project administration, marketing and sales. Is that not because we no longer 
actually have a comparative advantage globally in heavy engineering? We all love the idea of 
bringing back the Brunels, educating engineers and getting back to what made us great in the 
19th century, but is there not another reality? I should declare an interest in that I am a 
director of a company that has a big fabrication yard in Abu Dhabi, which Mr Barry will 
know very well. I see labour coming from India and elsewhere that is highly skilled and very 
competitive in its costs, and I question the idea that we can exercise some kind of revival of 
engineering as opposed to what we are good at, which is what you do: project management 
and pulling things together. Is that not where our comparative advantage lies, and should we 
not be concentrating on that rather than, at the risk of upsetting some of the other 
Members of the Committee, harping back to a past that is long since gone? 
The Chairman: That is a very central question. I should just like to supplement it, because 
it is one of the key questions that we are going to ask you. Are we trying to climb Mount 
Impossible, or is there not a world trend anyway towards more and more sophisticated 
services in the context of the information revolution? Is that not a strength that we should 
rather gladly play to, while recognising that India is churning out hundreds of thousands of 
engineers and we can never keep up? It is the same question, and it is a very central one. To 
what extent are we fighting a trend and to what extent should we ride with the trend? 
David Stanley: To merge the questions— 
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean: The Chairman’s questions are much more succinct than 
mine. 
David Stanley: There are two aspects to this. Even though we establish engineering 
operations around the world to deliver engineering locally to where the demand is and use a 
lot of indigenous engineers in that work, it has to be led by British engineers. That is part of 
our marketing and representation. There is a marked difference in the general statement of 
the capability of good engineers from the UK. We have a wider, more lateral thinking 
process. We have a better adaptation to the client’s requirements. We can put ourselves 
into the client’s shoes and think about what the client really needs from this. Yes, he might 
have written a scope and a definition of the project, but that is not necessarily quite what he 
wants. We bring extra expertise to deliver those solutions. Perhaps Brunel was given a 
scope of work to build a railway to Bristol, but he did it with much more thinking, with 
larger radius bends so that it could take much faster trains than were thought about at the 
time he was building it.  
ARM, Penspen Group Ltd, PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC) and Shell – Oral evidence (QQ 
218-235) 
105 
 
My point is that there is still great strength in British education and British engineering and 
the thinking process which they develop that other countries do not have. We have that 
issue regularly with Indian engineers. We have a very large group of Indian engineers in our 
Abu Dhabi office, but we lead them with British engineers and our clients look for that 
leadership. They are very happy to have the lower price, which is the other factor in it: we 
cannot staff it with 100% British engineers because it is too expensive if we are going to win 
in a competitive environment.  
To answer your question about why I moved away from engineering and more towards 
marketing— 
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean: I was teasing you. 
David Stanley: It is about the relationship, about the trust and the confidence that you build 
with a client by having the dialogue with the client about you and your company’s 
competency. To be able to talk at an engineering level ends up with the client being 
confident that you and your company can deliver what he needs. 
Q227  The Chairman: Mr Barry, is it all services nowadays? In 1982, our trade figures 
hardly mentioned services. Now we are told that they are 52% of our overseas earnings. Is it 
a service world that we moving into? 
John Barry: It seems to me that when we look globally we have to have a slightly larger 
definition of services. Listening to the conversation about British engineering and British 
engineers versus others, it seems to me that one of the things that we can very usefully do, 
based on our strengths, is to help others to be good engineers. We know how to do it. We 
have the know-how. That is what we really bring to the party. We could take an engineer 
who comes out of a university in India and turn him into someone who can do useful things 
in the modern commercial world, and can do them globally. That takes us back to education 
and to free exchange, which is so important. We talked earlier about campaigns to sell our 
technical abilities and so on. They are worth thinking about. The GREAT campaign was 
good: the posters are still up over the road in Victoria Street.  
On a smaller scale, the person who comes in to study for a couple of years or the people 
from Gasco in Abu Dhabi who came to Mossmorran in Scotland for a year to learn about 
health and safety engineering seem to me to be where we can really play strongly. That is 
what creates the aura that for me is the soft power that I can leverage. It is not all about 
having to do everything ourselves; it is about being open, about facilitating people coming in 
and out. On a hobby horse, I would love to see us declare visa-free entry for Emiratis before 
Schengen does it. That would really get some Brownie points, but that is an aside and I 
realise it is very Abu Dhabi-specific.  
Q228  The Chairman: You are touching on an issue that concerns this Committee, and 
we are going to have evidence on it, so do not feel that you need to hold back on this. I will, 
if I may, turn to the next part of our discussion. What more can the government agencies 
and departments—HMG—do to reinforce your efforts? You are at the sharp end. Mr 
Pattison, dipping back into your past, you were, I think, part of the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office and worked in Washington. Do you draw from that time any 
particularly precise views on what more could be done by government to reinforce your 
efforts? That is something that we are going to report on. 
Stephen Pattison: As I have said earlier, I think that, at its broadest, the Government could 
more to establish the UK as a high-tech country. That would be extremely significant. If you 
are looking at what the various government agencies can deliver in this area, my own view is 
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that they do a reasonable job but that frankly it is a bit patchy. They are getting better but 
they lack expertise in high-tech, for example, and in how to present Britain’s high-tech 
excellence. Too many agencies regard their main role as simply bringing two people into 
contact with each other, a willing buyer and a willing seller, rather than promoting an image 
of the UK as a place of high-tech excellence.  
Lastly, more could be done to professionalise the skills of some of the people working in 
British government agencies, at home and overseas. That is not done simply by bringing in 
external people. My own view is that some Governments spend a lot of time bringing in 
external people, and it is a bit hit and miss. What is needed is a more significant effort to get 
the people they have, who by and large are pretty good, to focus on the sorts of issues that 
we are talking about today. 
Gilly Lord: The area of the Government’s domestic policies that is most relevant to my 
business is how financial services and professional services are regulated. I talked earlier 
about the importance of innovation and creativity to our profession so that we cannot rest 
on our laurels. We need to move our codes and standards forward. A very careful balance 
needs to be established between regulation and the absolutely apparent and fundamental 
need to make sure that our financial system is stable and secure, while still allowing people 
to innovate. That is the single thing for my profession that is most important for the 
Government in setting policy. 
The Chairman: John Barry, would you like to add to that? 
John Barry: Yes, a couple of things. One was triggered in the pre-read by the reference to 
the Commonwealth. I found myself wondering why the Chinese have made such inroads into 
Africa, which ought to be our natural playing ground and indeed was for many years. If we 
think about how we can fix that, we bring different things to what the Chinese bring. We 
bring sustainability. We bring transparency. There is a role for building into the 
Government’s narrative, through the Commonwealth perhaps, the reason why it would be 
better to be with the British. We should not be ashamed of doing that, in a non-arrogant 
fashion of course. There is something in that big picture in how we can leverage the 
Commonwealth. 
Then there is consistency. Many countries that do not have a turnover of government every 
five years wonder whether we are good partners for a 30 or 40-year typical oil and gas 
project. An example that comes to mind is the statements that are being made around the 
European Union. Are we in? Are we out? Do we like it? Do we not like it? If I was a partner 
looking at the UK, either to invest in or potentially as someone to partner with, I would be 
wondering about things like that, and I would like to see evidence of a Government having a 
real long-term view when it comes to these commercial matters. 
Finally, it is very good that we see government now making efforts to travel around the 
world and often to take industry players with them and so on. We see a lot of these very 
good missions. I would just urge that they are sustained. It is, in the end, all about 
relationships. I think one of you said earlier that they are personal, and I do not think it is 
good enough to say, “Right, we can tick the box now. We have done Indonesia”. You 
actually have to work at these things at all levels and keep going, and the rewards come in 
the somewhat longer term.  
The Chairman: I cannot resist asking this. Should we be working with the Chinese? Should 
we be advising them with the services of how to get on in various parts of Africa, because 
they have not always been very successful? 
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John Barry: That is very profound, is it not, Lord Chairman, because in fact different 
countries are good at different things. We alluded to that in the engineering conversation 
earlier on. Maybe there is scope to do more together. I see that the Chinese will take over 
from the Koreans, who took over from the Japanese in engineering construction, and we will 
be working with them because we will be designing the clever things that they are probably 
the best placed to build in the end. Perhaps that is an analogy that we can use as well. 
Q229   Lord Janvrin: I wanted to follow up on the point that I think you made, Stephen: 
that government agencies need better focus. From where you sit, and given that you have 
sat inside as well as outside the government machine, do you see a need for a much clearer 
strategic view from government in this whole area of soft power? Do you think that that is 
actually possible, having worked from within? 
Stephen Pattison: Is there a need for it? Yes. Is it possible? That is a separate question, I 
think. No one has said this, but some of the questions about Africa touch on this. There are 
reasons why the Chinese are successful in Africa and why Britain has not been successful in 
Africa. It is not because we lack the companies that can go and do it, it is because we have a 
bit of baggage in Africa. Some of it is historical, some of it is ideological, and so on and so 
forth. If you are looking at the British role in this area, and you are talking about soft power, 
it is conflicted. On the one hand we are asking whether we can do more to promote British 
commercial interests. On the other hand, we are asking whether we can do more to 
promote other values that might not necessarily support British commercial interests. Let 
me say, for example, because it is well known, that the present Government’s decision to 
receive the Dalai Lama resulted in an 18-month or two-year freeze—whatever it was—in 
UK-China relations. It has only just recovered in a sense with the recent trade missions by 
the Chancellor and the Mayor of London. That is a trade-off that you have to make in 
arranging your foreign policy priorities.  
The Chairman: It could be a trade-off between the short term and the long term, could it 
not? 
Stephen Pattison: Yes. 
The Chairman: Occasionally, things that are painful in the short term win out in the long 
term. 
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean: Are you right about Africa and baggage? Is not the reason 
why the Chinese have done very well there that they have something that we do not have, 
which is loads of money, which they spent on infrastructure, roads and all kinds of things 
that have been welcomed with open arms? 
Stephen Pattison: That is part of it, too. They have loads of money and loads of people. 
They send their own people, who live in their own villages, and they get on with it and do it. 
The Chairman: I know that Mr Stanley wants to come in on China as well. 
David Stanley: We have worked with the Chinese for about 15 years, not in China but 
outside China. They were looking to undertake an EPC contract, in Abu Dhabi actually—the 
Abu Dhabi crude oil pipeline, which is a very big pipeline across Abu Dhabi—to bypass the 
Straits of Hormuz. They recognised that they were not able to do the engineering and the 
project management in a manner that would be acceptable to the Emirati client, and they 
appointed us to do that for them. We had already worked on other projects with them, and 
we continue to work with them in that area. You could say that that is perhaps a short-term 
horizon, because they will learn how to do it themselves, but we ring-fenced it. Of course 
they will learn a lot from it, but we are confident that we will move further forwards ahead 
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of the pace at which they can do that. If we did not do it, someone else would have to do it. 
We are in business to do business, and as the opportunities come up we take them. 
Q230  Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: This has been really helpful, and I must say I find it 
fascinating. I want to help you with another question. I am glad you said that we should not 
be complacent and look to our past, because I agree fully with that. Currently we have lots 
of great engineers; Mr Dyson is one of them. We have people building airports out in China 
who are doing a good job, and we have great artists, wonderful authors and great 
musicians—and I do not just mean One Direction, who we were talking about earlier, but 
lots of others. I am looking for a silver thread that joins them all together, a theme. I do not 
like the Great Britain theme. I think that “Great” implies imperialism, that we are better than 
you. I personally prefer Cool Britannia, but that might be too Blairite for some of my 
colleagues. I just wondered whether you could help us. Is there something that links it all 
together, that describes Britain—and I mean Britain: England, Scotland, Wales and Northern 
Ireland—a phrase or something that can link it all together. 
The Chairman: It is a very difficult question. 
David Stanley: You are asking a physicist and an engineer to do marketing. We have tried in 
different ways to capture and bottle that and to get a simple message across, but even in 
your description of it you covered a lot of areas. To try to get all those distilled into a 
succinct expression is extremely difficult. In fact, Britishness is the only generic word that 
captures all those values and excellences that you touch on, the music scene being one of 
them. There is also drama, the arts—all sorts of areas that are amazing. There is huge talent 
here. 
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: Gilly has an idea. 
Gilly Lord: The thing that is most striking about your list is the thing that I would like to be 
the answer: I would love Britain to be known for its diversity, the fact that we can do so 
many of these things and the fact that we have this amazing multiethnic population, which 
should make us able to do business all over the world really successfully. For me, it is about 
diversity. 
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: That is very good. 
John Barry: To me, if there is one word it is “open”; we are open to incomers and to ideas, 
and we are transparent in the way we do our business. 
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: That brings us back to visas as well, mind you. Open and 
diverse. 
Stephen Pattison: This is not original, but to me it is about innovation and creativity. One 
Direction and everyone else are successful because they are responding to a demand, 
particularly among young people, and there is a great angle on innovation and creativity in 
Britain. If I had to choose one phrase, I would be looking for something like “New Britain”—
something that gets across the fact that we are modern but that we rely on some of the old 
values: trust, respectability and so on.  
The Chairman: I am going to jump back a bit, but you have touched a chord: innovation is 
the story. We mentioned government bilateral missions to China and so on. Is it helpful that 
X million Chinese people—the number was disputed—watch “Downton Abbey”? Is that the 
image that we want to get across? 
David Stanley: It may create the link by which you can establish your relationship. I do not 
watch “Downton Abbey”, but I think I am probably the only one among those I ever talk to. 
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Whether it is “Downton Abbey”, the Olympics or the opening of Parliament, they are all 
areas where you can establish a dialogue, a relationship, some sort of values between people 
and the trust that emerges from it. Those are the foundations on which one can then 
hopefully develop business. 
John Barry: In thinking about what is changing, technology, innovation and so on, we must 
not throw out the baby with the bathwater. There are things in our traditions that are 
incredibly important. I think of the royal family. For a significant subset of countries they are 
incredibly important in maintaining relationships at the top level. You will be aware that we 
secured a very important contract in Abu Dhabi in April this year, and I do not believe it is a 
coincidence that that was announced on the first day of Sheikh Khalifa’s state visit to this 
country.  
The Chairman: So we could have the glorious paradox in a way that monarchy, which is 
an ancient institution, is leading us into the age of innovation and soft power in the future. 
John Barry: Yes, and as one who is married to a French republican I still believe that the 
royal family give us good value in the 21st century. 
The Chairman: Does the Committee have any other questions on this area? 
Q231   Baroness Prosser: Mention was made earlier of the lack of arrangements in Africa 
being possibly to do with the history and the baggage. That is something that people might 
debate for ages. The Chinese were there many years ago when we had the money to go in, 
so there is probably something in that. One thing that is said by people whom I have spoken 
with who have been working with the Chinese community is that innovation and creativity 
are not part of what they do. They are extremely hardworking and focused, but the idea of 
being innovative in the middle of all that is not something that they do, so I wonder what 
you think of the idea of diversity, innovation and creativity being labels that we can stick with 
and be very proud of and that separate us a bit from what is going on particularly, say, with 
the Chinese. 
John Barry: Chairman, may I just comment that we have suggested several times without 
challenging it that our baggage in some Commonwealth countries stops us from being 
significant players? 
Baroness Prosser: In some places it is lauded and people are very happy, I agree.  
John Barry: What I am saying is that I think that our Commonwealth debate could include 
more of a business element. I do not think it is about neocolonialism; it is actually a very 
positive thing that we could build in in a number of those countries. 
Q232   Lord Forsyth of Drumlean: We have talked quite a lot about what government 
could do, and there is still a bit of mist about exactly where the focus should be, but do you 
think that business organisations and professional bodies could be doing more in this area? I 
know that the CBI has come out with a ringing endorsement of the EU today, but do you 
think that organisations that represent business or the professional bodies could be doing 
more to promote this concept of soft power around the world, and if so, what? 
David Stanley: Actually, if I may, I would bring UKTI into that answer as well. 
The Chairman: Please do. 
David Stanley: It seems to me that UKTI’s focus is very much on the big business 
opportunities that there are, and its support to SMEs is much less. As a consequence of that, 
it is covering too much in too many places. It has a certain number of companies that it has 
relations with in the UK and it focuses on them and what they are doing around the world in 
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an account management-type process. From a businessman’s point of view, you segment 
your markets and identify in each market the strongest product or service that you might 
sell into it. It does not have to be specifically a pipeline or engineering product. It could be 
oil and gas in, say, Iraq, which is clearly the dominant part of its economy at the moment. It 
has a broad coverage. Even though there are many other opportunities than oil and gas, it is 
the dominant aspect—92%—of its economy. So dedicated or more focused support groups 
are needed, whether for industry sectors or for countries like Iraq, Britain or China. The 
China-Britain Business Council, which is an extremely effective operation, looks at much 
more focused delivery to the businesses in Britain and the opportunities that there are in 
those places. There are several ways of cutting that cake. One is geographical, through the 
Britain-and-other-country organisation—a dedicated structure—which helps the businesses 
to solve the issues of how to do business in those countries, how to find out what the 
opportunities are and how to get going there. The other, perhaps, is the professional cut or 
market sector cuts. Each one of those has a role to play. We cannot cover all of them, so 
like any business you have to choose those that are going to give you the best returns and 
decide on supporting them. At the moment in Iraq we have a UKTI operation, which is 
actually fairly small. We have the IBBC not duplicating—it is doing a different service—but 
overlapping. Why? We should be doing both. 
The Chairman: I speak as an adviser to the British Chambers of Commerce. Could our 
chambers of commerce be more like the Germans’, going abroad with massive delegations 
and programmes? 
David Stanley: From my point of view, we have almost no interface with British chambers 
of commerce. I am sorry to say that to you. They do not provide any support to us in where 
we are trying to go. I see that as a massive development, if that is going to become the case. 
Stephen Pattison: There are two problems with industry groups. One is that they tend to 
be very focused on companies that want to make sales abroad, so their agenda is driven very 
much by companies that want to win a particular contract. Secondly, all industry groups tend 
to be dominated by a handful of companies, so they are not very good at capturing the new 
companies. If we think that innovation and creativity is it, and that it is going to be in 
Shoreditch and with these other companies, I have to say that the traditional business 
organisations are not very good at representing that lot, so I fear that if we trust those 
organisations with the message, it will get slightly distorted. I am not sure that they are the 
answer. 
Q233  Lord Forsyth of Drumlean: Is that not true of government organisations as well? 
My question was what could be done. You are right in your assessment of how good they 
are at it, but could they not be better at it? I am not just thinking of organisations like the 
CBI. I cannot think what they called, but I am sure there is an oil producers’ organisation, 
and there is the Institution of Civil Engineers. All these bodies have a very grand history. We 
were talking earlier about the expertise in British engineering of pulling things together. Are 
they busy promoting that around the globe? Do they need help to do so? 
David Stanley: They are doing it, but I think that there are fears of treading on other toes. 
There are parallels. UKTI is doing some of it; the offshore gas engineering group is doing it—
groups like that—but there is no co-ordination between them. 
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean: How could this be fixed? 
John Barry: I wonder whether there is a catalyst role for UKTI, although it clearly cannot do 
everything. In my own neck of the woods, I see the Institute of Chemical Engineers doing a 
great job of reaching out to Emiratis, offering all the things that they would offer to young 
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engineers anywhere. That anchors the British connection in the mind for the rest of your 
career. I see other institutes that could perhaps learn from that. I am afraid that I do not 
have a solution, but I see that some best practices could be adopted. In terms of business 
groups in country, Lord Chairman, you referred to a German chamber of commerce. I look 
at the American Business Council in the Emirates. It does it properly. It has four people 
working for it. It has an office in Washington DC. All too often, we tend to be very hard 
working and well meaning amateurs and to under-resource these sorts of things. I think that 
big companies, and maybe even medium and smaller ones, would come up with some funds if 
the opportunity were there. This is not high on our agenda every day, so we do not always 
drive these things—it needs some crystallisation—but we need to put more resources into 
these things and do them more professionally. 
Gilly Lord: I would like to comment on the activities of my professional body, which is 
ICAEW, the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales. That sounds by its 
title a very parochial and very UK body, but it has been impressive in how it has responded 
to change over recent years. It has about 140,000 members, more than 20,000 of whom are 
overseas. More than that, the great thing that it is doing at the moment is working with 
many emerging economies to help people establish their own accountancy profession. 
Rather than saying, “Please come and join our accountancy profession because it is so great”, 
it is helping them to work out how you do it in your own country. It has done it in 
Botswana—I have my list here—and many countries around the world. Coming back to one 
of the things that we talked about at the beginning, establishing relationships and an affection 
for the UK, I think that is very powerful. 
Q234   Baroness Armstrong of Hill Top: I have done quite a lot of work through 
different organisations in Africa. Oil and gas are now very important in east Africa. In 
Tanzania, they are anxious about how it is developed. They are a bit anxious about us being 
top-heavy in telling them how to do it. How do you go in in a different way? Your company’s 
experience in Nigeria has not exactly been a model that people have been able to use 
elsewhere. I know that there are all sorts of myths around it, but that is how it comes 
across to them. I have come across your organisation in Africa. I have also come across the 
organisation of public health workers and that of the people who sort out sewerage and 
waste. A lot of people who have retired go and do that work for nothing and translate 
British values around those things enormously. I spoke to a woman MP in Tanzania who had 
her house burnt because people thought that she was being too friendly to the oil company 
and that they were doing deals above their heads. It was all myth. What do you think this 
country needs to do in those developing economies and areas where there is anxiety about 
the great white country coming in and telling them how to do it, and exploiting them? 
The Chairman: Sounds like one for you first, Mr Barry. 
John Barry: I have lived for three and a half years in Nigeria. I confirm that it is a very 
complex situation. Probably the Nigerians would be the best advocates for working with a 
company like Shell. 
Baroness Armstrong of Hill Top: A lot of them would be, I know that. 
John Barry: But we are not here to discuss that. I cannot help but come back to this idea of 
openness. Everywhere I look around the world in my business—when I look at the fracking 
debate, the Arctic, Nigeria—I see that one gains people’s confidence not by trying to be 
clever and rushing things through but by being open and showing what things really mean, 
and being very honest about challenges and problems, if there are any, and how they can be 
managed and mitigated. I do not know the situation in Tanzania very well—it is not an area I 
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have worked on—but as a general principle I would say that there is no substitute for 
actually inviting people around, showing them how you do things, being very honest and 
working with people whom they trust, be it academia or other institutes. You should not 
pretend that there is not a problem. 
Q235  The Chairman: Would any of the other three like to comment on this final, 
enormous issue? It is very central to our thoughts, but we do not have much more time. Is 
all the great capital investment coming from the old capital sources of the West, or has that 
world changed as well? 
Gilly Lord: I would like to add one comment that builds on your comment, Mr Barry, about 
openness. Transparency is hugely important. The relevance to my world is that, much of the 
time as accountants, we think about reporting profits and pounds and dollars. In fact, what 
we need to get much better at is reporting a much wider impact. If a company is doing 
business in Tanzania, yes, we need to ask what profits they might earn, but we also need to 
ask what they are doing for the local community, what they are doing for the environment 
and whether they are having a positive or negative impact. I think if we can become much 
more transparent and rigorous in reporting that much wider impact, I would hope that we 
would help the kind of situation that you described. 
David Stanley: On the Tanzanian question, Penspen started business in Kenya about 30 
years ago and we developed the Kenya Pipeline Company. It started from just a consultancy 
project where we were asked to look at the feasibility of developing a pipeline to bring 
products from Mombasa up to Nairobi and on to Uganda in subsequent phases. It has gone 
wrong in recent years. Corruption is a very big factor and creates the accusatory, adversarial 
environment which I think you are now talking about in Tanzania. I do not have a ready 
solution, but open consultancy and offering expertise that in a transparent and fair manner 
might lead to the ability of local politicians or decision-makers to realise that they have the 
right solution and here is the right way to go forward with it. 
Stephen Pattison: A last word on this point, which ties into soft power. Business could do 
more, because it is not very good at it, at getting across the message that business is a force 
for good, wherever it is. In the UK, we are very well placed. We have some terrific 
companies. Unilever is leading the way in sustainability. We have a product that can help ICT 
infrastructure reach most parts of developing countries at low cost. There is a good story to 
tell; it gets blotted out by the less good stories that dominate the newspaper headlines. If I 
were looking at soft power strategy for the UK, one of the things I might factor into it is 
business as a force for good. 
The Chairman: That is a very good note to have. We have hit a lot of nails on the head. 
We would like to go on, but we do not have time. I am personally thrilled because of my 
interest in the reference to the Commonwealth by Mr Barry, which I think is a great soft 
power network, but that is for another session. We thank you all very much indeed for an 
extremely illuminating session. 
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We  welcome the Select Committee’s efforts to understand how the UK Government might 
develop and employ better the country’s soft power resources to strengthen the UK’s 
influence abroad, and how the UK’s soft power is extended and used by organisations. We 
appreciate the chance to be involved with this exercise.  
 
Asia House’s second name is soft power. Our aim is to bring the UK and Asia closer 
through activities and events focused on business, policy and culture.  We are not a political 
body but hope to influence the development of national policy, education and social 
attitudes. We have strong views on the need to prepare the next generation in the UK for 
the reality of the world outside. Our particular responsibilities relate to Asia. We are a 
charity operating without any contribution from public funds. We aim nevertheless to assist 
the positioning of the UK as an effective player in this vital region.  
 
Asia House has links with some 40 individual countries, ranging, in our broad definition of 
Asia, from the Gulf to the Pacific. South and East Asia are naturally important in our 
programmes, but we pay particular attention to those countries and regions that are not 
currently represented or significantly reported upon in the UK. Over the last 18 months, 
this has included an emphasis on Burma, Central Asia, and the increasing importance of the 
ASEAN Secretariat ahead of community and economic integration in 2015.  We have joined 
with parliamentary and trade delegates visiting Indonesia and hosted the ASEAN Secretary 
General and the Deputy Secretary General in the past 12 months. We have been 
represented at other ASEAN events in the region. Alongside conferences, roundtable 
discussions and business events, we provide opportunities for people to experience Asian 
cultures through film, literature, art, food and performance. We mount or host important 
exhibitions at Asia House of Asian visual art. These efforts are explicitly welcomed by Asian 
governments and commercial players as well as the Asian public. 
 
The first component of soft power for Asia House is building and deepening the 
understanding of Asian societies and the way they function – objective understanding based 
on facts. The UK’s national information base needs strengthening. This requires a coherent 
and cooperative effort.  
 
Our second function is to use this understanding to strengthen economic success. Asia has 
50% of world GDP. It will not be possible to export to or invest in Asia effectively, or to 
attract a sustained volume of inward investment in the UK, without a thorough grasp of the 
objectives, capabilities and mind set of the cultures concerned. This belief drives the many 
conferences (trade, energy, and environment) and briefings we run for our corporate 
subscribers. We have contributed also, in a small but significant way, by publishing 
introductory guides to Asian markets for SMEs looking to expand in Asia. Our Navigating 
Asian Markets series provide the market perspective alongside cultural guidance, to 
demonstrate that understanding the culture is central to commercial success. 
 
The third function is to prepare the next generation to deal with Asia. Asia will be a big fact 
for them, impacting directly on their personal prospects. Our youth programmes reflect this 
perception. Broadly speaking there is a thirst among young people for knowledge of Asia. 
But this is not always focused or fed with useful information. Gaps in the UK’s foreign 
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language capability are very evident. Australian Asian language programmes are in sharp 
contrast.  
 
It should go without saying that to play a significant role in Asia we need to communicate 
effectively. English is an enormous strategic asset. But we cannot rely on English alone. Asian 
languages must receive closer attention in our educational system. Mandarin Chinese is now 
widely taught though not to a uniformly high standard. Our visits to British schools have 
revealed some imaginative solutions – and considerable gaps. We were delighted that, after 
some thought, the educational authorities decided to permit the teaching of further Asian 
languages at Key Stage 2. The study of Japanese, for instance, is an important contributor to 
that political relationship.  Many of our contacts point to language study as the gateway to 
real understanding of, and successful grassroots operation in, the societies concerned. 
Similarly we detect a thirst in schools for a curriculum delivering stronger information on 
Asian countries and their cultures.   
 
Opportunities in Asia challenge the UK to deploy its best soft power skills – reputation, 
education, and the contribution to international policy development. The Monarchy, the 
Armed Forces and the World Service contribute hugely to perceptions of the UK. The 
global standing of our science must be maintained. Creative thinking generally, not least in 
sport and music, brings enhanced reputation and leverage. The outcome of the London 
Olympics was admired in Asia as elsewhere. The popularity with Asian students of a British 
education, whether at school, university or research level, speaks for itself. Our universities 
are listed in Shanghai at the top of the world tree but this will only remain true while our 
leading educational institutions are rigorous in defence of independent thinking and academic 
standards.  
 
Asia House goes with this grain. We work collegially. We aim to bring in new voices to 
develop a shared, forward-looking, position on the Asian future and our response, though 
specific roles cannot be allocated top down. We cooperate with leading think tanks and 
cultural institutions as well as government. We reach out increasingly to relevant partners, 
not only in Asia but also in the US and Continental Europe. We see the Asian 
Commonwealth and its traditions as a huge plus. We have evidence that our Asian 
interlocutors appreciate this perspective. 
 
We are opposed to any narrowing of British attitudes towards open debate and engagement 
with the world outside. In all these matters the UK’s reputation for transparency, reason in 
global problem-solving and a constructive tradition in international fora, is central. We need 
to be seen as an outward-looking and inwardly welcoming culture, conscious of our 
limitations as well as our record and our strengths. But it should indeed be our objective to 
help shape the international landscape.  
 
Sir John Boyd KCMG 
Chairman 
 
September 2013 
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Universities, scholarships and soft power 
 
Background 
 
1. This submission focuses on the role that academic activity, and in particular government-
funded scholarships, can play in soft diplomacy. While appreciating that this represents 
only one area of the Committee’s remit, it is an important one. There is increasing 
evidence that academic or scientific collaboration represents one of the most effective 
forms of diplomacy – as demonstrated by the establishment of major programmes in the 
field by the American Association for the Advancement of Science and the Royal Society 
in the UK. International scholarships represent a very personal manifestation of this, and 
one in which the benefits are starting to be quantified. The comments below include 
evidence of this from the three main scholarship schemes of the UK government. 
 
The Association of Commonwealth Universities 
 
2. Although based in London, and constituted as a UK charity under the patronage of Her 
Majesty The Queen, the Association of Commonwealth Universities (ACU) is a 
Commonwealth, not a UK, body. We are a membership organisation, with over 530 
member institutions drawn from 45 countries. Encouragingly, at a time when the viability 
of some Commonwealth activities is questioned, membership is higher than at any time 
in our history. Our core (membership) income is approximately £1 million per annum. 
 
3. The ACU is, in the terms of the Committee’s inquiry, a ‘non-state actor’. The ACU is 
not a government body, and it is not our primary role to generate influence for the UK 
or for any other country. We would draw a particular distinction here with the role of 
our ‘sister organisation’ the Agence universitaire de la Francophonie, which in 2012 had a 
budget of €37.1 million, of which €33.2 million came from government.23 This difference 
in resources may make the Commonwealth look insignificant by comparison, but it is not 
a model that we would like to see adopted by the UK. We greatly value our 
independence from government, and emphasise that the promotion of the UK (or any 
other member state) is not our prime function. Nor, however, are the objectives 
incompatible; in many ways, ‘neutral’ fora such as the Commonwealth provide better 
opportunities for effective diplomacy than specifically UK ones. The ACU is marking its 
centenary year by launching an endowment fund to provide some permanent 
underpinning to our work. We hope that this will attract the support of the UK and 
other governments, on a one-off basis. 
 
International scholarships and soft power 
 
4. The ACU has, since 2012, been the only organisation to administer all three major 
international scholarship schemes of the UK government at the same time. Two of the 
schemes – the Chevening and Marshall Scholarships – are funded by the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office (FCO), and have public diplomacy benefits as their main 
objective. The Commonwealth Scholarships are primarily funded by the Department for 
                                            
23 http://www.auf.org/auf/en-bref/budget  
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International Development (DFID), with modest support from the Department of 
Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) and the Scottish Government. Total investment from 
government is substantial – around £42 million per annum to support around 2,500 
individuals – although significantly lower than countries such as Australia (AUD 334.2 
million in 2012)24, France (€86 million in 2009)25, and Germany (17,674 individuals 
supported in 2011)26. 
 
5. In recent years, the ACU has also sought to undertake groundbreaking work on behalf of 
these scholarship schemes to evaluate the impact of government investment in 
scholarships. As a result, we believe that we are increasingly able to discuss the role that 
these schemes play in pursuing public diplomacy and international development 
objectives, and propose some practical measures to improve this. We particularly 
welcome increasing recognition by government over the past decade that development 
and public diplomacy/soft power objectives can be complementary. Development 
scholarships have huge potential to further public diplomacy; public diplomacy 
scholarships also have a real impact on recipient countries. 
 
6. For international scholarships to generate soft power benefits, two preliminary 
conditions must be fulfilled. First, the recipients themselves must have influence; second, 
they must retain their links with their home countries, where the UK is seeking to 
enhance its reputation. Both of these connections can be demonstrated. The anecdotal 
evidence of influence is strong. A list of former Chevening, Commonwealth, and Marshall 
Scholars is appended. Marshall, for example, can point to several alumni who have served 
in the Obama administration. In recent surveys, we have sought to move beyond reliance 
on ‘star’ examples to establish more general evidence. A survey of Commonwealth 
Scholarships alumni, for example, found that 45% of respondents had influenced 
government thinking in specific policy areas, and 25% had held public office.27 18% of 
Marshall alumni who responded to a recent (2012) survey had also held ‘a political or 
public related post’, and 37% had served as a board member or trustee of a charitable or 
public body. In sectors where comparisons are possible, award holders rise to 
disproportionately senior levels in their career – a claim backed up by income levels – 
and their scholarship is instrumental in gaining career advancement. All of this might be 
expected as holders of prestigious UK degrees. 
 
7. Surveys of Commonwealth Scholars consistently show between 85% and 92% of former 
award holders living in their home regions, and around one-sixth of Marshall Scholars 
have studied or worked outside the United States. In both cases, there is strong 
evidence that these scholars return and build careers in their home countries, although 
the importance of this is being diluted by the increasing trend of ‘global careers’ during 
which alumni work in several countries. We would also emphasise that alumni not 
working in their home countries can still have significant benefits for the UK; many work, 
for example, for intergovernmental bodies or NGOs. A recent example is the current 
Governor of the Bank of England, who undertook his doctorate at the University of 
Oxford on a Commonwealth Scholarship. 
                                            
24 http://www.australiaawards.gov.au/content/about.html  
25 French Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs, Receiving foreign students (2010), p.5 
http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/IMG/pdf/MAE_mobilite_etudiante_v_anglaise_web.pdf  
26 DAAD, 2011 Annual Report (2012), p.94 https://www.daad.de/imperia/md/content/presse/daad_jahresbericht-11-
engl_120712b.pdf  
27 Commonwealth Scholarship Commission in the United Kingdom, Evaluating Commonwealth Scholarships in the United 
Kingdom: Assessing impact in key priority areas (2009) http://cscuk.dfid.gov.uk/2009/06/assessing-impact-in-key-priority-areas  
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8. Moving beyond this, soft power relations require a willingness on the part of the 
individual to retain relations with the UK. Our ability to quantify this is in its infancy, but 
the available evidence is highly encouraging. Commonwealth Scholarship surveys have 
broken down these links into several categories. 88% of Marshall survey respondents had 
visited (or lived in) the UK since their awards, and 30% had visited at least every four 
years. Around a quarter said that these visits were mainly for business purposes, and 
59% rated business as at least equal with social reasons for their visits. Marshall has also 
started to examine financial contributions to the UK. 45% of survey respondents had 
made a donation to, or financial investment in, a UK institution since their award. The 
Association of Marshall Scholars (the US-based Marshall alumni association) is also 
playing an important fundraising role, while almost 200 former Commonwealth Scholars 
contributed to an endowment fund set up to mark the 50th anniversary of the scheme in 
2009. 
 
9. The detailed evaluation of scholarships remains in its infancy, and many of the findings 
above can be seen as a proxy for public diplomacy and soft power benefit, rather than 
firm evidence. However, the evidence does suggest that scholarship alumni have 
significant potential to influence the reputation of the UK, and clear willingness to 
maintain their connections with this country. The policy question remains, therefore, 
what can be done to increase the prospect of this happening in practice? In this context, 
we would make the following observations: 
 
a. Funding needs to be at competitive levels. Although HMG invests some resources in 
international scholarships, we note above that this investment has not kept pace with 
countries that we might regard as ‘competitors’ both in public diplomacy terms or as 
providers of higher education. For example, China plans to increase the number of 
government scholarships offered to international students to 50,000 by 2015.28 
Although the process has not been even (DFID, for example, has recognised the 
value of the contributions that such scholarships make to development, and has 
consequently increased funding for Commonwealth Scholarships in real terms since 
2008), support for all three schemes is significantly lower in real terms than at their 
historical peak. 
 
b. Branding is vital. International scholarships depend largely on their historical 
reputation and prestige. This can take decades to build. In the UK context, alumni 
associate themselves directly with the Chevening, Commonwealth, and Marshall 
communities, as well as with the UK generally. In this context, the UK has three very 
strong international brands, which have been built up over 60 years. It is critical that 
all three are preserved, and resourced to a level that remains internationally 
competitive. 
 
c. HMG scholarships need to be seen as a coherent package. Although we regard 
maintenance of the three ‘brands’ as critical, awareness of each, and coordination 
between the branches of HMG offering them, has historically been weak. This has, 
however, improved in recent years and we now sense a real desire on the part of 
FCO, DFID and BIS in particular to work together. Some practical ways through 
                                            
28 Yang Xinyu, ‘National Policy and Government Support for Student Mobility’, presentation at the Conference about 
Cooperation between European and Chinese Higher Education Institutions, 16-17 May 2011, Peking University, China 
(http://www.emeuropeasia.org/upload/EMECW11/Conf_YANG_XINYU_CSC.pdf) 
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which this can be achieved – such as strengthening the UK experience for scholars 
and subsequent alumni programmes – are highlighted below. 
 
d. Serendipity is inevitable, but can be managed. Scholarships, like higher education 
generally, involve a degree of unpredictability. They are essentially an investment in 
high-quality individuals, with all the uncertainty that this involves. That said, ways can 
be developed to focus investment on specific sectors. Distance learning scholarships 
offered by the Commonwealth Scholarships scheme, for example, focus on targeted 
courses and sectors. Doctoral Commonwealth Scholars are known to go on to 
careers in academia in particularly high numbers. Candidates for Chevening 
Scholarships must have a minimum level of work experience. All three schemes have 
developed ‘leadership’ criteria for use in their selection processes. The 
Commonwealth scheme also maintains virtual ’professional networks’ for alumni in 
related areas of work. 
 
e. UK experience is vital. For many years, surprisingly little attention was paid to the 
experience of HMG scholarship holders while in the UK. In recent years, there has 
been welcome recognition that the schemes can do much to improve this, and at the 
same time emphasising the connection of HMG with the scholarships. This 
experience needs to embrace many elements of British life, but an insight into the UK 
system of government should be prominent. There is much good practice here 
already – Marshall Scholars visit Downing Street, both FCO and DFID make 
ministers available to attend welcome programmes and other events, and some 
scholars will meet Her Majesty The Queen next month, while the Commonwealth 
Parliamentary Association annually hosts an event for Commonwealth Scholars in the 
Palace of Westminster. This is an area in which all three schemes are developing 
their work. 
 
f. British Embassies and High Commissions have a critical role to play. Just as the experience 
of scholarship holders in the UK needs to be actively managed, so does contact with 
HMG on their return home. In our view, this responsibility rests squarely with British 
Embassies. Once again, there is much good practice here, particularly within the 
Chevening and Marshall schemes; this has been less the case with Commonwealth 
Scholarships, perhaps because of the DFID funding base and lack of awareness. With 
the new desire for HMG to work together, however, we feel this is changing. 
Fundamental to this approach is the ability of the three schemes to provide posts 
with necessary information and contacts. A good example of this is the Directory of 
Commonwealth Scholars, which is updated online annually. Marshall Scholars also 
have a very tight network, highlighted by the staggering fact that over 50% of all those 
ever to hold a Marshall Scholarship answered a recent survey. In the case of 
Chevening, too, the many local databases are now being combined into a global one. 
It is likely that, within the next two years, we might even be able to produce a global 
directory comprising all three schemes. Such data is not only of use to Embassies and 
others in identifying individual contacts, but it also underpins our efforts to rigorously 
measure impact through surveys of alumni. 
 
Soft diplomacy and the wider higher education context 
 
10. This submission has primarily discussed the role of international scholarships and soft 
power. We now conclude with some comments on the importance of higher education 
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more generally. As stated above, there is growing recognition that academic relations are 
a particularly powerful tool of diplomacy; academics tend to speak the same language as 
their disciplinary peers in a way that is likely to survive short-term political 
circumstances. From the student perspective, we have also presented evidence above 
that higher education can affect individuals at a particularly important time of their life. 
 
11. Immigration policy is significant in realising this potential. Immigration issues have 
generally been resolved for the HMG-funded scholarship holders that we refer to above 
– they receive additional help from the team at the ACU, they have greater credibility 
than most students, and, where necessary, we are able to draw on the support of 
Embassies and High Commissions. Anecdotal information from ACU members, however, 
confirms increasing concern about the UK as an accessible destination. Our experience 
of organising the annual Commonwealth Residential School for the first time in the UK 
this year reinforced our fears, with applicants from three countries (who had been 
chosen from some 200 applying for bursaries) being rejected. These decisions were hard 
to fault on the grounds of criteria supplied to UKBA officials; our bursaries were 
specifically intended to attract students without the means to otherwise travel to the 
UK, and who were thus seen as high risk. The inability of the UK to welcome such 
talent, even for a short period, is nonetheless of concern. 
  
12. The final point we would like to make concerns outward mobility. Much has been said 
about the desirability of more UK students undertaking some part of their course 
overseas, and we would endorse this. Much of the focus of this debate (for funding and 
political reasons) has focused on Europe, but we believe that the Commonwealth – as a 
two-way organisation with immense diversity and extensive use of English – should not 
be overlooked as a channel for such activity. Nor should such activity be confined to the 
‘developed’ Commonwealth. Although the vast majority of Commonwealth Scholarships 
are held (and funded by) the UK, the scheme has widespread capability to arrange 
awards (not funded by the UK) in other member states. Each year, UK candidates are 
nominated for awards in locations such as Brunei Darussalam, India, Malaysia, New 
Zealand, and Trinidad and Tobago. The number of countries is increasing – largely thanks 
to the anniversary endowment fund mentioned earlier – so that Commonwealth 
Scholarships now exist in Kenya, Samoa, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, and other 
low and middle income countries. Sadly, however, the withdrawal of Canada this year 
has been a step in the opposite direction. We believe that developing a Commonwealth-
wide programme in conjunction with other governments, but based on the foundations 
laid by the existing Commonwealth Scholarship and Fellowship Plan (CSFP), could be an 
important element of UK policy in the area of outward mobility, which would in turn 
contribute to public diplomacy objectives. 
 
The Association of Commonwealth Universities 
 
18 September 2013 
 
The opinions stated above reflect the views of the Association of Commonwealth 
Universities alone, and not necessarily those of the HMG scholarship schemes or their 
funding departments which are quoted. 
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Appendix 1: Eminent alumni 
 
Chevening Scholars 
Sergei Stanishev Bulgaria currently President of the Party of 
European Socialists; former Prime 
Minister of Bulgaria 
Alvaro Uribe Velez Colombia former President of Colombia 
Baldwin Spencer Antigua and Barbuda Prime Minister of Antigua and 
Barbuda 
Anote Tong Kiribati President of Kiribati 
Marek Belka Poland currently Head of the National Bank 
of Poland; former Prime Minister of 
Poland 
Joao Miranda Angola former Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
Angola 
Gega Mgaloblishvili Georgia former Prime Minister of Georgia 
Wang Lili China Vice Governor of the Industrial and 
Commercial Bank of China 
Bozidarka Dodik Bosnia and Herzegovina Supreme Court Judge, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
Commonwealth Scholars 
Dame Bridget Ogilvie Australia former Director of the Wellcome Trust, UK 
Professor Germaine Greer Australia Broadcaster and author 
Nicholas J O Liverpool Dominica former President of Dominica 
Dr Michael Cullen New Zealand former Deputy Prime Minister; Minister of 
Finance; Minister of Tertiary Education; Shadow 
Leader of the House, New Zealand 
Dr Kevin Lynch  Canada former Deputy Minister, Department of Finance, 
Canada; Executive Director at the International 
Monetary Fund; Clerk of the Privy Council and 
Secretary to the Cabinet, Canada 
Professor Elizabeth Blackburn Australia 2009 recipient of Nobel Prize for 
Medicine or Physiology 
Sir Ross Cranston Australia currently High Court Judge, UK; former 
Member of Parliament; Solicitor General, UK 
Professor Atiur Rahman Bangladesh Governor, Bangladesh Bank 
Professor Walter Woon Singapore former Attorney General, Singapore 
Dr Kenny Anthony St Lucia Prime Minister of St Lucia 
Dr Rolph Payet Seychelles Minister for Environment and Energy, 
Seychelles; Founding President and Vice 
Chancellor, University of the Seychelles 
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Mark Carney Canada Governor, Bank of England 
Alison Stone Roofe Jamaica Jamaica’s first Ambassador to Brazil 
Marshall Scholars29 
Dr Ray Dolby Founder and Chairman, Dolby Laboratories 
Justice Stephen Breyer Supreme Court Justice 
Bruce Babbitt former Governor of Arizona; US Secretary of the Interior for 
President Bill Clinton; 1988 Presidential candidate 
Professor Roger Tsien 2008 Nobel Prize for Chemistry 
Thomas Friedman Pulitzer Prize-winning author; columnist for The New York 
Times 
Dr Cindy Sughrue Chief Executive, Scottish Ballet 
Reid Hoffman Founder and CEO, LinkedIn 
Professor Amy Finkelstein Winner of the Clark Medal for Economics 
 
 
September 2013 
 
  
                                            
29 Marshall Scholarships are awarded to US citizens 
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BBC – Written evidence 
 
Introduction 
 
Joseph Nye, who invented the term ‘soft power’, defines it as ‘The ability of a country to get 
what it wants through attraction, rather than coercion or payment’, based on the 
deployment of intangible assets (institutions, ideas, values, culture and perceived legitimacy of 
policies) rather than physical resources (armies and treasuries).  When effective, it is 
characterised by foreign countries or businesses choosing to associate themselves with the 
UK, whether in trade, diplomacy or even military activity.   
 
The BBC is not a soft power ‘asset’ to be deployed at will by the Government.  However, 
through providing global public goods, the most trusted objective international news 
services, and content which deepens knowledge and understanding, and is inspiring and 
entertaining, it is able to project positive values about the UK around the world, and enables 
the UK to accrue soft power, both geopolitically and economically. Indeed as the Secretary 
of State for Culture, Media & Sport, Maria Miller, acknowledged in her recent speech to the 
Royal Television Society, the UK’s Public Service Broadcasters play an important role in 
influencing the way that the UK is perceived internationally.  
 
The BBC is one of Britain’s leading global cultural assets that enable the open exchange of 
ideas, information, and values among nations and so helps to foster mutual understanding. It 
is just as important that the BBC brings ‘the UK to the world’ as it is ‘the world to the UK’. 
The BBC’s contribution to the UK’s standing and reputation in the world sits alongside its 
support for the comparative advantage of Britain’s creative industries.  
 
The BBC contributes to the UK’s reputation abroad through its global portfolio of services 
which encompasses:  
• BBC World Service - the world's leading international multimedia broadcaster 
providing impartial news and analysis in English and 27 other languages;  
• BBC World News – the BBC’s commercially funded 24-hour news and information 
channel; 
• BBC Worldwide - the BBC’s main commercial arm in the UK and overseas 
supporting the BBC’s public service mission through operating linear TV and digital 
services, developing global product brands and licensing secondary merchandise; and 
• bbc.com - which alongside BBCNews.com, offers high quality international news, 
business, features and in-depth analysis. 
 
This diverse range of activities means that the BBC has a strong international presence, 
touching people across the world. BBC Worldwide’s 44 channels are available in over 406 
million households across the world. Global News (comprising bbc.com, BBC World News 
and BBC World Service) reaches 170 countries, with an audience of 256 million people who 
consume it on a weekly basis. Recently bbc.com reached a major milestone – in August for 
the first time there were more than 1 billion page views of the BBC’s international website 
in the month. 
 
At the heart of the BBC's global effort is the desire to deliver the best possible output for 
our audiences on a UK and a global stage, and in doing so there are a number of ways that 
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the BBC, as an independent media provider, enhances the UK's ‘soft power’ - its strength, 
prosperity, wellbeing and place in the world.     
• BBC News delivers a global perspective on the world free from national or 
commercial interest, and as result Britain gains geopolitically through enhanced global 
reputation, relevancy and respect.    
• The BBC’s global activities bring a direct economic benefit to the UK’s creative 
economy, also driving growth in the UK’s creative sector.   
• The UK economy also indirectly benefits as the BBC’s overseas activities play a key 
role in shaping the UK's global influence and positive reputation– enhancing Britain as 
an attractive place to visit, to study and to do business; attracting the world’s leading 
talents in a range of fields; and promoting understanding of the UK’s cultural variety 
and richness.   
 
Our assessment of the BBC’s role has been informed by conversations with a range of 
stakeholders. We include a number of their statements in the submission. 
 
This global role is important for the BBC, and we will be spending a significant proportion of 
the licence fee on the World Service from 2014. The move from the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office to licence fee funding distances the BBC World Service from 
perceptions that it has been an arm of government, enabling the BBC’s role in promoting 
global values to be even more respected; and, as a by-product, increasing its value to the UK.  
The move also provides greater clarity and security of funding for the World Service 
(through to the end of the current Charter agreement in 2016).  Looking ahead, and in 
order to make the most of this spending, we recommend greater clarity on Parliament’s role 
to ensure an appropriate and proportionate level of accountability. In particular the BBC 
would like to better understand the following: 
 
• The Foreign Affairs Committee has indicated that it will have continued interest in 
the World Service after 2014, but the Culture, Media & Sport Committee will be the 
parliamentary committee with oversight for all of the BBC including the World 
Service.   What will be the potential mechanism of co-operation between the two 
committees to ensure that parliamentary interest is focussed appropriately?  
• Parliamentarians periodically ask questions of ministers concerning the BBC World 
Service. Is it clear to which department (FCO or DCMS) such questions should be 
directed from April 2014? 
 
Geopolitical impact of the BBC  
 
1) The BBC plays a major role in enhancing the UK's standing and reputation in 
the world by providing a global public good in the form of accurate, impartial 
objective journalism, free of national or commercial interest, which in turn 
enhances British ‘soft power’.    
 
As the BBC Trust Position paper on the BBC World Service30 states: “The BBC World Service 
is editorially and operationally independent of the UK Government. Unlike some other international 
broadcasters, the objective of the World Service is not to advance the foreign policy of the UK 
Government…. This independence is highly valued by our audiences. It is an explicit role of the BBC 
Trust to ensure that the independence of the BBC is maintained and we will continue to fulfill that 
                                            
30 http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/bbctrust/assets/files/pdf/consult/wsol/wsol_positioning.pdf  
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role with regard to the World Service.” 
 
The BBC is consistently rated the most trusted and best-known international news provider, 
with CNN our nearest competitor31.  In the words of Professor Joseph Nye: 
 
"In the information age, when there is a surplus of information, the scarce resource is credibility – 
and credibility is established by being open and showing you are open, including being self-critical, 
and critical of your allies.  If you can establish a reputation for credibility – and BBC has that, it is a 
pity to see it squandered.”    
 
The global media landscape in which we operate is competitive, but far from free.  Around 
the world today, only one in six people lives in a country with free media. According to 
Freedom House, this is the worst media freedom rate in more than a decade.32 
 
Trusted news is especially valued at times of upheaval.  In Egypt, The BBC audience 
quadrupled during the Arab Spring, and high levels of reach have been maintained since that 
time, showing an ongoing need for trustworthy, objective news.  The BBC Arabic TV 
audience in Egypt is currently over 8 million.  There is also a need for trusted news in 
developed, stable countries.  In the US, there is a decline in trust for US news providers.  
American consumers value the distinctive international perspective offered by the BBC, 
which fills in a gap in domestic media.  
 
Professor Ngaire Woods “The BBC World Service has a long established global brand which is 
widely trusted as bringing independent analysis with reliability, depth, accuracy and global coverage.    
The BBC's capacity to deliver on this is powerful.  When you look across the resources of journalism 
across the world, they are massively under threat - with newspapers cutting back and other media 
pushing particular points of view.   The incredible gift of the BBC is impartial information - that is 
what people thirst for.”    
 
a) The BBC provides a counter-balance to other large international media 
organisations, and creates impact in a far more competitive fragmented digital 
media landscape. 
 
The last few years have witnessed media liberalisation in many countries and a dramatic 
flourishing of competition. A host of local commercial media outfits are entering the market.   
The power of international media as a vehicle of soft power is demonstrated by the 
increasing effort and budget that China, Iran and Russia are putting into their international 
media operations.  However there is a marked difference in the values that are projected by 
international media such as CCTV, Press TV, Russia Today, Al Jazeera and Al-Arabiya and 
those of the BBC33.   
 
There have been many cases across the world in which BBC content has been dropped in 
favour of paid content from providers such as Voice of America (VoA), CCTV, and Voice of 
Russia.   In the Arab world, Deutsche Welle, RT and CCTV are increasingly offering 
packages combining content, training programmes, equipment and in the case of CCTV and 
RT, hard cash.  In African countries such as Kenya, Uganda, and Benin, there have been many 
                                            
31 Source: BBC Global News Brand Tracker conducted by Kantar Media, December 2012 and other independent surveys 
32 Freedom House, ‘Freedom in the World’ Annual Report 2013   
33 See Annex 1for a Strategic Assessment of Global Competition between International Broadcasters [Not reproduced 
here] 
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cases of BBC deals being cancelled because of more lucrative offers from VoA, CCTV, and 
Deutsche Welle. 
 
Digital platforms provide new challenges and new opportunities for the BBC to reach 
audiences. The ways that global audiences consume content is evolving, and the BBC has 
been at the forefront of continually innovating the type of content, the way we deliver it and 
the platforms we use.  For example, in Burma, a country whose media is just opening up 
after decades of state censorship, BBC Burmese has recently launched a one-minute audio 
news bulletin for mobiles. 
 
As well as the digital offer on BBC News online, and BBC.com, the BBC offers digital 
content in all its 28 languages.   The largest portion of growth in the BBC Global News 
Audience in 2013 was from digital audiences, young people using their mobiles to discover 
the BBC, often for the first time.  The BBC continues to invest in growing and understanding 
the digital dynamics of the global media market place.  The BBC also reaches audiences on a 
host of social media. BBC Top Gear has more than 13 million ‘likes’ on Facebook. BBC 
World News has over 4 million Facebook ‘likes’, and more than 4 million Twitter followers. 
On YouTube BBC Worldwide’s eight channels have attracted over 4,750,000 subscribers to 
date with Top Gear reaching the three million subscriber mark last month (August), ranking 
76th out of the top 100 most popular YouTube channels 
 
Yet this more complex media landscape is also more fragmented.  In Kenya, for example, 
new radio stations in diverse languages are also broadcasting a more one-sided picture to 
their listeners.  In India, there are over 800 TV channels; regionalisation and local language 
content is also making news increasingly partisan. The BBC is rare in having the capacity to 
reach all sections of society in often fractured countries, enabling discussion that can 
transcend deep divisions.    
 
b) The World Service, alongside BBC Media Action, plays a significant role in 
post-conflict and fragile states such as Afghanistan and Somalia, deepening the 
communities’ mutual understanding, providing a public good and thus indirectly 
benefiting British soft power. 
 
The BBC reaches over 70 million people in the countries of high need (across Pakistan, 
Afghanistan, Nigeria, Egypt, Libya, Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia, Darfur, Syria and 
Burma), on average reaching over 1 in 4 people in these areas of need.  Our recent first ever 
survey in Somaliland and Puntland showed the BBC to have a very high reach of 63%. 
 
Many countries, especially those affected by conflict, don’t look to the BBC for impartial and 
trusted news only, but for platforms for independent and trusted debate and dialogue.   BBC 
Media Action, the BBC’s development arm, works with national partners as well as with the 
BBC to engage more than 250 million people worldwide.   
 
For example, over recent months, the BBC Afghan service has broadcast a series of debate 
programmes, named ‘Open Jirga’, bringing together men and women across diverse 
communities across Afghanistan, to engage with national leaders such as President Karzai, a 
first for Afghanistan.  Similar programmes designed to improve accountability and foster 
dialogue have been created (often with DFID funding) in countries including Bangladesh, 
Egypt, and the Palestinian Territories.   
BBC – Written evidence 
126 
 
 
Professor James Gow: “The BBC is the best easiest form of humanitarian assistance that can 
be provided after an emergency, giving people the best possible shot at truth, knowledge, and 
understanding. It is always important that the BBC is where possible, broadcast in places which most 
need it, which are challenged by peace and security.” 
 
 
c) The BBC also has big audiences in diaspora communities, in the UK and 
internationally, reaching communities who may have considerable impact on 
political outcomes back home.  There are 0.3 million UK users of content in other 
languages including Somali, Urdu and Bengali.   
 
 
d) Working through BBC Media Action and the BBC College of Journalism, the 
BBC builds the capacity of local media in many countries of the world, sharing 
our values of objectivity, accuracy and quality.    Media Action supports training and 
capacity building programmes for journalists and media organisations in Africa, Asia, the 
Middle East, North Africa and parts of Eastern Europe. Training journalists and media 
organisations around the globe also provides the BBC with potential partners to enhance 
our newsgathering.    
 
Set up by BBC Media Action in 2005, Radio Al Mirbad is Iraq's only independent radio 
station providing public service broadcasting.  It gives communities in the nine southern 
provinces a voice and holds officials to account. In 2012, Al Mirbad launched its online 
platform, www.almirbad.com, with a presence also on Facebook, Twitter and YouTube. 
 
This year the BBC has been working with MRTV, the Burmese state broadcaster, to improve 
the quality of information they provide to Burmese audiences. And we will continue to build 
the capacity of working journalists across the country to ensure that as the media opens up, 
they are prepared to report on issues accurately and impartially.  
 
2) The BBC helps set the framework for global exchanges, providing the space in 
which people across different communities and cultures can have meaningful 
conversations.  The BBC demonstrates (rather than advocates) free expression.    
 
The BBC is perceived to be the embodiment of a culture that has a passionate commitment 
to freedom of expression.  For example, following the Israeli elections, a BBC Persian TV 
discussion was broadcast between Iranians and Israelis, which couldn’t be countenanced in 
Iran itself.   Programmes like World Have your Say demonstrate and promote open discussion 
and debate, and challenging journalism.  Following the gang rape of a woman in Delhi last 
December, our African services held discussions between men and women, breaking taboos 
and challenging stereotypes and attitudes.        
 
Philippe Sands QC: “What the World Service does is to offer people in a state of oppression a 
lifeline to a different set of values – and that is very significant”.   
 
3) BBC Monitoring observes and understands key media sources, enabling its 
customers, including the BBC and the British Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office, to make more informed decisions, and enhances the UK’s relationship 
with the US.     
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BBC Monitoring shares insights with BBC News, including media analysis, which gives the 
BBC a special understanding of competitive media strengths. It also provides services for key 
government customers, including the FCO, Ministry of Defence, the Cabinet Office and the 
intelligence agencies, plus the commercial market.  It has been working in partnership with 
the US Open Source Center since World War II on the basis of complete information 
sharing, product transfer and reciprocal tasking. This enables the partnership to cover 150 
countries in 100 languages from 12,000 sources. BBC Monitoring delivers 800 stories per 
day, producing actionable information on news, events, opinion and media environments. 
 
4) The contribution that the BBC makes through BBC Worldwide has direct 
economic benefits to the UK (see below), which also enhances the UK’s geopolitical 
power. The BBC is one of Britain’s leading global cultural assets that enables the open 
exchange of ideas, information, and values among nations and so helps to foster mutual 
understanding.  Research indicates that countries with higher degrees of mutual 
understanding and trust invest and trade with each other more in both directions34.     
   
Direct Economic Benefits 
 
The BBC’s global activities bring a direct economic benefit to the UK by providing an 
international platform for UK talent and creativity. This in turn helps to build the reputation 
and awareness of the UK’s creative industries thus enhancing the UK’s soft power. There 
are several ways that the BBC’s international activities generate revenues which flow back to 
the UK. For example by: 
• Exporting programmes and formats and through secondary exploitation (DVDs, 
merchandise and partnerships with Netflix and Hulu); 
• Establishing production bases overseas – which in turn bring revenues back to the 
UK; 
• Attracting inward investment; and 
• Generating revenues for the creative industries. 
 
Exports 
 
BBC Worldwide is the largest distributor of finished TV programmes outside the major US 
studios, with a catalogue of 50,000 hours, sold to over 700 international broadcasters and 
digital platforms. It supplies 44 channels internationally which are available in 406 million 
households, providing a shop front for a range of content that both entertains and inspires. 
In 2012/13 BBC Worldwide achieved headline sales of £312.3m including top selling titles, 
such as Africa, sold to 195 territories. 
 
Establishing production bases overseas 
 
The BBC is BBC Worldwide’s primary production partner for content supply, sitting 
alongside output from BBC Worldwide’s production houses and from the UK independent 
production sector. BBC Worldwide’s Content and Production business generated headline 
sales of £151.2m in 2013/13 (compared to £135.5m in 2011/12), with particularly strong 
sales in new content and new formats produced by its productions houses in Los Angeles 
and France.   
                                            
34 Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2009, Cultural Biases in Economic Exchange? by Paoloa Sapienza and Luigi Zingales 
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Attracting inward investment 
 
The BBC plays an important role in helping to attract inward investment. Taken together the 
BBC and BBC Worldwide helped to attract £32m of co-production funding into the UK 
production sector in 2011/12 from overseas broadcasters. For example, BBC Worldwide 
and Lookout Point brought together BBC, Mammoth Screen, HBO Miniseries, ARTE France, 
Trademarke Film, BNP Paribas Fortis Film Fund and Anchorage Entertainment to make BBC 
Two’s acclaimed drama by Sir Tom Stoppard, Parade’s End. 
 
Revenue to the creative industries 
 
Many of BBC Worldwide’s activities lead to revenues flows to rights holders through 
upfront rights investment, profit shares and royalties. In 2012/13 BBC Worldwide returned 
£91 million to rights holders. 
 
Indirect Economic Benefits 
 
For the UK creative sector as a whole, the BBC’s global approach maximises our national 
competitive advantage by raising the profile and reputation of the UK as the world’s leading 
centre for media and the arts. 
 
The BBC’s global perspective, free from national or commercial interests, enhances the lives 
of audiences around the world, and also builds the BBC and the UK’s reputation as a trusted 
an credible partner.  With the growth of BBC Worldwide's own portfolio of BBC-branded 
direct-to-consumer channels and digital services, we are increasingly providing international 
audiences with carefully curated BBC experiences which showcase a broad range of the 
UK's highest quality output and bring to life the full range of values and 
characteristics which together comprise British creativity. By propagating British 
values and culture in its broadest sense, we seek to inspire and tap into the wider aspirations 
of younger audiences from around the world. 
 
The BBC also acts as a National Champion for the wider economy, well beyond the 
creative industries.  
 
Colin Stanbridge “We do a lot of work in India, China, Far East, and South America, 
representing SMEs, who we encourage to market and who travel with us on trade missions.  The 
World Service sets the scene very nicely.  The SMEs don't have the brand advantage of large 
companies, and therefore rely more on the strong brand of the BBC.  People in our markets know 
about the UK through the work of the World Service, which creates a vision of Britain, one based 
upon values of integrity quality and impartiality, that helps our companies to be more trusted ….The 
BBC helps companies punch above their weight.  I do believe that the work that the World Service 
does is a key driver promoting the UK brand" 
 
The impact of our global efforts also has a profound effect on our partners (including other 
important UK cultural institutions which lack the BBC’s international reach), the rest of the 
UK creative sector and indeed the wider economy.  
 
The BBC’s portfolio of international services acts as a platform and business enabler for 
partners from the British Film Institute and the Royal Opera House to UK 
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independent producers. Partnership with the BBC enables such businesses and 
institutions to deepen their engagement with international audiences, maximise the value of 
their exports, and attract inward investment. The BBC is the only UK player in both the 
business-to-business and direct-to-consumer space which can offer these benefits to British 
content producers, brands and institutions. In particular, the creative sector benefits because 
of the dynamic market in commissioned programming that the BBC has helped to create. 
 
A study35 of business influencers across five countries found that the BBC is a frequent 
source of news and information for business influencers. Proportions saying they access the 
BBC most days (TV, radio or online) range from 22% (Turkey) to 70% (India).     
 
These influencers were asked to consider the attractiveness of different countries as 
business partners. Great Britain ranks second to the US among the countries measured in 
terms of attractiveness (and well ahead of France and Germany), with 51% rating it ‘very 
attractive’ – but among those who access the BBC daily or most days, Great Britain’s rating 
is much higher (64% ‘very attractive’), and on a par with that of the US (65%).  There is 
widespread endorsement among influencers of the idea that the BBC is a great ambassador 
for Britain.  Nine in ten feel this way, with 49% strongly agreeing that this is the case – and 
even more (57%) among those who identify themselves as ‘key’ decision makers within their 
company. These key decision makers are also more likely to feel that the BBC is a positive 
influence in stimulating business with Great Britain, and that it reflects positively overall on 
Great Britain.   
 
In its news services, the BBC covers culture across the globe, including the UK, 
where there is editorial justification.  Our audiences expect us to cover what is 
happening in the arts and entertainment arena in the UK, because of its strength, creativity 
and originality.  In the period April – July 2013, the BBC News website has featured stories 
on a host of BBC cultural institutions and their activities, including the Tate, Royal Opera 
House, the Royal Academy of Arts, the National Gallery, the Victoria and Albert Museum, 
the British Library, the British Film Institute, the British Museum, and countless articles on 
productions from theatres including The Royal Court, the National Theatre of Scotland, and 
The Theatre Royal Dury Lane.  
 
During the 2012 Olympics, BBC global output featured a series of programmes and content 
in multiple languages with the strap line “London Calling” and "London- the city of 2012 
brought to life by the BBC". The Olympics saw record-breaking traffic levels for Global 
News- driven by BBC.com/sport/Olympics.   Olympics period saw highest traffic ever for: 
Afrique, Great Lakes mobile, Indonesia, Pashto, Persian, UK, China, and Vietnamese digital 
sites. In research conducted with the BBC Global Minds community, when prompted, more 
than two third of the users found the BBC coverage of the Olympics improved their 
perception of London and UK in general, and more than 80% of them said they are now 
interested in visiting London/UK as a result of it.  
 
The BBC also contributes to promoting the English language, through the BBC 
English website and podcasts, and BBC World News which is available in more 
than 200 countries and territories across the globe.  The BBC’s English Language 
Teaching offering and the BBC content more widely continues to be used by teachers, 
students alike to enhance their education and build their English communication skills.   The 
                                            
35 Human Capital, BBC Global News, International Research Report, February 2010 
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BBC Persian Service has also partnered with the British Council to produce Word on the 
Street, a TV drama adventure set in the UK, which is distributed internationally by the Open 
University in countries from Iran to Hong Kong, Uzbekistan to Columbia. 
 
6) The BBC helps position the UK in its relationships with the BRIC countries, at 
a crucial moment in history when global power is shifting East and South.  The 
economic activity of BBC Worldwide in these countries builds upon the 
reputation of the BBC, established by the BBC World Service. 
 
In June 2013 BBC Brasil experienced a record in access to its desktop and mobile sites 
during the wave of protests in Brazil, driven mainly by Facebook and search engine referrals.  
The Brazilian audience may well have been weary of the coverage of private media in Brazil, 
perceived by many as biased, and therefore looked to BBC Brasil with its reputation for 
independent journalism.   
 
Professor Rana Mitter “Since 2000, there has been a change in the global economic and 
political power structures and relationships.  The UK is no longer as potent an actor, but 
rather one that has to react to new circumstances.  Today we have this window of 
opportunity, a transition moment, when power is shifting, when the UK can assert itself, 
make itself relevant to the BRIC countries.  The conversations between BRIC countries are 
becoming increasingly important, but still limited; there are only four direct flights between 
Delhi and Beijing a week.  Five years from now, these opportunities will likely be closed.”    
 
Annex 1: Extract from Shawn Powers: “New Players, New Directions: A 
Strategic Assessment of Global Competition between International 
Broadcasters”, December 2012, Georgia State University, Atlanta.  Prepared for 
Director, Office of Strategy and Development, Broadcasting Board of Governors, USA [not 
reproduced here]. 
 
Annex 2: Supporting quotes and biographies 
 
All quotes are from conversations with the BBC’s Emily Kasriel and have been approved by 
their sources for public quotation. 
 
Professor James Gow 
Professor of International Peace and Security, and Director of the International Peace and 
Security Programme at Kings College, London. 
 
Professor Rana Mitter 
Professor of the History and Politics of Modern China, University of Oxford.  Frequent 
traveller to China and India and involved in many symposia.  
 
“If Britain didn’t have the BBC World Service, it would want to create it, as illustrated by the lengths 
China and Russia are going to create internationally focused media.  CCTV and RTV look to the BBC 
model – they want to be a widely respected news brand”.  
 
“The BBC World Service brand continues to be one of the best known brands around the world, 
even in places such as China where reception and availability is often limited.  No other international 
broadcaster comes close.  This is particularly important at a time when Britain's service skills such as 
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higher education and consultancy are at the forefront of its economic model.   Having the BBC 
positions Britain as a country which handles information in a sophisticated and productive way.” 
  
Sir Mark Moody-Stuart  
Former Chairman of Anglo American plc, and the Royal Dutch Shell Group following a long 
career with Shell living in Holland, Spain, Oman, Brunei, Australia, Nigeria, Turkey and 
Malaysia, and UK. 
 
“The World Service values of integrity and impartiality are important contributors to soft power and 
contribute to the maintenance of influence and communication with people in countries even when 
intergovernmental relations may be strained.  In some way the World Service contributes more than 
the FCO to British standing, through delivering a unique service that your audience can’t get from 
anywhere else.” 
  
Professor Joseph Nye   
Distinguished Service Professor and former Dean of Harvard University’s Kennedy School of 
Government  A renowned global thinker, who is known widely for having coined the term 
’soft power’ in international relations. 
 
“I understand the British government is looking to increase their relationships with the BRIC 
countries. The BBC plays an important part of that strategy – a point of entry that is not mistrusted 
- a point of entry to British influence.  If you are a citizen in Brasilia or Beijing and you want to know 
what is true about a certain event which you read on internet, the BBC is the gold standard that you 
turn to.” 
 
Professor Philippe Sands QC 
A barrister in the Matrix Chambers and a professor of international law at University 
College London, he has appeared before many international courts including the 
International Court of Justice, and the European Court of Justice. He frequently acts for 
states, international organisations, NGOs and the private sector on aspects of international 
law.    
 
Colin Standbridge 
Chief Executive of the London Chamber of Commerce and Industry.   He was Managing 
Director of Carlton Broadcasting, and worked at the BBC for 20 years.  
 
Professor Ngaire Woods 
Professor of International Political Economy, founding Director of the Global Economic 
Governance Programme, University College, and Dean of the Blavatnik School of 
Government.  She has served as an Advisor to the IMF Board, to the UNDP’s Human 
Development Report, and to the Commonwealth Heads of Government. 
 
September 2013 
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BBC culture website 
The BBC Culture feature section on BBC.com was launched by BBC Worldwide in May 
2013 - it is one of five non-news feature sections available on the website outside the UK. 
BBC Culture focuses on film, fashion, art and music and is a fusion of videos and images 
coupled with editorial content from a host of well-known and respected journalists and 
commentators, offering an alternative lens on global trends across the arts. 
A section titled ‘Big In…’ features relevant and topical cultural stories from around the 
world as reported by the BBC’s network of correspondents, as well as linking to content 
from other feature sections BBC Travel, BBC Future and BBC Autos.   
The website has presented many stories featuring British cultural talent and institutions, 
using them as a starting point to explore wider questions.   Some examples include: 
 
• The V&A’s Club to Catwalk exhibition was featured in a story exploring fashion’s 
fascination with club culture.   
• The BP Walk Through British Art Exhibition was covered in a story asking, What 
makes British art ‘British’?   
• Are ‘feminine’ looks the future of men’s fashion drew upon London Men’s fashion 
week.  
• To celebrate 100 years since Benjamin Britten’s birth, a piece recommended the best 
way for a casual listener to discover the magic of his music.   
 
Cultural Diplomacy Group 
First established by the British Council in 2010, the Cultural Diplomacy Group comprises 
senior level representatives from major UK-wide cultural institutions such as the British 
Museum and V&A, relevant UK national bodies such as the British Film Institute and UK 
Trade and Investment, as well as national Arts Councils, the Department for Culture, Media 
& Sport, the Foreign & Commonwealth Office and the devolved Governments.   BBC World 
Service is also represented on the Group. 
The purpose of the Group is to enhance the impact from UK cultural diplomacy activity 
internationally, by providing a forum for sharing forward plans, opportunities and common 
policy issues, and where relevant identifying joint approaches and investments.  This enables 
relevant members to work together as effectively as possible to support UK and devolved 
Government objectives.  
The Group meets regularly to share plans and ideas around major UK cultural landmarks 
and anniversaries, such as the forthcoming WW1 centenary, the 2014 Commonwealth 
Games and the 400th anniversary of the death of William Shakespeare coming up in 2016, 
and to seek out opportunities to collaborate where appropriate.   
The British Council manages and administers the Group arranging for different members to 
Chair in locations around the UK.  It met most recently in June 2013 in Cardiff, and will 
meet again in November in London.  
 
September 2013 
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Evidence Session No. 4   Heard in Public.   Questions 63 - 92 
 
MONDAY 15 JULY 2013 
Members present 
Lord Howell of Guildford (Chairman) 
Baroness Armstrong of Hill Top 
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean 
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock 
Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts 
Baroness Hussein-Ece 
Lord Janvrin 
Baroness Morris of Bolton 
Baroness Nicholson of Winterbourne 
Baroness Prosser 
Lord Ramsbotham 
________________ 
Examination of Witnesses 
 
Martin Davidson CMG, Chief Executive, British Council, Peter Horrocks, Director, 
BBC World Service, and Dr Jonathan Williams, Deputy Director, British Museum 
 
Q63  The Chairman: A very warm welcome to our three witnesses this afternoon. I will 
not introduce you, because we know very well who you are. You have in front of you a list 
of the interests that are declared to give you a good idea of all the different aspects of the 
interests and involvement of Members of this Committee in this broad area of study and 
inspection. I hope that is helpful. Just a bit of logistics: if a Division is called, I shall have to 
immediately adjourn the Committee for five minutes. One always hopes it will not happen, 
but it may happen, so just to warn you about that. 
As you know, we are concerned with the concept of soft power and British influence. There 
are many different phrases to describe how and why this is becoming a more significant part 
of our affairs. The excellent paper that comes from the British Council—from Mr Davidson’s 
stable—states, which I rather like, that “soft power involves the things that make people 
love a country rather than fear it”. That is quite a good starting point. Can we begin by each 
one of you giving a short statement on what your understanding of soft power is and how it 
affects your work, and whether it is more important or less important? Later on we will go 
into why it has become more significant and everyone is talking about it. But first just give us 
a feel of how you see that it connects up with the interests and priorities of the country in 
which we all live. Who would like to start? Mr Davidson, you are in the middle, so you start 
from the middle. 
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Martin Davidson: Thank you very much, Lord Chairman. We would define soft power as a 
nation’s ability to build trust and make relationships of value through sharing its most 
attractive attributes. The British Council is only one part of that set of soft power 
instruments that the UK has. In our case, the attractive instruments that we seek to engage 
are our language, which is one of the most powerful attractors to our country; our 
education system; and our arts and creativity. There is a fourth area that I think is also 
extremely important, which is the way in which our society is organised, and if we have time, 
I will come back to that in a moment. 
There are also a wide range of other very important actors in the whole area of soft power. 
The Premier League, for example, is extremely important and one of the most attractive 
aspects for people right around the world when they look at the UK. Our wider sports 
agenda is also seen as hugely attractive. Broadcasting, of course, is a major attractor, and not 
simply the World Service—I will leave it to Peter to talk about that—but more generally 
there are probably very few countries in the world where you are not likely to see a BBC 
programme. There is also our scientific research, our commercial arts, our design systems, 
and you only have to bear in mind that in Formula 1 eight of the 11 teams are based and 
designed here in the UK. I would think that also aspects of our military are seen as a soft-
power engagement, not least the way in which the military and civilian organisations react 
and interact with each other. There is also of course the Royal Family. 
Within the areas that the British Council covers is our language, and we estimate there are 
1.5 billion people in the world learning English at this time. Many of them are looking to the 
UK for an involvement. In education there are something like 0.5 million foreign students at 
all levels studying here in this country and who go back with a changed attitude towards us. 
Our arts and creativity are also huge attractors. Right across the board, in all areas of the 
arts, the UK is seen at the forefront of that agenda. Our acceptance of difference, our 
tolerance of different views, our diversity: all are seen as important aspects of the way we 
organise our society, along with the rule of law, a certainty of how society operates, and also 
pluralism, the opportunity for individuals to take part in that society. All are critically 
important. 
Within the broader context we believe there are three critical aspects that are important to 
consider. The first is that Government has a very limited role that it can play in the area of 
soft power. If government fingerprints are all over the activity then, almost by very 
definition, it is seen as less trusted, less open, less honest and moving more towards the 
propaganda area. But it does not mean that the Government has no role. We would regard 
Government as having a critical role in creating the environment and conditions within 
which soft power can be operated. Not least this requires movement of people, and simple 
things like visa policy make a huge difference to how a country is seen and whether or not 
people are able to move backwards and forwards. Supporting and helping create the 
different instruments of soft power that a nation might have, but at arm’s length, is a critical 
component of effectiveness in soft power. 
The second critical element is mutuality. We cannot expect others to be interested in us if 
we are not interested in them. Increasingly, if you talk to China, if you talk to India, if you 
talk to a whole range of other countries, they want us to be involved and looking at them 
and seeing them as of interest to us, just as much as presenting ourselves. 
I think the third area is that this is a long-term, slow-burn activity. It is not an activity that 
turns itself around within a few years but rather something that is generational: “How do 
you build a generation of engagement between this country and other countries?” not, “How 
do you make it highly instrumental within a very short period of time?” 
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Q64  The Chairman: Thank you very much. You have raised a lot of points that we will 
come back to, but may I go to Mr Horrocks now? 
Peter Horrocks: Thank you very much, Lord Chairman. I would absolutely associate myself 
with the definition that Martin Davidson gave and the definition of Joseph Nye—whose work 
I know you have already looked at—of the ability of a country to get what it wants through 
attraction rather than coercion or payment. Of course for a broadcaster attracting 
audiences comes naturally, and it might be worth explaining to the Committee the way in 
which the BBC’s main channels in English describe themselves to audiences around the 
world. We do not use Britishness. We describe the World News television as coming from 
“the world’s newsroom”, our new newsroom at Broadcasting House in London. We 
describe the World Service as “the world’s radio station”. So, there is a sense of ownership 
by the world of something that is obviously a British-funded asset. 
Next April the jurisdiction of the BBC World Service comes completely under the BBC 
Trust who will be funding it through the UK licence fee rather than through the grant-in-aid 
that the World Service has received from the Foreign Office. It recently published a draft 
operating licence, which is the governance document from next April for the World Service. 
It describes the editorial agenda of the World Service in this way: that it should provide a 
global perspective on the world, not one based upon any national or commercial interest. 
So, the BBC Trust is saying explicitly that we should not be taking a British or national 
commercial interest. How, therefore, can we be a contributor—as we believe we are—to 
Britain’s soft power, that paradox? Well, it is because of the mutuality or the exchange of 
ideas, which is such an important characteristic of global debate. In particular, through digital, 
we believe the BBC in all its activities provides Britain’s biggest digital export. But digital is 
about two-way: it is multi-layered; it is multi-polar. And that is what we believe our 
audiences around the world are looking for. The result of that? We recently announced the 
new audience reach for the BBC’s international news, its global news reach, of over a 
quarter of a billion people, the largest audience ever. Despite the cuts that we received a 
couple of years ago, the World Service is now also at its highest ever level, and BBC 
Worldwide has an audience of about 100 million alongside that, plus, we believe, an enviable 
reputation for the quality and impartiality of our news. That creates value to licence fee 
payers who benefit from the BBC’s reputation in terms of the interviews that we can get and 
the money that BBC Worldwide, our commercial arm, creates. It also does come back to 
the UK and creates reputational benefit for the UK, because audiences around the world, of 
course, understand this is something that the UK is providing. That generosity of spirit, 
described by Kofi Annan as “Britain’s greatest gift to the world”, is reciprocated, although 
we have a global perspective as our editorial driver. 
There are many ways in which we can assess that direct benefit to Britain, but I will give one 
example in terms of commerce. A survey of international business leaders, conducted a 
couple of years ago by an independent polling organisation, indicated that business leaders 
who consumed the BBC were twice as likely to regard Britain as an attractive partner to do 
business with than those who did not. There is other evidence I could provide the 
Committee with. 
So, we can attract people to Britain precisely because we are not pursuing a British agenda. 
We are, however, communicating British values and, of course, we reflect fully news and 
culture from the BBC. Therefore the paradox creates the ability for us, with our fellow 
organisations, to be the strongest of soft power. 
Q65  The Chairman: Thank you very much. Dr Williams, you are the centre of a gigantic 
hub of culture and activity worldwide. How do you see the subject? 
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Dr Williams: Thank you, Lord Chairman. I have learnt an awful lot about what soft power is 
from reading the proceedings of this Committee, and it seems to me that the definitions, the 
discussions that you have had, have laid some very useful parameters. Certainly in thinking 
about what soft power might be, in trying to develop my own abstract definition, what I am 
about to say may be somewhat academic. But that is what I am, so I have to be true to 
myself. That is an appropriate thing to say, because one of the key things about soft power is 
that its exercise is based—and this is a point the Committee has touched on—on the notion 
that, whatever the message about the country that may be broadcast, it has to be consistent, 
credible and coherent with everything else that the world knows about the country 
concerned. I think that is a really important point when we think in the abstract about what 
soft power may be. 
I think what my two colleagues have said is absolutely right: that if it is anything, soft power 
is based upon what a country is, its essence, its attractive power, its ethical and its cultural 
characteristics. It is not about what we do to the world or what we produce. To the extent 
that it can be instrumentalised, either for state or government purposes, it needs to be 
based on a message, which is credible, coherent and consistent with everything else that the 
world knows about the kind of people that we are and the kinds of institutions that the 
country has. 
Let me say a little bit about the British Museum; an awful lot of what I am about to say is 
going to be strikingly similar to what we have heard from my colleagues. As many of you 
may know, over the last 10 years or so the British Museum has sought to describe itself, and 
really be, a museum of the world, for the world. In some senses, there may be thought to be 
some sort of contradiction or tension between our name, British Museum, and the notion 
that what we are in fact is a museum of the world for the world. This is a transformation in 
our own understanding of ourselves that my director, Neil MacGregor, has managed to 
create within the museum and also broadcast effectively to audiences within Britain and 
around the world. He has done that by taking us back to our Enlightenment origins. Here I 
am going to sing the praises of Parliament, taking us back to the extraordinary way in which 
it has set up the British Museum as the original arm’s-length cultural body upon which all 
other similar bodies, museums, galleries, opera companies and ballets throughout the 
common law world have since been modelled; setting the museum up as a trustee 
institution, incorporated as an independent legal personality, empowering it to act on behalf 
of beneficiaries, beneficiaries not defined as citizens of this country but left entirely open. I 
think this is the extent to which the debates around soft power, if not soft power itself 
exactly, have begun to have an effect and real impact on the way in which we have seen 
ourselves and understood our role as a museum: over the last 10 years we have increasingly 
actively identified the beneficiaries of the British Museum’s trust as the citizens of the world. 
What Parliament did in 1753 was to take a unique collection of things—books, antiquities, 
fossils, everything—from all over the world and make them publicly accessible for free—and 
we still are free to this day—for the benefit of the whole world, with the intention of 
creating a new kind of global citizen. That was Parliament’s vision 260 years ago, and it is that 
vision that in partnership with our colleagues in the BBC and the British Council and many 
other museums and galleries around London and around Britain we have been increasingly 
re-excavating and reviving in order to make a reality of our claim that we are a museum of 
the world for the world, founded by Parliament for the benefit of a global audience, 260 
years ago. That is a vision Parliament provided us with, which we have been seeking to make 
a reality of in the 21st century. 
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While I do not think my museum or other museums would see themselves as instruments of 
soft power, it is clear that the debates around culture and its role in the global conversation 
have had a significant impact on the way in which museums and galleries such as mine and 
other major British public institutions have shaped their self-understanding, particularly over 
the last 10 years or so. 
The Chairman: Thank you very much indeed. That is very comprehensive from all three 
sources and authorities. I know my colleagues would like to question, in particular, the many 
points that have come up, but they are going to come up anyway in our further discussion. 
Lord Forsyth would like to come in. 
Q66  Lord Forsyth of Drumlean: I have a question. Mr Davidson, when you talked about 
the attractiveness of Britain—you mentioned our culture and everything—you did not 
mention science, engineering, the City of London, financial services, any of those aspects. 
Was that because the list would have been too long? 
Martin Davidson: I did mention the scientific research, which I think is a critically important 
element. There are many different aspects, and I suppose that issues around banks and so on 
at the moment do not make that the most popular attractor around the world. But I would 
agree with my colleagues who said that it is really about credibility. In what areas is the UK 
seen as both a global leader but also a credible leader? Thailand has recently announced that 
it wishes to brand itself as “the kitchen of the world”. I am not sure we would do terribly 
well branding the UK as the kitchen of the world, but there unfortunately— 
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean: Forgive me; London is a major financial centre. 
Martin Davidson: Absolutely. 
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean: The City of London is not just about banks. It is a major 
contributor to our economic well-being. It is recognised throughout the world and we are in 
firm competition with New York. It is a bit surprising that it is not top of your agenda. Or 
do you not think that because there has been some adverse publicity surrounding the banks 
it should be something that you are trying to correct? 
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: Edinburgh is also quite a big financial centre, and none of you 
mentioned Scotland at all in any of your presentations. 
Martin Davidson: I have been having conversations with the Lord Mayor, both the present 
and the future one— 
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: The Lord Mayor of London? 
Martin Davidson: The Lord Mayor of London, precisely about this area of how the work 
that we as an organisation can do can support the City as a financial centre, so we do 
absolutely see the consonance there. 
The other point about my organisation—and indeed shared by my colleagues—is that we 
are all UK bodies. We see ourselves as responsible to the Governments in Edinburgh, 
Belfast and Cardiff just as much as we do to the Government here in London, and we put a 
significant amount of effort into talking to those Governments about what their soft power 
agendas are, just as much as we do here. 
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean: Lord Chairman, may I just add one other question, which is 
to Mr Horrocks? 
The Chairman: Yes. 
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Q67   Lord Forsyth of Drumlean: I have always been a great supporter of the BBC 
World Service because I felt that it provided a British perspective on what is going on in the 
world, and with that the values associated with impartial news and so on. I have been quite 
surprised by this doctrine that says you do not use the word “Britain” and that you have to 
operate as a global organisation because, paradoxically, that would make you less credible. 
The licence payers in Britain expect you to be promoting Britain and its values. As for the 
idea of dropping the name “Britain” or the “UK” from the news bulletins, is that not 
something that you think might put you at risk, in terms of getting support and funding from 
British taxpayers or licence payers? 
Peter Horrocks: No, I do not believe that, and if that is how you understood what I was 
saying, I may have mis-described it. Everything is BBC-branded, of course, and everyone 
knows that the BBC is the British Broadcasting Corporation. 
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean: No, you said the news service— 
Peter Horrocks: Yes, and the BBC Trust has said that we should take a global perspective in 
the way that we deal with the news. But we absolutely reflect British values, and British 
values of fairness and impartiality are absolutely the bedrock. 
If I can go back to your point about economics and the way that Britain’s role in the global 
economy is communicated to the world, the fact that London is such an open financial 
centre, you will hear of course far more British experts on all of the BBC’s airwaves, both 
on radio and on television. We will be talking to UK politicians, including many people in this 
room. So, a British understanding of global issues is absolutely something that we are 
communicating, and British culture plays a very significant part in that global offer that we 
have. 
Q68  Lord Forsyth of Drumlean: But why is it not branded as global news from the 
British Broadcasting Corporation or from London? 
Peter Horrocks: Well, it is. If you look at “BBC World News”, for instance, it uses a skyline 
showing London. I can talk about last year. Our marketing and our editorial campaign 
around the Olympics, which we did not have the sports rights to, were under the label 
“London Calling”. It was all about how London is a wonderful, diverse and open city. That 
was extremely attractive content to our audiences around the world. The reason we do not 
put Britishness and British as the hallmark of it is that other countries have services that are 
explicitly about reflecting the national political agenda—we can perhaps talk later on what 
the Chinese and the Russians and the Iranians are doing in this regard—and their services 
are regarded as being propaganda, and that is not effective in terms of attracting people 
around the world. So, we can have that proper even-handed global perspective but reflect 
British knowledge, British expertise, British culture and British values, so being impartial, but 
also being an attractor to Britain. That is the logic of our editorial offer. 
Q69  Baroness Nicholson of Winterbourne: It seems to me that traditionally the huge 
cultural institutions that you represent have always seen their task as promoting the cultural 
values of the United Kingdom, yet more recently there has been an obligation placed upon 
you all to try to earn a bit of a living for Britain as well, not just to promote our values. Is 
there an understanding in these institutions, and others, that that is now at least a part of the 
obligations placed upon you by the taxpayer? Or is there still a feeling inside the institutions 
that perhaps this is a little bit something they do not want to touch; that somehow this is a 
step too far and cultural values will dwindle if there is something commercial and some 
quantification of helping Britain earn a living more effectively through your work than before? 
As a side question to that, with the rise of some pretty dominating and maybe narrower 
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values in parts of the globe at the moment, are you going to put a bigger push behind 
cultural values from here, and can that be quantified in any way at all? It does seem to be a 
difficult time that we are going through in some regions at the moment, very contra-
indicative to our particular value system. What are you doing about that? Would you define 
it as soft power or not? 
Martin Davidson: First, around the financial environment, there are two aspects to that. 
One, of course, is the internal financial environment of each of our organisations. We in the 
British Council are now required to find something like 80% of our total turnover through 
our income generated from non-governmental sources. 
The Chairman: Is that 80% of your turnover or 80% of your revenue? 
Martin Davidson: 80% of our turnover. 
The Chairman: The turnover, okay. 
Martin Davidson: So, that is about £780 million of turnover. The Government grant is now 
just over 20%. That again drives a significant cultural shift within the organisation. We have 
to have very effective commercial income-generating individuals within the organisation, but 
it is absolutely vital that we also see ourselves as a public service: not either/or but both 
those things at the same time. Sometimes it is difficult to persuade publics overseas, who are 
not used to the mixed funding model that is usual in this country, to see that. But that is one 
of the reasons why in our case, for example, as well as teaching for income we also put in a 
huge amount of effort into providing English language materials for public education systems 
right around the world free to the user. That is a very important balance. 
Of course there is also recognition that different bodies within the UK will use for particular 
purposes the long-term trust and influence created by the work that we do. At the moment, 
those purposes will include the prosperity and long-term health of the British economy just 
as much as the wider cultural influence of the UK. I do not think that my colleagues see that 
as a problem in any sense whatever. Indeed, I think we all recognise that if you are going to 
draw public money, then you actually have to be able to demonstrate a public good that 
flows from that. But I think the danger comes if we are pushed into a very instrumental 
approach, which suggests that you do X in order to raise the income flowing to a particular 
institution or a particular business environment. For example, at the moment we have done 
some very useful work, I believe, with DCMS and with colleagues here and others, in looking 
at the range of cultural events that will be taking place in 11 countries around the world 
over the next three to five years, including India, China, Brazil and other countries. We are 
asking the question, “Well, how do we use those big cultural events that are taking place, 
which are taking place because the British Museum, the V&A, the British Council and other 
organisations want to do them? How can we use those and ally them with other areas of 
work?” We are having a conversation with the UKTI—for example, there is an idea of a very 
substantial design exhibition in Mumbai in about 18 months’ time—on how can we put a 
British design marketing agenda around that and, indeed, a design education agenda around 
that, so we actually make the most of these events that are taking place. I think that that 
approach of using what is already happening and what is already planned, but using it in a way 
that can support the wider commercial and prosperity agenda, is something that, certainly in 
my case, my colleagues are very comfortable with. 
Q70  Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts: One question about the focus: the British 
Council produces a wonderful map of dots and stuff, and there is a lot in Mr Horrocks’s stuff 
on the BBC. Is our role of soft power to do a little everywhere or a lot in the biggest 
countries? 
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Martin Davidson: I suppose my answer to that would be that it is a rather standard 80:20 
principle—you should put 80% of your effort into 20% of the places—but that it is important 
for the long term for the UK that we are engaged with other parts of the world. Two or 
three years ago a lot of questions were being asked about whether or not we should 
continue in North Africa. Now, nobody would say that we should not be involved with 
North Africa. It clearly is critically important. We never know quite where the agenda is 
going to move. So, that 80:20 principle seems to me to be broadly right, but the UK is well 
served by having the capacity, not just from my organisation but more widely, to operate on 
a global basis. That does seem to me to be very, very important. 
Q71  Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts: Could I just ask Peter Horrocks this? In your 
letter circulated to us about the World Service, you had a category in there of languages of 
particular need. 
Peter Horrocks: Yes. 
Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts: Some of them seemed to me to be quite marginal in 
terms of numbers. I wondered how you reached that and how you saw that fitting into our 
soft-power plans. 
Peter Horrocks: There are two categories in terms of the non-English languages: the larger 
languages, which I think you were referring to in your first question; and then the languages 
of need. For instance, services to Somalia or services in Arabic that would be heard by 
people in Darfur are services that are quite substantial to audiences in Afghanistan. Most of 
those are delivered cost-effectively through radio, which is a very cost-effective way of 
getting to large numbers of people. That urgent need, in countries where there is no other 
credible news source at all, is a very important part of what the BBC does. However, 
languages that go, for instance, to the BRICS countries I believe are increasingly important 
for us. So that is the way in which the BBC can gain trust for Britain through the editorial 
approach that I set out earlier. Professor Nye has spoken to us about this and says, “The 
BBC plays an important part of that strategy, a point of entry that is not mistrusted, a point 
of entry to British influence. If you are a citizen in Brasilia or Beijing, you want to know what 
is true about a certain event, and the BBC is the gold standard”. So, we are focusing greater 
resource on those major languages. Of course we cannot cover every one of the world’s 
languages—we reduced from 32 to 27 languages two years ago—and in order to be effective 
in broadcasting terms you certainly do need to have focus. 
Q72  The Chairman: I would love to move on to this question. You have mentioned 
several times Beijing and the wider world and the fact that your audience is 250 million out 
of 6.5 billion, so you could say it is wonderfully large for one country, but it is pretty small in 
the world scene. Baroness Morris, would you like to pursue this theme? Are other people 
taking over the airwaves? Are we still where we were? 
Baroness Morris of Bolton: The marketplace in global soft power is becoming 
increasingly competitive, and I wondered if you saw yourself losing ground to the likes of Al 
Jazeera in the Middle East or China Central Television in Africa. Then, to slightly widen that 
out from just television, we have also seen a huge increase in government-sponsored cultural 
activities such as the Confucius Institute. So where exactly do you see that with regard to 
the British Council? Then, generally in all of this, how do you intend to carve out a 
distinctive position for yourselves that enhances our cultural values and helps the UK’s soft 
power? 
The Chairman: I can see how the British Museum has done that just off the back foot, and 
amazingly has carved out a fantastic global niche. But for our other two colleagues here 
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perhaps there is a doubt in the air as to whether we are quite what we were. Are we losing 
out in the cyber-dominated, totally connected world, or are we still carrying weight? Just 
reassure us on this. 
Peter Horrocks: I would not want to downplay that threat. 
The Chairman: Sorry, can you think of the answer to that for a few minutes? We have to 
go and vote. 
The Committee suspended for 10 minutes for a Division in the House. 
Q73  The Chairman: Apologies for that break. There was a question hanging in the air: is 
this the world we knew, where the BBC was the voice of freedom in the world? Since 1934, 
the British Council seemed to have the field almost to itself, but suddenly it is getting a bit 
crowded. Are we still where we were? 
Peter Horrocks: We certainly are not where we were and, although I am proud of the 
strong performance that the BBC World Service in particular has had, I would not be in the 
slightest bit complacent; in fact, I would probably be the most worried person in the room 
about the fragility or potential fragility of our audience position. As you say, it is largely 
because of the competition that we are now seeing from other state providers in particular. 
Let me give a couple of illustrations of that. The Chinese, through their efforts, are using 
their vast financial resources. A few years ago, a $9 billion budget for Chinese international 
broadcasting was announced, a multi-year budget, but still a vast budget in comparison to the 
resources that we have. In Africa, for instance, that is being used to support the change to 
digital television, paying for the infrastructure, helping to organise the frequencies and then 
using China’s financial muscle to pay for access to the airwaves, including in some cases 
squeezing out BBC output. We provide our output for free for local broadcasters to be able 
to transmit on their television or radio stations. The Chinese pay people to take that, so 
although those broadcasters may well believe—I am sure they do—that the BBC’s quality 
and impartiality are greater, they will sometimes choose to take the Chinese content 
because the Chinese are paying them. That is not something we can afford or that we 
choose to do. The Iranians are getting into this. They have even launched a Spanish language 
channel from Iran. There are also the Russians, of course. Then there is Al Jazeera, which is 
really a state-funded organisation.  
You asked how we can still maintain a strong position and be distinctive. We can be creative, 
we can draw on all of the resources of the BBC and our colleagues across the BBC, using 
the technologies, especially digital, and we are particularly proud of the success we are 
having in digital. But the most important thing is to stay true to our editorial values. That is 
why I talked about impartiality as being the absolute bedrock. Of course most audiences 
around the world realise that news from China or Russia is news that comes with a Chinese 
or Russian flavour. Al Jazeera has had some recent experience where the commentators 
believe that Qatar’s foreign-policy interests in terms of supporting Islamists in a number of 
countries has had an impact on Al Jazeera in Arabic and its editorial agenda, and that has 
created a backlash around the Middle East. So it is absolutely crucial that you modernise, 
that you use the resources as effectively as you can, but you stay true to your values, and 
that remains our distinctive position. 
Q74  The Chairman: What about the British Council going strong since 1934? 
Martin Davidson: There are many new players on the block. China is obviously one and the 
Confucius Centres have set up 350-odd centres in the last 10 years. It is very difficult to 
know exactly how much money the Chinese are spending on this. The best published 
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number that we have been able to find is US$200 million, but my guess is that a multiple of 
that is being spent. In Africa, China is applying a very, very large number of scholarships, 
certainly in the tens of thousands, for African students to study in China. So these are big, 
competitive players, but China is not alone. Turkey has launched the Yunus Emre Institute, 
developing its soft power especially into the Middle East. South Korea is a very substantial 
player in this space; Taiwan has started similarly. So it is a much more crowded space, but I 
think it is important not to pretend that there has not been competition in the past: the 
Germans, the French, the Italians and the Spanish have all been substantially significant 
players in this space for a very substantial period of time.  
We have to always ask the question: are some of these new players doing things that are 
interesting and that we can learn from? I think some of the approaches that the Confucius 
Institutes have taken to teaching Chinese are interesting, and indeed we are not ashamed to 
have a look at them and copy them where there are good ideas coming through. But we also 
have to understand that the UK’s approach does have some very real and substantial 
advantages, not least, we would argue, the arm’s length. I think the Chinese have a significant 
problem in that the fingerprints of government are very clearly on the activity and that raises 
substantial suspicion. Of the areas that we have advantage in, first of all is the approach 
towards mutuality: that we are quite explicitly interested in what other people have to say as 
well as trying to project ourselves. The Chinese approach and the approaches of most of the 
other players are very one-way. Second is the range of functions that we have available to us 
and the sheer strength of the UK’s institutions in this area. Thirdly, frankly, we get an 
enormous amount of benefit for really very little money compared with what other 
countries are spending in this space. 
Q75  Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: Martin Davidson, I thought you were going to be 
helpful for a minute when you were talking about learning from the Confucius Centres, but 
then you went back into mode—if you will excuse me saying so, each of you sounded like 
three male members of the British establishment saying what a wonderful job you are doing, 
which does not help us with our study. What we want to look at is how we can do it better. 
Have each of you never sat down with your staff and said, “How could we learn from France 
or from China or from Germany? What can we do? What other things ought we to be 
doing? How can we collaborate with other bodies?” You do not sound innovative. You do 
not come up with good ideas. You always just seem to be saying what a wonderful job you 
are doing.  
Martin Davidson: Well, it is a challenge. First of all, I think you cannot turn yourself from an 
organisation functioning with more than 50% of government grant to one functioning with 
20% unless you are innovative. It requires you to go out and do things in a completely 
different way. One of the big challenges for us is how we deliver something that people are 
prepared to pay for. This is not simply big, rich companies; these are individuals, 350,000 or 
more young people around the world, prepared to spend their own money on learning 
English with us because we do it better than other organisations. So I think we have a 
significant agenda around innovation and we certainly do not pretend that we have it all 
right. I think we look at the Confucius Centres and ask the question: what do they have to 
teach us? 
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: What conclusions have you come up with? 
Martin Davidson: We have come to a number of conclusions, not least in establishing our 
new teaching platforms in Pakistan, in Iraq and in extending them in Sri Lanka to Jaffna, 
where we are copying a number of the approaches that the Confucius Centres have taken, 
particularly using local teachers, which is something that we have not done before. We work 
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very closely with the French and we have launched a new series of cultural seasons, which is 
very much drawing on the French example. Unfortunately, we do not have the amount of 
money that France puts into it, so we have to rely very heavily on non-governmental funding 
to do that. 
Q76  Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: You have said that twice now, about reductions in 
funding. Do you just accept that? Can we help in going to the Government and saying, “The 
British Council could do a great deal better if you gave them more money for scholarships”? 
Do not accept things as they are. We are not here to accept things as they are. We are 
looking at what they might be. 
Martin Davidson: Absolutely, and of course we would like more money, but, to be 
absolutely frank with you, for me the biggest agenda over the last five years has not been to 
tilt against the windmill of government cuts but to transform the organisation so that it can 
not just live with those cuts but expand and develop against that background. I hope that as 
we move forward we are going to move into a position where the Government will invest in 
scholarships, particularly investing in sub-Saharan Africa, particularly investing in supporting 
those countries wanting to develop themselves, particularly investing in how society has 
organised itself. I believe those are critically important areas, and I would want the British 
Council to be part of that, although not the sole recipient of that, because there are many 
other organisations. 
Q77  Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: Do you argue that that could save our Government 
money elsewhere, deploying troops to difficult areas in which problems might not arise if we 
were doing more in terms of scholarships and cultural activities? 
Martin Davidson: It is enormously difficult always to prove the negative, but certainly our 
belief very strongly is that soft power, well utilised and well deployed, is a substantial and 
significant saver of other forms of intervention. 
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: Because this Committee has been set up to look at it, I would 
have thought each of you would have thought, “Hey, this is an opportunity to put our case”, 
and then we will report to Government. That is what Select Committees are about. 
Peter Horrocks: Can I have a go? 
Q78   The Chairman: Mr Horrocks, just to speak to Lord Foulkes’s question, bear in 
mind the world is now totally connected up on iPads and iPhones and everything else. How 
are you going to cope in this entirely new electronic landscape? 
Peter Horrocks: I appreciate Lord Foulkes’s question, and it is the kind of question I would 
like World Service presenters to be asking to get the debate going. Accepting that these 
organisations need to change, the World Service had to make some really difficult cuts a 
couple of years ago. We swallowed that, we got on with it and we have bounced back. 
Sometimes these organisations can be seen through rather a sepia-tinted view of what they 
may have been some years ago. The competitive world that we have just been discussing is 
going to require us to make choices. Under the BBC Trust’s strategic control, I hope that 
politicians and those who are concerned about organisations like the BBC World Service 
will accept that those decisions need to be made in the broadcasting interests of the 
audience and not through an over-political prism. So, that might mean if there are services, 
for instance, that are too small at some stage in the future, we may have to close some 
services in order to maintain our effectiveness. We will need to innovate and change, and 
that might mean changing the balance between radio and television and online. Our real 
competitors are going to be—already are—Google and Facebook and mobile providers, not 
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so much the Voice of America or indeed Iranian broadcasting, because that is the way that 
audiences in Africa and Asia are going to be getting their news. So we must understand that 
we might need to make choices that will reflect that different way.  
In terms of the funding, clearly the responsibility of the funding of the World Service is now 
moving to the BBC, and the BBC Trust will need to make those decisions. But there are 
ways that Government can help the BBC’s international activity in a supplemental way. For 
instance, the Department for International Development does some excellent work through 
the BBC’s development charity, BBC Media Action, to support programming in places like 
Somalia and Afghanistan and providing a place for debate, where politicians can be challenged 
by their publics in a way that does not happen in those societies. 
Then the last thing—and this is looking ahead to the future of the BBC in the debate that 
will happen around the BBC’s charter over the next few years—is that for the first time the 
publicly funded global part of the BBC, the World Service, will be part of the licence fee, and 
there will be a discussion about the appropriate level of activity. Clearly the political debate 
around the BBC in the UK is often influenced by views about the BBC’s role—whether it is 
too large, and how it affects competition in the UK. From a global point of view, in relation 
to the BBC as a national champion that can help others in the creative sector—for instance, 
the independent production sector benefits hugely from the activities of BBC Worldwide—I 
think politicians, as they debate the future of the BBC, considering its UK role and its global 
role together, may see things that could be helpful there. 
The Chairman: I am going to ask Baroness Hussein-Ece to follow up on this particular 
point. 
Q79  Baroness Hussein-Ece: Thank you very much. Just following on from the questions 
that you have had from Lord Foulkes as well on this subject, do you not think that social 
media—because you have touched on that now—has become much more influential, 
particularly in parts of the Arab world that you mentioned and other places like that? People 
are no longer passive recipients of packaged, presented news tied up in a bow: “This is the 
news”. It is much more instant with social networks, with Twitter. We saw the in the Arab 
spring what was called a Twitter storm. We and all the world were getting instant news 
about what was happening on the ground and not having to wait for news bulletins or 
programmes. Do you not think that particularly the BBC is losing out on this? I am 
questioning the media outlet. The BBC is not really keeping abreast of these changes. 
Peter Horrocks: That is not fair, I am afraid. No, that is not fair. 
Baroness Hussein-Ece: Because if there is an appetite for more around the world now, if, 
as the Lord Chairman said, the world has become much smaller now and news is very 
instant, do you not think that the BBC could potentially lose out if they do not keep abreast 
of these major changes? 
Peter Horrocks: Of course we could potentially lose out, but our audience is at its highest 
level ever; our digital audience is growing substantially. But it absolutely does change our 
role in exactly the way that you say. It is no longer people in London saying, “This is how the 
world is”, to people around the world. It is a dialogue; it is a debate. 
Let me give you an example of what is happening in Turkey. The BBC’s Turkish service 
broadcasts in television, not in radio. We have decided not to broadcast any more via 
television, because the distributor kept interfering with reports that they regarded as being 
controversial. So, we are now only available online. But what the team can do is to help the 
Turkish society to know what is trustworthy news and to host a debate about the future of 
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Turkey, because through social media you have one group of people who have one set of 
fierce opinions and another group of people with separate fierce opinions that they do not 
discuss with each other. So the BBC’s service in Turkey is conducting programmes, 
discussions, that talk about the future of Turkey and which judge which news is reliable. 
People are coming to the BBC Turkish service in vast numbers because we are modernising 
and changing our role. It is not a one-way role. It is a two-way role and one where the BBC 
is trusted by audiences around the world to host that conversation. 
Q80  Baroness Hussein-Ece: I just want to respond on that. Obviously I follow the 
Turkish news and what was going on there, and that is the case. But there are parts of the 
world where perhaps they do not have that embedded in the same way, so they are relying 
on their own people on the ground to get the news and information from. There were 
probably traditionally ways with trusted commentators from their own background and 
community. I just want to make one comment. I think obviously we are all big fans of all 
three institutions, particularly of the BBC, but do you not think the BBC did lose a bit of 
trust in the aftermath of Operation Cast Lead, showing a bit of bias there in refusing to 
broadcast the appeal for Palestinians in that way? It lost a lot of credibility and kudos. 
Certainly I have heard a lot of people in the Arab world say that you showed some bias 
when you did that. That is just one example. 
Peter Horrocks: I do not particularly want to go through all the ins and outs of that. All I 
would say is— 
Baroness Hussein-Ece: It is an example of how easy it is to lose some trust. 
Peter Horrocks: No, absolutely, and I appreciate that some members of the audience did 
lose trust. That trust in the Arabic world has come back. Our audience levels in the Arabic-
speaking world are the largest component of the increase in the BBC’s audience that we 
announced only a few weeks ago. It was because of our commitment to being even-handed. 
We knew that running that campaign, that promotion of aid support for one side in that 
conflict, could be seen to compromise our impartiality. That is why we took that difficult 
decision. I appreciate that not everyone agreed with it and it did have a detrimental effect in 
the short term, but the long-term benefit of being impartial counts, and that is why our 
audiences have come back up. 
Q81  Lord Ramsbotham: My question is stimulated by a remark of yours, Martin, when 
you talked about the fingerprints of Government, because all three of you have outlined how 
you see the role of your organisation in projecting British values, which you have arrived at 
individually. But at the beginning of our deliberations, we were told that the 2010 Foreign 
Office business plan includes the development of a long-term programme to enhance UK 
soft power, co-ordinated by the National Security Council. Are you conscious of that, and 
do you welcome the fact that the National Security Council is the organisation trying to co-
ordinate the project of just the things that you have been outlining to us? 
Martin Davidson: I am aware of the involvement of the National Security Council around 
some of these areas. I think it bears on what is the role of Government and what is the role 
of other organisations in this whole area. I can see that there is a role for Government—
indeed, would welcome a role for Government—to grow soft power, which for me is 
around putting more resource in some of those areas that Lord Foulkes talked about and 
what I was talking about a few moments ago. It would be around helping define where the 
UK’s wider interests sit. But I think if the Government then seeks to deploy that soft power, 
it is going to fail along the way. I would draw a distinction between creating the conditions 
that allow that soft power to be grown and the attempt to deploy it. My organisation’s view 
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is very clearly that we have to be of the UK, not of the Government of the day, and that 
overseas target audiences are extremely conscious of and very clear in drawing the 
distinction between the two. 
Q82  The Chairman: Can I bring Dr Williams in again, because my own experience with 
the British Museum is that you and your director, Neil MacGregor, have been expanding 
enormous influence worldwide without, I suspect, referring very much to the National 
Security Council or anybody else. Have you had any conscious guiding principles in the way 
in that the British Museum has now become, as it were, the museum of the world? 
Dr Williams: These are conscious guiding principles that the trustees have drawn from their 
statutory obligations laid down by Parliament. They have an obligation to make a reality of 
global ownership of the collections for which they are responsible. Those are our basic 
principles, and from them flows everything that we do, to make those collections available 
both here in London and throughout the world through a series of physical loans of things—
4,000 objects lent last year alone—and also increasingly in the digital world, with 27 million 
visitors to our website last year, and that is continuing to increase. So, the guiding principle 
is that this is a collection that the trustees hold in trust for the world and that they have to 
take every new opportunity that each new generation offers to make a reality of that 
obligation. 
The Chairman: Have you run into a lot of historical baggage problems? We were warned 
in earlier evidence that Britain has invaded practically every country on the planet and we 
have one or two slightly awkward incidents in the past to live down. 
Dr Williams: What that means is that Britain has a long and rich and complicated series and 
nexus of relationships with countries all over the world. The British Museum and its 
collections are one of the legacies of those many different relationships. What that provides 
us with now in the 21st century is an opportunity to revisit those relationships and refashion 
them for public benefit, both in this country and in the country concerned. One example: 
just now we have finished the second year of a leadership training programme for India’s 
future museum directors, a programme supported by the Indian Government. The Indian 
Government came to the British Museum to ask us to assist them in putting together a high-
level leadership programme to enable Indian state museums to partake in the global 
conversation around collections and cultures, and that has been a great success so far. 
Peter Horrocks: That baggage of history need not be a problem. It is an editorial 
opportunity. So, for the World Service, Commonwealth countries form by far the largest 
single component, and the World Service is a place where those problems of the past are 
worked through. For instance, with the revelations over the last few years about what 
happened in Kenya with the Mau Mau, the World Service of course has investigated that and 
given a substantial amount of airtime to hearing from Kenyans who expressed concern about 
what happened. It is the fact that it is discussed openly and without any fear or favour that 
makes our output attractive to people in that part of East Africa. 
The Chairman: Thank you. Lord Janvrin, would you like to come in? 
Q83  Lord Janvrin: I think it is more of the same. It is around this whole question of the 
independence of your organisations and retaining that independence yet still being in need of 
public funding support. My question is that if you are arm’s length cultural bodies or arm’s 
length institutions, are you not at arm’s length from all the key decisions that really affect 
how you can operate? I am thinking in terms of within the British Government, whether it is 
over visa policies or tertiary education or whatever. Do you have any input into those kinds 
of discussions, and how can we improve that kind of joined-up Government in the future to 
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ensure that those kinds of decisions that may be taken in a domestic context have huge 
repercussions for you and indeed the country in trying to deploy soft power? 
Martin Davidson: I think, for the British Council, critical to this is that we see ourselves as 
operating in partnership with a wide range of organisations. Of course we have an extremely 
long history of discussion with the Foreign Office, as an NDPB of the Foreign Office, as well 
as being a chartered organisation and a charity. So, the conversation that I have with the 
Foreign Office is around the nature of where are the major foreign policy objectives and 
what it is that the British Council can do in order to support those, but not in how we do it 
and the way in that we do it. We regard that as being the operational independence of the 
organisation, and critically important for our credibility across the world. But we obviously 
have to have conversations with UKTI, with DBIS, with the universities, and with the great 
institutions, all of which have to be part of the discussion about how we do things. 
We do indeed have conversations with the Home Office around issues like visas. We are 
working very closely with the universities around student study visas, for example, because 
these are vitally important aspects of how the UK is perceived overseas. You only have to 
look at how the Indian press reacted to the idea of a visa bond to see how extremely 
negative the overseas perceptions are of this country from the way that we deal with visa 
applications. I cannot think of any senior discussion I have had over the last couple of years 
that has not started from the position of visas. It is critically important for us, so we do have 
to have those. Some of those conversations take place below the radar and some of them 
take place in a rather more public place, and I think it is effectively a question of what is 
going to be the best way of having those conversations at particular times. 
Peter Horrocks: It is not the BBC’s role, of course, as an editorially independent 
organisation, to be advising or inputting to Government on those broader policy questions. 
The BBC World Service has always been editorially independent. One of the great 
advantages of the structural change that will happen next April when the funding moves from 
the Foreign Office to the BBC licence fee is that one of the charges that, for instance, the 
Iranians and the Russians have periodically made against the World Service is that it is in the 
pay of the Foreign Office, therefore it must be dancing to the UK Government’s tune. It will 
be even easier to dismiss that because of the change in funding. However, another thing that 
we are altering editorially, partly as a result of licence fee funding, is that we want to show 
to people who are paying in the UK the benefits of the World Service—not just around the 
world, but coming back into the UK. So, increasingly you may be hearing and seeing on the 
BBC’s airwaves in the UK our international correspondents, the ones from the language 
services, who are delivering bilingually much more than they used to. For instance, with 
visas, increasingly that is reported around the world by people from India or Kenya or 
wherever it might be, who will have a very direct understanding of that. Of course we reflect 
the other side of the story as well in terms of the need for those restrictions from a UK 
Government point of view, but reflecting the world back into the UK through our editorial 
activity can also help people to be more aware of the international dimension of UK policy 
decisions. 
The Chairman: Lord Forsyth, would you like to say something? 
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean: I wanted to change the subject slightly. 
The Chairman: I think time is going by, so go ahead. 
Q84  Lord Forsyth of Drumlean: I wondered if you could give a specific example of a 
project undertaken or something that you have done that has directly contributed to the 
UK’s influence abroad? Supplementary to that is: how do you measure this? Dr Williams 
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talked about hits on the website. That need not necessarily indicate success in achieving 
British influence. This concept of cultural value: I do not understand what “cultural value” 
means. How is it measured, and can you relate that to a specific example? That is for all 
three of you. 
Martin Davidson: I could kick off. I think one programme that we are very proud of is our 
UK Now season in China. That ran last year from April to October, specifically looking at the 
cultural relationship between the UK and China in the Olympic year. We had something like 
800 artists performing in 29 cities to 4 million people across the country with very, very 
substantially greater media coverage. It cost us about £1 million to put together. We gained 
a further £3.5 million from British business in order to put it together and about £10 million 
of input from the Chinese side. So, that was a very specific piece of activity, which was to 
explore the UK with China in this very important year. 
Direct impact is always very difficult to be able to identify, but we have talked to the 
commercial sponsors of the activity—and those included companies like Jaguar Land Rover, 
Diageo, Burberry—and they have all identified a specific increase in interest in their brands 
in China as a result of that. The British Ambassador has also reported that he has seen a 
significant shift in the way in which the Chinese look at the UK as a creative hub rather than 
simply financial or interesting but rather faded part of the world. So, there are those sorts of 
outcomes. But I think one of the problems we had with this is that it is extremely difficult to 
be able to identify a causal link between a particular piece of activity and a shift in— 
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean: Sorry to interrupt you. If my addition is correct, you spent 
£20 million on this project in total in China. In measuring the effectiveness of that, 
comments by sponsors and comments by the British Ambassador are very useful, but 
normally if you are spending that kind of money you would be expecting to have more 
quantitative information as to whether or not you want to do it again, for example. 
Martin Davidson: Clearly there is the anecdotal and the quantitative. For example, we 
measure the quality of the comments that appear in public through media and so on, so 
there is a well-founded mechanism for doing that and identifying the value. We look at the 
numbers of people who have attended and so on. 
But I think I would like to just move on to the second part of your question, which is 
around, “What is the value of all this cultural activity?” A piece of work that we have done 
has identified specific value very clearly. We have asked that question in 10 countries: “Are 
people more interested in working or doing business with the UK as a result of having been 
involved in an event of that kind?” On average there is a 30% increase in willingness or 
interest in doing business with the UK. The largest increase comes from some of those 
countries where we have the greatest interest. For example, in Turkey, it is something like a 
30%, 35% increase. In Russia it is nearly a 50% increase. In China it is about a 20% increase. 
So, there is, across the board, quite clearly a linkage between people’s willingness to do 
business with the UK and the experience that they have had through these types of 
activities. That is what I would argue has been the cultural value of the sorts of events that 
we are doing. 
Q85  The Chairman: Dr Williams, your turn; tell us about a project and how you think it 
has had an impact and helped. 
Dr Williams: Perhaps I can talk about what, for us, was a fairly remarkable project and I 
think interesting given the context of our conversations around international relations: the 
loan of the Cyrus Cylinder to Tehran in 2010. Iran, as we all know, is a country with which 
Britain has limited international contact and no diplomatic representation, as I understand it, 
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and there is also of course a fraught context and difficult international conversations. The 
Cyrus Cylinder, just to fill in a little bit, is a really remarkable object, not from Iran, 
interestingly, but originally found in Iraq. It is an inscription recording the great deeds of the 
ancient Persian King Cyrus and his restoration of the various rights and temples and peoples 
within his empire. For many years, this has been a national icon in the Iranian context. It is 
the kind of object that every Iranian schoolchild learns about. It has appeared on Iranian 
stamps and coins; it is a really important thing in the Iranian public conversation. For that 
reason, the trustees decided that it was important that they share this object, which is 
entrusted to them, with their beneficiaries in Iran.  
Because of longstanding relationships with the national museum in Tehran, sustained by 
colleagues in our department of the Middle East, we were able to have a kind of 
conversation that other bits of the British public sphere have perhaps found more difficult to 
have, and that enabled this unique thing to be lent for a period of some months to the 
national museum in Tehran, where it was seen by about 1 million people. That is just a 
number of people, rather like my 27 million hits on the website. But the very fact of the 
achievement of this loan and, equally as important, its return was of importance. The object, 
by the way, is now on a five-venue tour of museums across America, where it is stimulating 
a very interesting series of conversations around the value and the significance of Iranian and 
Middle Eastern cultures across America, and next year we are going to be lending it to 
Mumbai, where it will coincide with the World Zoroastrian Congress. This is just an 
indication of the kinds of projects that the trustees are clear that they want to undertake. It 
was absolutely not without risk. It was a risky thing to do, but they felt that they had an 
ethical obligation to do it.  
[Interruption] 
If the Greek Government were ever to ask for a loan, then the trustees would consider 
such a request. 
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean: Forgive me for appearing to be negative—I think it was a 
great thing to do—but my question was about an example where you could demonstrate 
that attitudes towards Britain had been improved. I have no idea how this was received in 
Iran, but I can equally imagine people saying, “What on earth are these people in London 
doing with this article, which they took as an Imperialist power with no idea with what its 
history was?” That was a good thing to do and 1 million people went to see it, but what is 
the evidence that that has made people more inclined to take a positive view of Britain, and 
how do you measure that? 
Dr Williams: We do not have that evidence, and to be honest the British Museum’s primary 
interest in lending things around the world is not in order to further public understanding or 
Iranian sympathy for or understanding of Britain, as such, as an entity or an international 
state actor. 
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean: So, how is that related to soft power, then? 
Dr Williams: It is related to soft power insofar as the loan of this extraordinary object from 
a great international institution in London to the national museum in Tehran achieved a level 
of communication between the public sphere in this country and Iran that is very, very 
difficult in other aspects of public life. It is not really about soft power, but what it is, at the 
very least, is maintaining a channel of communication between Britain and Iran – within the 
public sphere around the area of culture, which is otherwise clearly rather difficult to sustain 
at this moment in history. 
BBC World Service, British Council and British Museum – Oral evidence (QQ 63-92) 
150 
 
Peter Horrocks: Can I give one specific piece of evidence, again relating to 2012? The BBC’s 
audiences consumed a lot of Olympics content, as you would expect, but, as you say, just 
consumption does not prove the point. We have an online panel of those who use the BBC 
around the world, and when we asked them after 2012 two-thirds of them said they found 
the BBC coverage improved their perception of London and the UK in general and more 
than 80% of them said they were now more interested in visiting London or the UK as a 
result of it. Of course that is not just the BBC’s coverage; that is the whole effect. But there 
was a demonstrable effect, and those were people who have consumed through the BBC. As 
I referred to earlier, the surveys that we have done relating to people who consume the 
BBC—their positive perceptions of the UK are significantly higher than those who do not. I 
can share that data with the Committee. As I said earlier, that is not our primary intention. 
Our primary intention is to inform audiences through the global perspective, but it has the 
effect of creating those benefits for the UK, and we have comprehensive evidence in relation 
to that. 
The Chairman: With time running out, I have two quick questions from Baroness 
Nicholson and Baroness Hussein-Ece, and then I want to ask Baroness Armstrong to lead on 
the final subject; as brief as you can, please. 
Q86  Baroness Nicholson of Winterbourne: Thank you very much. It is a follow-up to 
Lord Forsyth’s question. Rather hesitantly, I am wondering if you should not, perhaps 
collectively or individually, look at more sophisticated and further-reaching analyses of the 
impact of what you are doing. For example, the Iranian example is so easy to quantify, but 
you did not touch on the obvious points, which is that there is a vast, highly-wealthy Iranian 
diaspora globally. We only have a proportion of it here. We would like to attract far more, 
and certainly as soon as sanctions go we want Britain to be in there first of all. Those things 
can be quantified, and you could have been analysing who came and perhaps a sample of it—
who saw, who talked, who wrote and all the rest of it. If you take the World Service, Britain 
is primus inter pares globally, for example, on music. The World Service, the BBC, is one of 
the biggest promoters of UK music—probably of any nation’s music ever. We have been 
primus inter pares with in music for the best part of 30 years. Are we going to last on that? 
Are you analysing that? Are you seeing what your input is, what is the impact of the Proms, 
for example; and Martin Davidson’s contribution on music in the British Council? Are you in 
fact not perhaps, as I was suggesting in the beginning, a little bit too hesitant, perhaps a little 
bit embarrassed, about thinking about money, other than earning a living, other than running 
the show? You are not really using the quantification that you could be using.  
Could you not look in a much more sophisticated way at quantifying what you are doing and 
its impact for the UK, which should lead to bigger investment from the UK into the 
institutions? We are looking into the past. The British Museum was largely filled with its 
wonderful products—wonderful items—a long, long time ago. We are not making huge 
investments now. You have spoken already about a smaller budget—I think somebody did—
at the moment. If you want to get more, then I would suggest far more sophisticated 
analysis, which could answer so quickly the sorts of questions that Lord Forsyth has properly 
put. 
The Chairman: A brief comment on that. 
Peter Horrocks: Certainly the BBC’s cultural role is absolutely crucial, and of course Lord 
Hall, as the new Director General, with his background, is very focused on that. The BBC 
has a section of the BBC website around the world called BBC Culture. It covers the stories 
of the British Museum and the Tate Gallery. It has a huge amount of British cultural content 
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on there. That is growing very rapidly. It gets advertising support. It is commercially 
supported rather than through public funding, and it is doing very well, because Britain’s 
culture is attractive, it fits with the BBC’s editorial values and it brings a commercial return 
as well. We have that information, and we can share that with you. So, in digital, it is much 
easier than in some of these broader activities to be able to survey. The costs of surveying 
around the world are substantial, so I would suggest that looking at digital performance as 
one indicator, and a proxy for some of these activities is quite useful in terms of assessing 
cost-effectiveness. 
Q87  Baroness Hussein-Ece: Mine is just a quick follow-up from the Cyrus Cylinder, 
from what Dr Williams was saying, and it also part of what Lord Forsyth was saying—that 
you had such success when you lent it. Over a million Iranians went to see it. It is going 
round the world. But then has that been followed up? It seems to me that you have these 
programmes of lending artefacts that came from those countries in the first place and are of 
great significance to those countries. They go and see them. They all go home again. What 
happens after that? Is there any follow-up? Is there any sort of programme? Are there any 
exchanges? It seems to me that once you have made that contact—as you said, you have 
made a very good contact; you have communicated—what do you do with afterwards? 
Dr Williams: That loan transaction was based on a pre-existing very long-term relationship, 
and that relationship continues. We have ongoing academic programmes together with the 
National Museum in Tehran, and that will absolutely continue. We are all about long-term 
relationships. The British Museum has been around for 260 years, and it is going to be 
around for an awful lot longer. We will only be able to be the museum we can be for Britain 
and for the world through developing rich relationships with partner institutions all over the 
world; absolutely. 
Baroness Hussein-Ece: Does it develop into anything else? I know we are talking about 
partnerships and relationships and what you did was obviously very significant and very 
important for the people of Iran who arguably are saying, “Thank you very much for letting 
us have a look at something that was originally ours and it is very important to us—more 
important than it is to the British”. But what do you do with it afterwards? Do you develop 
some sort of exchange programme? Do Iranian young people come here perhaps? What do 
you do with that relationship? 
Dr Williams: Absolutely. We have Iranian scholars working with the British Museum. We 
would not be able to do what we can do with our collections without that input. Of course, 
that will continue. We will be constantly looking for opportunities with that museum and 
with museums across the world for loans and exchanges. We are a very porous, open-ended 
and collaborative institution. Just to repeat myself, we are nothing without the relationships 
we have across the world and that relationship in Tehran is a pretty unusual relationship 
within the British context, and it really adds another dimension to what we can do with our 
fantastic Iranian collections. Clearly we need to reflect the Iranian perspective on the 
collections that reflect upon and come from the Iranian past. But we also want to create a 
global conversation so that we get the Chinese perspective on the Iranian past or the 
American perspective or whatever it may be. That role of being a cultural junction box I 
think is a role that all three institutions before you today would like to see themselves 
playing, and at our very best we do that pretty successfully. I cite that particular instance, 
because it is a really unusual one within the context of the British Museum. We have 
relationships in every continent, but that one is really special to us. 
The Chairman: Would you like to add anything on this? 
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Martin Davidson: Just to respond a little bit to Baroness Nicholson’s question and 
challenge, there are two publications that we will share with the Committee. One is called 
Trust Pays, which looks at the extent to which people’s trust in the Government of the UK 
and in the people of the UK is changed as a result of the broader cultural work that we are 
all engaged in. It shows a very significant shift in both of those indices. I hasten to say that is 
done not by us but by an external agency.  
The other one is Culture Means Business, which looks at the impact on people’s willingness to 
do business with the UK as a result of this work. Again, as with the World Service, this does 
show a significant and real shift in people’s willingness to do business, to visit the UK and to 
study in this country as a result of this work. I do think it is important that we are able to 
demonstrate that sort of impact from the sort of work that we do. 
The Chairman: That does lead well into Baroness Armstrong’s question. 
Q88   Baroness Armstrong of Hill Top: It certainly does. We are interested in the level 
of co-operation between you as partially publicly funded bodies and other partially publicly 
funded bodies. And if I can also ask a supplementary, as we are coming to the end, is there 
one thing that that you think this Committee should be recommending in terms of its overall 
remit of the role of the British Government in improving soft power? 
Peter Horrocks: The level of co-operation and partnership: I think probably from the BBC 
point of view it is editorially opportunistic because of the need for us to be providing a 
separate editorially-based judgment and because of what I set out a number of times in my 
evidence. If we did it simply because there is a campaign and therefore it needs to be on the 
World Service, our audiences would see through that. It has to be an editorial judgment. We 
can do a lot more in terms of the co-ordination, but with the British Museum, for example, 
all the things that we have heard about were reflected. Martin and I were in Egypt a couple 
of years ago with a fantastic event that the British Council laid on looking at Darwin’s legacy 
and debating evolution in an Islamic context. That made fantastic programming for the 
World Service. We can do those kinds of bi-lateral collaborations. When the Public 
Diplomacy Board existed, the World Service was an observer on that. Anybody that brings 
more information together that allows us to be able to make editorial judgments on behalf 
of our audiences around the world will be welcome. There is already a cultural diplomacy 
group that does some good work. The Council takes a very significant role in that—and I am 
sure Martin can talk to that—and the BBC can be supportive of that. 
To your second question, in relation specifically to the BBC and looking ahead, I would say 
that the most important thing would be proper understanding of the weight to be attached 
to the global role of the BBC and how that influences the overall political perspective 
towards the BBC in terms of the long-term future of the World Service and its ability to be 
able to act as a magnifier for all of the other aspects of British soft power. 
Martin Davidson: We work closely with the BBC, with the British Museum and with a wide 
range of other institutions. As an organisation, while we have direct ownership of our 
English-language work, in the other areas of work we can only deliver anything of value by 
working in partnership with other organisations, whether those are the great museums and 
galleries or the great universities or organisations like the BBC. As Peter has said, we have 
already identified a number of areas in the past where we have worked closely with the 
BBC, including for example around the Olympics where we did a great deal of work on using 
the Olympics as an education link between the schools in this country and schools overseas. 
We are working with the British Museum at the moment on taking their Pompeii exhibition, 
Pompeii Live, around the world to something like 50-odd countries. 
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Dr Williams: Over 1,000 cinemas. 
Martin Davidson: 1,000 cinemas. So, finding ways of working together is absolutely critical. 
Could we do it better? Yes. I am quite certain that we could, and that is one of the reasons 
why we have brought together this cultural-diplomacy group to ask the question “How do 
we share knowledge about what is going on already and find ways of creating links and 
contacts?” Part of the problem is that there is a vast amount going on between this country 
and other countries, and simply understanding the quantum and understanding what is 
happening, looking at how we can bring that together, is a really important agenda. That is 
why we have worked with the organisations on the cultural calendar. There are admittedly 
only 11 countries, but the amount of work that has gone into that has been considerable. 
The question now is: so what? What are we going to do having found out that this work is 
going on? That is where we are having the conversations at the moment of the kind I 
described a little bit earlier. How do we use the design exhibition, to do a trade show 
around that or to do an education exhibition around that? If there were two things that I 
would ask the Committee to consider—if you are giving me the chance for one, then go for 
two—I think they are, first of all, to reinforce that this area of work is important. It matters 
to the UK. It is something we are extremely good at but there is significant competition 
arising around the world. The second one is also to encourage this greater exchange of 
knowledge about what is going on so that we get some of the connections—the cohesion, 
the co-operation—which I think would make a great deal more of what is already happening 
than we do at the moment. 
Q89  The Chairman: You slightly pre-empted what I was going to wind up with. I was 
going to ask each of you to answer a simple question. We are a Parliamentary Committee, 
and we should be reporting to the Government. The question for us will be: what have we 
learnt from these spearhead organisations such as yours which you believe, and I think it is 
widely recognised, are doing enormously powerful and influential work? What more would 
you expect? Or what less would you expect of the Government in terms of getting out of 
your way rather than into your way? To complete this session could each of you give us a 
few minutes on what you would like to see of Government and Government Departments 
and the Government structure in furthering your work? Let us start with Dr Williams. 
Dr Williams: Thank you. Just to answer Baroness Armstrong’s questions around 
collaboration, I guess the best example I have of collaboration, particularly with the BBC, is 
the History of the World project. The latest figure on that is that 32.5 million people around 
the world have downloaded podcasts relating to that project, and the book has been 
translated into 13 languages and not just the usual European languages. It is has gone into 
Chinese and Turkish, and it has become a global phenomenon. We could not have done that 
without the collaboration and the platform that the BBC have provided us with. Neither 
would we be able to have made what will become such a global success of our Pompeii Live 
broadcast without working together with the British Council. That said, we can all do much 
more, and we can all do it much better. But the support that we get from embassies 
throughout the world and from UKTI—we would not be able to grow what is becoming an 
increasingly important part of our global presence, our international commercial touring 
exhibition programme, without the kinds of support we get from other public bodies that 
allow us to go and talk to new potential partners and venues across the world where we can 
stage exhibitions in order to both generate revenue for the museum, for Britain, but also 
fulfil the trustees’ mandate of sharing their collections. 
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Making friends and partners and building the museum’s reputation in countries around the 
world is then of course what drives inward tourism. One in four visitors to London comes 
to the British Museum, and one in 10 visitors to the UK comes to the British Museum. Add 
all the other museums and galleries to that, and you have a significant proportion of people 
coming to Britain largely because of our cultural offer and our cultural attraction. So, driving 
that inward tourism is an important part of the cultural benefit that a very active and vibrant 
cultural sector brings to the country. 
I am sure my colleagues will agree with this: one of the things that we would most benefit 
from is Government looking again at questions around visa restrictions. It is clearly a very 
important matter for the future. There are huge opportunities. We see them from my own 
sector—for the UK benefiting from burgeoning audiences in China and India and around the 
world, and a different kind of visa regime would allow the UK to capitalise on that. 
Martin Davidson: I suppose I have already spoken about a number of the areas which I 
think are important. I would echo the issue around visas. I think Government has to 
recognise that in addition to all the digital work, and there is a huge amount that goes on 
digitally across all our organisations, the exchange of individuals matters hugely. Creating the 
conditions that allow that exchange to take place is vitally important for the long-term health 
and prosperity of this country. So, encouraging movement and exchanges of people is 
critically important. I do think that as a country we have underestimated the importance of 
scholarships, especially, I would suggest, in some of the newly emerging parts of the world. 
That is both encouraging those countries who already wish to spend their money on 
spending people to this country as well as helping others come. 
The final thing would be creating the conditions that allow organisations to make more of 
the expertise we have in this country but particularly helping to focus that into areas that are 
of greatest importance to the UK. So, I would suggest, as I said a little earlier, helping British 
institutions engage with sub-Saharan Africa and the capacities of those countries to develop 
themselves is a vitally important aspect of this. So, it is not simply something you do in the 
developed and wealthy world. It matters hugely in the developing world as well. 
Q90  The Chairman: Mr Horrocks, you sounded as though you are happy in your new 
locality separate from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Are you happy in it, and do 
you want that to be developed more? What is your shopping list from Government? 
Peter Horrocks: I think it is going to work for us. The BBC Trust and the BBC chairman, 
Lord Patten, are extremely supportive of that international role. We clearly do not know 
what will happen in a few years’ time when the BBC’s charter comes up for renewal. But I 
believe that if we can show that we are taking the UK’s values to the world, and crucially 
that we are bringing the world back to the UK in the way I was describing—the way that we 
are using our language service teams to be reporting back to the UK, because it is about that 
mutuality, that exchange, that network, that the digital technology can provide—I would ask 
the Committee and hopefully Government to understand that to be effective in that world 
we are talking about being competitive with the Googles and the Facebooks and the 
Twitters. Those are all US companies.  
For the UK to be able to punch above its weight versus the Chinese, the Russians and the 
American technology companies, we are going to need to have scale; we are going to need 
to have creativity, and that is a crucial thing that is required here. It is not always 
Government that can be creative itself. It can create the conditions for that. The Creative 
Industries Council, in which the BBC is playing an important part in terms of its international 
role, I think can play a part. And the Government can help to create the conditions for 
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brilliant content that we can then take to the world. So when the Olympics is organised 
brilliantly, and it was amazing material, the BBC can then take that around the world. It is 
creating the people who act as the exemplars. I was thinking who they are from the BBC’s 
point of view: John Simpson in news; Sir David Attenborough in factual programming; maybe 
Jeremy Clarkson—not necessarily everyone’s choice—as a cultural representative. But that 
triumvirate and having the strength of the creative organisation which can then take those 
kinds of emblems of Britain to the world is fantastic for all of us, and we need Government 
to create the conditions for that to be possible. 
The Chairman: Two final questions: Lord Hodgson and Lord Foulkes. 
Q91  Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts: I would ask Martin Davidson one very quick 
question. You stressed the importance of scholarships and access to our educational 
facilities. We get quite a bit of feedback about the unsatisfactory nature of UK 
undergraduate education; about the way that UK students are not finding it all that they 
hoped it was going to be. Do we do checks on people who have come here as to how 
satisfactory they have found it and how well it has worked for them? If it is bad, we ought to 
be learning about it. 
Martin Davidson: There is a range of satisfaction surveys of students done both at 
undergraduate and postgraduate level. On the whole the results of those are very good. I 
have to say that the students are becoming increasingly demanding as we go forward. 
One thing perhaps we have not touched on that I do think is important though is to what 
extent are we supporting young people from this country going elsewhere. A critical issue 
for me is that we have something like a 20:1 mismatch between the number of foreign 
students coming here and British students going overseas. So if we do want to engage 
properly with China, then we need people who can speak Chinese, who have been to China, 
worked in China; and the same with India and the same with Brazil. So, one of the big issues 
in exactly the same way as Mr Horrocks has talked about—talking in Britain about what we 
understand about the rest of the world—is that we need young people also going overseas; 
that soft power has to be seen through that lens as well. 
The Chairman: That is a very important invention now that the Far Eastern universities 
are getting to the top of the world university league. It is our generation that needs to learn 
from them. 
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: You have very kindly come to give evidence before we have 
put out the official call for evidence. I wonder if you wanted to go away and consult with 
some of your excellent staff, the young ones and the women in particular, and come up with 
some ideas about things that you are not doing or other people are not doing, that you 
might do and we might do. Could you do that, do you think? 
Peter Horrocks: I would be delighted to. 
Martin Davidson: Yes. 
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: Would you? 
Dr Williams: Yes. 
Q92  The Chairman: I have one final, final question that I am going to give myself the 
freedom to ask. Is it a help or hindrance to all three of your magnificent networks that we 
are part of the European Union network ourselves; that we are rather close to Washington 
and the United States; that we are members of the Commonwealth network? They are 
three identifying labels stuck on Britain today. Do they help or hinder? 
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Peter Horrocks: I think they intersect. But it is the fact that the UK and this city have a 
global perspective that is the most important thing—that overarching view that Britain, 
because of its history, the Empire, the spread of the English language, can have cultural 
institutions that are global before they are British. But by that help, the Britishness of course 
can each take advantage of those, whether it is the Commonwealth or the EU or the 
transatlantic relationship. But it is only by staying resolutely global, I believe, that these 
organisations can be successful. 
The Chairman: Do you have a word on that? 
Martin Davidson: I would echo that. I think that the fact that we are as globally connected a 
country as any is a huge advantage to us. I would also say that London is without question 
one of the most attractive aspects of this country: not alone, but this city has an 
extraordinary attraction around the world, and people come here because of it. 
The Chairman: Dr Williams, final point. 
Dr Williams: I think from the British Museum’s or, more broadly, the museums’ and 
galleries’ perspective the Commonwealth and the American contexts are very beneficial to 
us because we work in both areas very extensively with partner institutions, national 
museums, that are set up in exactly the same way as we are with a similar arm’s length 
relationship to Government. We have a relationship with the national museum in Zimbabwe, 
which is governed by trustees. We have relations with similar trustee bodies all over the 
common law world. We speak the same cultural language. We have the same 
understandings of what the role of these cultural organisations is within our particular 
countries but also globally. 
As for the European context, that is also extremely important for us. Many of our great 
things are from European countries. Next year we are doing a major show on Germany and 
German history and culture. We have talked a lot about building cultural understanding in 
this country and across the world of countries in the Far East and south Asia, but there is 
also a job to do to build cultural understanding in this country of some of our nearest 
neighbours. Right now we have a partnership ongoing with the National Museum of 
Denmark to reflect upon an aspect of a history common to all the nations of these islands, 
and also northern Europe—on the Vikings. The largest Viking ship ever discovered is going 
to be visiting London early next year. 
So, in that sense the British Museum absolutely finds the American and the Commonwealth 
contexts very benign ones in which to work, because we speak the same language and we 
start from the same premises. But we also feel there are big opportunities and big needs for 
us to build cultural understanding of some of closest European neighbours as well. 
The Chairman: I think that is an excellent note on which to end, with the Vikings, and I 
would like to thank you all three very much for coming on this hot afternoon and answering 
all our queries and questions with great expertise and learning. Very many thanks to all three 
of you; most grateful. 
Martin Davidson: Thank you. 
Peter Horrocks: Thank you. 
Dr Williams: Thank you. 
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Defence 
Q42  The Chairman: Good afternoon, gentlemen. Thank you very much indeed for 
joining us and, I hope, for enlightening us and helping us with our various investigations and 
inquiries. I am not going to introduce you individually because we all have bits of paper in 
front of us saying exactly who you are. I am told that you, the witnesses, have in front of you 
details of the various interests and involvements of the Members on this Committee, which 
may help in the discussion.  
This is a very big canvas. It is an area in which many branches of government and many 
branches of national activity far outside government have a deep interest, and it does seem 
to be a very rapidly changing scene in which we need both to contribute our own views and 
to learn a bit as we go along. Could I begin by asking a fairly general question to all three of 
you, which is to make a short statement about your understanding of what soft power is? I 
believe that, Mr Beadle, you wanted to make an initial statement.  
Nicholas Beadle: My Lord Chairman, I can wrap it up in the definition question, if you wish. 
The Chairman: Right. Just before I unleash the question, can I just say this? In looking at 
the papers coming out of both the MoD and the Foreign Office in recent times, and indeed 
in going back to the work of the National Security Council on the strategic defence review 
of three years ago, it seems that soft power comes into your lives in two ways: one, the 
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military is interweaving with soft power to achieve its objectives in various theatres; and, 
two, soft power itself is drawing on the work of the military to pursue other objectives in 
the fields of trade, prosperity and building up our international reputation. There are two 
streams, as it were. I just make that observation because it is maybe not entirely clear in the 
general discussion that these are two separate streams. Can you start, when you talk about 
soft power, mainly by saying how you see that soft power issues have come into the conduct 
of military operations in recent years and going back further—maybe back as far as many 
decades ago in Malaya, Northern Ireland and so on? Who would like to start? 
Steve McCarthy: We are all very keen. 
The Chairman: Mr Beadle, the compass points at you. 
Nicholas Beadle: Thank you, my Lord Chairman. First of all, I should declare an interest as 
a member of the court of Heriot-Watt University in Edinburgh and as being associated with 
the University of Exeter. In a private capacity I am an advocate, under the soft power 
agenda, for increased numbers of student visas. I realise that is less relevant in today’s 
session on defence, but I thought that I would mention it overall, particularly as I came 
across it in my previous cross-government positions in the Ministry of Defence, the Foreign 
Office, the Cabinet Office and No. 10. 
In setting the UK military effort in smart power in context, I would say that, in the last 
decade, UK foreign policy by way of UK military operations has had a profound effect on the 
international perceptions of this nation. That is true whether it is seen as a staunch ally in 
the war against terrorism or whether it is seen as a nation that is an aggressor intent on 
damaging, for example, the Islamic religion or, indeed, dismantling the pre-eminence of state 
sovereignty.  
Within that backdrop of polarised opinion about the UK, there are complex and 
contradicting views of its enduring values. The role of increased effort of soft power is not 
just to reinstate those perceptions of our values but to harness them for prosperity and a 
more secure future. I think that soft power must be seen over time. We may come to see 
this brief period of interventionalism in the continuum of state-to-state relations. That may 
be true in military terms, but with the emergence of new actors, both state and non-state, 
this makes a world where non-military power needs to be more carefully balanced. I will 
leave it at that.  
Q43   The Chairman: Thank you. Mr McCarthy, would you mind going next? 
Steve McCarthy: Let me start with the definition. In the MoD, we tend to use the phrase 
“International defence engagement”. The reason we use that slightly more obscure term 
than soft power is that, for us, what we are talking about is in practice every defence 
engagement internationally that is short of combat operations. This will perhaps be relevant 
when we get into later questioning. In practice, we do not see a division between at least the 
assets that are used for what one might call hard power and the assets that might be used 
for soft power. If you take, for example, the issue of a ship visit to a foreign port, that is 
clearly a very good opportunity for us to engage with and influence whichever nation it is—
or at least their navy. However, we did not build the ship for soft power purposes; we built 
the ship for hard power purposes, if you like.  
For us, what we define as defence engagement is the whole continuum of defence activity 
that is not combat. It is quite important, while we are in definitions, to say that for us that 
means not just the military—not just the Army, Navy and Air Force—but everything that 
Defence has, from ministerial visits and senior official engagements to the use of the likes of 
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the defence academy, all the way through the entire defence machine of the UK. We tend to 
start with a fairly broad definition; if you want to go into more detail on that, we obviously 
can. 
The Chairman: Thank you. General Mayall? 
Lt General Simon Mayall: Thank you. Many of your Lordships are very aware of the 
original definition from Joseph Nye, which was “the attractive power of culture”. That was 
then combined with soft and hard power into the concept of smart power, which Mr Beadle 
referred to. In terms of using defence, military assets or defence engagement in pursuit, 
there is no doubt about the attraction. There is a lot of attractive power in the culture of 
the British military. As we know, it is excised through precisely the sorts of things that Mr 
McCarthy was talking about—but Sandhurst, Dartmouth, Cranwell et cetera. The attractive 
power is definitely there because of the calibre and credibility of the hard power that lies 
behind it. Our capacity to attract people through defence engagement is very firmly based on 
the reputational excellence that we have. Our capacity to use soft power in a way that 
reassures those people whom we wish to be friends with is largely based on our capacity 
also to deter those people whom we are less friendly with.  
I would also like to take up what you said, my Lord Chairman, about the wider utility of it. In 
the appointment I have as defence senior adviser in the Middle East, I specifically put as my 
mission statement “to maximise the potential of the UK’s military relationships in support of 
wider British national interests”. If we come to a further question about the particular area 
in which I hope that I act as a soft power ambassador, north Africa and the Middle East, I 
hope it will become very clear that much of what we have achieved under the Gulf initiative 
in our prosperity agenda was very firmly by the use of what might be termed the application 
of cultural attraction to the United Kingdom’s military assets—well short of anything to do 
with pulling the trigger. 
Q44  Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: I wonder if you could clarify something, Mr Beadle. You 
said “smart power” and then you moved on and twice said “soft power”. General, you said 
“smart power” and you sort of defined it as the combination of hard and soft power, but I 
was not clear. Could you clarify what you think of as smart power, as opposed to soft 
power? 
Nicholas Beadle: My Lord Chairman, I think that my view of both smart and soft power has 
been shaped not just through experiences in government. I spent some time at Harvard with 
Professor Nye at the time at which he and Richard Armitage were doing the bipartisan 
committee on smart power. One of the many lessons from that work was that the binary 
definitions of what was traditionally hard power, which was seen as military power, versus 
soft power, which was seen as everything else, were no longer as valid as they had been. 
Something new was needed and I think that the emergence of smart power did more than 
just say that there was a continuum—it is probably better described as quanta; a spectrum 
with divisions amongst it. The point that was drawn from that work was that the boundaries 
between what was traditionally soft and traditionally hard were now more flexible. I would 
argue probably that hard and soft power is less defined now by the input that you put in—
military or non-military—than it is by the effect that it has.  
Perhaps I should use an example to illustrate that. The recent example of Russian energy 
policy is probably a good one. Ostensibly, on the face of it it is soft and not military, but if 
you view it from the recipient end, you see that citizens of the eastern European nations in 
midwinter have the threat of their gas taps being turned off, which is a fairly hard practical 
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use of power. That is probably one of the lessons that was not as well publicised in Nye and 
Armitage’s work on smart power. 
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: It might be seen by some as a ruse to get some of the 
international development money channelled into the Ministry of Defence—might it not, 
General? 
Lt General Simon Mayall: It is very unfair to call it a ruse. The idea that you can box up 
the military and say, “There is a box marked ‘hard power’ and its only utility is in crises, 
wars and conflicts,” is, to my mind, to lose a huge national advantage. In many cases, issues of 
security, stability and capacity building—all of which help the development of a country—are 
ways in which we should use the military when not engaged in conflict. I would like to think 
as we withdraw from Afghanistan that we are not simply an organisation that is either on 
operations or sat back in the United Kingdom waiting on contingency, but that we are used 
in a classic smart power way by Governments of whatever hue to pursue British national 
interest. That interest is often quite selfless. It is very firmly in our interests and values to 
create the stable conditions under which precisely the more traditional development—aid, 
money, systems and processes—can flourish and take root. It is hardly a ruse; I think it is a 
very sensible way to view the military as a real, national asset, beyond old-fashioned 
definitions of “conflict” and “not conflict”. 
Q45  Baroness Nicholson of Winterbourne: The USA is thinking hard about this, much 
of it based on the Iraqi experience. You will of course recall and know better than I do that 
in General Chiarelli’s gap between his two assignments he wrote that hugely important 
piece. That was followed by some material from General Hammond and finally by Petraeus 
and so on. As a result, five departments are now studying this very issue and trying to 
balance up which department should take which part of the responsibility. Do you feel that it 
is time we did the same and did a very serious analysis of this? I know that there was a tri-
departmental committee that sat for a while because of the crossover with some of the 
ministries in Iraq at the very beginning but that seemed to more or less come to nothing, 
whereas the States have taken this very seriously. The DOD came to see me only 10 days 
ago to discuss how this is moving. How should we do this, and are we too small to address 
it like that?  
A question on the margins is the definition of what to do, and what activities this should 
cover. Do you think that there is any way in which there could be those activities? I recall 
well watching the UK military for example setting up local councils—a fantastic initiative. 
Should that also incorporate civilian health or some sort of other stabilising factors? Where 
are we on this? Are we moving ahead or are we sitting in our normal positions and saying, 
“Well, these budgets belong to so-and-so. Those budgets belong to another department,” 
and somehow it is not going to work?  
The Chairman: To add to the first bit of Baroness Nicholson’s fabulous question, are we 
following the Americans or leading them?  Here is their book, the US Army/Marine Corps 
Counterinsurgency Field Manual 2007. Do we want the same thing? 
Steve McCarthy: To slightly boastfully answer that last question, we are leading them. To 
come back to your point about the experience starting with Iraq, that committee still 
exists—it has changed its title a few times—as a thing called the Building Stability Overseas 
Board. I am one of the members, from the MoD. Colleagues from DfID and the FCO are the 
other members of the board. We manage and oversee a line of funding that comes from 
none of our own departmental budgets but is funded and voted directly from the Treasury, 
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called the conflict pool, which we use to fund programmes and activity in areas that are at 
risk of instability or conflict where this joined-up approach really makes a difference. The 
buzzword for it is “defence, diplomacy and development”, all in one place.  
You mentioned scale and size. We have an advantage in scale and size. I know the American 
system relatively well, having worked there for a while in my past. The US system, because 
of its size, and because of the way in which budgets are so carefully monitored and voted by 
the Congress, has great difficulty in funding what they would call interagency operations 
going on.  
I had conversations for example in the Pentagon about two years ago about how we make 
this work in the UK, to which the short summary from the US side was that we could never 
do it like that here because of the way in which their system is structured.  
Interestingly, one of the other points is that the US is broadly trying to catch up not only 
with the UK but with a number of other European countries, which are also somewhat 
more flexible in the way they can do things and are a bit further ahead of this game, as we 
are. We definitely see the value of doing these things in a joined-up way. The example that 
you used is replicated in numerous places. If the military happens to have from the UK 
perspective a certain number of particular skills to offer, or alternatively—this is very often 
the case—the recipient country happens to structure itself in such a way that the military is 
a very influential part of its society, using defence capabilities to underpin other more social 
developments can be a very effective way to do business and to improve their security.  
The short version of where we are is that the committee still exists. We meet every 
month—we have a meeting on Thursday this week—and we are looking at trying to increase 
the level through which we use not just those three departments but the broader NSC 
machinery to bring in other departments that could play a role. 
Q46  The Chairman: General Mayall, did you want to say something? 
Lt General Simon Mayall: Thank you very much, my Lord Chairman. I remember, when I 
was working with Peter Grayley, that Baroness Nicholson was quite rightly very impressed 
with how much money the American commanders had been entrusted with for soft power. I 
am not sure how effective that was, given the circumstances at the time. As a result of the 
school of hard knocks in 10 years of operations, I think we have got much much closer 
through the PRTs—the provisional reconstruction teams—and the like to DfID, to the FCO, 
to the NGOs. In some ways, we have replicated our activity in campaigns such as Malaysia. I 
think we have broken down some of the stove-pipes in personal relationships and 
understanding. I think that people who would automatically have associated people in 
uniform with a gun as simply stove-piped, as I said before, saying, “You do the hard end—
security, defence, conflict—and we’ll do this”, have realised the synergies that we can create 
by creating the conditions on the ground within which the more traditional organisations 
that you would expect to take forward development can do so.  
I do think that we have an issue over funding, but I think it is the natural competition 
between bureaucracies, particularly in a time of austerity. I think that we should absolutely 
investigate the capacity to think more of every aspect as an asset for the United Kingdom.  
On the point about soft power, because of the historical experience and the reputation that 
we have built up in very ambiguous circumstances, the United Kingdom Armed Forces—
probably the land forces in particular, because inevitably they are the ones who are most on 
the ground dealing with other agencies, other government departments or obviously the 
people—prove to be hugely effective in areas that we have operated in. This has been a 
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force multiplier, undoubtedly. It has provided its own force protection. That attractive 
nature, backed up by the credibility of being a well equipped, well trained, well disciplined 
Army, Navy, air force of a certain size gives us influence with allies, dare I say it with 
opponents, and with natural colleagues in the operating space. 
Nicholas Beadle: I would just add a couple of points. I am largely in agreement with Mr 
McCarthy and General Mayall. However, I would sound a couple of notes of caution. First, 
size is important in order to get things done. It is sometimes a matter of total expenditure in 
order to make progress as rapidly as it is needed. It is one thing to have a plan to 
counteract, for example, drugs in Afghanistan over the next 15 or 20 years, but without 
sufficient resources that will not come to anything, and the space will have been lost in the 
meantime.  
The second is that I do not see much prospect of the UK Government, irrespective of who 
is in power, delivering the sort of speech that, say, Robert Gates made in 2007—the “man 
bites dog” speech, as it was known. The Defense Department was seen as having an 
imbalance with the State Department, which was able to say that the Defense Department 
had more lawyers than the State Department had deployable diplomats. Clearly something 
was wrong with that, said the Secretary for Defense. My ex-Ministry of Defence colleagues 
will probably not thank me for saying that, but I do not see much prospect of that sort of 
rebalancing coming in the current framework.  
The Chairman: Do you want to follow that up, Baroness Nicholson? 
Q47  Baroness Nicholson of Winterbourne: I have a quick follow-up question. Is it 
possible that the imbalance in the UK, if there is one, is the other way around? If you look at 
the military budget and the way in which the military uses its soft power budget, you see 
extraordinary economy and maximum output. If you look at the DfID budget, which is 
extremely large, and you wonder what the definition of development is, could there be an 
imbalance? Could we examine this the other way around? 
The Chairman: You need a microscope to see the Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
budget. Could there be, as Baroness Nicholson says, a certain imbalance, given that the 
more we talk, the more it is clear that we are all in the same strategic position? 
Nicholas Beadle: Perhaps I should re-address the balance that I presented before. I do think 
that the Ministry of Defence has in the past been very efficient in its deployment of 
resources in the soft power area of its operations. The inevitable change from the 
Department for International Development’s budget being driven largely by issues of poverty 
into being driven by ones that are more about the national interest certainly allows for a 
little of that rebalancing.  
In terms of the American system, I will make just one final point—about the then Defense 
Secretary, Robert Gates, who did not rescind the order that allowed their military to take 
charge of both military and civilian affairs in an area where the civilians were unable to do so. 
We have experienced some of that ourselves in Iraq, where in my opinion we have clung to 
the principle of civilian control for civilian projects, perhaps to the detriment of achieving the 
ends. 
The Chairman: Very interesting. Lord Ramsbotham? 
Q48   Lord Ramsbotham: Before coming to the international defence engagement 
strategy, which intrigues me, I will make three little observations. First, Mr Beadle, you 
mentioned size. I hope that in size you include the word “sustainability”, because it has 
Nicholas Beadle CMG, RUSI and Government (Lt General Simon Mayall CB, Steve 
McCarthy, Ministry of Defence) – Oral evidence (QQ 42-62) 
163 
 
always seemed to me to be rather like that desperate operation in Uganda where we 
provided a contribution for only six months. We could not sustain all the good that that was 
doing.  
Simon, you mentioned influence. I always remember visiting the UN operations in Somalia, 
and asking Admiral Howe, the American admiral in charge, whether there was anything that 
he would like. He said, “Yes, I would love a British officer in headquarters”, because of what 
a British officer could contribute. My question stems from two things. One was 
remembering when we went into Bosnia and the very close co-operation between the MoD 
and the then ODA; they were hand in glove. The second was visiting Afghanistan and finding 
almost a disconnect between the military, DfID and the FCO. I was deeply unhappy about 
this and came back deeply disturbed, in fact by the briefing that we were given by DfID, 
which appeared to bear no relation to what the military was doing. Nor did the military 
commander have any influence over what DfID was apparently doing. I found this alarming. 
My question about this international defence engagement strategy, which I am sure is a very 
good thing to have, relates to two things that we have heard here. One is that the soft 
power direction is coming from the NSC, so I would presume that this international defence 
engagement strategy is part of it. Secondly, however, the influence that it appears to be 
having has always seemed to me to be what the FCO did, with the MoD in support rather 
than in the lead. I wonder whether you could educate me.  
Steve McCarthy: The answer is in reverse order. On the last point, the international 
defence engagement strategy is a joint FCO-MoD document, so it would be only fair to say 
that neither of us is in the lead in that sense. However, the vast majority of the resources 
that underpin the delivery of the strategy, which is obviously what really matters, come from 
the MoD. Certainly my Secretary of State would be quite keen to ensure that he had very 
firm hands on where we use our resources. It is quite an important part. One of the reasons 
why we produced the international defence engagement strategy in the first place was to try 
to get further towards the second point that you made about connectivity. DfID is a 
member of the board that oversees the IDES as well. I am certainly not saying that co-
ordination cannot be better, but it is actually pretty good in those senses. The defence 
engagement strategy is designed to try to ensure that where we deploy defence assets, they 
are deployed of course for defence reasons but also in order to make a real contribution to 
a broader HMG effort. That ultimately brings us back to the NSC, the priorities and the 
direction that it sets.  
I might also just offer you a thought on sustainability. You very sensibly made a point about 
six-month engagements. One of the decisions that we took, I think, two years ago on the 
conflict pool, which I mentioned earlier, was to enable individual projects in individual 
countries to bid for funds for up to three years, specifically to do two things: the first was to 
fix the sustainability problem which you mentioned; the second was genuinely to try to get 
better value for money out of this, too, on the basis that if you are doing training and other 
repetitive activities, which does not apply to all programmes of course, you ought to get 
more efficient at those the more you go on over time. If you have only an annual budget, you 
cannot plan to do that, so you are in effect planning potential efficiency out of the system. 
We now have a number of programmes that are forward-funded for three years. Actually, 
we are now in the second year, so there will be another two years’ worth. Our intention 
would certainly be, subject to what the next Government decide and the funding that is put 
back into that pool, to continue that effort, because we absolutely recognise that this is a 
long-term game that you cannot play on an annual basis in many cases.  
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Q49  The Chairman: General Mayall? 
Lt General Simon Mayall: Thank you very much, my Lord Chairman. I will answer, if I may, 
some of Lord Ramsbotham’s points. On the international defence engagement strategy, I 
absolutely echo what Mr McCarthy has said. In my business I look on myself as a force 
multiplier for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and for Her Majesty's ambassadors 
around the Middle East and north Africa. I could not do the work that I do if I was not 
absolutely hand in glove with the FCO and HMAs. In fact, I am funded partly out of the 
Conflict Prevention Pool from DfID, UKTI, the FCO and the Ministry of Defence, which I 
think is absolutely right, because it is through the prism of a senior bloke in uniform with 
sustained, high-level personal engagement precisely bringing this UK brand to countries 
around the world that really welcome it, and I cannot tell you how much it is welcomed. We 
are sometimes a little backward leaning, or self-deprecating, in understanding precisely what 
the UK military is, as part of the United Kingdom. I very much go to the ambassador and say 
that I want to be used as a golf club in his golf bag of engagement. In the Middle East, as you 
will well know, my Lord Chairman, security is the big issue, so it is important to meet those 
security concerns by demonstrating that we are reliable, long-term, strategic allies who they 
most want to deal with. The Americans, fundamentally, are too big, but they are the ultimate 
guarantors. The French, in many ways, have been very successful in using the soft power 
influence of their defence. I will come back to that in a minute. We should be more 
aggressively engaged in a part of the world where the door is wide open. Through the GCC, 
or dare I say it the Commonwealth, where we have this very long historical and massive 
network of connections, as you well know my Lord, I think we can do more. As I say, I very 
firmly do this through the prism of defence and security, because in many parts of the world 
that reliability is what they most want.  
I have to say that the French engagement is very heavily tied into raisons d’état. Their 
deployments around the world, including in the area that I work in, are very well thought 
through and very well funded, and they are very well engaged in the area. In the UAE, they 
have a three-star French admiral, a French Foreign Legion battalion, a squadron of Rafale 
aircraft parked permanently on the ground—well, occasionally they take off—and a small 
naval port. As I said to the Secretary of State, he has me, and I do this for 13 countries. The 
French absolutely get defence engagement in support of wider French interests. I do not 
want to say that defence engagement gets you defence sales, although it does up to a point, 
but defence sales are important for defence relationships, which of course are terribly 
important for national and international relationships. We talk in the Army—Lord 
Ramsbotham will be very aware of this—about the reactive force and the adaptive force. I 
would like to think of it as an engaged force that is very firmly viewed through the much 
wider prism of UK national interests. I think this is what the international defence 
engagement strategy is pointing to quite clearly—to political and diplomatic objectives—but 
what gives us this soft power influence in many places is the defence engagement part of it.  
If I may, I will make just one or two more points. The influence thing is absolutely critical. 
One of the core qualities that we bring is our planning. Interestingly, we put something like 
£800 million a year into the UN peacekeeping organisation. UNIFIL costs about £800 million 
itself, and we contribute 8% of that: £40 million. We do not put a single officer in there. If 
you put a single officer in there, you get a union flag flying over the headquarters and you 
have influence. Some £40 million of British taxpayers’ money goes into UNIFIL, but nobody 
knows that we have any engagement there because we do not put anybody in. We are a bit 
purist about this sometimes when we “exercise”. Again, I come back to influence being 
based on credibility. People want the UK in there, and I think Lord Ramsbotham was 
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absolutely right to have spotted that. I am not saying we should spread ourselves thinly, but 
we have a credibility that goes with our capacity to do very joined-up, joint, all-arms 
operations in coalition warfare, et cetera. That is what gives us that influence, but there are 
times when, particularly in the current climate, we should not just come off operations and 
sit back at our home base; we should be out there absolutely getting that leverage that 
Baroness Nicholson recognises so clearly. 
The Chairman: That is so interesting. Thank you very much. Baroness Armstrong? 
Q50  Lord Ramsbotham: Can I just follow that up? I am very interested that you mention 
the Lebanese force. Out of interest, when we have withdrawn from Afghanistan, presumably 
we are thinking about what we are going to do with the forces that we have available, and 
we may be able to think of providing that sort of influence.  
Lt General Simon Mayall: That is what I like to think. I do think that we are in the business 
of stability. I think that Lebanon is hugely important to us. The contagion effect of Syria is 
ghastly. We slightly go to these places that are important to us and do not commit even 
small numbers, which would give us influence, of hugely well trained staff officers, as you will 
know, my Lord, from Shrivenham, which is excellent. They are a massive asset to 
commanders who are looking to find their way through very complex operations, so we lose 
the capacity to link this back to our foreign policy objectives and then to our government 
objectives. Very small amounts of well-focused defence engagement give us very important 
amounts of global influence. 
The Chairman: That is a very important theme. Baroness Armstrong? 
Q51   Baroness Armstrong of Hill Top: I want to take us back to the point about 
balancing, but first I must declare my interests, as registered. I particularly ought to note my 
involvement with Voluntary Service Overseas and with the Tony Blair Africa Governance 
Initiative. I am on the board of both. It seems to me that the balancing act between the 
military and non-military departments is very important for government diplomacy and 
support internationally. I have to say that as a member of the Cabinet during Iraq, we were 
not really convinced that DfID and the Ministry of Defence were exactly working as one, to 
put it mildly. It does seem to me that there are occasions when it is perfectly within 
government policy—I am not saying this about Iraq, actually—to have military involvement, 
both hard and soft. However, non-military intervention in effect is also required, because we 
will want to build civil society, and a military aspect to that might be unhelpful rather than 
helpful. How do you work on all that together, making sure that across government there is 
coherence and understanding of the strategy while deploying totally different personnel, if 
you like? 
Steve McCarthy: It is a really difficult act. One of the things that we have to grapple with, of 
course, is that when there is clearly a crisis, some instability, in an individual country, the 
balance is not just between what you deploy and when you deploy it, but between the 
circumstances and the international system that you are deploying it in. In other words, this 
is not just the UK as a single actor; there are likely to be numerous other countries in a 
similar respect.  
Co-ordination is one of the biggest challenges that we face, not just internally, which your 
question related to, but externally. Unfortunately these things always grind rather more 
slowly than one would like, but in the context of the overall setting of priorities from the 
NSC downwards for countries which the UK believes not only have risk and instability in 
them but which are particularly relevant to our own interests, we have begun to drive a 
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much more strategic approach to thinking about which departments have what assets and 
which ones make the most sense in the circumstances of the individual country. A really 
good example of that was the Libyan situation of a couple of years ago. In that conflict, there 
was clearly an issue about the extent to which military engagement in attempting to rebuild 
the structures compared with the civilian engagement was the right thing. The answer was 
that a little of the military aspect was needed, too, because some of this was about the 
security situations and the security structures, but mostly it was a civilian advisory effort, 
based on how to restore a judicial process or a governance process. Some of the answer is 
that in every case we really do try to draw a balance. We are also very keen to be flexible in 
this. The situation on the ground in any country may well change over time, and things might 
have to shift in the balance of where we are. 
I am afraid that is quite a long answer, and probably a slightly platitudinous one, to a 
perfectly valid question. The short version is that it is a balance and we try to make it as easy 
as we can. 
The Chairman: Order. I am afraid that we will have to stop for five minutes because there 
is a Division. We will resume in five minutes. I apologise to our witnesses, but that is the 
way it all seems to work. 
Sitting suspended for a Division in the House. 
Q52   The Chairman: I think we will resume. We have quality here, if not quantity. We 
have been concentrating so far more on the military end as well as on what soft power does 
for military engagements, and on the balance between overwhelming force, if we might put it 
that way, and winning hearts and minds at the other end. I think we will have just a few more 
questions in that area. Lord Janvrin, would you like to talk about that? Later, we will get on 
to supporting national interests.  
Lord Janvrin: I may broaden my questions into that. 
The Chairman: Okay, let us just stay with the military side for the moment and ask this. 
What is new about trying to win hearts and minds? We did it in the Malayan emergency 50 
or 60 years ago. Why has it become more difficult and more important, and why is the 
military, both here and in America, saying that we must have more civilian involvement right 
up at the spearhead of operations? What has changed? 
Nicholas Beadle: Experience has changed our thinking, certainly over the last decade. I was 
in Baghdad in 2003-04 as the senior coalition adviser on creating a new ministry of defence, 
and I learnt a great deal about the Iraqis’ perception of the way in which the coalition was 
approaching these issues. It stood me in good stead, because in 2005 the FCO asked me to 
be the HMG representative on a new campaign strategy, or rather an alternative campaign 
strategy, which was to be reviewed in the light of developing existing strategy. Rebalancing 
the hard and soft power elements of the campaign was clearly necessary. The existing 
campaign plan had been drafted largely so that the DoD and the State Department could 
very much do the things that they were doing. Everybody could point to something in the 
campaign plan and say, “I’m doing that”, and carry on. It was largely hard for the military and 
soft for the State Department. We based the new work on the Malaya campaign. This report 
for the President, which was shared with our PM, suggested an ink spot strategy and looked 
at creating elements—I hate to use the phrase “safe havens”—whereby through a process of 
clear, hold and build we would allow enduring security and a demonstrable and long-lasting, 
or sustainable at least, improved standard of living for the people inside. This was in order to 
attract others in. At the end of that it was clear that we needed two things. One was that 
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we needed more troops to do the clear part of it. Partly as a result of that and partly as a 
result of other deliberations, the military surge came along and unfortunately was not 
matched by the soft power surge, which had been indicated as being absolutely essential. The 
problem with that was that we ended up having enclaves. Unfortunately, they were created 
by the militia, which totally undermined the essential element of this, which was the 
monopoly of force with the legitimate Government of Iraq. I use that as an example, because 
to an extent we had similar problems in the south with the UK campaign, in so much as 
there were elements of the military, which had one strategy, and elements of DfID, which 
had another. If you bear with me, I will move quickly to Libya and try to contrast that with 
this to put this into perspective to show how far we have come.  
Q53  The Chairman: Give us examples. That is fine. 
Nicholas Beadle: I think this is a different case altogether. The way in which we found 
ourselves in the lead is a very interesting study in power politics. Once there, I have to say 
that the Prime Minister, with the new NSC, did a very good job of balancing the hard and 
soft power elements and matched them to the circumstances on the ground. I worked in the 
National Security Council Secretariat in support of the National Security Council at the time 
and throughout the Libya part, and I have to say that the range of issues covered should not 
be underestimated. Without revealing any secrets or anything else, I can honestly say that 
the soft power effect was a major consideration throughout our deliberations. There was 
clearly pretty much unanimity on the humanitarian efforts and the supply of non-lethal 
weapons, and the departments pulled together, at least at the beginning, in order to deliver 
those. Of course, the fact that our air support, as part of the coalition, was acting 
legitimately under the UN principle of the responsibility to protect, which has been an 
extremely important development over the past 15 or 20 years, will both bind us and give us 
that international legitimacy, which is so important if you are selling a soft power agenda; you 
have to have this legitimacy. The “we do not act unless it’s legal” approach is all well and 
good here at home, but of course it does not count for very much on the ground. Unless we 
keep working on the nature of our role in a conflict over time, history shows us that we can 
slip into a position where the conflict regresses again, which we need to avoid. Even in Libya, 
we are seen as liberators at the moment, but that is not something that one can rest one’s 
laurels on. We need to keep working at that. 
Anyone who thinks that launching a Paveway missile from a combat air sortie is any less hard 
than a ground attack is, I am afraid, very much mistaken. It is really damaging, whether we hit 
innocent civilians from 10,000 feet or 10 feet. This is an area that we have to concentrate 
on. One of the real lessons for me of Libya was seeing the extent to which the targeting 
process, both here in the UK and in NATO, had been tightened dramatically from previous 
conflicts. We had learnt lessons from Iraq and from Afghanistan, and that was a very positive 
move. Not only was the collateral damage bar set very, very low, but a material collateral 
damage consideration was also made. I will give one example from the energy field, my Lord 
Chairman. I ran the oil and gas cell, and I think that you helpfully joined us a the FCO to talk 
to overseas oil people in order to help them to get back in in due course. As part of the 
remit was to deny supplies to the regime element, one of the things that we looked at was a 
relatively easily pushed concept of getting rid of one of Libya’s largest refineries, Zawiya, 
which is very close to Tripoli. We knew that Gaddafi was using this to supply his forces, and 
it was quite an obvious target for us. However, our considerations included, first of all, 
whether it potentially supplied fuel to the hospital. We did not know that for a fact. As it 
turned out, it did not, but we did consider that as an issue. The second consideration was 
that it would cause at least £1 billion of damage, and we were thinking of our soft power 
approach towards the end in the post-conflict arena. The third was the time it would have 
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taken to reinstate that capacity. It would have meant that the incoming Government could 
not have been seen to be providing for their citizens. We thought that these were all 
important considerations, besides the usual consideration about the potential for civilian 
casualties.  
The decision was taken not to do it, and I think it was the right one, but it is a very good 
example of how the soft power element of decision-making has developed over recent 
periods. That is just one anecdote of how things have changed, but I think the overriding 
principle is that if we are not going to lose the peace, we have to be very careful to match 
our aspirations in the military field to the post-conflict situation. 
Q54   The Chairman: That partly answers the question. General Mayall, you were going 
to say something. 
Lt General Simon Mayall: I would like to comment, if I may, but after Steve McCarthy. 
Steve McCarthy: Briefly, there are three things. First, on the question of why things have 
changed, I think it is the nature of conflict. It is quite hard to find a scenario in the 21st 
century where a military intervention alone will solve the issue. The second is economics. 
We simply cannot afford to have different departments doing different things for different 
objectives any more. It makes no sense at all. The third is the view from the other end of 
the telescope, from the recipient countries of our involvement, which do not see the 
Ministry of Defence, DfID, the FCO or the Home Office from the UK; they see HMG, the 
UK. Getting those things together and tied up are really why we have to do this in a more 
co-ordinated way. 
The Chairman: That is a very good point. General Mayall.  
Lt General Simon Mayall: Just to segue from Mr McCarthy, we are not dealing 
fundamentally with existential threats from military force. We are intervening in areas where 
we, nationally or in co-ordination with other people, have deemed that the international 
order has been upset and requires an intervention. It is normally instability. We have learnt 
from the school of hard knocks that military intervention is rarely decisive. It keeps taking us 
back, dare I say, to Carl von Clausewitz, who said that war—or, frankly, any defence 
engagement—is politics by other means. For us in the military, the key word is relevance. 
How are we using our military force relevantly to the situation? I remember David Petraeus 
in Iraq always having this great cry, “Tell me how this ends”, and constantly and quite rightly 
bringing it back to the politicians to say, “What are your objectives here? What are your 
strategic aims? How can I manage the application of military force that is appropriate to your 
strategic political aims as stated and how can I make sure that they are appropriate again 
with the other instruments of national power, and wider than national power, being 
employed on the ground?”   
One of the key things for us in the British military has been a mixture of experience, as I 
have said, but also education. It is about the quality of the education of our officers and all 
the way down through our soldiers back to Rupert Smith’s strategic corporal. Are you using 
military power—that is, an individual or a weapons system or a formation—that is relevant 
to your objectives? You could talk about the intrusion of the media, but you would rather 
hope that the British military are operating to morally and ethically high standards anyway. 
Perhaps I may use an anecdote. When I was in Kosovo, at a time when there was very little 
threat, either from Serbia or internally—because we were to an extent defending a 
revolution there—I gave us the centre of gravity, the thing that we the military needed to 
put our effort into: public ambivalence to the rule of law. That may look like a rather odd 
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military mission, but, to my mind, organised crime was a bigger threat to the future of 
Kosovo than Serbia. For my American friends, any idea that you would use hard military 
power to help set the conditions to tackle organised crime was well outside their remit. I 
felt that that was quite comfortably within the Government’s objectives, so we used a 
mixture of security and intelligence to build up task forces, in conjunction with the 
ambassador there, the senior policemen, the senior judges and the senior prosecuting 
authorities, and via information operations—in which we had a lot of assets—in order to 
create the conditions whereby we could lift some of these people without having a security 
riot on the street. 
The Chairman: Baroness Armstrong, we were interrupted by a Division. Had you finished 
your questions? 
Baroness Armstrong of Hill Top: Yes. 
The Chairman: Then Baroness Hussein-Ece is next. 
Q55   Baroness Hussein-Ece: Before I start, I also have to declare my interests as 
recorded, drawing attention particularly to my visit to Khartoum in Sudan. I should also 
highlight my interest in Turkey, given my background as chair of the APPG on Turkey. 
I was very interested in the comments that Mr McCarthy made just now, because it prefaced 
what I was going to say: that we are only just beginning to look at the other end of the 
telescope. I am just wondering how much that has shifted in terms of foreign policy and what 
we look at as our interests, whatever they may be—be it implementing trade, peacekeeping, 
nation-building or bringing stability. I was struck, right at the beginning, by what Mr Beadle 
said. When talking about soft power, he used the phrase “damaging … the Islamic religion”. 
That ties in with looking at the other end, because depending on where your starting point 
is, the perspective is obviously very different. I spend a lot of time in Turkey and am from a 
Muslim background myself. When I talk to people from different communities, both here or 
anywhere else, I find that their perspective is very different. The narrative seems to have 
changed completely in terms of military intervention and defence. They see what has 
happened with Iraq and Afghanistan, the lessons learnt, as being quite destabilising, and how 
we are trying hard now to repair the relationship and the perception of what we may have 
wanted to achieve and what we are leaving behind. What is your sense of soft power in 
terms of legacy, of using our very important historical networks in how we approach that 
legacy and of bringing sustainable stability and proper programmes to these countries in 
order to rebuild civil society? It is a reputational thing. Of course, the military has a very 
good reputation, but it does not have a very good reputation particularly in respect to the 
Middle East.  
The Chairman: Just to add a spike at the end of that excellent question: how do we know 
that the military are held in good regard around the world? 
Baroness Hussein-Ece: I was being polite. 
The Chairman: The military over the years have not always been popular, so how do we 
know? General Mayall, you were saying that they are all seen pretty well and I hope they are. 
But how do we know that? How do we measure that? 
Lt General Simon Mayall: The number of people who beat a path to our door for defence 
engagement, places on our courses, training teams, loan service officers. If I could bottle the 
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appetite for British military engagement, I would be a billionaire. It is huge and it is 
transferable. In terms of our influence on the security state apparatus that we deal with, I 
think we are a huge force for good. I stand fast by the Baroness’s remarks on objectives that 
we have been associated with. I would like to slightly ring-fence the education and training 
that the British military can take as well as our role and I think our behaviour, broadly 
speaking, for the hundreds of thousands of service men and women we have put through 
these operations. I think we have little to be ashamed of within our own organisation—with 
some very obvious exceptions that have been prosecuted quite rightly through due process. 
But I do think that a huge path has been beaten to our door. I am delighted to say that I take 
great pride in that. 
Q56  The Chairman: Now, Mr Beadle, you look as though you wanted to add to that. Did 
you? 
Nicholas Beadle: Very briefly. I would agree with General Mayall insomuch as that is 
government-to-government and military-to-military relationships. I think it is somewhat 
different when looking at the other end of the telescope, as citizen to citizen, which is far 
more prevalent at the moment than it used to be with the advent of social networks and the 
ability for people to make their feelings known. In that complex environment, it is very 
difficult to know how a process or a procedure that you put in place in terms of soft power 
is going to work out. Not all of it works out very well.  
I would also just like to touch on this issue of our own diaspora, for example. Certainly 
within Afghanistan or, perhaps, a very good example might be Pakistan, we clearly have very 
important, strategic considerations and we also have a very strong Pakistani diaspora. Now, 
what they think about what we are doing is quite clearly key to how other people feel too. 
Some of the work I did when I was running the Afghanistan communications and strategy 
teams across Government was to look at the diaspora and how they felt about the approach 
that we were taking. I was quite surprised, actually. Apart from it being a little bit more 
about why we were expending money on this, that was rather stronger than the issue about 
our approach or attacking their home country. It was very interesting that that came out. 
But I think it is part of what Professor Peggy Levitt from Harvard mentions in her book, 
which is called the social imaginary. People in Pakistan get news from people in the UK about 
the UK. It is that which has a very strong effect on their perceptions of the UK. It is not 
what Government put out on a press release. It is not necessarily what we say in terms of 
international conferences. It is far more about this individual-to-individual communication. 
The Chairman: That is very interesting. 
Baroness Hussein-Ece: Can I just press you on that, Mr Beadle? What did you mean 
when you said about damaging the Islamic religion? What did you mean by that? 
Nicholas Beadle: On those particular interventions, in particular on Iraq rather than 
Afghanistan—and, to an extent, the way in which the war on terror was initially conducted 
and potentially, I suppose, now the drone attacks and so on—there was the issue of the type 
of approach that we had taken. I think we were associated with something which left no 
room for negotiation—left no room to talk to these people. Arguably, of course, we are 
changing how we are approaching things now. It did lead to one or two things; and I am sure 
Steve McCarthy can elaborate on this. We did bring forward a number of other initiatives at 
the time such as Prevent and CONTEST and so on. It was not that we were unthinking in 
government. I just think that the overwhelming impression was that we were doing too 
much. 
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Q57  The Chairman: Lord Janvrin, and then I am going to come to Lord Foulkes; it is 
your turn. 
Lord Janvrin: I will broaden it if I may. 
The Chairman: Yes, well, what we are doing I think is sliding a little from the issue of how 
the military in hot combat situations need to mobilise the civilian soft power element, into 
how the military are going to fulfil their contributions to our national interests in prosperity, 
sales, equipment and trade. We are beginning to cross over between the two, but I do not 
mind. We have to cover both, so please go ahead. 
Lord Janvrin: For many people, the whole concept of soft power is more about culture, 
cultural diplomacy, education, and, above all, trade and business, and, if you want a sort of 
jacket around that, something like the GREAT campaign, which many of you will be familiar 
with. That is what, to many people, soft power is all about. It is more and more being 
interpreted, as you said, about citizen-to-citizen contact rather than government-to-
government or military-to-military. In this context—and that is what we are looking at, this 
rather broader canvas—I have two questions. To what extent is the kind of joined-up 
thinking that you have been doing with defence engagement, bringing together diplomacy, 
defence, development—connected with this wider field of trade, education, culture, et 
cetera? The second part of the question is: can we learn from your experience of trying to 
join up defence, diplomacy and development in terms of the broader canvas in how we link 
what we are doing with trade, with business, and with the prosperity of the nation? 
The Chairman: Right, well, the next half hour can cover that. But these are the keys. How 
does the defence establishment fit into this new world in which you are an army or a navy 
or an air force, but the other side—your opponents—are not? It is all counterinsurgency; it 
is all irregular warfare. You have to integrate with the civil side to make any progress. That is 
what is being discovered by everybody now. Secondly, in doing all this, what is your impact 
on the bigger interests of the nation, including, as Lord Janvrin says, the trade and prosperity 
and general good will? Is trade going to follow a flag, or is it going to follow all kinds of new 
forms of soft power? 
Steve McCarthy: I think this is multidimensional. Even just within the defence bubble—and I 
take your point about broadening out—there is, in its own terms, educational activity and 
trade activity as well. But, to get to what you were really asking about, one of the things we 
increasingly do across Whitehall is look at countries, particularly priority countries, on that 
very wide pan-government basis and look at what—I think in a rather ugly phrase—is called 
a golden key that might unlock a relationship between the UK and whichever state we are 
talking about.  
Although you said that one of the issues is in some cases that it might be the military at this 
end doing it but at the other end it is the civilians doing it, actually, the opposite is also true: 
in many countries that we engage with around the world, things that are done in this 
country by civil society, in those countries are done by military people. Burma is the classic 
current example of that. One of the reasons why, following the Prime Minister’s visit there, 
we put a lot of effort into re-engaging with Burma in a defence sense is that a lot of Burmese 
society, whether we like it or not, is influenced by the military.  So there is a really good 
opportunity there to sustain issues to do with democracy and the rule of law by engaging at 
a defence level because they can, we hope, see that that is the way in which in the UK the 
military operate—within civilian societal control. The point about the joined-up-ness was my 
reference earlier on to the view from the other end of the telescope because ambassadors 
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through history, I suspect, have torn their hair out, with one department in the UK wanting 
to do something that is completely out of kilter with the broader aims of the ambassador 
and his staff or the way in which it is received in the individual country.  
So we are increasingly trying to make sure that not only do we use the levers that we have 
in the right way, but they are pulled in some sort of harmonic arrangement with the levers 
that we are also trying to pull in other departments. We have done this for a number of 
countries, particularly those that are loosely called the emerging powers, where the nature 
of the UK’s relationship really fundamentally needs to change. It is usually not a country with 
which we have had a long-standing historical connectivity—some of them are—but we know 
they are going to be very key players in the future, at least economically and probably 
politically.  We have to develop those relationships with them, and that may be done 
through an increasing defence engagement but it is more likely to be done by that as part of 
an overall global approach. So we are definitely trying to get that. Are we perfect at it yet? 
No, absolutely not. But we are trying to make those things join up. 
Q58   The Chairman: General Mayall, would you like to say something? 
Lt General Simon Mayall: I think, coming back to Lord Janvrin’s point about soft power, 
when you apply it to defence you have to assume that part of the attraction of the non-
conflict aspect of defence is that is has got credibility. That reputation is partly based on 
credibility.  
I would say that various different parts of the world respond to different applications of the 
instruments of national power. In the Gulf states for instance, where I spend a lot of time, 
they genuinely believe that they have an existential threat that is coming from Iran. Although 
our intervention would be with a third party or, as you say, counterinsurgency and stability, 
they are of course seeking a rather more conventional set of defence relationships which are 
based on rather more conventional forces there. The nature of the Gulf again, as noble 
Lords are very aware, is one of very small decision-making elites in which defence has been 
the key concern they have as a family regime country. This means that if you can approach 
countries in certain parts of the world through the defence prism, clearly you have a chance 
to influence them on a range of other issues.  
I talked earlier about the Americans, the French and probably ourselves in the Gulf. As P5 
members, these people have no doubts that they wish to have friends who have influence 
around the world; the United Kingdom clearly is one of them. Then, as I say, the balance 
there between the political, the diplomatic, the military and commercial is one aspect. If you 
go out to the Far East or South America, quite clearly there is a very different balance. The 
application of the soft power advantage of the military, for instance, other than providing 
some technical support in South America, is hugely different compared to the Middle East, 
where we offer, up to a point, security guarantees to people who are key to our own 
prosperity and security.  
Undoubtedly, in parts of the world—I say the Gulf, and come back again to the 
Commonwealth where we have this long-standing historical and cultural affinity—we 
translate those defence relationships into commercial advantage. Some of it is because they 
are prepared to pay for our education and training. It comes back to beating a path to our 
door: they would rather come to Sandhurst than they would to West Point or Saint-Cyr. 
Some of it is because they will pay for our officers to actually work within their armed 
forces. Part of it is clearly defence sales, because they are buying a relationship through that 
which, in the case of something like Typhoon, is a relationship with the Royal Air Force as 
much as BAE Systems. Part of it, of course, is that in terms of sovereign wealth funds, oil and 
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gas energy concessions, contracts to meet their own health education requirements for 
burgeoning and increasingly young populations, they will favour the United Kingdom. Again, 
it comes back to what the objectives are, and having a really good assessment of what is the 
most attractive part of the United Kingdom offer that gives us a competitive advantage. In 
some parts of the world it happens to be defence, through the prism of meeting some of 
their security concerns.  
The Chairman: Different markets, different approach. Absolutely; very good.  
Q59  Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: I was on the Joint Committee on the National Security 
Strategy for four years and two successive National Security Advisers gave evidence to us. 
You know, Mr Beadle, I did not detect that anything that the national security strategy 
incorporated had anything to do with soft power. All we got was defence issues that were 
debated again and again and again. I am just slightly concerned, as far as our inquiry is 
concerned, that all three of you are looking through rose-tinted spectacles. To summarise 
your evidence: as far as Britain is concerned, everything in the garden is lovely; we should 
write a little report saying that and go home. You would help us a great deal more if you 
could be a bit more self-critical and suggest to us some of the ways in which it can be 
improved. None of you has said, “Hey, wait a minute, maybe we are not doing quite as well, 
maybe this is something new we could do, maybe we could learn from the French, the 
Italians or the Americans”, but you have not given us anything to help us in our inquiry, 
really, have you? 
The Chairman: There is a challenge. Mr Beadle. 
Nicholas Beadle: I am glad to take up the challenge, particularly as I am no longer involved 
in the Civil Service so I feel a little easier about this. To an extent, I agree with the premise 
of the question. It has some merit in it, inasmuch as there is a question mark about whether 
the Government should be doing soft power at all or whether they should be an enabler for 
some of the soft power elements. There is no doubt that defence is just a small part of the 
overall perception of the UK. Its actions can be Simon’s force multiplier but they can also 
have the potential for doing great damage to our reputation. So care is needed. I do not 
think there is complacency there—there certainly should not be—but I can give you a 
couple of examples of where we could improve, perhaps. This is a wider soft power issue, 
not purely on defence, but that was the challenge you gave me. 
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: No, I meant in a wider sense. 
Nicholas Beadle: One I would pick out in particular is the Korean Wave. This was the rise 
of popular culture from the 1990s onwards which took south-east Asia by storm. The name 
was not coined by the South Korean Government. The name came from a Chinese 
journalist. The Chinese felt it was being done to them, quite frankly. They could not 
understand why this culture was making such progress. It was not started by the South 
Korean Government; this was citizen-to-citizen, a natural cultural expansion. However, the 
South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs took this forward and embraced it. In contrast, for 
example, to the GREAT campaign, which is principally advertising and the creation of a 
framework—I am a fan of that, but I will come back to it, if I may. the Korean wave was not 
something that the Government did, it was just something that the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs embraced. What it did was to say, “This fits very much with understanding more 
about Korea. It also fits with Korean unification ambitions because it is saying that we are an 
open society, et cetera”. Thirdly, it said, “This is a contribution to prosperity, not just for 
South Korea but for all”. That was quite interesting. So South Korean television stations 
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were expanding in different countries and so on and they were helping others come to this 
form. There is one example of what we could do. 
Q60  Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: Can I have another one as well? 
Nicholas Beadle: Oh, you would like another one? 
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock:  Yes. You said you had another one. 
Nicholas Beadle: If I may touch on the GREAT campaign first— 
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: All right. 
Nicholas Beadle: I think it leads to another example. A great deal was made about the 
success of the Olympics and so on. To push back on your comment about everything being 
rosy in the garden, I would say that I was very proud, as many other people were, when I 
saw the Armed Forces step up to the plate when there was an issue of security. However, 
and this might be more in tune with your thoughts, when I travel abroad and I see a capital 
city of large numbers of armed people on the streets, my reaction is, “This is authoritarian” 
and “How safe is it here?”. As I say, I was extremely proud of the way in which our Armed 
Forces committed themselves but I would be interested to see what people from abroad 
thought about that sight. 
The Chairman: Are you saying that Andy Murray does more for our foreign policy than 
the Army? 
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: Very much, yes. 
Nicholas Beadle: No.  
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: He certainly does more than Alex Salmond. 
The Chairman: I am sorry, I think someone else wants to come in. 
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: I wanted to hear a reply from the General because he is the 
one who has been saying that everything is rosy. Perhaps our Armed Forces are not as 
welcome in, say, Kenya or Belize. Different countries have different perceptions. We should 
be a bit careful. 
Lt General Simon Mayall: My Lord, I absolutely accept that. I do, however, find that 
compared with the historical reputations of some other countries, we are in a considerably 
better place.  
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: What do you mean, a better place, and what can we do 
about it? 
Lt General Simon Mayall: I go back to what I do: my primary motivation is the British 
national interest, which I pursue, as I said earlier, through the prism of defence and security. 
There is a question: what do you want from your soft power? There is the soft power which 
is about hearts and minds on operations, so how would you wish to use a national asset in 
conjunction, as Baroness Armstrong was saying, with the other instruments of national 
power? Do we want to use it for good in pursuit of security and stability in other parts of 
the world? Of course we do. Do we want to use it for prosperity? If I was going to close 
down just to prosperity and put something helpful to the Committee, I would say that we 
have a thing called irreducible spare capacity within the military whereby we meet the almost 
endless demand for international defence training. If we were really serious about getting the 
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maximum advantage out of the United Kingdom Armed Forces, over and above their 
operations and how they conduct themselves on those operations in the balance of hard 
power and hearts and minds, while we are waiting in a contingency role, it is important to 
take this appetite for defence training and use it much more widely by making it a core 
function of the United Kingdom’s Armed Forces.  
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: What about dealing with emergencies and disasters? We 
could do a lot more on those, could we not?  
Lt General Simon Mayall: I am a great believer, Lord Foulkes, as I said earlier, in the 
concept of the engaged force. It is not a question either of operations for which I do not see 
much political or public appetite for a while to come, and it is not to say that it will not 
happen. I believe that a country like ours absolutely should have the capacity to have very 
well founded, trained and equipped Armed Forces to be able to deal with those. But I do not 
think that we can just be put back in a box because that is a waste of a superb asset. I believe 
that we should link it back to the political objectives of this nation, part of which is our 
reputation, and we absolutely should use it. That is because when we are in a really hard and 
austere fiscal position, a government department that is taking almost £32 billion needs to 
show what the British public gets for it. It is part of the narrative that says, “We can do a 
whole range of things that are of advantage to the United Kingdom.” That is not simply a 
selfish advantage, in my opinion.  
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: When I was in DfID and we asked for help from the forces, 
you would send us a bill for everything. Okay, those services need to be paid for, but it 
should not be done like that. There should be some co-ordination.  
Lt General Simon Mayall: I can only agree, but I do think it is one of the areas where we 
could do things better. I do not think it is rosy in the garden. We do not appear quite to 
have the mechanisms. It comes down to stove-piping, silo funding. When times are tight, that 
is what we fall back on. That is why I think that other nations may be better at being able 
actively to use their military without ending up with an unseemly toing and froing between 
departments and the Treasury over the funding of operations. It is quite clearly in the British 
national interest, and I mean that in the wider sense, not just selfish national interest.  
Q61  Baroness Nicholson of Winterbourne: I think the point that the General has just 
made is perhaps a point that is rather in the forefront for a number of Members of this 
Committee. Does Mr McCarthy, for example, feel that the committee you are running—I 
hate to call it IDES, the Ides of March—is strong enough to be able to pull together these 
rather disparate threads that, historically, our different ministries have been pursuing for a 
decade or two? For example, we laud—and I think rightly so—many of the DfID objectives. 
On the other hand, it is dealing, as is clearly said by one of our witnesses here, from the 
objective perhaps of pursuing the British company interest, for example. Yet, trade is at the 
very head of the Foreign Office’s perspectives at the moment under William Hague—and 
correctly. How are you going to bring together the elements that are not yet united in 
British policy? Do you have a strong enough mechanism? The General has just said about 
other nations, for example, being able to use the military—whether one calls it soft power 
or not—more effectively without upsetting all the other ministries. One saw, as indeed has 
already been noted, on the ground in Iraq the not just differing but totally contradictory 
aspects that were there from different ministries. It was devastatingly negative on the 
population, let alone on British interests and on our influence. How is this going to be pulled 
together? Are you strong enough? What do you foresee? 
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Steve McCarthy: The specific committee that we talked about earlier on—the Building 
Stability Overseas Board—works very well at managing on a tri-departmental basis the 
money it is allocated to manage. That is roughly £200 million a year and out of that comes 
the UK’s contribution to the UN peacekeeping budget. Compared with the amount of 
money that is spent in my department, DfID and even the FCO, accepting the scale point, 
that is frankly a drop in the ocean. It is a very small amount of what we are talking about. 
Are we strong enough to manage the things for which we currently have responsibility? Yes, 
absolutely. But I think there is definitely a need to think at a higher level about the way all 
departments that are relevant to national security at least bring things together, without 
even going to the broader point about national interest. That is work that the Cabinet Office 
is looking at right now as we speak.  
I think it is probably fair to say that two years is quite a long time. Actually, the way it takes 
to turn the Whitehall machine around is sometimes a bit slower than any of us would like. 
But if I come back to Lord Foulkes’s point, I think you can draw a parallel back to the 
national security strategy, which actually did set some of these things off. It did talk about 
using all of the tools at our power to support and sustain British interest. It has taken us a 
while to get there but we are beginning to get there.  
To offer you one other thing that I think we could certainly begin to do much better—which 
will feed directly into your question about being able to bring the broader machinery 
together—we still have a tendency to look at things on a country-by-country basis. Not only 
are we stove-piped here in the UK, but it is as if every individual country in the world is a 
little island on its own and does not talk to its neighbours or anything else. We are 
increasingly trying to bring the perspective up to a regional level—not to do away with the 
country perspectives, which are obviously very important, but to understand relationships 
between the neighbours in the countries in any given region. We can therefore try to have a 
broader influence across the piece when it makes sense to do so. To take you to a non-
controversial example, perhaps, when we involve ourselves with friends and allies in the 
Scandinavian countries, we tend to deal with Denmark, Sweden, Finland and Norway alone. 
We tend not to recognise that if you talk to a Dane or a Swede the first thing they talk 
about is what is going on with Denmark and Sweden. We have to get up to that sort of 
regional level. As part of the defence engagement strategy we put in place specifically as a 
sort of an experiment—although I do not think that we will change it ultimately—a formal 
linkage of our defence attachés in those countries. Therefore, they work together for a 
common aim as opposed to, as it were, just working for their bilateral embassy. That is a 
small step but I think that is another thing that we could look to do more of across 
government—thinking about the regional context not just the bilateral context. 
Q62  The Chairman: We are getting quite close to the time when we must let our 
witnesses go. They have been very helpful over a two-hour period. I just have some final 
points on the military and the support of the national interest. General Mayall, you have 
been active in the area of arms sales, particularly in the Middle East, where, as you say, there 
is an existential threat and the emphasis is on security and defence. Would you say that 
being very active and successful in this field puts this country at an advantage or disadvantage 
compared with countries that do not arrive with a lot of arms sales in their shop windows, 
as it were? 
Lt General Simon Mayall: “Defence sales”. We know the emotive nature of “arms sales”. 
As I say, even with the imperative of prosperity, we are not just in the business of selling 
arms. Defence sales are part of relationships and we deal with responsible Governments, I 
like to think, in most parts of the world. It is a virtuous cycle. If you engage politically, 
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diplomatically and militarily as a credible nation with a long-term strategy objective to 
meet—yes, selfishly—your own security needs in a part of the world, the chances are that 
those countries will reward that strategic commitment with defence sales. In the part of the 
world I particularly work in, the Gulf, there is no question that any of these countries could 
possibly defend themselves on their own. They absolutely rely on the guarantee of the 
Americans, fundamentally; and, as I say, in many cases, if there was an invasion—Saddam into 
Kuwait—the UN would wrap round to give the legality, the legitimacy, for an intervention 
on that country’s behalf. But they are very aware that some of our security requirements 
and prosperity requirements are met by defence sales.  
I support defence sales in parts of the world because I think they give you these long-term 
relationships. They give you political influence. They help the United Kingdom then to 
engage through ambassadors, Ministers and senior officials in parts of the world that give us 
challenges between interests and values. There is no doubt about it: if you do not engage up 
to a point, you will find that your competitors are rewarded for their engagement. Where 
you do engage, I think you get rewarded with defence sales. They have a commercial value of 
their own, that is undeniable, but to my mind they underpin long-term strategic partnerships 
that are built fundamentally on relationships, particularly in that part of the world. We have 
seen already, particularly in the Middle East, that the political, diplomatic and military 
engagement has led to defence sales but it has also led to a huge amount of other 
commercial activity, which comes as a result of the nature of the power in that part of the 
world.  
The Chairman: That is very helpful. So the answer is that it is a very strong positive 
element.  
It is coming up to six o’clock. Unless there are any final questions, I would like to thank all 
our witnesses very much indeed. It is an enormous canvas. We could spend many hours on 
different aspects of it. What emerges very clearly is the extraordinary interweaving of hard 
and soft power nowadays. The days of armies against armies or air forces against air forces 
have simply gone and opponents are all from the insurgency or irregular or less visible 
quarter. That means the use of soft power and working on minds become as important as 
working on defensive positions, and, secondly, that what is being done on the military side, 
including defence sales, is all part of supporting national interests more effectively than in the 
past, and it is very positive. Thank you very much indeed. Obviously we shall think very hard 
on some of the things you have said, and we are very grateful to you. 
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SECTION 1: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
1. Soft power can be highly effective – but rarely is. This submission examines the current 
low level of effectiveness, suggests some common reasons for failure, and then 
proposes a more rigorous approach, before offering thoughts on high level decision-
making and the private sector. 
2. Soft power is too focused on communication. Traditional marketing is woefully 
ineffective within the commercial sector, and worse still in the governmental arena. 
Military communication efforts provide good examples of the general performance, but 
rigorous measurement of effectiveness is needed. 
3. Other than rigorous evaluation, common flaws in influence efforts include a lack of 
focus on objectives, poor target audience selection, the pursuit of consistency over 
targeted messaging, an emphasis on attitudes rather than behaviour and the use of 
inadequate and inappropriate research.  
4. Rather than focusing on bureaucratic structures, we recommend 6 widely applicable 
principles for a better approach. These will allow the effective and orderly planning of 
strategic communication campaigns, vastly boosting reliability and reducing waste. 
5. Too often, soft power is narrowly conceived, leading to the exclusion of promising 
potential solutions. The principles outlined above could significantly improve foreign 
policy decision-making. 
6. Specialist expertise is required, and at present, the industry struggles to provide it. 
More must be done to identify the most effective practitioners. 
7. The Behavioural Dynamics Institute is a private, not-for-profit, non-partisan institute 
that fosters multidisciplinary collaboration to investigate influence and complex human 
group or societal issues where behaviour change is key. The Influence Advisory Panel 
(x-iap.com) is an initiative of the BDI. We also assist our commercial partner, SCL, in 
the design and analysis of field research that directly informs strategic communication 
efforts by governments. 
SECTION 2: INTRODUCTION  
8. Section summary: Soft power can be highly effective – but rarely is. This 
submission examines the current low level of effectiveness, suggests some 
common reasons for failure, and then proposes a more rigorous approach, 
before offering thoughts on high level decision-making and the private 
sector. 
9. We contend that soft power can be highly effective – but that it rarely is. We contend 
that this low return on investment is not limited to government efforts, but is rather a 
crisis across the whole field of influence, because that field relies on faulty assumptions 
and a misguided focus on communication, sustained by poor metrics.  
10. The ability to persuade foreign actors to ‘do what the UK wants’ is a critical capability 
that is fundamental to the country’s prosperity. The current low level of effectiveness 
should be an urgent concern.  
11. Current soft power approaches focus too much on communication, and draw 
principally on marketing theory. This is a mistake: soft power is much wider, 
encompassing all possible non-violent solutions (including economic power). Indeed, 
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throughout this debate, it should be borne in mind that there is no easy distinction 
between hard and soft power. Both are merely the exercise of available actions, and 
good strategy is derived by matching tools to objectives, rather than preselecting tools 
regardless of aim. Once an objective has been decided, the full range of means should 
be considered. 
12. The next section of this submission provides evidence with regard to the current low 
level of effectiveness. We then suggest some common reasons for the failure of soft 
power efforts, and then propose a more rigorous approach. The final sections of this 
submission briefly explore the role of soft power in high-level decision-making and the 
ability of the private sector to contribute. 
13. These conclusions are derived from a wealth of research conducted and synthesized 
by the Behavioural Dynamics Institute, including the study of primary research data 
gathered by our commercial partners SCL in consultancy projects across more than 50 
countries. However, where possible we have cited publically available sources. 
SECTION 3: CURRENT EFFECTIVENESS 
14. Section summary: Soft power is too focused on communication. Traditional 
marketing is woefully ineffective within the commercial sector, and worse 
still in the governmental arena. Military communication efforts provide 
good examples of the general performance, but rigorous measurement of 
effectiveness is needed. 
15. Soft power, as presently construed, is largely an exercise in communication, drawing 
heavily on marketing theory. Yet traditional marketing is not working, even in the 
commercial arena for which it was designed.  
16. A series of studies by the Fournaise Marketing Group has revealed fundamental lack of 
satisfaction with marketers’ efforts. In a 2013 survey of 1200 senior managers, 78% 
agreed that advertising and media agencies “are not performance-driven enough and 
do not focus enough on helping to generate the (real and P&L-quantifiable) business 
results they expect their marketing departments to deliver.”  Research by McKinsey 
suggests that consumer behaviour is changing in ways which make traditional marketing 
techniques even less relevant; we contend that they were not especially effective in the 
first place.  The author of one of the key critiques of modern marketing, Greg Stuart, 
explained "I spent the first decade of my career as an agency media guy….I felt like a 
charlatan the entire time....I knew in my heart of hearts that we collectively, not just 
Greg Stuart, did not know what we were doing in spending clients' money."   
17. Small wonder then that failure rates are even higher in the governmental arena, for 
which marketing techniques were not designed. Enormous sums are spent upon 
government communication, from employing press officers to dropping leaflets on Iraqi 
civilians to teaching children the Green Cross Code. Yet the effectiveness of all this is 
in considerable doubt. 
18. The military experience in Afghanistan is instructive. A paucity of data means that it is 
not possible to directly analyze results for the UK military, but US efforts have been 
relatively well analyzed, and are comparable. In 2003, the Department of Defense’s 
‘Information Operations Roadmap’ concluded that “Currently, however, our PSYOP 
campaigns are often reactive and not well organized for maximum impact.”  Little has 
changed, and similar conclusions still appear in reviews of the effectiveness of US soft 
power deployment. Christopher Paul, in his review, noted that “Countless studies, 
articles, and opinion pieces have announced that US strategic communication and 
public diplomacy are in crisis and inadequate to meet current demand.”  Arturo Munoz 
identified nine principal messaging themes used by US forces in Afghanistan. Of those, 
he rated three as ‘effective’ between 2001-2005; after 2005 he identified no US 
message whose effectiveness was more than ‘mixed’.  Much of the communication 
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effort has wrongly focused on changing Afghan attitudes rather than behaviour; it is 
therefore chastening to discover that even those attitudes have been moving in the 
wrong direction: in one annual poll, the proportion of Afghans awarding positive 
ratings to US work in Afghanistan fell from 68% in 2005 to 32% in 2010.   
19. One should not conclude from this that effective military influence is impossible. There 
are examples of success. Christopher Lamb has identified two communications 
operations which resulted in direct and immediate behavioural change: a leaflet drop 
and broadcast effort at the start of the war in Afghanistan which led to the surrender 
of 1000 Taliban fighters in Kunduz Province, and the promotion of a weapons buy-back 
scheme in Iraq in 2004, which achieved impressive results.  Causation is always difficult 
to establish, but there is no doubt that there are many more such case studies out 
there. The task is not impossible, and if done better, soft power efforts could be vastly 
more effective. 
20. As more data becomes available, a similar story is likely to emerge in analyzing civilian 
governmental communication efforts. The Government Communications Plan notes 
that there are 1,910 specialist communicators across government, plus another 1,394 
in state-funded ‘arms-length bodies and non-ministerial organisations’, together 
spending at least £237m.  As well as their day-to-day work, the plan provides an 
incomplete list of 46 specific communication campaigns that the government will 
undertake. That figure is certainly an undercount. 
21. Some of these campaigns will be effective; some will not. We noted above that data on 
British military communication efforts was lacking. The same is broadly true of civilian 
efforts. Rigorous evaluation is rare. The House of Lords Science and Technology 
Committee published a report in 2011 on behaviour change; they found that “A 
common concern raised by witnesses was the need for greater consistency in the 
quality of evaluation of government behaviour change interventions, with many 
suggesting that this was a significant area of weakness.”  Measuring effectiveness in 
communication is extremely difficult, but it is too important to ignore. 
22. There is a lack of expertise in evaluations and a lack of patience or funding to conduct 
them. Perhaps above all, there is a depressingly common tendency to conflate process 
with outcomes. Some particularly unfortunate examples were observed in the 
evidence of effectiveness presented for FCO public diplomacy efforts around the 
Olympics. A DVD was produced for South African audiences about the London 
Olympics: as evidence for the campaign’s success, the British High Commission cited 
the following: “The media coverage produced a solid impression of a modern dynamic 
Olympic event. All of the TV coverage used footage from the DVD. The Mayor of 
London and swimmer Natalie Du Toit were interviewed in front of the DVD 
branding.”   
23. More positive examples exist. The THINK! campaign on road safety is frequently cited 
as one of the most effective government communication campaigns. The claim may be 
true. It is certainly one of the most rigorously evidenced campaigns. Over the past 5 
years, an impressive body of behaviourally-focused research has been built up.  In this 
it is an example worth emulating. 
24. Though more evidence is needed, and rigorous evaluation is urgent, we assess that 
many communication campaigns fail, but that some succeed. A central concern must 
therefore be boosting reliability. In the following sections, we examine the common 
reasons for failure, and propose a more effective approach to soft power and 
influence. 
SECTION 4: REASONS FOR FAILURE 
25. Section summary: Other than rigorous evaluation, common flaws in 
influence efforts include a lack of focus on objectives, poor target audience 
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selection, the pursuit of consistency over targeted messaging, an emphasis 
on attitudes rather than behaviour and the use of inadequate and 
inappropriate research.  
26. As previously mentioned, the most common failure of campaigns is the lack of an 
ongoing process of rigorous evaluation of effectiveness. However, certain other errors 
recur in soft power and influence campaigns, leading to their failure. This section 
outlines some of them, and cites examples of recent UK campaigns that have made 
these errors. 
27.  One especially common flaw is a lack of focus on objectives. Campaigns are frequently 
tied to fuzzy objectives, with little explanation of how the campaign is likely to achieve 
the stated objective, little effort to demonstrate why a particular campaign is the best 
means to achieve that objective,  and little focus on what concrete difference it would 
make to the public, or to HMG stakeholders, if the aim were achieved.  
28. One small intervention in Palestine serves as an example. The post provided funding 
and support to a female car racing team. The intervention aimed to achieve the 
following: ‘challenge negative perceptions about the UK in Palestine; present the UK as 
socially inclusive, open and collaborative; capitalise on improved perceptions of the UK 
brought about by our support for the Speed Sisters project to re-frame policy 
conversations and enhance the UK's reputation; support objective 1 of the Occupied 
Palestinian Territories country business plan – speciﬁcally to 'Implement an 
engagement and communication strategy that enhances the UK and international 
community's reputation as honest brokers'; Support wider campaigning for MENA 
Partners for Progress.’   
29. This is not a focused campaign; it is a nice idea supported by a pick and mix of worthy 
sounding objectives, with the clear implication that the idea preceded the objectives. 
That does not mean it is a bad initiative. It may have done a lot of good. But it seems 
unlikely that it could achieve all of the objectives listed above, and in austere times, 
greater focus is needed.  
30. That same example also illustrates another common flaw: it picks a vague target 
audience. To take the target audience first, the stated audience was “young Arabs 
particularly those involved in rally driving and motor sports and Arab women.”  These 
are broad categories: young Arabs and female Arabs encompass an enormous range of 
lives, and there is little reason to believe that the same communication campaign would 
persuade such a diverse group.  The unfairness of picking the Speed Sisters campaign 
should be recorded: it is only one example among many, and not a particularly 
extreme example at that.  
31. A related error is to put consistency above targeted messaging. The GREAT Britain 
campaign is a major UK Government effort that falls into this trap. It hopes to reach 
“nearly 90 million people across the 14 cities in our nine target markets”, 
communicating about 11 different subjects.  A prospective tourist in Delhi will not be 
persuaded by the same messaging as a businessman in Berlin, and thus the pursuit of 
consistency has weakened the effectiveness of the campaign. 
32. It is moreover often assumed by influence plans, but not demonstrated with reference 
to research, that the selected target audiences are sufficiently salient to the 
stated objectives and sufficiently influenceable; i.e. that they can be persuaded 
to change their behaviour, and that if they did so the objectives would be achieved.  
33. Perhaps the most common failure of all is the targeting of attitudes, rather than 
behaviour. It is a central assertion of traditional marketing that if you change 
attitudes, real world behavioural change will follow. The reliability of that assertion has 
been repeatedly and comprehensively debunked in everything from hotel admissions to 
happiness.  Attitudes sometimes precede behaviour, but often do not. Since it is the 
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behavioural change that is ultimately wanted, that is what must be researched. Very 
often, simplistic views of attitudes lead to a misunderstanding of likely behaviour. 
Research in Saudi Arabia has repeatedly demonstrated the clear divide between 
enthusiasm for Hollywood and distaste for US support of Israel, while in China, young 
people dislike US support for Taiwan – but still fight to study at its colleges.  
34. Another exceptionally common error is designing campaigns based on inadequate 
or inappropriate research. Too often campaigns are based on a bright idea, perhaps 
discussed with a few experts, rather than rigorous research with the target audience. 
When evidence is used, it is often a simple polling result suggesting the area in which 
the problem lies: that is inadequate, given how many decisions must be made on any 
campaign. Returning to the Fournaise research cited earlier, 72% of surveyed CEOs 
agreed that “they soon realised Ad & Media Agencies were not as data- and science-
driven as they had expected, relied too much on gut-feelings, hearsay, wrong 
methodologies and questionable information.”  Very often, the necessary research will 
not be purely quantitative; numbers can be misleading, and qualitative research has 
considerable strengths in this field.  It is not worth picking out particular UK soft 
power campaigns in this regard; almost none meet this test. Creativity is a poor 
substitute for evidence. 
35. These common flaws are visible across commercial and governmental influence 
campaigns. They are responsible for enormous waste of money and time. Below, we 
outline a better approach. 
SECTION 5: BETTER APPROACH 
36. Section summary: Rather than focusing on bureaucratic structures, we 
recommend 6 widely applicable principles for a better approach. These will 
allow the effective and orderly planning of strategic communication 
campaigns, vastly boosting reliability and reducing waste. 
37. Christopher Paul summarizes beautifully the way in which bland and impractical 
recommendations recur. He counts nine separate reports of US strategic 
communications that call for ‘leadership’. It would be hard to disagree. 20 studies, by 
Paul’s count, called for increased resources, an unlikely prospect at present, and 19 
called for better coordination, another point from which few would dissent.36 Rather 
than getting bogged down in arguments over bureaucratic structures or funding levels, 
we propose six principles which can be applied to soft power and influence efforts at 
all levels and across all departments.37 
38. Principle 1: Effective influence attempts to alter behaviour, not simply 
attitudes. Influence should attempt to achieve a specific, measurable and unambiguous 
behavioural objective. Campaigns aimed at creating and increasing Afghans’ positive 
attitudes towards ISAF, for example, were implicitly aimed at stopping a whole host of 
non-desired behaviours, from fighting to donating money to growing poppies. Yet SCL 
research which looked at one such behaviour in isolation – the planting of IEDs – 
uncovered that the reason for this behaviour had nothing to do with ‘liking’ or 
‘disliking’ ISAF soldiers. Fieldwork uncovered that many young Afghans in fact dreamt 
of going to the United States, and planting IEDs was one of the few activities that paid 
enough money to allow them to save up for their ambitions. 
39. Principle 2: Influence is most efficient and effective when it targets self-
identifying social groups, because behaviours (and attitudes) are 
determined by the social context. Cultural diplomacy directed at Chinese people 
is likely to fail, and so too is cultural diplomacy directed at Chinese males aged 18-32, 
                                            
36 Paul, Christopher, ‘Whither Strategic Communication? A Survey of Current Proposals and Recommendations’, RAND, 
2009, p.1, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2009/RAND_OP250.pdf  
37 These proposals were originally developed by Dr. Lee Rowland, and may be described as ‘the BDI approach’. 
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because that is an externally-imposed demographic category, not a self-identifying, 
cohesive group. Far more useful is cultural diplomacy aimed at Netizens, because they 
have a shared culture.  
40. Principle 3: Influence efforts must be attuned to local culture and 
circumstance to have any chance of success. Conclusions must be ‘audience-
centric’; they must adopt the perspective of the target audience. The best way to do 
this is through rigorous social science research. Three white British bureaucrats in a 
London office will not come up with an effective way of persuading Indians to buy 
British products. Asking a few British citizens of Indian origin for their opinions is little 
better. Qualitative and quantitative research designed by influence specialists and 
conducted by Indians in India is far more likely to generate effective cultural diplomacy 
strategies.  
41. Principle 4: Some pieces of cultural knowledge (for instance, motivations) 
are far more valuable than others, because they are diagnostic. That is, they 
help eliminate a great many possible hypotheses and approaches, meaning that you 
reach the correct solution more quickly. For instance, if the paramount aspiration 
among Rwandans is to own a house, then cultural diplomacy efforts focused on the 
success of UN efforts to help people buy a car or start a business will just be ignored. 
Therefore, by finding out one piece of information, two potential campaigns can be 
eliminated, or reshaped (starting a business can be sold to Rwandans as being the 
fastest way to homeownership, or mortgage loans for business owners can be made 
vastly more attractive and achievable). The BDI measures a bank of research 
parameters drawn from social psychology and related disciplines; these have proven far 
more effective than seeking a general cultural understanding.38 
42. Principle 5: A holistic understanding of a problem can often yield counter-
intuitive but more effective solutions. This means that quantitative research is 
not always the most useful technique. Though it can provide hard numbers that are 
simple to understand, it should be preceded by semi-structured qualitative research 
that allows for a full investigation of the social group at hand.  
43. Principle 6: Influence efforts without data-driven and audience-centric 
measures of effectiveness are a waste. Situations change, and after a few years, 
even the best cultural diplomacy effort may stop having an effect. Measuring 
effectiveness regularly means that you know when this has happened, and can make 
adjustments accordingly. Vitally, you must measure effectiveness – not just how many 
hours of programming you broadcast into Myanmar, or how many people listened to it 
(which are in fact measures of action and measures of performance), but how many 
people changed their behaviour accordingly. 
45. In general, a soft power effort should proceed in the following manner: an overall aim 
is determined, and this is distilled into specific behavioural objectives, perhaps 
supported by initial primary and secondary research. For each objective, the most 
salient and measurable self-identifying and cohesive target audience is selected, and 
primary research is conducted upon that group. This research will be in-depth and 
multi-stage, and will test a range of research parameters. Meanwhile, a baseline will be 
established to determine the effectiveness of the campaign. Analysis of the wealth of 
data thereby produced will allow the design of specific, fully articulated and actionable 
recommendations, which may or may not be communications-focused. The campaign 
will then be conducted, and its effectiveness is then measured. 
                                            
38 For more on these research parameters, refer to Rowland, Lee & van den Berg, Gaby, ‘In Pursuit of a Contextual 
Diagnostic Approach to Behaviour Change’, Behavioural Dynamics Institute, September 2012, 
http://www.bdinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/LeeGaby.pdf and Wein, Tom, ‘The Perfect and the Possible: 
Seeking a Frugal Model of Behavioural Change’, Behavioural Dynamics Institute, October 2012, 
http://www.bdinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/PerfectPossible.pdf  
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SECTION 6: A NOTE ON STRATEGIC DECISION-MAKING 
45. Section summary: Too often, soft power is narrowly conceived, leading to 
the exclusion of promising potential solutions. The principles outlined 
above could significantly improve foreign policy decision-making. 
46. At the beginning of this submission, we stressed that when exercising power to 
achieve an objective, all possible tools should be methodically considered. Too often 
decisions which are fundamentally operational – decisions on the means to be used – 
are made at the same time as decisions on the objectives to be pursued.  
47. The approach we have outlined, from concrete objectives to measures of effectiveness, 
via evidence-led strategy, is applicable well beyond communications. We believe it has 
considerable potential as a decision-making tool at the highest levels of government. 
48. Most – perhaps all – foreign policy actions aim to influence a group or individual to act 
in a certain way (even the most brutal wars aim for surrender rather than annihilation). 
Adopting the principles described above would provide a structured thinking process 
that insisted on consistent reference to the evidence, thereby improving foreign policy 
decision making in general. 
49. While ministers have an absolute right to involve themselves in all details of the 
organizations they head, they would likely achieve better results, in soft power and 
elsewhere, if they adopted a ‘mission command plus approval’ approach, in which they 
granted more room to those with a detailed understanding of the evidence to 
determine the best course of action, within the parameters they set. 
SECTION 7: A NOTE ON INDUSTRY 
50. Section summary: Specialist expertise is required, and at present, the 
industry struggles to provide it. More must be done to identify the most 
effective practitioners. 
51. In conclusion, it should be noted that effective soft power is a challenging, technical 
discipline, requiring a detailed understanding of research methods and the findings of 
social psychology, as well as considerable flexibility to achieve results in challenging 
environments. Specialist expertise will therefore often be required. In the long run, the 
Government may wish to consider bringing this expertise ‘in house’, as they have done 
with IT. In the meantime, however, much communications and soft power work will 
continue to be outsourced.  
52. It should therefore be borne in mind that many so-called communication specialists in 
the private sector also lack this expertise, and make many of the same errors as those 
outlined above. It can be exceptionally difficult to differentiate between the genuine 
article and opportunistic bluffers. The BDI consequently recommends the development 
of rigorous standards of communications procurement and accreditation which focus 
on the issues and errors identified above. 
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Introduction  
 
1. This submission deals with the specific issue of the UK’s relationship with the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). It seeks to bring to the attention 
of the Committee the impact that a potential withdrawal from the Convention 
might have on the range of soft power options available to the UK.  
 
2. The present policy of the Coalition Government as contained in the Programme 
for Government is not to withdraw. A Commission was established by the 
Coalition in March 2011 to ‘investigate the creation of a British Bill of Rights that 
incorporates and builds on all our obligations under the European Convention on 
Human Rights, ensures that these rights continue to be enshrined in British law, 
and protects and extends British liberties’39. However, ECHR withdrawal is an 
option being seriously considered by senior Conservatives as a potential policy 
option for any future Conservative government.  
 
Tensions within the Conservative Party  
 
3. There are significant tensions within the Conservative Party about UK membership 
of the ECHR in particular the influence in the UK of European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR) jurisprudence. 
 
4. During a debate in the House of Commons on the impact of the ECtHR’s decision 
in Hirst v UK40 which ruled that a blanket ban on voting for prisoners was a breach 
of article 3 of Protocol 1 of the ECHR a number of Conservative MPs expressed 
their discontent at the Strasbourg Court’s decision. One Conservative MP during 
the debate argued that, ‘The bottom line for me is that there would be less shame 
in leaving the European convention on human rights than in giving prisoners the 
vote’.41 
 
5. During a debate in the House of Commons on the 7th February on the issues 
surrounding the deportation of Abu Qatada another Conservative MP said, ‘What 
the British public want to know is this: if we cannot secure the reforms that we 
need from the European Court of Human Rights, will we withdraw from the 
                                            
39 Programme for Government, p.11 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/78977/coalition_programme_for_government
.pdf (last accessed 18th September, 2013). 
40 (No. 2) - 74025/01 [2005] ECHR 681 (6 October 2005) 
41 Philip Holloborne HC Debs 10 Feb 2011 vol 523 cc 537. 
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European convention? In the absence of that commitment, the Home Secretary will 
simply be spitting in the wind’.42  
 
6. The most senior Conservative to express discontent was the Home Secretary, 
Theresa May who in a speech on 9th March, 2013 said that, ‘by 2015 we’ll need a 
plan for dealing with the European Court of Human Rights. And yes, I want to be 
clear that all options – including leaving the Convention altogether – should be on 
the table’43.  
 
7. Not all elements of the Conservative Party agree with this direction, most notably 
the Attorney General who warned that if the UK withdrew it would risk being 
viewed as a ‘pariah state’ by the international community44. Previously, whilst in 
opposition he stated that withdrawing from the Convention would, ‘Send a very 
damaging signal about how the UK viewed the place and promotion of human 
rights and liberties and would be an encouragement to every tin pot dictator such 
as Robert Mugabe, who violates them. Nor, if a UK government intends to behave 
in an ethical manner, would withdrawal solve many of the problems now blamed 
on the ECHR itself.’45 
 
Background to the ECHR  
 
8. The ECHR is an international treaty devised by the Member States of the Council 
of Europe and was drafted by the Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly 
Committee on Legal and Administrative Questions, which was chaired by the 
Conservative politician Sir David Maxwell – Fyfe. 
 
9. The Convention has recently celebrated its 60th anniversary entering into force in 
September 1953. The UK was one of the first to sign the Convention in 1951. The 
Council of Europe was founded in 1949 and now has 47 Member States from 
across the continent of Europe including those new democracies that emerged 
after the break – up of the Soviet Union and the fall of the Berlin Wall. It is an 
international organisation, whose primary objective is to, ‘create a common 
democratic and legal area throughout the whole of the continent, ensuring respect 
for its fundamental values: human rights, democracy and the rule of law’46. The 
ECHR is highly regarded and considered as one of the crowning achievements of 
the Council of Europe by a range of international human rights lawyers and 
scholars. 
 
10. In recent years the power and influence of the Court has grown significantly due to 
reforms in how the Court operates, the Eastward expansion of the Council of 
                                            
42 http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201212/cmhansrd/cm120207/debtext/120207-0001.htm (last accessed, 18th 
September, 2013). 
43 http://conservativehome.blogs.com/thetorydiary/2013/03/full-text-of-theresa-mays-speech-we-will-win-by-being-the-party-
for-all.html (last accessed, 18th September, 2013). 
44 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/9596949/Britain-could-become-Belarus-if-it-abandons-human-rights-legislation-
warns-Attorney-General.html (last accessed, 18th September, 2013) 
45 Speech by Dominic Grieve MP to the Middle Temple, ‘Can the Bill of Rights do better than the Human Rights Act?’ 30th 
November 2009 http://www.dominicgrieve.org.uk/news/can-bill-rights-do-better-human-rights-act (last accessed, 18th 
September, 2013). 
46 http://www.coe.int/aboutcoe/index.asp?page=nosObjectifs (last accessed, 18th September, 2013). 
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Europe and a desire on behalf of the judges to view the Convention as a ‘living 
instrument’. 
 
Questions for the Committee to consider 
 
11. This evidence has outlined the serious concerns Conservatives have about and 
poses the following question for the Committee to consider:  
 
12. Is it in UK national interest to withdraw unilaterally from the ECHR? If so, what 
sort of example would the UK be setting by withdrawing from the ECHR even on 
a temporary basis? What credibility or moral authority will the UK have to raise 
concerns about states that fall short of internationally accepted standards about 
the protection of rights?  
 
13. The implications of the UK’s withdrawal from the ECHR need to be properly 
thought through and all aspects of the debate seriously considered. In other words, 
in an era of international relations when soft power options are increasingly relied 
upon by states in the pursuit of their foreign policy objectives can the UK really 
afford to leave itself open to accusations of double standards in an increasingly 
fragile and uncertain global order?  
 
14.  British withdrawal from the ECHR would provide the United States with a human 
rights problem. How can future American-led initiatives and interventions include 
Britain as a primary partner if the international community (particularly Russia and 
China) assert that Britain is casual about human rights?  
 
15. The United States seeks to utilise both soft and hard power when encouraging 
political liberalisation in authoritarian regimes and emerging democracies. What 
about the human rights problem of Britain? Surely the United States would have to 
robustly address this fact in some manner and one highly embarrassing for Britain. 
 
16. The problem of Britain withdrawing from the ECHR presents the United States 
with an awkward human rights problem. One that has implications for how it 
relates to its other foreign policy priorities.  Of these a notable priority is its 
relationship with China. The traditional approach to China has been to encourage 
trade and cultural exchanges in the hope that this emboldens reformers in the 
Communist Party and leads to a western facing Beijing that respects human rights.  
However, in recent years life in China has improved for many but summary 
violence and abuses continue. The United States knows this and seeks to engage 
the PRC on these issues.  How effectively will the United States be in presenting 
the western example of universal human rights recognition if Britain withdraws 
from the ECHR?  Surely, this weakens the American diplomatic position as Britain 
is their primary diplomatic and military partner.  
 
17. The UK government believes that the best way for China to achieve economic 
prosperity and stability in the future is for it to protect fundamental rights and 
uphold the rule of law. How would the Chinese government perceive UK 
withdrawal from the ECHR and how would this affect UK-China trade relations? 
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18. Does withdrawal from the ECHR not place Britain in a weaker position with 
Russia?  As Britain would be voluntarily giving up a degree of moral authority on 
the issue of human rights.  The British case for persuading and, at times, 
confronting Russia over its record on human rights and civil liberties would 
become redundant as the force of Britain’s argument would be rendered impotent.  
 
 
 
 
Conclusion  
 
19. In a multipolar and globally interdependent world states need all soft power 
options available to them particularly one as politically significant and symbolically 
important as being a signatory to the ECHR. 
 
20. Withdrawal from the ECHR could have major foreign policy ramifications for 
Britain.  Chief among these is a degree of isolation from the United States.  Britain 
will not be seen as an exemplar of advanced democracy that values human rights. 
Britain’s relationship with its European neighbours will change to the point where 
its contributions to debates about diplomatic and social issues will be respected 
less and deemed to be outside of settled norms.  Withdrawal from the ECHR in 
terms of British influence would be a retrograde step. 
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MONDAY 29 JULY 2013 
 MEMBERS PRESENT 
Lord Howell of Guildford (Chairman) 
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean  
Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts 
Baroness Hussein-Ece 
Lord Janvrin 
Baroness Nicholson of Winterbourne 
Lord Ramsbotham 
________________ 
 Witnesses 
Ian Birrell, Columnist and Foreign Correspondent, Contributing Editor for Mail and Mail on 
Sunday, Jonathan Glennie, Research Fellow, Centre for Aid and Public Expenditure, ODI, 
Mark Pyman, Director, Defence and Security Programme, Transparency International UK, 
and Phil Vernon, Director of Programmes, International Alert 
Q126   The Chairman: Welcome, and the first and most important thing is: jackets off if 
you so wish—it is up to you. Thank you very much, all four of you, for coming. You have 
before you, because it is an obligation and a proper thing, information about the relevant 
interests of everyone who is a Member of this Committee, so that will help you know what 
our particular concerns are and where we are coming from.  
As you know, the official label for this Committee is to examine soft power and Britain’s 
influence overseas, a very wide subject which we are seeking to narrow through a series of 
hearings right through the autumn, before we report. I am going to start with really the 
obvious question, for each of you, if possible with a short summarising reply before we really 
get going. Bearing in mind that of course hard power and soft power—military power at one 
end and kinds of diplomacy and persuasion at the other—are not opposites in any way, they 
are all parts of the same spectrum, which is a changing one from merely the traditional 
division between gunboats and diplomats. It is not like that any more. My first and opening 
question really is, to each of you, do you see your activities and your operations—and you 
are in a sense at the spearhead, the sharp end, in many of these areas—as in that spectrum? 
If so, where in that spectrum? Or are they not in that spectrum at all? Going left to right, 
could I start with Mr Pyman of Transparency International on that broad question of how 
you see your work and the hard, soft and smart power—whatever you like—fitting 
together, if at all. 
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Mark Pyman: As an NGO, I hope we are not doing too much of the hard power side. 
What we are doing does have a soft power element, because we are working in any number 
of countries overseas and, although we are a global international organisation, it is never in 
doubt that we come from the UK. We can see the influence that we are bringing to bear 
and, yes, I do think it has a soft power component to it. 
The Chairman: Actually, having said I would go left to right, Mr Birrell, do you mind if I 
come back to you at the end because you are, I hope, going to offer us a critique that may 
be slightly different? So I shall go straight to Jonathan Glennie and ask him for the 
observation on the general question.  
Jonathan Glennie: Would the Committee like to hear a very brief opening statement that I 
have prepared that basically does answer your question? 
Q127  The Chairman: Yes, of course. That is absolutely fine. 
Jonathan Glennie: I apologise; I have not printed it, so I am going to read from this laptop, 
which is going to be really annoying for everyone, but it is very short. 
Firstly, thanks for inviting me. It strikes me that this Committee is asking questions of great 
importance to my line of work. Let me try and summarise my view on the relationship 
between aid and soft power from an internationalist perspective, which I think is the 
inevitable perspective for someone who works, as I do, in poverty eradication, human rights 
and sustainable development. 
It is hard to exaggerate the mega-shifts in what I call “the geography of power” currently 
under way. We all know about the BRICS, and some of you will even have heard of the 
CIVETS, but countries like Peru and the Philippines will soon be among the 30 largest world 
economies, according to HSBC predictions. Developing countries and emerging countries 
are beginning to dominate global economic growth, and their political power is increasing as 
a consequence. They are also the home of rapidly increasing reserves of global savings—
almost 50% of world savings, according to the World Bank—and therefore, of course, the 
source of growing foreign investments, including aid and concessional loans.  
Even the smaller, low-income countries—less powerful countries—in places like Africa and 
elsewhere are finding a new assertiveness. Why? Because they are now living in what 
colleagues at ODI have termed an age of choice, in which many more external financing 
options are available to them than in the past, both private and public, as well as a huge 
expansion in domestic resource revenue in many countries. And they are looking to new 
examples of how to develop. As the exaggerated market fundamentalism of the so-called 
Washington consensus is tossed into the dustbin of history, poor countries no longer want 
to be the US or France only. They look to Brazil, Vietnam and, of course, China, and the 
term “Beijing consensus” has been coined—not a phrase I agree with, but it implies that 
countries are looking much broadly for examples and help than ever before.   
For Britain, we are gradually going to become less powerful, continuing the trend since the 
end of the empire. Power is zero sum. Where we used to get our way, increasingly even 
poor countries are saying thanks but no thanks when they do not like the modalities or the 
conditions attached to our aid or trade relationships.  
One response to this ebbing away of power has been to seek to defend our advantage—not 
just Britain, of course, but OECD countries in general. But as an internationalist I am 
naturally inclined against this approach. In fact, it is right and desirable that other countries 
become more wealthy and more powerful—that is the logic of working in international 
development. In seeking to increase the wealth of poor countries, inevitably they will 
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become more powerful, which inevitably leads to us becoming relatively less powerful. I 
want a world in which we all share roughly the same standard of living, and I care as much 
about the interests of other peoples as British interests, especially given how immensely well 
off we are compared to the rest of the world. Notwithstanding that we are going through a 
crisis, we are still among the 30 richest countries in the world in terms of income per capita, 
and one of the 10 largest economies. 
I have only got a couple more paragraphs to go, my Lord Chairman, so I will be very brief. 
Soft power is sometimes couched as another means, along with hard power, to promote 
Britain’s interests and security. But I would like to emphasise the importance of promoting 
values. The UK has played a role in promoting great causes with its aid, from civil rights and 
democracy, especially women’s rights and gay rights, to free healthcare and education, and 
peace in conflict countries. But it has also used the power of aid in ways of which we should 
feel ashamed—forcing countries to privatise key industries and basic services, forcing them 
to eliminate subsidies to crucial industries, et cetera, flying in the face of the evidence but 
suiting the interests of British corporates. 
The temptation in the aid business has been to use aid as if it was hard power—in other 
words, paying for strategic advantage and economic preferment. There are many examples 
of this historically, from the US cutting aid to Yemen, one of the world’s poorest countries, 
when it failed to support the first Gulf war, to China today only giving aid—I do not know if 
you know this—to countries that do not recognise Taiwan as an independent country. 
But the nature of soft power is that it is somewhat more nebulous—less direct. The UK is 
almost unique in its worthy insistence that aid is not used for political or economic gain, and 
it is right that that is so—the best aid relinquishes control to recipients who take the lead in 
spending it. It does not always work, but it is more likely to, and the respect earned is the 
soft power we are talking about. So, no, I do not believe aid should be used to promote our 
own interests. I think it should be used to promote international public goods and universally 
agreed values, which implies a move away from bilateral objectives and towards a more 
rules-based international public finance regime.  
To finish—and thank you very much for your patience—in my view the question is not 
about how the UK can safeguard its power and interests, but how it can help the world 
transition to one in which power is spread more evenly, for the good of all.  
Q128  The Chairman: Right, thank you. That states your position very clearly indeed and 
raises lots of questions which we will pursue. Mr Vernon, would you like to have a go? 
Phil Vernon: Thank you, Lord Chair. If it is okay, I will do something a bit similar, but maybe 
a bit shorter in answer to your question. 
The Chairman: A little bit shorter, because then I want to get to Mr Birrell. 
Phil Vernon: I would just like to say, first of all, that at International Alert we are a 
peacebuilding organisation, so we are part of the aid sector but a specific niche within it. I 
think we are about 18% funded by the British Government— 
The Chairman: 80%? 
Phil Vernon: 18% funded by different parts of the Government. I would like to think we are 
pretty independent, so if we are talking about the soft power of the UK Government I think 
that our work is probably not very much part of that—but of the soft power of the UK as a 
nation, probably yes, and I will come back to that in a moment, if I could.  
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Soft power is perhaps the achievement of one’s aims and ends through non-coercive 
means—through not purchasing, through not bribing, but through attracting and perhaps co-
opting, in the better sense of the word “co-opting”—as Joseph Nye says. I think he also 
says—I think I would agree with Jonathan—it is highly relevant to the current situation and 
the situation in the world. If the currency of soft power is, as Nye says, values, culture, 
policy and institutions, it seems to me that one’s soft power is embodied in the choices one 
makes and the actions one takes. So it is not what you say that you say but what you do 
which gives you power.  
I am not so sure about power being a zero-sum game. Power is not a commodity. One can 
really only talk about power vis-à-vis a particular objective or situation. I think one can look 
at soft power vis-à-vis a particular goal or aim. If it is fair to say that the United Kingdom 
Government and people have, as a long-term aim, a world which is increasingly liberal—in 
the general sense of the word—and democratic, prosperous and peaceful, then soft power is 
a very good way that this country can contribute to achieving that aim. A world that evolves 
in that way is not a linear process; that evolution is history—it is difficulties happening in the 
world. If the world becomes more liberal and democratic, it is not something that one can 
instrumentalise through coercion or through purchase, so soft power seems highly relevant 
to it.  
Is aid part of soft power? That was one of your questions. The answer is yes, no and maybe. 
I think Winston Churchill is said to have said about the Marshall plan that it was the “most 
unselfish and unsordid” act by a great power in history. I know it is controversial whether he 
said it about the Marshall plan or about lend-lease, but if he did say it about the Marshall 
plan, that quote embodies the complications of your question. Obviously the Marshall plan 
was not only unselfish, but it was to some degree unselfish. That opens up some of the 
complications of the question “Is aid a soft power instrument?”  
The act of giving, especially during a time of economic difficulty has got to be something that 
attracts people. If you divide aid into three areas—very briefly, my Lord, if I may—although 
all aid is political, humanitarian aid is probably the least controversial type of aid. The more 
humanitarian aid this country gives to people in difficult circumstances, the more I think a 
good press is going to accrue to this country, which gives us power and capital. I think 
development aid is a bit more complicated, but development aid that this country gives is 
not just money. A lot of what we do to support people in places like Uganda, Tunisia and 
Egypt is not just about money; it is support of other kinds, so we are contributing to 
progress in other ways. The third thing is that, through the aid budget and through our 
actions as a country, we are supporting the international system, which creates an enabling 
environment for a better world—a more prosperous, more peaceful and more democratic 
world. So I think, yes, there is a soft power element to overseas development aid given and 
supported by the UK.  
Q129   The Chairman: Right. Mr Birrell, what do you think about that?  
Ian Birrell: Well, it is interesting that we talk about humanitarian aid as being 
uncontroversial, because if you go to Haiti, of course, you can see a country which even 
before the earthquake three years ago had four times as much per capita in terms of aid as 
the Marshall plan gave to Europe, yet incomes have declined by a third, despite having so 
many more charities operating there than anywhere else. After the earthquake, there was 
huge resentment at this army of aid workers who came in and all lived in $5,000 flats and 
drove around in new cars while the people were suffering; in fact, the legacy is intense 
bitterness at how, according to the Prime Minister, 40% of the aid money went on 
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supporting the aid workers who came to save the country—and failed to do so so dismally 
that so many people are still living in abject squalor and without homes.  
If we look at the issue of soft power, it is an interesting question because it of course implies 
that soft power, when it comes to aid, is also all about the donor and not the recipient. One 
of my key arguments is that it is, of course. This very question and session underlines that. I 
think that Britain has huge advantages worldwide in soft power. If you look at the obvious 
things like the English language being so dominant; if you look at things like our education 
links; even if you look at newer things like music—I speak as the co-founder of Africa 
Express, a very successful project bringing together African and western musicians—and of 
course Premier League football, which is so dominant across Africa, the continent that I 
know best, Britain has these enormous advantages, along with issues such as our historic 
traditions of tolerance and democracy. Unfortunately, the way that the whole aid agenda has 
been allowed to dominate over the last 30 years, combined with a mixture of patronising 
attitudes which came out of it and an arrogance about our own brilliance, really, in terms of 
many of our institutions, gets translated when you see it abroad as looking down at a lot of 
the countries that we are meant to be helping. 
My issues with aid, in particular, I suppose can be summarised threefold, one of which is that 
while we preach against welfare dependency at home we are encouraging it abroad. We are 
doing so in a very, very regressive, devastating manner which is all about us coming along 
and telling people what to do and not listening to people on the ground. That actually often 
has disastrous effects. Secondly, we are supporting some of the most barbaric regimes in the 
world with our aid money. That is hardly a good way to spread British influence and power, 
when you are subjugating people and backing regimes which are guilty of appalling human 
rights abuses and democratic theft. Thirdly, there is this idea that Britain has put forward 
over the last 30 years—particularly our politicians and a couple of pop stars—that we can 
save the world and that we are the saviours of the world. This has been continually 
propagated with the idea that these countries are in need of our salvation—that they are 
sort of basket-case countries that are helpless, that they are dominated by starvation and 
conflict, that poverty is endemic everywhere, and that conflict is everywhere. That has the 
negative effect that actually people do not want to trade there and do not want to go there. 
They see Africa, particularly, as a horrible place of extreme violence, when the reality is so 
different. That is putting off trade, putting off people going there for holiday and putting off 
links, and therefore it is undermining our soft power. 
On top of that, I would say finally that we talk all the time about soft power, but it is often 
contaminated by hypocrisy. We talk of democracy when our own electorate is growing 
increasingly disenchanted. We talk about improving tax regimes when our own tax regimes 
have been so controversial in recent months and years. At the end of the day, there is the 
issue of how we would feel if scores of young Africans came here and started telling us how 
to run our own schools and hospitals. Of course they would not be allowed to come here 
because our visa policies do not allow them to, but were they to be allowed to we would 
not like it. That is as true in Africa. I hear more and more across Africa—you can see it with 
academics, with the young middle class, with politicians—that people resent the aid and the 
aid industry, which is growing so fast, and they resent the patronising and anachronistic 
attitudes that lie behind it. That is very damaging to our British interest long term. 
If I can, I will throw in just one last thing, which is to consider one country: Nigeria. Out of 
the top 10 recipients of British aid, it is getting the biggest rise in percentage terms of any of 
them—going up 116%. This is a country with the fastest-rising growth in champagne 
consumption in the world, which has just started its own space programme and is about to 
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start training astronauts, and where our own aid watchdog has said how ineffective a lot of 
the British aid going there is. Still we are pouring the money in, but at the same time we are 
turning away their students who want to come and study in our universities, and we are just 
about to introduce a bond of several thousand pounds to deter the sixth highest-spending 
consumers coming to our shops. It is utter insanity, and it shows the ridiculous, twisted and 
contorted nature of British policies towards the developing world that we have ended up 
with, where on the one hand we think we are saving them by giving them aid, and on the 
other we are saying to them, “Don’t come to our country to learn—to come to our 
universities—don’t come here to trade, and don’t come here on holiday”. To me, that 
shows everything that is wrong with our British soft power approach when it comes to aid, 
trade, tourism, development and immigration. 
Q130  The Chairman: All right. I am going to give your neighbours a chance to take 
another view, shall we say, because I think that this creates a good contrast of views about 
the whole scene. Before I do so, I think that Members of my Committee might like to ask a 
question or two. Who would like to go in first? 
Baroness Nicholson of Winterbourne: I would just like to follow up what Ian Birrell 
said. The two points that you make, which fit together so well, are, first, that aid is 
resented—you mentioned that you think that is clearly the case; there are many and prolific 
examples of it—and, secondly, that we in a sense have depicted ourselves as saviours of the 
globe. That strikes very strong notes with me, yet Mr Glennie is suggesting that we should 
put a great deal more money into non-accountable multilateral expenditure in order 
somehow to help liberal democracy in the world. What is your answer to that point? 
Ian Birrell: Well, I do not think that you impose democracy from outside; I have never 
thought that and I never will. If we want to help democracy, we should tackle the things that 
we can do at home. One of the biggest problems that Africa has is capital flight, with money 
being creamed off, whether by tax evasion, corrupt politicians or whatever. Where does a 
lot of it end up? It ends up in Britain, in British property, with British legal firms washing it 
and British banks hiding it. Why do we not start cracking down on the things that we can do 
at home, instead of lecturing the world on what it can do? If we could do that and start 
exposing a lot of these people who are stealing the money from their own people, it would 
have a huge impact on democracy. 
Baroness Nicholson of Winterbourne: But that is a bit of a red herring, because we are 
looking at soft power overseas. 
Ian Birrell: But that is soft power, because soft power is also about, rather than lecturing 
people, actually doing something. Here is something that we could do at home but do not. 
Were we to do it, that might get a lot more credit abroad than telling people how to run 
their own countries all the time. 
Q131  Lord Forsyth of Drumlean: My question is for Mr Glennie about his opening 
statement. Distinguishing between development aid and humanitarian aid—and leaving 
humanitarian aid on one side—how do you think it can be justified to ask people, perhaps on 
low incomes, to pay taxes without any indication of a return for them, for their economy 
and for the country? If it is because you think that there is some moral duty for doing it, 
would it not be better to raise these funds through the NGOs and others by people making 
voluntary contributions? Surely the Government are taking money by force from people for 
this purpose. Is there not an absolute moral duty to show that value for money is being 
obtained and to show that there is some benefit to the people who are having to make that 
contribution, particularly when times are hard? 
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Jonathan Glennie: I would like to answer a couple of Ian’s points, but the answer to that 
point is really yes and no. Is there a moral obligation to demonstrate to rich Britons that 
there is a return on the taxes— 
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean: I did not ask about rich Britons; I asked about taxpayers. 
Jonathan Glennie: Sorry. I am speaking about rich taxpayers in Britain— 
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean: Most of the money from the taxpayers comes from people 
on low incomes. 
Jonathan Glennie: I am sorry; I was trying to make an analogy. Is it okay for wealthy 
taxpayers in Britain to subsidise the living standards of the very poorest in Britain? Should 
those wealthy taxpayers expect a clear return on that or is it simply the right thing to do? 
Should London help to subsidise the poorest parts of Wales and some parts of the north of 
England? Should London expect a return on that or is it simply the right thing to do? My 
argument is that it is both. It is the right thing to do. I do not think that rich countries should 
expect a return on their help for poor countries. Nevertheless, they do get a return. I 
believe that when other parts of Britain are doing well, London also—in a somewhat 
nebulous way, admittedly—benefits. I believe that when other parts of the world are doing 
well, Britain also benefits, especially as we now live in a world where there are planetary 
resource limits and we all have somehow to divide our resources fairly and sustainably. I 
think that it is absolutely okay for Britain to support poorer countries without a clear, 
immediate return, even when we are going through economic turmoil and tough times, 
because our turmoil is nothing compared with the economic turmoil and tough times that 
other countries are going through. The response to people living on very low wages, with 
lowering wages and increasing inequality in this country, is to deal with our own policies. We 
have immense inequality in this country, so let us deal with the British policies and not—
David Cameron is right about this and says it again and again—try to bring the rest of the 
world into it. 
Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts: I, too, have a question for Mr Glennie. I think that you 
said that we have been in the habit of using aid as a type of hard power and that, instead, aid 
should be used to promote what I think you called universal values. Who sets the universal 
values? Is it not patronising if we are setting them? 
Jonathan Glennie: Admittedly it is a difficult academic question, but the UN Declaration of 
Human Rights is signed by almost every country in the world and, broadly speaking, those 
are the kind of universal values that I would say should underpin all our international co-
operation. Since that declaration was made, there have been a series of declarations that, 
again, most countries of the world have signed. So there are, I would argue, some quite clear 
universal values, although I admit that it is a very difficult question—some countries sign 
them without really believing in them. We deal with that the whole time in international 
development. It is a complicated area. 
Q132  Baroness Hussein-Ece: I want to go back to what Ian Birrell said. You were 
obviously being very challenging to us, which is very welcome, as it gets us thinking. 
Ian Birrell: I thought that I was being quite moderate. 
Baroness Hussein-Ece: You were challenging what we have heard so far in these sessions. 
One thing that resonated with me was when you talked about some of the aid programmes 
having the patronising attitude, “We know best”. That has always been a problem historically 
with this country, because of its colonial past, I suppose, especially with Africa. I was in the 
Sudan recently—I must declare all my interests, which are on the list. We have had a briefing 
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from DfID about what it has been achieving and its outputs. You could not argue with some 
of the things: 5.9 million children in primary education per year; immunisation— 
Ian Birrell: Do you want me to deal with that one first? 
Baroness Hussein-Ece: I have just given you a couple of examples. If you stop people in 
the street in this country, generally they will say, “It is surely a good thing to provide 
education rather than dishing out aid. These are things to empower people to do better in 
their own countries. Immunisation and all the rest are surely a good thing”. I hear what you 
are saying about visa restrictions here, which is an issue that comes up quite a bit. In terms 
of DfID responding, by the time that it has recalibrated its priorities or strategies, things 
have moved on in some of these countries and it is not quite keeping up. That is the first 
point that I wanted to ask you about. Also, my experience of talking to Ministers, MPs, 
various people and NGOs that I met when I was in the Sudan is that they want more 
investment. They want Britain to do more; they do not want Britain to go away. Even as a 
former colonial country, they are saying, “They are not supporting us in developing business 
to make our people prosperous, coming out of the conflict. We need business investment”. 
They did not talk about aid so much, but one of them said, “We want to go back to the 
golden days when we had a marvellous relationship and you supported us to become 
potentially a rich country with our energy, oil, gold and so on”. Do you think that we are 
not balancing those two things? The old slogan is “Trade not aid”. Should that be what we 
are looking at? 
Ian Birrell: I think that it is slightly too simplistic just to go down to trade versus aid, but 
certainly trade will do far more than aid ever will. Mo Ibrahim said only this week that aid 
was never going to help Africa to develop. It is very easy to trot out statistics without 
bothering to look at what lies behind those statistics. Let us look at the one on primary 
education. Last year, I was asked to go out to Kibera by some of the people working for 
British charities who were so horrified by the patronising attitudes that they saw from the 
British charity workers. Kibera is billed as the biggest slum in Africa, but in fact it is not. In 
the middle of it is a fantastic primary school, which Gordon Brown once visited to proclaim 
how brilliantly this money was doing in terms of primary education. In fact, what happened 
there was that free primary education came in, but there were no extra teachers, no extra 
classrooms and no extra books. The school, which is very famous, is right in the centre of 
Kibera. It used to offer a fantastic and inspirational education to the kids in the area, but 
standards absolutely crashed because the number of kids going there doubled. What then 
happened was that all the rich kids left and went to private schools, which increased 
inequality. Now some of the poorest kids are setting up their own private schools, because 
standards have fallen so much. So, yes, we are putting more kids into primary education, but 
actually the standards are worsening.  
This is not just me saying it. The independent aid watchdog said that £1 billion went into 
education in three east African countries but standards did not rise at all, for the same sorts 
of reason. They said exactly the same about Nigeria. It is easy to trot out these statistics 
from a department whose only interest is to give away ever bigger sums without ever 
monitoring effectively how that is being spent and turning a blind eye to unbelievably bad 
human rights abuses. We should look behind the statistics at the evidence.  
It is all much more complex, of course. Is it just about trade? It is not just about trade. We 
can do many other things, such as the ones that I have highlighted, including dealing with 
visas and clamping down on corruption where it comes to our shores. But it is part of the 
equation. The problem is that we have been so blinkered over the last 30 years by this aid 
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obsession. To some extent, I think that it is a weird colonial guilt, which has made us end up 
in a strange form of neo-colonialism today. The legacy of that is that we are missing 
opportunities. Look at what countries such as Turkey and Brazil are doing in Africa. It is 
incredible how much they are achieving—it is not just China. Yet we, who used to do more 
trade with Africa than anyone else, are being left behind because of this obsession with 
saving Africa through aid. 
The Chairman: But is your point, Mr Birrell, that our aid does not work or that the whole 
principle of trying to improve a nation’s reputational position by aid and development 
programmes is wrong? I am not quite sure. Or is it both? 
Ian Birrell: It is both. I think that aid is regressive and does not work and I think that 
increasingly it is resented and is bad for the British image. So it is both. 
Q133  The Chairman: Now Mr Glennie. 
Jonathan Glennie: I think that Ian is a brilliant writer and I agree with a lot of what he said 
just then. I just want to throw in the fact that I wrote a book called The Trouble with Aid: Why 
Less Could Mean More for Africa, not because I want you to read it, although if you wish to it 
is a very good book, but because I want to demonstrate that I am not sitting here as a mega 
aid lobbyist. I have criticised aid a lot, but nevertheless my view of Ian’s work—I have told 
him this—is that he is a polemicist. He has a line and he draws all the evidence that he can to 
follow that line. It is simply not okay to dismiss all the evidence, of which there is a vast 
amount, that aid has sometimes worked to deliver education and health in many parts of the 
world. I used to work for Christian Aid. We spent £1 million a year in Colombia. I can 
verify—Ian will disagree—that that aid meant a lot to the displaced communities in the north 
of Colombia and the poor women’s groups that we worked with in Bogotá. That is one tiny 
example, but my point is this: aid is very complicated. That is where I agree with Ian. I also 
agree that there is this big saviour complex. I think that we have totally exaggerated the 
importance of aid. The tax regime change that Ian is backing is something that we worked on 
at Christian Aid long before anyone else picked it up. I fully agree with all that stuff, but I do 
not think that it is okay to say, “All the effort of aid over the last 30 years is nonsense and 
rubbish”. That is just not true. Ian says that everyone resents aid. There is some resentment 
towards aid, yes. People in government do not like being told what to do and they are quite 
right not to. A lot of people see the long-term, cumulative effects of aid, which is to do with 
aid dependency. There is a brilliant book called Time to Listen—not written by me. You 
should look for that. It speaks to a whole bunch of aid receivers, who recognise the good 
that aid does. They also point out a lot of the problems with aid. That would be my slightly 
more balanced line. 
Q134  The Chairman: I am just going to ask a soothing, moderating question in my 
proper role as Chairman before we go on with this theme. Building on my original question, 
do all four of you believe that something has changed? One of the reasons we are here in 
this Committee is that we have a sense, largely supported by outside opinion, that the 
conditions of Asia, Africa and Latin America have changed, that the political outlook has 
changed and that there is a rising not merely economic but intellectual and political power in 
these nations. They look at Europe as being the cock of the roost for the past few hundred 
years and they say, “We’ve had enough of that”. Whether you think that aid is patronising 
and the wrong thing or whether you think it is doing extra work—both propositions are 
true—are we in completely changed conditions from, say, 30 years ago? Can I have a view 
on that? 
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Phil Vernon: There is a very simple answer to that and it is yes, absolutely. Things have 
changed massively and are changing. I think that the way you have framed this inquiry is a 
very interesting way of looking at that issue. I am not here to defend aid. I am not actually 
here to present the idea that aid is a factor in soft power, but I think that the world has 
changed and that Britain’s role in the world is changing and will continue to change. 
The Chairman: So that means that, if we are to do anything at all, we must couch 
whatever we do—humanitarian development or anything else—in terms that are different 
from the language of the aid lobbies of 20 or 30 years ago. 
Phil Vernon: Absolutely. In a way, I would not be an adherent of the UK’s soft power 
objective. I am a big fan of liberal democracy, but I am not a Whig. As a liberal democracy, 
we have to admit that this country, which is relatively successful, can make a great 
contribution to the evolution of other parts of the world in that direction. I think that we 
have a very attractive set of institutions. Those—I do not necessarily mean Governments—
in countries which are developing look to countries such as the United Kingdom and the 
United States and see things that they like, and they want to see what they can do along the 
same lines. We are an interesting model—although not a role model—for people to have a 
look at and learn from, and I think that that is part of the soft power equation. It is not the 
soft power for the United Kingdom; for me, it is the soft power of peaceful, prosperous and 
liberal democratic ways of living, for which I have a lot of ambitions for the world in the 
future.  
The Chairman: I have just one more question and then Lord Janvrin and others may wish 
to come in. Mr Pyman, the word in front of you—“Transparency”—is now central to a lot 
of our discussion. Ten or 15 years ago it was not much use. Does that fit in with your view 
that we are dealing with new conditions, new values and new standards around the world?  
Mark Pyman: The quick answer is that I do not know. I was not around 30 years ago in this 
industry, so I cannot give you a 30-year comparison. However, I am just thinking about the 
work that we do. We work a bit with conflict in poorer states but we work a lot more with 
countries that are in this rapidly developing environment, such as the Philippines, Indonesia, 
Colombia and India. We are involved in tackling defence corruption and security corruption. 
I think that I am in agreement with Phil. These countries are well aware that they are 
growing quickly, and they are well aware that they are going to outpace the UK by miles, if 
they have not done so already, but I find a huge appreciation of what the UK has to offer. It 
is nothing to do with patronising; it is to do with saying, “You’ve got skills and competences 
that we want to have from you”. I find that sincere and genuine, and I find that it is clearly 
contributing to what is happening in a particular country. To take an example, Colombia has 
had huge problems with the guerrillas and narcotics over the past 10 years. They were well 
aware that one of the reasons they were failing was that the public rightly perceived that the 
Colombian military and the Colombian MoD seemed to be tied in with both illegal groups—
it was perception, if not fact—and we worked with them for some years to try to untangle 
that. This has nothing to do with patronising or colonialism; they have big, serious and 
difficult problems, and we are a group that they think can help with those problems. That is 
what we find in country after country. I do not think of this as something very different from 
the situation 30 years ago. I think it is to do with providing really competent assistance on 
problems that quite often dwarf the scale of the UK’s problems.  
Q135  Baroness Nicholson of Winterbourne: The common theme coming across is 
more or less that aid only sometimes works, if then. However, that is not good enough, is it? 
This is a large sum of British taxpayers’ money that we are supposedly using to help 
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individuals and communities. There seems to be a thread coming through that the world has 
indeed changed, yet thinking of the Declaration of Human Rights I am reminded that we are 
not in 1947 and that many conventions have followed it, sometimes competing with it. 
Indeed, a common values system can no longer really be found very easily in the United 
Nations conventions. Coming back to the point about common values—here, we are being 
instructed that perhaps UK values, such as they are, are ones that people search for from 
us—would it not be better to have a look at what we are trying to achieve as a nation and 
to try to see exactly how we can analyse, quantify and determine exactly what we want to 
achieve as a nation, rather than perhaps as individual departments running in different 
directions? I feel that no one has yet said what aid actually works. Is it possible that that is 
because the very word “aid” is now so fuzzy, imprecise and unquantifiable that perhaps no 
one here can tell us what it really means, let alone which element of it works?  
Phil Vernon: I absolutely welcome your question and I completely agree with what is behind 
it. I have also written something that was published a couple of years ago. I found it very 
difficult to know whether I was talking about aid, development assistance or simply 
“processes which make life better for people”. It is quite hard, and I absolutely think that we 
have to look at what we do as a nation, and indeed as groups of nations that we are part of 
as well. I do not think that we are alone in this enterprise. A lot of issues come out of what 
you have said. I work for a smallish NGO. Our annual budget this year is £14 million. I think 
that we do a heck of a lot with relatively little. You can call what we do aid and you can call 
DfID giving £100 million to a Government somewhere aid, but they are very different 
endeavours. Putting everything together, it is easy for Ian to say that aid is wrong. I am sure 
that he knows as well as any of us that there are very good examples, as well as lots of bad 
examples.  
If I may, I shall give you just a couple of examples of our work that I think do work. We have 
reported on some of the outcomes in the past year. We have supported interesting new 
ways of working among political parties in Lebanon. We are doing that not with British 
support but with Norwegian support. That is aid, if you like. We are, and have been for the 
past three years, helping members of political parties in Lebanon to discover new ways of 
working on issues which get them beyond the sectarian differences that they have. It is long, 
slow work, but we have seen evidence of change there. That is aid.  
We have helped local community members to support the resolution of conflicts in the 
Congo and Kyrgyzstan. In many places we have helped to increase transparency and due 
care in the way that mining and oil are managed in specific contexts. I could go on but these 
are examples of actual outcomes with evidence behind them and of changes that have 
happened. Most cases are not huge; they are relatively small. However, they are all part of 
what I think is the incremental enterprise of fostering the evolution of change, which is non-
linear. You cannot preordain it. Certainly I could not be patronising and sit here and say that 
in the Congo it is going to change like this. With Congolese colleagues, I can formulate a 
strategy as to how my organisation, working with others, can support and thrust forward 
the changes, but I cannot preordain it. No one can preordain how history is going to happen, 
which is what development actually is. It is a very complicated enterprise that we are talking 
about here. 
The last thing I would say is that it is bound to fail a lot of the time because there is no clear 
theory of change that one can put out there. One of the mistakes that we sometimes make 
is to try to over-codify the business of political, social and economic evolution. Sometimes 
things just happen. I think that the most we can do is to help to create an environment in 
which things can happen more effectively, whether through capacity, skills, a bit of money, 
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capital or improved legal systems. All those sorts of things contribute, but it is definitely 
down to the nation and not DfID.  
Q136  Lord Janvrin: This very much follows on the theme of looking at the promotion of 
values. You talk about liberal democracy, conflict resolution, transparency and that kind of 
thing. Mr Vernon, we have been focusing very much on some of your thoughts but I should 
be interested in hearing from some of the others. Looking five or 10 years ahead, is this the 
way in which we should be looking at how Britain, if you like, scopes its aid overseas? I am 
using the word “aid” in very broad terms. Given that a number of you have spoken about 
the international importance of this—the fact that you work with the Norwegians and so 
on—is Britain going to get some kind of benefit out of it? Where you are international 
organisations but are probably seen abroad as British, are you extending our soft power 
with this sort of international approach? In other words, I am trying to untangle what is in it 
for Britain—I am sure that some of you may consider that to be the wrong question but I 
think that you necessarily have to ask it—while, at the same time, promoting international 
values.  
Phil Vernon: Perhaps I may quickly start off on that. I would say three things. The answer to 
your first question is yes. I think that is the way in which we should be thinking about 
scoping our support—call it aid or whatever. Secondly, is power accruing to this country? 
You are familiar with the millennium development goals. They are expiring in 2015 and will 
not be met. There are lots of reasons for that, and plenty that one can read about. I think it 
is fair to say that British NGOs and the British Government have been at the forefront—we 
have been intelligent voices—in shaping the next round of goals which are set to replace the 
millennium development goals. They are far more interesting than the MDGs. They are not 
subject/object goals; they are not about us doing things to other people or people “over 
there” getting a better life. They are supposed to be universal goals. They are an attempt to 
take the Millennium Declaration, which every country bar one, I think, signed up to in 2000, 
and convert it into a way of thinking about how change can happen differentially in different 
contexts and how the richer countries can support those changes. So I think that there is 
some soft power accruing to us but, as I said earlier, I think that one can only really examine 
the amount of power one has vis-à-vis a particular goal or end.  
Q137  The Chairman: How do we avoid Mr Birrell’s concern, to put it mildly, that in 
these operations we might be helping undesirable regimes to do nasty things, or, because of 
an element of “We know best” and “We’ve got wonderful systems and we’d like to share 
them with you”, that we are being a bit patronising? How do we avoid those pitfalls and 
maximise the sorts of things that you have talked about? That question is for Mr Glennie.  
Jonathan Glennie: Let me try to answer that quickly by saying what aid works. We have 
heard that a lot of the small aid—civil society-level aid and small interventions—works and I 
think that there is plenty of evidence of that. In terms of big aid, my line has always been that 
when you are talking about the cumulative impact of the aid as a small proportion of the 
recipient country’s overall finances—in other words, it is 30% or 40% of a country’s finances 
over a 20 or 30-year period, and that is the experience of many countries, especially in 
Africa—then I would argue that we are talking about the kind of analysis that Ian has given. A 
lot of very poor countries such as Rwanda and Liberia are seeking to reduce their aid 
dependency over time, and I think that that means that they can continue to use aid much 
more effectively, rather than just finish up with aid. How do we avoid the negative impacts? 
Life and history are complex. If you can take aid totally out of the equation, you still have 
Britain, America, China and a whole bunch of other countries supporting nefarious regimes. 
It has little to do with aid. Aid is one tool in the armoury of countries that sometimes want 
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to support democracy and sometimes want to totally undermine democracy for their own 
interests. That is just life.  
On whether we are working as a nation or working as DfID and other ministries, that is an 
interesting question. I can see the argument that says we should all be working together to 
achieve a similar objective. In our trade that is known as policy coherence—a nebulous 
term. Phil mentioned the 2015 goals. Those are going to be under the framework of 
sustainable development. The whole idea is that everything comes together in a kind of 
Utopic, wonderful new world. There obviously is a case for everyone working together, but 
at the same time it is quite unlikely that that is going to happen. I can sit here saying that I do 
not really believe in putting forward British interests and that I think we should be trying to 
seed interests in favour of the poorest of the world, but I also understand politics. So there 
is something to be said—and this was the great genius of setting up DfID—for having a 
champion for the poorest within government. The MoD and the FCO are always going to 
have slightly separate objectives. DfID has had different objectives. There is a story that 
Tony Blair told in a speech that he was giving to the ODI. I think he said that he was visiting 
Sierra Leone. He was speaking to some of the DfID people there and he asked, “How does 
it feel to work for the Government?”. This particular person said, “I don’t work for the 
British Government; I work for DfID”. Certainly in the early years, there was a very strong 
sense that DfID was specifically set up in order to champion causes that the overall British 
Government—quite understandably, because they are meant to represent the interests of 
the British people—might not champion in the same way. I just share that thought with you.  
Q138  The Chairman: Mr Birrell, it is your turn, and then we will hear from Mr Pyman.  
Ian Birrell: I think that spinning out DfID was one of the biggest mistakes that Tony Blair’s 
Government made, and there are a lot to choose from. All that has happened is that budgets 
have got bigger and bigger and bigger, and it has completely usurped the Foreign Office when 
it comes to foreign policy. It is driven not by any ideas of British interest but totally by the 
idea of giving away ever larger sums of money with ever fewer checks.  
Going back to other questions about universal values, I think that there are universal values 
that we should uphold. The problem is that we do not uphold them. We talk about aid but 
you should look at what is happening with aid going to Rwanda. This is a country which has 
been accused time and again of ripping off minerals from the Congo, of invading the Congo 
and of provoking a war which has killed more people than any conflict since World War II. 
Scotland Yard has said that Rwanda has sent hit squads to kill British citizens in Britain. We 
gave aid to the Media High Council, which stopped independent newspapers being allowed 
to exist. We gave aid to the body which stopped rivals standing against a President who won 
the election by an absurd amount. We pour money into Rwanda, despite the fact that it has 
absolutely appalling human rights issues. I think that that symbolises exactly what has gone 
wrong with our aid. We talk about universal values and then display complete contempt for 
them. There is also Ethiopia. I have just come back from talking to people who are suing the 
British Government because they are among 4 million people being thrown off their land by 
a one-party state, which is effectively guilty of Stalinist practices. It is totally authoritarian. 
Again, we are giving money to officials from a one-party regime which is throwing people off 
the land, which is then sold to people abroad—outside investors—or given to people from 
the tribe which is running the Government. Again, in Ethiopia, just as in Rwanda and 
elsewhere, British taxpayers’ money is going on abhorrent human rights abuses, which have 
nothing to do with universal values which we, as a nation, should uphold and which I 
personally hold dear.  
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I shall give you just one other case, which is Somaliland. It has been quoted in an economics 
paper in Stanford. Because it was not recognised, it got virtually no aid. After a civil war 
which left the entire country destroyed, the main capital, Hargeisa, was flattened. Most 
people fled into exile and then had to come back to a country which had absolutely nothing 
in it in probably the hottest corner of the world, given its location. Then, because it got no 
aid, Somaliland had no option but to build its own country, its own tax system and its own 
democratic institutions. They got together and, without any help from outside organisations 
in conflict resolution, democracy-building, good governance or anything like that, they got on 
and built a fantastic political system with two Houses—one democratically elected and the 
other based on a traditional system of elders. It took a lot of sitting around with the big 
conquerors to work out how to do it but, as a result, they have had elections which have 
gone to under 100 votes, and they have handed over power quite peacefully. That is a 
complete model for a country building under its own steam and without outside help. They 
take incredible pride in what they have done and in what they have achieved. There is even a 
fantastic maternity hospital, which is now exporting to other parts in the area. They have 
done it all themselves and they believe that they did it because they do not get aid.  
Unfortunately, we are now beginning to see corruption because aid groups are moving in 
there, but I think that Somaliland—a country even in a place such as that with as 
unprepossessing a set of circumstances as that—has shown that it has managed to create 
something which in many ways is a model in terms of tax-raising and particularly in terms of 
governance. It is such a contrast to Somalia, which is just down below and has had a terrible 
history in recent years.  
Q139  The Chairman: Mr Pyman, would you like to add anything to that? 
Mark Pyman: I want to make a few slightly different points. First, Baroness Nicholson talked 
about achieving things as a nation rather than as DfID. In the world in which we work, which 
is security anti-corruption and defence anti-corruption, DfID has quite a good name. One 
reason is that it has worked quite hard to make things work across government 
departmental divides. For all its bureaucratic faults, it has the Stabilisation Unit, which 
operates across FCO, DfID and MoD. It is just a bureaucratic thing, but most other 
Governments that I speak to are hugely envious of such cross government working, because 
they are much more stovepiped than the UK. I think that there is a positive angle there. 
The second point that I would like to make is about defining what is soft power. If I think 
about the analogy with the concept of ‘corruption’ 30 years ago, absolutely everyone had an 
opinion on what it was and what the remedy was. It has taken 20 or so years before the 
understanding of the subject has got to a sufficient depth that you can really disaggregate 
corruption for different countries or different environments and move to solutions. My 
sense is that soft power is in the same state today, and that it is going to be five or 10 years 
before people have a real understanding of it. It is currently the vehicle for too many of our 
wishes for UK influence, which I do not think is a very effective starting point. 
To think about DfID in five to 10 years’ time, DfID’s statutory obligation is to eradicate 
poverty. If I remember my statistics, most poor people in terms of numbers are in places 
such as China, Indonesia and India; in other words, they are not in the poorest and most 
fragile countries - the Rwandas, the Burundis, the Haitis and the Timor-Lestes of this world. 
Either its priorities are somewhat in the wrong direction or it is a wrong statement of 
priority. I do not quite know the answer to that, but it is not quite what you expect. If India 
and China are where DfID should be putting its money to match the objective of eradicating 
most poverty, then something is wrong with the objective. 
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My third point is a very small example of benefit to the UK. My team works a lot in Ukraine, 
with the security services and the defence environment. Not only is it a hugely corrupt 
nation with huge corruption problems, but a major reason why a lot of people are poor is all 
the abuses by the defence and security system. Even though there is limited political will at 
the top to do anything about this problem, there is a huge body of well meaning people in 
the heart of the security and defence apparatus who really want to see this problem get 
better. They hugely appreciate the kind of input that folk like us are giving them, to the tune 
of training thousands of senior officers and things like that. Phil put this in the context of 
small civil society things and maybe it is in that category but, to me, in terms of the influence 
that the UK directly gains from that, it is very tangible in a nation that has a long-term 
strategic interest for the UK. 
My fourth point—and here I agree with what Ian said a little while ago—is that one of the 
problems with lots of aid is that corruption always comes with it. It is very hard for it not to. 
The aid agencies mostly have a pretty bad record at putting strong measures in place to limit 
that corruption. DfID is by no means the worst of them, but I think that this is an area 
where one can do a lot better. The other side of that is that the UK is, as Ian says, a centre 
for laundering huge amounts of corrupt cash. DfID does a bit about that; it funds the 
Metropolitan Police unit that deals with proceeds of crime from overseas—I cannot 
remember what it is called. It also funds a couple of similar units. But this is very small 
indeed. In terms of contributing to Britain’s image overseas, Britain as a whole could be 10 
times stronger on this subject and have a lot more influence worldwide.  
Finally, on the corruption story, the subject is so prevalent in almost all aid environments 
that it means not that you do not give aid but that you are a great deal more careful about 
how you give it, to whom you give it and what the conditions are with it. Awareness of that 
is much higher now after all the dramas of Afghanistan than it was 10 or 15 years ago. 
The Chairman: Thank you very much. We have talked about whether aid is an investment 
and whether there is a return. Lord Forsyth, would you like to ask questions on that? 
Q140  Lord Forsyth of Drumlean: Just before I pick up on your point, Mr Pyman, when 
you say that there is a lot more we can do about Belgravia and Chelsea being in darkness 
because of all this money, what specifically do you think we should be doing? 
Mark Pyman: There are various relatively small initiatives for chasing the proceeds of 
illegally gotten assets. DfID has a very small initiative and the World Bank has one, but in 
terms of being ready to go after people where you think the money has come into this 
country illegally and corruptly, investigations and prosecutions is the short answer to your 
question, as well as the resources to enable that to happen. 
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean: Are you saying that we are dragging our feet on that? 
Mark Pyman: Yes. 
Ian Birrell: I just want to add a tiny thing to that. There is quite a contrast with France. The 
French have recently cracked down on three countries where very obvious theft of assets 
was going on. They have taken quite strong action against the rulers and their families, 
including prosecuting them and stripping them of assets. That is quite a contrast with how 
little we have done in this country. 
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean: Okay. Just going back to this aid question, I sat for many 
months on a different Select Committee of this House—the Economic Affairs Committee—
when we looked at development aid. One thing that struck me during that inquiry was that 
we had former officials from DfID saying to us, “We can’t spend the money quickly enough”. 
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Therefore, if people are spending money without clear objectives and clear methods of 
measurement, you are going to get waste and damage. The impact of that was huge 
distortions in the local wage economy and huge distortions on tax collection and so on. We 
are here not really to look at the merits of development aid as such but rather to look at it 
in the context of soft power. What I find quite difficult to grasp is that, if people argue that 
aid helps with soft power, when one asks how we can measure that and what are the 
examples—and listening to the diverse opinions from the four of you today—it tends to be 
asserted, “Actually, we’ve done great things in this or that country”. But it is difficult to get 
metrics that enable us to quantify whether it adds to soft power or makes no difference to 
soft power. Mr Glennie gave me the impression from his evidence that he does not really 
care whether it affects soft power or not, because he sees it as something that we should do 
regardless of Britain’s interest. But this Committee is looking at soft power, so is aid actually 
helping with soft power? If so, how can we measure the effectiveness of the benefits of it 
both in the short term and the long term, and are we doing it? 
Phil Vernon: Yes, that is the 56 something or other dollar question, I think— 
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean: It is $11 billion, actually. 
Phil Vernon: I think that the answer is probably that we cannot yet. This is the nub of the 
problem, I think. Turn back the clock 30 years. Aid was pretty simple. It was about building 
roads in places where we do not have roads. It was a very basic equation of investment in 
this in order to allow the possibility of that. Now, as we have peeled different layers of that 
onion over the decades, we have seen more and more of the complexity of what it means 
to—and I like to use this word—evolve, politically, economically and socially. I would say 
that I have learnt that it is virtually impossible to know exactly how to measure that. Not 
only that, but we will not know for some time.  
Let me take the example of Rwanda as a way of throwing into sharp relief the challenge. 
Nobody would doubt that, if one could contribute to central Africa being a better place for 
its citizens, that would be a good endeavour and a good thing to do—“good” and “better” 
according to the values that we talked about earlier. The problem is: what is the historical 
process through which the people of central Africa might achieve that more prosperous, 
more peaceful life? We cannot know; we can only posit. Take Paul Kagame, the President of 
Rwanda. One can look at him and his Government and say, “This is a corrupt, evil, et cetera 
Government that is stamping on people’s rights. We should definitely not support him or 
anything that he is involved with”. One could say, as he does—and I do not know the 
answer to this; I have worked in Rwanda myself, but I do not know the answer—that he has 
a good idea of how his country, which he knows better than we do, might evolve. He 
believes in same sort of values as we do but, a bit like St Augustine, not yet, because he does 
not think that the country is ready for it yet. So he is trying to shape the future of his 
country, which will be more in line with our values. If you are the British Government or a 
British NGO thinking about whether to try to provide support to those historical processes 
that have yet to unfold in Rwanda and its part of the world, I think that you have a judgment 
to make. It cannot be a judgment made on the basis of science; it has to be more of an arts 
judgment. It is, “Do we think that by allying ourselves with those people who are in power 
currently in Kigali and in that country we can help them to create the possibility of a better 
future for the people of that country now and in the future, as well as in the region?” It is a 
judgment. The metrics are too difficult and we will be dead before it is clear. So it is a bit of 
an article of faith. 
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Q141  Lord Forsyth of Drumlean: But just to give you an example, and I shall probably 
get into trouble for saying this, I remember that a couple of years ago, when Andrew 
Mitchell was in charge of DfID, he wrote me a letter asking whether I would like to come to 
Rwanda for three weeks to help to paint a school. I thought, “What a ridiculous proposal”. I 
am sure that, to improve things in Rwanda, there are better ways of inputting the cost of me 
going there for three weeks to paint a school. I completely understood why a project like 
that might be helpful to the Government or to Britain’s image, but I did not know whether it 
would be helpful to Rwanda. Did it represent a sensible way of using resources? I had my 
doubts, so I did not accept his invitation. What I am trying to get to the bottom of is this. My 
perspective is that we should not be spending scarce resources unless we know that they 
are going to advance our interest or that of another country and we can see the benefit. 
How are we meant to progress, given the sums involved? If this is justified on the grounds of 
soft power, where is the evidence? 
Phil Vernon: It is a big challenge, and I would say that we cannot know for sure the answer 
to that question. It is something that will take time. What I would say, going back to the 
question about whether it is a British or a DfID thing, is that if one chooses to invest one’s 
scarce resources in that place that I was talking about, one needs to accompany the 
investment of the money with people of the highest and most astute political calibre. It is not 
a technical investment; it is very much a political investment that one is making. So if one 
goes for that and one decides to invest those scarce resources in the ideas and the projects 
of the Government of Rwanda, one has to do it with one’s eyes wide open, create a genuine 
political partnership and take the risks that go with that. 
Jonathan Glennie: I think, with respect, Lord Forsyth, that possibly you were not invited 
for your painting skills; more probably, it was an opportunity for you to experience life in 
Rwanda rather than for you to help with building a school. That, I think, is relevant when we 
look at the kind of approach that we take to aid. This is where I disagree with Ian. I agree 
with the use of soft power when it promotes, as I said, positive values—not when it 
promotes our own interests, which is not something that I am particularly concerned with. 
With regard to Rwanda, I think that it is useful to have people who know deeply about 
Rwanda. I do not agree that Britain should simply cut off ties with all countries. I presume 
that Ian also means trading ties, by the way. There is no reason why one should cut aid and 
continue to trade with these heinous human rights abusers, so presumably there would be 
trade sanctions as well, in which case why are we trading with China? Why are we trading 
with the United States, a heinous human rights abuser? There are all sorts of other 
countries, too. We do so because engagement is often—not always—as good a thing as 
cutting all ties. Aid is part of that. Knowing about the country deeply and politically is a 
crucial part of answering your question, which is how we know whether we are making any 
difference. It is incredibly complicated. It would be great to have some clear evidence. New 
ways are emerging—the famous randomised control trials—that demonstrate which aid 
interventions are really working and which are not. It is a kind of social-scientific analysis. 
The reality is that, with these big investments, we do not know. Where is the evidence in 
Britain that a huge investment in whatever it is, perhaps the big railway, will— 
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean: Exactly. 
Jonathan Glennie: Fine, but where is the evidence? Maybe that is a terrible example and 
everyone disagrees with it, but sometimes the British Government make big investments on 
the basis of some evidence and there is a huge disagreement about it. There is politics 
involved. Indeed, in aid there are huge disagreements about which aid has worked and which 
aid has not worked. Ultimately, it is an analysis of the evidence and a balance of it. I do not 
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believe that we will ever come to a stage where there is clear evidence one way or the 
other. It is partly an art.  
I have a thought on the Chinese way of doing things. We have just had a Chinese delegation 
over in ODI. This is a simplistic way of putting it, but the Chinese way of doing it is to assess 
the impact of their output. In other words, when they have built the road, they assess 
whether the road is any good. That is a much easier thing to do than the task that DfID sets 
itself, which is not to assess whether the road is any good but to assess whether the road 
has had an impact on reducing poverty, increasing economic growth and supporting 
women’s rights—all those important outcomes, to use the technical language, that we really 
care about. That is really, really hard to check. DfID quite rightly sets itself a hard task. We 
will always be in this mire of, “It is not clear on the evidence”. My point is that we have the 
money to give aid. I do not think that we should be cutting aid on the basis that we are poor. 
Q142  The Chairman: Did you say that we have the money? 
Jonathan Glennie: Of course we have the money. We have huge amounts of money 
compared with the rest of the world and these countries that we are talking about.  
My final point—and this agrees with what Ian and Lord Forsyth have been saying—is that we 
always end up talking about aid, thinking that it is the big thing, but if I was to make a list of 
10 issues that Britain needs to focus on to increase poverty and to increase sustainable 
development around the world, and therefore to support soft power, if that is something 
that is a concern, aid would be down there at No. 10, possibly. It is not unimportant, but it is 
not as important as sorting out our tax regime, reducing our climate change emissions, 
sorting out the arms trade, making sure that our businesses are properly regulated or 
promoting human rights, which since the financial crisis we are doing less than we previously 
did, because we are more concerned supposedly with British interests. Those are the kind of 
things that we should be focusing on, not just aid. 
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean: Just to be clear about this, are you saying that aid is 10th on 
the list as far as soft power is concerned? Are you saying that it does not matter? 
Jonathan Glennie: What I am concerned about is the impact that we have on poverty 
reduction, where, yes, aid is 10th on the list. 
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean: In terms of soft power. 
Jonathan Glennie: I do not know. You were quite right when you said that I am not that 
interested in increasing Britain’s soft power. I am an internationalist; I think that Britain’s 
relative power needs to decrease over time and that other countries should become richer 
and more powerful. 
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean: I got that. 
Jonathan Glennie: That means that we are going to become relatively less powerful, which 
in my view is progress. It may not be from the perspective of people on this Committee, but 
it may actually be— 
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean: But are you saying that aid is No. 10 on a list of soft power 
or are you saying that it is No. 10 on your personal internationalist list? 
Jonathan Glennie: I am saying that if Britain really wants to help to eradicate poverty from 
the world and to support the structural transformation required so that we develop 
sustainably without ruining the world, aid comes down to about 10th on the list of things 
that we need to do. You can relate that to soft power as you wish. 
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The Chairman: We must press on. I know that Baroness Nicholson wants to come in, but 
we have very little time. 
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean: Could we just hear Mr Birrell answer the question, Lord 
Chairman? 
Ian Birrell: Just very briefly, while we are talking about Rwanda, I will quote the former head 
of Britain’s aid programme in Rwanda. He said: “It is difficult to describe how surreal the 
industry begins to feel after you have worked in Africa. It’s certainly the least effective major 
public sector funded by Western taxpayers”. It just seems to me bizarre that people who 
profess to have concern for the developing world think that it is absolutely fine to carry out 
some kind of giant social experiment on other parts of the world, which is really what 
everyone is admitting that the aid game is. 
Q143  The Chairman: I want to press on because we want to ask you briefly about 
working with other organisations around the world. Lord Janvrin, you have a question.  
Lord Janvrin: Yes. It picks up quite a lot of the theme of what we have been saying. 
However internationalist you are, are you actually identified as a British organisation, 
however labelled, or can you somehow stand above that label by working with others? Mr 
Vernon, you mentioned the Norwegians. I am back on the theme that if an organisation, 
which may be labelled international but is seen to be British, is promoting international 
values, some benefit accrues to this country. It is part of what I think soft power is about, 
which is projecting values. Do those of you who are looking at some of these international 
benchmarks, whether it be in transparency or in other fields, think that there is a British 
benefit to it? 
Mark Pyman: From the point of view of my organisation, Transparency International, the 
answer is yes, definitely. Sometimes we speak worldwide on corruption purely as an 
international organisation. I lead the defence and security programme worldwide out of 
London, and in every country we are in people say, “Ah now, is that because you’re 
British?”—brackets for laughter at some of our defence scandals over the past few years. 
Leaving that to one side, it connects very directly with the question of whether they think 
that the origin of this particular initiative comes from Britain or not. That is seen in a 
positive light. So I think that, for us, the answer is a very distinct “yes”.  
Phil Vernon: I would say it is not something for us. We are a British organisation. We work 
in 25 or 26 countries and there are about 210 of us. I think I am right in saying that we have 
50 nationalities working in the organisation. Most people probably do not even see us as 
British, even though the headquarters are in London. In some circumstances, we prefer not 
to be seen as British. If I take the Lebanon example, personally I am not associated with that 
work but I am told by my colleagues that it is quite handy that our funding there is neither 
British nor American, and that to some extent we can be Norwegian in that context; it 
makes life a bit easier for us. We made a decision, which our board of trustees debated and 
agreed with, not to work in Afghanistan on the basis that, as a British NGO, we would be 
seen as part of the occupying forces. So sometimes we see ourselves as more British and 
sometimes as less so, but I cannot put my finger on what has accrued to Britain because of 
our work.  
However, I would say that success creates legitimacy and that he or she who is successful 
gets associated with that success. Where we have made a positive difference and where 
people see that we are a British NGO, that cannot be bad for Britain, but we do not make a 
big deal of it. 
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The Chairman: It does not help or hinder that we are a member of the European Union 
or part of the Commonwealth family? Do either of those issues come into your work at all? 
Mark Pyman: Not for us. 
Ian Birrell: The only thing I would add, if I may wear my cultural hat for a second rather 
than my polemicist hat, is that culture is obviously a huge part of British soft power, with the 
creative industries being so strong. Part of the reason for that now is the diverse nature of 
British society, and particularly London, but it is very, very hard to continue down that path 
when it is so hard for foreign performers outside Europe to come to Britain to work. You 
might be an African musician trying to get a visa to come to this country. If you are in, say, 
Mali, where a lot of them are at the moment, first you have to send your passport to Dakar. 
You might be summoned to an interview in Dakar and your passport and your details then 
go to Accra in Ghana. You can be without a passport for two or three weeks, and that stops 
you working. It costs more than it costs to get a visa for Schengen and, at the end of it, you 
might not get the visa anyway because of such paranoia about immigration issues.  
Those things are not unique, and it makes it very, very hard for, say, a band of 10 or 15 
people to come to Britain, where they are not going to earn much money given the state of 
the music industry. If we are trying to push our soft power, which I think we should, one of 
the things we should be looking at is how to make it easier for businesspeople, performers 
and people like that who want to come and work with British businesses and British artistic 
troupes to get visas. At the moment it is very, very hard, and that is going to have a long-
term impact as these countries grow very fast and become richer. Actually, our artists need 
to get there. At the moment their artists are not coming here or they are going to play or 
tour in a Schengen area where they need only one visa and it costs less, or they will go to 
America. If I may, I should like to prompt the Committee to have a further look at the whole 
issue of visa requirements. I am not saying that you need to abandon them, but it needs to 
be made easier for people with quite prominent names in some of these industries to come 
and work here.  
The Chairman: That is a common theme that has come up with many of our witnesses.  
Q144  Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts: Can I raise one point? I understand what you 
are saying about particular groups, but equally you have been suggesting that what these 
countries now need is not the ability to build a road but a much more sophisticated 
emergence of middle-class, politicised individuals. Is Britain’s soft power helped or hindered 
by the fact that we often permanently recruit people to come and serve here in our 
National Health Service? We recruit nurses. I am told that the NHS has recruited in Malawi 
and that there are 330 nurses for 12 million people in Malawi. Does that help? It helps us 
here—I understand that—but does it help our soft power? 
Ian Birrell: I refer you to a report by Michael Clemens at the Center for Global 
Development. He looked at this issue and found that their staff coming here is actually very 
beneficial to the countries concerned and that the idea that we are stealing their staff is all a 
bit of a myth. What happens is that a lot of them go back from here much better trained. 
They send back remittances and it makes it a more attractive industry. The Philippines is of 
course the best example of this. But actually it is a complete myth and it merits further 
looking at. 
Jonathan Glennie: Just on that last point, I agree that Michael Clemens’s work has thrown 
up some interesting questions about this, but I think that it would be dangerous just to 
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dismiss the whole brain-drain problem as a myth. It could well be a problem, although I do 
not know the answer.  
Ian Birrell: The other point is that surely people have a right to go where they want. If 
people want to go somewhere, who are you to comment? Would you tell a doctor in 
Birmingham that they could not go and work in Glasgow because it might not be good for 
people in Birmingham? Surely people have a right to travel where they want and to work 
where they want.  
Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts: I would say two things. First of all, do I have a right to 
say to a doctor from India on a visa, “At the end of it, you’re finished. You go back.”? All I 
am saying is that physical geography does apply some constraints on us. It is an 
acknowledged fact that England is now more densely populated than the Netherlands and 
that our population is going to increase by the equivalent of 14 cities the size of Manchester 
in the next 12 years. So that does something for us. I am not quite sure what it does for our 
soft power but there is a public policy issue there. 
Ian Birrell: I am very happy to get into the immigration debate, where I suspect I have 
different views from you, but I do not think that that is necessarily what the Chairman 
wants.  
Q145   The Chairman: I do not think that we want to get into that. Baroness Nicholson, 
you want to talk about how these gentlemen and their work comes up with the grimmer 
aspects of nation-building and development that we have seen in recent years.  
Baroness Nicholson of Winterbourne: Yes. The problem with some of the answers 
that we have heard—and they have been very interesting indeed—is that there is no real 
commonality, except to say more or less that aid is not working other than in small doses 
and in very small elements, which runs counter to the view of multilateral aid and Britain’s 
enormous amount of aid going that way. What about the concept of aid used as capacity-
building and institution-building? At the moment, I am really only interested in the reference 
to “official aid”. I do not really think that it is any of our business what private aid does. It is 
the official aid flows that I think we are really interested in. How can those be used in terms 
of Britain’s overall goals of capacity-building and institution-building in order to provide 
unstable nations that could be a danger to us with greater stability and perhaps more 
investment either in Britain or vice versa? How can overseas aid be used, if at all, for that? 
Jonathan Glennie: Another part of your question concerned whether we should be 
including private aid in our purview. I wanted to reply to the point about our relations and 
to the question about capacity-building. I do not know what we mean by private aid but I 
think that NGOs should be included within the purview of this Committee. In so far as soft 
power relates to Britain’s brand and reputation, I think that the work of British NGOs is 
absolutely integral to that.  
Q146  Baroness Nicholson of Winterbourne: I beg your pardon. Could I quickly 
interrupt on a point of accuracy? By private aid, I meant personal donations. Britain is the 
second highest personal donor on the globe, and that is money that people can give to be 
used in any way they want. I am talking about taxpayer money, whoever uses it. It can be 
used by NGOs. At the moment, a huge amount of it goes via DfID to Governments, where 
it is non-accountable. It cannot be traced and we do not know what happens to it, as reports 
from the House of Commons consistently tell us and as our own evidence shows. So it is 
the unaccountable, non-transferable use of official aid that is a major concern of mine—and, I 
am sure, of others as well. You have all identified to your satisfaction, although perhaps 
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possibly not Ian, that small aid can be used effectively for the direct reduction of poverty in 
small doses, but the vast amount of official aid is not used in that way any longer. It was until 
about 1997 and then there was a big shift in DfID. It now goes straight to Governments, 
which, as Transparency International tells us, are self-evidently corrupt. Also, a huge amount 
goes through sub-contracting, sub-contracting and sub-contracting to very large NGOs, 
which gives rise to comments such as, “We’ve got to get rid of money fast”, because 
perhaps the public want it.  
Ian Birrell: You have sort of answered your own question there, have you not? The truth is 
that capacity-building is as much of a sham as a lot of the other aid lobby work, as we have 
seen so spectacularly in Afghanistan, where there are unbelievable amounts of money 
pouring out in suitcases to Dubai and helping the Dubai property boom. We see it in 
Pakistan, and yet DfID is ramping up the amount of money being given to Pakistan, despite 
the fact—I think it is correct to say—that not one politician bothers to pay taxes there. 
Only 2 million people do in a country of how ever many it is. I cannot remember how many. 
Is it 900 million? The truth is that capacity-building is just the latest fad within the aid world. 
When it is done through the multilateral bodies, all that happens is that they often tend, like 
the EU, to have administration levels which would not be accepted in Britain. If DfID gave 
money directly to aid groups, the administration costs would be higher. Of course, a lot of 
the EU money goes to places such as Turkey to help their accession, so that is another part 
of our aid budget. This capacity-building is just a complete sham. It goes through lots of 
hands to get there. Very little reaches the ground, and what does reach the ground is often 
just endless talking shops. When I was in Kenya, someone told me that they could live off 
the PDs they were being offered to go to a conference every single day, often in the 4 and 5-
star hotels of Mombassa. It is capacity-building for the charities; it is not capacity-building for 
the countries.  
Phil Vernon: I am very sceptical about huge dollops of money being given to Governments 
that are not yet accountable to their people—not only not accountable to these taxpayers 
here but not accountable to their people. Let me take a country such as Uganda, where I 
worked for five years several years ago now. If we the British taxpayer, through the 
Government, want Uganda to become more democratic, there is a serious logical flaw in the 
idea that we should provide the money. We know that the basic idea of democracy is that 
taxation and representation go together, so there is a serious flaw in that argument, and I am 
as sceptical as Ian is on that. I think that most of us would be. However, I can accept that 
there is a long-term view that this is part of a process in which things will get better and we 
have to accept that there is a leakage during the initial period. I am not saying I agree with it 
but I can accept that that view does exist. It is the World Bank’s view and it is probably 
DfID’s view, or it was.  
In several places where I have worked I have seen another kind of capacity-building which is 
really inspiring. This is where money flows from the likes of DfID, the US Government and 
others and from private donations to local NGOs and local organisations providing services 
in education, health and economic development—you name it. The places that I am talking 
about are where I have worked and they are all in Africa. You do not really have a policy 
dialogue. Policy is about cutting the cake. It is about who is in government, who is going to 
spend the money and whether you have some money. So there is not really a dialogue about 
which is the best policy—this policy or that policy—to provide better education for our 
children. 
My aspiration would be that that policy dialogue should come about, and I have seen it 
happen. How? I have seen NGOs which have been given funding of relatively small amounts 
Ian Birrell, Columnist and Foreign Correspondent, Jonathan Glennie, Overseas Development 
Institute, International Alert and Transparency International UK – Oral evidence (QQ 126-
151) 
211 
 
of money by the likes of the UK. I have seen some of the leaders of those NGOs get deeply 
frustrated about the fact that the policy environment within which they are working stops 
them being able to achieve what they are trying to achieve, which is better health outcomes, 
better patient outcomes and so on. They have become politicised, and I have seen some of 
them go into public life as politicians. So I think that there is capacity-building of a different 
kind, although, again, it is much harder to plan for. By spreading some of the British 
taxpayers’ money relatively thinly—because it is not a huge amount of money—through 
projects of national NGOs in some of the countries we are talking about, a certain number 
of those leaders become politicised and they get into policy debates and start to change 
things.  
Baroness Nicholson of Winterbourne: But I thought that the purpose of DfID was to 
conquer poverty. 
Phil Vernon: Well, I would go back Mark’s point, with which I agree. I think that DfID’s 
mandate is not completely correct and I think that you would find that most people who 
work for DfID, probably including the Ministers, would agree with that. 
Jonathan Glennie: I would love to live in the world that I believe Ian inhabits, where 
everything is black and white, where capacity-building is a sham and where aid is a total 
disaster. I live in this really annoying world, where there is mixed evidence and the world is 
complex, where sometimes capacity-building has transformed a situation and sometimes it 
has been a complete sham and where sometimes budget support has really worked and 
sometimes it has not. I do not believe that there is evidence that suggests that budget 
support is less effective than other forms of aid going around the Government—I do not 
think that that evidence exists. Sometimes budget support works and sometimes it does not, 
but it is certainly more risky in one sense, in terms of fiduciary risk. As we are looking at aid 
effectiveness and value for money, I would like to share with this with the Committee. If you 
are just looking at fiduciary risk—the risk of money going astray—you can put down all the 
accountants you want, you can micromanage every penny and you can not devolve any 
power over decision-making. But all the evidence—30 or 40 years of research into this—
suggests that when you do not allow aid recipients to take control of the money, you are 
less likely to achieve your objectives. We can minimise loss, but we are still wasting the 
money, even though I can account for every penny, because it does not achieve the 
development objectives. We have to take risks in aid and we have to take risks in 
relationships with Governments.  
Q147  Baroness Nicholson of Winterbourne: Is there not a difference between 
control and accountability? To have transparency in expenditure is different from who 
controls it. 
Jonathan Glennie: You have to focus on accountability as much as you can, but you cannot 
just have a total clampdown on who controls the money. The minute you allow other 
people to engage in that control, you also cede control of the accounting. That is what has 
happened in budget support. 
Baroness Nicholson of Winterbourne: But control and accountability are not the same 
thing. You can give someone control and you can still put in full accountability in auditing. 
Jonathan Glennie: The problem is when they do not account for it. Of course, all those 
things are in place. When we give money to Uganda, they are expected to account for every 
penny. It is not like giving; they are expected to account for it and to show how it has gone. 
What happens when they do not? That is the question. Does Britain just say, “Oh well, leave 
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it then”? Or does it say, “Actually, aid is a risky business and life is complicated sometimes”? 
This sounds absolutely terrible and you are the ones who will have to relay it to the British 
public, not me. I understand that. 
Baroness Nicholson of Winterbourne: So what percentage of official British aid from 
the taxpayer do you feel should be non-accountable and non-transparent? 
Jonathan Glennie: I believe that something like 75% of private— 
Baroness Nicholson of Winterbourne: No, official aid. 
Jonathan Glennie: Just a minute—this is my analogy. I believe that something like 75% of 
private venture capital is wasted, but 25% makes a mega change. I think that we have to 
move slowly towards that approach within aid. It is really hard to do, because this is British 
taxpayers’ money. But unless we do that, we will not make it effective. If every penny in 
every pound has to be accounted for and has to be effective, it is not going to happen and it 
is an unfortunate way to approach very complicated problems. We have to accept waste—
not waste, but we have to accept that things will be lost, just as venture capitalists accept 
that 75%— 
Baroness Nicholson of Winterbourne: Why?  
Jonathan Glennie: Because sometimes you invest in something risky that is really going to 
make a difference and it does not work. You have to allow aid programmers that leeway, 
saying, “Go and do what you think is right”. It may not work, but that is exactly what 
venture capitalists do.  
Baroness Nicholson of Winterbourne: Is that not what is known as corruption by 
Transparency International? 
Jonathan Glennie: No, not at all. I am talking about giving money to— 
The Chairman: I think that we must move on, as we have two more questions. Do you 
want to just answer that, Mr Pyman? 
Mark Pyman: No, I do not think that it is the same. Let us take the example of budget aid 
to Afghanistan, for example, leaving aside some of the horror stories. In the years after 2004, 
the Finance Ministry became quite competent. Could the UK give a bunch of money to the 
Afghan Finance Ministry and have them be very clear about what the money was doing and 
where it was going? At the time, it could. So was it non-accountable and non-transparent? 
Baroness Nicholson of Winterbourne: Unaudited by outsiders? 
Mark Pyman: That I do not remember, but I think you could perfectly well demand that it 
be audited by outsiders. The other example from my memory was when they were giving 
budget aid to the Liberians, where actually the way that they achieved accountability was to 
require dual signatures in each of the departments, as a way of being extremely clear as to 
how the money was being disbursed, department by department. So yes, some of it would 
still have been wasted—to take up the point from my left here—but actually I think that was 
a very strong example of accountability within giving on-budget aid. “It is possible” is the 
answer to your question.  
Baroness Nicholson of Winterbourne: Your definition of waste, therefore—are you 
meaning that it would be misspent in terms of the particular objective of the programme? 
What I am searching for is accountability and auditing, which is something different. You can 
perfectly well spend the money the wrong way, if you like it, but it will still exactly validate 
precisely how everything has been spent. What is your definition of waste in that context? 
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Mark Pyman: The first one that you were saying, so you spend it on an objective and it 
happens— 
Baroness Nicholson of Winterbourne: But you can still account for it. 
Mark Pyman: Absolutely, yes. 
Q148  The Chairman: But you cannot pin it all down, as Mr Glennie was rightly telling us. 
Just one final question on this section: have any of you worked with the military? 
Mark Pyman: Yes, I work a lot with the military.  
The Chairman: We have had military witnesses before us saying that the military in 
modern forms of low-intensity warfare and post conflict have a role to play in all this. Is that 
your view? 
Mark Pyman: Yes, it is. It is subject to all sorts of limitations, because they clearly cannot 
and should not be the lead player on this. Where would I start? Let me give you an example, 
and maybe it is a bad example in reply to your question, but let me try it anyway. We have 
been involved in Afghanistan for about five or six years. We have been making a noise since 
the beginning that says that corruption is not being taken seriously as an issue by almost 
anyone. The one body that has picked it up and said, “Actually, you were right and nobody is 
doing it properly, so we’ll see if we can do something about it”, is the military, and they 
actually put a string of measures in place to try to address corruption issues. They are not 
doing particularly well, inevitably, because it is 10 years after the conflict started, but they 
identified that they needed to be doing something in this area in order to give the 
intervention in Afghanistan any chance of success.  
There is an example where the military came in rather reluctantly, but actually I think they 
have had rather a useful impact on this subject. I think if you are in an environment of post-
conflict stabilisation, where usually the No. 1 issue is the police—who look an awful lot like 
the military in an awful lot of developing countries—then police and/or security force and/or 
military training to those police forces and security forces is absolutely one of the 
preconditions of stabilisation. That would be an example where I think it is completely 
essential. 
The Chairman: That is useful. That is helpful. Mr Glennie?  
Jonathan Glennie: When I was in Colombia, the British Government was providing human 
rights training to the Colombian military. I do not believe it was aid money as such; I think it 
probably came from the Foreign Office. Whether we were right or wrong, our line as British 
NGOs was that that should not happen—not because we thought that it was not being 
effective. It is a bit similar to what Ian was saying about Rwanda, I suppose. This military was 
indicted and implicated in very, very serious human rights abuses. That is why they were 
receiving human rights training. The question was whether this training was actually going to 
help, or whether it was providing a fig leaf and allowing them to say, “Look, we’re having 
human rights training” and then just continuing, which I think was our view at the time. That 
is the kind of conundrum that we had.  
The Chairman: Yes. Quickly, Mr Vernon.  
Phil Vernon: Very quickly, and bringing it back to the soft power question: I am slightly out 
of date, but I think what the British Armed Forces did in Sierra Leone—I do not mean the 
military intervention but the many years of security sector reform which we supported 
there through training and other capacity-building means—so far has been a success. I think 
in terms of maintaining some influence, if you are talking about soft power in that part of the 
Ian Birrell, Columnist and Foreign Correspondent, Jonathan Glennie, Overseas Development 
Institute, International Alert and Transparency International UK – Oral evidence (QQ 126-
151) 
214 
 
world, it has been a good thing for the UK. If I compare that with the way that the United 
States has supported security sector reform in neighbouring Liberia, any objective observer 
would say we did a better job and our reputation would be better because of it. It was done 
in a very opaque way in quasi-military companies by the Americans, and it was done in a 
much more open way using the British armed services largely, and police as well, in Sierra 
Leone.  
Q149  The Chairman: Finally, Lord Hodgson: just a final question on the other big aid 
givers—Japan, Saudi Arabia and so on. 
Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts: We have touched on various other countries that 
have become major aid givers in our earlier conversations—China, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, 
Germany. What are the consequences for our foreign policy for our soft power reputation if 
they are to overtake us in quantum, approach or ability? Or should we just say, “Well, we’re 
a small country and that is the way it is”? 
Ian Birrell: I think it is a sign of the changing world that countries like India, Brazil and 
Turkey are becoming such players in this world. I think it diminishes the impact of British aid. 
Obviously, hopefully, it might diminish it a little bit more. It is interesting. Again, there are 
lessons that can be learned, because of course Chinese aid, which is often very heavily 
criticised, is done in a very different way to the way western aid is given. They see it as a 
way of trying to raise countries out of poverty in the same way as they have brought so 
many people out of poverty at home, and they try and transplant some of the techniques 
there—sometimes successfully, sometimes very unsuccessfully. Often it is done through 
loans which have to repaid out of natural resource earnings, so it is quite a different 
approach. I think in some ways it is often more successful, because it is much more sort of 
mechanical and trade-based, but obviously going alongside it are all sorts of environmental 
and political issues.  
Ultimately it is surely about learning from them and accepting that that is the changing world. 
But it does also mean, of course, that the aid industry is growing bigger and bigger all the 
time. I think it makes it even more a dangerous and unaccountable force in these countries, 
because it is growing bigger all the time. That is a problem, whereby you have such a large 
force involved in so many aspects of society and public services, and yet which is so 
unaccountable to the people on the ground. That is a problem that is going to get worse 
rather than better because of all the extra players coming in.  
Phil Vernon: Just very quickly, I would add two things. According to Nye’s definitions—
perhaps it does not matter—I think the Chinese approach is probably not soft power. It is 
probably much more of a sort of bribery or purchasing approach to power application. 
Maybe it does not matter that much. I think the other thing is that, whatever people might 
say in criticism of British overseas development aid—and I have got plenty to say and have 
said plenty about it myself—it is relatively transparent. It is relatively easy for people to find 
out what we are trying to do and why we are trying to do it. It is not easy to find out how 
much is leaked, because it is too sensitive, I think, but it is pretty easy to find out what is 
going on and why it is going on. In some of the other countries you mentioned, Lord 
Hodgson, it is much, much harder to find out; it is much more opaque and in the 
background. Therefore it could be more risky for the people in the countries that we are 
talking about. 
Jonathan Glennie: I agree with that last point. I also agree that there are many, many more 
development actors, including official actors, round the table. I believe that Kazakhstan is the 
latest country to set up an aid agency. There are many South American aid agencies. South 
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Africa has one. Yes, after years of attempting to harmonise some aid, it is now looking very 
fragmented, and that is going to be problematic in terms of accountability. 
The answer to your question is that, with these arrivals of big new money—some of which 
is basically traditional aid, some of which is very different and looks more like trade and 
loans—undoubtedly Britain’s soft power is going to be relatively diminished. You just have to 
go to any African country to see that. Once you no longer rely so much on a particular 
source of finance, the power of that source of finance is going to be diminished. To end on a 
very positive note about British aid, as I said at the beginning, its focus on civil rights and 
democracy—those kind of issues—has been, in my view, incredibly positive throughout the 
world. It is not the focus of some emerging players, and it would be a great loss if that 
pressure—British values in that sense—is lost to the world of development. As you know, I 
do not agree with our kind of slavish adherence to market fundamentalism—I think that has 
had an immensely denigrating impact on much of the world—but the focus on civil rights has 
been very positive. 
Q150  Lord Forsyth of Drumlean: Chairman, just on this point: I do not want to be 
negative, but amongst the papers which were circulated to the Committee was an article 
which Mr Birrell wrote, I think in May of this year, about what was going on in Ethiopia and 
the Gambela region. Now, it is very difficult sitting on this Committee: here you are talking 
about civil rights. I do not know if you have read that article or you are aware of what has 
been going on—  
Jonathan Glennie: I am, yes.  
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean: —but in terms of soft power it seems to me to be 
desperately counterproductive. It is also very hard to reconcile what you are saying with 
events like this taking place. To Ethiopia, we have contributed I think £1.6 billion over the 
period of this Parliament in aid. How that reconciles with your last statement, I find quite 
difficult to understand.  
Jonathan Glennie: It is actually quite easy. I do not know the details of the Ethiopia land 
displacement case; I have read about. I have read Ian’s articles and I have read a number of 
other articles, and it is certainly a very serious case. It is quite possible, is it not, 
theoretically, that that is an exception to the rule—that generally speaking Britain is a very 
strong adherent of civil rights in a number of countries, and that in some cases it is not? 
Ian Birrell: But do you really believe that? 
Jonathan Glennie: I do, especially—and there is plenty of evidence—on the focus on 
women’s rights. Britain and others, and the west in general, have been part of a 
transformation in the way that women and girls are viewed around the world. That is partly 
to do with this aid. It is partly to do with a whole range of other issues. Let us call it the 
international development community, which probably sounds terrible to some people—the 
UN, all of those attempts to spread equality and those kind of values. There is lots of 
evidence to demonstrate that that has been incredibly impressive.  
On Ethiopia, yes, there is absolutely no doubt that there are civil rights and human rights 
abuses—as there are, as I said earlier, in almost all countries in the world. I would like to 
hear what people think we should be doing with all the other countries in the world where 
these things happen. Do we just cut off ties? I do not believe in that. I believe actually that 
engagement can also work sometimes. Finally, in countries like Ethiopia and Rwanda, if you 
look at the actual economic and social progress that those countries have made, it has been 
absolutely phenomenal in the last 20 years—absolutely phenomenal. It has transformed the 
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lives of millions of women and children especially. That is the plus side. To end this debate, 
let us just have that as well, not just the tyrannical human rights abuse, which is part of the 
story but possibly quite exaggerated. 
Q151  The Chairman: That is fair enough. 
Mark Pyman: Can I just come back to the question from Lord Hodgson? I think it is 
noticeable that for three of the four countries you mentioned—China, Saudi and Qatar—in 
terms of aid influence overseas, this is both about soft power and about hard power. It is 
not just about projecting their influence; it is also about military and security strength for 
those countries overseas. To me that brings it a little bit back to where you started that 
discussion, which is that soft power is only partly about aid, and it is partly about military and 
geopolitical influence. So, to take the example of China and Sri Lanka, they have given all 
sorts of aid to build ports. The purpose is nothing to do with helping the Sri Lankans with 
their ports; it is so that the Chinese have got a deep-water base at the bottom of India for 
the future. With the big donor countries, to me it is soft power but, actually in many of 
these cases, there is a military and security purpose behind it.  
On the second comment—when you were saying, “What should we do with them?”—it is 
just a competition. That is the way I think of it. It is competing for influence and some of the 
countries that we work in work with, say, the Saudis and say, “The Saudis are great. They 
give us money and ask no questions”. Okay, but five years later they come back and say, 
“But we like you, because actually you give us an answer that we can use and is useful”. To 
me, the soft power bit here with examples of those countries takes you very quickly back to 
whether there is a hard power element behind it, of which the soft power is merely the 
front end of it.  
The Chairman: I am going to halt it there, because we have kept you a very long time. It 
has been fascinating, and we could go on for much longer. You have stated your various 
cases with great articulacy, and we all know what the arguments and the counterarguments 
are a little more clearly than we did a couple of hours ago. So can I say thank you very much, 
Mr Vernon, Mr Glennie, Mr Birrell and Mr Pyman? We are very grateful to you for coming 
to us on this warm afternoon, and thank you again. 
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Soft Power:  a comment 
 
1.0 What not to do 
 
I am indebted to the media commentator Kaila Colbin for this recent example of how a 
government committee considering how to take propaganda advantage of digital media – 
in this case in Israel – came to exactly the wrong conclusion. Referring in her article (in 
“Online Spin” 23.08.13) to the much quoted post war publication “How To Win Friends 
And Influence People” by Dale Carnegie, she writes:  
“… it is also a book that the government of Israel has clearly neglected to 
read. Last week, the prime minister’s office issued a statement saying that 
students would be paid to say nice things about Israel online, without 
having to identify themselves as having any affiliation with the 
government. 
“This unbelievably shortsighted move is almost comical in its irony. The 
net result is that the government has put any nice comment made about 
Israel under a cloud of suspicion, thereby doing themselves out of the 
benefit of having sincere supporters speak up on their behalf. 
The point here is that media, and the thousands of social networks, blogs, video 
channels, forums etc. that most people dip into on a regular or daily basis, are highly 
influential, but not controllable. Just as we as individuals need to focus on what we are 
rather than worry about our reputations, so countries seeking influence over others 
need to focus above all on what they do, and not concern themselves with the message – 
and let the media look after themselves. 
 
2.0 Power? 
 
“Soft power” is largely defined by what it is not: power which is not hard, not military. 
But if we seek influence, whether as a nation or as a group or as individuals, we may do 
well to avoid use of the term “power”. We can, for example, all accept that we are 
influenced by friends and books and so on, but a suggestion that they therefore have 
power over us is a likely stimulus for resistance and an understandably negative response. 
Any individual or group or nation that crows about its soft power – such as Britain is I 
suspect in danger of doing - may expect short shrift from those it seeks to influence; 
such claims to power are instinctively rejected and, in those places where they matter, 
are destined to be counter-productive. Not by Nye perhaps, but by many of those who 
favour the term, soft power is seen as being incentivised and even coercive, and 
therefore a relative of hard power. But in today’s joined up world that position is 
weakened, and disinterested focus on quality outcomes, and discussion and analysis of 
this in the press, in the blogosphere and other electronic media, is more likely to 
generate favourable influence, politically and economically, than transparent (and 
probably crude) incentives.  
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3.0 Appropriate Action and the role of the British Council 
 
The positive influence which is the goal of almost all of us is a byproduct of friendship, 
commitment, integrity, expertise and, above all, example. Where programmes are 
undertaken in the name of the country, whether at home or abroad, we need as a nation 
to be sure that we provide the best, and do the job well. Such desirable outcomes are 
rarely to be achieved, in my submission, by the British Council. By attaching an 
increasingly overtly commercial organisation, nowadays owning multiple overseas 
companies, to our embassies and high commissions so giving it unique status and 
advantage, and supporting it with taxpayers’ money, by referring to this organisation at 
once as “part of the FCO family” and as a charity, Britain gives off a negative message, 
which is that this special case, and privilege for the few, is more important than the 
integrity and status of genuine commercial enterprise or genuine charities or genuine 
arms of government. The organisation is not trusted, nor indeed trustworthy, being 
neither fish nor fowl. Commerce, charity and government all play crucial roles in winning 
influence abroad, and their influence is strengthened by maintaining institutional integrity. 
Their influence is correspondingly weakened when those concepts are fudged, a fudge 
that is embodied in the British Council. 
 
4.0 Doing good, doing it well 
 
The things that Britain with all its resources can do as a nation to win friends and 
influence people are infinite. The single thing that we can do best and most easily and 
with the most beneficial results for us as a nation, now and in the future, is provide 
education and training resources. We do this through English language teaching at 
home and abroad, by offering formal programmes of qualifications in our schools, 
colleges and universities, through scholarships, through offerings of electronic libraries, 
MOOCS and specialist online courses, through the establishment of offshore branches of 
our institutions, and so on. For everybody’s sake, however, we should not allow a 
money-driven state-sponsored competitor to step in almost anywhere and distort the 
market to the detriment of genuine British enterprise and of the quality of provision to 
those whose good will we seek.  
 
David Blackie 
Director 
International Education Connect Ltd 
 
August 2013 
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Introduction 
 
1. BP is one of the world's leading international oil and gas companies. Through our 
work we provide customers with fuel for transportation, energy for heat and light, 
lubricants to keep engines moving, and the petrochemicals products used to make 
everyday items as diverse as paints, clothes and packaging. BP has been based in the 
UK for over 100 years and we intend to be here for a long time to come. We are 
continuing to invest in our businesses so we can provide the energy the country 
needs.  
 
2. The majority of international companies involved in foreign investments welcome the 
support of their home government in the business they do abroad.  This is not 
unusual – Exxon and Chevron look to the support of the US Government, Total to 
the French Government, Shell to the Dutch Government (as well as the UK), etc.  BP 
therefore has a particular interest in the way the UK Government supports UK 
businesses abroad and welcomes a number of recent reforms that have been 
introduced to improve the UK’s ability to trade. 
 
UK Trade & Investment (UKTI) 
 
3. Since 2011 a Strategic Relations team has been established within UKTI to work 
closely with large UK-based companies.  Aside from helping us with queries relating 
to UKTI per se, we have found this team to be extremely effective in helping to 
connect the different Whitehall departments that have an interest in BP’s activities.  
We are very supportive of this Strategic Relationship Management initiative.    
 
4. The Prime Minister’s appointment of cross-party Trade Envoys is also welcome.  This 
has given more high-level attention to key export and investment markets.  The 
number of high-level trade delegations has been increased as a result and our country 
offices in these markets have reported favourably on this increased activity.   
 
5. The organisation of trade delegations accompanying VVIP trips has also been 
improved.  The briefings before and after the trade delegation led by the Prime 
Minister to India were very useful.  We also recognise the benefits that can extend to 
large British investors such as ourselves from encouraging more small and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs) to participate on such trade delegations, should it lead them 
to joining BP in investing in the substantial opportunities which exist in many parts of 
the world. 
 
6. We also support the work that UKTI is doing in reviewing the operation of British 
business councils in 21 key markets.  We have met with UKTI to discuss our 
experience of business councils in these markets.  We recognise that they can play an 
important role in helping SMEs to set up business in new markets while also 
demonstrating the UK’s, and British companies’, commitment to the wider 
communities in which they are doing business. 
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7. In sub-Saharan Africa, we welcome the launch of the high-level Prosperity 
Partnerships, which will see UKTI, the Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO) and 
the Department for International Development (DFID) working much more closely 
together in Angola, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Mozambique and Tanzania.  While time will 
be needed to assess the impact of these Partnerships, we would hope that successful 
innovations, for the benefit of both partner countries and the UK, might be exported 
to other markets too.  
 
 
Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO) 
 
8. Beyond UKTI, we have been impressed by the way the Prosperity Directorate within 
the FCO has offered greater assurance to companies that the FCO in London and its 
diplomatic posts are working extremely closely to resolve commercial issues facing 
UK companies around the world.  FCO officials are clearly well-connected to their 
counterparts in departments such as DECC, BIS and HMT.  The advice offered by 
diplomatic posts around the world remains excellent; as is the support offered by the 
country desks in the FCO in London. 
 
Department for International Development (DFID) 
 
9. In March 2013, BP’s CEO Bob Dudley co-signed a letter to the Financial Times in 
support of the Government’s decision to continue to honour its commitments to 
overseas aid.  The UK’s aid has contributed to improving education, health, sanitation 
and other public services in many of the world’s poorest countries. This investment 
in human capital is fundamental for a functioning economy.  There is much private 
companies can learn from the approach taken by DFID; equally companies 
themselves have experiences of working in developing markets, which will be of 
interest to DFID.  Therefore we welcome the appointment of private sector advisers 
within DFID which has seen a greater mutual understanding develop of both the 
work of the department and of that of UK companies in DFID’s target countries.  
Shared experience of what works and what doesn’t can only be helpful in promoting 
sustainable development as both companies and DFID develop programmes in 
support of local communities.   
 
November 2013 
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1. The British Academy, the national academy for the social sciences and humanities, 
welcomes the opportunity to submit evidence to the House of Lords Select Committee 
on Soft Power and the UK’s Influence. 
 
2. In this submission, the British Academy’s contribution is twofold. Firstly, in representing 
the Humanities and Social Sciences disciplines, it draws on a broad research base to 
provide intellectual clarity and to help focus and reframe the debate. Secondly, it 
provides a brief account of the centrality of our national higher education and research 
to the UK’s soft power resources. 
 
3. Beyond this brief submission, the British Academy is currently undertaking a project on 
‘soft power’ and is due to publish a report at the end of the year as a contribution to 
current debates. 
 
What is the British Academy’s understanding of soft power? 
 
4. Soft power is analytically difficult to distinguish from influence, which has many 
manifestations. In particular it can be argued that diplomacy, and foreign policy more 
generally (as opposed to coercion and deterrence), has always been about trying to 
‘mobilise’ soft power. 
 
5. Our analysis starts from the proposition that soft power exists, but is not always 
useable by governments. Indeed, while it is questionable whether it can be mobilised in 
any meaningful sense, even more importantly, it is questionable whether it actually needs 
to be ‘mobilised’.  
 
6. We believe that maintaining a soft power position independent of government is an 
advantage to government precisely because it allows the myriad elements of civil society 
and national culture to do their work without any attempt to ‘coordinate’ or manage 
them unnecessarily. Central to this view of soft power is its primary location in the 
domestic sphere: soft power begins at home. 
 
7. Rather than being in simple opposition to hard power, soft power exists in a complex 
and changing relationship to it. Traditional instruments of hard power can be deployed 
successfully in a soft power context. Indeed, it is notable that in recent years the UK 
military has demonstrated that an important part of its future role involves elements of 
soft power. 
 
Soft power and diplomacy 
 
8. The UK can increase its influence by pursuing its objectives via a wide range of 
international mechanisms as well as a broad range of ever accelerating and deepening 
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horizontal networks powered in part by the revolution in information technology and 
social media. This places a premium on understanding networks, and on accepting that 
individuals, networks, countries and international organisations are subject to many 
other pulls than the straightforward ones of national feeling and loyalty. The need for 
significant research in this area is clear and pressing. 
 
9. There is a volatile quality to soft power assets which relates to the fact that soft power’s 
reliance on reputation means that it can easily be undermined by an action in another 
sphere (most notably using hard power) which causes serious antagonism or resentment 
to third parties. Nevertheless, it is also important to recognise that soft power assets 
can serve to counter other unwelcome negative impressions. The UK is now a country 
of multiple diasporas, which in the opportunities and challenges this has brought 
illustrates the double-sided coin of the UK’s history and influence in the world. Creative 
nurturing and harnessing of such challenges can turn possible negatives into positives in 
the long-term, and the government has an important role in supporting this process. 
 
Aspects of soft power – looking longer term  
 
10. As has already been indicated, it is critical to understand that the UK’s soft power and 
influence exist beyond the narrow realm of our foreign policy. In the Academy’s view, a 
clear distinction should be drawn between the long- and short-term soft power benefits 
of the UK’s cultural and intellectual appeal, while also acknowledging that these are 
inherently difficult to measure. In the short-term, there are important commercial 
benefits to be gained from soft power assets such as the international attractiveness of 
UK education.  
 
11. In the medium and longer term, other benefits can be enjoyed.  First, the projection of 
Britain abroad through a combination of cultural diplomacy and the independent 
activities of citizens can serve to improve the country’s reputation and attractiveness to 
all kinds of potential partners, whether inside multilateral organisations like the EU, UN 
and the Commonwealth, or in terms of commercial investment. But that also depends 
on the kinds of actions taken by private citizens. For example, Euroscepticism  has led to 
much disillusion elsewhere in the EU, while both Paris and Washington have objected in 
the past to what they saw as the growth of "Londistan". Second, the promotion of global 
public goods such as human rights or action to deal with climate change has the 
potential to place Britain in a leadership role, so long as it is not undermined by the 
simultaneous pursuit of state interests, leading to the perception of double standards.  
 
12. The corollary of the importance of the longer term is that governments need to make 
investments in critical areas such as the BBC, higher education and the arts, and then to 
hold their nerve when payoffs are not immediately visible. If this approach is taken, the 
benefits can be considerable for relatively small sums invested. The more challenging 
aspect of this for government is that the most important benefits gained are often the 
most intangible and difficult to measure, although certain institutions, such as 
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outstanding universities, the BBC and the British Council, have a proven track record in 
this respect. 
  
Learning from others: how much should governments do?  
 
13. Once soft power is seen as having no necessary relationship with foreign policy, it is 
easier to understand American cultural success in influencing (and selling) to millions 
around the world despite widespread hostility to some of its foreign policy actions. The 
separation between the deployment of the its cultural assets and its government often 
enables American cultural influence to prevail however public opinion may view its 
government’s foreign policy at any particular time. Meanwhile China’s government has 
been criticised as having too visible a hand in its recent cultural and cooperative 
initiatives. Nevertheless the growing popularity of Confucius Institutes worldwide 
demonstrates that the issue is complex, rather than a simple negative relationship 
between government intervention and popular appeal.  The provision of basic funding at 
arm's length and the conduct of a sophisticated diplomacy (including public diplomacy) 
are crucial in enabling medium-sized countries, such as Britain or France, to present 
themselves well abroad, with concomitant benefits in trade, tourism, and political 
goodwill. Moreover, there is still plenty of scope for public diplomacy to celebrate and 
disseminate the products of the UK’s cultural, educational, social and legal success. 
 
What does soft power mean for the British Academy’s work? 
 
14. The British Academy’s work in representing and promoting academic excellence at 
home and overseas can be considered a constituent part of the UK’s national image and 
influence. Almost all areas of the Academy’s remit, from law and languages to 
archaeology and area studies, are relevant to soft power, in that they throw light on the 
ways in which human beings influence each other while also generating resources that 
can benefit the United Kingdom as a whole. The UK’s leading role in many of these 
disciplines is a further benefit in terms of both its capacity to attract scholars and 
students from all over the world and the vigour of the UK academic and research 
community, which provides tangible soft power gains (such as revenues from 
international students) but also more intangible benefits to the image of the UK as an 
important global intellectual hub. The Academy has maintained longstanding support for 
a small network of research institutes overseas.47 The depths of collaborations that 
these centres foster in a range of disciplines makes a significant contribution to the UK’s 
soft power in these countries. 
 
 
 
 
                                            
47 Details of these institutes are available at: http://www.britac.ac.uk/intl/index.cfm 
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What is the role played by UK universities and research institutions in 
contributing to the UK’s soft power? Does the global influence of UK universities 
and research institutions face any threats? 
 
15. An emphasis on the means of soft power will have implications for the kind of role that 
the UK seeks (or is able) to fulfil. Commentators on soft power have placed emphasis 
on the country´s cultural resources: its intellectual and artistic heritage, the strength of 
its universities, and the attractions of its sport and music scene. The cultural aspects of 
soft power can benefit the UK in the long term through perceptions of excellence, 
creativity and distinctiveness, leading to admiration and to some degree a desire to 
emulate. In the professions there may also be opportunities for disseminating best 
practices and standards, as for example in the legal profession. 
 
16. In particular, the humanities and social sciences provide the high-level skills and ground-
breaking research essential to an economy driven by ideas and knowledge, to social and 
cultural well-being, and to the UK’s place and reputation in the world. UK research, not 
least in the humanities and social sciences, is internationally recognised as of 
exceptionally high quality. But other countries are investing heavily in research and 
related human capital and becoming more competitive. It is imperative to maintain an 
enabling environment in the UK with, for example, sustained funding and measures to 
facilitate mobility and interaction. 
 
17. Research is a global undertaking and strong links with researchers around the world are 
essential to maintain the UK’s internationally renowned research base, as well as 
promoting lasting ties of real economic, political and cultural value. More generally, the 
world is changing with extraordinary rapidity, and countries of major significance to the 
UK – economically, politically and culturally – are assuming new positions of influence. 
The insights of researchers in the humanities and social sciences can help us understand 
these changes and how best to respond to them. 
 
What impact do languages have on soft power and diplomacy? 
 
18. The Academy welcomes the Committee’s acknowledgement of language learning as an 
aspect of soft power. Together with geographical expertise, foreign language skills have 
long been regarded as the hallmarks of the highly esteemed British diplomatic service. 
The ability to speak a foreign language is a key element in the formation of relationships, 
mutual cultural understanding, trust and the networks that facilitate interaction and 
cooperation across borders and societies. In a radically different landscape of 
international engagement that confronts Britain today – with the rise of China, Brazil, 
Russia and India as economic powers and the increase in ethnic and regional conflicts – 
language skills can no longer be regarded as an optional adjunct to a well-equipped 
society and government. Rather, they are a key indicator of how prepared we are to 
operate within the fast changing landscape of global engagement. 
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19. Nevertheless, the British Academy has been concerned with the de-prioritisation of 
languages within government. Prompted by recent reports of declining language capacity 
within certain areas of government, the Academy launched an inquiry entitled Lost for 
Words: the need for languages in UK diplomacy and security. The inquiry aims to serve as a 
first step towards reviewing how language capacity within the UK affects the pursuit of 
public policy objectives relating to international engagement and security. A report 
deriving from the inquiry will be published in November 2013. 
 
What more can be done to encourage British people to learn foreign languages 
and acquire deeper understanding of foreign cultures? 
 
20. The Academy recognises the importance of the English language and English-language 
publications in advancing the UK’s influence abroad. The UK’s teaching, academic and 
research base both contributes to, and benefits from, the current predominance of the 
English language. What we must not do is assume that the global success of English 
immunises against the need for knowledge of other languages. 
 
21. The value of languages for the individual, as well as society at large, has been well 
documented over a number of years. There is strong evidence that the UK is suffering 
from a growing deficit in foreign language skills at a time when globally, the demand is 
expanding. The number of students studying languages in school and at university has 
declined considerably, and many of the languages forecast to be of increasing importance 
– for trade, security and diplomacy – are not provided for within the UK’s education 
system. 48 The Academy has been at the forefront of promoting excellence in the study 
of languages for over a century, and in 2011 launched a programme to address the skills 
deficit in language learning in UK education and research. Through its language 
programme, the Academy is funding research and relevant initiatives, and seeking to 
influence policy in these areas. 
 
Summary 
 
22. The British Academy recommends that a distinction should be drawn between the 
short, medium and long-term benefits of the UK’s rich cultural and intellectual assets. 
Greater recognition needs to be given both to the way in which these assets contribute 
to the UK’s influence and reputation in the world, and also to the importance of 
language learning. The Academy welcomes further engagement with the Committee on 
this area of inquiry and looks forward to contributing to the discussion and debate, 
including through our publications later this year.  
 
September 2013 
 
  
                                            
48 These issues are outlined further in recent British Academy publications including Languages: State of the Nation Report 
(February 2013); Talk the Talk (June 2013); Postgraduate Funding: the Neglected Dimension (July 2012). Publications and details 
available at: www.britac.ac.uk 
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What is soft power and why is it important? 
 
A country’s soft power is its ability to make friends and influence people not through 
military might, but through its most attractive assets, notably culture, education, language 
and values. In short, it’s the things that make people love a country rather than fear it, things 
that are often the products of its people, its culture, its values, its brands and education 
institutions. 
 
The UK continues to seek and need a major role and profile in the modern world. As a 
result of history, language, trade and culture, it is one of the most internationally connected 
countries on earth. It thrives on those connections. They bring investors, entrepreneurs, 
researchers and innovators to the UK. Our prosperity and security depends on being 
trusted by other peoples, on our ability to continue to attract the brightest and best to 
choose the UK over our competitors. 
 
The changing nature of influence in the world and the growing importance of 
‘Soft Power’ 
 
As Lord Howell recently said, there is a growing feeling that the entire international 
landscape is being transformed by hyperconnectivity, social media, and the very rapid rise of 
direct people‐to‐people social and cultural exchange ‐ not mediated by states. This is 
beginning to alter the entire fabric of relations between nations. 
 
The rise of people‐to‐people influence and the resultant diffusion of power away from 
Governments requires recognition that persuasion, influence, trust and what other people 
think of the UK matter to our future. In an increasingly competitive, more volatile world we 
will need to go beyond the traditional international relations armoury of force, diplomacy 
and aid, and focus on how we can attract people to the UK. 
 
The UK is a ‘soft power’ superpower 
 
As Foreign Secretary William Hague recently wrote “the UK remains a modern day cultural 
superpower. The UK is fortunate to have some immense assets and advantages in this area: 
the English language, connecting us to billions of people; links to almost every other nation 
2 on earth through our history and diverse society; skills in financial services, engineering, 
science and technology that are second to none; and fine institutions like the British Council, 
BBC World Service and our historic universities which are beacons for democratic values 
around the world. Staying competitive in ‘soft power’ for decades to come means nurturing 
these assets and valuing them as much as our military, economic and diplomatic advantages. 
Government must play a full part in helping to liberate that ingenuity and talent across our 
national life, and to champion it all over the world.” 
 
Independent cultural bodies are the UK’s best ‘Soft Power’ assets 
The UK should continue to support cultural exchange through independent, autonomous 
agencies and brands like the British Council, BBC, Premier League, universities and the UK’s 
theatres, galleries and museums. The trust that these bodies and the artists, educators, 
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sportspeople, curators and broadcasters they support generate for the UK builds the 
relationships and environment that attracts people and businesses to choose the UK over 
our competitors. Research by DEMOS suggests direct government involvement invites 
suspicion and hostility; it is people‐to‐people contact and reciprocity that build trust. 
 
The UK does not wholly publically‐fund or ‘state control’ cultural bodies and universities, all 
the UK’s best cultural bodies and universities earn income, innovate, partner and are 
entrepreneurial in pursuit of their mission. However, public funding remains critical to their 
continued success, providing the space to innovate, take creative risks and invest long term 
in a way that would not be possible in a purely commercial model. They are also more 
aligned with UK government and national policy than in countries where there is no 
connection. As a result of government investment, agencies like the British Council are 
active in strategically important places in Sub‐Saharan Africa where they simply would not be 
able to operate were they dependent only on self‐generated income. The UK’s soft power 
success is a direct result of this ‘mixed economy’ model. 
 
The British Council is among the world’s most effective international cultural 
bodies 
 
The British Council is aligned with the FCO through its NDPB status and Board‐level 
representation. The British Council has retained the same mission for which it was founded 
in 1934 but has transformed its economic model. Government grant now represents less 
than 20% of the British Council’s turnover; entrepreneurship delivers the rest through ‘paid 
for’, partnerships and work under contract. 
 
The British Council builds trust for the UK by sharing English, the Arts, education and 
support to stronger societies through work with state and public education systems and 
support for governance and international development. The Foreign Office grant to the 
British Council in 2013‐14 is £162m out of total projected income of £833m. By comparison 
last year the German government spent over €588m towards the same broad objectives. 
 
Directly connected through governance to the UK’s long term foreign policy interests the 
British Council creates the context – millions of English speakers, UK‐educated world 
leaders, global expertise and ‘thought leadership’; and millions of people and thousands of 
institutions connected to the UK ‐ which support and inform the UK’s knowledge, 
understanding and influence in the world. 
 
The British Council delivers the UK’s national interest, by being aligned, at arm’s length, 
expert, entrepreneurial and above all for and from the people of the UK. 
 
The British Council’s contribution to the UK’s soft power 
 
We share the UK’s great cultural assets: the English language, arts and education with the 
world. The critical element in the British Council’s approach is the focus on mutuality. Soft 
power is not just showcasing the UK’s assets; it is sharing those assets and supporting the 
reciprocal exchange of ideas and culture. Through this work the British Council: 
• builds trust in the people and institutions of the UK and supports prosperity and 
security around the world 
• encourages people to visit, study in, and do business with the UK 
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• attracts people who really matter to all our futures to visit and engage with the UK 
 
The British Council has offices in over 100 countries and has been building long‐term trust, 
people‐to‐people connections and international opportunities for the UK for more than 75 
years. We work in: 
 
• Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Turkey and other high growth countries that 
offer so much potential for the UK’s businesses and institutions 
• fragile and post‐conflict states like Libya, South Sudan, Iraq and Afghanistan that are 
strategically key to the UK’s security 
• marginalised environments like Burma and Zimbabwe where we build capacity and 
international connections for those who want access to the wider world 
• Europe, the USA, Japan, the Commonwealth where we work to maintain, renew and 
enrich traditional ties 
 
A 24/7 networked world means that huge numbers of important international connections 
take place outside traditional state‐to‐state relations. People trust people more than they 
trust governments, so connections between people often make a more significant 
contribution to soft power than government‐led activities. 
 
The British Council’s operational independence from the UK Government enables it to 
connect UK teachers, learners, artists, sportspeople, scientists and policy makers with their 
counterparts around the world, building trust between people, whatever the state of 
relations between governments. That trust creates opportunities for UK businesses, artists, 
and cultural and educational institutions to engage with new opportunities and global 
markets. 
 
Hard and/or soft power? And what about Aid? 
 
The UK’s international reputation rests on a spectrum of interventions. At one end there is 
development and aid where the UK is recognised as leading the world and at the other is 
the UK’s hard power – its ability to project military force, enforce sanctions and that prized 
seat on the Security Council. In between there is soft power, diplomacy, trade and cultural 
relations. This spectrum can be simplified as: giving ‐ attracting ‐ forcing. 
 
The UK has traditional strengths across this spectrum with leading international aid charities, 
global agencies like the British Council and world renowned cultural and educational 
institutions, and widely respected defence assets. The ability to engage across the whole 
spectrum gives the UK very significant advantages in international relations, we are able to 
engage with other countries on multiple levels at the same time – for example in 
Gaddafi era Libya where Government policy was towards the forcing end of the spectrum, 
the British Council maintained people‐to‐people contact so when change came to the 
country the UK had access to valuable, established networks and could respond quickly and 
effectively. 
 
The spectrum is not rigidly divided. It is easy to identify the extremes but the space occupied 
by soft power is much harder to delineate. Trust and attractiveness can be built through aid 
projects that focus on good governance, education reform and the sharing of the UK’s 
values, for example through our capacity building work in the justice system in Pakistan. It 
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can, albeit rarely, be built through military intervention. Sierra Leone would be an example 
of how the UK’s global reputation was enhanced by the effective deployment of force. It is 
the capacity to work across the spectrum that allows the UK to punch well above its weight 
internationally. However, there is no room for complacency. 
 
The “global race” 
 
Other countries are playing catch up to the UK on international aid spending, are spending 
more than the UK on hard power assets, and investing heavily in their soft power offer. 
There is global competition to topple the UK from its number one position in the soft 
power league table. Much has been made of the Chinese government’s ambitions for its 
global network of Confucius Institutes and international English language news services but it 
is not the only rapidly emerging soft power. Brazil, Turkey, the Gulf States, South Korea and 
others are all focussing on the potential of soft power to increase their global influence; to 
enhance their international reputation; and to attract international investors, students and 
tourists. 
 
The UK has the best assets in the world, making it the most attractive place on earth. That is 
why London is France’s sixth city. However, it cannot afford to rest on its laurels if it desires 
to retain its crown. As new entrants come into the soft power market, the UK must 
continue to invest and innovate to continue to benefit from the inward investment and 
prestige its soft power brings to the country. There are three critical challenges the UK’s 
position: 
 
1. The key to the UK’s success in soft power is the focus on reciprocity – the sharing of 
our culture, language and values. The UK’s greatest soft power weakness is the level 
of language skills amongst the UK population. While it has been hugely advantageous 
to the UK that one in four people around the world speak English that still leaves 
three in every four people that do not, people we are simply not talking to. Speaking 
the local language opens doors for people, businesses and institutions looking to 
work in new markets. It builds the trust that is so crucial in attracting and influencing. 
The UK needs to invest in developing young people’s skills in modern languages like 
Arabic, Russian and Chinese to be competitive in the 21st century. 
2. The UK’s arts, cultural and educational sectors are some of the most successful in 
the world. Their great strength has been their ability to combine public, private and 
philanthropic income in a ‘mixed economy’ funding model at arm’s length from 
government. It is vital that the UK maintains this balance in future to continue to 
harness the innovation and dynamism of the private sector; to provide the space to 
take creative risks and invest for the long term; and to enable agencies to continue to 
operate in places the market cannot reach. 
3. The recent reforms to UK visa policy have caused widespread concern around the 
world, damaging the UK’s reputation in countries like India and Brazil that are critical 
to our future success. In seeking to manage net migration, it is vital that the 
unintended consequence of policy is not that those who the UK most needs to 
influence and attract are prevented from visiting, investing or studying in the UK. 
 
The UK is uniquely well placed in terms of soft power. It has world renowned cultural assets 
and internationally respected institutions like the BBC and the British Council but continued 
success in an ever more crowded market is not guaranteed. Government investment and 
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policy – in education, business, culture, foreign and defence affairs, and immigration ‐ remain 
vital to ensuring the UK remains the most attractive place on earth. 
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About the British Council 
 
The British Council creates international opportunities for the people of the UK and other 
countries and builds trust between them worldwide. We are on the ground in over 100 
countries. We connect the UK with people around the world, sharing the UK’s most 
attractive assets: the English language, the arts, education and our ways of living and 
organising society. We have over 75 years’ experience as the UK’s leading soft power 
agency. 
 
1 Summary 
1.1 The UK has emerged as the world leader in soft power, overtaking the Hollywood 
fuelled might of the United States and leaving other European competitors trailing. Yet even 
as we celebrate coming first in Monocle’s 2012 soft power league table, the UK’s supremacy 
may already be a thing of the past. China, Turkey, Brazil, Russia, South Korea and other 
leading economies are all developing soft power strategies and investing in cultural institutes, 
scholarship programmes and broadcasting. Influence and attraction, how a country wins the 
support and good will of other nations, are becoming increasingly important as the power 
structures of the 20th century give way to an increasingly volatile present where that 
influence and attraction is increasingly dependent on people rather than governments. Trust 
and reputation are critical to international success and prosperity.  
 
1.2 The UK is a soft power superpower with unique assets - in the English language, our arts 
and culture and our education and ways of living - that are immensely attractive to people 
around the world. How we have deployed these assets has been critical to our success to 
date but we cannot take that success for granted and must learn and adapt to an ever 
changing world. 
 
2 The spectrum of international engagements 
 
Giving 
 
Attracting 
 
Forcing 
 
Aid English Relationship 
building 
Cultural 
diplomacy 
Messaging Military 
Action 
Development Education Cultural 
exchange 
Showcasing Diplomacy Sanctions 
 Skills Convening & 
networking 
Broadcasting Advocacy Coercion 
 Qualifications Partnerships 
& links 
Trade 
promotion 
Campaigns  
 International 
experiences 
Trade    
 
2.1 The UK is one of a handful of international players to have the capacity to project power 
in all its forms anywhere. It has unique strengths in the soft and hard power stakes, as well as 
being a world leader in international development. The UK’s physical presence globally 
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through the diplomatic network, DfID and the MoD, agencies like the British Council and 
UKTI and international NGOs and businesses gives the UK a powerful platform for 
influencing and engaging internationally. The UK is able to work across the spectrum of 
international interventions, from the giving end of aid and development assistance through 
soft power to the forcing end of military action. Soft power is an essential plank of the UK’s 
international relations strategy, complementary to our military forces and development 
assistance.  
 
2.2 The spectrum is not rigidly divided. It is easy to identify the extremes but the space 
occupied by soft power is much harder to delineate. Trust and attractiveness can be built 
through aid projects that focus on good governance, education reform and the sharing of the 
UK’s values. The capacity to work across the spectrum strengthens the UK’s hand, each 
element reinforcing the potential impact of the other. At its most successful, the UK’s 
foreign policy engages across the spectrum in multiple ways simultaneously. Sierra Leone 
might be a textbook example of what can be achieved by the co-ordinated engagement 
across the spectrum with the UK’s military power needed to create the environment where 
development assistance, education reform, capacity building and reconciliation work could 
be taken forward. The world is though a complicated place, often the UK will find itself 
engaging in multiple, potentially contradictory interactions across the spectrum of 
international relations. This may be a deliberate carrot and stick approach to a country or 
simply reflect the multitude of contacts between peoples in a hyper-connected age.  
 
2.3 Soft power is not a replacement for hard power; those looking to soft power to make 
up for the impact of defence cuts on the UK’s influence internationally are being unrealistic. 
No one wants to be in the position where the answer is a naval deployment or boots on the 
ground but hard power remains vital to our international security in an uncertain, volatile 
world. While the recent Parliamentary vote on Syria reflects the fact that the UK’s appetite 
for “foreign adventures” has been diminished by our experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq, 
British military interventions in the former Yugoslavia and Sierra Leone have delivered 
positive outcomes that soft power or development assistance could not possibly have 
achieved. Soft power sits alongside hard power and development assistance and has a key 
role to play in fragile and post-conflict states looking to rebuild and reconcile, as has been 
the experience in Kosovo for example, but it cannot force peace on warring peoples. 
 
2.4 The UK draws international clout from its status as a Permanent Member of the Security 
Council and its membership of other international organisations including the EU and 
Commonwealth. The EU and the Commonwealth in particular are bodies with considerable 
soft power strengths. Both are reliant on soft power levers to exert influence in 
international affairs. Their strength comes from the focus on shared human values of 
decency, respect, tolerance and equality, they stand up for the rule of law and human rights 
and as communities with collective decision making, they are less easily portrayed as 
pursuing selfish strategic aims than individual nation states. 
 
2.5 Soft power is a powerful tool for governments looking to improve relations and keep 
channels open when international tensions arise. The Security Council maybe deadlocked or 
the UK marginalised at the EU Summit, but through soft power the UK can bring nuance, 
depth and renewal to government relations and continue to build trust despite political 
difficulties. While relations with Russia can be difficult – the British Council was forced to 
close our offices in St Petersburg and Ekaterinberg in 2008 following diplomatic disputes 
between the British and Russian Governments – the Russian people remain interested and 
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open to engagement with their British counterparts. The UK-Russia Year of Culture 2014 
will capitalise on that interest and will present multiple opportunities for the British 
Government to engage with Russian ministers and officials.  
 
2.6 The UK’s capacity to work across the spectrum distinguishes it from much of the rest of 
the world. It gives credibility, generates respect - and a little envy - and comes with a 
responsibility to be activist, outward looking and engaged in the challenges of the day. 
 
3 The meaning and importance of soft power 
 
3.1 A country’s soft power is its ability to make friends and influence people not through 
military might, but through its most attractive assets, notably culture, education, language 
and values. It’s the things that make people love a country rather than fear it, things that are 
often the products of its people, its culture, its values, and its education institutions. Put 
simply a country’s soft power is its attractiveness to others. According to Monocle the UK is 
currently first in the world for soft power, thanks in part to the global audience captivated 
by the Diamond Jubilee and the 2012 Olympics and Paralympics.     
 
3.2 Sir Anthony Parsons explained the value of soft power to state actors:  
It is really dazzlingly obvious … [i]f you are thoroughly familiar with someone else’s 
language and literature, if you know and love his country, its cities, its arts, its people, 
you will be instinctively disposed … to support him actively when you consider him right 
and to avoid punishing him too fiercely when you regard him as being wrong. 
 
3.3 Reputation and trust are critically important to a country’s success as the certainties of 
the 20th century give way to a more fluid, volatile world. With multiplying players on the 
international stage seeking to make their mark and challenge established power structures, 
military power is no longer a guarantor of success internationally. International challenges 
like the Syria crisis and global poverty create new alliances and bring new voices to the fore. 
Soft power has a key role to play in establishing the UK as an honest, trusted broker in such 
contexts. The revolutions convulsing the Arab world require co-operation between state 
and other actors and interventions across the spectrum of international relations with 
development assistance, diplomacy, soft power and military capacity all crucial elements in 
delivering a safe and prosperous future across the region. To succeed in this world, the UK 
must act in partnership with old friends, attract new allies and persuade and win over 
doubters to achieve its strategic objectives. In the shifting, volatile dynamics of the 21st 
century, soft power is more important to the UK’s success than ever before. 
 
Hyper-connectivity 
 
3.4 At the same time the tectonics of power are in flux, influence is moving away from 
governments towards individuals and civil society groupings. People-to-people contacts are 
growing in importance at a dramatic pace. 24 hour broadcasting, social media and mobile 
services mean people are better informed than ever before and can interact directly with 
each other across national boundaries with limited governmental interference – even in 
places where government seeks to impose barriers upon the flow of information and 
opinion. With 6 billion mobile phones around the world, 75% of which are in developing 
countries, the explosion in people-to-people contacts is far from being a purely Western 
phenomenon. Shared interests, passions and beliefs bring people together in chat rooms, the 
blogosphere and other online fora, creating a platform for people to organise themselves – 
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with everything from Pussy Riot supporters to Twilight Fanfic to be found in the 
undergrowth of this rich, wild new digital jungle. Businesses and institutions looking to 
expand rely increasingly on the internet to reach and influence new audiences as well as to 
invigorate and grow their presence in existing markets. Governments and agencies have 
recognised the growing importance of media like Twitter, Tumblr, Instragram, Pinterest and 
Facebook though they have had mixed results from their attempts to exploit it for their own 
messaging and influence, partly because of social media users scepticism of Governmental 
“propaganda”. UK cultural and educational institutions are developing their digital offer to 
extend their reach, offering access to their collections, promoting their study opportunities, 
exploiting their intellectual property and sharing knowledge. 
 
3.5 The British Council is developing its online presence to take advantage of the 
opportunities available in this new hyper-connected age. We benefit from our arms-length 
relationship with the UK Government and are viewed as a reliable, trusted player in the 
online world. We have an expanding online global presence, using digital services to reach 
millions of young people. Digital participation rose from 73 million in 2011-12 to 90 million 
in 2012-13. The number of people taking part in our online learning and social networks has 
doubled over the same period to 8.4 million. We expect this growth to accelerate further 
as we invest in our range of online tools and mobile apps. Our award-winning English 
language services on China’s leading micro blogging site Sina Weibo; our Middle East and 
North Africa Facebook page that is supporting 1,200,000 learners of English; and our Study, 
Work, Create web portal that brings together all the international opportunities available to 
young people in the UK in a one stop shop, are all examples of our global digital offer. We 
are also working with Intel to provide English language learning materials on 100 million 
computers by 2020 for schools, teachers and individuals to increase access to English 
language skills and improved technology-based learning worldwide. 
 
Trust 
3.6 Where it is successfully deployed, a nation’s soft power builds trust, strengthening ties 
between peoples and increasing the likelihood people will consider a country as a place to 
visit, study or invest. Our Trust Pays49 research has found the increased willingness to look 
positively on a country can be marked, both in places with which we have traditional ties but 
also places with no historic or cultural links. For example in India the percentage of 
respondents surveyed that looked to the UK more positively after engaging with the UK’s 
great cultural assets rose by 24% while in Russia it rises to 29% and Saudi Arabia 19%. The 
research also shows that the UK benefits significantly from its historic links through the 
Commonwealth with much higher levels of trust than the USA or Germany in countries like 
Pakistan and India. The other critical finding of the research is that trust in the people of the 
UK usually runs ahead of trust in the UK Government, perhaps unsurprisingly so in Russia 
and China but also in Spain and Saudi Arabia where there is 20% difference in levels of trust. 
The research is clear, exposure to a country’s culture and values can improve perceptions, 
counter negative impressions and open up opportunities for further engagement. Successful, 
non-Governmental people-to–people engagement increases the likelihood an individual will 
choose and/or recommend the UK as destination for visiting, study and investment. Crucially 
for Governments, our research has found that cultural engagement - soft power - 
successfully deployed, measurably increases the trust in Governments, generating 
opportunities for diplomacy and trade. 
Reciprocity 
                                            
49 Trust Pays, British Council, 2012 
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3.7 Soft power is most effective where the focus is on sharing and reciprocity rather than 
simply selling a message. It parallels how people behave in their everyday life – friendships 
develop through communication, shared experiences, understanding and mutual interests. 
Hard power intimidates, soft power engages. By sharing the best of our culture, language and 
education and being interested and accepting of what others have to offer trust is built up. 
At its simplest, the key to soft power is old fashioned good manners. 
 
4 The UK’s soft power assets 
4.1 The UK has exceptional soft power assets in its culture, language and education; it’s long, 
rich and uniquely outward-looking history; and the powerful attractions of a modern, 
vibrant, creative, ultra-connected, open, tolerant, stable, democratic society.  
 
English 
 
4.2 Our single greatest soft power asset is the English language. The value of English to the 
UK cannot be overstated; it is the international language of the world and gives the UK and 
other Anglophone countries a very real edge in international affairs. It is one of the six 
official languages of the United Nations, the working language of the World Bank and one of 
three procedural languages of the EU. The long-term economic benefit to the UK of the 
English language has been estimated at £405bn by consultancy firm Brand Finance with the 
Intellectual Property asset value of the language to the UK estimated at £101bn.50 It is one of 
the key elements in the success of international financial centres like London, New York and 
Hong Kong. Our research has consistently found English to be the UK’s most attractive soft 
power asset globally, with the implication that the strongest assets are those offering 
practical, economic advantage. Research undertaken by Euromonitor for us found that 
proficiency in English significantly increases the earning potential of young people in the 
Middle East and North Africa, varying from 5% in Tunisia to 95% in Iraq. Proficiency in 
English is a valued skill globally, sharing our language and creating opportunities to learn and 
practice speaking it is the most potent soft power deployment available to the UK. 
 
4.3 But English is a critical element in the soft power of the UK and other states not only as 
an immensely attractive asset in its own right but also because it is vital to the accessibility of 
other key cultural assets – our education, culture and values. The UK’s global influence 
draws on its reputation as a place of excellence, creativity, ingenuity, a world leader in 
finance, the Law, science, research, the arts and creative industries. 
 
Education 
 
4.4 The UK’s education institutions are highly regarded internationally and are an essential 
element of our soft power offer. Our schools and universities attract international students 
through the English language and the quality of the educational experience on offer. There is 
a significant advantage to an international student of having qualifications from a globally 
recognised institution like Cambridge University; it greatly enhances an individual’s career 
prospects in much the same way that proficiency in English offers potentially significant 
economic advantages. The UK higher education sector is one of the most internationalised 
in the world: 18 per cent of our student base is international, over 25 per cent of faculty are 
non-EU, and more than 80 per cent of UK institutions are involved in international 
partnerships. BIS estimates that in 2011 the value of education exports to the UK was £17.5 
                                            
50 The English Effect, British Council, 2013 
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billion with the UK the second most popular destination for international students with 13% 
of the international market.  
 
4.5 The British Council supports the UK’s educational institutions internationally, bringing 
together partners in research collaborations like the BIRAX Regenerative Medicine initiative 
that is deepening collaboration between the UK and Israel in regenerative medicine. The 
scheme is supporting high-quality and ground-breaking UK–Israel research projects to 
develop treatments for multiple sclerosis and Parkinson’s disease and a regenerative therapy 
for type 1 diabetes. We promote the UK’s higher education institutions overseas to attract 
international students through exhibitions and services like the Education UK website that 
lists more than 150,000 UK courses and our Transnational Education (TNE) service which 
helps UK institutions develop and effectively promote international programmes. Our 
dedicated staff in-country provide bespoke support to identify the best opportunities to 
promote courses, broker relevant partnerships, develop and execute marketing plans and 
establish a clear route map through the local legal and regulatory processes including quality 
assurance frameworks. 
 
4.6 The successful expansion of the UK international higher education market is vulnerable 
to the consequences of UK Government policy. The UK is the second most popular 
destination for Indian nationals looking to study overseas – a total of 40,890 students in 
2010–11, contributing over £850 million to the UK economy but Indians are now rejecting 
the UK as a result of recent developments in visa policies. Since 2011 we have seen a 20% 
drop in the number of students coming to the UK from India. It is a very human response to 
the local press coverage of the UK’s recent policy changes. 
 
4.7 Higher education is by far the biggest part of the international education market but 
there is massive scope for expansion across the sector. Transnational education is set to 
grow dramatically as schools, colleges and other entrepreneurial institutions follow the trail 
blazed by Nottingham University in Malaysia and open up campuses in the high growth 
economies of Asia, the Middle East and the emerging Southern hemisphere powers. The 
market for English language teaching is huge and demand far outstrips the capacity available 
from current providers including the British Council and the leading private sector providers 
like Pearson. The scale of the opportunities available are immense and we work with private 
sector providers through market intelligence and networking opportunities to grow their 
own businesses overseas.  
 
Culture 
 
4.8 The UK’s arts, heritage and creative industries continue to play an important role in the 
UK’s attractiveness, with institutions such as the British Museum and Tate Modern 
continuing to draw millions of visitors every year. Visit Britain estimated the value of tourism 
to the UK economy in 2009 at £115 billion, the equivalent of 8.9% of UK GDP. Museums, 
galleries and the historic environment are essential attractions for visitors to the UK but so 
too are the UK’s performance spaces and arts companies. 2012 saw record ticket sales 
figures for London’s Theatreland of £529.7 million. The 2011 Edinburgh Festivals Impact 
Study estimated the economic impact of the festivals at £262 million to Scotland annually 
with the Fringe worth £142 million to Edinburgh. Public investment in cultural assets has a 
very real dividend for the UK economy.  
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4.9 The global pervasiveness of US and UK pop culture owes much to the international 
success of the English language. In an age where social media is increasingly significant in 
shaping opinions and sharing views, English is the premier language of the internet with a 
54.9% share. Globally UK artists and cultural exports are enjoying success at a level not seen 
in many years with the James Bond franchise, Adele and One Direction all enjoying very 
significant sales. Global album sales of UK artists were a record 13.3% of the worldwide total 
for 2012. The output from Hollywood is studded with UK talent – our actors, directors, 
screenwriters, technicians and studios are major players in popular culture globally. British 
talent dominates the publishing industry with Shakespeare followed closely by Tolkien and J 
K Rowling in numbers of sales. In 2011 exports by UK publishers were valued by the 
Publishers Association at £1,223m. Many of the world’s most popular literary icons are 
British – Sherlock Holmes, Elizabeth Bennett, Winnie the Pooh, Frankenstein’s Monster – 
creating great interest and passion for the UK. 
 
4.10 Elite culture has long played a role in soft power. The UK’s cultural institutions are 
globally recognised with tours of our orchestras, theatrical and dance companies and 
museums and galleries always immensely popular. Our architects, artists and designers are in 
demand around the world with Lord Foster, Zaha Hadid, Thomas Heatherwick and other 
leading figures transforming cityscapes and public spaces with the best in British design. Our 
influence in the world of fashion is immense with our designers playing leading roles in the 
great fashion houses as well as masterminding the success of their own labels under the 
watchful eye of Anna Wintour. 
 
4.11 The British Council manages the British Pavilion at the Venice Biennale and supports 
the devolved administrations’ participation at the festival, showcasing the best of British art. 
We also support and help to co-ordinate the international activities of the UK’s great arts 
institutions to ensure maximum impact for the UK, through programmes like our four year 
Transform season in Brazil where we are collaborating with the Southbank Centre, the ICA, 
the BFI, the Roundhouse and the V&A to take the very best of British arts and creativity to 
new audiences across Brazil. 
 
4.12 Sport has a universal appeal that crosses language and cultural barriers making it the 
most accessible and exportable of the UK’s soft power assets. And the UK is a world leader. 
The sporting elite are every bit as popular internationally as movie and pop stars – Andy 
Murray and Gareth Bale are hugely popular figures around the world. The global following of 
Premier League Clubs is staggering. Chelsea has supporters’ club branches in Mongolia, 
Japan, Chile, Nigeria, Brazil, Singapore, Russia, Uzbekistan and even Iran. Football is a global 
game with universal appeal. The British Council recognises the global appeal of the Premier 
League, our partnership with the Premier League on Premier Skills has helped us train more 
than 2,300 coaches since 2007 and reached a further 400,000 young people around the 
world.  
 
4.13 The commercial success of many of our modern stars owes much to the UK’s 
pragmatic mixed economy approach to funding for culture. Public funding underpins the local 
and regional infrastructure that fosters talent – the local theatre where the next Ian 
Mckellen learns his craft, the music programme that gives the next Emeli Sandé the creative 
space to practice and grow. Public support has been critical to UK artists’ global impact. 
Equally significantly, it enables our great national companies to take creative risks instead of 
always producing the popular show that is guaranteed to sell out, to enable directors, 
composers, choreographers and playwrights to experiment and develop the skills and 
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experience to make the new classics of the 21st century. However, it is not all about tax 
payer funding. Our theatres, galleries and arts companies are incredibly entrepreneurial, they 
must maximise their own income if they are to thrive. Entrepreneurialism drives ambition 
and innovation – the Tate Gallery receives 40% of its funding from the Government with the 
rest coming from foundations, corporate sponsors, individual and international supporters, a 
100,000 strong Membership scheme and a £4.9m profit from the Catering and Enterprise 
team. 
 
4.14 The UK’s heritage casts a powerful spell over much of the globe. The Royal Wedding 
was not just a UK or even Commonwealth event it drew a truly global audience with an 
estimated 2bn people in more than 180 countries following newspaper reports, photos and 
TV. In the build-up to the big day Twitter recorded 237 tweets about the wedding every 
second. The Royal Family are a soft power magnet, for many people around the globe the 
Queen is one of life’s few constants, a pole star in an ever changing world. The value of the 
UK’s stability, history, pomp and ceremony as a soft power asset is difficult to quantify, there 
are visitor numbers for the castles and palaces and viewing figures for the Diamond Jubilee 
regatta but the importance of history, roots, of belonging is intangible. It is nevertheless an 
inspiration to those countries emerging from periods of instability and conflict. The 
Commonwealth is also a critical component of the UK’s soft power, it brings countries 
together and celebrates and promotes shared values and experiences. Those in the UK that 
dismiss it fail to recognise the value placed in it by the governments of other member 
countries or the soft power benefits to the UK of the education, cultural and sporting links 
that it promotes.  
 
London 
 
4.15 London is undoubtedly one of the world’s most attractive cities and is an integral part 
in the UK’s soft power. It is an irresistible magnet for people from all corners of the world, 
not just those with historic or cultural links. The City is an immense asset. London’s global 
position as a leading financial hub is a massive global draw. That hub status is not simply a 
result of our history; other once-great centres of commerce have faded into relative 
obscurity. It depends on the UK’s attractiveness – the English language; our convenient time 
zone between the USA and the Far East; a stable, open, tolerant country; an economy with 
transparent legal, tax and regulatory regimes; the talented people who live and work here; 
and the quality of life on offer: the shops and restaurants, theatres, museums and 
international sporting venues, the parks and architecture, the schools and infrastructure. The 
concentration of financial, legal and other key services and international institutions in one 
place, together with the capital’s great cultural assets form a unique and rich offer to 
investors, entrepreneurs, writers, artists, academics and students.  
 
4.16 London has a reputation for offering the best in fashion, luxury goods and services with 
internationally lauded hotels and restaurants. London has been the playground for the 
wealthy for centuries both as a showroom for the best British brands like Burberry and Rolls 
Royce but also as the world’s auction house for everything from Old Masters to fine wines. 
London, and the wider UK, benefit from brand Britain, from the legendary “cool” of ‘60s 
Carnaby Street to the 21st century ubiquity of Cara Delevigne’s eyebrows. London appeals 
to the rich and the fabulous, to the young and the fashion forward, to the mature and 
nostalgic. The London Underground sign is every bit as iconic as McDonalds golden arches 
or Apple’s apple. 
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Values 
 
4.17 Much of London’s global success can be traced to the UK’s values. The freedoms and 
security we take for granted are hugely attractive to people living in less open and tolerant 
places. Other countries look to the UK for advice and support on how to strengthen their 
civic institutions and build a safer, more prosperous future. The Foreign Office’s work 
promoting Human Rights is also incredibly important to the UK’s reputation – speaking out 
against repression, intolerance and criminality builds trust with the isolated, oppressed 
victims of abuse and the “silent majority” that despise injustice and want only peace and a 
better future for their children. Government sponsored campaigns like the work on violence 
against women and girls are building trust for the UK and enhancing our reputation as a just, 
caring and reliable ally. The UK has far more internationally focussed NGOs than other 
countries in Europe. The advocacy work of Amnesty International, the life-saving 
development work of Oxfam and Save the Children and the numerous other NGOs that 
strive to build a better world give the UK a massive boost in credibility and trust. Sharing 
our way of life, showing solidarity with the citizens of the world, caring enough to want to 
help and knowing to ask how we can help, are all reasons the UK is taken seriously, 
respected and listened to internationally. 
 
4.18 The British Council manages the Justice for All programme in Nigeria that aims to build 
the capacity, accountability and responsiveness of key policing, justice and anti-corruption 
institutions to improve access to security and justice for all Nigerians. In Burma, we offer 
uncensored access to the internet, with a quarter of a million users coming to our libraries 
each year. People can learn English and experience UK and international culture and 
freedom of expression in a safe, open environment. We have initiated a programme to train 
10,000 English teachers a year in partnership with Burma’s Ministry of Education – this will 
improve the teaching of English for two million young Burmese each year. 
 
5 Learning from others 
 
5.1 Our report, Influence and Attraction: Culture and the race for soft power in the 21st 
century, explores global approaches to soft power in depth. Many countries are recognising 
the importance of soft power and are developing their offer. There are long established 
players like the French and Germans. Much is made of China’s enormous investment in 
international English language broadcasting and its rapidly expanding network of Confucius 
Institutes. There are newer entrants into the soft power “market”: Thailand, South Korea, 
Brazil, Turkey, Iraq, the Gulf States and many others who are developing soft power 
strategies and investing to grow their international reputation and clout. For most, 
investment in soft power is viewed as a national PR operation, a marketing campaign to shift 
perceptions of a country, attract potential investors, students and tourists, and/or counter 
the “negative propaganda” of rival states. It is about winning the “battle for hearts and 
minds” and the “Global Race”. This is evident in the approach of the Chinese whose massive 
investment in international English language TV and its global network of Confucius Institutes 
is designed to deliver former President Hu Jintao’s aspiration to make “the voice of China 
better heard in international affairs”.  
 
Soft power strategies 
 
5.2 Countries around the world are adopting strategies for their soft power, investing in 
infrastructure like cultural institutes and programmes like scholarship schemes and 
British Council – Supplementary written evidence 
241 
 
marketing campaigns. There are different models for deploying a nation’s soft power. 
Western countries’ cultural institutes tend to take one of two broad approaches - an arm’s 
length governance structure that is aligned with their government’s broad strategic priorities 
but are empowered to act autonomously, or else as a unit embedded in the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and functioning very much as an arm of government. Our research suggests 
the former approach is more successful at generating trust as people tend to be less trusting 
of government “propaganda”.  
 
5.3 The lesson for the UK is that we cannot rest on our laurels, other countries are looking 
at what the UK has done to secure its top spot in the soft power league table and are 
developing their own offer. The scale of China’s ambitions is reflected in the level of 
investment in its network of Confucius Institutes, spending rose from ¥350 million in 2006 
to ¥1.23 billion in 2009 and a network of 122 classrooms and institutes in 49 countries in 
2006 to a network of 826 in 104 countries in 2011. Vast resources are also being invested in 
English language broadcasting by China. 
 
5.4 The UK will need to continue to innovate, to support its soft power assets. In age of 
limited public resources, the UK cannot simply compete £ for ¥ with China and other 
competitors. We will need to think strategically about how we invest, supporting 
organisations like our universities and museums to be more entrepreneurial and to be 
ambitious internationally. Knowing when to get out of the way and avoiding undermining the 
UK’s soft power is a key challenge for Government. Governments are not as effective at 
building trust as people, striking the right balance between central control and an ineffective, 
uncoordinated approach to soft power is critical. The UK has been getting the mix broadly 
right but there are certainly lessons to be learned from our soft power competitors.  
 
Les Saisons Culturelles 
 
5.5 The long success of the French Cultural Festivals, Seasons and Years over the last 
quarter century, developed in collaboration between the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and 
Culture and the Institute Français, is one the UK has adopted to great effect recently. The 
approach targets the places that are strategically important to the UK’s prosperity and 
deploys the soft power assets that will hold the strongest appeal to that place to build 
bridges, challenge preconceptions and develop further opportunities for the UK. The role of 
Government is significant, the announcement of the Season brings political leaders together, 
opening channels for diplomacy and engagement, and over the course of the Season 
politicians, businesses and other partners have countless opportunities to engage – parallel 
events are almost inevitably scheduled to discuss education, the creative industries, for 
networking and to explore commercial opportunities. 
 
5.6 In 2012 we organised UKNow which saw events take place in 29 cities across China, 
including Hong Kong and Macao, and featured 780 UK artists performing across 170 venues. 
More than four million people attended events and millions more participated through the 
website and social media channels. Last year we launched Transform, a four-year 
programme of cultural exchange and collaboration between the UK and Brazil. The UK is 
viewed by Brazilian stakeholders and cultural organisations as a leader in terms of arts and 
cultural management, and policy development and implementation - particularly in 
articulating and linking cultural policy to economic policy. Transform is using our established 
reputation to develop and deepening links between Brazil and the UK to build trust and 
generate further opportunities for the UK. In 2014 we are looking forward to the UK-
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Russia Year of Culture and to ZA/Connect, our UK-South Africa Season. The great strength 
of the Season approach is in the magnifying effect of a series of events, a single exhibition or 
performance may attract rave reviews but the impact on the UK’s standing and reputation 
will be limited as the focus will be on the event itself. A co-ordinated programme of cultural 
events can powerfully demonstrate the attractions of the UK. They work so well as they are 
built around reciprocal arrangements. For example, the British Council’s programme for the 
2014 UK-Russia Year of Culture will bring the best of Russian arts and culture to audiences 
across the UK as well as taking the best of British creativity to audiences in Moscow, St 
Petersburg and other major Russian cities.  
 
Scholarships 
 
5.7 Scholarship programmes like Chevening bring the brightest and best international 
students to the UK, creating a pool of alumni who should look positively to the UK after 
spending a long period in the country submerged in the culture and surrounded by its 
people. It is a model replicated around the world. The Chinese are investing heavily in 
expanding provision – there are an unprecedented 12,000 African students currently 
studying in China a figure that dwarfs that of all the other programmes open to young 
Africans. It has the potential to have a very significant impact on China’s future influence 
across the continent. By way of illustration of the potential of this investment by China, the 
Heads of State of Denmark, Portugal, Iceland, Norway and Turkey have all studied in the 
UK; a 2011 report by the Home Affairs Select Committee identified 27 such Heads of State. 
The UK does exceptionally well in attracting young people to study in the UK but the 
numbers of scholarships on offer are limited which could leave the UK lagging far behind 
China in terms of influence in Africa as the African economy picks up pace. There may be a 
role for Government to provide additional, targeted scholarships for the leaders of the 
tomorrow. At present we rely on attracting young people with the means to fund their own 
studies to choose the UK but those unable to afford the fees and living expenses of studying 
here will turn to China and other providers to get the education they want at a price they 
can afford enabling China to build trust and develop the contacts that will give them 
influence in the future. We will need to be much more proactive if we want to build up trust 
and influence and secure our market position in the “African lion” economies of the 21st 
century.  
 
5.8 Engaging in schemes like Brazilian President Dilma’s Science Without Borders 
programme and supporting UK higher education institutions to attract more of the brightest 
and best international students or to open up new campuses in overseas markets are models 
for what might be done in Africa and other places of strategic importance to the UK’s future 
security and prosperity. With the UK’s traditional strengths in higher education, links 
through the Commonwealth and the growing recognition of the commercial advantages of 
the English language in Francophone Africa and elsewhere, the UK has a strong appeal to 
young people but Government intervention is needed to ensure opportunities are made 
available to the people the UK most needs to engage with to meet its strategic needs, rather 
than just the ones wealthy enough to self-finance their studies. 
 
Broadcasting 
 
5.9 In the BBC World Service the UK has a unique asset. The trust it has built around the 
world for the UK since its foundation has been huge. For many people it has been their only 
link to the wider world. For many years it was unrivalled in its reach and impact. Technology 
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and the ambitions of other states has seen an explosion in competitors. The rise and rise of 
Al-Jazeera and the massive investment in China Central Television have been well 
documented but the internet and mobile services are “voices” speaking to the world, 
informing and colouring opinion, influencing and shaping reputation and trust. This new 
crowded market is one the UK is well placed to compete and thrive in. The BBC has been at 
the forefront of innovation in online and broadcast news and will continue to do so while 
the UK’s globally recognised creativity and expertise in digital services will continue to 
combine to produce the kind of vibrant content for radio, television and the internet that 
people want to see and hear. Services like the British Council’s award winning Selector 
which shares the best of new British music with audiences all over the world attracts 
international audiences as well as awards. More subtly, the independence of the BBC will see 
it continue to be recognised and trusted as an unbiased reporter. Al-Jazeera’s success comes 
in no small part from its freedom to report while CCTV’s influence overseas will continue to 
be undermined as long as the suspicion that it is the voice of the Chinese authorities persists 
in the minds of audiences. The UK will though need to avoid being too heavily reliant on the 
current international supremacy of English as other languages grow in importance, our 
competitors in Europe and the Far East are investing in Arab language TV channels for 
example. 
 
Film, video games & superbrands 
 
5.10 The free-market Americans have in Hollywood the true global Behemoth of soft power. 
The film industry is the reason the USA is a consistent leader in soft power and at 
apparently little cost to the American people. From Tehran to Taipei the blockbuster and A-
list star exerts an attraction with very few rivals. Hollywood is a critical element in the 
USA’s soft power, James Bond and Harry Potter may be quintessentially British icons but 
they sit alongside Superman, G I Joe, the Terminator, Indiana Jones, Captain James T Kirk, 
Jason Bourne, Mickey Mouse, and Han Solo. The attractive power of these icons is huge. But 
it is a myth that the movie industry is free soft power for the USA. Hollywood’s great 
commercial success depends on the tax credits, movie production incentives, cash rebates, 
grants, tax exemptions and fee waivers and other kickbacks offered by US state legislatures, 
and international players – including Canada, the UK, New Zealand, Hungary and the Czech 
Republic, that can offset 25-30% or more of the production expenditure. It is more heavily 
subsidised than the UK’s national arts institutions.  
 
5.11 Alongside the UK and the USA, Japan has produced some of the greatest pop culture 
icons of recent years. Video games and anime icons like Mario, Zelda, Sonic the Hedgehog, 
and the world’s second most famous mouse, Pikachu, are all significant contributors to 
Japan’s soft power. The Pokémon phenomenon was a master class in creativity, branding and 
marketing by Nintendo, one of the few global rivals to Disney, Marvel and George Lucas in 
the creation of enduring, pop culture icons. Gaming, gadgets and Tokyo’s soaring 
architecture and neon lights project an image of an ultra-modern, high tech, innovative, 
creative, fun and exciting nation. 
 
5.12 But icons are not the preserve of movies, games and comic books, the US’s instantly 
recognisable super brands are also iconic – McDonalds, Coke, Pepsi, Nike – and a crucial 
element in its global attractiveness. The UK has its share of super brands and iconic figures 
but there has been a tendency for the UK to export its creativity rather than harness it – 
British ingenuity can be found at the heart of the success of Apple, Marvel and all the other 
soft power pop culture powerhouses. Fostering that talent at home and building the 
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businesses that can compete on equal terms with Square Enix, HBO and Sony should be a 
goal of a government looking to rebalance the UK economy.  
 
Immigration 
 
5.13 The UK Government’s approach to immigration has significant implications for the UK’s 
attractiveness. What is often regarded as a domestic issue is followed closely in Kolkata, São 
Paulo and many other cities round the world. UK politicians and the Home Office have at 
times displayed a naivety over the UK’s national interests in building trust in key markets 
through its handling both of policy but more particularly the messaging around policy 
changes. Whatever the intention, the message being received overseas is that the UK is 
closed for business. With the very significant inward investment made into the UK economy 
by the Chinese, the Indians and the Gulf States, and the high volumes of students choosing 
the UK for study for 1-3 years before returning home, much greater effort should be made 
to ensure the efforts of the Foreign Office, BIS and the Prime Minister himself are not 
undermined by poor communications. Our international competitors are looking to 
encourage and make it easier for brilliant researchers, wealthy tourists and potential 
investors to visit and enrich their countries at the very time we are perceived as raising the 
drawbridge to deter people from coming to the UK.  
 
6 Recommendations 
 
6.1 We are now entering an entirely new world where influence is increasingly diffuse, and 
the prevalence and speed of connections created by new technology are fundamentally 
changing the way in which people relate to each other. Relationships between countries are 
changing fast. Soft power has always been important, but in this new environment it is now 
indispensable for countries that want to prosper and remain secure. 
 
6.2 This fundamental change in the international landscape is increasingly placing individuals, 
civil society organisations and businesses as key actors in international relations. The 
challenge for governments is how to create the conditions whereby the people of their 
countries can effectively participate in this globalised international community, maximising 
benefits in trade, investment, security, knowledge and mutual learning and connections. 
 
6.3 To date, the process of globalisation and growth of hyper-connectivity has been a very 
positive development for the UK. We have a long proud history as an outward facing nation, 
and the rise of the English language as the de-facto language of global business and higher 
education has given the UK a huge competitive advantage. The UK population is widely 
regarded as diverse, tolerant and accepting of difference – vital attributes in a globally 
connected world.   
 
6.4 However, the UK cannot rest on its laurels as other countries are developing soft power 
strategies and investing heavily to compete with the established soft power superpowers. 
They are assimilating the lessons of the UK’s success and are also innovating – for example 
Thailand’s ambition to become the ‘kitchen of the world’ or Brazil’s Science Without 
Borders programme. Monocle’s reigning soft power champion is vulnerable in a number of 
key areas and will need to take action to remain competitive.  
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The relatively weak level of international skills in the UK population  
 
6.5 As country we are far too dependent on the dominance of the English language. English 
has been hugely advantageous to the UK and 1 in 4 people globally speak the language but 
that leaves 3 in 4 who do not. Many of those are in key growth markets with large 
populations like Brazil, Indonesia, China, countries whose languages are going to be 
increasingly important as their economic power continues to grow. With Asian economies 
growing fast, our competitors in Western Europe and around the world are learning 
Mandarin and other languages in increasing numbers while the UK continues to lag behind.  
6.6 According to the Education and Employers Task Force, poor language competency is 
resulting in a direct loss of at least £7.3 billion per annum to the UK economy – that’s 0.5% 
of GDP. As international trade grows, this is only likely to increase. In addition, if UK citizens 
cannot speak other languages they will miss out on opportunities for international learning 
and knowledge exchange, and risk being seen as internally focused and disinterested in other 
countries – the opposite of what makes for successful influence in a global age. 
 
6.7 In a world where individuals connect more and more across international boundaries, 
and knowledge and networks are increasingly the key sources of attraction and influence, 
promoting the value of modern languages to young people is going to be critical. Yet the 
current trend is in exactly the opposite direction. 
 
6.8 A 2012 European Commission study found that only 9% of English pupils surveyed at age 
15 were competent in their first foreign language beyond a basic level, compared to 42% of 
their peers across the EU.   
 
6.9 Language learning in UK schools has seen a sharp decline from 78% of GCSE students in 
2001 to 40% in 2011 (Language Trends Survey) and although the results this year may finally 
mark the turning point in this trend, the 2013 A-level results continue to be a source of 
serious concern with a 10% fall in the number of students taking French on 2012 and falls in 
Mandarin, Arabic, German and Italian. This decline is also apparent in higher education.  
Despite a 3.5% increase in the number of students applying to university in 2013, applications 
to study modern languages fell by 6.7% and many institutions are looking to downsize or 
close their language departments. 
 
6.10 In 2013, our Culture at Work research showed that businesses in 9 key countries 
(including India, China, Brazil and South Africa and the UK), place a high value on 
intercultural and language skills for bringing in new clients, building trust and protecting 
reputation.  Our research has also revealed the significant disparity between the very high 
value placed by UK employers on modern languages and international skills, and the low 
value placed on these skills by UK young people.   
 
6.11 While the government’s recent reforms to the school curriculum that have placed a 
greater emphasis on language learning are to be welcomed, we believe that much more 
needs to be done in this area to deliver the kind of step change that the UK requires.  
 
6.12 Possible options for increasing take up might include: 
• Compulsory language learning, though this would not necessarily alter young people’s 
attitudes to language learning. 
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• A vigorous campaign to inform parents and young people of the career benefits of 
language learning. 
• Curriculum reform to make languages a more accessible and attractive subject to 
young people.  
The low number of UK young people who study overseas 
 
6.13 Equally important to language learning is the cultural understanding and familiarity that a 
period of studying or living overseas brings. The UK is a global leader in the international 
student recruitment market, attracting young people from around the world. However, it 
performs very weakly in terms of the outward mobility of students with only around 22,000 
UK students studying overseas, while the UK attracts over 400,000 students to study in UK 
higher education Institutions each year, as well as several hundred thousand more in pre-HE 
education, vocational training, Further Education or English language training. 
 
6.14 The critical importance of international skills and experience to the UK economy has 
been highlighted by the British Chambers of Commerce in a survey of over 8,000 businesses. 
The findings suggested that “providing firms with more training in foreign languages, and 
increasing their exposure to international companies would encourage more business 
owners to export”. We believe that ensuring that a higher proportion of the future 
workforce has studied and experienced life abroad would make a significant impact in this 
area. 
 
6.15 As well as the clear gain for businesses through a better skilled workforce, there is 
significant evidence that people forming connections and friendships with people from the 
UK – including with UK students studying overseas - has wider soft power benefits. This is 
demonstrated, for example in higher levels of trust towards the people and government of 
the UK and an increased propensity to want to do invest, visit or study in the UK. Our 
brilliant young people are among the best ambassadors the UK has. 
 
6.16 The British Council has recently launched a major new programme - Generation UK - 
which aims to enable 15,000 young people to undertake a fully funded study or work 
placement in China by 2016. Later this year we plan to extend this scheme to also offer 
opportunities in India. We would very much like to further extend this scheme, both in 
terms of numbers and countries covered in the future, and are working with private sector 
partners to secure funding.   
 
6.17 Again a key challenge is getting young people to recognise the benefits of living, working 
or studying abroad. More work needs to be undertaken to understand the barriers to young 
people’s outward mobility. Poor language skills and a fear of the unknown are likely possible 
factors but it may also partly be a result of the UK’s own attractions – if you want to work 
and live in the greatest city in the world why would you choose anywhere other than 
London to study for your MA? 
 
6.18 Understanding the barriers and identifying the policy responses to address the barriers 
are a key challenge. The UK government, the devolved governments, the education sector, 
the British Council and major UK businesses all have a role to play in increasing outward 
mobility for UK students and young people. There are plentiful opportunities for UK people 
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to live, work and study abroad but we need to inform young people about the benefits of 
doing so.  
 
6.19 Possible options include: 
• Developing a strategy to promote the very significant economic benefits of 
international skills and language learning are likely to be an important part of any co-
ordinated activity to increase take up. 
• A brokerage service to match graduates and current students with UK businesses 
who would like to develop their export potential to develop funding and training 
opportunities for young people to acquire the international skills their sponsoring 
partner needs. 
• Given the high levels of youth unemployment in the UK the value for money 
possibilities for a Government sponsored scheme to enable suitably qualified young 
people to undertake voluntary international study or work placements that will then 
enhance their employability and up skill the workforce are worth exploring.   
Scholarships 
 
6.20 Providing future leaders the opportunity to study in the UK has proven immensely 
valuable for building trust. Chevening and Fulbright alumni have retained strong links with 
the UK and are assets for our international influence and reputation. Scholarships are a 
unique way of attracting the brightest and best to the UK and to build lasting relationships. 
The UK is already a leading destination for international students yet more could be done to 
target young people who cannot afford to fund their own studies but who are likely to rise 
to positions of importance and influence in future. Scholarships offered on merit to 
outstanding young academics in countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia and the Middle 
East and North Africa would enable the UK to engage the young people who will hold key 
roles in strategically important countries in future. 
 
6.21 Possible options: 
 
• Expand existing scholarship programmes like Chevening by increasing the number of 
funded places available. 
• Develop international public-private partnership programmes bringing together UK 
firms that are looking to develop a presence overseas using a model similar to the 
British Council’s partnership with Tullow Oil. The Tullow Group Sponsorship 
scheme aims to build capacity in areas where Tullow’s host countries experience 
significant skills gaps, especially, but not exclusively, around their oil and gas 
industries. 
• Invest in the interchange of students and academics between UK and partner 
countries through programmes like UKIERI that has already created 600 partnerships 
between UK and Indian education institutions. 
 
Visa policy  
 
6.22 Following the introduction of new visa requirements in 2011 there has been a drop of 
almost 25% in the number of students coming to the UK from India and a 13% drop from 
Pakistan. The biggest impacts have been in Further Education and the English Language 
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Teaching Sector. The ONS quarterly report for April 2013 showed a 46% fall in applications 
from international students to further education colleges and English language schools.  
 
6.23 While some of the fall in applications has been offset by growth in the number of 
students coming to the UK from China, the UK’s overall growth in international student 
numbers of 4,570 in 2011-12 is tiny compared to recent US figures of a growth of 41,000 
students over the same period.  
 
6.24 Where our competitors are continuing to show strong growth in the numbers of 
international student applications, the UK’s market share is slowing and the current visa 
arrangements are a critical factor in the decline in growth. There are real risks to the UK’s 
research base as pioneering programmes in engineering and life sciences depend upon 
international students and researchers. In the longer term a fall in international student 
numbers could have significant costs to the UK’s economy. About 90% of full time 
postgraduate taught students in biotech and some engineering programmes are international 
– long term reduction in the number of these students would threaten the UK’s research 
base. Put crudely, the income from international students taking Masters courses is 
underpinning the advanced research programmes the UK depends upon to be internationally 
competitive.  
 
6.25 The British Council fully supports the Government’s intention to attract genuine 
students to the UK and we have been working very hard with the UK Government to get 
the right messages out to key countries, especially India. However, given the long term 
economic, soft power and other benefits from international student recruitment we believe 
that there should be a much greater awareness of the impact of domestic policy issues such 
as immigration policy and their impact on soft power.  
 
6.26 It is a fact that the vast majority of students return home at the end of their course or 
else after gaining an extra 6 – 18 months of professional experience. They are not migrants, 
they are temporary visitors - paying guests – they should be excluded from the net-migration 
figures.  
 
6.27 Alongside student visas, delivering a flexible, affordable, fast and effective service for 
visitor visas for international artists, sportsmen and –women and politicians and other 
leaders is key to the UK’s soft power. Needless bureaucracy and red tape should not be 
allowed to jeopardise important intercultural engagement. 
 
6.28 The two aspects of the visa regulations that have the potential to do the most damage 
to the UK economy and cost the most UK jobs are the restrictions to ‘pathway’ visas and 
the post-study work visas. We would support a review of these policies which we believe 
have a detrimental impact on the UK’s soft power. 
 
6.29 Possible options: 
 
• Government should consider how to better co-ordinate work across departments to 
ensure a joined up approach that takes account of the international implications to 
the UK’s influence and reputation of policies like immigration.  
• Government should consider separating international students from the migrant 
statistics 
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• Government should assess the impact of visa reforms on the UK’s economy and 
international influence and reputation and consider reviewing policy accordingly. 
 
 
Maintaining a vibrant ‘mixed economy’ soft power model 
 
6.30 At a time of financial austerity there is a real risk that government departments and 
wider public and third sector bodies will deprioritise international work to focus on their 
‘core’ domestic roles. Whilst such programmes are relatively easy to cut, this could have 
long term soft power implications for the UK. 
 
6.31 Given the growing importance of soft power, we believe Government should consider 
introducing mechanisms to incentivise the protection of spending on international activity by 
departments. In addition, to encourage more international outreach, we would suggest 
consideration is given to how government could incentivise public bodies linked to the arts, 
education and culture to increase the proportion of their work undertaken internationally 
and examine the potential to use tax incentives to encourage businesses to support or 
sponsor international cultural programmes which support UK soft power, like student 
exchange programmes and support international events like Expos and tours by UK arts 
companies. 
 
6.32 Many of the UK’s soft power assets are extremely valuable contributors to the UK 
economy and should be nurtured and supported by Government for that alone. While our 
universities and national cultural institutions – including the British Council – are 
demonstrating increasing entrepreneurialism in developing and growing their own income, 
public funding remains crucial to the fostering of young talent, the pursuit of excellence and 
the continual renewal of the UK’s creative base. Government should be wary of cutting the 
relative modest funding for the arts and HE sectors as the limited short term impact on the 
Exchequer could have very serious implications for the economy in the long term if it 
damages the UK’s research base or starves the creative industries of the talent necessary to 
drive innovation or dims the light of the country’s cultural fires that does so much to lure 
tourists, students and investors to the UK. Further research on the value of the arts and 
education to the UK’s soft power could be illuminating, potentially adding a significant 
premium to the existing economic case for investment. 
 
6.33 Apart from the domestic economic arguments for public subsidy for arts and education, 
in terms of soft power, public money is also the lever by which Government can influence 
and co-ordinate the international activities of a vibrant, diverse creative economy to 
maximise impact for the UK’s influence and attraction. Seasons need to be co-ordinated and 
the FCO and organisations like the British Council need to have the resources to administer 
and organise complex programmes and be able to support other participants’ involvement.  
 
6.34 Public money is needed to ensure the UK’s soft power is deployed where it needs to 
be rather than just where it is profitable to be. It is essential to the British Council’s work 
and presence in strategically important but fragile states where it would be impossible to 
generate an income to support our activities. If the UK wants to continue to operate across 
the whole spectrum of international relations on a global scale it will need to continue to 
invest public money on its soft power assets as well as on military hardware and 
development assistance. 
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6.35 Possible options: 
 
• Further research on the effectiveness of different international strengths in soft 
power would enable the UK to learn from the experiences of others and take action 
to mitigate the risks of losing influence and reputation. 
• Government should explore the potential of tax breaks and other incentives to 
encourage private sector support for international soft power programmes like 
scholarship schemes and international arts showcases and festivals that support the 
UK’s strategic objectives.  
• Government could consider funding models to support the expansion in the 
international activities of our great cultural institutions, potentially involving private as 
well as public money. For example: National Lottery money might be used to support 
international partnerships to bring new work to UK audiences and share the best of 
the UK’s cultural assets overseas; Government could set up a challenge fund 
administered by a body like the Arts Council or the British Council to encourage 
organisations to develop more ambitious international touring programmes; and/or 
Government could bring forward targeted support to enable more institutions to 
take part in Cultural Seasons in strategically important countries. 
• Government and agencies need to consider the potential opportunities and 
challenges of the explosive growth in social media and other people-to-people 
contacts in terms of the UK’s soft power to maximise the benefits in terms of reach 
and impact. 
 
7 Appendix – the British Council 
 
About the British Council 
7.1 The British Council creates international opportunities for the people of the UK and 
other countries and builds trust between them worldwide. We are on the ground in over 
100 countries. We connect the UK with people around the world, sharing the UK’s most 
attractive assets: the English language, the arts, education and our ways of living and 
organising society. We have over 75 years’ experience as the UK’s leading soft power 
agency. 
 
7.2 We stand beside and complement the work of the Diplomatic Service, HM Armed 
Forces, DfID, UKTI and the BBC World Service, in representing the UK to the wider world. 
We are closely aligned with the FCO through our NDPB status and Board-level 
representation but, crucially, are operationally independent. Our key strength is that we 
work in the spirit of reciprocity – we not only take the UK to the world but we also help 
bring the world to the UK. We share rather than broadcast and discuss rather than lecture. 
In a very human way, we build trust between the people of the UK and the peoples of other 
nations. 
 
7.3 We work with three main groups of people - young people in education, or starting out 
on their careers, the leaders of the next generation; those who are practitioners in their 
field, such as teachers, academics, artists and community leaders; and a smaller number of 
people who are leaders in their societies: in politics, business, education or the arts. 
 
7.4 We act on behalf of the whole of the UK and have offices in Belfast, Cardiff, Edinburgh, 
London and Manchester. We work closely with the devolved administrations as well as with 
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the UK Government. We share the great cultural assets of England, Northern Ireland, 
Scotland and Wales with the rest of the world. We support the UK’s higher education 
institutions to attract international students, promoting our universities globally. We work 
closely with partners like the Premier League, Arts Council Northern Ireland, the National 
Museums of Scotland and National Theatre Wales on projects in the UK and overseas, like 
Premier Skills, Derry-Londonderry 2013, the Edinburgh Festivals and the Dylan Thomas 100 
Festival.  
 
7.5 We work with the UK Government and international partners to deliver life-changing 
projects with truly global reach. With funding from DfID we are delivering training for 1650 
teacher training college tutors in Tanzania to improve the training of 70,000 student primary 
and secondary school teachers. Through Badiliko, a programme run in partnership with 
Microsoft, we are establishing 90 solar-powered digital classrooms in six countries across 
Sub-Saharan Africa, training 3,000 teachers to use IT equipment and helping 100,000 
students gain new employment skills. Our UK Now Festival in China brought 780 UK artists 
to 170 venues across 29 cities to reach more than four million attendees and was made 
possible through support from Government and private sector sponsors like Jaguar and 
Diageo.  
 
7.6 Although the British Council has retained the same mission for which it was founded in 
1934, it has transformed its delivery model to become an exemplar of the entrepreneurial 
public service approach that mixes public funding with self-generated income to deliver 
maximum impact at the lowest possible cost to taxpayers. In the current financial year the 
Foreign Office grant to the British Council is £162m out of total projected income of 
£833m. Government grant now represents less than 20% of the British Council’s turnover; 
entrepreneurship delivers the rest through ‘paid for’ services, partnerships and work under 
contract. The grant-in-aid element of our funding model nevertheless remains vital, it 
underpins our presence and activity in countries that are strategically important to the UK’s 
national interests but where there are very limited opportunities to generate income, for 
example in fragile and post-conflict states. It also supports the core infrastructure of our 
global network and enables the organisation to develop world-class content for our projects 
in English, education and the arts worldwide. 
 
7.7 Our performance last year in figures:  
• We reached over 553 million people worldwide; 
• We worked with 10.8 million people face-to-face;  
• 12.7 million people attended our exhibitions, fairs and festivals;  
• In English we worked with 1.7 million policy makers, Government ministers, 
teachers and learners, 2.37 million exams candidates, 55.9 million website users and 
143.8 million viewers, listeners and readers; 
• In the arts we worked with 532,000 artists, art lovers, cultural leaders and ministers, 
9.5 million exhibition, festival, event and performance attendees and 142.3 million 
viewers, listeners and readers; and 
• In education and society we worked with 2.9 million education and citizenship 
exhibition and fair attendees, 5.9 million teachers, academics, education and youth 
sector leaders and young people and 14.7 million website users 
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How the British Council evaluates impact 
 
7.8 The British Council’s evaluation framework is grounded in a theory of change. Within 
the context of our overall strategy and purpose it sets out logically how our work in Arts, 
English, and Education and Society achieves positive change for our UK and overseas 
stakeholders. Such an approach is widely used by charities, social enterprises, government 
departments such as DFID and the private sector.  
 
7.9 To measure the impact of our work we use a range of tools: 
 
• We commission independent research. In the last year this has included the value of 
cultural relations activities to the UK business community: Culture Means Business and 
the impact of cultural relations in building trust for the UK: Trust Pays. The Trust 
research demonstrated that those people who had engaged in cultural activity with 
the UK had a higher level of trust in the people and government of the UK than 
those who had not. It also found that those who had engaged in cultural activity run 
by the British Council had a higher level of trust than those who had participated in 
activities provided by any other organisation. 
 
• We conduct an annual impact survey of our global stakeholders to assess how our 
work contributes to professional development, institutional development, and to 
awareness of and sustainable links with the UK. Whilst these are not exact measures 
of soft power, they do indicate the extent to which people value the experience of 
participating in our programmes. This clearly is an important factor in determining 
whether they are likely to have an enhanced view of the UK after participating in 
these activities. In the last year we surveyed and received data from 5000 people 
who have participated in our programmes within the last 6 – 24 months. The results 
have confirmed that as a result of our work almost 80% of our overseas participants 
in our programmes have strengthened or created new links with the UK and 85% 
have increased their awareness of the UK contribution to their sector.  
 
• We commission independent evaluation reports for our main programmes and have 
a system of internal reporting to understand how effectively our portfolio is 
delivering to its planned outcomes and delivering impact.  
 
• We are subject to the scrutiny of government and parliament. In June, the 
Independent Commission on Aid Impact reported, “The British Council’s response to 
the Arab Spring has been considered, strategic and a good complement to the FCO’s. It has 
a strong delivery model based on good local partnerships and beneficiary engagement and 
has proved effective at its core goal of skills development and individual empowerment, with 
some wider impact through social mobilisation.” 
 
September 2013 
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Creating Opportunities for UK Providers Worldwide 
 
Our Purpose 
  
The British Council shares the UK’s great cultural assets: the English language, arts, 
education and ways of living and organising society with the world. This:  
 
1. Builds trust in the people and institutions of the UK and supports prosperity and 
security around the world,  
2. Encourages people to visit, study in, and do business with the UK,  
3. Attracts people who really matter to our future to visit and engage with the UK. 
 
The trust generated by our work has a clear positive impact on people and governments’ 
willingness to do business with UK companies and institutions. Our research shows our 
work significantly increases the interest in the UK, and UK providers, creating opportunities 
for UK businesses.  
 
English is central to our work 
 
All cultural bodies worldwide start from sharing their language – the UK is immensely 
fortunate that English is ours. Nothing builds trust more effectively or is wanted more 
consistently from the UK worldwide, than our expertise and help in the English language. 
Some of this the British Council can deliver on behalf of the UK, a lot of it we do in 
partnership with other UK providers – exam boards, universities and private sector. But 
there is much more the UK could do, particularly in the state and public education systems 
of developing and emerging economies.  
 
We estimate over 1.5 billion people are learning English, one in five of the world's 
population. Of these, about 50 million people globally learn English through commercial 
teaching centres. The British Council has 1% of this market with our face-to-face teaching 
centres in 60 countries. However, we reach hundreds of millions more with our 
LearnEnglish websites for children, teens and adults, with wind-up MP3 players in Africa and 
via radio, television and social media worldwide in partnerships with the BBC, Premier 
League and others. 
 
We develop teachers and teaching resources in our large-scale English teaching operations in 
Western Europe, Asia, the Middle East and North Africa which are self-funding with no 
cross-subsidy from UK taxpayers. The resources we create in these larger operations enable 
us to reach and teach English in places few other organisations could – in conflict zones and 
developing countries throughout Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, the Middle East and 
North Africa; in countries like Afghanistan and South Sudan and in vital institutions for 
peace, governance and security like Egypt’s Al-Azhar University, military colleges and civil 
service academies.  
 
We use our English teaching expertise to open up other relationships for the UK with 
Ministries of Education. These enable us to work across state education sectors improving 
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quality and building capacity in teaching, teacher training, curriculum development, 
assessment and other areas. As an example, in Malaysia, we are working across 600 schools 
in Borneo to improve classroom teaching and learning of English and using a mentorship 
approach which will embed continuous teacher development and relationships long after the 
end of the project. 
 
British Council English teachers are world-renowned and form a top quality source of highly 
trained internationally mobile talent for other UK institutions and English providers - many 
of which are run by and employ former British Council teachers and teacher trainers. Within 
our pool of over 2,000 teachers we have a healthy annual turnover of around 20%, of which 
we estimate about 15% go into other jobs with other providers in the sector. Others go into 
academic research posts and contribute to English Language Teaching research, advancing 
the quality of English learning worldwide. 
 
Examples  
 
Piloting in the Americas, we have reframed our offer to governments and ministries to bring 
together the UK’s many strengths in both public education and English teaching. New web 
pages set out the opportunity for UK providers and presents to governments throughout 
the Americas the potential for complete UK-led, partnered and supplied solutions to these 
countries’ education needs for English, bilingualism and broader education – all the way from 
skills to Higher Education.  
 
• We work in partnership with others to deliver English Language contracts 
overseas in support of education reform in other countries, partners like 
Universities UK, HE institutions (Norwich Institute of Education, MARJON 
University, University of Wolverhampton, and University of Chichester), VSO, 
International House, Pearson, BELL Foundation and EAQUALS (quality and 
language assessment association). 
 
• We manage and distribute UK based exams internationally. This provides annual 
export earnings of over £70m to UK exam boards and professional bodies. 
 
• We jointly manage the Accreditation UK scheme with English UK. We accredit 
over 550 UK schools, colleges and universities as providers of quality English 
language learning, a powerful marketing tool for this £3billion UK business 
 
• We support and broker opportunities for the UK English Language Teaching 
sector in priority markets like China where we tender teacher development 
work to the UK sector on behalf of Chinese institutions. In other contexts, e.g. 
India we arrange seminars on market opportunities for UK providers. We publish 
market reports for the sector on key markets. This support and brokerage has 
led to numerous new contracts and business for British organisations. In Africa, 
for example, our work has helped to double the business for Cambridge 
International Exams in Nigeria. 
 
Fair Trading  
 
We have very clear policies on Fair Trading and a strong organisational commitment to 
increasing opportunity internationally for UK providers. We deliver our charitable objectives 
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with grant-in-aid from UK Government and also through partnerships, contracts and ‘paid 
for’ activities and we recognise that in carrying out our activities there may be an impact on 
other parties, including suppliers, competitors and partners. 
 
In response, the British Council adheres to all applicable legal requirements in our trading 
activities. We ensure operational and financial separation between State-funded activity and 
revenue generating activity through robust accounting firewalls and appropriate 
organisational structures. We have a Fair Trading Complaints Procedure for responding to 
concerns raised by other providers. 
 
We have clarified our guidance on when we can help UK organisations, and when we cannot 
given finite resources and our charitable purpose and mandate. We offer a mix of free and 
‘paid for’ services to support UK education providers of Education, English and Examination 
services, but we cannot offer free, unlimited promotion of one individual organisation’s 
products or services. We can offer support to UK providers under contract or on a ‘paid 
for’ basis where this does not conflict with our charitable purpose and does not unfairly 
disadvantage other UK providers. 
 
In summary  
 
The British Council builds the trust and creates the conditions for the success of UK 
providers. We are working hard with them to showcase the whole UK Education sector’s 
many strengths to overseas governments and agencies - all to create more exports, 
prosperity, security, opportunities and trust for the UK worldwide. 
 
18 December 2013 
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British Museum, British Council and BBC World Service – Oral 
evidence (QQ 63-92) 
 
Transcript to be found under the BBC World Service 
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1. Ever since the decision by Parliament in 1753 to establish the British Museum, the idea of 
global access to the collection in London has been at the heart of its activities, to help 
citizens both native and foreign to better understand the world and their place in it. 
Through revolutions in the safe transportation of objects, cheaper travel and digital 
technology, the Museum’s extensive international work and global collaboration have 
now enabled the Museum’s Trustees to make this principle a reality, sharing the 
collection and exchanging objects and expertise with museums and publics around the 
world. That the collection of the British Museum belongs as much to the world as it does 
to British citizens is a powerful statement about the openness of British culture, politics 
and society. This point is also illustrated by the international make-up of the Board of 
Trustees which is chaired by Niall FitzGerald, who is himself an Irish citizen. 
 
The extent and use of the UK’s soft power resources 
 
Is the Government doing enough to help the UK maximize the extent of, and benefit 
gained of, soft power? What more – or less – should the Government do to encourage 
the generation and use of soft power? 
 
2. The GREAT campaign is a good example of a Government-wide marketing initiative to 
promote the UK’s cultural activity to major international markets. However, the impact 
of this programme, along with other Government-supported initiatives and festivals, is 
clearly dependent on the capacity of those organisations that provide content. There are 
tensions between the aspirations of the GREAT campaign and the reality currently faced 
by content providers within the context of the changing climate for publicly-funded 
bodies. A possible solution might be to transfer funds directly from the GREAT campaign 
or from other promotional or coordinating organisations to the delivery bodies 
themselves. 
 
3. The World Collections Programme illustrated how a small amount of Government 
funding can enable key cultural institutions in the UK to collaborate with each other in a 
number of important regions of the world to provide a wider public benefit. This is 
particularly relevant to those areas of the world where commercial activity is not 
currently feasible or appropriate, but the reputational benefits for the organisations and 
the UK as whole can be considerable. The recent visit to the Museum by a senior 
delegation from the Nigerian Parliament and their subsequent invitation to work with 
them to develop their own Parliamentary museum demonstrates the different aspects of 
cultural relations which relate to soft power, including economic, political and 
democratic engagement. A dedicated fund to support the international activity of UK 
museums would enable them to pursue opportunities, including museum development, 
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training and capacity building, which otherwise will not be possible and could contribute 
significantly to the perception of the UK.  
 
 
 
4. National museums with global collections such as the British Museum require world-class 
staff to research, conserve, and present the collections to the public, both now and for 
future generations. Due to the nature of our collections the experts needed to carry out 
this work often come from outside the UK and the European Union. Securing visas for 
their stay has at times proved to be very difficult. This can also be true for visiting 
colleagues and overseas contacts such as those who attend the Museum’s annual 
International Training Programme (ITP), which welcomes over twenty young museum 
professionals each year to London from regions as varied as China, Brazil, Egypt, East and 
West Africa, India and the Middle East. The Museum has built important long-term 
relationships with the governments and cultural agencies of many countries in these 
areas, as well as developing new ones, and it is potentially embarrassing and damaging if 
the visa process is seen to be blocking potential applicants.  
 
5. Visas will remain an important issue for museums in a globalised and connected world. 
Initiatives such as the Interntational Training Programme can be of huge diplomatic and 
political value. The recent reception for the ITP was attended by a number of 
Ambassadors, Government Ministers, senior civil servants, and funders of the 
programme, who had the opportunity to meet the group of young museum professionals 
from around the world. The global network of alumni that the programme has 
developed is of huge value to the international museum community and is a great 
example of effective soft power. There is an opportunity for increased collaboration with 
the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and other international arms of Government to 
maximise the soft power potential of this global network of scholars, students, and 
future cultural leaders. 
 
6. The challenge around visas also affects in-bound tourism to the UK. A notable example 
of this have, until the recently announced changes, been the well-documented problems 
faced by Chinese visitors to the UK, who as a result are choosing to visit continental 
Europe instead. This has clearly been a missed opportunity when we consider the wider 
benefits for the economy and the significance of the appeal of London’s cultural offer for 
both tourists and employers. The role of museums in attracting and adding value to 
foreign visits is clear – 10% of visitors to the UK, and 25% of overseas visitors to 
London, choose to come to the British Museum alone. 
 
7. An important example of the way in which Government can support the British 
Museum’s activities and make the most of opportunities is the recent exhibition Mummy: 
the inside story which took place in Mumbai at the CSMVS (formerly the Prince of Wales 
Museum of Western India). The exhibition was a huge success with the public, receiving 
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over 300,000 visitors. It also provided the venue for a reception during the Prime 
Minister’s visit to India in February, bringing together both governments together with 
representatives of British and Indian businesses, supported by the joint sponsors of the 
exhibition, BP and the Reliance Foundation. The event helped to demonstrate the depth 
of engagement and collaboration between the two countries, while the involvement of 
the Prime Minister and his delegation added prestige to the exhibition and raised the 
profile of cultural relations between the UK and India. At the invitation of the Indian 
Government, the British Museum has, over the last two years, delivered a Leadership 
Training Programme for government museum and heritage professionals throughout 
India. This programme, and others like it, could provide an excellent opportunity for the 
UK Government to support and fund cultural activity which will also serve to support 
bilateral relations with India, and contribute substantively to the existing Memorandum of 
Understanding between the UK and India. 
 
Aspects of soft power 
 
What roles do sport and culture play in boosting the UK’s soft power? 
 
8. Key to the Museum’s on-going programme of touring exhibitions, loans, training and 
consultancy are long-term relationships around the globe with colleagues, partner 
museums and foreign governments. This dialogue and exchange, operating at a distance 
from formal inter-governmental relations, include hugely important relationships with 
colleagues in countries where official lines of communication can at times prove 
problematic or be non-existent, with Iran as the obvious example. These museum-to-
museum relationships, based on professional respect, shared expertise, and knowledge, 
are potentially able to sustain channels of communication between national institutions 
through the safe medium of cultural collaboration even in periods of disruption to other 
areas of official exchange, and can be of great symbolic and long-term diplomatic 
importance for the UK. 
 
9. In 2010, the Board of Trustees took the important decision to loan the Cyrus Cylinder 
to the National Museum of Iran, where the small exhibition was viewed by over half a 
million Iranians and was visited by President Ahmadinejad. The Cyrus Cylinder of the 
Persian King Cyrus the Great (559-530 BC) is one of the most famous objects to have 
survived from the ancient world and has often been referred to as the first bill of human 
rights. Following the loan to Tehran, the object has subsequently toured five venues 
around the United States during 2013 and will be displayed in Mumbai in December 2013 
to coincide with the World Zoroastrian Conference. 
 
10. Other recent examples of the role that culture can play in facilitating international 
engagement and dialogue include the Museum’s exhibition Afghanistan: crossroads of the 
ancient world in 2011, which was opened by the Foreign Secretary, Rt Hon William Hague 
MP, and President Karzai. In 2005, the British Museum exhibition Forgotten Empire: the 
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world of Ancient Persia, sponsored by BP, was the venue for the first ever meeting 
between the then Foreign Secretary, Rt Hon Jack Straw MP, and the new Iranian Vice-
President for Foreign Affairs. This event provided the first occasion for contact between 
the British Government and the new Ahmadinejad administration.  
 
11. The Museum’s collaboration with the British Government in both Iraq and Afghanistan 
are good examples of soft power and the benefits of working together in key countries 
and regions. In Iraq, the British Museum’s expertise helped to safeguard and restore 
Iraq’s cultural heritage. Working with the British Army, the Museum has helped to 
establish a new museum in Basrah. During recent years the Museum has also worked 
effectively with UK Border Force to identify and secure looted objects from Afghanistan, 
and with the support of the Ministry of Defence was able to return them to the National 
Museum in Kabul. 
 
12. Our international work also helps to contribute to this theme on a wider scale, by using 
the collection to create dialogues and understanding between cultures in different 
contexts. A potent example of this is the enormous appetite in countries such as China 
for major British Museum touring shows on great civilisations, such as the hugely popular 
exhibitions at the Shanghai Museum on Assyria (2006), Ancient Greece (2008) and India 
(2010). Other examples in China include the Museum’s contribution to the Urban 
Footprint Pavilion at the Shanghai Expo in 2010 and the more recent collaboration with 
the V&A on the exhibition Passion for Porcelain: Ceramic Masterpieces from the British 
Museum and V&A in 2012, as part of the British Council festival UK Now. This kind of 
activity helps to define Britain and its leading cultural organisations as both outward-
looking and as facilitators of international dialogue and exchange.  
 
13. The Museum’s major consultancy project in the United Arab Emirates to help the UAE 
government develop the Zayed National Museum in Abu Dhabi contributes to these 
agendas within what is clearly an important region for UK interests. The Museum’s 
involvement with the Zayed National Museum, designed by Foster and Partners, provides 
a significant British presence in the mind of important stakeholders in the UAE, alongside 
those of France and the United States with the development of outposts of the Louvre 
and the Guggenheim. That the British Museum is, by contrast, supporting the UAE to 
create its own national museum and help present the culture, history and identity of the 
Emirates to the public – not planting a branch museum - is symbolically very important 
and a clear example of the attractive power of the British Museum and the name of 
British cultural institutions more generally as good partners with a reputation for high 
quality. 
What more can be to encourage British people to acquire a deeper understanding of 
foreign cultures? 
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14. It is important to note that the Museum’s international engagement also includes the 
many exhibitions and programmes in London and around the UK, such as the 
forthcoming season on Germany in 2014 or the aforementioned Afghanistan exhibition, 
which help the British public and overseas visitors to acquire a deeper understanding of 
foreign cultures and provide both an historical and contemporary context. Exhibitions 
such as Hajj: journey to the heart of Islam, which was on show at the British Museum in 
2012, can also make important connections with diaspora communities throughout the 
UK, and facilitate opportunities for diplomatic and governmental dialogue and 
engagement. It is significant that the Hajj exhibition, about such a sensitive and important 
element of Islam, was developed for a global audience by the British Museum. It has since 
been shown at other venues in Europe and has also attracted much positive interest 
from countries in the Middle East.  
 
15. Another example of the way the Museum can help develop the understanding of foreign 
cultures is the A History of the World project, including the A History of the World in 100 
Objects radio series in partnership with BBC Radio 4. The radio programmes have now 
been downloaded over thirty-three million times worldwide and the wider programme 
included collaboration with over five hundred museums around the UK and the wider 
public. 
 
What will be the long-term impact of cuts to budgets of publicly-funded organisations 
who promote British culture overseas? 
 
16. The recent reductions in Government funding to the British Museum, along with other 
publicly-funded cultural institutions, inevitably increase pressure on the Museum to 
secure alternative funding sources and pursue further income-generating opportunities. 
This does of course impact upon the international activities which the Museum is able to 
undertake, including those of significant value in terms of soft power and international 
relations. For example, it was not possible to secure funding or sponsorship for a 
possible tour of regional venues throughout China of Passion for Porcelain, the joint 
exhibition with the V&A mentioned above. It is important to note at this point that the 
British Government does not currently fund any aspect of the Museum’s international or 
national activity beyond Bloomsbury. All of this work is funded by external supporters, 
sponsors, and donors.  
 
17. Although income-generating activity can often provide some of the benefits normally 
associated with soft power, this work is often limited due to resources, geography, and 
cultural expectations. This can result in valuable opportunities for cultural and diplomatic 
exchange and potential goodwill being missed, along with all of the associated benefits for 
the UK. This situation is often in stark contrast to those of our international 
comparators such as the state-supported French museums and the privately-supported 
American institutions, which are often able to deliver additional programmes for free in 
strategically important countries such as India or China. 
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Dr Robin Brown – Written evidence 
Introduction 
1. This submission focusses on the role of government in building soft power for the 
UK.  In particular it addresses the following issues. 
a. How should we understand concepts of influence and soft power. 
b. What is the current state of the UK’s soft power 
c. How should UK soft power be developed in the future. 
The discussion here draws on research for a forthcoming book, Public Diplomacies: Foreign 
Public Engagement in International Politics, that explores the role of soft power strategies in 
since the 19th century. 
 
What is Soft Power? 
2. For the purposes of this submission influence refers to the ability of a country to get 
other people to support or cooperate with its external policies.  Soft power is a 
broader concept relating to a country’s attractiveness. External public engagement 
organizations are official or quasi-official organizations that are concerned with 
developing a country’s soft power and influence.  This used as an umbrella term to 
take in diplomatic, trade, cultural and broadcasting organizations, 
3. Soft power is normally discussed in terms of attractiveness however it would be 
wrong to think merely in terms of a country’s image. In practice we can see two 
interacting components relationships and reputation.  Relationships between a 
country and those outside can come from many different sources for example trade, 
tourism, education, or scientific collaboration.  Reputation comes both from the 
direct experience of relationships and from more generalized information about a 
country, for instance via the media or through a foreign country’s educational system.   
Positive reputations encourage the formation of new relationships.  Reputation can 
only be sustained over time if it supported by the appropriate relationships.  Ideally, 
the work of building and maintaining relationships comes from those involved in them 
directly but where this is not feasible governments may  provide support to create 
relationships which would not otherwise exist. 
From this relational  perspective several corollaries follow 
4. Soft power is an aggregate of many different relationships.  Relationships and 
reputations are built around many different areas of activity and may have very 
limited spillover.  For instance a country’s reputation for excellence in a particular 
scientific area may have little relevance beyond researchers in that area.  
5.  A country’s reputation is different in sectors of activity and regions of the world.  
For instance a country may have a high reputation for the quality of its manufactured 
goods but not for tourism.   While the Scandinavian countries enjoy a highly positive 
reputation in Europe and North America reputations are much less positive in the 
Middle East.  
6. Relationships are about something, and require appropriate resources, if you don’t 
have a flourishing cultural sector or HE institutions it’s more difficult to form 
relationships in these areas just as a lack of military resources will reduce influence in 
networks around security issues.  
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7. Government and soft power interact in three ways.   
a. Government policies support or obstruct the development of assets that 
people in other countries find attractive, for instance leading universities or 
innovative businesses.  
b. Government develops mechanisms to make connections between soft power 
assets and foreign publics, for instance the work of the UKTI, the educational 
advisory role of the British Council, VisitBritain, the GREAT Campaign. Here 
government is facilitating the work of private actors.   
c. Government draws on soft power assets to support its foreign policies, for 
instance using expertise from the NGO sector to influence foreign 
government thinking on an issue.   
8. These three roles interact, it is much easier to facilitate where you have attractive 
assets in a country.  Successful facilitation can lead to influence,  where government 
by making a small investment leads to the creation of self-sustaining relationships.  
For instance during the Cold War the US support for performing arts, popular music 
and the publishing industry created networks that could then be sustained on a 
commercial basis. These networks then sustained interest in the US and ensured that 
its voice was heard. Existing connections between countries and a positive reputation 
ease the task of exerting influence. In turn the successful use of influence can ease the 
task of facilitation.  
9. Because soft power is constructed in multiple networks there is no one size fits all 
strategy to build it.  Three tensions need to be managed.  Firstly, the tension 
between the domestic and international impact of domestically oriented policies. 
Restrictions on student visas may fulfil domestic policy needs but are extremely 
damaging for the ability to build relationships in the long term.  Secondly, between 
the facilitative and influencing roles; what priority should each receive?  Thirdly, 
between different policy areas.  The plural nature of soft power creates major 
management problems. This is particularly the case for a country like the UK which 
has a broad range of soft power assets and wishes to exert influence across multiple 
regions and policy areas.  The history of foreign public engagement in all countries 
demonstrates recurring struggles over the correct priorities and methods.   
10. To summarize: we build influence by building positive and beneficial relationships and 
hence cultivating a positive reputation.  But the influence effect of these relationships 
and reputations may not be fungible, but be confined to the network (set of 
relationships) concerned with a particular issue.  This is consistent with the 
willingness of many people around the world to consume American popular culture 
but to still maintain hostile attitudes to the US.  
 
The State of UK Influence 
11. As Indicated by benchmarks such as the Anholt/GfK Nation Brand Index or Monocle 
IfG Soft Power Index the UK’s national soft power is strong.  An interesting 
perspective is offered by recent French debates on the diplomatie d’influence, these 
have focused on the role of specialist professional networks in influencing three 
areas, the specification of tenders for major projects, standard setting and the 
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development of policy ideas in each case the ability of the UK to operate effectively is 
a matter for envy.    
12. The UK’s current position is a product of relationships built up over a period of 
decades or centuries and reflects the central role of the UK in international relations, 
as well as consistent investment in soft power assets and foreign public engagement.   
However, there are challenges in the changing international environment and in the 
consequences of the current UK situation.   
13. The growth of emerging powers creates new challenges for the UK.  Firstly, there is 
the need to forge relationships where existing links are relatively weak in 
competition with other countries that see opportunities in the same regions. 
Secondly, emerging powers are building their own soft power assets, for instance 
universities,  that can compete with those in the UK.  Those same emerging powers 
are also investing in official public engagement networks and strategies in order to 
facilitate links with other countries, for instance China, Russia, South Korea, Turkey 
are all making major efforts to build their own networks of cultural centres.  New 
state sponsored broadcasting organizations have emerged that compete with the 
BBC.  The French external engagement machinery is also undergoing major revisions.  
14. While general reputation is only one element of the ability of the UK to forge 
relations and build influence the impact of the financial crisis has been widely noted.  
In foreign policy circles the invasion of Iraq, followed by questions over the UK 
performance in Iraq and Afghanistan, plus defence cuts have all damaged UK 
reputation and influence.  While these events may only have medium term impacts 
they play into a narrative of UK decline. 
 
The State of the UK External Engagement Organization. 
15. Compared with other ‘big four’ practitioners US, France and Germany, the basic 
organization of UK public engagement has been remarkably stable since the 1930s.  
This stability is seen other countries as a sign of the success and workability of the 
system.  The system consisting of the FCO, a cultural relations organization; the 
British Council, an international broadcaster: BBC and a trade and investment 
promotion body; currently UKTI.  Policy attention to this activity has varied over 
time; high in the 1950s and 1960s and low in the 1970s and 1980s. In the mid 1990s 
what had been referred to as ‘information work’ was rechristened, as ‘Public 
Diplomacy’.   
16.  In 1997 the Labour government, launched a number of initiatives in relation to the 
UK’s engagement organizations. It was believed that the post Cold War international 
environment demanded a new focus on public engagement strategies and that a more 
focused and coordinated approach was required.  This work was given added 
impetus after 9/11 with the Wilton and Carter reviews of public diplomacy. These 
led to the creation of new coordinating mechanisms.  
17. The interest in public diplomacy needs to be placed in the context of broader trends 
in UK foreign policy.  Firstly, official foreign policy thinking has come to focus on a 
vision of what might be termed ‘post-international politics’ where the chief issues are 
‘global’ such as terrorism or climate change that need to be addressed by 
international coalitions involving international organizations, states and NGOs.  This 
tended to shift attention away from interstate relations. Secondly, reinforcing this 
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general vision was the concern with ‘failed states’, the successive experiences in the 
former Yugoslavia, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan and Iraq obviously drew much attention 
from MoD, DFID and the FCO and led to conceptual and organizational innovations 
to facilitate joint working in addressing these issues.    
18. The arrival of the coalition government did indicate some change in direction as 
William Hague signalled that he wanted to give more attention to bilateral 
relationships, commercial diplomacy and key diplomatic skills.   Despite the 
commitment to expanding the UK diplomatic network the pressure of spending cuts 
having dramatic effects beyond simply a reduction in the level of activity.  
19. Under the pressure of the Olympics it appears that any general attempt to 
coordinate UK public diplomacy has been abandoned. A proposal for the NSC to 
develop a soft power strategy also appears to have lapsed. 
20. Cuts in government resources have resulted in the British Council becoming 
increasingly dependent on other sources of funding and as such less responsive to 
government priorities.  The transfer of the BBC World Service to license fee funding 
will over time produce a service that is reshaped by domestic license fee pressures 
and commercial opportunities.  In both cases we can expect the organizations to 
follow the money and to become less responsive to foreign policy priorities.   
21. The coalition government has committed the UK to spending 0.7% of GDP on aid as 
defined by the OECD DAC definition, at the same time it committed to spending 
30% of aid in fragile states and in focusing aid on the poorest countries.  In addition 
the 2002 Development Act requires DFID aid to be used for poverty reduction.  
Further the conclusion of reviews of aid carried out by the coalition limited the 
number of countries to which aid could be given. These multiple commitments place 
severe constraints on how aid can actually be delivered.  Essentially the government 
is committed to spending more money in fewer countries in a way consistent with 
multiple policies.  The FCO (and the British Council) has been set targets for their 
own ODA spend.  Essentially as their own programme budgets are cut an increasing 
proportion of what remains must be ODA compliant.  One of the attractions of a 
funding mechanism like the Conflict Pool is that it mixes ODA and non ODA 
budgets, in practice this reflects the fact that in conflict situations it may be necessary 
to spend non-ODA funds in order to facilitate ODA spend, for instance by providing 
security for development projects.  The result is a further skewing of overall 
programme spending as a result of the ODA target.  While the FCO does not have 
to meet the poverty reduction target not only are programme budgets being cut but 
the flexibility of what remains is being limited.  
The result is that not only is the machinery used to build British influence being starved of 
resources it is becoming less capable, more fragmented and less flexible.  
 
Towards a Soft Power Strategy for the UK 
How can this situation be reversed? 
22.  The first step is a reassessment of what British foreign policy is for. Are the 
assumptions that have guided foreign policy over the past 15 years still relevant? 
What will British external policy need to look like in a Post-American or G-Zero 
world? Given the commitment of emerging powers to national sovereignty how does 
this affect the way that the UK should think about foreign policy?  How will the UK 
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deal with radical changes in the EU whether as a result of a changing relationship 
between Eurozone and Non-Eurozone members or as a result of a UK referendum?  
Review the extent to which government priorities, departmental priorities and what 
departments are actually doing in the external area.  To what extent are priorities 
really priorities rather than list of bullet points. Assess the balance between 
functional/issue priorities and country and regional ones. To what extent do foreign 
policy, development and defence policies mesh? Priorities for soft power should 
emerge from this reassessment.  
23. Develop a cross-government soft power/influence doctrine that lays out the modes 
of soft power and influence that can be applied in different cases. What are the 
networks that can be constructed or mobilized?  Here the developments around 
failed states provide a useful model.  Because this is an area where DFID, MoD and 
FCO need to work together there has been considerable effort to develop shared 
strategies, approaches and funding mechanisms.  A similar approach can be applied 
around the influence agenda.  For instance a cross-government understanding of how 
influence can be used in support of external policy goals   Part of this approach is 
about developing routine collaboration across agencies, this needs to happen both in 
Whitehall and overseas.  This concept will need to consider both long and short 
term programmes of work.   
24. At an organizational level the soft power concept needs to be developed on a cross-
government basis.  The Cabinet Office should work with the FCO and other 
departments to monitor internal and external developments that affect the UK’s soft 
power.  
25. Aspirations to cooperate need to be backed up with resources. The ability of the UK 
government to support the development of soft power and to use influence in 
support of UK policy goals is dependent on adequate funding.  While the FCO has 
been expanding its network, and presence is a foundation of influence, the reduction 
in programme resources, combined with ODA requirements place narrow limits on 
what can be done.  While the 0.7% target gives the UK influence in issues around aid 
it gives very little benefit outside these networks.  In pure influence and soft power 
terms some of the resources would be better employed elsewhere, for instance in 
building relations with emerging powers. 
26. Again drawing on the experience with the Conflict Pool funding mechanism, an 
Engagement Pool that could be drawn on to support soft power and influence 
projects would be a useful way encourage greater involvement across government 
and beyond.   
27. The success of soft power strategies both in facilitating the work of the non-
government sector and in developing influence depends on the ability of non-
government and government organizations to work together.  It would be valuable to 
conduct a cross government review of the networks that outward facing agencies 
maintain in the UK; for instance in diaspora communities, business, NGOs, 
consultants, think tanks, universities.  How extensive are these networks?  Do they 
include the right people and organizations.  Is there scope for different organizations 
to draw on each other’s networks? Do these networks give the best understanding 
of the resources available to UK actors.  External facing departments would benefit 
from being able to draw on the widest range of resources. 
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28. Government agencies with primarily domestic remits should be required to give 
some attention to potential international impacts of their decisions and programmes 
even. In particular agencies with business, education, scientific, cultural and 
community responsibilities have role to play.   
 
 
Dr Robin Brown 
18 September 2013 
This evidence is being submitted in personal capacity 
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1. This submission is informed by two projects currently being led by the Centre for World 
Cinemas at the University of Leeds: ‘Film Policy, Cultural Diplomacy and Soft Power’ (funded 
by the Worldwide Universities Network) and ‘Screening European Heritage: History on 
Film, the Heritage Industry and Cultural Policy’ (funded by the AHRC and run in 
collaboration with B-Film: The Birmingham Centre for Film Studies). Both projects examine 
the way film and film policy around the world supports the use of the visual media as a 
vehicle for the communication of national identity and historical understanding at home and 
abroad. This process of communication plays a key role in the generation of a nation’s soft 
power. For the UK, film is particularly important in this regard, with film policy being crucial 
to ensuring that the soft power of the nation’s visual culture is fully leveraged.  
 
2. We welcome the committee’s return to Joseph Nye’s foundational definition of soft power 
in its introductory comments. In recent years there has been a significant increase in 
discussion of this term. Soft power is a complex idea, defined by, and related to, a whole 
host of policy areas (economic policy, public diplomacy, foreign policy etc). However, it also 
has a distinct role within this landscape which is often ignored, particularly in popular 
discussions of the term where it is frequently conflated with discussions of economic 
imperialism and/or cultural propaganda. At the heart of our understanding of soft power is 
the imperative to gain international influence and promote domestic economic growth 
through the attractiveness of one’s culture and values, effectively communicated to external 
audiences. 
 
3. The cultural industries in general, and the media in particular, have long been understood to 
play a key role in the generation of soft power and are considered to be central to the UK’s 
current position as the leading nation in the IfG-Monocle Soft Power Index. The nation’s 
success in this year’s survey is viewed by many commentators to be the result of events such 
as the filmmaker Danny Boyle’s Olympic opening ceremony as well as the international 
impact of certain British historical dramas from The King’s Speech (2010) to Downton Abbey 
(2010-). 
 
4. We particularly welcome the committee’s intention to ‘learn from others’ in its 
deliberations. The relationship between soft power avant la lettre and film policy is long and 
there are numerous examples of where it has failed to be generated. Here one might 
mention US foreign cultural policy in Germany in the immediate aftermath of the Second 
World War, where Hollywood imports were used as a straightforward ‘re-education’ tool. 
While the ethos of, for example, John Ford’s westerns was perceived by the US authorities 
as a perfect vehicle to explain the advantages of Western democracy, their often racist 
presentation of native Americans was instead viewed by many German audiences as 
reflecting an ideology reminiscent of National Socialism (for further discussion see the work 
of Jennifer Fay 2008). Or, we might mention the European film-funding schemes MEDIA and 
Eurimages. While the main aim of these schemes is to support the development of a 
sustainable European film industry, they are also rooted in the creation of a common, if 
loosely defined, understanding of European identity which can both help cement cultural 
links across the region and enable European cultural productions to have a global impact. 
Unfortunately, a large percentage of the films produced by these schemes fail to find any 
substantial audience, either at home or abroad. Such films are often condemned as 
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‘europuddings’ which, as the scholar Randall Halle notes, invariably have to appeal to the 
‘lowest common denominator’ in their search of a common understanding of Europeanness, 
and in the process fail to connect with the public (Halle 2008). Equally problematic were the 
efforts in the 1980s by the Basque authorities to produce a series of historical epics that 
attempted to dictate a wholly affirmative understanding of Basque citizenship, all of which 
failed to connect with spectators. Finally, one might note the disaster that was Confucius 
(2010), a large-budget Chinese historical fantasy film which was the product of a policy 
intended to showcase to the world the potential of the Chinese film industry. The film 
famously flopped, even at home, being unable to compete with James Cameron’s Avatar 
(2010), despite the Hollywood film receiving only very limited distribution within China. 
 
5. In each of these cases, policies have failed because they have attempted, at the very least, to 
control audiences’ understanding of a given film, at worst, the creative act of filmmaking 
itself. In the process, such policies have tended to produce banal films that have been 
dismissed as propaganda, however thinly disguised, by audiences. That said, many of these 
industries have clearly also enjoyed success and have wielded great influence that attests to 
their being instrumental in the generation of soft power. Hollywood dominates the world’s 
cinema screens due to the attractiveness of its product for a huge proportion of the global 
population. European funding, along with European distribution and exhibition networks, 
have been instrumental in the success of numerous films, not least The King’s Speech which, 
along with substantial support from the now disbanded UK Film Council, was also funded by 
MEDIA. And, of course, for many popular commentators at least, it is now seen as inevitable 
that China’s influence in the global media landscape is set to rise, demonstrated most 
obviously in recent discussions between US studios and the state-owned distribution 
company, the ‘China Film Group’. However, the success of China in the generation of soft 
power via its film industry will be contingent on it learning from the types of failed attempts 
outlined in paragraph 4 above, and specifically in allowing filmmakers to produce work that 
can critically engage with Chinese society and history and, in so doing, connect with 
audiences at home and abroad.  
 
6. With regard to the situation in the UK, we would like to support the findings of the 2012 
Smith report on the British Film Industry (‘A Future for British Film’), as well as the 
government’s and industry’s response to it. We also welcome the British Council’s 2013 
report ‘Influence and Attraction: Culture and the race for soft power in the 21st century’, in 
particular its emphasis on ‘mutuality’ and the need to foster genuine cross-cultural 
engagement and understanding for soft power to be nurtured and sustained. 
 
7. The success of the British Film Industry as an engine for the generation of soft power lies in 
its ability to i) connect with audiences, both at home and abroad through the design and 
marketing of films that generate high earnings and critical acclaim – in short, that people wish 
to see; ii) coordinate available domestic funding, working closely in collaboration with the 
television industry and new media platforms, and maximising training opportunities in these 
areas iii) engage proactively with transnational funding opportunities within and beyond 
Europe.  
 
8. With this in mind, we also welcome the BFI’s recently published international strategy with 
its emphasis on audience development activity and production. Currently, two thirds of box 
office returns for UK films are earned abroad. We agree with the strategy to coordinate the 
efforts of key cultural and film industry organisations, under the leadership of the BFI, with 
the aim of developing long-term relationships with international audiences. We also 
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welcome the development of a UK film ‘brand’ and the ‘We are UK Film’ initiative. 
However, we also stress the need for a flexible approach to branding in order to reflect and 
support the great diversity of UK film production and to ensure that the identity of UK film 
is led by individual creativity rather than ‘top down’ prescriptive criteria.  
 
9. There is a good deal of excellent practice internationally that we might draw on to explore 
further the soft power potential of film. A small country like Denmark, for instance, has 
managed to maintain a varied film culture and produce domestic as well as international 
successes through a funding policy focussed on the ‘bottom up’ nurturing of talent, and 
encouraging different kinds of productions for different kinds of audiences. This, in turns, 
offers an example of soft power as a multivalent phenomenon that can, in fact, be utilised 
not only internationally but also domestically.  The European art-house hit Flame and Citron 
(2008), for example, offered a differentiated and nuanced account of the Danish resistance 
against the Nazi occupation. In the process the film not only won foreign audiences through 
an emotionally engaging portrayal of the past, it also showcased a positively self-critical image 
of Denmark’s role during the war, in turn helping to enhance the nation’s international moral 
standing. By contrast, the domestic production This Life (2012) re-enacted more 
straightforwardly heroic acts of resistance for the national audience, to tremendous popular 
acclaim. 
 
10. It is only through the continued nurturing of the industry’s relationship with international 
audiences and the focussed marketing of UK films abroad, along with a creativity-focussed 
approach to film development at home, that the country will be able to maintain the 
international impact of its film in the face of superior levels of investment in production and 
marketing from other parts of the world (Hollywood, China) that the UK can never hope to 
match.  
 
 
Submission authors: 
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________________ 
 Witnesses 
Professor Michael Cox, Professor of International Relations, Head of Programme for 
Transatlantic Relations, Co-Director of LSE-IDEAS, London School of Economics (LSE), 
John Micklethwait, Editor-in-Chief, The Economist, and Lord Williams of Baglan, 
Chatham House 
Q23   The Chairman: Gentlemen, thank you very much for coming to talk to us. We 
value your presence and ideas very deeply. I will go through a couple of formalities. You 
have in front of you a written declaration of the interests of all the Committee Members 
around you. That will give you a rough idea of where they are coming from, or where they 
are not coming from in some cases. Secondly, Lord Williams, I believe you indicated that you 
would like to make an opening statement. Professor Cox and Mr Micklethwait, feel free to 
do so or not, according to your inclination. Lord Williams, you got the first bid in, so please 
go first. 
Lord Williams of Baglan: I just wanted to declare some interests. I am the international 
trustee of the BBC. I am also a governor of the School of Oriental and African Studies at the 
University of London, and a member of the council of Swansea University. Finally, I am a 
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member of a Carnegie-endowment project on political change in the Middle East, which has 
taken me to Istanbul, Cairo and Beirut in the past two months. Finally, if I may, I will refer to 
my role as a trustee of the BBC. It is perhaps relevant to what the Committee is looking at 
that later this week we will announce that the BBC has reached its highest ever global 
audience. We have surpassed the figure of 250 million, which was the target for 2015. I am 
particularly pleased, given the tumult in that part of the world, that the audiences for the 
Arabic service and the Farsi or Persian service have grown substantially. 
Q24  The Chairman: Thank you very much. That is a very telling statistic. I hope that this 
Committee will have the opportunity to speak with your BBC colleagues—in fact, we will—
as well as with other parts of the global information network in due course. That is a very 
significant sign. Thank you for making that comment. Your interests confirm my view that we 
are very lucky to have you here, and that you are ideally equipped to share your views with 
us.  
I will start with what sounds like a general question. As a Committee, we are anxious to 
corral this very broad subject and ensure that we do not just end up with generalities but 
focus on what is going on and what the major changes are that public policy should take 
account of. Are we just looking at diplomacy in new forms, or is there some new factor, 
possibly connected with the cyberworld and the informational revolution, that means that 
the whole analysis of soft power becomes much more relevant to the activities of 
government, to the priorities of the country and to public diplomacy generally?  That is the 
first question, and it gives you plenty of scope. I will start with the economist. Mr 
Micklethwait, you are an editor who oversees the world every week. Please give us your 
views. 
John Micklethwait: Well, I, too, should declare an interest. I am a trustee of the British 
Museum. In some ways that affects some of these things in the same way as the BBC. 
I think that something has changed in terms of soft power. I do not think that it has changed 
dramatically in terms of diplomacy, which still continues to be a business of people talking to 
people. In terms of the way that things are projected, there has been a change in soft power. 
I will use the British Museum as an example. You can reach a vast number of people, all the 
way round the world, much more easily via digital forms than ever before. You can also see 
that with the Economist. You have ever more means of distributing knowledge and, by 
extension, to some extent soft power, right the way round the world. In our case, the big 
change is, first, the internet, and secondly, particularly from our point of view, the rise of 
tablets. Each week, for example, you have the choice wherever you are between receiving 
the Economist in print, on a tablet or in audio form. The German Chancellor listens to it on 
audio and then complains about it afterwards, or Jimmy Carter receives it on his iPad at 
lunchtime in Plains, Georgia, and then receives his print edition a couple of days later. That is 
obviously an extended commercial for my own institution. However, beneath that there is a 
change in soft power, which is much more immediate and direct in terms of its ramifications.  
Until recently—Mick might be particularly good at putting this across—it tended to be 
cumulative. You collected soft power by the general extension of your actions. Now in the 
digital world, there has been a change—although not a complete reversal—whereby soft 
power can also be achieved dramatically and immediately through that digital reach. 
Wherever they are, people are able to see things. You can see that in the news today, and in 
the immediate reaction to quite small things that affects the way countries are perceived. So 
that opens up another avenue. The question for government is whether that is a completely 
new and different way of reaching things, and something that needs to be tackled in a wholly 
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different way, or whether most of it is simply doing what you do anyway, but applying a 
slightly digital edge to it. I suspect that it is probably slightly in the second category. 
Q25   The Chairman: You have put the question back very clearly indeed. It is the 
question of whether the Government, in the organisation of its interface with other 
countries and its dealing in international relations, has to revise its procedures in this age of 
total connectivity.  
Professor Michael Cox: I do not think that I have any interests to declare, other than that I 
have been a professor at the London School of Economics for 11 years, Aberystwyth for 
seven and Queen’s University for what seems like the previous 20. I take a rather different 
view to John’s. We did not rehearse this and I do not suppose you would want us all to sing 
from the same hymn sheet, so I will make it a bit more interesting. I think soft power is not 
something you can put on and off like a shirt, or polish up like a pair of shoes to get ready 
for a job interview. It is something more structural. Joe Nye is the reason we are all sitting 
here in this room. In the original sense, I think he meant “soft power” as a structural 
concept. It is what a system possesses other than its hard military or economic power. It is 
the message about itself that it sends around the world. That is not the same thing as 
propaganda. It is the image of a particular country, held by a fair number of people, for good 
or ill. Structurally this building is the embodiment of a political idea. That is soft power. Over 
the weekend, I visited Kelmscott, William Morris’s wonderful house in Oxfordshire, and was 
struck by how many overseas visitors were there. I did not immediately think, “Ah, I will be 
talking about soft power on Monday”, but it struck me that this is structural, and part of the 
deeper essence of what you might call the British way of life. I half go along with John on the 
movements and changes that have taken place, but there are some more fundamental 
structural—although I would not say unchangeable—things that are embodied in civil society 
and the way we do things, such as having lots of bookshops and critical students, and 
overseas academics coming to study here. Those kinds of things are much more structural. 
The second thing I would add to that is that it is very important not to make a sharp 
separation between hard and soft power. Sometimes we think that hard power is real power 
and soft power is the fuzzy stuff. Quite a lot of soft power derives from hard power. If your 
economy does not work, which is part of hard power, you are not going to have a great deal 
of soft power. If your soldiers misbehave overseas, that will weaken your soft power. If your 
soldiers behave well overseas, that will strengthen your soft power. I often see a kind of a 
Chinese wall put between the two concepts, whereas we should think of it as a totality in 
which one very much depends on the success of the other. By the way, when Joe Nye, who 
is a friend of mine, tried to formulate this idea in a modern context for President Obama, he 
said, “Let’s not talk about hard or soft power, let’s call it smart power”. Secretary of State 
Clinton picked up on that. It is interesting to see the two coming together. Going back to 
the original point, there is something more structural about it than something that can be 
easily changed and moves from week to week. 
Lord Williams of Baglan: This is a difficult question and a very broad one. It seems that soft 
power has had more effect on the governance of states than on international relations per 
se. There is a difference there. The chief actors in international relations are now almost the 
same as they were 500 years ago: namely, states. Of course, the number of states has 
proliferated. There are some non-state actors and there are international organisations such 
as the UN, NATO and the EU, but essentially it is about states. Where soft power has had 
the greatest impact is on the governance of states, whether they are rich or poor, large or 
small. Frankly, in some ways it has made the task of governance, whether in countries with 
long democratic traditions such as ours or newly independent states elsewhere, for example 
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in Africa, more difficult. It has forced Governments to react at a far quicker pace than they 
would have done not 50 years ago but 10 or 20 years ago. Collectively, we have seen this in 
our own political experiences and careers over the past 20 to 25 years. That is an issue. 
There is also the issue that in some ways soft power, as well as informing populations, has 
enabled challenges to government to come at a quicker pace, sometimes in a more 
unorthodox manner and sometimes in a more challenging if not threatening manner. I think 
of the rioting in London and other cities two summers ago, and the way that the tools of 
soft power such as Facebook and Twitter were used by those who were so obviously 
discontented. It is somewhat different, but I can see something similar—I found it striking—
in two of the BRICS, the fast-developing countries, Brazil and Turkey, within a month of each 
other. Seemingly small disputes, over a hike in bus fares in one case, in Sao Paulo, and over 
the Government of Turkey wanting to take over a park, were bread and butter issues of 
local politics, but all of a sudden, through soft power, became challenges to government. 
That is an issue. There is an issue for foreign ministries. They have to bring this into their 
diplomacy—that is a considerable challenge—and use all the tools such as the internet, 
Twitter and Facebook. I am not speaking particularly of the FCO, but foreign ministries 
generally have been one of the more traditional pillars of government, if I might put it that 
way. They have not had to respond to their citizens in the way that domestic departments 
such as health, education or law and order do on an almost daily basis. So it has produced 
challenges and difficulties for foreign ministries, and it is something that increasingly they 
have to get on top of. 
Q26  Lord Forsyth of Drumlean: Lord Williams, every time I think about what soft 
power is, it slips away like jelly. You appear to be describing as soft power the ability of 
people to communicate with each other and organise themselves through the internet and 
the various devices that can be added to it. Is that really any different? I can see that it 
changes the way people co-ordinate direct action, but we have had direct action since 
Peterloo and the Chartists. The fact that people can communicate and that things can be 
made more widely known is a technological development, but is it really soft power? Are we 
confusing the media with the message? 
Lord Williams of Baglan: I see your point, and you are right that in essence it is technology, 
but it produces a soft power that was not there before. If it was not for technology in Sao 
Paulo and Istanbul, would people, not in their thousands but in their tens of thousands, have 
taken to the streets over an increase in bus fares or moves to close a park? 
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean: I see that, but I would regard that as direct action rather 
than soft power. To me, it is the opposite of soft power. 
Professor Michael Cox: I will jump in here. I think to be fair to Nye, soft power in the way 
he uses it is not a jelly-like concept. I think that he meant it in three general senses. First, it is 
the broad model that a society has, and whether it has appeal beyond the borders of that 
society. Sometimes systems that you dislike may have an appeal beyond their borders. The 
old USSR had a message of liberation, socialism and industrialisation that had an appeal way 
beyond its own borders. It is not primarily the means of communication but the story you 
tell about yourself. Nye meant the things that any society does at any one time that cannot 
simply be grouped into hard military or economic power, such as bookshops, the level of 
tolerance, the rule of law, how you deploy your power, and how fair or unfair you seem as a 
society. It has a jelly-like quality, and I agree that it is not the means of communication or 
even the message but the story you have to tell about your society. Quite often you do not 
have to tell it. Joe Nye says there is a massive distinction between propaganda and a soft 
power story. Propaganda is what you have to sell hard. Soft power—I get back to my 
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structural argument—is what you have. Sometimes even not selling it is a good form of soft 
power, because you do not have to keep boasting and shouting about it all the time. 
Q27   Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: That is what I wanted Professor Cox to tell us a bit 
more about: what we say about ourselves. Michael Forsyth might have a different vision from 
me of the United Kingdom and what he wants to project. You mentioned this building, 
which is actually crumbling—you should go down the corridor and hope for the best. I 
would like us to abandon it and move into a modern, effective building that could be more 
efficient, but that is another matter. You have clarified that there are two things. One is how 
we see ourselves and the second is how we get that over to whoever we want to get it over 
to, how we get it to them and so on. Is that right? 
Professor Michael Cox: Yes. This may make it very amorphous, but it is not just a 
utilitarian concept, whereby you have a department of soft power and a Minister of Soft 
Power, as opposed to a Minister of Defence, for example. It does not quite work like that, 
which gets back to the jelly-like quality mentioned by Lord Forsyth. It is rather more 
amorphous, like jelly, to that extent. Often it is not something you have to sell. This is why I 
made the point with John earlier; it is more about what your society and system are. 
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: We need to define that, for example as democracy and the 
rule of law. 
Professor Michael Cox: Often others will define it for you, without you doing very much 
about it—although we have lost certain parts of the world and will never get them back. 
John Micklethwait: Lord Forsyth is right. You can make this point about the whole of 
society and the way in which digital ideas are distributed, as happened—and is still 
happening—in Brazil and Turkey. Certainly what Joe Nye was talking about was a 
Government’s ability to project power, sometimes within its borders but on the whole 
beyond its borders. I would advise the Committee with great respect to stick to that issue, 
which seems the most relevant. Mick and I are to some extent arguing over the edge of a 
pin, because I certainly agree that most of this is cumulative. It is the building, and the things 
that Britain has done in the past. But there is something new, to do with the interaction of 
these new things, that makes a difference. The bit I would argue about is that you are seeing 
some places making a deliberate attempt to project that. China has its Confucius Institutes, 
which are half-successful. They are deliberate soft-power organisations. They do a bit and 
give the idea that the Chinese are interested in things. The Chinese are trying to put across 
the idea that state capitalism is a good idea. But the main way in which China has increased 
its soft power—going back to what Mick first said—is entirely to do with the fact that its 
economy has done really well. It is much easier to use this to persuade the leaders of Russia 
or African countries, or any of the people you meet on an irregular basis. They are lured to 
China not by the Confucius Institutes but because the economy is doing well and they 
believe that their self-interest lies there.  
From a British point of view, the reasonable question to ask is that we are generally seen—
certainly Joe Nye would put this to you—as having been extremely good at soft power. We 
have good diplomats, the advantage of the British language, the BBC, the British Museum or 
whatever. We have vast panoply of things. The question now is whether we are still good at 
it, and I would argue that we have become lazy at it. That is the main thing that comes 
through to me. I will use the British Museum as an entirely self-interested example. We 
were looking at why the British Museum should rightfully and brilliantly continue to receive 
nearly the same amount of money from the Government as it currently does. I should add 
that the British Museum gets less money in real terms than it did in 1997, and the National 
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Health Service gets twice as much. You can read into that something about the efficiency of 
states, which Lord Williams was talking about. The point is that I imagined that if you took 
the wide array of culture represented on this panel and asked any government Minister 
where they saw the future of Britain and Britain’s strength, they would tend to come back 
and talk about learning, education, the media and museums. They tend to see all those 
things, but there is no organisation that even puts together a number for how much those 
industries are worth, let alone begins to campaign on their behalf. Britain generally is rather 
lazy on all those things. In some ways it is staggering how little we do. 
The Chairman: What is it all for? The judgment surely depends on what the outcomes 
are. If we have grown soft and sloppy about our soft power, does that reflect the fact that 
we have grown soft and inefficient about our prosperity, trade and international security, 
because that is what it is all about? 
John Micklethwait: I should let the others come in, but I will quickly say yes: it is, by 
definition. If you persuade students to come here and study regardless of your views on 
immigration, they tend to be people who are putting money into the economy. If you 
encourage people to come here to see the museums, watch television programmes, study or 
go for courses, that is all part of the same thing. It is a huge thing. If you ask most 
economists what the sources are of Britain's competitive advantage, they come back with 
the City, the high-tech end of manufacturing and various service industries. Then you come 
back with this wide array of culture through to learning, I suppose, in which a lot of people 
are employed already. There is no really cohesive attempt to look at that abroad. 
Q28   Baroness Hussein-Ece: I was interested when Lord Williams was talking because I 
was thinking about what had has happened in Turkey and Brazil over the past few weeks in 
relation to what we are doing in this Committee. I am particularly interested in Turkey: my 
family background is there. It struck me when Lord Williams was talking about soft power 
and the way that a message had gone across to mainly young people who were disengaged 
with the Government and what the Government were doing. What also struck me was the 
Government’s inability to adapt and respond to those who were demonstrating. They 
seemed to be completely out of step. In fact the Prime Minister started condemning Twitter 
and social media as evils that were disrupting the country and that it was all a big plot. 
Ironically, he is a very enthusiastic user of these social networks to get across his own 
message.  
Do you agree that the sort of new soft power of digital and social media networks reach 
way beyond the borders of a country and a society and holds up a bit of a mirror, as it did in 
Turkey and Brazil, to the particular society and its institutions? That is especially so in 
Turkey where there is secularism versus a conservative Islamic government. I wanted you to 
comment on that because we use these sorts of new network very effectively. When 
something like that happens, how do we respond now compared with 20 years ago? Are we 
using these tools appropriately to get across the right messages to help some parts of the 
world—some of these younger democracies—become more democratic, tolerant and to 
adopt some of these principles?  Are we using them effectively? 
Lord Williams of Baglan: Us as the UK? I think on the whole we are.  One of the 
extraordinary things about this country that I always took great pride in when I lived in Asia, 
the Balkans and so on is the generally favourable way in which the UK is seen. There are an 
enormous number of reasons for that. People have referred to the BBC. There are our 
universities. In the top 50 universities in the world, seven are British. That is not bad. There 
are obviously many American universities, but when you look at the rest of Europe, only 
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three are in the top 50—two Swiss and one German, if I am correct. Our NGOs have 
played an extraordinary role. Save the Children was established in 1919 just after the First 
World War. Oxfam was established in the middle of the Second World War, in 1942. 
Amnesty International was established at the height of the Cold War in 1961. Many other 
NGOs dedicated themselves to the care of the disadvantaged within the UK. But what is 
interesting is that these organisations—Save the Children, Oxfam and Amnesty 
International—from the beginning, looked overseas. You find very few European 
competitors like that. That has something to do with the tradition of governance in the UK 
compared with Europe, where in many countries there were strong traditions of 
authoritarianism that have not allowed for a full ripening of civil society. I think that we can 
be proud of our heritage with regard to soft power and proud too that it still makes an 
enormous impact across the globe. You mentioned the BBC. John is the editor of an 
international newspaper: its headquarters is here in London. We also have the Financial 
Times, which is another global newspaper. Now you can go anywhere in the world and get 
the FT on the day of publication. Our assets are extraordinarily rich. Whether there is more 
that we as the UK and the Government can do in supporting this and bringing wider 
attention to it may be something that the Committee could look at. 
Q29  The Chairman: Professor Cox? 
Professor Michael Cox: I visited Turkey recently. I was in Istanbul a week before the 
riots—no connection. One of the things that I lectured on to a group of businesspeople—
not Turkish but international—was the question of soft power. It is obviously the case that 
we are now witnessing a series of disturbances in a number of urban centres across 
Turkey—in Istanbul, Ankara and one or two others. But what is striking about AKP—a 
Government with which I do not have massive ideological sympathy—is that none the less it 
has been hugely successful. It won one election and then it won two more. What it did, 
which is what a lot of Governments do not do, is increase its vote as it went along. One of 
the reasons that it did that, quite clearly, was the economy. The same argument that John 
gave for China works equally well for Turkey. GDP has gone up two or three times. Living 
standards have gone up by an equal amount. Living standards in poor Anatolian regions have 
come up. New business groups have come in from Anatolia. It is not dominated by the 
European elites as it once was. Erdogan himself is very pro-European, and in formal terms, in 
some senses, remains so. If you look at Turkey in its own region, as opposed to how it is 
being reported in the West, although I do not know what impact the riots and disturbances 
have had, it was quite striking. Turkey had an enormous amount of soft power in its own 
region. There were opinion polls in Egypt and right across the Middle East. You know this, 
John. You had some in your own journal.  
What was very interesting is that Turkey emerged with an approval rating of about 75% as a 
model of a dynamic market economy in that region of the world which can, importantly, 
combine some form of Islam culturally and politically with an appearance to democracy.  
What is interesting about Turkey is the speed with which one can lose soft power as well.  
The real danger for Erdogan or his AKP Government is the speed at which he may now be 
losing some of that soft power. Way before, he had enormous amounts of it. That soft 
power for Turkey was frankly quite an advantage for this country. It was quite a strong 
advantage for the West. If I can put it straightforwardly, one thing that we do not have very 
much of is a decent model of how you combine economic development from a religious 
state and democracy within that particular region of the world. Therefore, what happens in 
Turkey does not just have Turkish significance, it has huge ramifications for the region and 
for us. 
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John Micklethwait: I was going to say almost exactly the same thing. The interesting thing 
about Turkey is that you go to Egypt and all these different areas, many of which, we should 
not forget, did not view the Turks with huge enthusiasm. But in the Arab spring everyone 
who saw it as a glass half full has seen Turkey as the model to which they are going. You 
have the various Muslim brotherhoods who have some links. What intrigues me is the idea 
of whether what has happened in the past two or three weeks has hurt that soft power. 
What is also interesting is that although you might expect it to be that way, at least some of 
the evidence of what Erdogan has been doing—economists have definitely felt this—is that 
you get attacked repeatedly as being part of the western media who are stirring up trouble 
and interfering in the life of Turkey. If he can pull that off, to some extent, by saying, “Look. I 
am the person who represents most of Turkey. I'm a democrat”, he might be able to hang 
on to some of that soft power. The lesson for most countries is that soft power only really 
works if it is broadly in accordance with what you stand for anyway. If you try and claim that 
you are something you are not, it is like one of those advertising campaigns: it does not 
really work. Turkey on the whole—and we have probably all been to Turkey recently—is 
broadly correct. Turkey is a democracy and it has been reasonably tolerant in different ways. 
It has helped with the army and done various things. That is not a bad image to project 
across the Arab world at the moment, even allowing for the really rather awful things that 
are happening at the moment.  So my instinct for Britain, which I agree is a very long jump 
from Turkey, is that we are strongest when what we are trying to project in terms of soft 
power is something that is inherently true.  
The Chairman: Credible. 
Baroness Hussein-Ece: There is a danger. Sitting in Parliament here, we have questions 
about that region, and we tend to look at it from the western perspective and do not quite 
see it in the way that Professor Cox described.  People from that region or different parts of 
the world see things in a different way from the way that we do.  Incidentally, Turkey uses 
soft power, as we see from their own soaps, with their own history, which have a huge 
following and are followed enthusiastically all round the Middle East.  Apparently, they have 
been so successful with people tuning into their programmes.  They have used it very 
effectively in the way that we have been doing for a long time. 
Q30   Lord Ramsbotham: I have been reflecting on two things that Michael Williams said.  
If I can reflect a little before that, I was thinking about the projection of the image and back 
to the Falklands war when, thanks to a technological accident, as it were, television was not 
available and everything had to come out by radio.  It was very interesting how much better 
informed people were by the radio than the television, which was presenting a very isolated 
image.  That leads me on to reflect on the image as presented by television because of 
thinking about the people who are going to receive it.  They receive a flickering something, 
but not a picture.  Therefore, if it is going to be used as a weapon for the projection of 
something, it is almost a propaganda tool.  The reason I mention that is because—thinking 
about Michael’s point about whether this should be co-ordinated, and all three of you have 
mentioned various disparate aspects of the soft power—last week, when we were talking 
about it with officials here, the National Security Council came into play as being a co-
ordinator.  The one thing we are not talking about is security.  We are talking about other 
things.  My question is: do you think this is something that can be co-ordinated and, if so, by 
whom?   
Lord Williams of Baglan: Certainly not the NSC. I think John might have some objections 
to that.  It is a difficult question that you pose. What we have done successfully is that 
NGOs and institutions such as the BBC, the British Museum and others have thrived in 
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Britain in a way that puts us at a considerable advantage, even with regard to many of our 
European neighbours, so we are getting something right.  That is something we should be 
proud of.  We need to create an environment where these sorts of organisations continue 
to grow and to flourish.  I am a little hesitant about co-ordination, although there might be 
some cases where that might be helpful.  Perhaps, for example, with regard to universities 
and higher education, there needs to be some co-ordination. With regard to the press and 
broadcasting, not at all, John would say, and I suppose John is right on that.  NGOs are feisty 
little organisations, and the last thing they want is a degree of political control.  Maybe there 
is more that government can do in creating an enabling environment, both domestically and 
internationally. We should want to see from Governments tolerance for British soft power, 
which there is, and the ability for our NGOs to operate in Africa, Asia or wherever it might 
be. 
Professor Michael Cox:  I said earlier that the idea of a Ministry of Soft Power or whatever 
strikes me. This is where the Confucius Institutes go wrong, and a whole bunch of things 
that China does simply go wrong because it just looks like government and state propaganda 
and therefore, by definition, people do not believe it.  It has to be bottom-up.   
There are two ways I think about this—or one way maybe.   Always ask the question: what 
impact has a policy we pursue had on something that we vaguely understand to be jelly-like 
soft power?  We know there is something out there called our image, our reputation, our 
whatever.  We know there is something out there, even if we cannot be very precise about 
what it is.  Ask the question: what impact on this rather vague, nebulous concept are our 
actions, policies and even our words going to have on the world out there because we live 
in a world where things go viral very quickly?   
I can think of two things, without getting party-political on this, because that is not what you 
want.  First, visas in higher education is a classic case. The policy was pursued, no doubt for 
good reasons to do with public opinion, immigration and students.  We know all about that 
stuff.  The consequence is that out there in the world, in countries such as India and other 
countries, particularly the rest—and we are talking about the rest later—it does feed in.  I 
have been asked in many countries in the world:  “Why have you got such rotten visa 
regulations?”  It makes the country look more closed than it really is.  Secondly, it is going to 
have impacts on recruitment in higher education.  It is the unintended consequence.  
Nobody asked the question, that is what I am saying.   
The other thing—I can say this without any interest in my career on the BBC, if it comes to 
that—is the impact of this now huge soft power institution, particularly of the World 
Service, but many of the other aspects.  Did anybody ask the question?  Maybe somebody 
did and nobody thought it was a very interesting question. It is asking that question: what are 
going to be the consequences?  The worst thing that often happens in most policies is the 
unintended consequences.  Nobody sets out to do things that are counterproductive, but 
they often are, as we well know.  This is true of universities as much as it is of government.  
It is just asking that question: “What effect do you think it is going have?”, however vague 
this concept may well be. 
Q31  The Chairman: John Micklethwait? 
John Micklethwait: Again, I had almost exactly the same notes. I think that visas are just a 
crime. I am very happily party-political. It is economically suicidal. It is possibly one of the 
most bananas policies we could humanly have. All you need to do is to talk to 
businesspeople or, indeed, students in any other country who want to come and spend 
money here. It is bitterly resented. It is completely useless in terms of recruiting people. You 
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look at something like the recent visa kerfuffle in Brazil. We have just spent a huge amount 
of money sending government Ministers out there. We then made it virtually impossible for 
Brazilians to come here, and whatever small plus point there was with all the money going to 
Brazil was completely wiped out overnight. At least the very first thing that Governments 
should try to do is do no harm.  
There is a second point. There is some element of co-ordination that Governments can do. I 
was generally staggered by the fact that there was not really any sense of how big were what 
might be described as Britain’s soft power industries—although I was not looking through 
that particular lens. You could rapidly get 200,000 or 300,000 people being employed in 
them without even spending more than half an hour on Wikipedia. That is considerably 
bigger than a lot of industries that receive a lot of government attention.  
I suspect that it comes as no surprise to readers of the Economist that I am not pro state 
subsidies in a massive way, but it is interesting that these institutions tend to get cut more 
than other ones. So at least from that perspective I would take the attitude that that is part 
of Britain not thinking about these things. You can go the other way and say that France 
takes a very positive attitude towards these things and does not always get it right, but if you 
were trying to look at any long-term version of British competitiveness—not just to do with 
projecting soft power but also in terms of economic competitiveness—you would at least be 
trying not to do harm to these industries. That alone would be a mild plea from my end.  
In terms of security, it strikes me that if you give the issue of visas to the security people, 
then, on the one hand, I cannot imagine them being in a rush to grant visas to young Arab 
students at this precise moment but, on the other hand, in terms of Britain’s soft power, 
that would be a big and wonderful thing.  
There is one tiny thing on Turkey that I should like to come back to. I should have said that 
a large part of Turkey’s soft power within the region has been the fact that under Erdogan it 
has got considerably more hostile towards Israel. If you look at the way in which soft power 
is built by some powers but not necessarily by Britain, it is in large part in the definition of 
hostility towards other people. A lot of China’s soft power in Asia comes from its hostility 
to Japan. You could follow that in different areas, and that is another way in which you 
encourage it, although I am not necessarily recommending that you go down that route.  
The Chairman: Is it also about who your friends are? Turkey having moved somewhat 
away from America, would you say that the same applies to us? 
John Micklethwait: That is a very good question and I will give you a personal answer. 
From the Economist’s point of view, I think we have always had a mild advantage over 
American competitors in terms of the coverage of foreign events. If you are an American 
news magazine, you run the risk that America always has a dog in every fight. There is no 
issue anywhere in the world where America is not heavily implicated one way or the other. 
There are some areas where we get criticised, and no doubt the BBC does as well. Very 
occasionally you get the aspect that you are trying to reintroduce colonialism or whatever, 
but on the whole most people do not see us in that light. So I think that there is an 
advantage for Britain in this area because we are not seen—however reluctantly by your 
Lordships—as a global superpower. We are seen as a kind of cultural force, and one which 
is close to America but not having exactly the same goals. 
Q32   Baroness Prosser: Can I go back to the business of digital communications? While I 
agree, of course, that the use of such tools has been hugely beneficial in co-ordinating 
activity, it seems to me that the most important thing that has come out of such 
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development is the ability of people in quite remote and often relatively underdeveloped 
areas of the world to find out what is going on in many other areas of the world. There are 
lots of situations of which people would have been completely ignorant a number of years 
ago but they now know about them almost immediately. That must impact on the way that 
such people feel they are being treated. Why do we not have the opportunity to speak  
about all those kinds of things? Given all that, what do you think the impact is on ways in 
which we should be delivering and developing soft power from this country? Thus far, we 
have listened in the main to people from government departments. They have been very 
knowledgeable but, personally, I did not think that they were hugely imaginative about ways 
in which we could develop such programmes. I do not know what you think. Professor Cox, 
you said that soft power can come quite quickly but can speedily be lost. What do you think 
the impact of all this is on ways in which we ought to move forward? 
Professor Michael Cox: To be perfectly honest, I had not thought of the way in which 
we—the UK—or government should respond to this. Perhaps my colleague can say 
something on this and I can think of some other things.  Going back to the original question, 
certainly the impact that this is having on, say, economic development, is remarkable. After 
all, in large parts of the world you do not have laid down cables everywhere; you have to go 
through cellular phones and mobiles. Communication therefore becomes very important. A 
huge amount of entrepreneurialism, both potential and real, is emerging in countries such as 
those in sub-Saharan Africa, and it has emerged largely through new digital forms of 
communication, including cell phones and mobiles phones. More and more business and 
more and more transactions will happen in that way.  
The downside of that is that Governments then do not feel that there is any onus on them 
to develop infrastructure. That is a negative. How this country could develop this I will leave 
up to others who know much more about it. The other day I was having a very interesting 
discussion with somebody about what the British economy is. I am not an economist—I am 
at the London School of Economics and Political Science. It was quite interesting. We got 
into a discussion about what the British economy is per se, and yes it is the financial sector, 
which we know about, and yes it is the service sector, but what we now think of as industry 
is actually high tech—it is the new technologies. You have only to travel in and around 
Cambridge and many other parts of the world. Yesterday, I drove past Harwell. This is very 
advanced, and we are in the forefront of these areas. I do not quite know how government 
or departments have thought about this but we have a massive advantage here.  
There is another thing that falls into both soft power and economic power. For reasons that 
I have never fully understood, this is a hugely creative country. We are supposed to have a 
rigid class system but somehow or other it got bypassed. There is the creativity of the music 
industry and the arts. London is an exciting city to be in. Others are maybe more beautiful 
and more classic, without naming names, but London is very exciting and innovative, and part 
of this goes back to the question of innovation technologies and nanotechnologies, and 
music. Young people like coming to this city and they find it very exciting precisely in those 
kinds of areas. Again, I shall leave this to others to think about. Given those advantages, are 
we taking enough care of this? Are we developing it? Could government do more to 
facilitate that? Frankly, at the moment I suspect that we are not. This is something that 
comes from the bottom up in a fundamental sense.  
Lord Williams of Baglan: I will echo if I may John Micklethwait’s statement with regard to 
visas and so on. Universities are such a critical part of this country’s infrastructure, nationally 
and internationally. We are putting at stake our present, very strong position. We have 
more universities in the top 50 and the top 100 than all of Europe put together, and this 
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cannot be sustained with the present visa regime. People will eventually go to their second 
and third choices if they cannot get in. 
Q33   The Chairman: I do not want to get into hot issues on this side at this moment, but 
how does that compare with your impressions of what happens in America, France, 
Germany, Japan or Italy? Are we notably tougher and more awkward? Are our numbers 
falling rapidly faster than those of other countries, or is this just a sort of sui generis 
argument? 
Lord Williams of Baglan: Others will know more, perhaps Michael in particular, because he 
is an academic. Certainly, in the US it is easier to get in. In certain subjects, for example in 
the sciences, if you get a PhD that automatically puts you in line for a green card and 
citizenship. Am I right, John? 
John Micklethwait: To be fair, America has problems as well. The high-tech companies 
have, quite correctly, gone crazy about some of the problems that they have had there. They 
also have a nativist element, if I can put it that way, which has caused them substantial 
problems, as you can find from anyone in Silicon Valley. The truth is that our rules are 
tougher than those of most European countries. So it is true that it is easier to go and study 
in Germany or France. But, for the reasons so ably spelled out, the figures are that out of 
the top 20 universities in the world three or four are British and the rest are all American. A 
century ago, if there had been a list of universities, you would have found, at the very 
minimum, four or five of the big German or French ones. People do not want to go to those 
places. The added problem at the moment is that, if you are in India, you face at least some 
degree of more competition from domestic institutions. You can get more engineering 
degrees, for example. China is building universities like anything. All those things represent 
different versions of competition.  
I would perhaps be more positive and say that, if you look at the world at the moment and 
guess at industries going forward, at least some of the evidence is that, after about 20 years 
of it supposedly happening, the influence of technology on education, which has previously 
always been exaggerated, is one of those areas that seems to be just beginning to take off in 
a substantial way, particularly in America. It is not just British universities but British private 
schools that are doing fantastically well around the world, and are seen generally as being of 
an incredibly high standard. How people make money out of that is a difficult question for 
the Committee, which I can give a vague economic answer to. London is a large part of this, 
and the difference between London and the south-east and the rest of the country matters 
enormously. The fact that London is so cosmopolitan is another reason why people want to 
come to this country. That makes a big difference, to the extent that government policy is 
steered by that. 
Professor Michael Cox: Without going into too much detail on the facts and figures, I did 
an analysis last year of the Times Higher Education top 500 list of universities around the 
world. My goodness, that was pretty dull. What was amazing, though, was that the 
fundamentals are, if you take the top 100 institutions in the world today, 89 of those are 
definably in parts of the world that we would call the West, with the United States a long 
way ahead of anyone else with about 49 of them. We have about 17 in the top 100. The 
English-speaking countries do pretty well. Canada and Australia also do well here. 
Continental universities the other side of the channel do not do too badly—the northern 
Europeans, largely. What is remarkable is that soft power is also about language; it is a 
linguistic power. There is no way around that. Linguistic power is part of our advantage. 
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The Chairman: Did not I read at the weekend that the Times index of universities put the 
Japanese, Hong Kong and South Korean universities at the top of the list? So things have 
changed. 
Professor Michael Cox: Let me be absolutely precise. Only two of mainland China’s 
institutions rank in the top 100, and both are in Beijing. Only two of Japan’s universities rank 
in the top 100. That gives you four of the Asian universities. All the rest come from Hong 
Kong with three, Singapore with two, three in South Korea and one in Taiwan. In other 
words, all the countries in Asia that have done particularly well in higher education, using 
these criteria of excellence in research and teaching, along with globality, tend to be in those 
parts of Asia that have had the longest links with the West. This is not a political or post-
colonial point. It is remarkable that the Asian countries that have done so well economically 
do not do very well in measurements of international higher education. This one does 
remarkably well, for all sorts of reasons—but having the language is a significant part of soft 
power. 
Q34   Baroness Goudie: I wanted to come in on a quick point on the question of whether 
we are getting lazy. I thought that we were on the basis of evidence that we had last week 
and the other week. People said, “Don’t worry so much. We’ve got 10 years extra, on the 
back of the Olympic Games”. This I do not agree with at all. I felt that it was making some 
departments sit on their laurels and not really do anything. We know that a number of 
emerging countries are working very hard and that we need to work much harder because 
we are living in the past, not in the future. I know you have touched on that a bit this 
afternoon, and I have found your evidence a breath of fresh air. 
Professor Michael Cox: I think the success of the Olympics was almost an accident—let us 
be blunt. Prior to the Olympics, everybody was talking it down; nobody said that it was 
going to succeed—they said that everybody would be stuck at terminal 5 for three days. 
There was a real talking down of the thing. Then bit by bit we discovered that we had done 
something rather good. It started with the opening ceremony, then we started winning 
medals and people started to really enjoy it. There was the wonderful set of volunteers all 
over London, making London such a great place to be—and I love London generally. It is 
total nonsense, because an Olympics is a one-off, and what followed was a one-off. It was 
great, but it will not last forever. 
Baroness Goudie: That is why we have to move on. 
Professor Michael Cox: Definitely. 
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: I have found what has been said very interesting and 
eloquent. The only problem is that it has not helped us to narrow this down. It has only 
indicated how wide the area is. Can you help us by narrowing down where we can add value 
and be useful if we pursue it further? We have hundreds of potential witnesses, but it would 
be really helpful if you could tell us the areas in which something might be said and done, and 
we could follow that through.  
John Micklethwait: I will go first, although I am going to sound a bit repetitive. Basically, 
you have to look at this from a global perspective. Britain comes to this with a huge number 
of assets; it is not just the English language. I will use a tragic British Museum example, when 
it sent the Cyrus cylinder to Iran, and 1 million Iranians go to look at it. That makes a 
complete transition in the way in which people think. The digital thing makes it different, and 
this is true of quite a lot of British cultural assets in soft power. In the old days you could ask 
why London had this collection of things for the world which the world cannot go to see, 
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but now two things are happening. First, those assets go round the world, pretty much 
constantly. Secondly, people can come through digital means to see it. So there is an element 
whereby we come with all these things and this huge history of democracy, and there is a 
vast amount of that sort of thing that Britain has. That would be one argument—that you 
open that up. The second one, where I am going to sound repetitive, is that you tell 
government to get out of the way, when it is doing things that are fundamentally deleterious 
to that long-term thing. 
Q35   Lord Forsyth of Drumlean: You have emphasised our cultural heritage—
democracy and all the good things about Britain—but everyone has said that China is a good 
example of a country that uses soft power because its economy is strong. I can think of 
fewer examples of countries where democracy, the rule of law and human rights are less in 
evidence than China. So what are we saying here? Is it about projecting our values, or about 
using the assets and comparative advantages that we have to advance our economic position, 
which is what China is doing? I am with Lord Foulkes. We have to be clear about what our 
objective is—and if it is just to make people feel good. You gave the example of providing 
these artefacts in the museum, and how 1 million people came to see them. I wonder how 
many of them thought, “How did the British get these and why are we not getting them 
back?” There could be a double-edged benefit there. So what is the answer to Lord 
Foulkes’s question? What should we be doing? To my mind, it is about working out where 
we have a comparative advantage and using that to get business and trade. Is that too 
narrow? 
John Micklethwait: That is a bit narrow. At the very minimum, what we are saying to you 
is: “For God’s sake, do that”, because you are not doing it.  That is the point.  You are not 
even beginning to use the mentality of the people who deal with this is not to think about 
these assets that we have and which make a difference to soft power.  If you look at the soft 
power around the world—this is not my shtick—and if you look at what we are doing with 
visas for students, that makes a big difference.  We have by any measure an outsized 
education capacity in this country and people who are willing to come here and spend a lot 
of money either on pre-university education or university education.  To quite a large 
extent, we have a Government who make that very difficult.  That goes for both parties.  
From the point of view of projecting soft power, that would seem to be not an altogether 
helpful starting point.   
From the point of view of the rest of these things, I think it is to some extent a matter of 
government realising what is there.  Government comes at this very much from the 
perspective of thinking of our industries, such as car making.  It is from that angle.  The 
strengths of the British economy have moved, and I do not think government has.  I am not 
pleading for more money or anything like that.  I am pleading for some degree of ability to 
recognise where they are from.  At the moment, the Department for Culture, Media and 
Sport is seen as a place where you spend a bit of money; is not actually seen as a profit 
centre.  I would argue that it is a huge profit centre for this country.   
Q36   Baroness Morris of Bolton:  This has been touched on, but I still think there are 
some interesting answers to come out of this.  John said that we come to this with a huge 
number of assets, but we have become rather lazy, to pick up what Baroness Goudie said.  
Around the world, a lot of our old friends think that we have rather taken those friendships 
for granted while at the same time there have been new players coming into the market 
who have been very active and effective.  I wonder to what extent traditional powers are 
being confronted by a rise in the rest in terms of rival states.   
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Lord Williams of Baglan: There is quite a lot to that.  The question to my mind is more 
that the UK and others are being challenged by the rise of the rest, the likes of China, India, 
Brazil, Turkey and South Africa.  It is not because of those countries’ capacity with regard to 
soft power; that is a small element.  It is largely and overwhelmingly because of their 
extraordinary economic development, and with that has come political and military power 
for some of those countries, particularly China and India, which are both nuclear powers. It 
calls into question things like the Security Council of the United Nations which essentially 
has not changed in 70 years, since the Second World War, and whether that is a model that 
can endure indefinitely.  There was one minor change in 1965 when the number of non-
permanent members went up from six to 10.   How much longer can one go on without 
countries such as India, which is the most populous country after China, and Japan, which 
pays about 2.5 times the funding that the UK contributes to the UN?  How much longer can 
they be excluded from the halls of power, as it were? 
Professor Michael Cox: There is a long and a short answer, but you want the short one.  
“The rest” is a term that Fareed Zakaria coined in his book some time ago.  The rest 
constitute largely non-western powers, and that is the challenge.  Many of the countries we 
define as part of the rest are countries that either stood outside the world order, challenged 
it or were even fundamentally opposed to the world order, if you think of China and Russia 
and India, in a certain sense because of the socialist traditions and, historically, its admiration 
for Soviet-style planning.  The challenge—rather than confrontation—of the rest in this 
loose sense, including Turkey and others, is that we are dealing with countries that are, in a 
sense, in large part, although not completely, joining up to an western economic order but 
are still non-western powers.  Therefore, they have certain ways of looking at the world 
which are not western in any simple sense.  China is the most obvious example, but it is 
equally true of India, it is certainly true of Russia and it is even true of Brazil.  It is certainly 
true of Turkey.  All those countries are coming at us or coming towards us with a different 
set of assumptions about how the world ought to be organised.  This was the original point 
of Jim O’Neill’s notion of the BRICs.  It was not that there are countries which are growing 
economically, but that we will have to change the foundations of governance in order to 
accommodate them.  That is the challenge.   
The other point I would make about the rest, which are changing international relations 
economically, is that I still find it interesting that once you start doing some of the 
straightforward analysis, much of what I would call power—military power, soft power 
largely and even a large part of the economic power—still resides in that part of the world 
that we call the West. I am not sure how we answer this question; it may be too academic. 
It is really quite remarkable how much speaking up of Asia there has been—if I might put it 
like that—and talking up of the Asian 21st-century idea, when, in fact still today the greatest 
amount of economic activity occurs transatlantic.  If you are looking at foreign direct 
investment, it is still primarily transatlantic.  If you are looking at some of the biggest 
corporations in the world, they are still 65%, 70%, 80% transatlantic.  The question is how 
you marry or bring together—maybe John has some thoughts on this—the notion that we 
are living in a world that is changing, evolving, moving towards the rest but where power in 
those sorts of senses still remains very much embedded within more traditional western 
power.  The trick is how you draw those countries in, how you give them incentives to co-
operate to become part of this order and ensure that they have fewer and fewer incentives 
to stay outside of it.  How you play that game with them and what role we play in that is a 
much larger policy question.   
John Micklethwait: My answer would be that the rise of the rest is inevitable, that we are 
bound to lose soft power to them to some extent, and that that is a good thing. Sadly, the 
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single most amazing thing from the past 25 years, when historians come to write about it, 
will not be the various things that happened in the West but the fact that a billion people 
jumped out of extreme poverty in parts of the rest of the world. That was the biggest thing 
that happened in all our lifetimes—or the lifetimes of most of us. We may dispute it, but that 
is bound to happen. From a geostrategic point of view, if you are Barack Obama, by the time 
you have left the White House, if you have not cemented Brazil, India and above all China 
into some version of the world order, you could argue that you will have failed. It is possible, 
if they do not bring China into the system, that it will be much harder going forward. There 
is a big thing there, and Britain could play a role, although you could not claim that we are 
the people pulling it: that will always be the Americans.  
The question to ask, now that the debate is moving from what Britain does at home in order 
to increase its soft power to what it does with diplomacy, is not whether we are shedding 
power to these people, because the answer is yes, we are bound to, because power to some 
extent has to reflect economic reality. The question is whether we are doing as well as we 
could. When you look at these powers—Mick pointed towards this—they are not 
challenging us in the way you might expect. It is not just to do with the West having more 
powerful soldiers and better armaments. The Pentagon’s budget is still colossally bigger than 
anything even the Chinese have on offer. It is still noticeable that the Chinese are still very 
scared of the Japanese navy, whatever they say about the islands. China, at least to itself and 
largely to the outside world, is still so focused on what is happening at home that its 
ambitions to go global are linked slightly to its need for resources, but not much more than 
that. It has never had a vision of itself that extends much beyond its region. One can read 
Henry Kissinger on that.  
India, again, is a pretty regional power. I heard a statistic, which I hope is correct, that India 
has fewer diplomats than Singapore. It does not project power in a particularly hefty way. 
Brazil is a very regional power, if that. It does not throw its weight around, even in Latin 
America. South Africa is the same; it operates very much within Africa. That leaves Russia, 
which is an old-style European power. If you put the other four against Russia, you do not 
see a diplomatic challenge in terms of soft power. I would argue that in the way in which we 
treat ourselves against those powers, we should be more circumspect than just saying that 
they are doing well. The answer is that they do not want to invade our space that much to 
begin with. We should certainly ask ourselves big questions about why we, out of all the 
powers around the world, sell so little to China. 
Q37   The Chairman: Are we losing out on the power to convey our message? What 
about Al-Jazeera and all the new organisations springing up? You painted a picture of the 
system and them not coming into it, but are there other systems that we are not going into? 
I am quite surprised that you feel that it is still such a western-dominated world when all 
these new realities are emerging. 
John Micklethwait: We are all arguing that the balance is changing, but even in the purely 
economic way in which it is changing, you have to query the numbers. Yes, China is on 
course to become a bigger economy than America, and that will make a difference, 
depending on how you measure it. But by any measure of income per head, China is going to 
be behind for 30 or so years. Just the other day, I was reading a book by someone who is 
extremely good at soft power, whatever his other attributes, namely Lee Kuan Yew. He 
makes the point, despite spending a lot of his life warning the West that it is decadent and 
running out of time, that China will spend the next 20 or 30 years trying to catch up with 
America on the pure economic side. He is extremely close to the leaders of China and his 
view is that they take the same attitude. So it is a more nuanced picture in terms of political 
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power than it is in terms of purely economic power. If you look at the British viewpoint 
going into that—I am almost clinically trying not to look at things from a British point of 
view—yes, we do have superb diplomats and very good soldiers and a network throughout 
much of developing Asia that many people are highly envious of. But you could then ask how 
much power we wield, why Lee Kuan Yew has influence in places where we do not seem to 
have it, and why other people are able to sell so much more to China when we have this 
huge heritage there. Those are decent questions to ask from a soft power point of view. 
Baroness Hussein-Ece: Given our networks and institutions, and the historic influence we 
have had, do you think we are now waning, and that the way we are doing things is not 
keeping up with the new changes in the world order, with the emerging powers and people 
coming together in the Middle East, the South Pacific and South America? Are we failing to 
adapt and make the most of our soft power? Professor Cox said earlier about the success of 
the Olympics that it was an accident. It seems to be a national pastime that we talk ourselves 
down all the time. We do not promote ourselves in the way that we should. We seem to 
have lost confidence. If a Martian landed and looked at our media, they would think from 
reading the headlines in some of the newspapers that we were all going to hell in a hand-
cart. Are we just talking ourselves down, or have we not moved on and adapted?  
The Chairman: I will add one more question on that theme. I was asked at the British 
Council the other night whether I thought the GREAT Britain programme of self-promotion 
round the world was a good thing or a bad thing. Being a politician, I gave an ambiguous 
answer. What does our panel think about GREAT Britain, given what Michael Cox said 
earlier about the dangers of drifting into self-puffery, boasting and propaganda? 
Professor Michael Cox: I lived for four or five years of my life in Scotland, 20 in Ireland, 
seven in the great nation of Wales and I am now back in London. We have the upcoming 
referendum and devolution and various issues like that. This brings us to the area of the role 
of history. What is the story we want to tell about our own history? It is an extraordinarily 
important part of power. What is our narrative about ourselves? This is where we may have 
lost some of our confidence—and maybe for good reason. The history we used to tell 
ourselves was somewhat self-congratulatory. 
Baroness Prosser: Lord Chairman, were you talking about the GREAT Britain campaign? 
The Chairman: Yes. 
Professor Michael Cox: I am linking it to a larger question. If we are to have a campaign 
about Great Britain, we have to know what we think Great Britain is. Part of that has to be 
defined by the history that we tell ourselves about these islands and the various parts of this 
island nation. Having lived in different parts of this conglomeration—this kingdom—I find 
that very different stories are told. This is why I have grave doubts about putting a single 
narrative back into this. Telling multiple narratives about a complex, multinational structure 
we call the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland is far better, warts and 
all. That is equally important. If we tell a Putinistic history—which he is constructing quite 
deliberately in an almost Stalinoid attempt to rewrite the whole history of imperial Russia—
people will not believe it, and it will tell against us in the end. 
Q38  Baroness Nicholson of Winterbourne: I should declare my interests, so go to 
sleep for a minute. I chair the AMAR International Charitable Foundation, which is an NGO, 
separately registered, working in the UK, the USA, Iraq, Lebanon and Yemen. I chair the Iraq 
Britain Business Council, again as a volunteer. It is an NGO in Iraq and a not-for-profit 
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charitable company in the UK. I chair the Booker Prize for Russian Fiction, which is an NGO 
registered in Russia. I am President of the Caine Prize for African Writing, which is a charity 
registered here, and a Vice-Patron of the Man Booker Prize for English Fiction. I am the 
chairman elect of the supervisory board of the Joint Leasing Company, Azerbaijan. It is a fee-
paying post that is just about to start. I chair—again, this is unpaid—the Asociatia Children’s 
High Level Group of Romania and Armenia. I am a high representative for Romanian 
children. I am a board member of the strategic development board of the Durham Global 
Security Institute and a board member of the Global Warming Policy Foundation. I think that 
is enough for the moment. Could I possibly ask a question now?  
I am looking for some definitions of Britain’s success. If the term “soft power” has any 
validity, it should enable us to clarify how we see Britain being more successful than we are 
at the moment. As Mr Micklethwait said, the City is one of our trump cards, and I would 
suggest that the soft power that Turkey has been exercising comes from its very strong 
membership and former secretaryship of the Organisation of Islamic Co-operation, and also 
from its 10% growth rate in recent years. One definition of success in the use of soft power 
might be the building of international trust. When push comes to shove and there is a 
problem, it is the country that trusts you and has confidence in your judgment that will come 
to your aid—or you will go to theirs. Inherently, I suggest that this is where Lord Forsyth’s 
example of China gives us a pointer. The trust of the Chinese in the country in which they 
are investing is not desperately high, whereas when Britain and some other western nations 
come, we employ locally, build locally and engage in institution building, which shows that we 
have the good of that country at least partly in our hearts. I suggest that education and 
universities are something that you can identify very clearly, because our ethics and values 
are well demonstrated in our tertiary education system. I suggest that that is why it is so 
popular. I question whether at the moment the NGO world can be seen as helpful in 
governmental policy terms in this way. Lord Williams pointed out with some pride the 
splendid record of the UK. Of course, it is not a unique record. Ahead of us in per capita 
giving is the Netherlands. The terrific volunteering ethic of the USA outstrips us in many 
ways. They are much better grounded in that sense. There is much less government 
intervention and much more big society in the USA than in anywhere else I know on the 
globe.  
On top of that, the Nordic Alliance is absolutely superlative. Of course, the western nations 
other than the USA began their NGOs at the same time—or earlier, in the case of 
Switzerland—but these were then pushed out by the First and Second World Wars, 
particularly the Second World War. Now NGOs are seen by a number of countries—Russia 
is a clear example, but there are others—as having become merely a weapon of foreign 
Governments and funded by them. I wonder whether our use of NGOs in the UK as a soft 
power tool is any longer good and wise. The communication revolution seems to be the 
heart of this: smart power rather than soft power. As for definitions of success, have we 
done anything at all on this in our foreign policy? I do not think so. The Government have 
rightly put trade and aid at the heart of our policy, but is the communication world not the 
exact tool that we should be working on? Could we not be sharper in judging ourselves, and 
make some goals that we could try to meet through the use of soft power, with the purpose 
of making Britain more successful in every way we can? 
Lord Williams of Baglan: I go back to my initial points. We are very strong in soft power, 
whether we are talking about the NGOs that you referred to, the universities, the media, or 
arts and culture. They are not only of global renown, but our soft power has global reach. 
There is no comparable soft power in Europe. Of course, we are aided by the fact of the 
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English language. You are right to talk about countries such as Norway and Switzerland, with 
their own proud heritage in this regard. But their work is in the NGO field, and that is just 
one part of our cluster of soft power. This is something to be recognised. We ought to think 
about what more can be done to reinforce it. We raised the practical issue of the 
universities, for example, and the effect of the visa regime. Our weaknesses, of course, are in 
large part economic. When the Security Council was formed and met for the first time in 
Methodist Central Hall in Westminster, in January 1946, Britain was the second economic 
power in the world. Now I think that we are the seventh largest power, which is still pretty 
high, but we do not have the economic strength that we had in the past. Moreover, there is 
something peculiar about our economic strength. John alluded to this. Why do we export 
twice as much to the Republic of Ireland as to China? Why have we consistently failed to be 
an economic power of global reach? That is a broad statement, and there are several 
outstanding international companies that are British based, but there is a real issue to be 
recognised. There is also a political issue in the period ahead. We face the probability of not 
just one referendum but two in the space of four or five years. That will be very distracting 
to the projection of British power, whether soft or hard, in the world. 
Q39   The Chairman: That is touching on some very much wider areas that we will have 
to address. The Committee will call witnesses to deal with where soft power and hard 
power forces and flows meet, particularly in dealing with military interventions against 
irregular warfare and terrorist activity. Obviously the Americans are giving the same sort of 
thought to that, and suggesting that civilian power should be at the forefront and should 
spearhead all military operations. It is a revolutionary thought. We will come to that. 
Professor Michael Cox: I will make two quick points.  Some of this is slightly repetitive. I 
think that there is a correlation, although I am not sure where the causal link lies, with why 
Britain is such an attractive place for foreign direct investment. It may be that our workers 
work harder than the Germans and speak more languages than the Norwegians, but, going 
back to our vague notion of soft power, here it includes the rule of law. It is a relatively safe 
and stable country to be in. British people by and large—although sometimes less large these 
days—tend to be quite polite and nice to foreigners, strange though that may sound to some 
people. And we have fairly good schools. Frankly, that is why foreigners—not just poor ones 
but rich ones who want to invest here—want to come here.  Forty per cent of US foreign 
direct investment in the world, a good part of which comes to Europe, comes to the UK. 
Between 250,000 and 300,000 French people now work in and around London. These are 
measures of success, and they are not just because we have better labour laws or because 
our workers work harder. There is an environment in which people want to live, and to 
which they want to bring their wives and children. That it what I would call soft power, and 
we have been pretty good at it. Our education system we have talked about. I do not want 
to sound self-congratulatory, but the statistics and facts speak for themselves at various 
levels. Paying a compliment to John, we have the two publishing outlets in the world that are 
deemed to be not British but global, namely the Financial Times and the Economist, which have 
no significant competitors. These are measures of success. It is not just a question of 
economics. Part of the success in attracting foreign direct investment, productive immigrants 
and productive business people to this country must correlate with the underlying 
structures of the civil society and the kind of society that we have created. 
John Micklethwait: I shall try to answer the questions of the two Baronesses. I apologise 
for not doing so earlier. I will try to list the bits of soft power. There is diplomacy and the 
military, and education and the arts. The media comes in somewhere, and the whole 
element of democratic institutions—into which, arguably, some of the NGOs fit, as being 
part of the institutions of politics. I will say one quick thing about economic power. There is 
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one way in which we beat ourselves up too much. A lot of the world comes to London to 
do business. Law is a very good example. It is not just the City. It is also the case that Britain 
has more influence in Asia. For instance, Jardine Matheson is by some measures Indonesia’s 
biggest manufacturer. That would not appear anywhere in our export figures, although 
possibly they may not thank me for saying that. Our problem with exporting is the lack of a 
mittelstand. We do not have enough medium-sized companies that are good at exporting. 
That seems to be the core of it.  
On the softer versions of soft power, we have three bits. The first is that we have a much 
more international mindset than most other countries. Yes, there are elements of British life 
that are incredibly local, but in general we have always been more interested in the outside 
world than most people, for reasons of our maritime history or whatever. The second is 
that we have generally been liberal with a small “l”, and a safe haven for people on the run 
from different places—not, sadly, American leakers at this precise moment, but we have 
been in the past. One of the things we stand for in the world, and certainly in Europe, is a 
liberal economic outlook in different ways and shapes. The third point is trespassing on what 
you said. We are seen, on the question of whether we are close to America or part of 
Europe, as being conveniently close to both those things. People very high up in China will 
give you a long lecture about how awful the Europeans are, with the exception of the 
Germans. They include the British not as honorary Germans, sadly, but as somehow not 
quite part of Europe. To that extent, the Channel is quite a wide ocean, and it gives Britain a 
distinctive feel.  
On the question of how you measure this, the answer must include some elements of 
economic trade and foreign direct investment. Secondly, there must be an element of 
popularity, which is simple to poll. The third one is somewhat less easy to measure but I 
suspect is still to some extent analysable. It is our ability to get people to do things that they 
would otherwise not want to do, and which they are not just doing for reasons of hard 
power—in other words, it is not just because our gunboats are appearing in their harbour 
but because they think that it is generally in their interest to be nice to us. That is the hard 
edge to diplomatic soft power. There is some element at the end of this of access around 
the world to British institutions. If we have these assets and do not use them, it is a negation 
of soft power. This is where the visas come in. What is interesting about soft power at the 
moment is that there is some element of recalibration because of digital technologies that 
allow you to reach people in ways that you did not before. I see it in my industry and in 
various other institutions that I have looked at, possibly including this one. 
Q40   The Chairman: I will ask our expert panel to give some final comments. The 
message seems to be that we have all these assets and are extremely good at soft power. 
We are top of the soft power index and our influence is everywhere. Considering that we 
have invaded practically every country on earth, we are still remarkably popular. But 
somehow we are not quite achieving it. Our inward investment is excellent, but our trade 
performance is not up to what it has to be for us to survive, and our influence around the 
world in some areas—for example, in persuading the Russians to do things or other 
countries to see our point of view—is not as good as it should be. That seems to be the 
point. 
Baroness Armstrong of Hill Top: I wanted to ask how the UK might find a workable 
balance between hard and soft power, but you have sort of answered that. However, it 
seems that what you were saying before about the state or the Government not causing 
problems is a huge part of this. Actually, it is a bit more than that. Now, so many people 
internationally—thinking about people who use social media—want a channel that is not the 
Professor Michael Cox, London School of Economics (LSE), John Micklethwait, The 
Economist and Lord Williams of Baglan, Chatham House – Oral evidence (QQ 23-41) 
292 
 
state. They want to operate in different ways. This is where I disagree with you about the 
Olympics. It was a perfect example of where the state had to be centrally involved, but it 
was successful because the state representatives knew that they could not be seen to be in 
the forefront. They had to make sure that the structures were there and that the stadiums 
got built, and they appointed people to do that, but then, quite bravely, they gave over to 
Danny Boyle, who did the opening ceremony, and others to give a view of Britain that was 
quite challenging to the state. I think that the Committee has to come to a balance between 
hard and soft power, and how the Government enables soft power to get further to the 
front, but without losing control totally. That is the space we have to come into. Perhaps in 
your summing up you would think about that. 
The Chairman: That is an excellent final summary question. It could not have been better. 
Could we have your expert views? 
Professor Michael Cox: Perhaps I can jump in on that one. When I said that the success of 
the Olympics was an accident, perhaps I used the wrong word. Possibly it was “unforeseen”. 
We did not realise that it would be quite so successful. I was walking around this city for 
two or three weeks beforehand, and Londoners seemed to be leaving London rather than 
staying for the Olympics. The more significant point that we will agree on is that the image 
of Britain—this gets back to the history question I mentioned earlier—presented at the 
Olympics, through Danny Boyle and subsequently, was perfect soft power, to put it bluntly. 
It was self-critical. It did not look too establishment. We had nurses jumping up and down 
on National Health Service beds. The Chinese did a very different kind of soft power in their 
Olympics. It was a projection of state power. Ours was a very self-critical reflection. It was a 
combination of Dickens. Afterwards, a lot of my Chinese friends said to me, “What the hell 
was that all about?”. It really was quintessentially British. I could not imagine the French 
doing it in the same way, for rather different reasons, and I could not imagine the Americans 
doing it like that. What was distinctly British was that it was self-critical. It slightly came from 
below. Here we do agree. The Government did put a lot of money into it. It led from 
behind, almost, and in the end it turned out to be a massive success. When I said it was an 
accident, I did not mean that in a pejorative sense. Many people were taken by surprise that 
it was so successful. In my answer to the other question on the Olympics I said that we 
cannot build on that and say that it will be the be all and end all.  
I will make two final summary points. Lord Howell raised the point about balance. You 
cannot be successful using soft power alone. Joe Nye never thought that soft power was a 
substitute for other things. I will not go into the background academic stuff, but he was 
having a debate with a man called Paul Kennedy—another Brit—who had written a book 
saying that America was in decline. Joe came back and said that America was not in decline, 
that it had a lot of military power and strong economic power, and that it had something 
else that we do not talk enough about, which is soft power. He always believed that soft 
power was not a substitute, but had to be related to and connected to the other two forms 
of power. He was saying something else as well. It is difficult to define because you cannot 
measure it in terms of military budgets and GDP, but it makes a fundamentally important 
contribution to aspects of hard power. In other words, if you want to do military things 
abroad, it makes it easier if you have good soft power. If you have good soft power, it will 
help you grow economically. Nye is trying to bring all those things into a complex analysis 
that is not easily measurable. 
Q41  The Chairman: Lord Williams? 
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Lord Williams of Baglan: I agree very much with what Michael said there. It is not just a 
question of economic power and soft power. Germany is a much stronger economic power 
than the United Kingdom. That is simply a fact. But has Germany had the influence that the 
United Kingdom has had globally? I would say not. By a considerable mile, we are in advance 
through the array of institutions that we have talked about, including the media, NGOs, 
universities and so on. That is something we should do our best to try to protect. It has 
been difficult for us as a panel to answer the question put by Baroness Armstrong about 
how a Government should enable soft power. We have identified one particular issue, which 
is the visa regime. It is a rather draconian regime that has been placed on some of the 
world’s best universities. Wider than that, I am grasping to find recommendations for how 
government could enable soft power. Almost by definition, soft power is and should be 
independent of government. I welcome the fact that within six months, the BBC World 
Service will be free of the Foreign Office and will be funded directly from the licence fee—
which, incidentally, is how it was funded for its first six years. It was only because of the 
Second World War, for very good reason, that in 1938 the Foreign Office took on the 
World Service. 
John Micklethwait: I will go back to the concept of soft power. Lord Williams is absolutely 
right: it is a non-governmental force in general, and its impact comes through best if it is not 
seen as pushed by government. On the West Bank, for instance, you will find the influence 
of Hollywood and Silicon Valley considerably more useful for America’s image in the world 
than troops. When I said that we were lazy with soft power, I was referring to an 
accumulated complacency, for all the reasons we have gone through. If this gathering were in 
Paris, I guarantee that there would be a vast number of people pushing every available thing, 
because the French have to work really hard at this. I see it from the British Museum’s point 
of view in the vast amounts of help that the Louvre gets. The French have to work hard 
because they do not have the advantage of the English language, or the same ability to 
sometimes piggy-back off the Americans. Trying to define yourself against that is quite 
difficult. In terms of things that government can do, we have all mentioned visas. The sort of 
things that fit in to soft power are things such as broadband. If everything we say is correct, 
broadband must make a difference in access to education, the arts and culture, and our 
ability to sell these things everywhere. Heathrow and other British airports make a huge 
difference. We are not talking just about students. The people who get angry with our soft 
power are people trying to get in. The Chinese who are cross about trying to visit this 
country, and the tourists who do not come here, do not come because we are not part of 
Schengen. Our inability to work out some accommodation on that with the Chinese strikes 
me as a straightforward piece of self-defeating inefficiency. There must be some degree of 
co-ordination. I have tried to say that a couple of times, but there simply is not. There are 
three people here and we have been able to put across a vague idea of the different 
ingredients of the cultural complex—I was about to say the military-industrial complex. 
American and European politicians think we have a much firmer grasp of these things than 
we do. In fact, we have virtually no numbers and no real co-ordination. We should be 
prepared to stand for a liberal point of view. That is worth something, and part of what we 
are. I have a hunch that London is absolutely crucial. What it stands for more than 
anywhere—by some measures more than New York now—is that it is a multicultural, 
cosmopolitan city. That helps the new version. The Olympics thing sort of worked, although 
I talked to South Koreans who found bits of it completely unintelligible. The bit that came 
through rather strongly was that Britain was not the same as before. Some of Blair’s Cool 
Britannia stuff, whatever its many defects, carried the same message. People come to 
London and realise that it is not like the Sherlock Holmes movies. That has changed 
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considerably. On what you do about soft power, we are all slightly grasping around this 
digital idea. Where is digital technology colliding with those areas that we talked about as 
being part of our soft power? It is colliding with defence and security. This is where you get 
into cyberwarfare. It is certainly—I should have pushed this harder—beginning to collide 
with education. There is now a real opportunity for people. The teachers of the future will 
possibly be closer to being tutors, with most of the teaching done across computers. That is 
beginning to happen in America. If we are so good at education, why are we not more 
prominent in that? Digital technology colliding with the media is something that I have to 
deal with. In a variety of different institutions the means of doing things are colliding with 
them, and the ways in which government can help may be illustrative. That is the best I can 
do. 
The Chairman: Right. You have given us enormous food for thought—plates and plates of 
it. We are very grateful to you. We now have much more work ahead. This was an excellent 
second session and you have been extremely helpful. Thank you all very much. 
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Individual Submission in Personal Capacity 
The following is an individual submission by a 19 year old university student in Perth, 
Australia who has been following the committee’s work with interest and who would like to 
make some contribution to the debate on Soft Power and the UK’s Influence. I have no 
specific interests to declare and do not form part of any particular organisation or political 
group. 
 
I. What is your understanding of soft power? 
a. My understanding of soft power is very much concerned with contrasting soft 
power from hard power. Hard power brings to mind a focus on coercion and 
force, whether it be through military might or economic sanctions. Soft 
power on the other hand brings to mind the term influence (which ironically 
also features in the title of this committee); the ability of a country to use its 
influences in areas such as culture, language, diplomatic ties and general 
reputation to further its interests in a particular field. 
II. How important is a country’s soft power? 
a. I would consider a country’s soft power immensely important, especially in a 
world which has largely seen peace for many decades. Whilst the use of both 
soft and hard power tends to produce the same outcome (in other words, 
they are both means to achieve a solution), the former results in a somewhat 
more content partner or ally; the latter in a decline in relations between 
nations. 
III. In a digitally connected world, is soft power becoming more important? If so, why, 
and will this trend continue? 
a. Yes I believe soft power is becoming more important and I believe there are 
two ways of looking at this. 
b. Firstly, with the rise of a digitally connected world, we are seeing a general fall 
in the number of armed conflicts worldwide. This naturally strengthens the 
need for soft power as opposed to hard power, which is now being placed 
under more scrutiny than ever before. In other words, it is now much easier 
for members of the general public to examine hard power decisions and vent 
their opinions in the public arena than it has been in the past. However soft 
power is, as aforementioned, viewed in a more favourable light. 
c. Secondly, I believe that soft power is becoming more important in a general 
sense due to this digitally connected world. People want to see positive 
diplomacy and negotiations, not negative. A digitally connected world also 
provides a more economical platform for nations to project their influence 
abroad, through the use of the internet. While being cheaper, I believe that 
this form of influence is no less effective and should be capitalised on. 
IV. What are the most important soft power assets that the UK possesses? Can we put 
a value on the UK’s soft power resources? 
Wygene Chong – Written evidence 
296 
 
a. I would consider the UK’s most important soft power assets as  
i. the Commonwealth, as an international organisation in which the UK 
plays a crucial role, both in its history and in its present governance. 
ii. the Monarchy, as both an ancient and modern institution that provides 
leadership and inspiration to the world. 
iii. the BBC, as an internationally-acclaimed media organisation which 
broadcasts worldwide. 
iv. the British Council, as a well-recognised education and cultural 
organisation. 
v. the UK’s diplomatic network, being the UK’s physical presence abroad 
and the coordinator of the UK’s overseas initiatives. 
vi. its universities, being the educators not only of the British population, 
but of a vast proportion of the world’s talented young people. 
b. I am sure that it would be possible to put a value on the UK’s soft power 
resources but I personally think this is a waste of taxpayer resources. This is 
an activity best left to think tanks and interest groups. 
V. Is the Government doing enough to help the UK maximise the extent of, and benefit 
gained from, its soft power? What more – or less – should the Government do to 
encourage the generation and use of soft power? 
a. I believe the Government could do a lot more to help the UK maximise its 
use of soft power. I would propose: 
i. An official ‘Soft Power Policy’, created as a collaboration between the 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Department for Culture, 
Media and Sport. This should set clear targets for long-term 
development, in particular strengthening what I would call the ‘key 
pillars of the UK’s soft power’, being the entities listed in IV(a). 
VI. How can non-state actors in the UK, including businesses, best be encouraged to 
generate soft power for the UK, and be discouraged from undermining it? 
a. I would suggest an annual pot of funds of significant value to be awarded to a 
number of businesses and organisations who present projects that would 
generate soft power for the UK. The awards would be administered jointly by 
the Department for Culture, Media and Sport and the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office. 
VII. How can the UK mobilise its soft power resources to boost trade with other 
countries and foreign direct investment in the UK? 
a. Well, mobilisation requires leadership, and that can only be provided by the 
Government through the aforementioned soft power policy.  
b. The UK’s network of embassies, consulates and high commissions should be 
responsible for being on the frontline on coordinating the rollout of any 
mobilisation. 
VIII. Who should be the target audiences, and what should be the aims, of the application 
of the UK’s soft power?  
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a. Everyone, but particularly countries with strong economic potential for the 
UK.  
b. The general aim of the application of the UK’s soft power should be to build a 
positive image of the UK as an influential, prosperous and esteemed global 
power. 
IX. Are there spheres of influence in which the Government should do more to 
promote the UK? 
a. There are many spheres of influence but I would like to point out two in 
particular: 
i. Universities; the UK has many of these and many rank amongst the 
best in the world. However, I believe the university sector needs 
stronger support to attract the very brightest from around the world. 
I am not in a position to comment exactly on what is required but I 
recognise that universities around the world are working extremely 
hard to entice international students, with the strong support of their 
governments. The UK must keep up or risk falling behind. 
ii. Tourism; the UK is a popular nation to visit but still lags significantly 
behind rivals such as France, Italy, Germany, Spain, Turkey, China and 
the US. The Government must set even more ambitious targets to 
attract tourists from around the world. Again, I am not in a position to 
comment on exactly what is required, but I recognise for example that 
the UK receives relatively very little from the world’s largest ‘supplier’ 
of tourists, China. This should be rectified. 
X. What roles do international networks such as the UN, the EU and the 
Commonwealth play in strengthening the UK’s soft power and influence abroad and 
facilitating its application? How could the UK use these networks more effectively to 
increase its influence? 
a. I will focus solely on the Commonwealth. I believe the Commonwealth is still 
far below its full potential as an influential international organisation. 
Currently, the two most significant manifestations of the Commonwealth are 
the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting and the Commonwealth 
Games.  
b. I believe the UK needs to play a stronger role in the Commonwealth in order 
to more effectively increase its influence (both of the UK and the 
Commonwealth). This could be done with… 
i. An annual award of funds from the UK government for 
business/investment projects within the Commonwealth. This could 
eventually transition to an award of funds from a pot of money 
maintained by the Commonwealth. 
ii. An annual festival hosted by the UK showcasing Commonwealth 
business, organisations and culture. 
iii. A ‘Commonwealth Scholarship’ awarded to talented students from 
around the world to study at UK universities. 
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iv. The establishment of a ‘Commonwealth Council’ of senior 
government officials from all Commonwealth members which meets 
bi-annually in London to propose policies for the further development 
of the Commonwealth. 
v. A Commonwealth free-trade zone. 
c. I would like to make the point that I would not envisage the Commonwealth 
becoming a political nor economic organ; rather, it should remain an 
organisation fostering cooperation and shared history. 
XI. How best should the UK’s foreign policy and approach to diplomacy respond to the 
new global communications environment, where social media have rapidly become 
prominent, where alternative media organisations (such as Al Jazeera) have multiplied 
in power and reach, and where the grips of traditional elites on the flows of 
information in their countries have weakened? 
a. I think the answer is quite simple here: fight. 
b. The BBC should be expanded, particularly in its Worldwide division and in its 
Online division. It should be championed as a source of up-to-date, quality 
information.  
c. UK Government departments should also make good use of social media, 
being coordinated by the Government Digital Service. This is already working 
quite well at present so I will not comment any further. 
XII. How should the UK best respond to the more prominent role in international affairs 
played by non-state actors and emerging powers? Can the UK shape this landscape as 
it develops, or must it take a purely reactive approach? 
a. It must shape this landscape or risk losing its position among the global elite. 
It can do this by following everything else I have said in this submission. 
XIII. How are UK institutions (such as Parliament, the Monarchy, and religious bodies) and 
values (such as the UK’s commitment to the rule of law, human rights and freedom 
of speech) perceived abroad? Do other countries have negative opinions of the UK? 
Do those representing the UK give enough consideration to how the UK is 
perceived? 
a. UK institutions are generally perceived in a positive light, but there is plenty 
of room for improvement. 
b. The Monarchy plays a central role in the UK’s reputation and this role needs 
to be enhanced. I think the recent Royal Wedding and Diamond Jubilee have 
demonstrated globally the power of the Monarchy to impress and inspire. 
Coupled with the promotional power of the BBC, I believe it would be 
beneficial to open up more of the ancient ceremonies and procedures 
involving the Monarchy, as well as the Royal Palaces. More should be done to 
help the Monarchy reach out to the public. 
c. The Church of England and its global influence through the Anglican 
Communion is also an important and perhaps often forgotten advantage. The 
Church should be aided particularly in its role in developing communities 
worldwide, especially in nations which are still developing. 
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d. Parliament is also a key player in the UK’s reputation, but quite often the 
House of Commons (or in Lords terminology, ‘the other place’) is perceived 
in a negative light; they look like a bunch of children during heated debates. I 
think it would be highly beneficial for the House of Commons to follow 
procedure more in tune with the House of Lords. The other point I would to 
make here is that the world is often not aware of the work (and sometimes 
existence) of the upper chamber and it would be beneficial for the House of 
Lords to reach out to the world in this regard. That said, I think it is already 
doing quite well, especially with its social media connections and use of videos 
created by the Parliament Education Service. 
e. In contrast to the above, the UK’s use of hard power is perceived generally in 
a negative light abroad. It often draws cries of unnecessary interference and 
hypocrisy. In my opinion not enough consideration of this fact is made by 
those representing the UK. I believe that the application of hard power, in any 
form, be it economic/trade sanctions or military force, should be limited as an 
extreme last resort. Diplomatic efforts should always take precedence, using 
the UK’s influential assets such as the BBC and social media to project a 
positive solution to the problem. This solution should in most cases be a 
compromise, not lending full support to any party in a conflict.  
XIV. Are there any examples of how its commitment to such values has hindered the UK’s 
influence abroad or damaged its interests? 
a. The UK’s activities in the Middle East, in my opinion, have significantly 
hindered the UK’s influence abroad and damaged its interests. Whilst they 
may yield a long-term solution, I continue to hold strongly to the fact that soft 
power is a more powerful, if tiring, instrument than hard power, which has 
been wielded particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
XV. What is your assessment of the role played by UK universities and research 
institutions in contributing to the UK’s soft power? Does the global influence of UK 
universities and research institutions face any threats? 
a. I have already commented on the role of UK universities and how they face 
threats to their position from around the world. I would just like to say here 
that essentially the aim of government policy should be to make it a ‘dream’ 
to go to a British university and to make that dream a reality for millions 
through the organs of the Commonwealth and the British Council. 
XVI. To what extent should the UK Government involve the devolved administrations in 
its work on soft power? Does the UK have a single narrative or should it project a 
loose collection of narratives to reflect the character of its regions? 
a. Certainly the UK Government should involve the devolved administrations in 
its work, but I believe that the best way forward is to produce a single 
narrative. A loose collection of narratives only weakens the influence of the 
UK. For example, many people around the world are not even aware of the 
distinctions between England, Wales, Ireland, Northern Ireland, United 
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Kingdom and Great Britain. To continue to use so many distinctions, 
particularly on frontline marketing, is damaging to the UK’s reputation abroad. 
Wygene Chong 
Perth, Australia 
14th August 2013 
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Memorandum of evidence to the 
House of Lords Select Committee on Soft Power and the UK’s Influence 
from Professor Andrew Coyle CMG, Emeritus Professor of King’s College London and 
Visiting Professor University of Essex 
 
1. This submission is made by Andrew Coyle, Emeritus Professor of King’s College 
London (KCL) and Visiting Professor University of Essex. Between 1997 and 2005 the 
author was founding Director of the International Centre for Prison Studies in the School of 
Law KCL and during that period was also Professor of Prison Studies at King’s. Before that 
he worked for 25 years at a senior level in the prison services of the United Kingdom, during 
which time he was governor of several major prisons, the last of which was Brixton Prison 
(1991–1997). 
 
The International Centre for Prison Studies 
 
2. The International Centre for Prison Studies (ICPS) was established in 1997 and is 
recognised internationally as a leading academic centre for the study of penal systems and 
prison reform issues. ICPS was part of the School of Law in King’s College London until 
2010 when the Law School was restructured. The Centre now has a partnership with the 
University of Essex. One of the unique features of ICPS is that many of those who have been 
most closely involved in its work have many years of operational experience in criminal 
justice, particularly in the prison and probation fields, usually within the United Kingdom.  
 
3. From the outset, as its name implies, ICPS placed all of its work in an international 
context. It did this by identifying, assessing and analysing the agreed principles on which 
imprisonment should be based. Internationally these principles are enshrined in treaties, 
covenants and standards which have been agreed by the international community through 
bodies such as the United Nations. There are parallel norms which have been agreed on a 
regional basis by bodies such as the Council of Europe. ICPS then set about demonstrating 
how these principles could be used as the basis for a coherent set of policies to be 
developed by individual governments to inform their use of imprisonment. Finally, based on 
these principles and policies, ICPS identified good practice in the way that prisons should 
be operated and managed.  
 
UK Government support 
 
4. ICPS raises funds for all of its work, often from international donors and national 
charitable foundations and trusts. Over the years a significant amount of funding for specific 
pieces of work has come from United Kingdom Government sources, most notably the 
FCO and DfID. In 2002 ICPS published a comprehensive handbook on A Human Rights 
Approach to Prison Management. The costs of research for this work and its initial publication 
were funded by the FCO, which also funded a second edition of the work in 2009. Over the 
last decade this handbook has become one of the best recognised works in its field. It has 
been translated into some 18 languages, sometimes with funding from other sources, and it 
now used widely by international bodies in many regions of the world as well as by national 
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governments for training prison staff and as a basis for prison reform work. As an example, 
the Brazilian Government funded the printing of 40,000 copies in Portuguese for use by its 
prison staff. The FCO also provided funding for ICPS to write and publish a series of 
Guidance Notes on Prison Reform. These notes identify the major problems facing prison 
systems around the world and contain detailed advice for governments, funders and 
policymakers on how to alleviate these problems. The notes have been widely translated and 
are in use internationally. FCO and DfID have funded several other similar publications by 
ICPS. 
 
5. From its earliest days ICPS has been invited to lead a wide variety of projects to 
reform prison systems around the world. These invitations have come from a variety of 
sources. Some of them have been international or regional, including various offices of the 
United Nations and European bodies which have sought help for their work within member 
states. They have also come from individual governments which have identified penal reform 
as a key element of attempts to improve access to justice and to reduce inefficiency and 
corruption within official institutions. In many of these cases initial approaches have come via 
UK embassies or directly from the FCO as part of its work to assist other countries to 
improve their justice systems as a vital part of good governance. 
 
6. As an example, between 1998 and 2004 DfID funded a number of major prison 
projects in several countries of the former Soviet Union, with a particular focus on the 
Russian Federation. These projects had a number of strands which included training prison 
staff in good practices and assisting relevant governments to develop humane and decent 
prisons. ICPS led this work in-country and also secured the assistance of prison services in 
the UK to demonstrate examples of good practice where these existed.  All of these 
projects were based on the model described above of assisting other countries to identify 
international principles, to translate these into sound policies and then to implement them 
through good practice. The lead taken by ICPS and its staff as well as the involvement of 
other UK partners undoubtedly created a significant degree of trust between relevant 
government departments and officials in these countries towards their UK collaborators. UK 
funding has also supported similar projects in Africa, Australasia, South East Asia and Latin 
America. At the request of the UK Government ICPS has also contributed to justice reform 
work in countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan. 
 
Libya 
 
7. The work which has ICPS has done and continues to do in several North African 
countries may be of particular interest to the current inquiry. In 2004 ICPS was requested 
by the UK embassy in Tripoli to provide assistance to the Libyan Government in new prison 
reform initiatives. This request came directly as a result of early discussions between the UK 
authorities and the Ghadaffi regime as the latter began to open to outside influence. This 
resulted in a series of major prison reform projects which lasted until the change of regime 
in early 2010. Throughout six years ICPS experts visited Libya on a regular basis and 
sponsored several visits by Libyan prison and justice officials to the UK. The Prison Service 
of England and Wales co-operated positively with these initiatives. By early 2010 discussions 
had commenced about how the experience in Libya might be used to encourage similar 
reforms in other countries in the region. 
 
8. The revolution in Libya in early 2010 put an end to the prison reform work in Libya. 
This, however, proved to be a temporary cessation. In the latter years of the project it had 
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been championed by Mustafa Abdul Jalil, the Minister of Justice, who had been able to 
oppose some of the excesses of the Ghadaffi regime. After the revolution Abdul Jalil was 
appointed as head of the Transitional Council. In one of his first meetings with the UK 
Ambassador he indicated that he wished to give priority to setting the prisons on a legal 
footing and that he would be very grateful if ICPS could be involved in this work. He chose 
this bilateral course in preference to multilateral work with other countries. ICPS embarked 
on a new programme of support and for the last six months has had an embedded prison 
adviser working in the Ministry of Justice in Tripoli with funding from the UK Government. 
 
Algeria 
 
9. In late 2005 the Algerian Government approached the UK Embassy for advice about 
how to implement its new programme of prison reform. This led to a series of discussions 
between ICPS and the Algerian Ministry of Justice. The outcome of these was a request from 
the Algerians for ICPS to engage in a joint project for strategic prison change in the Algerian 
prison system. The FCO agreed to fund this project which subsequently ran at an intensive 
level between 2006 and 2012. ICPS experts visited Algeria on a regular basis and senior 
Algerian officials visited the UK. At the request of the Algerian authorities a Memorandum of 
Understanding was signed by the Director General of the Algerian Prison Service and the 
Chief Executive of the National Offender Management Service. When the project formally 
ended the Algerian authorities indicated that they wished to have an ongoing link with ICPS 
experts and continued funding for this is being provided by the FCO. For a number of years 
the European Commission (EC) has had a parallel project for justice reform in Algeria. The 
senior Algerian officials have made clear that they very much value the practical outcome 
from the UK funded projects and ICPS is now providing expert input to the EC project 
 
Soft power 
 
10. The International Centre for Prison Studies seeks to assist governments and other 
relevant agencies to develop appropriate policies on prisons and the use of imprisonment. Its 
aims are: 
• To develop a body of knowledge, based on international covenants and instruments, 
about the principles on which the use of imprisonment should be based, which can be 
used as a sound foundation for policies on prison issues. 
• To build up a resource network for the spread of best practice in prison 
management worldwide to which prison administrators can turn for practical advice 
on how to manage prison systems which are just, decent, humane and cost effective 
 
11. In the current academic jargon, the work carried out by ICPS achieves considerable 
‘impact’ in the manner in which it provides a sound knowledge base for the humane use of 
imprisonment and has assisted governments and other bodies to make use of that 
knowledge base. In carrying out its mandate ICPS has worked in some of the most 
problematic countries in different regions of the world. In terms of this Select Committee’s 
inquiry, ICPS has shown how it is possible to exercise soft power in a strategic and effective 
manner. 
 
12. ICPS is not a surrogate for the UK Government, nor does it seek to present the 
prison services of the UK as models in all that they do. However, ICPS is based in the 
United Kingdom and it has received considerable support in its work from the UK 
Government. It has also worked successfully with the National Offender Management 
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Service in a number of its projects in other countries. As a consequence it can be argued 
that it has helped the United Kingdom to make a significant contribution to prison reform in 
a number of countries. In so doing it has increased the standing of the United Kingdom in 
encouraging adherence to international standards, in improving good governance and in 
pursuing a number of specific objectives, such as international abolition of the death penalty. 
 
13. ICPS has also been active in recent years in developing understanding about 
important matters of topical concern, such as the management of very high risk prisoners 
and of violent extremists in prison. In its work in Libya and elsewhere it has enabled the UK 
Government to provide countries in transition with particular operational expertise in a 
manner which has enhanced the UK Government’s wider objectives in post conflict 
environments. 
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Lord Howell of Guildford (Chairman) 
Baroness Armstrong of Hill Top 
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean 
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock 
Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts 
Lord Janvrin 
Baroness Nicholson of Winterbourne 
Baroness Prosser 
Lord Ramsbotham 
________________ 
Examination of Witnesses 
Peter Callaghan, Director General, Commonwealth Business Council, Uday Dholakia, 
Chairman, National Asian Business Association, and Chair, Leicestershire Asian Business 
Association, and David Maisey, Director, Institute of Export 
 
Q93  The Chairman: Welcome, gentlemen, and thank you very much for coming. You 
have the interests of the Members of this Committee before you on a list, I hope, so you will 
know how our views are shaping. I am not going to identify all three of you because we 
know who you are and you know who you are. I note that Mr Dholakia would like to make 
an initial statement. I would like to make an initial statement as well, which in a sense is going 
to be an umbrella question, but I would just like to say this to set the tone of the whole 
discussion. 
I think we all recognise, and you recognise, that we are seeing an era-shifting change in 
technology going on in world markets, and indeed the Prime Minister has spoken of a battle 
for Britain’s future in a super-competitive world. What we are doing on this Committee is 
asking whether a key element in that struggle is the deployment of so-called soft power, 
which of course is not really soft at all. As you will appreciate, it is tough and intense, but it 
does stand in contrast to the doctrines of force of the past or the belief that we could just 
threaten or walk into or bluster our way into new markets and succeed. That was yesterday 
and today we have to consider new approaches. You are really one of the spearheads to 
these new approaches in the front line, and it is your views and assessment of how you see 
the soft-power element and what you would like to see change and improve and what more 
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you would like to do that we want to hear from you today. That was my opening statement, 
and now I would ask Mr Dholakia, as you asked, to make an opening statement. 
Uday Dholakia: Thank you, Lord Chairman, my Lords. Soft power in terms of the British 
Asian community is not a new phenomenon. It has been in existence within our culture for a 
long time. It embraces human dignity, culture, media, religion, entertainment, arts, family and 
commercial links. The invitation to a potential business colleague, be it an exporter or 
importer, to come home and have a meal with the family essentially goes beyond just the 
price and the contract. It is a soft-power engagement, based on a relationship on a long-term 
basis, whether the business is transacted today, in five years’ time or on behalf of somebody 
else or to help somebody else. In conclusion, my submission is very much that we have an 
inside track into the commercial centre of gravity towards the east and as a country we 
ought to engage with that inside track. Thank you. 
Q94  The Chairman: Thank you very much. In a sense, it was a very valuable opening 
statement that has really answered what is the first question to all three of you, which is 
how you see the soft-power element in your work and the ambitions and goals of the 
various members of your organisations. I should also have mentioned that Mr Maisey and Mr 
Dholakia have sent through notes that we have. I am afraid it was rather late in the day, but 
they are very useful and simple and short, which is the best thing of all, and we can probably 
have questions built on those as well because they are in front of Members of the 
Committee. Let me start with Peter Callaghan of the Commonwealth Business Council. 
How do you respond to the question I put about the soft-power element in your work? 
Peter Callaghan: I have long held the view that philosophies are much stronger than rules. 
People are much more likely to do things for philosophical reasons than they will do by 
following the rulebook. Another saying that I have is that leadership is not taken but it is 
given. It is given as a result of followers being willing to follow you, so you cannot impose 
leadership on people; people have to want to follow you as a leader. 
I think that applies to what you are looking for in this soft power. The UK occupies a very 
interesting position in terms of people aspiring to many of the values that Britain has and so 
people are willingly following the leadership that is provided by the UK. You see that in our 
language, education, sports and business; people willingly follow the values and the policies 
and style of doing things that Britain has. I think Britain has soft power and it has always had 
that. It occupies a unique position between Europe and the rest of the world.  
One thing I would go back to is in the day of sailing ships Britain had a unique position that it 
had many of the harbours where large ocean-going ships had to trans-ship into smaller ships 
that went into the rest of Europe, and I think Britain is in a similar position today. It bridges 
the gap between the European world and other parts of the world, whether that be Africa, 
North America or Asia. The UK occupies a unique position, especially because of education. 
A lot of people in these countries have been educated here or they have sent their children 
or they have had special courses. I think that is a very important part of the soft-power 
aspect of the UK. 
The thing I would like to finish on is relationships—my colleague touched on this—and the 
fact that business is all about building relationships. You do not do business with people you 
do not know. You need to have time to build those relationships and from those 
relationships comes an understanding of each other—not necessarily an acceptance but 
certainly an understanding. The Commonwealth is an important way of building those 
relationships very quickly because we have a common language and we have some common 
history. So while the Commonwealth is not a super-weapon, so to speak, in this battle that 
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the Prime Minister talks about, it is nevertheless a very important enabling part of building 
the relationships that are necessary for trade to be based on around the world. Thank you. 
Q95  The Chairman: The clerk has just reminded me that I said outside that we had 
already stripped down in this Committee. I believe it is the hottest day of the year so far, 
and if any of you would like to take your jackets off, we would completely understand. 
Thank you very much. We are going to come back to a number of the points you have 
made, too, but could I just ask Mr Maisey if he would like to begin with the central point: 
what his organisation does and how he sees this soft power dimension? 
David Maisey: Thank you, Lord Chairman. I am representing the Institute of Export today 
as a newly appointed director and trustee. I also own and manage a company, ICC Solutions 
Ltd, and we supply and develop test tools for chip and PIN by way of a very large global 
customer base. So I am actively engaged in export on a day-to-day basis with my 
organisation. 
Our view of soft power is it defines a nation’s brand image and influences how our 
organisations and our products are perceived. There are a number of components of soft 
power: government, education, culture and, very importantly, innovation. Certainly from my 
experience, one of the most powerful things about UK business is our ability to be 
innovative and deliver the highest levels of excellence in terms of solutions and customer 
service. We are engaged in a relatively niche market but we work, as ICC Solutions, with all 
of the payment associations and the major banks over the globe. They demand the best-
quality solutions. Our closest competitors are based in Europe, in France, Holland and 
Belgium, yet we rise above these other organisations simply because of the British way of 
doing business and how we excel in certain things. 
There are some tangible components of soft power, notably, for example, the Queen’s 
Awards for Enterprise. My organisation won two Queen’s Awards for Enterprise last year in 
international trade and innovation, and I can tell you that these have been exceedingly well 
received by our global client base, not just within the Commonwealth but outside the 
Commonwealth as well. They have a massive impact on how our organisation has been 
perceived. I think generally soft power is about excellence; it is about innovation and quality 
and the British way of doing business. 
Q96  The Chairman: Thank you very much indeed. The British way of doing business—
that is a very useful springboard phrase to develop. Would any Members of the Committee 
like to come in at this stage? 
I think what you have described is fine in general, but we have to try to work out how this is 
going to be developed in the British interest. Let me start with a headline from today or 
yesterday: the Olympics are said to have contributed mightily to actual deals and real 
returns. Is that the sort of soft power that you have in mind? Do you think those figures are 
right, incidentally, about getting £9.9 billion-worth of extra deals out of the Olympics? 
Would any of you like to comment on that? 
Uday Dholakia: I think that was something to celebrate, but the Olympics only comes 
around after so many years. I was listening to the radio on the way down here, and I also, if 
my memory serves me right, heard how many millions were put into the Olympic 
redundancy packages. We live in the real-time values of Twitter, e-mails and blogs. While we 
celebrate, the perception of what the Olympics did and did not do is mixed around the 
world. While we have a very good reputation, and my colleague has touched on that, as a 
result of the British way of doing business, my question is: what is the British way of doing 
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business in the contemporary competitive and globalised world today? I think there is need 
for some rebuilding, recalibration and redefinition of what “British” means. We start off with 
a very good base in terms of integrity, creativity, innovation and sense of fair play. I am 
speaking in my voluntary role. For my day job I work for Birmingham Airport, and I just 
secured Air India flights into Birmingham four times a week from 1 August, so that we have 
connectivity and inward investment with India. But we need to define what is the new British 
way of doing business, and I would like to think that we can build empathy and other 
people’s values into this as well. 
Q97  The Chairman: There is a note of challenge or criticism in what you just said, and 
indeed in your paper, where you remark: “A very real perception by many British Asians is 
that upper echelons of diplomacy, trade and inward investment promotion are narrow and 
established hands for whom diversity in Britain has only comparatively recently been 
accepted as relevant”. That is quite a sharp observation. Is this based on the fact that some 
of your colleagues feel real difficulties in— 
Uday Dholakia: It is a factual observation, Lord Chairman. I started my career as a local 
authority officer, and I was headhunted into DTI. I worked for Kenneth Clarke as Minister 
then for four years. It is a real observation. It is also an observation based on travelling 
abroad and doing business day in day out. I do not see many people from diverse 
communities at the hierarchy within FCO, BIS, UKTI. I have not seen any non-executive 
directors, and yet we are held-up as a good entrepreneurial community. 
Q98  The Chairman: I will turn to Mr Maisey. You too put in a paper, again with a critical 
note to it, which is good hard stuff to build on. You say, “We are not seeing a joined-up 
approach from Government. It appears to start with great ambitions and then runs out of 
time, which leads to a compromise”. What are you looking for from Government? 
David Maisey: There are generally some good ideas being put forward, but none is really 
taken through to complete fruition. There is a lot of mismatch and confusion for people like 
myself and other organisations like the Institute of Export. They see that certain initiatives 
can be undertaken in one governmental department but not reflected in another, and we 
have the situation where generally what we find day to day, especially for smaller businesses, 
is there is no centralised resource for all the information that exporters need. We have 
personal experience of this, as do many organisations within the Institute of Export, which 
have to in many ways rely upon HMRC for information, and that can typically take two 
weeks. When you want to be very dynamic, very proactive and you have clients chasing you 
on a daily basis as to certain criteria that they may need to satisfy, two weeks is completely 
unacceptable. It is just generally a number of components. It is the disparity between 
different departments within the Government and certain departments not knowing what is 
happening in other departments. The essential point is having a complete, centralised 
resource of information that people can turn to. 
The Chairman: That is very interesting. 
Q99   Lord Ramsbotham: I was very interested by that comment because that impinges 
on various things that we have been hearing before and have been exploring, for example 
that the National Security Council is the general overseer of soft power. Is that right, or is 
that far too shadowy? Do you, as a person involved in the marketplace, feel that 
Government is coming together to help you, or are you having to deal with a splintered and 
fragmented Government, having to pick off each bit of it as you have to, which makes life 
more difficult for you? 
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David Maisey: Absolutely, and I would totally agree that there is too much fragmentation. 
Exporting now, we all appreciate that we have to be a lot more dynamic. The world is very 
much a changing and evolving place. We are seeing more activity taking place in the east as 
opposed to the west. The UK has enjoyed being in pole position for soft power, but we can 
see that will soon start to decline unless we attack it and challenge it. Some of the major 
assets for the UK, such as the BBC World Service and the British Council, are having more 
challenges now with funding; some have been cut or removed completely. These have been a 
fantastic way to sell the UK to the globe. What we are seeing now are these diminishing, and 
additionally we see nations like China and Turkey becoming very much focused on soft 
power, China especially—we all know the massive economy there. They have always had a 
very hard-line stance and have been negligent of soft power, but they are now very much 
focusing on soft power. In fact, they have established some 320 educational institutes over 
the globe simply to promote China and the Chinese culture and the Chinese language and so 
on, and it is a subtle way of them opening the door to do more business. 
Uday Dholakia: I have a rather sanguine view of this. I think we live in realistic times where 
money is tight and the government apparatus can only do so much. This is why I am here. 
We want to come to the crease and bring our own resources, networks, cultural links, 
inside track, not just in the Asian subcontinent, but in east Africa, South Africa, the United 
States and parts of Europe and the Middle East as well. We have real challenges. My 
fundamental concern is that something like the UKTI ought to be a core function of the 
Government and not something that is outsourced here, there and everywhere. Look at the 
US Department of Commerce and how aggressively it promotes the hard power as well as 
the soft power worldwide. I think there is a lesson to be learnt out there. 
We are an island and, while we are very good at export documentation and export support, 
let us think about supply chains and imports as well. We have to import a lot of raw 
materials to make Land Rover Jaguars or food and drink, or whisky as well, if I may use that 
as an example. We need to be savvy at import relationships as well as exports. One of our 
biggest unique selling propositions in this country is our regulation. This summer I spoke at 
the Trading Standards annual conference in Brighton. They were rather hoping that I would 
complain about the burdens of regulation on SMEs. I did a little bit of that, but what I talked 
about was that we have the best regulations in the world. If you buy a British product or 
service abroad, you know it is legitimate, it is transparent and there is a redress complaints 
procedure. I think that is something that we need to build on so that the world looks at us 
in terms of better regulation models and frameworks. I feel that is one soft area of power 
that will give us ongoing competitive advantage. 
Q100  Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts: You have raised the question of the gap 
between firms, particularly SMEs, and the Government, and it is multi-faceted. One of the 
intermediaries that Lord Heseltine referred to, of course, is the role of the chambers of 
commerce, which are closer to the ground for many SMEs, and yet, as he points out in his 
report, the membership of chambers of commerce is very small indeed compared to 
equivalent organisations in Germany. Should we be thinking about ways to use the chambers 
of commerce as protagonists and informers and developers of smaller firms to work around 
the world? If so, is that going to be better than trying to find a way to focus the huge 
panapoly of govermental apparatus on one contact point? 
Uday Dholakia: If I may address that, let me give you the example of Leicestershire, which I 
know reasonably well. We have some 45,000 businesses in Leicestershire, from micro to 
quite substantial businesses. I would say not more than 10% are members of the CBI, LABA 
or the Federation of Small Businesses. How do we engage with the 90%? Clearly 
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Government does not have the resource to do this. What I am advocating is a partnership 
that goes beyond just chambers of commerce. I read Lord Heseltine’s No Stone Unturned 
report. In fact, Lord Heseltine was in Leicester two Fridays ago, and had lunch with all the 
representatives of the business community. I really feel there are big gaps in the government 
offering. We will ignore it at our peril. What we need is real leadership from this 
institution—from both Houses—to create alliances and partnerships that are legacy-based 
that add real value. The chamber on its own cannot deliver this. 
Compare our chambers of commerce network to, say, those in Germany, which are a quasi-
statutory instrument in Germany. I feel really depressed when I go abroad and see that my 
competitors have all the data from the French chamber, the German chamber, and US 
Department of Commerce and the only access I have is to OMIS reports from the UKTI. 
We need to look at a wider coalition. Let us tease out the best in what the people have to 
offer. One of the reasons I am here today is that we have nine British Asian business 
associations up and down the country which trade internationally and bring in inward 
investment; they are really keen to engage, to go out there and promote UK plc, but 
unfortunately they are not engaged. 
Q101  The Chairman: I am just going to chuck a question at Mr Callaghan, which I hope 
will pave the way for Lord Janvrin, who wants to pursue something. What I want to ask you, 
Mr Callaghan, is whether you feel that your members and you are operating in new markets 
with new patterns of behaviour, new conditions and new tastes and techniques for operating 
and doing business. Has something quite big changed in the world, and are we moving away 
from our traditional business patterns? 
Peter Callaghan: I have worked in most parts of the world except South America. I have 
run a lot of international businesses. I have actively used UKTI. As you can tell, I am not 
from this country, but I have been here 23 years, so I have run businesses from here and 
from Australia, and from places including Russia, eastern Europe, North America, Asia and 
India. I have a slightly different view about UKTI. I have found it extremely helpful and 
extremely useful in-country. You get out of it what you put into it. I do not think business 
has changed one bit. I think it is still about relationships and, whatever the technology you 
are dealing with, it does not really matter unless you have a good relationship with someone. 
You asked earlier about sport and the role it plays in these things, like the deals at the 
Olympics. I think these events bring people together—they get to know each other and 
relationships are formed, people start talking, they feel good and they say, “Let us work on 
this together”. The CBC has run lots of Commonwealth business forums in conjunction with 
the Heads of Government meetings, and lots of deals always come out of this. It takes a 
while for them to be completed afterwards, but nevertheless people get together in these 
forums, they build relationships and they say, “Let us work together and make something 
happen”. That is what business is about. 
I think the thing that has changed for the UK is a thing called integration—I do not know if 
you are familiar with this term. Today you cannot export low-value products; you have to 
export highly integrated products or highly integrated services, so you are either exporting a 
car or an aerospace subsystem, a jet engine. They are highly integrated, they involve lots of 
different suppliers and technologies—drugs are an example of a highly integrated product—
or you are exporting highly integrated systems, such as power transmission and generation, 
water supply and sewerage, or railway transportation. These are highly integrated systems, 
and they bring a lot of suppliers with them. I think if there is anything that has changed for 
Britain it is that we have to be more in the integrated product, integrated system supply 
arrangement, and for that we need more companies like the BAEs and the Rolls-Royces. 
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The one thing that I would be encouraging about where there might be something 
Government could do is the post-trade mission consortium. Trade missions go to countries, 
they build relationships and people say, “Let us do such and such”, but it falls flat afterwards 
because there is no follow-through. So if there was one thing I would vote for it is not to 
change UKTI but somehow to encourage the formation of post-trade mission consortia. It 
does not have to be a Government-led institution—it could be a chamber, it could be the 
bodies that are represented here today—but it should pull together those teams. I think that 
is where the Germans, whom I have competed with, the Chinese and the Japanese are much 
better than we are. They form consortiums willingly, and that is soft power. Coming back to 
the starting point of soft power, people want to be part of it rather than be compelled to do 
it. 
Q102  Lord Janvrin: That leads straight into the area that I want to get into. All of you 
started off by saying, “We had terrific advantages, we had the language and the education 
and the Commonwealth”, and so on, but then all of you have said, “UKTI could do more of 
this”, or, “We could use people in different ways”. You have all mentioned Chinese, the US 
Chamber of Commerce, the Germans and so on. Is there advice that we can give to 
Government on how other people do it, in your experience, that we could make use of? 
Can you be a little bit more specific? I am addressing this to all three of you, if I may, on how 
we can learn from others. 
Peter Callaghan: I was competing in my previous job for a £100 million contract to supply 
mobile hospitals to the Saudi Arabian health service, and we were competing against a 
German company. A hospital is not just a set of boxes. There is quite a lot of money 
involved in all the equipment that goes inside the hospital as well as all the supplies, so you 
have to form a consortium to be able to bid for that hospital. It is not just one single 
company. The leading company was called Zeppelin, but there were lots of companies 
involved in that bid, and they had active involvement from their trade organisation to 
facilitate the bid. They obviously won it. That is something that I think we could do in this 
country—encourage those sorts of consortia. I am not suggesting that UKTI should lead the 
consortium, but certainly it has to be able to facilitate, encourage different firms to get 
together and know each other. In the case of Zeppelin leading that consortium, it had built 
up relationships with all the various suppliers over years in order to make the bid. A £100 
million bid is a big bid for a mobile hospital. So I would be encouraging doing something to 
facilitate the building of consortia. Rolls-Royce and BAE already do this when they are 
bidding on big projects, but I think we could learn to do more of that. If we are going to 
succeed in the UK, it is about selling or exporting more integrated products that pull with 
them the supply base in both this country and elsewhere. 
David Maisey: I completely agree that voluntary consortiums are a very efficient way to 
work. There is no doubt about it, from my own personal experience globally, that when 
people pull together for the benefit of all involved they tend to achieve a lot more as 
opposed to being forced into doing something. The Institute of Export is committed to the 
education of their members to ensure that all of their 2,000-plus members have the basic 
infrastructure and knowledge requirements to help them export globally to existing and new 
and emerging markets, which is absolutely vital as a first layer to have that education and the 
information and knowledge of what needs to be done. 
Referring back to the UKTI, I think they are also an excellent organisation and they have 
launched a few initiatives. One of these is Export Champions. That is where the UKTI select 
a number of high achievers who have done well at export and have them collaborate to 
share their experience with other companies to encourage them to export, to help them 
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actually export, all based on experience. There is absolutely no doubt that in today’s climate 
we need to utilise technology more. Technology is going to change the way that we all 
communicate; it has already done so, but it will do so more when we look at soft power and 
what can be achieved by technology. We all know the World Wide Web. That has made 
such a huge difference to my own business, because we deal mainly electronically although, 
having said that, people still want the face-to-face relationships. In Canada and the USA, for 
example, they are very keen on face-to-face and you cannot take that away, but you can 
collaborate more, you can have more consortiums and you can utilise the power of 
technology more. 
Q103  Lord Janvrin: Can I come back to my question? You mentioned the Germans. How 
are they doing better at this than we are? Do they have a different organisation? Is there a 
different structure? Where can we learn from the people who are beating you on contracts? 
David Maisey: I think it was my colleague who mentioned Germany. 
Uday Dholakia: The end issue is legacy. Let me give you a practical example. You decide 
that you want to export to India, for example. You do your market research; you have your 
local export adviser from UKTI; you commission an OMIS report. You turn up in India, you 
have a nice drinks reception at the High Commission, and next morning you wonder, “How 
the hell do I do business? How the hell do I get repeat business, and how do I expand on 
this?” I feel that UKTI in this country is not fit for purpose. Abroad, yes. If I am a £10 million 
business exporting to Saudi Arabia, I am sure I will get the Prime Minister to take me with 
him to Riyadh. I am talking about the SMEs who are not based in London, who are based out 
in the country, in the Midlands, in the north-east of England. We need to create a legacy-
based relationship. 
So, you have been to India, you have met a few people, and you have come back to a place 
like Leicester or Derby or Lincoln. What I would like to create is a relationship with the 
Asian business community. There are 11 Indian banks in Leicester. Each of those bankers is 
very well experienced in doing business and getting money out of India for customers. What 
can I do to bring those bankers and those mentors to work with a farmer in Lincoln, to 
work with an engineering company in Derby so there is a legacy base, so that somebody 
who understands you can talk to you on a regular basis and create that next stage of your 
relationship? That is where I am coming from. Yes, there are sterling people within UKTI 
doing a great job; I have tremendous respect for them. The proposition that I am putting to 
you, my Lords, is: is UKTI fit for purpose in this country compared to what the Americans, 
the Germans or the Japanese do? It is something that I would like you to investigate. I feel 
that it is not fit for purpose. 
Q104  Baroness Nicholson of Winterbourne: I was just going to carry on with this 
one, not the question I was planning to ask. Going back to the beginning of some of your 
points, while supporting fully what Mr Callaghan has said about lack of follow-up, despite the 
fact that the Foreign Office has quite properly put trade and industry at the very top of its 
agenda, Mr Maisey says, quite correctly I think, that there is a huge lack of joined-up 
government on the ground. What suggestions do you have that can be taken from examples 
from other nations of how you should get a completely cohesive single face on the ground 
that will enable our businesses to succeed where we are at this moment failing in the face of 
other competition? For example, would you like to see DfID maybe not necessarily always 
choosing a British company but giving British companies first choice and only turning to 
another company from another nation if the British company does not fit the standards? 
What recommendations do you have? Would you like to see UKTI, the Foreign Office and 
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DfID more closely linked together on the ground? What is it you are suggesting? You are 
giving us what is wrong. Have you any thoughts as to what we should have on the ground? 
David Maisey: That is a very good point, and this is what we need to further assess, 
because there are no magical answers immediately, but we do agree that we need that 
collaboration. We do need more power given to the likes of the Institute of Export and the 
UKTI so that these can become a centralised resource of information. But I think also we 
cannot overlook the fact that we have to encourage everything from the bottom up, so this 
is all about innovation. It is about manufacturing excellence, and this is why some countries 
are doing better than the UK, because they are more innovative and maybe the 
manufacturing is better. We have taken some knocks. We still have some fantastic 
organisations here doing extremely well, but often we just lack that attitude of, “Go for it 
and make it a success”. This is something that I see a lot in my line of business. We export a 
software application and it is very technical, very innovative, we have won many awards for 
that, but it is about having the guts to start with. 
A lot of people I know—because I speak to a lot of different business leads—are concerned 
about the economy, they are concerned about stepping too far beyond their comfort zone. 
They have so many other things to think about these days that it is suffocating the capability 
to be innovative and achieve these higher levels of excellence. So we have to look at that as 
well to encourage all of that activity, as well as what you have suggested, having the overall 
body that co-ordinates and provides the information. 
Q105  Lord Forsyth of Drumlean: I am getting two messages, listening to your 
experience. Perhaps I am misunderstanding you, Mr Callaghan, but you seem to be 
presenting a sort of big-business picture, the £100 million contract with the consortiums, 
while Mr Maisey and Mr Dholakia are saying, “We have to have innovation, and we have to 
give the SMEs more of an opportunity”. Certainly my own experience, talking to small and 
medium-sized businesses, is that they say, “It is impossible for us to break into these 
markets, because we do not have the resources, we do not have the knowhow, and the DTI 
and other organisations are only interested in the big boys”. You have emphasised the 
importance of businesses like British Aerospace and so on, which are very fine businesses, 
but most large businesses in the end decline and it is small and medium-sized businesses that 
become the big businesses of the future. 
What I would like to know is: how do we use our networks, whether they are 
Commonwealth networks or whether they are relations with India or whether it is 
particular sectors where we have a comparative advantage, as in technology? How can we 
solve this problem? There are lots of words, but it is not clear to me in practical terms what 
the things are that we need to do. I do not for the life of me see why the Government 
should be involved in helping you to put together a consortium to bid in Saudi Arabia. I 
would have thought that if you have a bid you want to get the best people together for that 
purpose, but I can see how there may be a very innovative high-tech firm that is at the 
leading edge that wants to be able to export its product but simply does not have the 
resources or the manpower, or the time even, to do so. How do we deal with that? 
David Maisey: Let me reflect, if I may—I know Peter wants to speak—on you have said. My 
organisation, ICC Solutions, has 18 people. Last year we exported to 63 countries, the year 
before it was 55, the year before that it was 44, and that was with fewer staff. We have 
achieved a lot with a small number of people. We do not become involved in consortiums. 
We do it all ourselves. Our challenge has been to find all the information that we need in 
order to export to markets, and especially new and evolving markets, the Middle East being 
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a very good example, because there are so many criteria that you must satisfy. It is having 
that centralised resource of information for us. We have worked with the chambers over 
the years, we have worked with UKTI, we have worked with the Institute of Export, and 
they have all been excellent in their own way, but we have had to jump from one to the 
other, to HMRC as well, to the— 
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean: So you are talking about the compliance requirements, 
regulatory requirements of the countries concerned. You are not talking about how to 
market your product. 
David Maisey: Absolutely, yes. We believe we firmly know how to market and position our 
product, but of course what is beneficial is obtaining information about that particular 
market so you know how best to deal with the people and also how to fully position your 
product. 
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean: So marketing and access and credibility are not an issue; it is 
knowing how to get through all the regulatory and local hoops that you are concerned 
about. 
David Maisey: Essentially, combined with some of the local knowledge. I do feel that is very 
important, because as a small business we have seen diversity of cultures and we have to 
work in many different ways to satisfy our clients, and, as you will appreciate, with a small 
team of 18 people, that is very hard to achieve unless you have very focused and committed 
staff. That commitment is there, but we have wasted quite a lot of effort over the years 
going off down alleyways searching for information when really it should have just been 
there immediately. 
Peter Callaghan: Just to correct an impression I created, perhaps, a £100 million hospital 
involves hundreds of suppliers. It is not just one supplier with a £100 million contract; it is 
lots of small suppliers as well, but someone has to take the lead to integrate all of that 
together. I used the example of British Aerospace; in the case of the company I was working 
for it was Marshall in Cambridge. The business I was running averaged about £60 million a 
year, so it is not a big business by any means. It is about integrating the supply chain from 
smaller companies, some of them quite small, where someone takes the lead. Why did the 
Germans do better and why did they win that contract? They spent seven years bidding 
against us. They travelled more often to Saudi Arabia. Their trade organisation had more 
people in their office in Riyadh who knew the lie of the land than the UKTI did. We had a 
good relationship with UKTI, but they seemed to have just the finger on the pulse of who 
needed to be talked to and what they needed to be offered. They take a much more 
proactive role. The thing I would vote for would be to double the number of people in the 
UKTI offices overseas, the British trade commissioners. I would put more people into those 
offices, based on my very positive experiences with those offices around the world. 
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean: But what would they be doing? 
Peter Callaghan: You go to a country maybe once every three or four months, so your 
relationships are very short-term. If the UK trade commissions had more people to establish 
relationships inside the country when you go there, you can get a briefing, and you are much 
more up to speed as to who to talk to, what lines to take. That is what we used the trade 
commissioners for. They could do a lot more than they are currently doing, but you would 
probably have to have ex-business people who are oriented to getting an idea of what was 
going on in the marketplace so that when you got there you could be briefed by them. That 
is the practical recommendation I would make. 
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Q106  Baroness Prosser: Why do you think it is that UKTI is so on the back foot on 
these things? Do you think it is an attitudinal problem or— 
Peter Callaghan: I do not find them on the back foot. 
Baroness Prosser: No, but what you have just been saying is that— 
Peter Callaghan: That was Mr Dholakia. 
Baroness Prosser: No. You said you need people to co-ordinate and you gave us an 
example that the Germans were up there, upfront, spending more time abroad and so on. 
Peter Callaghan: I forget the name of the German trade organisation, but in-country they 
seem to be much more interested in the background and the details to these bids so that 
when their teams went to Riyadh, they were being briefed by the German trade— 
Baroness Prosser: Who is it that is at fault in this country for not being so— 
Peter Callaghan: No one is at fault. There are only so many trade commissioners in these 
offices. I am just arguing you could do with more of them. 
Baroness Prosser: So that is a UKTI issue, then? 
Peter Callaghan: It is probably a budget issue. 
The Chairman: The next witness is from the UKTI, and we can put these questions to 
him, but we need to move it on because of timing. This phrase of yours, “a British way of 
doing business”—of course our way of doing business is not the same as the way of doing 
business with new markets, including emerging markets. That leads to a question that I think 
Baroness Nicholson wanted to put, which is quintessential. 
Q107  Baroness Nicholson of Winterbourne: Mr Dholakia, you mentioned about 
halfway through the very large amount of regulation that Britain has. I would like to invite 
anyone to comment on whether your companies, the ones that you have been representing 
and nurturing, have found the Bribery Act to be a big handicap. I recall that when the Bribery 
Act came in there was a big consultation period with companies who were not altogether 
satisfied. Of course in the emerging markets and other markets, with the rise of bribery and 
corruption globally being horrific, the real struggle is quite often against a country where it is 
state companies and maybe they do not have the same respect for our Bribery Act as, say, 
the US would have, and certainly not maybe locally. What is the competition doing about 
corruption, and is this hampering our companies very badly indeed? 
Uday Dholakia: What I would like to see in terms of your question is localised international 
trade centres where we bring in the synergies of the universities, private equity and the 
experience of the local business community to help local businesses. In terms of anti-bribery, 
I think the whole world is moving in the right direction; they want a level playing field, and 
they want to do away with sharp practices. My concern is that when we come up with 
regulation and if we do not weigh-up the ethos and the modus operandi of that legislation, 
we are perceived to be anti-investment, anti-trade and an anti-business country, and I think 
there is danger in that. I firmly believe in the long-term and medium-term aims and 
objectives. If we do not communicate with our soft power while we are moving the agenda 
for anti-bribery forward internationally, then we will be perceived—and we are perceived—
as being anti-investment, anti-business, anti-trade, with our regulations on visas and people 
coming into our universities. 
I was in India with the prominent Vice-Chancellor from Nottingham University, Sir Colin 
Campbell, and we were talking to the Institute of Management in Ahmedabad, to the bright 
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and the best, asking why they were not coming to the Russell Group of universities rather 
than Ivy League—they were ever so polite and did not say much. After a couple of beers, 
they said we were perceived to be expensive, stuffy, and you could not get jobs here. More 
importantly, in America, at MIT or Stanford or UCLA, they saw peers from their own 
communities who were heads of departments, who were Nobel prize-winning economists, 
and that gave them the impetus to go to America. The business case for having soft power in 
this area is very important. 
I go back to my early proposition, that our regulations are the best in the world; that is our 
USP, but sometimes we do not communicate intelligent regulation very well, and in the short 
term we send out mixed signals. People do not just listen to the Prime Minister in the House 
or the Opposition on the television; they also read blogs, they also listen to our commercial 
radio stations and television stations, and make their minds up. It is no longer that COI and 
the BBC send the messages to the world. The world is looking at us from all sides, and 
sometimes we are perceived to be anti-enterprise. 
David Maisey: I would also suggest that no one wants to see corruption in business. We all 
want a fair, competitive, even playing field. To some extent, the Bribery Act is perceived as 
limiting what companies can do and what they can offer. I know from my own experience in 
the Institute of Export that there is confusion about what is involved in the Bribery Act. 
There are companies who are now setting limits on hospitality, for example, because they 
are concerned that may be perceived as bribery. The other consideration is it is very much 
unilateral. There should be a multilateral implementation, because we need to be mindful of 
all of the different cultures globally, and there are different ways of doing business in each of 
these nations. It is incorrect as westerners if we go along and impose certain ways of doing 
business on the eastern cultures. We have to be flexible, and I think the Bribery Act itself 
does not lend that flexibility. It has now put businesses in fear that they may well be 
overstepping the mark with simple things like hospitality and doing business that is relevant 
to the nation that they are in. These things do need to be considered and, never mind 
internationally, even in the UK there is a lot of confusion with it. 
Q108  Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts: On the Bribery Act, which is now out for 
consultation, people say that the difference between it and the US Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act is that you have responsibility for your agents in this country, where you do not in the 
US. What I am always amazed by is how few people write in to say something. When that 
consultation closes, there will be a couple of hundred, but there ought to be a couple of 
thousand. If people really believe that they can influence the Government, that is what they 
ought to be doing. I hope that organisations like yours, if this is a problem, do write in and 
say so because the weight of evidence will have an impact. We heard earlier about the BBC 
World Service and we heard then, Mr Dholakia, about how Britain was perceived as stuffy 
and anti-enterprise. Is the World Service pro-enterprise? Does it have enough— 
Uday Dholakia: My Lord, I have a real concern about the BBC. When I got home after a 
day’s business, I saw one of your colleagues use the term “lost the plot”. I think if they have 
lost the plot in internal issues in the UK, they certainly have lost the plot externally. The 
world does not see us through the BBC any more. There are a plethora of multimedia 
communication platforms out there. That is my biggest concern, that the world is viewing us 
in real-time values, not the historical values of cricket, fair play, integrity. Those are still 
underlying, important values, but the values have changed. Some of the events that happen in 
this Westminster village are heavily reported worldwide, and people made their own 
perceptions about these issues as well. I would say that certainly the BBC needs to take 
stock of that. 
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One point I will make is that there are no senior people in policymaking or the editorial end 
from the diverse community. Yes, we see people in front of the television. I had the privilege 
to work as a commissioner for the Broadcasting Standards Commission, chaired by Lord 
Dubs, and we worked very hard to put a diversity provision within the Communications Bill 
before Ofcom was established. I am sad to say the BBC today has no empathy in terms of 
policy and direction with the rest of the world because it does not reflect the rest of the 
world. It certainly does not reflect the communities that are based up here. 
The Chairman: Strong words there; that is very interesting. 
Q109  Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: That is very interesting, and all the evidence has been 
interesting. I know you want to get on to the Commonwealth, but I wanted to check 
something. Do the three of you work together on a regular basis, or are you just here 
because we happen to have invited you to the same session? 
Uday Dholakia: I work with the Institute of Export. In fact, I did a presentation to some of 
the companies who were keen to do business with India and, rather than doing an academic 
business presentation, I did almost like Arthur Daley’s philosophy of doing business. What is 
the reality? Let me give you a quick example. If there is a major festival in Bombay, UKTI and 
the chambers will advise you not to go during that period. What I was advocating is that is 
the right period to go and say to your host or your client, “Can I come and spend the day 
with you or your family to get underneath your skin to build a relationship?” so the next 
morning when you wake up to do business you have already covered a lot of useful ground. 
That is the place that I am coming from. 
Q110  Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: Each of you has made some very interesting and some 
quite strong comments. You have given us some very interesting evidence. Was it because 
we asked you about soft power, or have you been thinking for some time, “Hey, Britain 
should do more on soft power”? Has that been something that has been seething away in 
your thoughts? 
Uday Dholakia: I have been badgering Lord Stephen Green and Margot James MP on this. I 
have been badgering for the last 10 years, because it is really frustrating to go abroad and 
find that we are losing our competitive advantage. 
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: Is that the same with Mr Maisey and Mr Callaghan? Have you 
been feeling strongly about this issue? 
David Maisey: Yes, we have, from both the Institute of Export and the ICC Solutions 
perspective. Ultimately, “soft power” is a term, but it is all the underlying principles. For my 
company, that has been absolutely key for our continued evolution and success. Constantly, 
daily, we are looking at how people globally perceive us and what we need to do to enhance 
our company. 
Q111  Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: I think my colleague Baroness Nicholson mentioned 
this earlier. If you were asked to point to one country that we should look at to see, “Hey, 
wait a minute, they are good”, would you say Korea or would you say Australia, or France, 
or America? Where would you say we should look at to see some really interesting, 
innovative things, using your word, Mr Maisey? 
Uday Dholakia: Germany and United States. 
David Maisey: Yes, I would agree. 
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: You think they are ahead in soft power, both of them. 
David Maisey: Certainly the US. I think Germany is evolving and, as I mentioned earlier, 
China and Turkey undoubtedly are evolving in terms of soft power. 
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: What about France? They always seem to be pushing the 
French case through the French institutes. 
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David Maisey: I think, with all due respect, many people have had enough of France and the 
general attitude, again with all due respect. We see this day in, day out. Speaking with clients 
globally, they have exactly that perception. They are becoming somewhat annoyed with the 
ongoing arrogance of the French and their failure to be flexible and to adapt. It will be 
interesting to see how that evolves, but talking from personal experience it is not my own 
personal point of view. 
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: Mr Callaghan, in the Commonwealth is there a country that 
we could emulate? 
The Chairman: Can I just interrupt? That is the question that we want Baroness Prosser 
to develop. 
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: Are we going on to the Commonwealth? 
The Chairman: Yes, we are going on and it is going to be, I am afraid, the last question. I 
just declare an interest when I speak on this subject because I am President of the Royal 
Commonwealth Society and Chairman of the Council of Commonwealth Societies. Baroness 
Prosser, you put the question and let us build on it with what Lord Foulkes was asking. 
Q112  Baroness Prosser: The majority of Commonwealth countries have retained over 
the years the very similar legal systems, governance procedures and so on that they 
inherited and developed during the time when we were much more involved. Do you find 
that dealing with Commonwealth countries as British companies makes it slightly easier at 
all? Does it give any advantage? 
Uday Dholakia: I think that Indians—I speak as somebody who is British and who is 
absolutely passionate about UK plc—and people anywhere that English is spoken and 
appreciate Pythonism have a great affection for us. Affection itself does not translate into 
commercial reality. There is a shift in paradigm that needs to be taken on board. One of the 
observations is that a lot of our institutions are London-centric. There is an exciting life 
outside London. There is a lot of business to be done outside London. That is one 
observation. 
The whole world is knocking on the doors of English-speaking emerging markets, so what is 
our unique selling proposition? Soft power is an important one, but I go back to my original 
submission that we need to restructure and recalibrate it. It may be a question of learning as 
well. I will give you an actual example. One of the biggest challenges we have in doing 
business with the Indian subcontinent is regulation in terms of import and export, especially 
around food. I put a proposition that better regulation is our USP that sets us apart and the 
rest of the world wants to adopt our model. The World Bank wants to adopt our model. 
Rather than just taking SMEs to India, I am taking British regulators to India to a conference 
and saying to the SMEs, “If you want to do business with us, these are the prerequisites. If 
you get it right, we can do a lot of business together, but if you need help, these are the 
signposting areas where we can give you help”. As a result of that, the Indian regulators now 
want to come to this country and adopt our best practices as well. Those are soft skills. 
Those are influencing skills that we need to build on. 
Q113  Baroness Prosser: Mr Maisey, what do you think? 
David Maisey: Certainly, from my experience, it has been a benefit to engage with other 
Commonwealth countries, and most notably Canada has been our key area for export over 
the last number of years. We have established somewhat of a monopoly in terms of the test 
tools that we supply within the Canadian marketplace and that is undoubtedly due to the 
very close relationships that we enjoy as both being part of the Commonwealth. It is the 
same culture, the same business ethos and obviously similar laws and so on. Canada has 
been a wonderful destination and undoubtedly that is because of the Commonwealth link. 
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Interestingly, because of our activity in Canada as part of the Commonwealth, what we are 
now seeing is migration to the US. Typically, there is often conflict between Canada and the 
US, but in this case the US is looking to Canada to see how they have implemented the chip-
and-PIN model. Canada looked to the UK; now the US is looking to Canada. That is part of, 
I suggest, the power of the Commonwealth going beyond and now starting to influence how 
the US is going to manage their chip-and-PIN migration. That potential, incidentally, is 
massive, infinitely bigger than Canada itself. As part of that Commonwealth relationship, we 
are now looking to achieve huge things in the US. 
Q114  Baroness Prosser: That is interesting. Could we say the same, Mr Callaghan, if you 
look at Australia and the very close relationships nowadays in that Pacific Rim with 
Singapore, Hong Kong, which are themselves ex-Commonwealth, and their legal systems? 
Baroness Armstrong of Hill Top: It is still part of the Commonwealth. 
Baroness Prosser: Yes, indeed. I was just giving an example. 
Peter Callaghan: The first thing I would say is that people build relationships by doing 
things together. One of the most important things that we have all done and continue to do 
is education. People in the Commonwealth are educated either in their own country, but, 
most importantly, they are educated in other Commonwealth countries. It is not just the UK 
they come to but Singapore, Australia, New Zealand and Canada. They are educated in 
other Commonwealth countries. In that process, English is the common language and the 
examples and the case studies and the material they work with are largely Commonwealth 
examples, whether they be English or Canadian or Australian or whatever. It is a very 
important form of soft power. When people are educated technically as doctors, engineers, 
accountants, whatever they might be, in a Commonwealth country, they are taking across 
the soft power that you are talking about. I think there is a huge benefit in the 
Commonwealth for that reason—it is inherent that people have done things together. That 
is the thing I come back to about the trade commissioners in these countries. When you go 
there, you go and see them. You build a relationship with the trade commissioners, and they 
in turn build a relationship in that country with people so that you automatically fit into the 
patterns, the processes, the ways of doing business in those places. I think the 
Commonwealth is tremendously important because of the soft power it already has. 
Q115  Baroness Armstrong of Hill Top: Do Commonwealth countries talk about visa 
issues? 
Peter Callaghan: There is a committee that is looking at this expansion of the APEC card 
across the Commonwealth, the business visa. That is something that is going on at the 
moment. 
Baroness Armstrong of Hill Top: So, visas are not a problem at the moment. 
Uday Dholakia: They are a major problem. It is also how we communicate processing of 
visas. I think as a country we are sending out mixed signals. Investment money has the 
opportunity to go anywhere in the world to be invested. We have a competitive advantage 
because of language, integrity and everything else, but my advocacy is that we ought not to 
take it for granted. We need to build on it. We need to calibrate it. We need to innovate 
with that. 
The Chairman: Baroness Armstrong has chucked a large rock in the pool right at the end 
because, of course, the visa issue is one that comes up again and again, but I think we are 
going to call this to a halt now. We are very grateful to you. Speaking for myself, I have 
tremendously enjoyed this short session, and I think we can draw on a number of your 
comments very heavily, particularly in the next session that we are going to have with the 
UKTI. Thank you very much indeed for taking the time on this hot afternoon to be here and 
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good wishes in all your work. We shall study very carefully what you have told us. Thank 
you very much indeed. 
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Commonwealth Parliamentary Association (CPA) – Written 
evidence 
 
1. CPA UK 
1.01. The Commonwealth Parliamentary Association is the professional association of 
Commonwealth parliamentarians, a network of over 17,000 parliamentarians from 175 
national and devolved legislatures.   
1.01. The Commonwealth Parliamentary Association UK Branch (CPA UK) is one of the 
largest and most active branches of the international CPA and delivers a unique annual 
programme both in Westminster and overseas. Governed by an Executive Committee of 
parliamentarians from all main parties and with a membership of Members from both 
Houses of Parliament, CPA UK undertakes international parliamentary outreach on behalf of 
the UK Parliament and its Members. Its specific focus is on parliamentary diplomacy and 
parliamentary strengthening activities, seeking to foster co-operation and understanding 
between parliaments, promote good parliamentary practice and advance parliamentary 
democracy. 
2. The meaning and importance of soft power 
2.01. How important is a country’s soft power? What is the evidence that soft power makes a 
difference?  
2.02. CPA UK’s work is in large part instigated through requests for programmes and 
partnerships from Commonwealth legislatures, so the organisation relies on demand for the 
UK’s existing soft power to generate its activity. Over the last three financial years, CPA UK 
has seen 30% year-on-year uplift in its programmes, indicating that the UK’s soft power is 
both increasing and meeting with a favourable reception and increased appetite abroad.  
2.03. CPA UK’s aim in creating links between Westminster and international parliaments is 
to strengthen good governance and democratic accountability. Improved parliamentary 
practice can lead to good governance, which in turn helps improve a country’s peace and 
stability, which catalyses social and economic development, stabilises its economy, and 
thereby makes trade with and investment in the country more secure.  
2.04. How do deployments of soft power inter-relate with harder and more physical exercises of the 
nation’s power, ranging from trade sanctions up to the full use of force through military means? 
2.05. Exercising soft power influence on other nations can lead to peaceful and amicable 
resolution of differences in opinion, in particular where it is likely that more overt attempts 
to change a country’s course of action might lead to large-scale international consequences 
and that a softer approach will have greater impact. For instance, the UK Government’s 
recent decision to attend the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Sri Lanka 
despite its inconsistent human rights record indicates that it is preferable to maintain links 
and to continue to highlight issues and lobby for improvement rather than to isolate the 
country and leave it without international checks.  
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2.06. To this end CPA UK facilitates peer-to-peer exchanges between different countries’ 
parliamentarians, a context in which it is possible for MPs and Peers to raise challenges and 
disagreements amongst their international colleagues informally, with the aim of instigating 
action from parliaments. In recent weeks, for instance, the UK delegation to the 59th 
Commonwealth Parliamentary Conference (CPC) in Johannesburg raised the issues of the 
persecution of LGBTI individuals, female genital mutilation and the death penalty with 
Members from countries where these practices persist.  
3. The extent and use of the UK’s soft power resources 
3.01. What are the most important soft power assets that the UK possesses? Can we put a value 
on the UK’s soft power resources? 
3.02. CPA UK is able to undertake its work on the basis that Commonwealth countries – 
and others, such as Japan – share the Westminster parliamentary system and English 
language, enabling parliamentarians from across the Commonwealth to share best practice 
within the same organisational and procedural framework.  
3.03. The shared language and, in many cases, legal system and business/administrative law, 
also allows for easier trading relationships, as well as for increased cultural exchange and 
understanding.  
3.04. How can non-state actors in the UK, including businesses, best be encouraged to generate soft 
power for the UK, and be discouraged from undermining it? 
3.05. CPA UK undertakes to work, wherever possible, in partnership with NGOs and civil 
society organisations such as Volunteer Services Overseas (VSO), the British Council, and 
the Westminster Foundation for Democracy (WFD). By identifying shared goals and creating 
strong, well-planned partnerships, it is possible to collaborate and to leverage public funding 
and non-state actors’ funding to increase the reach and impact of programmes.  
3.06. Who should be the target audiences, and what should be aims, of the application of the UK’s 
soft power? Is the UK using its soft power well and to the right ends?  
3.07. Parliaments, as the institutions that create legislation, hold governments to account, 
and represent citizens’ interests, are a hugely important target for soft power, with far-
reaching influence that extends up to governments and down to individuals through civil 
society and grassroots political structures. As such, focusing soft power on parliamentarians 
leverages its impact. However, parliaments are often forgotten stakeholders in the 
developmental process, falling between governments and civil society organisations; for 
instance, in the consultation process for the post-2015 development agenda, there is no 
clear route through which parliamentarians can make their voices heard. 
3.08. Is there sufficient return for the Government’s investment in soft power? Is the Government’s 
investment adequate? 
3.09. CPA UK runs its programmes on extremely tight budgets, consistently making 
decisions based on maximising value for money; it has found that a great deal of soft power 
influence can be achieved without incurring large costs. However, soft power requires non-
monetary investment, such as human resource, time and facilitation assistance, i.e. opening 
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the right doors, and greater assistance from Government in these areas would be gratefully 
received by all actors.  
4. Soft power and diplomacy 
4.01. What roles do international networks such as the UN, the EU and the Commonwealth play in 
strengthening the UK’s soft power and influence abroad and facilitating its application? How could 
the UK use these networks more effectively to increase its influence? 
4.02. As an informal grouping of states, the Commonwealth network is based on friendship 
between nations and shared values. As such, approaches between members and under the 
Commonwealth’s auspices are likely to be received favourably, and shared language, 
administrative/legal frameworks and, to an extent, history are likely to make cultural 
understanding easier. The advantages of shared values and history also apply to the EU.  
4.03. However, in the Commonwealth this shared history can have the unfortunate side 
effect of allowing disagreements and wrongs of the distant past to have enduring 
ramifications. For instance, in some quarters in some African countries, the UK’s attempts to 
influence elements of domestic policy such as homosexual rights are perceived to be ongoing 
interference from a former colonial power.  
4.04. How best should the UK’s foreign policy and approach to diplomacy respond to the new global 
communications environment? 
4.05. With increasing channels through which the public can access the media, and with an 
increasingly fraught relationship between politicians and the media, it is important that use of 
both traditional and new media by Government be as open, responsive and comprehensive 
as possible, to ensure that the general public feels that Government is being transparent and 
has nothing to hide and to build bridges with media.  
4.06. How should the UK best respond to the more prominent role in international affairs played by 
non-state actors and emerging powers? Can the UK shape this landscape as it develops, or must it 
take a purely reactive approach? 
4.07. In many cases, the interests and objectives of non-state actors will tie in with those of 
the UK, making it practical to link with them and promote these shared aims. It is important 
to ensure positive perception in as many quarters as possible to secure the UK’s position.  
4.08. Bilateral links already exist with several of the emerging global powerhouses, such as 
India and many African countries through the Commonwealth. In some cases, these nations 
lack strength in their democratic institutions; CPA UK seeks to work with these to reinforce 
good governance and parliamentary democracy, promoting stability, human rights and the 
rule of law.  
4.09. How are UK institutions and values perceived abroad? Do other countries have negative 
opinions of the UK? Do those representing the UK give enough consideration to how the UK is 
perceived? 
4.10. Westminster continues to be seen as the mother of parliaments and a universal gold 
standard of parliamentary best practice. This is evidenced by the popularity of CPA UK’s 
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Westminster-based programmes, notably the Westminster Seminar on Parliamentary 
Practice and Procedure, which each year is oversubscribed.  
4.11. However, in its dealings with some partner parliaments, CPA UK has found that the 
relationship can be overshadowed by ongoing ill feeling towards the UK as the former 
colonial power, and in some cases its exercise of soft power can be perceived to be ongoing 
interference with a sovereign power’s domestic policy. This should be borne in mind by 
representatives of the UK, as in some cases exchanges of views can be perceived as 
preaching.  
4.12. Are there any examples of how its commitment to such values has hindered the UK’s influence 
abroad or damaged its interests? How can the UK promote its values abroad without being accused 
of cultural imperialism, propagandising or hypocrisy?  
4.13. At the recent CPC in Johannesburg, a session on the Commonwealth Charter sparked 
a discussion of the rights of and protections given to LGBTI individuals in the 2/3 of 
Commonwealth countries that criminalise homosexuality. In this session, several delegates 
implied or directly accused the UK of imposing a liberal, human rights western agenda to the 
detriment of the sovereignty of other nations. This was handled by one UK delegate by citing 
the number of instances where the UK has not performed well, for instance in preventing 
women voting for many years, the low female and ethnic minority representation in 
Parliament, criminalisation of homosexuality until relatively recently and permissive attitudes 
towards racism. It is important to emphasise in any attempt to influence that the UK is still 
far from perfect, and therefore any efforts are mutual, not merely a case of developed 
western countries dictating to the less developed world.  
5. Aspects of soft power 
5.01. What is your assessment of the role played by the English language, and English language 
publications, in advancing the UK’s influence abroad? 
5.02. Because the Commonwealth’s shared language is English, one barrier is removed in 
bilateral exchanges with other Commonwealth countries, whether at governmental, 
parliamentary or non-state level. This is particularly beneficial in business agreements, as it 
dramatically reduces the costs by eliminating the need for translation of documentation. It 
also means that cultural influences, such as books, music, films and television programmes, 
are more likely to be shared, creating opportunities to develop closer relationships.  
5.03. In the parliamentary context, English is the main language for parliamentary business in 
the majority of Commonwealth countries. However, in some, for instance Mozambique, 
English is not always the first language of Members, making English language training essential 
in enabling parliaments to be effective and robust. The British Council undertakes some 
parliamentary English language training, but due to lack of resources is not able to provide it 
across the board where it is needed.  
5.04. What soft power gains can the UK expect from its overseas aid and humanitarian 
commitments? Should aid be used to advance the UK’s influence abroad? 
5.05. The UK’s aid payments and humanitarian relief contribute to stability and to social and 
economic development through improvements to communities’ health, food security, 
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education and infrastructure. This stability in turn gives economies and businesses the space 
in which to develop, and eventually to become new trading partners. It also can provide a 
means through which the UK can influence decision-makers in recipient countries, a symbol 
of support and friendship that may make calls for improved human rights records and 
strengthened roles for parliament, civil society and the media more effective.  
5.06. To what extent should the UK Government involve the devolved administrations in its work on 
soft power? Does the UK have a single narrative or should it project a loose collection of narratives 
to reflect the character of its regions? 
5.07. The international CPA is unique in recognising devolved legislatures equally to national; 
Holyrood, the Senedd and the Oireachtas therefore form an important part of the British 
CPA branches’ work. For instance, similarities between the devolved legislatures and those 
of small countries such as Pacific and Caribbean islands mean they have a great deal of 
knowledge to share on issues of mutual concern, more than a Westminster parliamentarian 
might be able to contribute.  
5.08. Furthermore, devolved administrations have their own bilateral relationships (Wales 
with Lesotho, Scotland with Malawi for instance) that are individually valuable and should be 
fostered.  
5.09. It is also important to preserve the multiple narratives of the regions as each will speak 
to different countries. For example, Northern Ireland’s post-conflict and peacebuilding 
experience links it with countries such as Sri Lanka, Rwanda and South Africa, all of which 
face the challenges of integrating divided communities, whilst Scotland’s ongoing 
devolution/independence debate bears similarities to that of Quebec in Canada.  
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Q165  The Chairman: Can I begin by welcoming the witnesses and making the formal 
statement I am required to make that the declared interests of this Committee are before 
you on pieces of paper, I hope? Thank you very much for coming. The Committee’s label is, 
as you know, that we are examining soft power and Britain’s influence overseas. Part of the 
remit, we believe, is to look at the great institutions that Britain belongs to and see two 
things: one, how our membership of those institutions—in this case, we are talking about 
the European Union—help Britain’s strength, diplomacy, persuasion, attractiveness and our 
ability to pursue our interests around the world in soft or smart ways; and, two, what the 
institution itself—in this case, the European Union—wields in the way of soft power and 
influence in the world. Inevitably, these two aspects will overlap as we discuss them, but 
those are the two main questions for us. 
I know that our witnesses would like to make initial comments on how they see this remit 
of ours, and I am very happy that that should be so. I begin by asking Lord Leach of Fairford, 
who as we know is the founder of Open Europe, which is an extremely active body in 
illuminating the European scene. I will then ask other witnesses whether they would like to 
speak briefly as well. 
Lord Leach of Fairford: Thank you. I apologise for my [bruised] appearance, and if slight 
concussion appears in my remarks I hope my inquisitors will be forgiving. A business 
colleague recently met a member of the standing committee of the Chinese politburo, who 
expressed the view that Sino-British relations were far more than a matter of trade figures. 
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The UK was the only country to have refrained from protectionist measures against China. 
Since the industrial revolution, the British have designed most of the rules of international 
engagement, from sports to standards of governance. It was the home of the English 
language. It had a strong role in education, science and technology, and in services, especially 
the financial sector, it was a—perhaps the—world leader. Without ports or harbours—
there are not so many ships nowadays—we were the world’s shipping hub because of our 
advanced impartial legal system. This, he said, added up to significant soft power, placing us 
as the nation that is always worth consulting on multinational issues.  
Now, these ingredients of soft power, in the eyes of an independent observer of great 
insight who possesses both soft and hard power, may be of interest to your Committee 
because they are, I think, at variance with the usual way in which the term is used. They are 
specific, not vague. They are embedded in the culture of a nation with a long history of 
stability and continuity through difficult and changing times. The EU essentially defines soft 
power by contrasting it to the real military power and the concentrated economic power 
that it does not possess. The USA defines it in terms of the limitations of hard power, the 
need also to be effective to win hearts and minds through alliances of the willing. 
It is only a phrase, so define it how you will, but I found the Chinese usage compelling. If you 
broadly divide soft power into trade negotiations and foreign and defence matters, it is, I 
think, self-evident that the EU’s influence is proportionate to its own internal agreement or 
disagreement. Where member states are split, for example between protectionism and free 
trade or between armed intervention and neutrality, the EU’s effectiveness is slight. In some 
cases it can be counterproductive. Even where there is internal agreement, it is always fair to 
ask—I am not prejudging the answer—whether the states might not have done equally well 
to agree independently rather than within the institutional framework of the Commission or 
the External Action Service.  
That is by way of introduction, trying to give the Chinese view, which I do find compelling, of 
what soft power really is. 
Q166   The Chairman: That is extremely helpful and clarifying. Thank you very much. 
Could we just ask Mr Bond to cover the same ground briefly? 
Ian Bond: Thank you very much Lord Chairman. I will do my best on both scores. I will 
start by accepting the Joseph Nye classical definition of soft power: that it is the power of 
attraction rather than coercion or bribery. From that perspective, the EU seems to me to be 
pre-eminently a soft power actor. It would be fair to say that its economic soft power has 
been diminished by the crisis in the eurozone over recent years—there is no question about 
that. But it does retain a significant degree of soft power in other ways, for example through 
the continuation of the enlargement process and through the relationships that it has with its 
neighbours. That in turn reflects the attractions that the values of Europe have.  
I saw a very interesting example of this in a rather unexpected area. As you probably know, 
negotiations are going to start, if the Americans reopen their Government, on the 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. One of the attractions for Americans in the 
TTIP by comparison with some of the free trade agreements that they have entered into 
with other countries, for example in Latin America, is that the EU will be setting high 
standards in areas such as labour and environment, which is seen as quite attractive, rather 
than having to worry about human rights standards or labour standards in third countries. 
That underlines a point one of your previous witnesses from the Department for Business, 
Innovation and Skills made, which is that the EU has an important role in setting the rules of 
the game.  
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In many parts of the world, the EU can be a force multiplier for the UK. It is not always the 
case, but it is often the case, whether it is in the Middle East or the Sahel. The problem for 
the UK is that sometimes our attitudes to the EU make it more difficult for us to exercise 
the leverage within the Union that would best enable us to pursue our objectives. 
The Chairman: Thank you. Graham Mather, would you like to give us a little opening sally 
on these themes? 
Graham Mather: Thank you, my Lord Chairman. I will follow and adopt much of what was 
said by the previous witnesses. I agree that Joe Nye is right that hard power is push, soft 
power is pull. For me, the EU’s primary attraction in the soft power sense concerns the 
norms which it espouses: democracy, human rights and market logic. The techniques are 
fourfold. The first, as Mr Bond mentioned, is enlargement. The second, which he also 
mentioned, is the neighbourhood policy, to which I would add bilateralism with great powers 
as number three, and finally what one might call inter-regionalism: that is, relating with other 
regional groupings in the world. 
I think the EU’s soft power is unbalanced in that enlargement is a much stronger form of soft 
power than the others. It seems to me that it gets progressively weaker through the 
neighbourhood policy, bilateralism and regionalism. Ultimately you have to ask, for those out 
of its region that are not going to join the EU: what is this soft power? Is the EU purely a 
European experience, or are its values truly more universal and capable of attracting? I will, if 
I may, just borrow a definition from Lee Kuan Yew, which the Committee may have heard: 
“Soft power is achieved only when other nations admire and want to emulate aspects of that 
nation’s civilisation”—so here we are talking, mutatis mutandis, of the admiration of the EU. 
I would just like to say two or three words on the British relationship. What is at the heart 
of Britain’s soft power? May I suggest one or two? The BBC is enormously important 
globally. Then there is the City of London, and the Crown and Commonwealth—we have 
just heard from the Commonwealth. Conceivably, the Church of England could play such a 
role, as the two previous popes did for the Catholic Church. Then there is the English 
language. We saw in the Eurostat figures last month that 94% of upper secondary students 
across the EU learn English—an astonishing bridge and connection. So the question I really 
ask myself is: what does the EU add to these? In some areas it might inadvertently subtract. I 
do not think it has impeded the BBC in any way, but some recent measures and some of the 
directives, such as the AIFM directive in the City of London, will certainly not help the City 
globally.  
In conclusion, it is difficult for the EU to create the focused structure of credibility that Lee 
Kuan Yew was talking about. 
Q167  The Chairman: Thank you very much indeed. That raises some interesting 
questions. Would any of the Committee like to pursue that? I think you have made, first, the 
very obvious point, a very good point, that the EU clearly has magnetism for countries that 
wish to join. That is always a sign. This Committee discussed earlier the Commonwealth and 
the countries that wish to join that. There must be some soft power attraction of a kind. 
Nevertheless, there is also criticism that when it comes to the EU thinking of itself as an 
influence in the world through its Diplomatic Service, its EAS and so on, it does not seem to 
have made a major impact on the current issues that worry us in Syria, Afghanistan, Libya 
and Egypt. Where is the EU? I do not know whether any of our witnesses would like to 
comment on that broader question as well as, if necessary, coming back to the question of 
how it helps Britain. 
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Graham Mather: If I might carry on with that theme, let us think about the Chancellor of 
the Exchequer’s very important visit to China, which is currently under way. The Chancellor 
almost made it explicitly clear that this was a bilateral initiative, and it has been reported as 
such. He went so far as to say, in picking up what was said earlier about the propensity of 
some countries to protectionism vis-à-vis China, that this included some European member 
states but not, of course, the United Kingdom. In a way, we see that very important 
interaction as almost entirely bilateral, but—I must just nod in this direction—the 
Chancellor has announced a pilot programme to ameliorate visa requirements, which have 
seriously upset our Chinese colleagues. He is doing so, I understand, by piggy-backing on the 
Schengen system, so that if a Chinese visitor applies for a Schengen visa it will be accepted 
by the United Kingdom, but it does not mean that the United Kingdom will join Schengen. 
Lord Leach of Fairford: Assisted by a flying squad of officers going around Chengdu and 
Chongqing, I have to add, in order to get an accelerated VIP service. It is not quite joining 
Schengen. The French, I think, are talking about disjoining Schengen, I saw the other day. 
Ian Bond: If I may add a word on this question, first, the Chancellor’s visit is an example of 
where the member states sometimes undercut the effectiveness of the EU. The fact is that in 
a number of areas we need the Commission and its weight to be able to negotiate with the 
Chinese on issues of market access and so on. Yet, what we—we are not alone in this—and 
a number of the other member states tend to do is to turn to the Commission when we 
have difficult questions to raise with the Chinese and then go to the Chinese and say, “Of 
course, we’re much more open to co-operation with you than our partners are, and we 
certainly don’t agree with what the Commission is doing”. You saw an excellent example of 
the results of that when the Chinese appeared to be dumping solar panels on the European 
market. The Commission took action to look after European producers who were being 
unfairly undercut by Chinese competition, and the Chinese went not to the Commission to 
negotiate a solution but to the Germans to lay down the law to the Commission. That is 
actually not in our interests in the long term. 
Baroness Nicholson of Winterbourne: What extraordinarily interesting contributions 
we have just had. Could I go to something very basic? 
The Chairman: I am so sorry. I have to interrupt you; there is a Division downstairs, 
which means that the Committee must adjourn for five minutes. It is very inconvenient, I am 
afraid, but that is what we have to do. When we come back, you can go on with your 
question. I apologise to our witnesses but that is the way this place works. 
 
Session suspended for a Division in the House. 
 
The Chairman: I think, despite Lord Leach not coming back to us, that we will push on. 
He can join in when he returns. Baroness Nicholson, you were just putting a question when 
the bell interrupted. 
Q168   Baroness Nicholson of Winterbourne:  Thank you very much indeed. Both 
Graham and Mr Bond made points on the enlargement of the EU being its greatest strength 
and in a sense the soft power being derived from that strength rather than sitting on its own, 
independent of it. You then mentioned the neighbourhood policy as a slightly less strong 
instrument. Earlier, Mr Bond or Lord Leach mentioned trade and industry influence in the 
Gulf, for example. As I perceive it, the further we get away from the enlargement countries, 
the weaker the EU becomes. Therefore I can see the immediate temptation, perhaps rightly 
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taken by the UK, of treating China as bilateral. But the enlargement of the EU has brought 
problems of its own, say with the less stable single market of 28 members than previously 
with the 15. My suggestion might be that the real strength of the EU is, curiously, depleted 
internally by enlargement, by the weakening of the fight against corruption and a number of 
important legislative matters internally given the weakening of the free market. How will this 
balance play out in the future since Turkey is not necessarily coming into the EU? We are 
starting to the see the growth of the eastern policies, taking people away such as Armenia, 
which has now given way on a partnership association agreement in favour of the eastern 
partnership. How do you foresee this strength of the EU? Will it remain rather static where 
it is or will it have another way of enlarging its soft and underlying power? 
The Chairman: I might add: does it need to change its doctrines of the 20th century, 
which were ones of centralisation, into a more decentralised pattern to fulfil the objectives 
for the future that Baroness Nicholson has just spoken about? 
Lord Leach of Fairford: As I came late to the question, I might not get it completely right. 
The Chairman: If you do not answer it satisfactorily, I am sure that Baroness Nicholson 
will intervene. Have a go. 
Lord Leach of Fairford: I think that the centralisation of power, which was understandable 
at the beginning of the creation of what is now the EU, was necessary. There is the usual 
stuff: the wounds of war and very high tariffs. All those things had to be brought together in 
a centralised way. Here we are, nearly 70 years after the war, with a far more diverse state 
and a world that is far more globalised and networked rather than concentrated and 
regionalised. In those circumstances, the centralisation doctrine has gone from positive 
through neutral and is becoming counterproductive. A classic case of that is the euro itself, 
stated to be the currency of the Union although clearly it is not. It is admittedly 
counterproductive. That does not mean that it is easy to unwind it. Of course, it is 
extremely difficult to do so. But that is a classic case of where centralisation went too far 
and was a mistake. There is a strong case, one I hope the Government will put—I begin 
already to see signs of that in murmurings about the undesirability of resolving all problems 
through ever closer union—towards decentralisation. It is a personal view but I would like 
to see Europe redefine itself as the single market, so that if you are in good standing with the 
single market you are a member in good standing of the European Union. That is obviously 
an economic issue but leaving monetary, political and social arrangements much more in the 
hands of the national democracies. I think that would greatly increase the soft power of the 
European Union, although by traditional doctrines it would decrease it—some would say 
destroy it. It is the coalition of the willing as opposed to the coerced, one size fits all set of 
policies. 
The Chairman: Mr Bond, what would you say to that? Those are interesting thoughts. 
Ian Bond: I was interested in the idea of a centralisation doctrine. There has been an 
accretion of power. Some of it is rather more necessary than Lord Leach allows for ensuring 
that you have a single market that works. It is a little while ago, but if you take the example 
of the UK and BSE crisis, it was the Commission that ultimately forced France to accept that 
it had to start importing British beef again. It is not clear to me that we could have achieved 
that bilaterally, other than by possibly sanctioning a lot of French Champagne. It seems to 
me that having the Commission as quite a powerful referee is quite important to the running 
of the single market, which matters to us. That is not to say that there are not a lot of areas 
that can be left to the member states to decide. I do not think the working time directive is 
as bad a thing as is sometimes portrayed in the UK, but there is a fair case to be made that 
Centre for European Reform, European Policy Forum and Open Europe – Oral evidence 
(QQ 165-175) 
331 
 
not every country in Europe needs to run its health service rosters in precisely the same 
way. That is an example of where I would say you could pass some power back to the 
member states. 
Q169  Baroness Nicholson of Winterbourne: I raised a point about the weakening, as I 
perceive it at the moment, of the single market by the 28 member states—at the moment—
with what I would suggest is the great weakening of the fight against corruption and the rise 
of corruption. In other words, there is a lack of consistency in national legislation and in the 
culture nationally of certain member states to fight corruption at all. That has weakened the 
single market dramatically. I wondered whether Graham felt that that was so. If so, how 
does he feel that should be tackled? More to the point, what other strength does the EU 
have with which to balance its power outside the EU if the single market is in a little bit of 
trouble? 
Graham Mather: Lord Chairman, I agree with Lord Leach that the single market is at the 
heart of the EU and that that economic power is the primary attraction for countries that 
want to join and, to a slightly lesser extent, to neighbouring countries that may want to 
associate with it. Both of those show soft power in operation. It can be complex. A Swiss 
friend said the other day, “So long as Europe remains liberal, we will not want to sign an 
association agreement, but if you become really protectionist then we would have to join”. 
There are tensions there. If we just extend it to the difficulties that Baroness Nicholson 
mentioned, as an example the Polish Government have some special economic zones that 
are very important to them. The EU said that they must phase them out by 2019. The Polish 
Government have now, of their own volition, said that they will not phase them out until 
2026. They may never get round to it. That will be a different sort of single market in that 
there will be more flexibility in it to adjust tax rates and regulation, but I would see that as 
desirable rather than undesirable, and not necessarily as a weakening.  
Finally, if one may look at the still further regions, Europe has for example the ACP—the 
Afro-Caribbean Pacific—relationship. There is some soft power there but it seems mainly to 
the benefit of the French. It seems to preoccupy the francophone countries. There is a soft 
power in Mercosur but the links seem primarily to be trade-related. The Asia-Europe 
dialogue does not seem to have any real soft power benefits for Europe because Asia does 
not seem to think it has anything to gain. If we come back to the question, if there is nothing 
to gain there is not much soft power. 
Lord Leach of Fairford: Can I make a brief comment on corruption, as that was raised? 
Clearly the time when there is most leverage over corruption is when a country is applying 
to join. Once it has applied successfully and joined we see clear examples—with no names 
and no pack drill—where the pressure comes off and it becomes much more difficult to 
eradicate. Of course you are right that it must weaken soft power if part of the Union is 
patently more corrupt than others. 
Ian Bond: Just to add to that, I am sure that is right. I can think of a small number of 
countries where the Commission should probably have done more ahead of their accession 
to try to deal with the problem of corruption. Equally, I can see that in the last big wave of 
accession in 2004 a lot of the countries that joined, for example the Baltic States, brought 
with them quite a reasonable level of economic culture—if I can put it that way. So the 
picture is mixed. Where I do agree is that the further you get away from countries that have 
an ambition or a realistic chance of joining the Union, the weaker its ability to influence 
countries’ behaviour becomes. 
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Q170   Lord Ramsbotham: In a previous session we considered the Commonwealth. 
One witness was responsible in the Foreign Office for both the Commonwealth and the 
European Union—as bodies, rather than anything else. Thinking about the United Kingdom’s 
involvement in soft power as a partner member of the Commonwealth, we are involved not 
just in our own soft power projection but in a contribution to the soft power projection of 
the Commonwealth. We are also a member of the European Union, and I wonder what 
particulars you feel we should concentrate on for soft power projection that is particularly 
European-related, over and above what we are doing as a member of the Commonwealth. 
Ian Bond: The other two witnesses are looking at me. One area I would certainly look at is 
education. The European Union has a scholarship programme, mostly aimed at masters and 
doctoral students, called Erasmus Mundus. It is quite noticeable that the UK participates less 
in this programme than, for example, France or Spain. I can probably find some figures but I 
think it is something like 17 programmes involve British universities—some British 
universities are involved in more than one programme—while the French are involved in 
something like 23 or 24. It seems to me that that is an example where you have a European 
programme, funded in part by our contributions to the European Union, yet we do not 
seem to be actively pursuing that ourselves. It enables us to bring over high-quality graduates 
from countries outside the European Union and to inculcate into them something of the 
strengths of our academic and university system, our research strengths and so on. It seems 
that that is an undoubted benefit and we should make more use of it. 
Lord Leach of Fairford: Can I give a slightly different answer without disagreeing with that? 
I go back to the remark—I cannot remember who made it; maybe it was Erhard or Kohl—
that the EU without Britain is a mere torso. What did he mean? It is a phrase you quite often 
hear still repeated in Germany. It means that Britain is the principal voice for free trade, the 
principal voice for the reform of the common fisheries policy, which has been a moral 
outrage, and the principal voice for the reform of the agricultural policy, which has been 
another moral outrage. It is in contact with its own democracy in a way that countries that 
work on party lists never are. I am not accusing them of being undemocratic, of course, but 
it is a different, less direct and immediate form of democracy. These are qualities that 
Germans and others—I speak of Germans as standing for integration generally—see as a 
unique contribution of Britain. That is a genuinely valuable contribution to Europe. Were 
Britain for example to leave the EU—we have a referendum coming up in a few years’ 
time—that is what would be most missed in Europe.  
The Chairman: That is very helpful. Graham Mather.  
Graham Mather: I wonder whether I could make a sort of organisational suggestion against 
this background. I think many of us have found in Brussels that the City of London 
historically has been seen as Europe’s shared financial capital, and that the success of the 
City of London benefits the European Union as a whole. There is pride in its achievements 
and support for its work. That mood might recently have changed slightly. One certainly 
picks up vibrations now that say, in effect, “Oh, if you are having this referendum, if you are 
pulling away, if you are not interested any more, that is a different matter”. My point really is 
that we have talked about education, the BBC, the Commonwealth and the City, but these 
are very wide subjects to grapple with and to pull together. I wonder whether there ought 
not to be a sort of soft power unit somewhere, perhaps in the Cabinet Office, with the 
reach to get into the world of education, the world of finance, the world of the 
Commonwealth and broadcasting, to do this. The question is whether we are organised 
sufficiently to engage with the EU in securing those shared benefits in which the great 
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strengths of Britain are also seen as great strengths of the European Union. Systematic 
efforts should be made to align and to inform.  
Q171   Lord Ramsbotham: One of the things that worried us in our very first session 
was that we discovered that the NSC was essentially the organiser of soft power. Of all 
organisations that seems to me to be completely wrong, because everyone immediately 
smells propaganda, and that is wrong. It is not a security matter, it is much more than that, 
and the security people should not be involved. I take your point about someone rejecting it. 
The Chairman: My question is going to reinforce Lord Ramsbotham’s. We have the EEAS, 
and we have European embassies being developed around the world. What is their message? 
Is it just that Europe is a good thing, which is really very near propaganda, or are they saying, 
“Look, we have all these assets within the space of the European Union, including this 
brilliant financial centre in London and many qualities throughout Europe which the world 
still values”? Are they telling the European story? What are they doing? That is quite a 
question to which we need to know the answer, just to know whether we are getting our 
money’s worth. Would either Mr Bond or Lord Leach like to elaborate? 
Lord Leach of Fairford: I should defer to him, but I would say that looking at embassies 
around the world, particularly in Asia, which I know best, all too often European soft power 
is expressed in, I am afraid, lectures about civil rights and about climate change, a subject 
which diplomats know even less about than the IPCC. I do not think that is what I would 
regard as a valuable projection of soft power, but I am afraid that is how it often comes 
across. 
Ian Bond: I think that the role of EU delegations abroad depends very much on the country 
where they are posted. Before I joined the Centre for European Reform, I was a diplomat 
and served in Washington. The EU delegation in Washington is very heavily involved in trade 
issues, in aviation, in regulatory matters of one sort of another. It is doing a really important 
job on behalf of the member states in opening the US market in many cases. Does it do as 
much as it should to project Europe and European values? Arguably it does some things but 
probably not as much as it might. Equally we, the British Government, might get rather 
uncomfortable if it went too far down that road. Some of the delegations in, say, the 
countries of the eastern partnerships are disposing of quite large sums of money for 
technical assistance programmes to help those countries to harmonise more with EU 
legislation and to become readier to work with the European Union. You can see that in 
Ukraine, for example. The missions, just like British embassies, play very varied roles 
depending on where they are. Soft power is part of it, but the proportion varies from one to 
another. 
The Chairman: Can you add to that, Graham Mather? 
Graham Mather: I would just add if I might, Lord Chairman, that there is a distinction 
between useful diplomatic functions in which the EEAS is very new and the effective 
deployment of soft power in changing opinions towards the institution. There is no evidence 
yet that it has made much progress in doing that. I would just add, following Lord 
Ramsbotham’s question, that the conflict between hard and soft power might increase for 
the EU as it strengthens its attempts to become a hard power and to have credible military 
forces and a mechanism to use them without prejudice to NATO. It may be difficult to 
attract support for these soft power values if at the same time Europe is attempting to 
become a hard power system. 
The Chairman: Baroness Nicholson again, and then I have one more question. 
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Q172   Baroness Nicholson of Winterbourne: Thank you. I have a rather blunt 
question. What benefit is the UK going to have in the future from the EU’s soft power or 
other strengths? After all, as we know, the EU spends a very tiny proportion of its effort on 
foreign policy in any shape or form. Almost all its time, certainly I would say from my decade 
in Brussels as deputy chairman of the Foreign Policy Committee, is spent on trying to keep 
its own house in order, and given what I would suggest is the growth of corruption internally 
that is exactly what it should be doing. Britain is different. I am not an empty chair policy 
person at all, but we have a far wider international history and reach than any other 
members of the EU. Despite the fact that countries such as the Netherlands and so on had 
vast empires, Britain for some reason, perhaps the Commonwealth, has a completely 
different perspective from that of our fellow member states. We have the UN Security 
Council, the Commonwealth and very strong and unique relationships with the USA. We 
are different, and perhaps that is reflected in the way in which the population of the UK is 
looking at membership of the EU at the moment, and our Government are responding. So 
given Britain’s difficult position in Brussels—desirable or undesirable is not the point—how 
at all are we going to be able to benefit from the EU as the EU progresses? 
Graham Mather: I will, if I may, give an example, following exactly what Baroness Nicholson 
said. I was looking at the speech by Lord Hall at the BBC about the reach of BBC news: “It 
now is relied upon”, he said, “by a quarter of a billion people around the world”, and his 
ambitious aim is to double that global audience by 2022 to half a billion people. It seems to 
me that the EU does not really have anything great to add to that. 
Baroness Nicholson of Winterbourne: And 1.2 billion people on the globe speak 
English. 
Graham Mather: Yes, so the EU addition may be rather marginal. 
The Chairman: This exchange is moving towards a rather limited conclusion to the 
question of what soft power the EU adds to HMG and the UK or what soft power capacity 
the EU has. I have a feeling, Mr Bond, that you might feel that that is going too far the wrong 
way. 
Ian Bond: I think it depends on the area. I would not dissent at all from the BBC example. It 
is quite clear that Euro news is never going to be a competitor for the BBC. That is obvious. 
But it does seem to me that in other areas, particularly trade policy, we are still going to get 
quite a lot of benefit from the EU, both in the neighbourhood and more widely. More than 
one American has said to me that they would not be interested in negotiating a free trade 
agreement with the UK alone; it is simply not a big enough market to be significant enough 
to devote the political effort to it. But a European Union that is a market of 450 million is 
worth negotiating with. 
The Chairman: Because the chances are good? After all, this is going to lead straight into 
agriculture, is it not? It will be the clash of American agricultural interests against European 
ones, so might not the very size of this body, the European Union, be an obstacle to clearing 
up some of these trade barriers? 
Ian Bond: It clearly is not going to be an easy discussion, but trade discussions never are. 
That does not make the payoff to our economies, from an American point of view or indeed 
from ours, less worth while.  
Q173  Baroness Goudie: I just wanted to ask one question. You talked about the 
American delegation. The Americans have a huge delegation both to the Commission and to 
the parliaments in Europe. Is that right? I have met various of them when I have been around 
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Europe. They are basically looking at trade not through soft power but through their 
influence into Europe and the Community as a whole, and to protect some of their own 
policies.  
Ian Bond: I do not know the complete details of the US delegation in Brussels. I have met a 
lot of people who are following trade issues, but there are certainly also people who follow 
justice and home affairs issues, and I assume that there are some who follow external foreign 
policy issues. There are certainly very close and direct links between the External Action 
Service and the State Department. They pick up the telephone to each other on a very 
regular basis. The Americans engage across the whole range of EU activity. 
Baroness Goudie: That is what I thought. I just needed it clarifying, because of the points 
that we were talking about. It is very helpful to hear that. 
The Chairman: We hear from time to time from the State Department that it is American 
policy still to see Europe as a united whole, and that tends to jar through British sensibilities 
because we are not so keen on ever closer union and so on. Do you think American policy 
towards Europe is changing as they realise some of the problems, particularly from the euro 
crisis and the divisions that this causes? Are they being a little less enthusiastic? 
Lord Leach of Fairford: I think it has become a mantra for dealing with Europe, really going 
all the way back to the CIA days when they wanted a political Europe as opposed to NATO, 
so there was no political soft underbelly behind the protection against the Soviet empire. It 
is just something that they say the whole time. There are various things that nations say the 
whole time. When you get down to hard tacks, they are not at all averse to separation. For 
example, if one agrees with them on some military intervention, they do not say, “I do not 
think we will work with you”, because unless the whole of Europe works with them they 
simply will not do it. So they act as though they thought the real power resided in Germany, 
in Britain, in France and in some other countries, although the mantra is always the same. 
The Chairman: That is an interesting answer. 
Q174   Baroness Nicholson of Winterbourne: At the same time as we signed the 
treaty of Brussels in 1947, we were also a founder member of the Council of Europe. Do 
our kind witnesses feel that Britain could make more use of and put more effort into the 
Council of Europe, which has its own different aura further to the north and the east? 
Should we make a greater effort there? I leave aside the temptation to criticise or not 
criticise the Court of Human Rights, which is a different story.  
The Chairman: It is a good question. 
Baroness Nicholson of Winterbourne: Should be make more effort there? We are very 
strong in the Council of Europe. 
The Chairman: I am going to elaborate on that, because it is a fascinating question. We 
are founder members of the Council of Europe. It is a containment vessel of the values and 
everyone wants to join it. The Russians have tried to come in as well.  
Baroness Nicholson of Winterbourne: And Turkey. 
The Chairman: It is a great post-war achievement. Has our soft power quality and high 
stance in that been weakened and overshadowed by our membership of the European 
Union? 
Baroness Nicholson of Winterbourne: I think so. 
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Lord Leach of Fairford: It is a hugely complicated question, because of course the European 
Union saw itself from the beginning as being in opposition to the Council of Europe. There 
were two visions of how Europe might evolve, and it went one way and not the other. Now, 
if it is correct that the European Union begins to see itself more in terms of devolved power 
and not so much in terms of fragmented but separated powers going back, then of course 
the Council of Europe becomes rather more user friendly. Many of the aspects of the 
Council of Europe, particularly rights, have already in effect been colonised by the European 
Union and incorporated as informing the fundamental human rights charter and whole 
sections of the Lisbon treaty and taken as precedents by the Court of Justice. So effectively 
that dimension has ceased to be a Council dimension and has become a fudged dimension 
between the Council and the European Union itself.  
I think the underlying answer to the question is that I wish it was so, but I suspect it will be 
hard to make it much more important. That is no bad thing.  
Q175  The Chairman: We have kept you here for an hour, and I am sorry for the 
interruption in the middle. Without going into vast even bigger areas of whether Britain 
should be a member of the EU and so on, which it is not for this Committee to examine, we 
cannot take things much further, but would Mr Mather or Mr Bond like to make a final 
commentary on our work as a Committee looking at the soft power, reputation and 
influence of this nation, whether being a member of the EU is helping it, and if so what 
further policies we should encourage in the reform of the European Union to promote it? 
These are very much your subjects, gentlemen, so you should come easily to this. 
Graham Mather: Lord Chairman, may I first pick up on the Council of Europe question? 
We have been very much at home in the Council of Europe. It seems a natural environment 
for British ideas to be exported and developed, so even if some of its agenda has been 
colonised, as Lord Leach said, perhaps we can see it as a large and friendly think tank into 
which we can continue to inject ideas.  
We have been less comfortable with the European institutions. We often, it seems to me, 
try to influence it by mail order from a safe distance, and certainly the number of officials in 
the institutions of UK origin continues to decline and must be a matter for serious concern, 
especially if you add to that the fact that the political grouping to which I belong has 
detached itself from the main centre-right grouping in the EU, which undoubtedly further 
reduces the opportunity for idea exchange and for soft power deployment, if nothing else. 
So my view is a rather sober one. I think that the EU can add only marginally to our 
deployment of soft power and that we should try to focus our minds very clearly on how we 
could assist it to do more, perhaps, as I tried to suggest earlier, by organisational means. 
The Chairman: Mr Bond, a last word. 
Ian Bond: I can only echo what Mr Mather said about our staffing in the EU institutions. It is 
quite poor. In the Commission we are something like 4.5% of the Commission staff, 
compared with something like 12.5% of the EU population as a whole. There should be 
three times as many of us in the institutions. If we want the EU to help us to project our soft 
power, it helps if our political discourse about the EU is a little less negative. It does not 
encourage good British candidates to apply to an organisation that is so often pilloried in the 
British press. I am delighted that the Foreign Secretary is putting more effort into trying to 
get good British candidates to apply for European jobs. From my own contacts, I think there 
is still a perception that, because the general view of the European Union is quite negative, if 
you become too closely associated with the European Union, that might not be of benefit to 
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your long-term career. I think there are plenty of examples to show that that is not true, but 
it is a perception that people have and I hope we can push against it. 
The only other thing I would say is that it does seem to me that, particularly in eastern 
Europe, the European Union still disposes of considerable soft power. 
The Chairman: You were ambassador in Latvia, were you not? 
Ian Bond: I was ambassador in Latvia. That is true. Should I have declared that as an 
interest? 
The Chairman: No, it is just that from that point of view the magnetism of the EU is 
clearly very strong in that area, which is very interesting. 
Ian Bond: If you look beyond the current member states, it is quite interesting to see that 
when the Armenians, under extreme pressure from the Russians, signed up to join the 
Russian-led customs union and stopped their negotiations with the EU on an association 
agreement, people demonstrated in Armenia in favour of closer integration with the EU. I 
have seen no one in eastern Europe demonstrating in favour of a closer relationship with 
Russia.  
The Chairman: Lord Leach, a final final word. 
Lord Leach of Fairford: That was a slightly different flavour to this. I think the Commission 
is going through a lean period. It is not surprising, because its triumph was the euro and you 
would expect it to go through a very lean period. It is not going to make any real 
contribution to solving the euro crisis. That has to be solved at a national level, just as if 
there is a big trade dispute with China. As a graphic example, China very sensibly goes to 
Berlin and says, “Can you sort it?”. Increasingly with the weakness of the Commission, and 
with the sheer growth in numbers to 28 countries, policy is going to get decided very much 
at a great power level. Therefore I would draw attention to the fact that British engagement 
with Germany, as any German will tell you, has been running at about four times what it has 
been running at in the past 50 years. Its engagement is massive. The reason for that goes 
back to what we were talking about at the very beginning of this session: that if Europe is to 
be more evolved in order to be more effective, more efficient, more prosperous, and in the 
end therefore to have more soft power by giving space to each other, that has to come from 
an agreement between the principal advocate of integration historically, partly because of the 
history of the war—i.e. Germany and the great power house of the integrated part of 
Europe—and the principal advocate of democracy and a freer and more flexible type of 
Europe, which is Britain. It cannot be decided by 28 countries; it has to be decided 
essentially by those two. I do not mean “decided”, but if they agree and then take an agreed 
position to the rest of Europe, obviously most notably France, that is the best chance for a 
good outcome. The non-engagement with the Commission is partly just an outcrop of 
nature. 
The Chairman: Well, there we are, and of course that raises the vast question—I feel we 
have been deliberately walking around it—of whether the treaties, as they exist, are the right 
ones or whether they can be changed. And thereby hangs another tale. I would like to leave 
it there. Thank you very much indeed. You have been very helpful, very illuminating, and we 
are extremely grateful. 
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1. SUMMARY 
 
1.1. The Centre for Peace and Reconciliation Studies at Coventry University welcomes the 
opportunity to make this submission to the House of Lord’s Committee on Soft Power and 
the UK’s Influence.   
 
1.2. We note that one of the priorities of the coalition government is to use soft power to 
promote British values, advance development and prevent conflict overseas. Our submission 
will focus on how we can make effective use of the UK’s soft power resources to enhance 
security at home and abroad. Specifically, we will respond to the following areas of interest:  
 
‐ The importance of a country’s soft power and the evidence that it makes a difference 
‐ The relationship between soft power and ‘hard’ exercises of a nation’s power 
‐ The UK’s soft power assets and how can we make the most of them 
‐ The role for non-state actors in generating and capitalising on UK soft power 
‐ The part that sport plays in the UK’s influence and soft power 
 
1.3. We will not substantively address the questions around trade, language or digital 
interconnectedness. 
 
1.4. The submission draws from our own experiences related to the committee’s areas of 
interest, both as a research centre engaged in responding to protracted conflicts and 
humanitarian crises and also as a UK higher education provider with significant presence in 
emerging economy countries. We have particular expertise in linking hard power and soft 
power approaches, most notably in the humanitarian sphere and the maritime security 
domain. We are also a research leader in the area of sports and peace, where our work 
focuses on understanding the social impacts of major sporting events such as the Olympics.  
 
1.5. Established in 1999, the Centre for Peace and Reconciliation Studies conducts cutting-
edge interdisciplinary research that addresses the challenges posed by violent conflict and 
cultivates a deeper understanding of peace and reconciliation. Our research and consultancy 
services provide academic expertise and practical insights into the dynamics of war and 
humanitarian crises.  
 
2. RESPONSES TO THE SELECT COMMITTEE’S AREAS OF INTEREST 
 
2.1. How important is a country’s soft power? What evidence is there that soft 
power makes a difference? 
 
2.1.1. The UK’s soft power capability provides the means for us to influence the actions of 
other countries in ways that support our continued security and prosperity. It allows us to 
pursue our goals internationally without relying on coercion or force, and to work 
cooperatively with other countries in order to strengthen the rules-based international 
system in line with British values. What’s more, it allows us to exercise our influence and 
pursue our goals in ways that demonstrate our own commitment to the values we hold. For 
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any country this is crucially important. However the UK’s position as one of the five 
permanent members on the United Nations Security Council, one of the biggest countries in 
the European Union and a member of the Commonwealth of Nations, makes our need to 
manage soft power even more acute.  
 
2.1.2. This is critically and ever increasingly important in today’s world. The threats to our 
security are changing rapidly, partly as a result of the same processes of technological 
innovation that are transforming our personal lives, allowing us interact with people abroad 
with unprecedented ease, speed and openness. While this increasingly open and 
interconnected world brings new opportunities, it also exposes us to new forms of 
vulnerability such as cyber-attacks and threats posed by networked criminal or terrorist 
groups Changes in our natural environment also create uncertainties and pose a danger to 
public safety, and here our concerns include the effects of climate change on food, fuel and 
water supply. It is more often the case now that our enemies are not necessarily other 
nation states, but are non-state actors or even the forces of nature. This has significant 
repercussions for how we seek to address security challenges. Military operations are less 
likely to bring us the lasting solutions we need, and there are many actions that require the 
consent and cooperation of others. Often security threats require a comprehensive 
response, pursued in partnership with other countries and involving the strategic 
deployment of resources from a range of UK government departments, public sector 
agencies and non-governmental organisations. The more we are able to influence others, the 
more scope we will have to set agendas and lead in responding to these challenges.  
 
2.1.3. The importance of soft power is also set to keep growing in a world where rapid 
developments in the global communications infrastructure is empowering citizens and 
enabling them to make their voices heard, pressure their representatives and participate in 
decision-making. The swiftness of communication and its networked character are redefining 
the balance of power between the state and citizens in many countries, including in those 
that may have previously lacked a culture of public consultation and accountability.  The 
relationships that we build with these more participatory publics will be crucial for our 
national security. Governments that seek to support us in pursuing our foreign policy and 
national security goals will need the support of their populace, and those that wish us harm 
will also need to justify this to win internal support.  Our own messages will increasingly be 
scrutinised for honesty and consistency, both at home and abroad. The challenge for us is to 
find ways of reaching out to citizens of other countries – particularly the young – and to 
project our soft power messages in ways which resonate with people and cut across their 
busy lives. 
 
2.1.4. The serious commitments that other countries are making to develop their soft power 
capabilities is a clear indication that these resources can make a crucial difference in 
achieving trade and security goals. Emerging economy countries are vastly increasing their 
investment in soft power in order to increase their influence internationally. Turkey has 
steadily increased its contributions as a humanitarian aid provider and offers its mediation 
services in some of the world’s most intractable conflicts. Qatar has exponentially increased 
its soft power projection through its sponsorship of the news network Al Jazeera. The 
British Council reports that China has opened more than 300 overseas cultural institutes in 
less than ten years. Meanwhile established leaders like Norway, Switzerland and Canada 
continue to invest in and capitalise upon their reputations as upholders of universal values, 
aid providers and stewards of the environment. 
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2.1.5. Thanks in no small measure to the successes of the Olympics and Paralympics, the 
Queen’s Jubilee and the royal wedding, the UK is now very highly ranked for its soft power 
projection. The 2013 IfG-Monacle Soft Power Index considers the UK to have the highest 
levels of soft power in the world. In light of this increase in our soft power capabilities, and 
with an awareness of the need to adapt to a changing and increasingly uncertain world, the 
UK government and policy communities are rightly considering the opportunities for more 
effectively deploying soft power resources and consolidating gains. We welcome the 
increasing attention and the support for investing in soft power, particularly within UK 
government departments working overseas. We particularly welcome the inclusion of soft 
power in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s business plan and congratulate the British 
Council for its leadership in promoting soft power.   
 
2.1.6. It is vital to our national interest for us to build from our position of strength and 
maintain our investment in soft power, developing our position relative to other emerging 
and established countries. We call on the committee to affirm the increasing 
importance of soft power in responding to today’s security challenges and to 
encourage support for developing our soft power capabilities across 
government.   
 
 
2.2. How does soft power interrelate with ‘harder’ exercises of a nation’s power? 
 
2.2.1. Soft power assets are part of the full spectrum of means through which power may be 
exercised. This spectrum also includes the use of force, often encapsulated by military assets, 
and economic payments to achieve certain ends; collectively known as hard power. At its 
most effective, soft power can offer significant advantages over hard power in managing 
security challenges. Whereas hard power can be important to contain threats and prevent 
violence in the short term, soft power can aspire to go beyond this in seeking a lasting 
resolution to underlying conflict issues. Its subtlety can mean that it is less divisive, reducing 
the strain on our relationships with other countries, and it is likely to be more cost effective 
than military action.  
 
2.2.2. There is currently a lack of clarity around how hard and soft power may be applied 
together so that each consolidates the gains of the other. It is widely accepted that 
containing violence through military action does not constitute a strategy in itself, and that 
this is unlikely to secure a lasting settlement in the absence of a robust political plan to 
address contested claims and issues. In the UK we also recognise the importance of working 
for a negotiated resolution to conflict, and we can assume that our soft power increases our 
influence when we are a stakeholder in such discussions. But there is no set formula for 
judging the combination of hard and soft power that need to be applied in any given context 
– except to say that the latter involves less loss of life and takes a smaller toll on our 
finances and international standing. 
 
2.2.3. The Centre for Peace and Reconciliation Studies adopts an integrated approach to 
peacebuilding, prioritising the importance of working collaboratively with partners in a range 
of sectors. Over time we have gained particular experience in researching hard and soft 
forms of power at the points where they intersect. One such context includes humanitarian 
action, where there has been increasing interaction between civilian and military actors, and 
a drive to create policies, methods and tools to facilitate collaboration of an appropriate 
nature. Another includes maritime security, where a range of military and civilian actors are 
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currently responding to challenges like piracy, illegal fishing, trafficking and smuggling. We 
believe that there are transferable lessons from each of these contexts which may help us 
better understand the interrelationship between hard and soft power in more general terms, 
and especially within foreign policy.  
 
2.2.4. Experiences from the humanitarian sphere indicate that creating a culture of dialogue, 
exchange and effective coordination between hard and soft power institutions will be vital if 
we are to fully utilise our range of security assets. What’s more, while the irregularity and 
unpredictability of most security challenges makes it an almost impossible task for us to 
adopt fixed rules governing the deployment of our hard and soft power assets in any given 
context, it would be possible for us to iterate some basic principles more clearly. This 
additional clarity would help to ensure the consistency of messaging across the wide range of 
actors capable of contributing to – or destabilising – the UK’s planned response to a specific 
set of circumstances.  
 
2.2.5. We can also evidence the need to integrate hard and soft power approaches within a 
comprehensive framework for response through the centre’s work on maritime security. 
Reported incidents of piracy off the Horn of Africa have reduced in the last year through a 
combination of international naval patrols, vessel hardening techniques and the use of armed 
guards. Yet while these improvements at sea should be recognised, a hard power response 
will do little to tackle the instability ashore which is often the source of such problems. Here 
the delivery of humanitarian relief and the focus on development is crucially important. Yet 
there remains a lack of sufficient awareness of activities on land and at sea by those working 
in different environments, and this is all too typical of institutions seeking to enhance security 
through different means.  We believe that universities and research centres can play an 
important role as facilitators here. In this particular case our centre will be hosting a series 
of seminars funded by the UK Economic and Social Research Council to examine the 
relationship between maritime insecurity and sustainable development. This research 
programme seeks to bring together academic and non-academic, state and non-state actors, 
and has been supported by the Royal Navy and Nautical Institute.  We urge the 
committee to underline the importance of communication and dialogue 
between hard and soft power institutions in addressing security challenges, both 
to ensure the coherence of messaging and the coherence of action, and to 
recognise the role that universities can play in building cross-sectoral networks 
and facilitating sustainable knowledge transfer between different actors.  
 
2.3. What are the important soft power assets that the UK has? How can we 
make the most of these? What is the role for non-state actors? 
 
2.3.1. The UK has an unparalleled range of soft power assets at its disposal. We are an 
outward-looking country that contributes significantly to promoting and realising a more 
values-based global governance. We have a strong reputation as a generous and effective aid 
provider and we are well recognised as a global hub for non-governmental organisations 
working in development, humanitarian aid and peacebuilding. We have recently reached an 
important milestone in our aid spending, reaching 0.7% of GNI, and we are co-chair of the 
United Nations committee developing the successor framework to the Millennium 
Development Goals. Our leadership in these areas goes hand-in-hand with the attractiveness 
of our cultural institutions and other soft power assets to give us credibility and leverage in 
global conversations on security and governance.  
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2.3.2. Our leadership role in development, humanitarian aid and peacebuilding is buttressed 
by our values. Informed by these, we invest heavily in strengthening democratic freedom, 
universal human rights and the rule of law. These investments are often made by UK 
government departments working overseas, including the Department for International 
Development and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, as well as other operationally 
independent bodies such as the British Council and British non-governmental organisations. 
Importantly, our value-based foreign policy is an extension of our way of doing things at 
home. We are one of the world’s longest standing and most stable democracies, with an 
exceptionally strong human rights record. In order to maintain our international reputation 
as a responsible global actor lead by our values, and thus to make the most of our soft 
power assets, it is imperative that we continue to maintain our strong domestic record on 
human rights and other freedoms. We must also recognise that how we pursue our goals 
matters. We need to be as consistent as possible in the application of our values and 
encourage high levels of civil society and community involvement in the activities we are 
involved in and the decisions we make. UK soft power is affected by the perceptions 
of others. In order to make the most of our soft power assets we should 
continue to ensure that our actions are values-based, and that these values are 
consistently applied to the fullest extent possible both at home and abroad.  
 
2.3.3. We note with concern that investment in UK soft power institutions is jeopardised by 
the deficit in our public finances. The British Council, BBC World Service and British Film 
Institute all play an invaluable role in promoting British soft power, and each has been 
affected by the current financial climate. To make the most of our soft power assets we 
must continue to invest in them, guarding against the possibility of decline. We encourage 
the committee to press the government to invest more in soft power assets like 
the British Council, BBC World Service and the British Film Institute, and to 
provide additional support for them to weather retrenchments in public 
spending while retaining a focus on results and value for money.  
 
2.3.4. A good deal of soft power projection lies outside of government, and this is 
particularly the case when we are deploying soft power resources in order to meet security 
challenges or achieve foreign policy objectives around stabilisation, conflict prevention and 
development. Here again a key determinant for making the most of our soft power assets 
lies in coordination, this time between government departments and affiliated bodies and 
others in the public and non-governmental sector. An integrated approach would support 
partnerships across different sectors, including universities, cultural institutions and 
businesses. At the Centre for Peace and Reconciliation Studies we are using our expertise to 
build up higher education sectors abroad, and have contributed significantly to developing 
peace studies curricula and a research culture in China, Kenya and Palestine. Non-state 
actors are playing a vital role in generating UK soft power, and the government 
can support this through resourcing and amplification. The continuation of 
funding for organisations delivering soft power goals is vital, and these funding 
relationships need to be sustained. 
 
2.4. What parts do sport and culture play in the UK’s influence and soft power? 
 
2.4.1 The UK has a long tradition of sporting success and has lead the way in the inception 
and development of some of the world’s most popular sports and sporting events, such as 
the Olympic and Paralympic Games. Sport is practiced in some form or other almost 
universally, and in terms of economics is one of the largest business sectors on the planet. It 
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is also often used as a political soft power battleground such is its reach and influence within 
society. This makes it an important area in which the UK can increase soft power influence, 
through activities such as hosting mega-events like the Olympic and Paralympic Games or 
World Championships, or through the opportunities created by having individuals in key 
positions within sports organisations (e.g. Sir Philip Craven as President of the International 
Paralympic Committee). 
 
2.4.2 An increasing area of interest over the past decade or so, both practically and 
academically, has been the use of sport as a tool for peace and development. Increasing 
numbers of organisations are including sport within their development programmes as stand-
alone tools as well as part of a more holistic approach, particularly within post-conflict zones 
and areas hit by natural disasters. Sports organisations and big businesses are using sport as 
part of their Corporate Social Responsibility programmes, while governments and NGOs 
are increasingly integrating sport within aid programmes as a way to lessen tensions, 
improve health and break down barriers. In addition, sport is increasingly being used as a 
way to re-integrate people with disabilities into society and to help change attitudes towards 
disability. Programmes such as the International Inspiration programme operated by UK 
Sport International, which emerged out of London 2012, allow us to increase UK reach and 
recognition abroad and so maintain high levels of soft power. 
 
2.4.2 The Centre for Peace and Reconciliation Studies is actively involved in research aimed 
at increasing and better understanding the impact of sport and sporting mega-events as a 
tool to bring about social change. From September 2013 we are hosting a Brazilian research 
fellow sponsored through Marie Curie International, who will be researching the relevance 
and transferability of the social legacy programmes of the London 2012 Olympic and 
Paralympic Games. In addition we are implementing a four year staff exchange scheme, again 
funded through Marie Curie International, in which we are partnered with four other higher 
education providers in Brazil, Germany, South Africa and the USA. The aim of this project is 
to look at the management of impact for mega-events (both sporting and cultural) in order 
to make recommendations as to how to better ensure a lasting positive legacy. We 
encourage the committee to highlight the role of sport in bringing about social 
change and the platform it provides for communicating soft power messages on 
human rights and development. We also encourage support for the role that 
universities play in improving our understanding in this area.  
 
3. KEY RECOMMENDATIONS IN SUMMARY 
3.1. We call on the committee to affirm the increasing importance of soft power in 
responding to today’s security challenges and to encourage support for developing soft 
power capabilities across government.   
3.2. We urge the committee to underline the importance of communication and dialogue 
between hard and soft power institutions in addressing security challenges, both to ensure 
the coherence of messaging and the coherence of action, and to recognise the role that 
universities can play in building cross-sectoral networks and facilitating sustainable 
knowledge transfer between different actors. 
3.3. UK soft power is affected by the perceptions of others. In order to make the most of 
our soft power assets we should continue to ensure that our actions are values-based, and 
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that these values are consistently applied to the fullest extent possible both at home and 
abroad. 
 
3.4. We encourage the committee to press the government to invest more in soft power 
assets like the British Council, BBC World Service and the British Film Institute, and to 
provide additional support for them to weather retrenchments in public spending while 
retaining a focus on results and value for money.  
 
3.5. Non-state actors are playing a vital role in generating UK soft power, and the 
government can support this through resourcing and amplification. The continuation of 
funding for organisations delivering soft power goals is vital, and these funding relationships 
need to be sustained. 
3.6. We encourage the committee to highlight the role of sport in bringing about social 
change and the platform it provides for communicating soft power messages on human 
rights and development. We also encourage support for the role that universities play in 
improving our understanding in this area. 
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City of London Corporation – Written evidence 
 
Submitted by the Office of the City Remembrancer 
 
Introduction 
 
1. The City of London Corporation supports the maintenance and promotion of 
London as a leading international centre for financial and related business services, 
under the broad brand of “the City.” The services cluster based in London is a major 
asset to the UK. It is a significant contributor to the UK balance of payments and to 
the public finances and employment. Over 1 million people are directly employed in 
UK financial services with a further 967,000 employed in related professional 
services. Around two-thirds of UK financial and related professional services 
employees are based outside London51. 
 
2. The City Corporation has extensive engagement with the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office and UK Trade and Investment, as part of this promotional 
work. The aim is to support UK-based financial and professional services firms to 
develop business in overseas markets, and to attract enhanced levels of inward 
investment into the Square Mile, London and the UK as a whole.  
 
3. Financial and professional services continue to be the UK’s leading export sector 
with a trade surplus larger than the combined surplus of all other net exporting 
industries in the UK.  The value of UK financial and professional services is something 
that the City of London Corporation makes every effort to promote not only within 
the UK but on an international scale.  
 
4. The City is fully aware of the need for British business to look not only beyond our 
borders, but beyond those of our traditional European trading partners.  The Lord 
Mayor travels extensively throughout the year as part of his programme to promote 
British businesses abroad.  The impact of the door-opening role that the Lord 
Mayor’s status provides is seen as particularly valuable in emerging markets and 
countries where there is strong government involvement in economic functions, and 
where building long-term relationships is essential.   
  
5. A consistent message received by the Lord Mayor when overseas is that the UK has 
a strong global brand, representing a hallmark of quality and reliability in a wide range 
of sectors, from manufacturing and engineering, to finance, infrastructure, education, 
and legal and professional services.  
 
6. The City of London’s experience is that the nature of the office of Lord Mayor and 
‘the British Embassy brand’ are also very powerful and widely respected. It is right to 
seek to try to build on these brand assets, and the City Corporation is greatly 
encouraged by the recent emphasis placed by the Government on "commercial 
diplomacy".  
 
                                            
51 Trends in UK Financial and Professional Services, TheCityUK, June 2012. 
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7. Increasingly the Lord Mayor’s meetings overseas are less dominated by discussions 
purely about financial and professional services and include more about sectors of the 
economy to which financial and other services are relevant such as infrastructure and 
manufacturing – and the framework conditions/regulatory environment in which they 
operate. 
 
Trade Promotion 
 
8. The Lord Mayor currently spends approximately 90 days a year overseas, in over 30 
countries, promoting the markets and services of the UK based financial community. 
The focus of these visits has evolved and a substantial business delegation drawn 
largely from financial and business services companies now often accompanies the 
mayoral party.   
 
9. There are also occasions when, by engaging through the prism of financial services, 
the Lord Mayor contributes to advancing wider UK commercial interests – major 
infrastructure projects (HVOs) are a good example. The planning of the Lord 
Mayor’s visits routinely involves UK-based financial service firms, institutions and 
trade associations at an early stage in order to understand which countries are 
important for them, and how a visit by the Lord Mayor could help.  
 
10. The results are analysed jointly with UKTI, and then FCO diplomatic posts are 
invited to bid for visits according to the priorities that have come out of the 
consultation exercise. Selection of successful bids is made on the basis of the 
potential value to the financial and related business services industry.  
 
11. The schedule of visits is agreed well in advance of a new Lord Mayor taking office 
which allows staff in post sufficient time to plan a programme of meetings, especially 
since the Lord Mayor’s visits are less at risk from domestic factors which could 
potentially impact on other high level inward visits. 
 
12. The programme now regularly includes visits to major Asian markets such as India 
and China.  However, considerable effort is made to incorporate within the 
programme visits to less high profile countries which are visited less often by UK 
Ministers52. Recent countries include Mongolia, Myanmar, Angola and Panama. 
Feedback from posts in such countries suggests that there is particular benefit 
derived from these visits and they are highly valued. High level engagement at post on 
business issues by Political and Economic staff – including Heads of Mission – adds 
immense value to the UK’s trade promotion. 
 
13. Each visit programme is delivered in market by economic and commercial (often 
UKTI)  staff based in the Embassy and Consulate network, with the aim of increasing 
the profile of the UK-based financial services industry in overseas markets 
(predominately high growth markets), promoting business development 
opportunities for UK-based firms and influencing senior interlocutors to increase 
market access for such firms.  
 
                                            
52 The current programme of overseas visits is available on the City of London’s website 
http://www.cityoflondon.gov.uk/about-the-city/who-we-are/key-members/the-lord-mayor-of-the-city-of-
london/Pages/overseas-business-visits.aspx  
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14. The City enjoys a close and productive relationship with UKTI, and the support 
provided in facilitating engagements and undertaking market follow-up is an invaluable 
part of Mayoral visits.  
 
15. UKTI has a vital function in both attracting senior industry figures to visit the UK (to 
promote both trade and investment opportunities) and the coordination of overseas 
visit programmes made by business ambassadors and Government Ministers. There is 
however a danger of duplication of effort and it is important that UKTI maintains a 
proactive role to ensure that there is effective coordination of international visits 
across Government departments to promote the UK.  
 
16. There could also be a greater recognition across Whitehall of the role that UKTI 
plays and the on-going programme of business support and engagement that takes 
place. 
 
17. Effective and well-resourced UKTI teams are essential to the successful delivery of 
the visits. To this end, the City of London runs an annual ‘Industry Briefing Course’ 
for overseas based representatives from UKTI, which has a role in promoting the 
industry within their geographic remit. The week long intensive course arms UKTI 
staff with a core understanding of the UK-based financial and professional services 
industry and its role in support of the broader economy; first-hand experience and 
industry contacts help to increase the effectiveness of UKTI. 
 
Inward Investment 
 
18. In addition to the trade promotion work undertaken in tandem with UKTI, the City 
supports the delivery of inward investment services to assist foreign firms involved in 
the financial and related business services sector set up or expand in London and the 
rest of the UK. This includes working with firms that have been identified as targets 
by UKTI staff based in the overseas Embassy and Consulate network.  
 
19. The City then provides prospective investors with a range of services including 
market intelligence detailing the UK-based financial and professional services industry 
and facilitates introductions to relevant contacts in the sector.  
 
20. The UK’s Embassy and Consulate network provides a valuable and high profile point 
of contact for overseas firms looking to invest in the UK; Posts form an essential tool 
in facilitating access to firms to discuss and encourage their inward investment plans.  
UKTI is well placed within central government to work with other departments on 
issues that affect inward investment into the UK and this can be extremely valuable.  
 
Lord Mayor’s Regional Visits 
 
21. The Lord Mayor undertakes numerous visits throughout the UK to support regional 
economic activity, and to promote the contribution the City can make in partnership 
with the rest of the country. The Mayoralty represents the entire UK-based financial, 
professional and business services sector, regardless of ownership and not just those 
businesses based in the Square Mile.  It is therefore important to maintain close 
engagement with all the UK’s financial centres in order that the Lord Mayor, when 
overseas, can highlight the value that they add to the UK.   
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22. The range of different specialist services and cost bases available in the regions is an 
important competitiveness factor in the UK’s global financial services offer.  Regional 
representatives also regularly join the business delegations which accompany the 
Lord Mayor overseas.   
 
City Hospitality and Events 
 
23. The Lord Mayor and City of London Corporation, through the hosting of official 
receptions, meetings and general hospitality events, seek to encourage business 
contacts and showcase British strengths to spur new bilateral trade. The holding of 
State Banquets for visiting Heads of State at Guildhall and the major occasions such 
as the annual Diplomatic Banquet at Mansion House form part of the City’s 
contribution to fostering diplomatic relations between the UK and other countries. 
This has benefits (often not readily quantifiable) for the UK across a wide spectrum 
but including the creation of a positive atmosphere for finance and business, and the 
development of a better understanding of the range of opportunities that exist for 
UK based firms.  
 
Arts and Culture 
 
24. The City of London Corporation has long been a strong supporter of the arts. The 
arts enhance the quality of life and help to attract and retain talented people in 
London. Research instigated by the Lord Mayor and published earlier this year by the 
City of London Corporation53, explores the range of benefits that derive from the 
City’s arts and culture cluster. 
 
25. Drawing on data provided by a range of arts and culture organisations based in the 
City, the report highlights the substantial economic contribution made by the City’s 
world leading arts and culture institutions, showing that the cluster generated a net 
contribution of £225 million in GVA and supported 6,700 full-time-equivalent jobs in 
the City, as well as providing for the City’s residents, workers and visitors access to a 
vibrant and diverse range of world class cultural activities. 
 
26. There is a strong history of philanthropy in the Square Mile and the legacies of 
individuals such as Sir Thomas Gresham and Dick Whittington are very much part of 
the City today. Bequests were not only for the good of the community at the time 
but also an investment in its future. The Lord Mayor, and the City Corporation more 
generally, are keen to ensure the tradition of giving. The theme of this year’s Lord 
Mayor’s appeal, ‘The City in Society’ reflects the City of London’s contribution and 
ranging commitment to the society it serves in the 21st century. The Appeal is 
focusing on the City as a global centre for philanthropy, and particularly on its 
involvement in fostering the arts. By giving a platform to its chosen charities, the 
Appeal aims to encourage and challenge people to give more and do more to secure 
the future for the next generation. 
 
Interfaith Issues 
                                            
53 “The Economic, Social and Cultural Impact of the City Arts and Culture Cluster”, prepared for the City of London Corporation 
by BOP Consulting, January 2013 
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27. The City of London exhibits a singularly wide range of nationalities and faiths working 
in its businesses and visiting as tourists.  Its rich heritage of religious buildings reflects 
the migration of different groups through the Square Mile over many centuries and 
provides an opening for the Lord Mayor to engage actively on interfaith issues often 
complemented by contacts made on overseas visits. 
 
28. This year the Lord Mayor has engaged with a number of religious and faith leaders 
from around the world, and will be hosting a major dialogue and dinner on Faiths and 
the City that will encourage deeper understanding and promote appreciation at a 
time when globalisation places a growing premium on understanding and learning 
among disparate faith groups. 
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Demos and Soft Power 
 
1. Demos is Britain’s leading cross-party think tank. It has spent 20 years at the centre of the 
policy debate, with an overarching mission to bring politics closer to the people.  
 
2. In 2007, Demos published the pamphlet Cultural Diplomacy54, which examined the ways in 
which cultural relations were changing – through technological innovation, migration and 
mass tourism – and the consequences of this for politics. It argued that mass peer-to-peer 
cultural contact was increasing and adding an extra layer to cultural relations; cultural 
contact had originally been elite-to-elite, then elite-to-many, and was now entering a people-
to-people phase, through travel, migration and the internet. It found that where 
governments did get involved, their role was most effective when they were hands off, 
restricting themselves to facilitating the activities of independent bodies rather than 
attempting to impose control. 
 
3. In the six years since the report came out, the growth in mass peer-to-peer cultural 
contact has exceeded anyone’s expectations. YouTube, founded in 2006, is the most obvious 
and spectacularly successful example of the phenomenon. Interest in cultural diplomacy or 
soft power has increased, with the foundation of the Institute for Cultural Diplomacy in 
Berlin, the development of academic courses and a steady flow of conferences and events 
exploring the subject. This trend led to Demos revisiting the topic in a new pamphlet 
written for the British Council that sought to bring together various strands of enquiry, 
examine data and research, provide a conceptual framework to aid discussion, and set out 
some emerging lessons for countries seeking to maximise the impact of their cultural 
relations. 
 
Influence and Attraction 
 
4. The British Council and Demos report Influence and Attraction55 was published in June 
2013. The following paragraphs summarise the report’s argument. 
 
5. Culture and international politics are now in an interdependent relationship, where 
culture plays both a positive and negative role. In this new global environment, people-to-
people cultural contact sets the tone and sometimes the agenda for traditional state-to-state 
diplomacy. Nations are increasingly seeking to maximise their ‘soft power’ – a term used to 
describe their ability to achieve their international objectives through attraction and co-
option rather than coercion – in an effort to promote cultural understanding and avoid 
cultural misunderstanding. 
 
6. ‘Culture’ encompasses publicly funded, commercial and individual ‘homemade’ culture. 
Among its core expressive activities are language, sport, education, food and religion. 
‘Cultural relations’ refers to the sharing and communication of this culture internationally, 
                                            
54 Bound K, Briggs R, Holden J and Jones S (2007), Cultural Diplomacy, London, Demos, 
http://www.demos.co.uk/publications/culturaldiplomacy  
55 Holden J and Tryhorn C (2013), Influence and Attraction: Culture and the race for soft power in the 21st century, London, 
British Council, http://www.britishcouncil.org/sites/default/files/documents/influence-and-attraction-report.pdf 
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typically through education exchanges, language teaching, art performances or museum 
exhibitions, international broadcasting and a wide variety of other activities.  
 
7. The forces that shape cultural relations activity include:  
• foreign policy interests  
• the desire to create a positive image around the world  
• the unique history and legacy of each nation  
• ideology  
• resources  
• language  
• cultural assets – arts, education and individual expression  
• commerce 
 
8. The main cultural relations actors are:  
• nations, states and cities  
• cultural, broadcasting and educational institutions  
• NGOs  
• businesses  
• foundations, trusts and philanthropists  
• individuals, particularly artists, sports people and performers 
 
9. Cultural relations activities include a range of traditional instrumentalist objectives, but 
there are trends in many countries to move beyond simple cultural ‘projection’ and towards 
mutuality, together with increasing innovation and a recognition of the role of cultural actors 
as agents of social change. Cultural relations can build trust between people and that in turn 
impacts positively upon a wide range of activities, particularly tourism and trade.  
 
10. There is a growing seriousness about, and expenditure on, cultural relations in BRIC 
countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China) and more widely across Asia and the Middle East. 
Western powers face competition from emerging, high-growth economies that are 
becoming increasingly outward looking. By contrast, in the case of many Western nations, 
cultural relations have been subject to retrenchment and short-termism, as countries look 
inwards in a time of intense economic pressures. This is creating an inherent risk to these 
countries’ long-term global influence and their performance in culture, education, tourism 
and trade.  
 
11. In future, the role of NGOs and the third sector will increase. New cultural networks 
will form at different layers of government, particularly between cities. Peer-to-peer cultural 
contact will continue to grow and individual citizen cultural diplomacy will increase. The level 
of resources invested by countries matters, but enabling a genuine and open exchange of 
culture and ideas will be far more important in staying ahead in the race for soft power. The 
most successful nations will in future be those that are flexible and open to other cultures, 
responding quickly to changing dynamics and global trends.  
 
12. The implication for governments is that they should:  
• create conditions for broad and deep cultural exchange to flourish – because peer-to-
peer exchange is more likely to generate trust  
• work with commercial and third-sector initiatives – because it encourages innovation 
and decreases reliance on public funds  
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• adopt a mix of traditional and digital strategies – because it is cost-effective and 
responds to increasing technological sophistication  
• pay as much attention to inward-facing as they do to outward-facing cultural relations 
– because that will help develop a culturally literate and globally aware population  
• support cultural exchange through independent, autonomous agencies – because direct 
government involvement invites suspicion and hostility  
• embrace long-term relationship building instead of short-term transactional and 
instrumental thinking – because it is more effective  
 
13. To make the most of the increasing opportunities for intra-UK and international 
communication and cultural engagement, UK citizens need to be more globally aware, skilled 
in languages, comfortable with difference and culturally confident. Culture itself develops 
through exchange, therefore the UK also needs to stay ahead in ‘the commerce of culture’ – 
ensuring a continuing interchange of ideas, research, creativity and artistic practice with 
others around the world, enriching both the UK’s and other countries’ cultural and 
educational sectors.  
 
John Holden 
Associate, Demos; Visiting Professor, City University, London 
 
Chris Tryhorn 
Associate, Demos 
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Richard Dowden, Director of the Royal African Society, Journalist and former 
Africa Editor of The Independent and The Economist. 
1. My main expertise is in Africa where I have been involved since the early 1970s and 
since the 1980s have reported and analysed for a range of media. I regard an 
important part of my role as a journalist is to understand the thinking of ordinary 
people and interpret and explain to the rest of the world, their attitudes and 
understanding of events.  
2. Based on that experience my interest in soft power is from the point of view of the 
subject, people who experience other’s soft power. In Africa Britain has been 
respected and trusted. That respect was often genuine, based on the knowledge that 
Britain understood their situation and was ready to provide assistance and help 
nudge governments in the areas of freedom of speech and respect for human rights. 
However where soft power was used for propaganda or myth-making to cover self 
interest, the resulting disillusionment will last generations. Britain’s reputation in 
Africa was severely damaged by the invasion of Iraq on false premises. Almost 
everyone I have spoken to believes that the chemical weapons story was invented as 
a pretext for invasion in pursuit of Iraq’s oil.     
3. The view of Britain by Africans today may also be changing for other reasons. In 
recent years African nations have become more self confident and are increasingly 
pushing back against the former colonial powers. This is not necessarily because 
Britain makes wrong policy decisions. The tone of “we know best for you” is 
alienating a new generation of self confident Africans. This coincides with a 
revisitation of the colonial period and a growing realisation that colonialism was 
mostly bad for Africa. The cleverly finessed independence process is increasingly seen 
as not a real liberation but a tactical retreat by Britain and France that left African 
countries dependent on them. This perception, combined with Africa’s decade and a 
half of better economic growth and the new deals with China – which does not 
patronise Africa - have given African leaders the confidence to push back against the 
UK, the US and France. For example the united stand by African governments in 
support of Robert Mugabe after his recent electoral victory may owe more to 
solidarity against British attempts to bring him down than to real support for his 
policies. Other issues where Britain fails to recognise or understand local sensitivities 
are gay marriage (not popular in the world’s most religious continent) and aid. 
Britain’s policy in Africa has relied too much on aid and assumes that Africans will be 
grateful. Some may be, but the influential classes increasingly reject aid, seeing it as a 
soft power tool that weakens them and prevents them making their own choices. 
They also object to aid agencies use of pictures of starving, fly-blown African children 
which have come to symbolise their continent.      
4. That is the background. In the foreground are two obvious reasons why Africans, 
especially the middle classes, are turning away from Britain.  
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5. Firstly the diminishment of the BBC World Service, Britain’s strongest tool of soft 
power. Its reputation – justly earned but regularly ignored by UK politicians – is 
based on getting the facts right and giving a fair analysis. I have covered more than 24 
wars and crises in the Middle East and Africa and found that almost everywhere the 
“good guys” - and frequently the “Bad Guys” - listen to the BBCWS. In comparison 
every other major nationally owned global media organisation is propaganda -  
although Al Jazeera comes close except when covering some Middle Eastern 
countries. Privately owned, profit-driven, global media have little interest in anything 
that does not entertain their customers. At a time when more and more stations are 
trying to go global, the BBC, in poll position for decades, is again suffering from cuts 
which lower morale and lose good journalists and contributors.   
6. Secondly the failure of Britain to exploit its education system. After the US, UK 
universities are the preferred institutions for many people seeking respected 
qualifications, despite the high cost of places. The main deterrent is the extraordinary 
difficulty of getting a visa to the UK. In many countries in Africa would-be students 
have to spend over £1000 to travel to another country to buy a visa to the UK. I 
have come across several cases where bona fide students, having spent that sort of 
money, are turned down without explanation. And then there is the humiliation of 
arrival. As someone who makes many journeys a year from Africa to the UK, I notice 
that invariably only black people are questioned by the Border Agency at immigration 
and then again by customs. Welcome to the UK! Perhaps one of those turned away 
may one day be a president.   
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1. This paper is the product of a collaborative effort by staff at Durham University’s Durham 
Global Security Institute for Defence, Development and Diplomacy (DGSi) and 
members of the Institute’s Strategic Advisory Board, chaired General The Lord Dannatt. The 
Institute was established to focus on the interface between defence, development and 
diplomacy in conflict prevention, intervention and reconstruction, and to reflect critically on 
current practices. The focus here will be on the interface between hard and soft power in 
conflict situations and on how soft power can be harnessed better. 
Soft Power: Goals, Audience, Agents 
2. Before discussing the interface between hard and soft power, we need to be clear on what 
soft power should be used for, who its audience is, and who is doing the influencing. Soft power 
should not simply be about pursuing the ‘national interest’ but should also be 
informed by the notion of ‘global good’. As the authors of a report on American Smart 
Power argue (smart power being the skilful combination of soft and hard power), the U.S. can 
‘become a smarter power by once again investing in the global good’, reconciling ‘its 
overwhelming power with the rest of the world’s interests and values’ (Armitage and Nye 
2007). Although there is no global consensus on what constitutes ‘the global good’, the key 
point is that governments must try to understand the interests and values of those they seek to 
influence and respond to those where possible. Because cultural differences in how power, 
community, interests and values are understood affect social power (Lyon 2004; Kastrinou 
forthcoming), it is crucial that governments are informed by in-depth cultural expertise. 
3. Who should be the target of soft power? Nye observed that in a world where public opinion 
is becoming increasingly salient, state elites can no longer focus their efforts solely on 
elites in other states (2004: 16, 105-106). Yet governments are still unclear how to go 
beyond state elites and on what basis to engage foreign publics. One of the reasons the Arab 
Spring caught so many Western governments by surprise is that the most effective opposition 
actors were informal protest networks, rather than the official parties or registered NGOs 
(Gunning and Baron 2013). Although some governments had engaged with these networks, 
many considered them too informal and lacking in leadership to be taken seriously.  
4. Finally, we need to be clear about who is wielding soft power. Governments can play a 
central role in the creation and projection of soft power through public diplomacy, 
international development aid, democracy promotion and policies nurturing attractive values or 
culture at home and abroad. However, as Nye (2004: 14) notes, ‘soft power does not 
belong to the government in the same degree that hard power does’. Much of what 
positioned the UK first in Monocle Magazine's annual ‘Global Soft Power’ ranking (McClory 
2013) was about civil society and social fabric rather than government. In conflicts, non-state 
actors such as NGOs or private individuals are often best placed to lead, particularly if those 
seeking help are non-state actors who mistrust the intentions of the government. In those 
instances, government attempts to become involved can undermine an NGO’s credibility.  
Tensions and overlap between hard and soft power  
5. Nye recognises that hard and soft power are interlinked. Hard power can ‘create myths 
of invincibility or inevitability that attract others’, or it can be used to build the institutions that 
eventually will confer legitimacy on a hard power intervention, as has been the intention in Iraq 
and Afghanistan (with mixed results). Soft power, meanwhile, can limit what another state’s 
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hard power can achieve, as Nye argues was the case with the way France used soft power to 
try and constrict the US during and after the 2003 invasion of Iraq (2004:25-30).  
6. This relationship needs further reflection, particularly in the context of the blurring of 
boundaries between military and humanitarian personnel in conflict zones and the evolution of 
a whole-of-government approach in which defence, development and diplomacy are meant to 
work together. Hard power can seriously undermine soft power, for example when 
development aid is dispensed in areas where a government is also involved in drone 
attacks, as is the case with the U.S. in Pakistan. Between 2009 and 2012, when U.S. drone 
attacks increased, Pakistani public support for US financial and humanitarian aid to militant areas 
dropped from 72% to 50%, while those regarding the U.S. as an enemy rose from 64% to 74% 
(Pew 2012). Conversely, where development aid is too closely linked to the projection of hard 
power, it can come to be seen as an extension of hard power, losing much of its persuasive 
power – particularly when aid flows drop after the withdrawal of military personnel, as was the 
case with Afghanistan in the 1990s (and may happen again post-2014).  
7. Similarly, counter-terrorism laws and practices can affect the distribution of 
humanitarian aid with potentially devastating consequences for target populations. In Sri 
Lanka, humanitarian aid following the Tsunami was severely restricted by counter-terrorism 
laws stipulating that no assistance, financial or otherwise, could be given to organisations 
thought to be affiliated to the Tamil Tigers, although these were often the only organisations 
with the local capacity to deliver aid effectively (Arulanantham 2008). In Palestine, counter-
terrorism concerns have hindered UK distribution of aid, both governmental and non-
governmental, to organisations that have only a tangential affiliation with Hamas and a track 
record of spending aid solely on humanitarian projects (Gunning 2007, 2010).  
8. Some within DGSi argue that soft power should be seen in non-military terms as a 
purely civilian activity. Integrating the concept of soft power within the context of deploying 
military force can cause misunderstanding among the receiving population concerning the 
motivation for wanting to use soft power. For example, asking military personnel to dig wells 
and build roads in the types of asymmetric conflicts they are often engaged in, is short-term 
soft power whose motivation is often not understood by local communities and militants, with 
possibly negative effects on aid workers. Similarly, military or police protection of aid workers 
has contributed to the blurring of boundaries between soft and hard power, leading to an 
increase in attacks on aid workers. Because of this, it is crucial that development aid remains 
within the hands of development agencies, and is not transferred to the military.  
9. Others within DGSi argue that the UK’s Armed Forces do have soft power roles and 
should develop these further. In the context of defence budget cuts, soft power roles for 
the military could be attractive, as long they do not become a burdensome add-on to already 
overstretched forces. The development of guidelines regarding the cooperation between 
humanitarian workers and military forces in Afghanistan is an example of how soft and hard 
power can work together more effectively, although serious challenges remain in the 
implementation of these guidelines. Of particular importance are the stipulations that 
humanitarian agencies should retain their independence, ensure their security ‘primarily through 
local acceptance’, be able ‘to ensure sustainable access to all vulnerable populations in all parts 
of the country’, and that any information that ‘might endanger lives … must not be shared with 
military actors’ (IRIN News 2009).  
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Recommendations 
I. Greater strategic coordination between soft and hard power 
10. The potential effects of hard power on long-term soft power programmes must 
be taken into greater consideration. For instance, the cost of drone strikes to soft power 
programmes must be included in any military assessment determining whether such strikes are 
effective as counter-terrorism measures. Similarly, if militancy or terrorism is exacerbated by 
unemployment, relative deprivation and political exclusion, the long-term effects of hard 
power on development projects and society more broadly should be a primary 
concern of counter-terrorism strategies (Howell and Lind 2010). Conversely, to prevent 
development aid or other interventions increasing the likelihood of conflict, a conflict sensitive 
strategy must be employed. 
II. Enhancing the soft power potential of the Armed Forces 
11. The UK’s armed forces are among the best trained, disciplined, and effective militaries in 
the world with an influential role in the education and training of armed forces globally. Beyond 
training, the soft power value of UKAF lies in being exemplars of what a modern 
professional army should be. Particularly important is the military’s relationship with 
democracy, its attitude towards domestic and international law, and respect for human rights.  
12. The military can project soft power through involvement in disaster relief, although there 
are serious issues to be resolved concerning the use of foreign militaries in disaster zones and 
how they relate to the overall humanitarian relief structure. Unlike humanitarian intervention 
or state-building, disaster relief is short-term, usually enjoys wide-spread public support, reaps 
international goodwill, and does not carry the same potential for neo-colonial baggage as long-
term aid involvement nor as many risks for the assisting state. Armed forces are often uniquely 
able to reach crises quickly. However, the use of armed forces may put undue pressure on 
humanitarian budgets, while decisions to involve military actors might be interpreted as political 
rather than purely humanitarian. Operating within an internationally agreed framework, such as 
that provided by the UN, may mitigate some of these costs. 
13. Environmental security is another way for the military to play a soft power role. Some 
of these activities are protective, involving force or the threat of force (for example 
enforcement of environmental international law, protection of fish stock areas, CITES-related 
interdictions), but others have a straight ‘soft power’ rationale in being neither coercive nor 
rewarded. These include sub-icecap sampling (access to which is available only to military 
submarines), the sinking of decommissioned ships to provide reef erosion protection, and the 
use of military explosives to ‘burn off’ petroleum products spilled from tankers.  
III. Enhancing the UK’s mediation skills base and branding the UK as a global leader in mediation and 
peacebuilding 
14. Nye cites Norway’s focus on developing mediation skills and projecting an image of 
‘Norway as a force for peace in the world’ through ‘ruthless prioritization of its target 
audiences and its concentration on a single message’ (Leonard in Nye 2004:12). The UK already 
has expertise in international mediation, both within government and among NGOs such as 
Coventry Cathedral’s Ministry of Peace and Reconciliation, the Quakers, Conciliation 
Resources, the Oxford Research Group, and community groups in Northern Ireland. But this 
expertise is dispersed and the UK is not universally known as a global leader in 
mediation. With budget cuts and the Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015, a national 
conversation should be held on how to project the UK as a global leader in mediation 
and peacebuilding, to complement the global brand its armed forces already enjoy. 
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15. One of the reasons the UK was rated first by Monocle Magazine was the strength of its 
diplomatic network. This competitive advantage should be extended and branded more 
effectively. In particular, we recommend that the UK government increases the involvement 
of UK personnel in international mediation, at all levels. Unlike negotiations, which 
contain significant elements of hard power, mediation is towards the softer end of the 
peacemaking spectrum. Through its focus on listening, empowerment and moving beyond 
adversarial positions, it has the potential to prevent conflict and defuse it after it has erupted. 
Because it is non-coercive, mediation has a greater capacity to generate attraction. Whilst 
enhancing the training of diplomats in mediation skills is important, so is the strengthening of 
non-governmental mediators and grassroots organisations. This includes mapping, sharing and 
learning from past mediation experiences and the strengthening of academic expertise on 
international mediation and negotiation to feed back into the training of practitioners. 
16. We recommend that the UK follows the UN’s example by establishing a Mediation 
Support Unit, providing technical and administrative support to mediators, and follows the 
EU by pooling expertise, establishing a roster of experts and creating a framework for 
cooperation between NGOs and government, for example by facilitating training and exchange 
of expertise through annual conferences and training courses.  
17. For this type of soft power to be effective engagement must not only be at elite level 
but also through initiatives that include the broader public, including the sensitive 
involvement of those considered security threats. Norway and Switzerland have 
demonstrated that it is possible to engage armed non-state actors such as Hamas or the Tamil 
Tigers without legitimating their violent tactics, and that such contact can at times result in 
positive policy changes (Gunning 2010). Similarly, there is scope in the Syrian conflict to engage 
non-state actors through mediation training by non-state actors.  
18. Significant expertise in international mediation exists at grass roots level, and 
this needs to be tapped and nurtured. A number of local NGO’s have international 
programmes, and have been delivering training in international contexts for years. The focus of 
this work has been primarily on mediation skills that develop the capacity of local actors to 
communicate and engage constructively in dialogue. The work of these non-elite organisations 
is rooted in a particular model of peace building that promotes a two-way engagement with 
local non-elite actors, as well as with statutory bodies such as police forces and local 
government. This work is based on a philosophy of local empowerment that focuses on 
recognition and fostering local dialogue rooted in personal experience rather than on the 
imposition of norms that may be divisive. By developing indigenous capacity for non-violent 
conflict resolution and democratic dialogue such models contribute to democratisation. 
IV. Enhancing soft power through greater use of conflict expertise  
20. Sharing expertise can enhance one’s soft power by increasing one’s attractiveness, moral 
authority, and ability to influence international agendas, norms and institutions. The UK 
possesses a rich store of expertise and has a track record of transmitting this 
globally. The shape of global governmental and non-governmental organisations from the UN 
to Oxfam, common law based legal orders, university and cultural structures and education 
more broadly as well as specific forms of diplomacy, policing and armed forces, have all 
benefitted from UK expertise. This utilisation of soft power has been incremental.  
21. Domestically, the transmission of expertise can be enhanced through specific 
structures, such as scholarships or courses within academic institutions which can be 
enhanced by the Government through financing, immigration support and advertising. 
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Scholarships for emerging leadership who may develop strong links with UK institutions as well 
as with its principles, education and human rights practices are particularly valuable. Yet, the 
UK’s ability to wield this soft power is undermined by cuts to programmes such as Chevening 
and the Royal College of Defence Studies, as well as visa restrictions. Within Durham 
University, we annually lose legitimate overseas students, including scholarship students, as a 
result of visa problems. The outsourcing of visa provision and the securitisation of overseas 
students as potential threats seem to have exacerbated this problem. Although the Chevening 
cuts are in the process of being reversed, greater funding, particularly in conflict, mediation or 
leadership studies, would be a highly effective soft power investment. 
22. Externally, whilst much of this expertise has been transmitted through such organisations as 
the UN, the World Bank, NATO, the OSCE or the EU, expertise can also be leveraged by the 
UK government facilitating private provision of consultancy services by UK experts abroad. 
However, in recent years the UK has fallen behind in its contribution of experts to 
international bodies. For example, the UK’s contribution to UN policing in post-conflict 
areas has dropped from 230 in 2000 (placing the UK seventh in the world) to one in 2009. 
Richard Monk, former UN Police Commissioner in Bosnia Herzegovina and 
Kosovo, and a member of DGSi’s Advisory Board, wrote for this submission: 
In 1998, the UK contributed 80 police officers to the UN mission in Bosnia Herzegovina 
(UNMIBH) and a UK senior police officer was chosen to be the mission’s Police 
Commissioner. This created a presence and influence amongst national and contributing 
countries’ contingents, with a consequent authority to contribute to high-level UN DPKO 
policy-making. For example, the UK Police Commissioner was appointed by Kofi Annan to 
the high-level UN Panel on Peace Operations, which in 2000 produced the principal 
reference document to be used by all future UN peacekeeping missions, the Brahimi Report. 
Since then, UK Foreign Office support for police capacity- and institution-building in post 
conflict states and states-in-transition has dwindled to the present position where we 
contribute a single police officer to the UN Mission in Liberia. As a Permanent Member of 
the UN Security Council, this greatly diminishes our entitlement to be heard on issues of 
post-conflict security, stabilisation and re-building. 
To regain its ability to affect international policies on policing, the UK should appoint a 
Police Attaché to its Permanent Mission at the UN and re-boot itself as a police-
contributing country. With 18 nations having attached Police Attachés to their Permanent 
Missions, the absence of UK engagement is conspicuous. There will be a formal opportunity 
for the UK to reconsider its soft power commitment vis-à-vis international policing at the 
forthcoming joint DGSi/UN DPKO meeting in the UK (November 2013) of members of the 
Global Police Policy Community to finalise the newly developed Strategic Guidance 
Framework for International Police Peacekeeping. 
23. A similar shift has occurred regarding UN missions more broadly. Dame Margaret 
Anstee, former UN Under-Secretary General, former Special Representative of 
the Secretary General in Angola and a DGSi Advisory Board member, wrote:  
Historically the UK has played a leading role in the development of UN peacekeeping. It is 
the member state that has probably done most to develop a common doctrine which the 
Defence College and the Foreign Office disseminated through training courses for military 
and civilian personnel in developing countries, both here, at Shrivenham, and in the countries 
themselves. In recent times, these have been severely reduced, a false economy that should 
be reversed. 
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Whereas twenty years ago the UK used to contribute military contingents to a number of 
UN peacekeeping missions – e.g. Bosnia (UNPROFOR as well as the subsequent NATO 
mission), Kosovo, Liberia (albeit on the margins) – to my knowledge we do not have any 
military contingents in any UN mission today and this has been the case for a good many 
years. Yet the provision of military components to UN missions is a relatively low-
cost and impartial way of supporting the internationally-accepted policy of 
Responsibility to Protect that can make friends and avoid the animosity incurred by the 
Iraq and Afghanistan operations.  
24. Expertise can also be leveraged by the government drawing more consistently on 
existing academic expertise within the UK. By up-skilling its foreign policy and 
international development personnel, it can increase its soft power through making staff more 
effective at reading underlying structural tensions and understanding public opinion dynamics 
beyond state elites. Academics and experienced practitioners can advise civil servants 
on how to identify which non-state actors to engage.  
25. In addition, the UK has a wealth of expertise around arms control, counter-
proliferation, confidence-building measures, and what might broadly be termed ‘security 
dialogues’. The UK could do more to apply its expertise (military, academic, scientific, technical) 
to military security problems. In this it could look to Australia and Canada who exercise great 
regional and international influence by ‘agenda-setting’ and bringing countries (or countries’ 
militaries, academics, scientists or technicians) into multilateral fora.  
26. Finally, we would highlight the importance of the promotion of the English language as a 
critical element in the UK’s soft power through language courses in the UK, the 
British Council and the BBC. English is not only the international language of power, it is 
also often the language elites in developing nations use to monopolise power within their own 
borders and access global goods and resources. English is thus one key to internal political 
rights and power, to education, to promoting the growth of middle classes, and to challenge 
unjust rule. In Egypt, communication between local English-speaking protesters and 
transnational protest networks was one element in the evolution of networks and tactics that 
tipped the balance of power against Mubarak in 2011 (Gunning and Baron 2013). Cuts to the 
British Council and to the BBC, both of which promote not just English, but also an 
understanding of British culture, history and policies, should be reversed if we aim to harness 
this soft power more effectively.  
18 September 2013 
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Q274  The Chairman: Thank you, all three of you, very much for coming to talk to us 
today.  I should say that you should have in front of you a declaration of the interests of the 
people on this Committee, so you know where we are coming from.  I hope that paper is in 
your places.  As you know, this Committee is looking at Britain’s power and influence 
overseas—so-called soft power, but obviously there are many sorts of power—and 
evaluating where our strengths are, where our strengths could be increased, where our 
weaknesses are and how we can reshape our diplomacy, and other aspects of our interface 
with other countries, more effectively in our own nation’s interest and, indeed, in the 
interests of all the involved bodies.  Right at the centre of this, we feel, is the world of sport.  
I was given a bit of paper this morning saying that 1.46 billion people follow the 
Premier League on television around the world, so there is no doubt about the extent and 
the reach of that, and indeed many of our sporting events. 
Could I begin with a fairly general question to each one of you?  We will then develop ideas 
from there.  What role do you think the English Cricket Board, the BOA or the 
Premier League play in promoting British culture, influence and values abroad?  Is sport’s 
appeal universal?  Does the UK benefit, or are there some downsides that concern you?  
Can we start on that?  Could I start with Mr Collier, as you are sitting in the middle? 
David Collier: Thank you, my Lord Chairman.  When we go on overseas tours and trips, 
we do see it as an opportunity not only to showcase Britain but to act as a platform for 
promotion.  I was lucky enough to be in India yesterday and to see how the Indian populace 
engages with cricket and sport, which is quite incredible. 
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Baroness Armstrong of Hill Top: It is. 
David Collier: When we had the ICC Champions Trophy in England earlier in the year, we 
had a global television audience of over 1 billion people, and a lot of those were in the Indian 
subcontinent.  We have just had two trade missions to India, one with the Prime Minister 
and one with the Mayor of London.  Our opportunity is to help open the doors.  When we 
have the team and the players there, it helps.  It helps by opening the door, but that is our 
role.  The other area we see as somewhere where we can play some role is in the support 
of the community.  In Calcutta, there is a school called Future Hope, which we have 
supported over a number of years.  When we were in Pakistan in 2005, very sadly when the 
earthquake took place, to help and give some hope back at that time was a role that we 
could play.  We see it very much as a platform for promotion and an opportunity to 
showcase Britain, Chairman. 
Q275   The Chairman: Mr Scudamore, I notice that the Secretary of State for Culture, 
Media and Sport said that she regards you as an example of soft power that underpins the 
GREAT campaign.  She talks about the Premier League’s relationship with the British Council 
and so on.  Could you elaborate on all these aspects of your work? 
Richard Scudamore: Yes, thank you, Lord Chairman.  Your opening premise is entirely 
correct: we are now broadcasting over 200,000 hours into 212 countries across the world.  
Therefore, it is pretty hard to go anywhere in the world where they have not either heard 
of us or, certainly in most cases, seen us or some of our output.  Remember that many 
other organisations pay significant sums of money in advertising and marketing to have that 
type of reach.  We are in the unique position where people pay us for the privilege of being 
distributed in those 212 countries.  Clearly there is an opportunity there to use that 
power—let us call it influence—more widely.  This Government and, in fairness, the 
previous Government have recognised that. 
Just like David, we have been on a sixth and are about to go on a seventh tour with the 
Prime Minister on a trade mission.  For us, that is very much a spike in our activity.  Whilst 
that gets headlines and it plays back into the UK, we go on a very different basis from 
everybody else who goes on those trips.  Most other people go on those trips with a view 
to securing business or opening doors.  We have already done our 212-country business; we 
are very much there to help government to create a better feel, really, about the UK.  
Certainly, in the last one, I think Mr Cameron’s first four speeches referenced the 
Premier League in the opening gambit, where he said, “I am here on a trade delegation and I 
even have something you have all heard of and all recognise: the Premier League”, and we 
had the trophy and everything else.  I am not saying we are the vaudeville act of the trip by 
any means, but we are certainly there to provide a point of common discussion, a point of 
common interest and some levity, to lighten things, because we are clearly apolitical. 
However, as David said, the most important part of what we do is the work that we do in 
those countries: the community work, the social-development work and the work that we 
do long after the trips have left the country.  We are now operating with the British Council 
in over 21 countries.  We have trained over 2,300 coaches, who have in turn trained 
400,000 young people to play football.   
We are into some tough places to reach, as well.  The police from Rio have visited to look 
at and copy one of the social inclusion schemes that we operate here in the UK.  We have 
had the police from Jakarta come, and the social justice department from Jakarta come.  We 
have had the police in Calcutta come and the local Indian premier league have come.  We 
are developing huge programmes in the favelas and in the slums of India, using football and 
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the power of football to help develop people’s lives.  A whole canvas goes on where we 
think we are making a positive contribution to how people view the UK. 
Q276   The Chairman: There are many questions arising out of these things and we will 
pursue them.  However, Lord Moynihan, you were at the heart of the whole Olympic 
triumph a year ago, and have been very much involved in the BOA through this whole saga.  
How do you see the impact and legacy of the whole Olympic scene helping this country’s 
image in the world? 
Lord Moynihan: My Lord Chairman, first, I would agree with my colleagues that sport 
unquestionably is a major asset in the area of soft power. It has a global outreach.  We have 
just heard evidence to support that.  If well organised, it enhances reputation and respect, 
and it delivers credibility.  From the British Olympic Association’s point of view, in deciding 
to bid to host the Games in London, it was very important to us to make sure that this 
would provide clear benefits in the context of business opportunities, particularly in the 
sporting context, that it would enhance the confidence of the country pan-globally and that 
it would have significant outreach in the Olympic family, because we are very conscious of 
the fact that, of the 204 national Olympic committees, the overwhelming majority of them 
have sport run by Governments. It is the Governments who fund the vast majority of those 
204. It is the Governments who place the very high priority, therefore, on the success of 
their athletes.  That is why it is not surprising to recognise that Kazakhstan, Cuba, Ukraine, 
North Korea, Iran and Jamaica were all in the top 20 countries that came here, and they all 
had very significant funding.  The Jamaican Government put $17.4 million into the hands of 
the medallists and the finalists, and I think Usain Bolt took $2.6 million from that.  That is the 
Jamaican Government’s approach to it. We recognise that if you can host a great Games, 
you have that outreach to 204 national Olympic committees, the overwhelming majority of 
whom place the soft power of sport very high on their list of political priorities. 
The Chairman: What about the lasting aspects of it all on the Olympic side?  The charge 
was £9.3 billion. That is what we paid.  What is the lasting legacy of that?  Is it just a one-off 
thing?  Do we have to keep staging all the time to make our impact?   
Lord Moynihan: There are two important questions there.  To answer the first one, I have 
no doubt at all that, in the 21st century, if you are going to host a major sporting event such 
as the Olympic Games, sport  has to be the catalyst for urban regeneration programmes.  If 
you look at London, the first £6 billion was spent by the ODA on urban regeneration in one 
of the poorest parts not just of London but of Europe.  The urban regeneration investment 
that had to be accelerated to meet the opening ceremony is going to have lasting legacy 
benefits for the local communities in that area. 
First and foremost, therefore, to justify the spend, the sporting element had to be written 
into the proposal as the catalyst for a lasting legacy for the local people.  In this case, it was 
the East End of London.  When we set to work on preparing to bid, we had the west of 
London as one option and the east of London as the other.  Mayor Livingstone was in no 
doubt whatever about where he wanted it to go, for good reason.  The sporting element of 
the financial package—the £2 billion that was raised by LOCOG—was all raised from the 
private sector.  They took a third of their money from sales of tickets, they took a third of 
their money from sponsorship, and they took a third of their money from television rights.  
The actual running of the Games was all from the private sector.  The vast majority of 
government money went into infrastructure: new roads, burying the pylons, improving the 
rail services and making sure there was a legacy in housing, both private rented and social 
housing for some of the more deprived communities in the immediate area of the Olympic 
park.   
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The Chairman: One sees pictures of weeds growing over the entrance to the marvellous 
Olympic stadium, which we all enjoyed visiting.  Certainly, it looks a bit sad.  Is there a 
danger there that this will purvey the wrong impression? 
Lord Moynihan: It is apposite to quote another Select Committee of this House, which 
reported yesterday and said that it “searched for white elephants and did not find any”.  The 
reality is that it is not in danger of becoming a white elephant, because at a very early stage 
of planning the legacy aspects, the facilities, the park, integration with the local community 
and new infrastructure—were all taken into account.  I am a tremendous supporter of the 
work Sir John Armitt did in the early days.  Sir John Armitt was one of the jewels in the 
crown of the Olympic Games, because he saw right from day one that it was vital to seek 
good legacy use of the facilities by the local community as well as facilities for the benefit of 
high-performance athletes.  The local community needed to ‘buy in’ to make a very active 
park that had a legacy reaching forward many decades to come. 
Q277   The Chairman: Unless my colleagues want to come in, let us turn to football and 
cricket.  For football, it is perfectly obvious from the figures that you quote, Mr Scudamore, 
that we have a huge viewership in Asia.  The global audience distribution is 31% in Asia, 23% 
in Europe, excluding us, and 16% in the Middle East.  The extent of your popularity is not in 
question, but how do we benefit from it?  Does the UK benefit from it? 
Richard Scudamore: We benefit hugely.  Let us take the direct benefit: clearly, there is an 
economic return for that reach.  The Premier League generates some £800 million per year 
of international revenues, which in itself is good inward investment.  As you know, that 
money gets aggregated with what we generate domestically, and we divide that up between 
the clubs not just in the Premier League but throughout the football pyramid; it funds an 
awful lot of activity within the football pyramid.  There is the direct economic benefit of that.  
To give you a macro figure, we generate £1.9 billion a year, of which we will give away 
£268 million this year.  I would challenge this Committee, or any Committee, to come up 
with a business with a larger gross revenue that gives away that this percentage of its 
revenue.  This is obviously the direct benefit. 
The indirect benefit to the UK is that we are referred to overseas.  Whilst we have a pretty 
sophisticated marketing machine in the Premier League, we have been trying to get people 
to understand that we have a sponsor.  Despite our attempts to call our league the 
Barclay’s Premier League abroad, once you step outside the UK it is called the 
English Premier League.  Therefore, there is a huge association with it being quintessentially 
English.  Whilst you can talk about foreign players and owners, in a sense they are buying 
into and helping promote the Englishness of it.  That is what the foreign owners are buying; 
they are buying something that is very authentic, which has been here since 1888 and is very 
legitimate.  In a global world, where people all over the world have the same access to 
images, both in television and digital terms, people gravitate towards world best.   
Therefore, the reason for those audience numbers, in my view, is because what is produced 
here on English soil—and Welsh soil, of course, because we have Cardiff and Swansea—is 
something the rest of the world looks at and thinks, “We know the game football; it is a 
simple concept.  It is 11 against 11, and it has not changed much, but we do particularly like 
this version of it”.  It is the same reason why, in any global sport, global sporting icons will 
continue.  We have some fantastic assets here in this country.  It is not only our cricket and 
football, but think of Wimbledon and the British Open and a whole load of iconic sporting 
events.  Now they can see everything, people choose to gravitate towards the best.  We are 
lucky that we are producing the best.  
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This has huge impact on how positive people feel about us.  You will know this.  You have 
travelled the world; you have been to other countries.  You will know that sport is a 
common currency and a common language, which you can talk about to taxi drivers or 
anybody you meet.  It is not just my sport; it applies to a lot of English sports.  It is very 
powerful. 
Q278   Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts: I wonder whether I could press you a bit on 
the softer side.  I understand these money benefits.  This is not meant to be a negative 
question; indeed, I pray in aid the fact I am leaving this meeting to go and watch England play 
Germany at Wembley.  One of the appearances of the Premier League is that money counts 
for everything; if you are rich enough, you do not need to worry about anything.  You hardly 
need to worry about what a referee says.  You can speak to him in almost any way.  You do 
not need to be a lip reader to see what is said to the referees in the middle of these 
matches.  There seems to be a question mark here: the soft power aspects, as opposed to 
the economic values, do seem to be very much tipped towards the super rich, the super 
powerful and away from the rule of law and order, looking after the smaller person, and the 
sort of thing we might stand for in a wider field. 
Richard Scudamore: I am trying to wrestle the question from that.  We are talking about 
sport, are we not?  The reality is this— 
Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts: Could I stop you there?  When you go to watch 
children playing on a Saturday morning, they behave like Premier League players: they swear 
and shout and they curse the referee, and their fathers encourage them so to do. 
Richard Scudamore: Let me go all the way back.  Let me start with what I call our virtuous 
circle.  The only way sport in this country is successful is if you put on a show that people 
want to watch.  We will get into an interesting debate as to what sort of things people 
watch.  We believe that the show we put on is an extremely compelling show, and people 
want to watch it.  People want to watch it here in ever increasing numbers.  The stadia are 
literally fuller than they have ever been.  We are about to have our record season both in 
attendance and occupancy.  Our audiences around the world are growing, and the fact is 
that we are putting on a show that for whatever reason people want to watch. 
I do not shirk from the essence of the question: do we see things on a football field that 
perhaps are unedifying and you would not want to see?  The answer to that is yes, but we 
can only go by data, and the data are that the numbers of those incidents are reducing. 
Last season, only one team was charged by the FA with surrounding the referee at a game.  
That has come down from 19 five seasons ago.  The reality is that player behaviour is 
actually improving.  The game has improved.  We look through rose-coloured spectacles 
back at football.  As I say, I am of a certain age, and I can remember certain tackles, certain 
leg-breaking activities and punching.  Not a single punch was thrown in a Premier League 
game for the past two seasons.  I can produce video—not as much video, because we did 
not have as much taken back in the 1960s and 1970s—of more fisticuffs, more punching and 
more violence taking place on a football field.  The difference is that we now have 32 
cameras scrutinising absolutely everything that goes on.  I am not saying they are perfect, but 
I absolutely believe, from all the evidence we have, that player behaviour is actually better 
than it was in the past, although it is not perfect. 
We are also in a situation where, quite frankly, people are not sat watching the games for 
that reason.  They are watching the games because they provide compelling sporting 
entertainment and unscripted drama.  That is the most important aspect of this.  I do not 
need to sit here and defend the popularity of our sport, but there are important things that 
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have happened in the past to improve behaviour.  Are they all saintly?  Do they all 
necessarily show the Corinthian spirit you might wish them to display?  I cannot sit here and 
say they are, but it is not as bad as perhaps you might be characterising.   
Q279   Baroness Armstrong of Hill Top: I am a football fanatic; you have to be to 
support some teams.  I learnt my football in the Northern League, which will be 125 years 
old next year.  I could go on about all that, but that is not soft power.  Can I ask you how 
much of that £268 million is spent in the UK and how much is spent abroad? 
Richard Scudamore: Of that, we will probably spend about £20 million abroad. 
Baroness Armstrong of Hill Top: What sort of discussion do you have with the clubs 
about this sort of activity, about football being an international thing and their responsibilities 
internationally? 
Richard Scudamore: There is huge discussion.  First of all, nothing happens in the 
Premier League without a discussion with the clubs.  I know some may characterise it as an 
autocracy, but it is not; certainly, it is a democracy.  To get that group of owners to give 
away £268 million is itself a challenge, but it is a democratic challenge: constitutionally, 14 
clubs have to vote for anything to happen.  There is a big discussion that goes on with all our 
clubs about the relative merits of a number of things.  Let us get away from economics: 
there is not a club within the Premier League that does not value, cherish, nurture, actively 
promote and spend its own income—not just the money we might distribute to them—on 
these type of activities, whether that is the community activities at home or the international 
activities.  The clubs are fully engaged with us.  We may lead and open doors; we do lots of 
things with confederations around the world, other football associations and football leagues.  
We have visits from all of them and we visit them.  We take clubs with us. 
An example is our Premier Skills programme, which is a coaching programme operating with 
the British Council, about which you have probably heard from Martin Davidson at this 
Committee.  We operate that now in 21 countries and we are about to expand to 23.  We 
always take coaches from clubs.  We do not sit at the Premier League with a huge staff; we 
always take clubs with us whenever we are doing anything.  In fact, we were in New York 
with the British Consul doing a promotion on community activity a couple of months ago, 
and we took club people with us.  The clubs are all climbing over themselves to get involved 
in this on the ground.  There is Sunderland’s work in Africa.  Chelsea has left a blue pitch 
behind in China.  I cannot do this off the top of my head, but if you are interested I could 
give you a written, systematic report of where all the 20 current clubs are active on the 
ground internationally, trying to encourage the development of sport and football in those 
countries. 
Baroness Armstrong of Hill Top: In relation to what you said about soft power, and in 
fact what David Collier said about the responsibility to sell the country and the image of the 
country, do you think the feeling that supporters have that we are being taken over by 
foreigners as owners, and the reality of the number of foreign owners there are, is a 
challenge to this concept that the Premier League is essentially a British institution, because 
football was born here? 
Richard Scudamore: It is entirely the opposite: the fact that so many foreign players are 
able to come here, and we are prepared— 
Baroness Armstrong of Hill Top: I am talking about the owners. 
Richard Scudamore: I will come to the owners secondly.  First of all, our international 
appeal is partly enhanced by the fact that foreign players play here.  You get spikes of 
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interest in certain countries when certain players from foreign countries are playing here.  It 
is similar with foreign owners.  You cannot have it all ways.  I go on these trips with 
David Cameron, and on these trips he talks about how Britain is open for business.  If this 
country wishes to trade and do business overseas, the opposite is also true: these 
businesspeople have to be able to come and do business here. 
Let me go through the fan base.  When it comes to foreign ownership, whilst it is a very 
dangerous road to go down to put foreign owners in a group versus UK owners, I will give 
the Committee this evidence: I have been in this job for almost 15 years, and there is no 
such thing as a foreign owner or English owner by way of any distinction as to whether they 
are good owners or bad owners.  The reality is that I have worked with good and bad, both 
English and foreign.  The reality is that all that matters to us at the Premier League, quite 
frankly, is whether there are decent owners running the clubs properly and with proper 
probity.  We are pretty much in touch with the fans.  We have huge research resources; we 
do 30,000-fan surveys on an ongoing basis throughout.  The fans are, quite fundamentally, 
more concerned about the success of their team and whether their team are doing well or 
not than the nature of the ownership of their club.  That is absolutely the bottom line. 
There is a similar thing in an international context: the fact that we are open to business and 
we welcome foreign investment stands us well around the world.  It is why it makes it easier 
to go and speak to countries, because we are apolitical in that sense. 
Q280  Baroness Armstrong of Hill Top: You say that the important thing is whether 
they are good owners and whether they are owners who are doing the right thing.  There 
have been a few problems around that.  Some of the evidence given to the Committee is 
that one of strengths of this country in terms of its soft power—this goes beyond sport—is 
the nature of governance and regulatory activity.  Businesspeople tell us that our methods of 
accountancy and regulation have been something they have been able to use internationally.  
Is there not a bit of a problem around that? 
Richard Scudamore: It is entirely the opposite.  I can only tell you what I believe: that we 
are admired around the world for the way our football is governed.  We are admired 
around the world for it. Let me give you some examples.  At the end of the day, in our 
football regulation we do not regulate whether people are any good or not at making 
decisions.  Remember, this is a sporting competition, where only one can finish first and 
people can get promoted and relegated.  In the Premier League, we have a pretty robust 
rulebook on what is required of an owner in financial regulation and ownership tests.  We 
do not have a competency test as to whether you are going to pick the right manager, pick 
the right players or win football matches. 
However, we are admired around the world for the fact that we have taken the lead in many 
of these things.  Our financial regulation is ahead of the curve; our owners and directors test 
is way ahead of what goes on in other sporting organisations within football.  We have our 
third-party ownership rules, which means that no third party can invest in players.  I have 
entertained 46 other leagues and football associations in three years, coming to the 
Premier League or us visiting them, wishing to copy our football governance, not criticise it.  
Whilst we have a prism here where we look critically—I can only give you the evidence—
we are admired throughout the world for the way we organise football.   
Baroness Armstrong of Hill Top: I would just mention Birmingham and Portsmouth. 
The Chairman: I want to bring in cricket, but perhaps we can come back to it. 
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Q281   Baroness Goudie: Quickly, on the whole question of ethics around football and 
the Premier League, you have talked about a number of things involving education today.  
You have at no point talked about bringing up the makeup of your boards to have women 
on your boards.  You have hardly any women on football boards, although you have a 
number of women who attend football matches.  I have not seen anything in the press or 
anywhere else—I have done quite a lot of work on this—about encouraging girls not to 
grow up to want to be WAGs.  That is all part of what I feel football should be about.  You 
pretend and are meant to be a family game; it is quite important you put some more money 
into representing the other 51% of the world and Great Britain. 
Richard Scudamore: First of all, these are independent, separate limited companies. 
Baroness Goudie: No, but you should encourage this. 
Richard Scudamore: We are not going to get involved in the board makeup of individual 
football clubs.  We have a Premier League board, of which there are only two people; they 
are currently both male.  The chairmanship has just recently changed.  We only have a board 
of two. 
Baroness Armstrong of Hill Top: That is a problem, too. 
Baroness Goudie: That is why I am asking you these questions. 
Richard Scudamore: The problem is that it is not a normal board, because the material 
decisions are made by 20 clubs.  Effectively, you have 20 clubs as the shareholders.  There 
are not many businesses where every shareholder gets to vote on every material issue every 
four to six weeks, so you do not need a wider board.  When it comes to the clubs 
themselves, again, we are completely neutral as to what the club ownership structure looks 
like: having a 100% owner is entirely acceptable, as is a supporter-owned club like 
Swansea City.  As I say, we take a neutral position as to what that is. 
Coming on to women generally, though, we have hugely progressed the amount of women 
who attend our games.  We have huge programmes in gender diversity.  Also, when you 
look at the community programmes we are getting involved in, there are unbelievable 
numbers.  As my colleagues will know, we are supporting Premier League 4 Sport, where, as 
part of the Olympic programme, we offered 12 other sports help by using the infrastructure 
or name of a club.  For example, to Arsenal we said, “Would you mind having an Arsenal 
table tennis club?”. Equally, it might be badminton, hockey, judo or all these other sports.  
The number of take-ups in those sports through the Premier League community operation is 
now 37% female.  Again, nearly all our community work is completely gender neutral, 
despite football still being a far more natural sport for boys in this country.  We are very 
conscious of this.  As I say, we are absolutely promoting the interests of women, women’s 
football and women’s participation in other sports.  However, it is not a corporation, where 
I own the 20 clubs, so we are not going to get into mandating female membership on boards. 
Baroness Goudie: You should be changing your ethics in that way.  You should be going 
further. 
Q282   Lord Janvrin: I am going to move on to slightly different ground.  It is ground that 
all three of you have covered.  It is more for Mr Collier and Mr Scudamore. Lord Moynihan, 
I am sure we will come on to the mega-events.  One of the things we are grappling with is 
the extent to which Government can, should or should not be involved in the way in which 
soft power is projected around the world by, for example, football or cricket.  You have 
both referred to the way in which the Government is looking at trade promotion on the 
back of sporting activities.  Do you welcome that?  Could more be done, or do you think 
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there is a danger in government being too involved in some of your sporting activities?  
Could you say a little about the way you see this operating in future?  We are very keen to 
look at what we should be doing in five years’ time.   
David Collier: As a national governing body, it is important for us to be totally apolitical, to 
start with.  Richard said that at the start.  I see it as us promoting the national interest in 
many, many ways.  I do not see it as a political lead as much as a national-interest lead.  We 
have shown not only that we have the respect of the rest of the world but that we have 
been able to innovate with the rest of the world.  The UK—England and Wales, in cricket—
won the rights to stage the 2009 world event in England.  We staged the ICC Centenary 
conference in 2009 of 106 nations.  This year, 2013, we hosted the Champions Trophy.  We 
have the Women’s Cricket World Cup in 2017 and the World Test Championship, and the 
Cricket World Cup in 2019.  That is a tremendous track record of bringing global events to 
this country.  It is something we are particularly proud of.  The influence we can have in 
other countries is very, very important. 
I am lucky enough also to be involved in the hockey world.  I was tournament director at the 
Commonwealth Games in Delhi.  The overlap is tremendous.  The amount of interest there 
in England was fantastic.  I honestly believe that we played quite a significant role on that 
side.  Our Chance to Shine project, which some of the Members here will be fully aware of, 
has gone into schools in England and Wales and has been copied around the world.  We 
have 2 million children playing cricket, of which 46% are young girls.  If that is copied in 
countries like India, Pakistan and, in fact, Afghanistan, it will have a tremendous legacy from 
this country to overseas markets. 
Lord Janvrin: I appreciate all that, and I fully accept that this is terrific.  My interest is that 
that would happen whether government was encouraging it or not, because that is what you 
are doing; it is what you have decided as an apolitical body.  I just wonder whether there is 
more or less that the Government should or should not be doing in hitching on trade 
promotion to tours and that kind of thing.  It is that area. 
David Collier: Realistically, on an England cricket tour of two or three months, we probably 
have two opportunities to be able to support that type of activity.  When we were in 
New Zealand last year, we had a business reception at the High Commission and a 
supporting event in Christchurch.  When we hold those events, the most important thing is 
that they are fully structured and interlinked.  We do not want to have different events 
dotted around all over the place; it has to be a consolidated event.  That is the role that 
high commissions around the world play with us.  We have found they work exceptionally 
well.  The high commissions around the world are tremendously supportive when we go 
abroad, and we like to be able to reciprocate and give something back.   
Q283   The Chairman: This opens up a more difficult subject, which is not merely about 
sport supporting the Government but about where the Government’s interests on the 
foreign policy side begin to weave together with the activities of Olympic sports, cricket or 
football.  Are there some dangerous areas we ought to be aware of here that worry the 
three of you?  May I start with Lord Moynihan? 
Lord Moynihan: 25 years ago, the idea of state involvement in sport was frankly 
unthinkable.  When I was Minister, it barely registered on the agenda.  Now, the reality is 
that it is part of the everyday landscape in virtually every country.  The question is why, and 
the answer is that sport has universal power.  Its passion and its ability to captivate are 
engaging the public in ways which politicians can frankly only dream of.  The net result of 
that is that politicians are looking at the sprinkling of Olympic gold dust on their electoral 
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fortunes in equal measure to many millions of pounds spent on other policies.  The damage 
that results from that, or the risk, is one of intrusion by Governments into regulatory 
controls or ‘ownership’ to the detriment of sport.  On the other hand, sport stands firmly 
behind the view that it should be autonomous, live within the laws of the land and run its 
business accordingly, and, if it is a professional sport or one of the 26 summer Olympic 
sports, it should look after the interests of its athletes.  It applies to all three of us; even 
cricket was an Olympic sport back in Paris in 1900! 
The challenge, then, is to see how the two can be balanced.  Over the next 25 years, this is 
going to be a major challenge for sport, politicians and the soft power element of sport: 
retaining that autonomy but recognising the authority of government.  Take the 
European Union.  Ten years ago there was nothing, as far as the European Union was 
concerned, devoted to the promotion of sport.  In 2007, aWhite Paper on sport was 
published.  By the time we adopted the Lisbon treaty, the European Union adopted 
competence in the areas of sport.  Now, there are policies coming out of Brussels on gender 
equality in sport, fighting against doping in sport, social inclusion and volunteering.  This will 
continue.  The challenge for sport and for politicians is to find ways of co-operating, co-
ordinating, consulting and working together, while respecting each other’s position.  
However, if this carries on too far, without the checks and balances that are inherent in 
sport running its own activities there will be state control of sport.  There is a real danger 
that that direction might lead to, for example, Brussels being concerned about the HSE 
aspects of children swimming before 10 o'clock in the morning in an Olympic final under the 
age of 18.  You can see a whole series of different potential issues arising out of that. 
With autonomy on the one hand and the growing desire of state interference across the 
world on the other, the job of the Olympic movement, the job of FIFA and the job of the 
cricketing world is to retain autonomy through co-operation, co-ordination and working 
closely with Governments rather than being at odds with them.  That Olympic gold dust is 
very significant indeed to elected Governments. 
Q284  The Chairman: What about when Government expresses a view about whom we 
should be playing against and where we should go in the world or where we should 
compete?  Mr Collier, is that something that concerns you? 
David Collier: In the International Cricket Council, we have byelaws and regulations that 
say that we commit to a number of tours over an eight-year period, which is what we call 
the future tours programme.  There are only two reasons why you can cancel those tours: 
one is an independent safety and security assessment, i.e. that it is not safe to tour that 
particular country at that time, and the other one is a government instruction.  It cannot be 
advice; it must be an instruction.  There is a very clear line between advice and instruction.  
We have worked through a number of significant issues.  I totally agree with Lord Moynihan.  
In terms of working closely with Government, I reference the Mumbai attack, when we were 
touring India at the time.  Our chairman, our board and I had to decide whether we were 
going back a few weeks later, and we did.  Naturally, we worked very closely with the 
Government at that time, but it was a support mechanism; it was not a control mechanism.  
That was what was so important to us. 
The Chairman: How do you feel about the instruction side of it?  It has happened, has it 
not? 
David Collier: It has happened.  It is fortunately very rare.  There have been instructions 
from time to time.  The Gleneagles agreement was a very, very good example of a clear 
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instruction in sport.  In our view, it has to be that clear for us.  We are not experts in 
making those sorts of political decisions.  We require instruction, not advice. 
Richard Scudamore: I was going to make a general comment about independence versus 
autonomy.  I do not think there is a Prime Minister or a Government I have worked with in 
this job who wishes to run football.  As they have consistently said, “It is bad enough making 
the decisions that we have to make to run the country; we would be blamed for all that as 
well”.  Clearly, there is a separation.  However, there is clearly more that government could 
be doing.  Whilst we see ourselves as a sport, we think there is a lot of soft power inherent 
in the creative industries in the UK.  Sport would put itself alongside architects, designers, 
pop musicians and filmmakers.  Think of the creative industries that make people feel very 
good about Britain.  Again, it was on show and it was well shown at the Olympic 
opening ceremony, closing ceremony and throughout.  We showcased what was good about 
Britain, and so much of it was in our creative industries and our design industries; 
underpinning all that is intellectual property.  Whilst I may be in sport, I am actually in an 
intellectual property-based business.  Therefore, in answer to the question of whether 
government could do more, I think all of us would be of the view that a clear and consistent 
line globally on the value of a decent intellectual property base with a proper copyright 
regime could actually help our soft power, because so much of this soft power is tied up in 
these types of industries; we could be doing more.    
Q285   The Chairman: Let me ask you another question about our interface with the rest 
of the world.  Is the fact that we are members of the Commonwealth any consideration in 
any of your thinking?  Is it something we could do more about and emphasise more greatly? 
Richard Scudamore: The fact that we are a member of the Commonwealth has never 
actually crossed my mind in terms of how we might promote Britain. 
Baroness Armstrong of Hill Top: Football is not a Commonwealth sport in the way that 
cricket is. 
Richard Scudamore: It is not a Commonwealth sport; it is a global sport.  However, there 
are two things we have that are a huge advantage.  One is Greenwich mean time, because 
the fact that we are set on the meridian means doing business and communicating with the 
world on a global basis, where everything takes place eight hours before or eight hours after 
us is hugely advantageous.  The other is the English language.  In the work that we do with 
the British Council, there is no doubt about it: the universal language of business, certainly 
contractual business, around the world is English.  Airline pilots all speak English, people 
contract in English, people want to learn English.  Around the world we get great support 
from the British Council, UKTI and the Diplomatic Service, through the 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.  Basically wherever we go we have links with the 
British Council in promoting the English language.  These are two very important strengths.  
Greenwich mean time, for doing business globally, and the English language are two things 
that again we should be capitalising on. 
The Chairman: Of course, cricket is spiritually connected to the Commonwealth.  Is that 
something you think about a lot? 
David Collier: The whole cultural foundation of our game is based on England and the 
Commonwealth.  We do have natural links and ties.  Is it direct?  No, it is not.  Our use of 
the Commonwealth is much more indirect than direct.  We are now seeing the emergence 
of what I see as the next generation.  For instance, we have a tour by India to England next 
summer, and we will have two broadcasts: one will be in English, one will be in Hindi.  The 
Hindi audience will actually be larger than the English-speaking audience.  That is how it is 
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evolving.  It is a change and a migration from where we have been in the past, but it is an 
exciting migration.  We are getting a truly multicultural audience watching our sport.  At our 
Champions Trophy final last summer, I would say that 80% of the crowd were of Asian 
origin. That is a huge change and it is something we are very proud of. 
Q286   The Chairman: Lord Moynihan, the Commonwealth Games is coming up, and I 
know your eye is very much on that.  How do you think that is going to play in the wider 
world, and how will it play in this country? 
Lord Moynihan: In the wider world, it will be a great success.  One of the great attributes 
of the approach that Glasgow have taken towards hosting the Commonwealth Games next 
year is to build on the success of the London Games, as well as the confidence the world has 
now in the United Kingdom to host Games.  They have been very receptive to looking 
closely at how London was run and taking the best of London and to build on it.  They have 
a first-rate Organising Committee that is going to organise the Games.  As we have just 
heard, there is a strong historical tie, through sport, in the Commonwealth, which will 
celebrate together during the Commonwealth Games.  I have every confidence that we will 
see a great Games next year. 
That said, one of the challenges to government, and indeed to sport, is that we have often 
spoken about a decade of sport in this country and the importance of a decade of sport.  It 
is very important not only that we have a series of events—be it the Rugby League World 
Cup at the moment followed by the Commonwealth Games, the Ryder Cup, the 
Rugby World Cup, and of course the Cricket World Cup coming up towards the end of the 
decade— that we learn from each event, that we learn best practice, that we build skills in 
sports management, that we assist companies that are delivering services and goods to those 
events, and that we see this as a sequence of events that strengthen our ability to contribute 
globally, both in the running of events but also in the business side of international sport.  
We must not lose that opportunity.  It is quite easy, given the structure of sport, for 
sporting events to be a series of one-off events run by different groups.  I would hope that 
government would see the benefit of building through this decade so that when we emerge 
out of it we do not just look at a series of great events but we look back at a much more 
disciplined approach to a legacy framework of excellence that  can then contribute to the 
world, because there is a huge and growing business out there that we should be capturing.  
My colleagues here are frequently on planes in order to capture it. 
However, this comes back to some of the tougher questions to Mr Scudamore.  I have to 
say, when I look back at when I was Minister for Sport and the problems that I had at that 
time in football and look at the game today, I have seen it transformed.  When I look at the 
Olympic Games in London last year and then look back to the Daily Mail headline when we 
first hosted them in 1908, when there was a diplomatic crisis with the United States, and the 
front page of the Daily Mail was, “Battle of Shepherd’s Bush”, which highlighted the complete 
breakdown in relations between the US and ourselves—talk about soft power being 
completely counterproductive.  At that time we chose the umpires and the referees, and 
actually in effect managed the running of the sports in many respects. We organised that the 
best runners from America were not in the 400-metre final.  Instead, the best athletes were 
competing against each other in the earlier rounds.  Our policemen put on service boots 
when it came to the tug of war against the Americans and basically laughed them out of 
court, so we won gold, bronze and silver medals in the tug of war.  It got worse than that. 
There was a crisis at the opening ceremony when the Americans refused to dip their flag to 
King Edward VII stating, “This flag dips to no earthly king”, which caused a massive 
diplomatic crisis. 
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We should get it in perspective that where we are today is actually a very good place.  We 
should give credit to a lot of first-rate professional sports administrators who are now 
running football, cricket and our other sports.  However, we must not sit still but build on 
that and grow our influence, because that feel-good factor is very strong now in this country, 
and nothing succeeds like success.  We need to create a momentum of good will and 
opportunity that helps Governments to open doors and help build British business and 
influence around the world.  That can easily dissipate, if we are not very disciplined and 
focused on continuous improvement. 
Q287  The Chairman: That is a very positive and constructive view.  I have one slightly 
negative question before we move on.  Might the Commonwealth Games raise questions 
about the unity of the United Kingdom?   
Lord Moynihan: That is a question I have been asked ever since I first got into sports 
administration 30 years ago.  Of course, the distinction is that we take Team GB to the 
Olympic Games, and England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland will be competing in 
their own right in the Commonwealth Games.  The answer to that is very clear: at present, 
the International Olympic Committee takes the UN lead.  To look at it conversely, if 
Scotland determines to become an independent country, at that point the IOC would look 
at Scotland and say, “We recognise you as an independent country, and you would have 
your own national Olympic committee”.  Until that point, they would take the position of 
the United Nations that they are part of the United Kingdom and part of Team GB.  That is 
understood, and we have a healthy understanding and respect for that distinction. 
Baroness Armstrong of Hill Top: Would that be true of all sports? 
Lord Moynihan: It is not always without its challenges, not least Olympic football.   
The Chairman: In a sense, we have had a flying start as a nation, because we were the 
originators of many of these sports and associated with them.  What you are doing 
worldwide is very exciting, but is there a possibility that as the power and wealth in the 
world shifts outside Europe and almost the Atlantic area, other countries are going to take 
up these sports, promote them and promote new alliances and new leagues, which would 
take us away from the heights we have achieved?  Is there a danger, on the football side, that 
our extraordinary influence and the labels of Manchester United, Everton and so on, which 
are known across the globe, are going to be diluted and other countries are going to take a 
more prominent position?   
Richard Scudamore: Obviously there is a theoretical, and perhaps real, possibility that 
others will grow and start to compete.  However, there is an evolution about these things.  
If you go back to the early 1980s, the Italian teams were probably the people who exported 
most and were the most dominant world league in football.  Clearly the Germans are doing 
pretty well at the minute.  Their national team and their league are both doing pretty well.  
We are not complacent about that.  However, you have to look at what the drivers of 
interest are. 
I go back to my previous point: we need to continue to try to put on the best possible show.  
By that I mean an absolute focus on keeping the best talent on the field and basically making 
sure that what you watch is as good as it can be, and by making sure that grounds are full 
and that the clubs work extremely hard.  Despite many headlines about ticket pricing and 
everything else, the clubs work extremely hard to discount and to make sure that grounds 
are as full as they can be.  We have to make sure those stadia are modern and fit for 
purpose.  
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There is one big threat, which is the integrity threat in betting and betting manipulation.  
Our game is seen across the world as the most honest game.  Yes, the Chinese betting 
market bets on our football, because they believe it to be the most honest form of football 
in the world.  As long as we keep protecting the things that drive the interest and credibility 
of our sporting competition, I see no reason why we cannot keep up with the rest, if not 
stay ahead of them. 
Will others get near us?  Yes, they will, as the Germans are doing now.  Will other countries 
develop their football?  I am sure they will.  I am absolutely certain that China, India and the 
US will have professional leagues within my lifetime that are extremely strong and credible, 
but if we keep doing these things properly and protect the integrity of what we do, and keep 
reinvesting and doing the right things, I see no reason why we should not keep ahead of the 
pack. 
David Collier: We would see it as an opportunity and a bonus, actually, because we would 
see the whole balance of us exporting some expertise to help other countries develop as 
actually what we should be doing.  We have wonderful universities like Loughborough, which 
develop top-class sports administrators.  That is a fantastic thing that this country exports.  If 
we look at where we have been at the past in cricket, only 20 or 30 years ago there was a 
veto between England and Australia that could hold back every other nation.  To me, that is 
not a democratic way of running a world governing body or an organisation.  We are now in 
the situation where countries are seeking our help and influence to help them reach that 
next stage.  It is good for us and it is good for world sport if other countries become more 
professional. 
The Chairman: Is cricket spreading internationally?  One occasionally sees rather vacuous 
headlines about the United States getting more involved and that sort of thing.  Is that 
actually a phenomenon going on?  Are more countries becoming cricket mad? 
David Collier: The third largest television audience for the World Cup was out of the USA.  
It is growing enormously, particularly down the eastern seaboard.  Again, it is partly an Asian 
population down that eastern seaboard that has started to take up the game.  I lived in 
Texas for a time and we had a Dallas County Cricket Club, would you believe, there. 
Richard Scudamore: Is there a Dallas County Cricket Club? 
David Collier: Yes, Dallas County Cricket Club.  It is spreading.  We have 106 countries 
around the world.  China is playing more and more cricket based out of Shanghai and 
Hong Kong, obviously due to the influence there was there.  Afghanistan has just qualified 
for the next World Cup, which is a fantastic achievement. 
Baroness Armstrong of Hill Top: It is, yes. 
David Collier: When we see that story, and the Afghans coming over year to Lord’s last 
year to train and play, it is a story that sport should be proud of. 
The Chairman: That is a very interesting answer. 
Q288   Baroness Armstrong of Hill Top: The real threat to cricket in many senses has 
been the betting and the problem of that in India.  The growth of the Indian Premier League 
has encouraged a very different approach.  What are you learning from the strengths of the 
game in India, and what have you been doing around the gambling problem?  We did have it 
in this country.  How is that being dealt with internationally? 
David Collier: Betting and gaming is the area of sport that keeps me awake most at night at 
the moment.  It is very difficult.  When Hugh Robertson was the Minister for Sport, at the 
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Commonwealth Games in Delhi we talked about it on the night before the 
Commonwealth Ministers’ Meeting.  In a market that does not even allowing gambling, how 
you could even think about legislating in the Asian market in that area is a very difficult 
problem.  Betting and gaming is not solely a problem out of India by any manner of means. 
Baroness Armstrong of Hill Top: No, I know.  It is because cricket is so prevalent in 
India. 
David Collier: Absolutely, and the amounts that are being bet on sport are huge.  We have 
had input into the Gambling Act at the moment.  We are very concerned that we would 
need a major events bill, not only to promote major events in this country, but to help us.  
Richard mentioned intellectual property. A lot of the protections that were put around the 
Olympics would be wonderful for us to have.  It is very difficult for us to explain, after the 
Olympics, that to ticket tout a ticket for the archery was illegal and the next week it is not 
illegal in cricket.  It is very difficult to explain that to the general public.  This is why we think 
the consistency of a major events bill is something we need to take forward. 
Baroness Armstrong of Hill Top: That is interesting. 
Q289   The Chairman: I would like to come on to the soft-power aspects of our 
discussion and the additional contribution that your sports are making to development in 
other countries.  The Premier League does a lot in Africa, does it not?  You mentioned it 
earlier. Could you tell us a little bit more about what you do? 
Richard Scudamore: Yes, we have extensive activity across a whole range of countries.  Let 
us break it down. There is a community-based action programme.  The main programme is 
called Premier Skills.  Premier Skills is a coaching programme that coaches coaches, because 
there is very little point in us trying to send enough people abroad to coach actual players.  
We just could not send enough to make it effective.  It is a case of teaching someone to fish 
and you feed them for a lifetime. We have coached 2,300 coaches around the world, 
working with the British Council, which is an extremely strong partnership.  We will soon 
be in 23 countries: 400,000 young people have been trained through that. 
There is a more difficult to achieve yet very rewarding break-off from that, which is where 
we blended our Premier Skills activity with a scheme started here in the UK that came out 
of the discussion with the police regarding police charges, where we argued that we gave a 
lot back to communities and therefore our games should be policed and the police wanted 
to charge us more outwith the footprint of football clubs.  That discussion between the 
Metropolitan Police and me—Philip French, who is sat behind me, was with me then—
resulted in a programme called Kickz, which is our football clubs going into the toughest 
urban areas in this county as a diversionary activity, after schools on Thursdays, Fridays and 
Saturdays, taking young people in and teaching them football.  It has extended out to pop 
music, and various other sports have been involved and have copied the model.  We have 
taken that internationally, and the police from Brazil, Jakarta and Calcutta have been to copy 
this scheme, as I said.  We are working with police forces in various parts of the world.  A 
whole load of activity goes on throughout all these countries. 
The other development activity, which is more on the administrative side, is where we 
spend an inordinate amount of time visiting and developing relations through all the various 
confederations and other football bodies throughout the world.  As I say, we visit, we hold 
workshops, we have best-practice sharing sessions.  We cover a whole range of things, from 
governance to how form a league or write a rule book.  There is a whole load of stuff we do 
throughout the world with many confederations.  London is a very popular place to visit: not 
a week goes by when there is not another league or football association or football club 
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somewhere that wants to come and visit the Premier League and find out what we do.  I am 
not dismissing the discussion we had earlier about some of the issues—nobody is saying 
what we do here is perfect—but I still would contest that we are the envy of many in the 
world. 
Here is a view: you cannot only want to do business in these countries, you have to put 
some effort into soft power to make it actually live and feel real for those people that are 
viewing this.  Without all that other activity, it would be a very hollow thing we did, so we 
take it very seriously and try to live up to those responsibilities as best we can—very ably 
assisted, I have to say, by the clubs, which are very willing to take part in those activities. 
The Chairman: We are generally pretty proud to run an enormous overseas development 
programme in this country.  Do elements of that back up your work in sports and 
community work?  Is there a link between the two? 
David Collier: With the Department for International Development, for instance, we ran a 
programme regarding HIV in the Caribbean three years ago with Lord Newby.  On a very 
similar programme, we have an education and literacy programme running out of India at the 
present time.  We have partnerships with organisations such as Magic Bus.  There is a whole 
series of those activities. 
We have touched on Afghanistan, but this summer it was quite remarkable to see the 
Maasai warriors coming over to the UK in full regalia and playing at Lord’s.  The amount that 
has done to stimulate interest in the Maasai has been absolutely enormous.  We have many 
links, not only through domestic programmes but through those international programmes.   
Lord Moynihan: In the Olympic movement, one of the key issues in 2005 was to ensure 
that international development was at the heart of what we were going to do over those 
seven years building up to 2012.  I declare an interest as one of the founding trustees, when 
we set up International Inspiration.  International Inspiration reached over 16 million 
children across the world and sought to change and improve their lives through educational 
projects, public health projects, inclusion and community cohesion initiatives, and the 
empowerment of girls and women, which was a very important part of that.  All that was 
done working with British government agencies as well as the United Nations family. 
One of the things we pushed hard to do was to support the IOC in its attempts to gain 
observer status within the United Nations, which it has succeeded in doing.  That has 
provided a transformational opportunity for the Olympic movement.  We now have the UN 
Office on Sport for Development and Peace, based in Geneva, which makes 
recommendations directly into national and international strategies of national 
Governments.  The Foreign and Commonwealth Office has been very supportive of this, as 
it is with the Olympic Truce, which is a very important part of the work the Olympic family 
seeks to support.  Again, it comes back to the point I made about the transformation of 
sport over the last 25 years.  Sport now touches virtually every British government 
department’s agenda, let alone, internationally, every Government’s agenda.  Through 
development initiatives, we can seek to engage in a way that we never did 25 years ago, 
which has really gathered momentum over the last five years.  Hosting the Games here 
helped us accelerate our involvement in a range of projects, not least, as I say, International 
Inspiration and the IOC observer status at the UN.   
Richard Scudamore: I cannot let the moment go.  Lord Moynihan would acknowledge that 
the Premier League was the first to commit to funding International Inspiration, and we 
remain the largest contributor to it.  We were the first to come out of the blocks after the 
Singapore decision.  Again, there is joined-up-ness even on this table. 
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Lord Moynihan: Especially on this table. 
Richard Scudamore: Especially on this table. 
Q290  The Chairman: You have all had a great story to tell, but can we have the final bit 
of our discussion on the Government and what you feel our Government can do more to 
reinforce your, in many areas, highly successful operations, and what government should 
stop doing, which might get in the way of your highly successful operations?  Obviously, this 
Committee is going to report on the governmental aspects of soft power and it is by no 
means owned as an issue by government as a whole.  It is a many headed interface between 
this nation and others, but if in the quiet hours of the morning you are thinking, “What more 
can these people at Westminster and Whitehall do?”, what is your answer?  Who would like 
to start? 
David Collier: I would have one single answer, and that is the one I touched on earlier, 
which was the Major Events Bill.  The reason for that is that it brings great revenue into this 
country when we hold global events.  We cannot compete with some other nations unless 
we have some of the protections that were afforded around the Olympics.  We learnt an 
awful lot from the Olympics.  That experience was hugely beneficial.  Areas such as ticket 
touting, betting and gaming could easily be covered in that Bill and legislation.  We would not 
then have to go back, independently and individually, to the Minister to seek protections that 
are required from world governing bodies every time we bid for an event.  Every time I bid 
for a cricket event, I need to go back to the Minister to seek help on specific areas such as 
visas and touting.  If we could bring through a major events Bill, it would be a tremendous 
step forward for this country. 
The Chairman: That is a very clear answer. 
Richard Scudamore: I have touched on mine already, but I will widen it.  We need 
consistency, really.  We are open for business.  Would the Government please be consistent 
about the fact that we are open for business?  Would they have a consistent view about IP?  
I find government far happier to preach to the Chinese about IP when we are in China than 
when we are around the table in Brussels, and I certainly do in the corridors of these two 
institutions here, because it is politically more difficult to do it here than it is when you are 
in China.  It is the same elsewhere.  If we visit universities in India and the 
Universities Minister is with us, we are hijacked by the fact that Indian students are not 
getting visas. Even the most talented, brilliant students have difficulty with visas.  Again, when 
I travel the world, we are faced with inconsistency all the time.  I would ask that the 
Government at least try to be consistent about whether we are you open for business or 
not. If we are, let us have a consistent policy about the fact that we are open for business.   
The Chairman: For one moment, I thought we were going to have a session in which the 
visa issue was not going to be mentioned, but I was wrong; it comes into everything.  Thank 
you for highlighting it.  Lord Moynihan, do you have a final thought on this main question for 
government? 
Lord Moynihan: From the perspective of the British Olympic family, the answer is very 
clear: work day and night to ensure that we have a lasting sports legacy in this country from 
these Games, for our young people in particular, able bodied and disabled, through a 
coherent legacy plan that improves facilities, recognises the power and impact of sport on 
local communities, improves the quality of coaching, primary school teaching and sport in 
schools, and recognises that we should have a step change from what we had when we went 
into the Games as a result of hosting them.  We had the most magnificent Games. Now, let 
us make sure we match it with an outstanding legacy. 
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Q291   Lord Ramsbotham: I have come back from Kenya, where I was inspecting 
prisons.  I asked the high commissioner what the most significant thing as far as British soft 
power in Kenya was concerned, and he said the Premier League.  I then went to a prison 
where I met a marvellous Kenyan marathon runner, whose first experience of coming 
abroad was the Commonwealth Games in Manchester.  She said that she has never 
forgotten the way in which Manchester welcomed her at the Commonwealth Games. 
Just picking up on Lord Moynihan’s point, I went and studied what Manchester had done to 
exploit the Commonwealth Games, and how Manchester had welcomed it.  They had used it 
to provide a framework for everyone who wanted to get involved with any sport, to come 
in, join, learn and develop it.  I rather hoped that would have happened with the Olympics, 
and it does not seem to have happened. We do not seem to have learnt the lesson of 
Manchester.  It is a great pity. I do not know whether you would agree.   
Lord Moynihan: We have in some sports, but not in all.  The classic example of where we 
have is cycling.  We have now enhanced our reputation globally through Brian Cookson 
winning the presidency of UCI.  We have had two consecutive British Tour de France 
winners and we have built a tremendous industry push, both in this country and globally, on 
the back of that success.  We now have cycle lanes and linked-up government initiatives to 
support cycling.  We have Olympic success.  We have more people cycling to work, partially 
because of growing congestion on the roads.  This will be a $64 billion global business by 
2018, and our share of that business has gone up nearly £1 billion in two and a half years.  It 
shows that by co-ordinating and co-operating with government you can build on the success 
that we unquestionably had during the games at cycling and its wider popularity.  However, 
in many other sports we did not. 
In terms of welcoming the 10,500 athletes of the world, I always said that the key to the 
success of the Games would be listening to them as they left.  They went back around the 
world having experienced much of what we did, which was an extraordinary sense of self 
confidence and a certain pride, but a certain humility in the pride nevertheless, because it 
could easily have gone wrong on so many occasions.  We have done something outstanding 
in sport.  My belief is that we should not see it in isolation; we should be working together 
to make sure that in this decade we consistently win bids to host international and European 
events, and that we consistently learn from each event to improve our ability to look after 
the athletes who we are there to serve. 
Richard Scudamore: My Lord, your survey of one in Kenya is replicated throughout the 
world.  The many surveys done by Populus rank the Premier League alongside, in any 
particular order, depending on which country, the monarchy and the BBC as the most 
admired British institutions and the institutions that make people feel better about the UK.  
In India and China, we are actually number one, ahead of those two.  Again, your survey of 
one is sound. 
The Chairman: Just to add to Lord Ramsbotham’s question about Kenya, we do not have 
anyone from the world of tennis here today, although we all know about our tennis 
influence on the world, starting with Wimbledon.  Some of the most satisfactory feedback I 
have ever had from someone in relation to sport and aid was from the supply of tennis balls 
to primary and secondary schools in Kenya.  This produced effusive thanks far beyond what 
was offered in the first place, and it reminds us all that sport can be extremely rewarding in 
every aspect. Thank you very much indeed for telling us your story today.  You may have 
problems, but your successes outweigh your problems, and obviously want to be built upon.  
Thank you very much indeed. 
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Written Evidence by Prof. H. Scobie  
Chairman, European Economics & Financial Centre 
to House of Lords Select Committee 
on Soft Power and the UK’s Influence 
 
Below is the European Economics & Financial Centre’s response to a selection of the 
questions which were stated in the PDF file that was sent by the Committee to our Centre.   
 
Q1 What are the most important soft power assets the UK possesses?  Can we put 
a value on the UK’s soft power resources? 
 
A1 The most important soft power assets that the UK has are: 
 
(a) English Language  
(b) Telecommunications 
(c) TV news & documentary services  
(d) Fashion trend setting 
(e) Its creativity in a variety of areas 
 
A value can be put on the UK’s soft power resources given ample time and the 
necessary resources. One way of assessing the value would be in terms of increased 
exports of goods and services. For the assessment of the return one can apply the 
discounted value of future returns. However, the returns would have to be projected 
on the basis of certain assumptions and expectations. It cannot be assessed just in 
terms of the most recent values of the external trade account. 
 
 
Q2 Is the Government doing enough to help the UK maximise the extent of, and benefit 
gained from, its soft power? What more – or less – should the Government do to 
encourage the generation and use of soft power? 
 
A2 No - the government is not doing enough to help the UK maximise the extent of, 
and benefit gained from, its soft power. The government should give more support to 
both R&D and higher education as well as giving tax breaks to those who generate 
exports. 
 
The government should promote and do some of the marketing abroad for UK 
businesses, especially for small and medium-sized enterprises. SMES do not have the 
resources and cannot afford the cost of travel to trade fairs in other countries. UK 
embassies could introduce potential parties abroad who could partner with SMES and 
do the marketing and sales on behalf of the UK SMES in different countries abroad 
(on a commission basis). 
 
 
Q3 How can non-state actors in the UK, including businesses, best be encouraged to 
generate soft power for the UK, and be discouraged from undermining it? 
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A3 The government could encourage UK businesses to join international associations. 
For example, the International Association of Business Schools encourages British 
businesses to have links with other businesses abroad. 
 
The following are some examples that can undermine UK soft power: 
• Football hooligans being too nationalistic can undermine UK’s soft power  
• All the negative talk about UK leaving the EU. Countries can no longer be self 
sufficient.  
 
If the UK did not have immigrants, inflation in the country would be higher. Foreign 
workers have to work harder to keep their jobs and are more cost effective for 
employers. It is no accident that foreign workers such as East Europeans become 
hired. 
 
 
Q4 How can non-state actors in the UK, including businesses, best be encouraged and 
assisted to benefit from the UK’s soft power? How can the UK mobilise its soft 
power resources to boost trade with other countries and foreign direct investment 
in the UK? 
 
A4 The UK economy is best served by remaining in the EU. Foreign direct investment 
comes to the UK in order to export to the EU. The UK market by itself is not large 
enough for foreign investors. Ireland expects that if there is an EU referendum in the 
UK and the UK pulls out, FDI could be diverted to Ireland. 
 
Businesses have to adapt to international standards and norms. For example, British 
companies in the old days did not put plugs on their electrical appliances which they 
sold. American companies, on the other hand, sold their appliances with plugs. 
Separate hot and cold water taps, especially on airplanes, is another example of how 
the UK does not try to conform to international standards and norms.  
 
Finally, foreign direct investment can be encouraged through tax incentives. 
 
 
Q5 Who should be the target audiences, and what should be the aims, of the application 
of the UK’s soft power? Is the UK using its soft power well and to the right ends? 
 
A5  The target audience for longer term promotion of soft power should be towards the 
younger generation through universities and other training colleges. For the shorter 
term, soft power can be aimed towards businesses.  
 
For the assessment of the return one can apply cost-benefit analysis and estimate 
returns on the basis of Net Present Value. 
Such returns would have to be forecasted on the basis of certain assumptions and 
expectations. It cannot be assessed just in terms of the most recent external account 
balances. 
 
The government needs to think long term. For example, Vogue magazine invested in 
Russia and after 3 – 4 years, just as they were thinking of withdrawing their 
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publication, their circulation escalated and they decided to remain in Russia. The 
current UK investment in soft power is not adequate. There should be less 
interference in other countries’ affairs and their revolutions, such as in Libya. UK 
businesses should also strive for better industrial design of goods & services. 
 
 
Q6 Is there sufficient return for the Government’s investment in soft power? Is the 
Government’s investment adequate? 
 
A6 It is not clear how much and in what way the government has invested in soft power 
so far. However, whatever it has, it does not seem to be sufficient. 
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Exporting Education UK (EdExUK) – Written evidence 
 
1. Exporting Education UK (ExEdUK) is pleased to make this submission to the Lords 
Select Committee on Soft Power and the UK’s influence, which we strongly believe is 
timely and necessary. 
 
2. Exporting Education UK is a broad group of UK-based companies and organisations 
involved in education as an export (either educating foreign students in the UK or 
abroad) who have come together to promote the value of the education exports to 
UK plc and its contribution to the UK’s long term competitiveness in the global 
economy.  We currently have over 20 members, who span the full range of 
education from Pre-preps, Prep schools, High Schools, Sixth Form, FE & HE colleges, 
Professional Colleges and Education Publishers, all of whom are exemplars of UK 
education.  A full list of members is included at the end of this submission. 
 
3. As institutions whose main activity is to promote British education to international 
students - many of whom have done so over many years – we have a great deal of 
experience of building relationships with international students from around the 
world and follow their subsequent progress with interest and pride. 
 
4. Our experience leads us to believe that the relationships which international students 
establish with the UK and their experience of their time in the UK have tangible 
short, medium and long term benefits.   We were pleased to see government 
recognition of these benefits with the recent publication of the BIS Research Paper 
on the Wider Benefits of International Education in the UK.  
 
5. There is, however, an urgent need to establish a metric which seeks to quantify these 
benefits.  We believe this would be an invaluable aid for developing a supportive 
policy framework which creates an environment for growth in British education 
exports and international education in the UK.   Large scale economic and statistical 
analysis of this kind could usefully by commissioned by government. 
 
6. ExEdUK have also commissioned some work to analyse patterns of contact with 
British education of some of the world’s most successful and prominent people in a 
variety of professions.  We will share this with the Committee as soon as it is 
completed. 
 
7. In addition, OC&C Strategy Consultants, an ExEdUK founder member, is currently 
completing a research study in partnership with Google examining the opportunities 
associated with the internationalisation of British higher education.  This is due to be 
launched in London in November. 
 
8. In the interim period we would be very happy to give oral evidence to the committee 
to share the collective experiences of the UK education providers who are our 
members. 
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Appendix: Members of ExEdUK 
 
• ACS International Schools (www.acs schools.com) 
• Association of Colleges (www.aoc.co.uk) 
• Alpha Plus Group (www.alphaplusgroup.co.uk) 
• BSA (www.boarding.org.uk) (awaiting confirmation) 
• Cambridge Education Group (www.ceg-uk.com) 
• Dulwich College Management International (www.dulwichcollege.cn)  
• English UK (www.englishuk.com)  
• Excellence Education Group (www.duffmiller.com) 
• Funding for Independent Schools (supporter) (www.fismagazine.co.uk/)  
• GL Education Group (www.gl-education.com)  
• Greenwich School of Management (www.greenwich-college.ac.uk) 
• Independent Schools Council (observer status) (www.isc.co.uk)  
• Independent Schools Inspectorate (www.isi.net)  
• Kaplan UK (www.kaplan.co.uk)  
• Malvern House (www.malvernhouse.com)  
• Mander Portman Woodward (www.mpw.co.uk) 
• QA (www.qa.com) 
• Study Group (www.studygroup.com) 
• Study UK (www.study-uk.org)  
• OC&C Strategy Consultants (supporter) (www.occstrategy.com)   
• Wild Research (Supporter) (www.wildsearch.org) 
 
September 2013 
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Exporting Education UK (EdExUK) – Supplementary written 
evidence 
 
1. Exporting Education UK (ExEdUK) is pleased to make this supplementary submission 
to the Lords Select Committee on Soft Power and the UK’s influence, which contains 
further thoughts on action by Government which would help ensure that the UK is 
effectively positioned to maintain and extend its influence in the space of 
international education. 
 
2. Whilst the UK currently has an enviable reputation for both school, further and 
higher education across the world, the market for international students is an 
intensely competitive one.  The USA, Canada and Australia all have strategies in place 
to grow their market share.  Our European competitors in France and Germany are 
now beginning to teach courses in English in order to attract greater numbers of 
international students. 
 
3. So whilst our reputation is high and numbers of students from some places are 
increasing, our share of a fast growing market is declining. 
 
4. To ensure that the UK’s position is not eroded over time and that the short, medium 
and long term soft power benefits are not lost, we believe the Government must act 
now to support our ability to compete effectively. 
 
5. We believe the Government should consider the following: 
 
• The introduction of a 5 year student visa to cover two years of A level and a 
three year course in a higher education institution.  This would be subject to 
the awarding and take up of a confirmed place at such a higher education 
institution. This would remove the need for the student to apply twice for a 
visa and would encourage greater numbers of international A level students 
applying to independent schools and sixth forms with the benefit that the vast 
majority of these would then continue their education in the UK rather than 
look to the USA, Canada or Australia. 
 
• Increasing the resources available to UKTI Education to enable it to increase 
its ability to broker relationships between UK education providers and 
opportunities in key markets.  This should include marketing and on the 
ground support, as well as more opportunities to partner UK providers to 
jointly bid. 
 
• Increasing the number of visa processing centres in key and emerging markets 
(for instance there is no centre in Myanmar) to ensure there are fewer 
practical impediments for suitably qualified international students wishing to 
apply to UK institutions. 
 
• Commissioning detailed research to evaluate and quantify the short, medium 
and long term impact of soft power derived from contact with UK education.   
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This is an area which is currently under-researched but where better 
information would greatly improve the targeting of policy. 
 
Appendix: Members of ExEdUK 
 
• ACS International Schools (www.acs schools.com) 
• Association of Colleges (www.aoc.co.uk) 
• Alpha Plus Group (www.alphaplusgroup.co.uk) 
• BSA (www.boarding.org.uk) (awaiting confirmation) 
• Cambridge Education Group (www.ceg-uk.com) 
• Dulwich College Management International (www.dulwichcollege.cn)  
• English UK (www.englishuk.com)  
• Excellence Education Group (www.duffmiller.com) 
• Funding for Independent Schools (supporter) (www.fismagazine.co.uk/)  
• GL Education Group (www.gl-education.com)  
• Greenwich School of Management (www.greenwich-college.ac.uk) 
• Independent Schools Council (observer status) (www.isc.co.uk)  
• Independent Schools Inspectorate (www.isi.net)  
• Kaplan UK (www.kaplan.co.uk)  
• Mander Portman Woodward (www.mpw.co.uk) 
• QA (www.qa.com) 
• Study Group (www.studygroup.com) 
• Study UK (www.study-uk.org)  
• OC&C Strategy Consultants (supporter) (www.occstrategy.com)   
• Wild Research (Supporter) (www.wildsearch.org) 
 
October 2013 
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Bio 
 
Ali Fisher is an advisor, strategist and author on methods of achieving influence across a 
range of disciplines including Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication, Counter 
Terrorism, Child Protection, Human Security, and Public Health. Across these diverse 
disciplines Ali’s work enables organisations to identify and build networks of influence. 
 
Ali specialises in delivering insight into complex information ecosystems through network 
analysis and big data. In his work Ali has: collaborated with organisations seeking to track 
and counter the behaviour of extremists online; helped international foundations to identify, 
reach and support influential activists working in closed societies; and analysed the use of 
social media and role of journalists during large scale social movements. 
 
Ali previously directed Mappa Mundi Consulting and the cultural relations think-tank, 
Counterpoint. He worked as Associate Director of Digital Media Research at Intermedia, 
where he continues to be an associate, and has been lecturer in International Relations at 
Exeter University. Ali received his Ph.D. at the University of Birmingham. 
 
His books include Collaborative Public Diplomacy (2012), The Connective Mindshift(2013), 
and Trails of Engagement (2010). 
 
This document is submitted by Ali Fisher acting as an individual. 
 
Summary: 
This submission addresses two questions relating to UK soft power: 
• How best should the UK’s foreign policy and approach to diplomacy respond to the 
new global communications environment, where social media have rapidly become 
prominent, where alternative media organisations (such as Al Jazeera) have multiplied in 
power and reach, and where the grips of traditional elites on the flows of information in 
their countries have weakened? 
 
• How should the UK best respond to the more prominent role in international affairs 
played by non-state actors and emerging powers? Can the UK shape this landscape as it 
develops, or must it take a purely reactive approach? 
 
The central argument of this submission is that in a networked world too great an emphasis 
on soft power can limit the ability of a nation to embrace the full range of opportunities 
available when seeking to have influence in the new global communications environment.  
This is not to ignore the value of ‘soft power resources’ such as the British Museum, BBC 
World Service or British Council, but to argue there are a wider range of options through 
which the UK can achieve influence, than those narrowly conceived within the definitions of 
hard power and soft power.  
 
This argument is put forward because the new global communications environment, and in 
which the ‘soft power resources’ of the UK operate is a complex information ecosystem in 
which communities communicate and share information. Successful strategies within the new 
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global communication environment focus on achieving impact at specific points within 
‘networks of influence’ which comprise the information ecosystem. 
 
Equally, emerging powers and non-state actors are increasingly able to leverage influence 
within the new global communications environment by developing strategies specifically 
suited to the information landscape of the twenty first century. As a result, it will be 
increasingly important for the UK to recognise the landscape created by the new 
communications environment and use the tools capable of analysing the complex networks 
of influence which have many hubs, or coordination points, through which influence flows in 
multiple directions.  
 
In this environment the UK think beyond the representational or assertive approaches 
deployed through a ‘soft power’ strategy, and as a result be able to deploy approaches 
appropriate to a networked age, including greater use of facilitative and collaborative 
strategies.   
 
For the UK to continue to be influential in the international environment, UK soft power 
resources and the institutions responsible for them will need: 
 
• To make greater use of collaborative strategies when seeking influence within the 
international environment.  
• To leverage the increasing quantities of publicly observable and open data sources in 
designing programs intended to extend the influence of the UK.  
• To use the available data to better understand the complex networks of influence 
which shape the new global communications environment 
 
Written Evidence: 
 
This submission draws on the contemporary study and practice of public diplomacy, which 
has increasingly focused on multilateral initiatives, working in partnership, and collaborative 
or cooperative approaches. The following is an edited text taken from:  
Ali Fisher, Collaborative Public Diplomacy: How Transnational Networks Influenced 
American Studies in Europe, Palgrave Macmillan, 2013. ISBN13: 978-0230338968 
 
The power of networks 
 
1. R. S. Zaharna’s Battles to Bridges provides a breakthrough in the understanding 
influence in an international environment. The work expands significantly the 
literature on the role of relationships within Public diplomacy. This expands the work 
of Brian Hocking, Amelia Arsenault, and Geoffrey Cowan, from the conceptualization 
of collaboration to that of practical application and policy analysis.56 Increasingly 
public diplomacy focuses on partnership and collaboration. In doing so scholars 
recognize the role of relationships and the larger network structures these 
relationships create. These developments in public diplomacy can be enhanced 
through the research into the influence of networks on human behavior. 
                                            
56 G. Cowan and A. Arsenault, “Moving from Monologue to Dialogue to Collaboration: The Three Layers of Public 
Diplomacy,” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 616, no. 1 (March 1, 2008): 10–30. 
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2. The study of networks has a long and distinguished history.57 Recently the increase in 
computing power has significantly expanded the potential to investigate ever-larger 
networks. The analysis of public diplomacy by Brian Hocking and R. S. Zaharna draw 
influence from the concepts of “boundary spanners” and “network weavers” 
developed by network analysts including Valdis Krebs, Everett Rogers, and Thomas 
Valente.58 Key within these concepts is the in meaning of the term “periphery.” 
Contrary to colloquial use, when applied to a network infers the potential of great 
influence and importance. Thomas Valente has emphasized “the importance of 
marginals who act as bridges in diffusion.”59 Across these bridges new ideas, 
perspectives, and information can flow into a network. In public diplomacy, the 
factors that influence these individuals will be of growing importance as the emphasis 
on collaborative working and evaluating impact increases in scholarship and practice. 
 
3. This work is supported by the role of weak ties within a network. In the article 
“Strength of Weak Ties,” Mark Granovetter demonstrated the importance of those 
more distant members of a network in providing new information from diverse 
sources.60 Strong ties, those through which an actor is in closest contact, have a role 
in sustaining the core activities of a network. Weak ties link to the periphery of an 
actor’s network; in doing so weak ties have the potential to increase the size and 
diversity of an actor’s information horizon. If identified, these weak ties have the 
potential to increase the impact of public diplomacy practice and, for scholars, these 
weak ties provide the means to understand the influence of individuals able to bridge 
between one network and the next. 
 
4. Public diplomacy is always conducted through the interaction of individuals in a 
network and the interaction between networks. Success in public diplomacy is 
inextricably linked to the way individuals collaborate through relationships. This is the 
result from the way humans huddle in networks. The relationships between these 
huddles, or clusters, are negotiated through the connections that link the different 
hub points. A network might be a family, community, corporation, charity, or a 
network facilitated by social media. They are all networks, containing “small worlds” 
and “spheres of influence.”61 
 
5. As Mark Gerzon put it: 
We are all profoundly affected by the decisions and actions of people whose faces we 
may never see, whose language we may not speak, and whose names we would not 
recognize—and they, too, are affected by us.62 
 
6. The actions of individuals and communities within a series of interconnected 
networks. The structure of a series of relationships can be thought of as a network if 
                                            
57 For a history of network analysis see; John P. Scott, Social Network Analysis: A Handbook, 2nd ed. (Sage Publications Ltd, 
2000). 
58 Valdis Krebs, “Mapping Networks of Terrorist Cells,” Connections 24, no. 3 (2002): 43–52. 
Thomas W. Valente, Social Networks and Health: Models, Methods, and Applications, 1st ed. (Oxford University Press, US, 
2010). 
Everett M. Rogers, Diffusion of Innovations (Simon and Schuster, 1995). 
59 Thomas W. Valente, “The Diffusion Network Game,” Connections 19, no. 2 (1996): 30–37. 
Also see; Franco Malerba and Nicholas S. Vonortas, Innovation Networks in Industries (Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, 
UK, 2009).  
60  Granovetter, Mark, “The Strength of Weak Ties,” American Journal of Sociology 78, no. 6 (1973): 1360–13. 
61 Joel Levine, “The Sphere of Influence,” American Sociological Review 37, no. 1 (1972): 14–27. 
62 Mark Gerzon, Global Citizens (Rider: London, 2010). 
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there are two or more connections between three or more points. These 
connections provide contacts and relationships through which influence can flow. 
That flow of influence has the potential to be multidirectional, as it could move in 
either direction down any of the connections. 
 
7. The multi-hub and multidirectional nature of these ‘networks of influence’ emphasize 
the need to look beyond a broadcast-inspired model of “many-to-many” evolving 
from “one-to-many.” The complex connections through which public diplomacy 
takes place are better understood as numerous few-to-few interactions. These few-
to-few interactions cluster around numerous hubs and coordination points that 
create complex networks linking governments, substate, and nongovernmental 
groups to each other and to communities in countries around the world. It is within 
this context that collaborative public diplomacy takes place. 
 
8. Strategies for public diplomacy cannot be based around a concept of many-to-many, 
where it is thought everyone is in communication with everyone else. These “all-
channel” networks absorb a huge amount of time due to the massive rise in 
connections for every member added to the network. As a result, they rarely exist in 
human communication outside very small groups. 
 
9. Instead of these Herculean efforts, networks tend to create manageable clusters that 
coordinate their communication around certain hubs. This clustering has been 
demonstrated, for example, in the case of activists using social media after the Iranian 
election.63 It has been analyzed more fully in other fields, for example, the work of 
Robin Dunbar on the “social brain” and social group sizes.64 As a result, strategies 
have to evolve that can navigate the numerous small groups created by human 
behavior. 
 
10. The strategies available to public diplomats working in this operational environment 
are often analogous to situations that John Forbes Nash described as cooperative 
games; those in which the interests of those involved “are neither completely 
opposed nor completely coincident.”65 The nonzero-sum nature of these situations 
leads to emphasis on the bargaining problem and equilibrium points.66 The Nash 
equilibrium, as it later became known, exists in a situation where “neither player can 
improve his payoff by unilaterally changing his strategy.”67 As in public diplomacy, the 
better outcome is contingent on the behavior of both (or all) actors in a situation 
and each being prepared to shift position. Contrary to assumptions often seen in 
assertive approaches to public diplomacy, Nash concluded, “no equilibrium point can 
involve a dominated strategy.”68 
 
11. Echoing the emphasis on contingent behavior, Thomas Schelling argued: 
                                            
63 Fisher, “Bullets with Butterfly Wings,” in Yahya R. Kamalipour (Ed.), Media, Power, and Politics in the Digital Age: The 2009 
Presidential Election Uprising in Iran (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2010). 
64 R. Hill and R. Dunbar, “Social Network Size in Humans,” Human Nature 14, no. 1 (March 01, 2003): 53–72. 
W. X. Zhou, D. Sornette, R. A. Hill, and R. I. M. Dunbar, “Discrete Hierarchical Organization of Social Group Sizes,” 
Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences  272, no. 1561 (February 22, 2005): 439–44. 
65John F. Nash, “Two-Person Cooperative Games,” Econometrica 21, no. 1 (January 1, 1953): 128–40. 
66John F. Nash, “The Bargaining Problem,” Econometrica 18, no. 2, (1950): 155–62. 
John F. Nash, “Equilibrium Points in N-Person Games,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 36, no. 1 (January 1, 
1950): 48–49. 
67 R. B. Myerson, “Refinements of the Nash Equilibrium Concept,” International Journal of Game Theory 7 (June 1978): 73–80. 
68John F. Nash, “Non-Cooperative Games,” The Annals of Mathematics 54, no. 2, Second Series (1951): 286–95. 
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Diplomacy is bargaining; it seeks outcomes that, though not ideal for either party, are 
better for both than some of the alternatives. In diplomacy each party somewhat 
controls what the other wants, and can get more by compromise, exchange, or 
collaboration than by taking things in his own hands and ignoring the other’s wishes.69 
 
12. Bargaining and collaboration requires connection. This has not gone unnoticed in 
public diplomacy; networks and relationships are increasingly common terms. Among 
scholars, Kathy Fitzpatrick has presented a movement from messaging to mutuality 
and R. S. Zaharna the movement from battles to bridges.70 In practice, this emphasis 
is perhaps most evident in the use of social media whether in terms of 21st Century 
Statecraft, PD2.0, or strategies for cyberspace.71 
 
13. As Craig Hayden put it, “implies recognition that more people share some 
responsibility for diplomacy.” It represents “a kind of redistribution of labor in 
international relations.”72 While it may be true, as Juliana Geran Pilon argued, that in 
this “bewilderingly over-connected world everyone is in some sense a public 
diplomat.”73 The strategic focus of a professional public diplomat is the aggregated 
connections and interactions between activists and communities across society. 
Single issue, hyphenated diplomacy initiatives—“water,” “science,” or “faith” among 
others—may have an important role within this endeavor. However, professional 
public diplomacy strategies are based on an overview of existing interactions, bridging 
numerous issue areas, and an understanding of the behaviors most likely to facilitate 
connection or collaboration. 
 
14. Connectivity is more than a rhetorical flourish about many-to-many communication. 
Connection is fundamental to the health and success of an individual in their 
community. Relationships have been shown to influence how individuals seek 
information or advice and even find a job.74 In addition, the health of an individual can 
be influenced by changes in the health of close friends—and more distant 
individuals.75 Social isolation has even been identified as a risk factor for early death 
comparable with that of smoking.76 The influence of connection and the tendency of 
                                            
69Thomas Schelling, “Arms and Influence,” in Thomas Mahnken and Joseph A. Maiolo (Eds.), Strategic Studies: A Reader, 1st 
ed. (Routledge, 2008).  
70Kathy Fitzpatrick, “U.S. Public Diplomacy in a Post-9/11 World: From Messaging to Mutuality,” CPD Perspectives on Public 
Diplomacy, Paper 6. October 2011. 
71Bureau of Public Affairs Department Of State, The Office of Electronic Information, “21st Century Statecraft,” March 16, 
2011, http://www.state.gov/statecraft/overview/index.htm. 
“Public Diplomacy in the Twenty-First Century [Rush Transcript; Federal News Service],” Council on Foreign Relations, n.d., 
http://www.cfr.org/diplomacy/public-diplomacy-twenty-first-century-rush-transcript-federal-news-service/p16698. 
72Craig Hayden, “The Lessons of Hyphenated Diplomacy,” PDiN 2, no. 4 (April 2011), 
http://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/index.php/pdin_monitor/article/the_lessons_of_hyphenated_diplomacy/. 
73Juliana Geran Pilon, “The Art of Connection through Public and Cultural Diplomacy,” May 2011, 
http://www.iwp.edu/docLib/20110517_PublicandCulturalDiplomacy.pdf. 
74Mark Granovetter, Getting a Job: A Study of Contacts and Careers, 1st ed. (University Of Chicago Press, 1995). 
Nerida Creswick and Johanna I. Westbrook, “Social Network Analysis of Medication Advice-Seeking Interactions among 
Staff in an Australian Hospital,” International Journal of Medical Informatics 79, no. 6 (June 2010): 116–25 
75Nicholas Christakis and James Fowler, “The Spread of Obesity in a Large Social Network over 32 Years—NEJM,” New 
England Journal of Medicine (2007): 370–79. 
Ali, M. M., Dwyer, D. S, “Social Network Effects in Alcohol Consumption among Adolescent.” Addictive Behaviors 35, no. 
4: 337–41. 
Ali, M. M. et al., “Adolescent Weight Gain and Social Networks: Is There a Contagion Effect?,” Applied Economics 44 
(August 2012): 2969–83. 
76James. S. House, K. R. Landis, and D. Umberson, “Social Relationships and Health,” Science 241, no. 4865 (July 29, 1988): 
540–45. 
James S. House, “Social Isolation Kills, But How and Why?,” Psychosomatic Medicine 63, no. 2 (March 1, 2001): 273–74. 
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humans to huddle in small clusters make the development of connective relationships 
a fundamental aspect of collaborative public diplomacy. 
Beyond assertive strategies and representational mindsets 
15. Many perspectives on public diplomacy have emphasized “staying on message,” 
getting an image out, and understanding the “short-term ability to ‘move the needle,’” 
in terms of perception.77 However, as R. S. Zaharna has demonstrated, this addresses 
neither the underlying relationships nor the communication dynamic at play within 
the contemporary context.78 
16. An interpretation of public diplomacy based on an expanded conception of network 
communication has the advantage that it analyzes the engagement between actors in 
the information environment within which they interact. The analysis of public 
diplomacy becomes the analysis of the information ecosphere within which a project 
was conducted. The ecosphere, or infosphere, is a complex multi-hub and 
multidirectional network. This more closely represents the operational environment 
than interpretations based on monologue or dialogue. 
 
17. Approaches based on monologue and even dialogue focus on the egosphere of a 
particular public diplomacy actor rather than the complex network of relationships. 
An egospheric perspective focuses on relationships that connect with the single 
chosen organization, group, or community. The implicit assumption is that everyone 
orbits around that single group. As a result, monologue and dialogue 
disproportionately focus on the role of one node with a network, despite the 
complexity of real-world networks. 
 
18. The difficulty created by an egospheric perspective is that it places a single 
organization at the center of the network. In doing so, it diminishes the role of 
relationships between other actors. While there are times when an organization 
does have a central position, but this can only be shown once the relationships with 
other actors have been taken into account. An assertive approach to public 
diplomacy, in R. S. Zaharna’s terms, tends to be unidirectional. It focuses on changing 
the behavior of others that are conceived as orbiting around the public diplomacy 
actor. The assertive approach assumes that an organization has “the answer” to a 
particular challenge or situation and focuses on an attempt to make others follow. It 
does not leave space for asking questions or engaging in negotiation. When this is 
seen from the perspective of a network, assertive approaches in practice take little, if 
any, account of the role and resources of other nodes. This is due to the attempt to 
achieve dominance by crowding out other perspectives from the information horizon 
of a target audience.79 
 
19. As Diane Sonnenwald argued, “within any context and situation is an ‘information 
horizon’ in which individuals can act. Information horizons, which may consist of a 
variety of information resources, are determined socially and individually, and may be 
                                                                                                                                        
B. Lown, “Sudden Cardiac Death: Biobehavioral Perspective,” Circulation 76, no. 1, Pt. 2 (July 1987): 186–96.<AU: Kindly 
check if “I” is required.> 
77 Nicholas J. Cull, “Public Diplomacy: Lessons from the Past,” CPD Perspectives on Public Diplomacy (2009), 
http://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/publications/perspectives/CPDPerspectivesLessons.pdf. 
78 R. S. Zaharna, Battles to Bridges: US Strategic Communication and Public Diplomacy After 9/11 (Palgrave Macmillan, 2010). 
79 Sonnenwald, D. H., “Information Horizons,” in K. Fisher, S. Erdelez, and L. McKechnie (Eds.), Theories of Information 
Behavior: A Researcher’s Guide(Medford, NJ: Information Today, 2005), 191–97. 
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conceptualized as densely populated solution spaces.”80 Conceptually, information 
dominance would limit the potential solutions within the horizon. However, the 
influence of shifting networks and relationships makes genuine dominance extremely 
difficult and neglects the underlying relationship. People feeling pressure to think a 
particular are more likely to resist. While social media has increasingly highlighted the 
role of networks in the spread of information, their influence dates back before the 
computer, as the studies of innovation, diffusion, and social networks elegantly 
attest.81 
 
20. The associative approach demonstrates the importance of the relationships that 
combine to form networks. In addition, a collaborative approach considers the 
relative importance of different roles within a network and the contribution each 
actor can make to the realization of a collective goal. This moves beyond centralizing 
and unidirectional positions of the assertive approach and builds on the insight of the 
associative interpretation. This study develops the conception of negotiation within 
the multi-hub, multidirectional nature of collaborative public diplomacy. 
Power of collaboration: 
21. In a collaborative approach, successful actors are those most able to interact in a 
network with the result that certain outcomes become more likely. The collaborative 
actors are not contained within traditional notions of power that approximate to 
making others follow that actor’s will. Collaborative actors are results or outcome 
orientated but in a very different way to those using assertive strategies. They do not 
determine a specific policy or message and then seek to make it sound attractive so 
that others will follow when it is presented ex cathedra.82 Instead, collaborative actors 
value the input of others at all levels of decision making. The result is a collective 
refinement of objective, consideration of all relationships within the relevant 
network, and subsequent cocreation of message if a message-orientated approach is 
to be used.83 
22. Collaboration in public diplomacy creates the potential for greater diversity of 
cognition, experience, and perspective.84 Through collaboration, new solutions can 
enter an information horizon. Through greater diversity a decision-making process 
can become more likely to be innovative, relevant to a wider community, and less 
likely to be the result of a narrow political perspective—such as the “with us or 
against us” that damaged US public diplomacy after 9/11. 
                                            
80 Sonnenwald, D. H., “Evolving Perspectives of Human Information Behavior: Contexts, Situations, Social Networks and 
Information Horizons,” In Exploring the Contexts of Information Behavior: Proceedings of the Second International Conference in 
Information Needs (1999), 176–90.< AU: kindly provide the place and publisher details.> Library Management, Vol. 21 No.1, 
pp.49 - 55 
81 Rogers, Diffusion of Innovations;  
Valente, “The Diffusion Network Game.”  
Valente, Social Networks and Health. 
Scott, Social Network Analysis. 
Karl M. van Meter, “Terrorists/Liberators: Researching and Dealing with Adversary Social Networks,” Connections 24 
(2002): 66–78. 
Tom Koch, “The Map as Intent: Variations on the Theme of John Snow,” Cartographica 39, no. 4 (2004): 1–14. 
Bonnie Erikson, “Secret Societies and Social Structure,” Social Forces 60, no. 1 (1981): 188–210. 
82 Ali Fisher, “Music for the Jilted Generation: Open-Source Public Diplomacy,” The Hague Journal of Diplomacy 3, no. 2 
(2008): 129–52. 
83 For the range of options for influence see; Ali Fisher and Aurélie Bröckerhoff, Options for Influence: Global Campaigns of 
Persuasion in the New Worlds of Public Diplomacy (British Council, 2008). 
Ali Fisher, “Four Seasons in One Day, the Crowded House of UK Public Diplomacy,” in Nancy Snow and Philip M. Taylor 
(Eds.), Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy, New ed. (Routledge, 2008). 
84 James Surowiecki, The Wisdom of Crowds (Anchor, 2005). 
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Data and complex international systems 
23. From engaging with activists in closed societies to countering the efforts of Jihadist 
groups; there has never been a better time for diplomats to get into data. Never 
before has there been so much publicly observable and open data available about 
which communities are communicating with and influencing others. This data can 
empower the UK soft power resources to make greater use of collaborative 
strategies and facilitative approaches to shaping international networks of influence.  
 
24. While there is no doubt that technology can be disruptive for authorities, diplomats, 
and scholars, these technologies can also be empowering for those seeking to 
understand behavior within complex environments.  
 
25. Combining big data analysis and visualizations with the nuanced understanding of 
context, already central to diplomacy, can open opportunities for collaboration and 
to push the boundaries of what is imagined to be possible within 21st century public 
diplomacy and the deployment of the UK ‘soft power resources’.  
 
26. The amount of data available is greater than ever, perhaps 90% of which was 
generated in the last two years. At the same time, more people globally are 
communicating in ways that generate data which is publicly observable, for example 
through the API of social media platforms. Equally, the tools to analyse data have 
expanded rapidly, allowing users to search large amounts of data quickly and 
efficiently. 
 
27. Certainly, as Nassim Nicholas Taleb noted during the Moneyball Diplomacy event, 
there is a need for discrimination in analysis, due to the level of “noise” in data. 
Identifying what ‘signal’ is meaningful to the task of diplomacy will require diplomats 
and scholars to become increasingly comfortable engaging with, analysing, and using 
increasingly large and often unstructured data. Engaging in this type of work can open 
further opportunities for collaboration and to push the boundaries of what is 
imagined to be possible within public diplomacy.  
 
What are the options for UK soft power resources? 
28. As I have written previously, the opportunity in the era of big data comes not from 
drowning in a sea of data but navigating the most useful ways to derive insight and 
develop innovative strategies from that data.  
 
29. Getting into what can be loosely termed big data does not have to come with a big 
price tag, at least not until users have begun to develop fairly large-scale projects. 
One way diplomats can get into data and gain comfort with the approaches and 
research questions to which big data lends itself, is to participate in the growing 
amount of open source projects, use the software programs which result and 
experiment with the range free web-based software-as-service. 
 
30. Now is a good time for UK soft power resources to get into data, as there have 
been recent updates to Scraperwiki, Sparkwise, and SwiftRiver. In addition, there are 
tools such as Gapminder which seeks to be a “fact tank” that promotes a fact based 
world view by providing time series development data. Moreover, the recently 
launched Google Databoard allows users to build custom graphics based on Google 
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research studies. These tools and data such as GDELT (Global Data on Events, 
Location, and Tone), if used effectively, can enable diplomats to integrate big and 
unstructured data into their current tools and processes for planning, monitoring, 
and evaluating their specific projects. 
 
31. In addition, given the relational nature of public diplomacy, tools which allow the 
analysis of relational data and networks, provide further opportunities to track 
whether an organisation is engaging with specific communities, to understand the 
position of a user in the ‘greater network’ or to navigate the information landscapes 
of communication around an issue. A recent article in Forbes highlighted some of the 
ways NodeXL has been used and further examples of network analysis can be seen in 
the Gephi gallery on Flickr. 
 
What use is big data to UK soft power resources? 
32. Previous examples of using, for example, network analysis have been discussed in 
relation to identifying meaningful networks in public diplomacy and specific events. 
Examples can be seen during events like President Obama’s trip to Brazil, information 
sharing during the Arab Spring, or the protests following the 2009 Presidential 
Election in Iran. Studies such as these can allow diplomats to understand the ‘greater 
network’ to identify individuals or communities with which to engage, understand the 
nuance in their discussion, and find ways to collaborate. For example these studies 
could facilitate the achievement of their objectives where they intersect with the 
aims of diplomats.  
 
33. Equally, there is an opportunity to use data to analyse the strategic communication of 
groups a diplomat is responsible for challenging. This can give diplomats an edge over 
adversaries in contested environments. For example, an article I wrote with Nico 
Prucha published in the CTC Sentinel showed how Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) is using 
Twitter as a beacon for sharing shortlinks to content dispersed across numerous 
digital platforms. This method means videos shot on the battlefield in Syria are being 
uploaded onto YouTube and shared with followers via Twitter. Knowing which 
content is being most frequently shared and the nature of that content can help 
diplomats frame their responses and develop strategies to disrupt the networks 
disseminating content.  
 
34. To take full advantage, diplomats will need to be able to leverage genuinely 
interdisciplinary approaches, which combine in-depth knowledge of big data 
techniques and network analysis, with rich multilingual understanding of the 
ideological, religious, and cultural foundations of the groups they seek to challenge. 
 
Avoiding Misconceptions 
35. Identifying the opportunity which big data and open data present is not to suggest 
that diplomats are currently without knowledge, great nuance, and understanding. 
Equally, as Kate Crawford highlighted in a recent Foreign Policy article, the numbers 
do not speak for themselves. Data needs interpreting by those with a nuanced 
understanding of the context and the imagination to identify insights and develop 
innovative strategies. 
 
36. It would be as absurd to suggest that diplomacy should be conducted only on the 
basis of big data. However, it would be equally absurd to conduct public diplomacy 
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without using big data when it is available. The greatest opportunity for influence 
comes from the synthesis of big data insights with the nuance, experience and 
understanding developed by generations of diplomats.  
 
Conclusion 
37. Combining big data analysis and visualizations with the nuanced understanding of 
context, already central to the work of UK soft power resources, can open 
opportunities for collaboration and to push the boundaries of what is imagined to be 
possible within 21st century public diplomacy and the deployment of collaborative 
strategies by the UK ‘soft power resources’. 
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CHINA’S SOFT POWER IN AFRICA. LESSONS FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM 
 
This submission focuses on China’s most recent initiatives in the media and 
telecommunication sectors in Africa, on how China is crafting a unique soft power strategy 
and on what lessons this bears for the United Kingdom, both in Africa and globally. It is 
divided in three sections. The first two sections explore China’s increasing presence and 
influence in Africa. The final section explores implications and possible lesson for the UK to 
engage with African audiences and with rising powers.  
 
China’s new initiatives in the media and telecommunication sector in Africa 
China has been seeking greater engagement with African audiences and has dramatically 
boosted its potential to shape narratives in ways that can favour its image or interests 
abroad.  This process has displayed signs of continuity and discontinuity with China’s 
previous attempts to influence ideas and perceptions on the continent. It has included both 
old and new communication technologies and has developed through a mix of bold policy 
decisions and trials and errors.  
 
The relocation of the Regional Editorial Office for Africa of the state controlled news agency 
Xinhua from Paris to Nairobi in 2006 represented the first symbolic step of this new 
strategy. The same year, China Radio International began to seek partnerships with national 
broadcasters in Africa to relay some of its content and make it more accessible to local 
audiences (Cooper, 2009). In January 2012, state-owned China’s Central Television (CCTV) 
launched CCTV Africa, China’s flagship effort to win hearts and minds on the continent. 
CCTV Africa immediately became the largest initiative of an international TV broadcaster on 
African soil, counting more than one hundred and twenty staff-members of which around 
eighty are African (mostly Kenyans) and forty Chinese. The expansion of traditional media 
has been followed by unprecedented initiatives in the new media and telecommunication 
sector. In 2011, Xinhua launched what it labelled as the first “mobile newspaper” in Africa 
(Xinhua News Agency, 2011). Developed in Kenya in partnership with Huawei, China’s 
largest telecommunications and service company, and Safaricom, Kenya’s leading mobile 
operator, it allowed mobile subscribers to receive news selected by Xinhua via Multimedia 
Messaging Service (MMS). Alongside these media initiatives, which have been aimed at 
reaching wider audiences in Africa through different channels, since 2006 the Chinese 
government and Chinese companies have also begun to play an increasingly important role in 
the continent’s telecommunication sector, as symbolized by the multi-billion dollar loan from 
China’s EXIM Bank to enable Ethio-Telecom, Ethiopia’s sole telecom operator, to increase 
access to the Internet and mobile phones, a project later undertaken by Chinese telecom 
giants ZTE and Huawei (Gagliardone, Stremlau, & Nkrumah, 2012). 
 
Consequences of China’s greater engagement in Africa  
The Chinese government has signalled its lack of interest in exporting its own development 
model, and its intention to simply respond to the demands of its African partners. Ongoing 
research has largely confirmed that this ‘no strings attached’ approach is consistent, but this 
does not mean that China’s presence on the continent is neutral or has no impact on 
development policies and practices (Brautigam, 2009; Gagliardone, 2013). China is indirectly 
influencing media/IT policies and practices in at least three ways. 
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First, while Western donors have tended to favour media projects benefiting the private 
sector and the civil society, often seeking to create incentives for the state to open a 
dialogue with other forces in society, China has exhibited a tendency to privilege 
government actors, thus increasing governments’ capacity vis-à-vis other critical components 
in the development of a media and telecommunication systems. 
Second, with the launch of media projects such as CCTV Africa China has dramatically 
boosted its potential to shape narratives, exert soft power, and allow different voices to 
shape the political and development agenda. While international broadcasters such as the 
BBC World Service and Aljazeera have often tended to rely on civil society organisations as 
gatekeepers of information, CCTV has so far shown less interest in these actors, privileging 
the formal over the informal and also as part of its effort to provide more positive news 
from the continent. 
 
Third, China’s domestic example to balance between investment in media and 
telecommunication and efforts to contain the risks of political instability that new 
technologies may bring, has the potential to act as a legitimising force for other states that 
share concerns of balancing both development and security, and that are actively seeking 
justifications for limiting voices and uses of technology that are considered potentially 
destabilising. 
 
Implications and lessons for the UK 
China is increasing its presence in the African media at a time other international 
broadcasters, including BBC World, are struggling to maintain their presence and influence 
on the continent. In addition, initiatives such as CCTV Africa are supporting an idea of 
“positive reporting” which is tapping into a “rising Africa” narrative, connected to the rapid 
growth of many countries on the continent. This is further helping to frame Chinese media 
as allies of African actors who have long attempted to revert the negative image of their 
continent in the Western media as one that is blighted by wars, HIV and hunger. The risk is 
that, while the BBC has historically been perceived as an instrument to bring independent 
reporting into nations that enjoyed few or no free media, it may now be increasingly 
perceived as an outlet that perpetuates a negative image of the continent.  
At the same time, China’s poor domestic records regarding freedom of expression and the 
democratic deficit that affects its institutions constitute a significant legacy for its foreign 
channels, constraining their expansion into Africa. The blocking of Facebook and Twitter in 
China has, for example, placed CCTV Africa in an awkward position. While there is 
awareness among African and Chinese journalists and editors working for CCTV Africa that 
social media are essential for the operations of a modern international broadcaster, CCTV 
Africa has been timid in developing a strategy on these platforms. CCTV Africa’s official 
twitter account was created only six months after “Africa Live” went on air and as of April 
2013 it had reached only 3,802 followers. CCTV Africa’s facebook page was launched after 
ten months and on the same date had only 501 fans. These numbers are dwarfed by its most 
direct competitor, the BBC: on the same date BBC Africa’s twitter account had 171,267 
followers, while its facebook page had 116,290 fans. In addition, the support the Chinese 
government has provided to developing the communication infrastructure in countries such 
as Ethiopia, which actively filters political blogs, has attracted criticism and concerns.  
China’s increasing presence in the media and telecommunication sector in Africa should be 
interpreted both as a challenge and as an opportunity. It forces actors who have traditionally 
tried to exert their influence on a regional and global scale, such as the UK, to rethink their 
strategies of engagement with foreign audiences. It forces the BBC, for example, to spell out 
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its values more clearly, to further uphold the principles of impartiality and independent 
reporting that have gained it many fans all over the globe, and especially in Africa. Similarly, 
the British Government should be able to offer clearer guides to companies engaging in 
work related to media and communications abroad, preventing UK-based companies to 
engage in activities that may be detrimental to freedom of expression and privacy (e.g. selling 
software that can be used for filtering or monitoring content). This will help countries such 
as the UK maintain a moral high ground and contribute to achieving the goals of liberty and 
equality they uphold. Finally Africa can be an important terrain for engagement with new 
rising powers, including China. As China competes for loyalties in new terrains, it also needs 
to change its strategy to appeal to new audiences (Price, 2002). CCTV Africa’s style has 
become more aggressive and has taken on traits that have historically characterized 
international broadcasters such as the BBC. Chinese journalists in Africa tend to be more 
open to experimentation and hybridization of styles and genres and this can open the door 
to initiatives that can also influence Chinese media back home. In a post-Cold War scenario, 
there are multiple opportunities for traditional and new players to engage on new terrains 
and test new forms of cooperation. A new soft power strategy in Africa can go in this 
direction, showing to foreign audiences the ability of a country to move beyond partisan 
interests and work for a greater goal that can rally old and new players alike. The UK has 
both the historical and moral leverage to lead along this path.  
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Background on contributor: 
 
Dr Jamie Gaskarth is Deputy Director, School of Government at Plymouth University, and 
the convenor of the British Foreign Policy Working Group of the British International 
Studies Association. He is the author of British Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013) 
and co-author with Oliver Daddow of British Foreign Policy: The New Labour Years 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2011) as well as numerous academic articles on foreign policy and 
security. In 2011 he was a Visiting Research Scholar at the Center for British Studies, 
University of California at Berkeley. 
 
Summary of main points: 
 
• Governments find it difficult to exploit the cultural aspects of soft power to policy 
ends. 
• One thing the UK government can do is devise an attractive identity for their state in 
world politics and promote it through more consistent policymaking. 
• To do so, the UK needs to think strategically about what identity is most likely to fit 
with its values whilst also serving its future global needs.  
• It then has to be prepared to make some hard choices, dropping outdated ideas and 
relationships and forging new ones. It also may have to accept the policy constraints 
that come with living up to a particular identity in anticipation of future soft power 
benefits. 
 
The problem of soft power 
 
1. As the call for evidence for this inquiry states, the concept of soft power has been 
defined by its originator, Joseph S. Nye, as “the ability to get what you want through 
attraction rather than coercion or payments”85. Two important questions follow 
from this definition: 
 
What makes states attractive?  
What can governments do to increase their state’s attractiveness to other actors?  
 
2. Nye notes that a state’s soft power arises from “the attractiveness of a country’s 
culture, political ideals, and policies”86. Many commentaries on soft power focus on 
the cultural aspects of this combination and produce inventories of the cultural 
resources of a state87. These can be a useful reminder of how a country projects its 
culture abroad. Whether it represents a ‘toolkit’ for policymakers to exploit is 
another matter.  
 
3. The difficulty is that many cultural facets of soft power develop and flourish 
organically, involve non-state actors, and resist any attempts by governments to use 
                                            
85 Joseph S. Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), x. 
86 Ibid. 
87 E.g. John Holden, Influence and Attraction: Culture and the race for soft power in the 21st century (British Council/Demos, 
2013). 
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them instrumentally to serve national goals. For example, in the arts freedom of 
expression is usually the most highly valued resource a government can provide. 
Therefore, any attempt to interfere with creative choices to promote political ideas 
is seen as undermining rather than supporting potential soft power benefits. It is for 
this reason that governments have often struggled to know what to do with the 
concept of ‘soft power’88. 
 
What can governments do? 
 
4. There was another aspect to Nye’s calculus of attractiveness that often gets less 
attention but is very important to soft power: a state’s policies. In particular, the way 
a state’s foreign and domestic policies construct an attractive (or unattractive) 
identity for it in world politics89. That is something that governments can try to do 
something about and would have tangible benefits in terms of shaping political 
outcomes to the state’s advantage. 
 
5. The UK has held a number of different and at times conflicting identities in recent 
years. These include ‘status quo power’, supporter of the rule of law and multilateral 
organizations, bridge between Europe and the US, pivotal power, reliable ally of the 
United States, liberal interventionist, networker, thought leader, arms dealer, aid 
superpower, tolerant and multicultural Olympics host, education provider, advocate 
for neoliberalism, Eurosceptic state and the country that wants to be ‘tough on 
immigration’.  
 
6. The result is confusion over what Britain stands for. What kind of international legal 
order would the UK like to bring about? Does it want to have an open economy and 
multicultural society or retreat behind its borders? Would it prefer to support 
protesters for democracy or the UK arms industry? Is its future orientation towards 
Europe, the US or the emerging powers? Does it want the UK to crack down on tax 
havens or become one? Too often these choices are dismissed; as if the UK can be all 
things to all peoples. But there are real costs and benefits to the policies the UK 
adopts. The identities they imply appeal to different audiences. Without any 
overarching sense of Britain’s identity in the world, it is difficult for other 
governments and peoples to hold a consistent image of the UK to which they might 
be attracted.  
 
7. If Britain is serious about wanting to mobilise its soft power globally, it needs to have 
a  public debate, combined with rigorous strategic analysis, over what sort of state 
the UK wants to be. It then has to be prepared to make hard choices between 
competing identities. Within this discussion needs to be some consideration of who 
the UK is trying to attract, what images of Britain would be most attractive to them, 
and what policies are required to maintain each identity. This approach is rather 
different from the empirical, bottom up approach that tends to dominate British 
foreign policymaking –  whereby the government works out what resources it has 
and then decides what to do with them. But, it would result in a stronger narrative 
                                            
88 See Christopher Hill and Sarah Beadle, ‘To wield or not to wield, that is the question: Britain’s soft power options in the 
21st century’ Paper presented at a British Academy Workshop on Soft Power, 10-11 Carlton House Terrace, London, 11 
July 2013. 
89 Ibid, 13. 
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about British identity that could galvanise public support at home and abroad for 
British foreign policy. 
 
8. The UK foreign policy community has historically been resistant to thinking 
strategically and planning for the long term90. It is even less keen on discussing 
identity91. The consequences are that policymaking is costly - since resources have to 
be spread across a wider range of potential objectives – and at times contradictory, 
as the government hasn’t thought through how policies in one area might impact on 
another. 
 
9. There are also periodic schisms in the foreign policy community as conflicting ideas 
about Britain’s global identity compete for influence. The most recent example is the 
debate and votes on military action against Syria on 29 August 2013. Polls indicated a 
substantial majority of the public against British involvement in this international 
police action92. Nevertheless, both major parties moved motions that paved the way 
for the use of force.  
 
10. Other countries reacted with surprise when the result failed to secure agreement. 
Some individuals in the UK predicted the end of Britain’s reputation as a reliable ally 
and great power93. On the one hand, such an outcome could have negative impacts 
on the UK’s soft power – particularly in the United States. Given the importance of 
this relationship, particularly in the defence and intelligence fields, this would be a 
significant cost. On the other hand, the assertion of democratic control over the 
executive might bring alternative soft power benefits. The political ideals that have 
long been trumpeted as evidence of the strength of British culture – parliamentary 
democracy, respect for the rule of law, freedom of speech and conscience – have 
arguably been affirmed in the most public fashion. At present, debates on these 
matters happen by accident rather than design and so the government is always 
struggling to rationalise its policies after the fact. 
 
11. The government should capitalise on this development to announce a reappraisal of 
Britain’s identity in world politics. In a world of rising powers and relative decline of 
Britain’s traditional allies, the UK needs to reappraise how it sees itself, who it needs 
to reach out to and attract, and what policies will enable it do so. Recent 
parliamentary inquiries into national strategy and foreign policy have called for just 
such a re-examination but have thus far gone unheeded94.  
The pros and cons of strategizing identity 
 
 
                                            
90 Peter Mangold, Success and Failure in British Foreign Policy (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), 5, 68. 
91 John Coles, Making Foreign Policy: A Certain Idea of Britain (London: John Murray, 2000), 11. 
92 http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2013/aug/31/poll-british-military-action-syria; http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-
23931479. 
93 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/10275565/Syria-crisis-Paddy-Ashdown-ashamed-of-Britain-over-Commons-
vote.html; http://www.dailymail.co.uk/debate/article-2408040/ANDREW-ROBERTS-Hideously-amoral-Little-England-
stepped-looking-glass.html. 
94 House of Lords/House of Commons, Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy, First review of the National 
Security Strategy 2010 (27 Feb 2012) HC 1384, 18-19, 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt201012/jtselect/jtnatsec/265/265.pdf; Public Accounts Committee (2011) Who 
Does UK National Strategy? Further Report (25 Jan), para 7, 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmselect/cmpubadm/713/71303.htm. See also Christopher Hill, ‘Tough 
Choices’ The World Today, April 2010, 11-14. 
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12. Advantages 
Promoting a particular identity in world politics has a number of potential positive 
outcomes for the UK’s soft power: 
 
It allows foreign policymakers to shape how Britain is viewed by others. 
It provides greater public understanding and involvement in policymaking. 
It reduces misunderstanding among allies and enemies by increasing the predictability 
of UK policy choices. 
It gives a clearer framework for devising policies (and underlines their attractive 
qualities). 
It allows resources to be deployed more strategically and effectively to serve policy 
goals. 
 
13. Disadvantages 
Of course, it could also result in negative outcomes, such as: 
 
Distracting policymakers from immediate priorities. 
Pursuing identity goals at the expense of material interests. 
Pursuing identities that are no longer relevant, or fail to acknowledge changes. 
Loss of flexibility over range of policy choices. 
Predictability of foreign policy could be exploited by rivals. 
 
14. Nevertheless, if the UK made a concerted effort to project a coherent identity in its 
foreign policy, and provided regular opportunities to reappraise that identity, many of 
these negative potential outcomes could be avoided. The positive soft power 
implications of giving a clear sense of what the UK stands for, and why it is an 
attractive society, would be substantial. 
 
15. To conclude, I would like to offer an illustrative example of a foreign policy identity 
that is in accord with British values, would be attractive to other states (particularly 
the rising powers of China, India, Brazil and Russia), and could be exploited by 
policymakers to advance foreign policy goals. 
 
Example: The Rule of Law state 
 
16. The UK has a reputation, with long historical roots, of being a supporter of 
international law. This has been challenged in recent decades by the UK’s willingness 
to use force outside the framework of international law in Kosovo, and on a 
questionable legal basis in Iraq in 2003. It has also allegedly cooperated with rendition 
operations on an extra-judicial basis. This had negative soft power impacts in the 
developing and Muslim worlds and undermined support for foreign policy at home. It 
also affects the UK’s ability to insist on the rule of law and sovereignty in disputes 
such as those over the status of the Falkland Islands and Gibraltar.  
 
17. A re-affirmation of the identity of Britain as a state that respects the rule of law at 
home and abroad would bring substantial positive outcomes. As a declining power, it 
is in the UK’s interests to constrain emerging and potentially rival powers within a 
framework of international law. This would allow the UK to consolidate its gains and 
assert its rights when they are infringed. Important powers the UK wishes to engage 
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with, such as China, Brazil and India, value the rule of law, due process and 
sovereignty internationally.  
 
18. To promote this identity, the UK could increase financial contributions to 
international legal organizations, emphasise its commitment to the due process of 
law, including the importance of the UN Security Council and UN Charter as its 
central foundations, and offer to host conferences and symposia on thorny legal 
problems. Rhetorically, it could emphasise the significance of UN approval for 
international action, whilst promoting reform of key institutions to make them more 
representative of the emerging power configuration. To be credible, it may also have 
to publicly express regret for transgressing international law in the past – albeit with 
an explanation of why it felt this was necessary. 
 
19. Meanwhile, at home, the commitment to the rule of law could be demonstrated by 
reining back on criticisms of judicial decisions, enforcing regulation (such as in the 
banking and arms industry sectors), repealing unnecessary security legislation and 
offering greater transparency in the judicial process. In short, it could engage in a 
rigorous public diplomacy effort to underline the renewed importance of this aspect 
of British identity.   
 
20. The primary benefits of this approach would be: 
to reinforce international legal frameworks that are important to world order and 
the UK’s place within it; 
to instil the image of Britain as a constructive actor in world politics that acts in good 
faith; 
to attract support for the idea that the UK’s policy goals are legitimate; 
to connect British foreign policy to domestic and international mechanisms of 
accountability; 
to provide a clear steer on the limits and possibilities of UK action, including the use 
of force. 
 
21. This is only one possible identity the UK might adopt and the author does not 
necessarily advocate it over other possibilities. It is merely designed to show how 
having a strong sense of an underlying British identity could feed into the policy 
process in a way that might be utilised to attract other global actors to the UK’s 
viewpoints and so further its goals. The UK might have to accept constraints on its 
behaviour. The emphasis on international law and the UN in particular would mean it 
could not simply take it upon itself to act without authorisation – distinguishing this 
identity from the more permissive idea of ‘good international citizenship’ which was 
prominent in the 1990s95.  
 
22. However, in a trajectory of relative decline in its hard power, the attractive potential 
in being a state that contributed substantially to international law and society would 
enable the UK to continue to shape the rules and values of global politics. In other 
words, Britain’s soft power could be translated into lasting influence. 
 
  
                                            
95 Wheeler, N. J. and Dunne, T. (1998) ‘Good International Citizenship: a third way for British foreign policy’ International 
Affairs, 74,4, 847-870. 
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Q236   The Chairman: Lord Mayor, thank you first of all for being with us today. This is 
much appreciated. I have just a formal statement to make. You have in front of you the list 
of the interests that have been declared by the Committee to give you an idea of where we 
are all coming from—I think that that is an important bit of information. As you know, we 
are a Committee formed to examine so-called soft power and British influence overseas, 
how it is deployed at present, what the potential is and what we can do in the future to 
make it more effective in delivering the goods and gaining the benefits for this country. That 
is our scene. You have spoken on and been involved in these matters in immense detail, so 
we will value your comments. I am going to start with the obvious first question, and my 
colleagues will probably come in, which is: why on earth is London such a magnet? Why are 
we so successful in the financial services field? Twenty or 30 years ago, it was said that it was 
London, Tokyo and Wall Street. Time has gone on, the financial world has been through 
appalling trials and paroxysms, and London has not been immune from those. Yet today we 
have the feeling—maybe it is not supported statistically—that London is actually pulling 
ahead and that we are the financial hub of the world. This is remarkable. Can you explain 
why? What is the secret? 
Roger Gifford: A small question, Chairman. I agree with you that things seem very to be 
very much in London’s favour at the moment. I am not saying that that cannot change, but 
they are in favour, absolutely. As to the reasons why, we would point to the good old values 
of the rule of law, respect for the independence of the judiciary and the fact that that has 
produced an international contract law that is essentially English law and is viewed the world 
over as a gold standard. I think that the UK is viewed overseas as a very attractive place to 
come to and invest in and to run a business. The tax regime is seen as reasonable. That, with 
years of investment by the authorities into making the system work well, has stood us in 
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good stead. Today, there are special features that mean that London is seen as a safe haven 
for funds. When geopolitical problems come, inevitably New York, Singapore, Hong Kong 
and London benefit—and in this latest round, London has benefited hugely, not only from 
money from the Gulf states but from Greece and Cyprus. I think that we are up at around 
£5.5 trillion of funds under management now, which was only £3.5 trillion to £4 trillion five 
years ago. There has been a move towards safety by many international investors and there 
is a large element of soft power about that. I wish I could say that the City of London and 
the Lord Mayor take all responsibility for it, but that would not be quite accurate. 
The Chairman: A large element of soft power? Elaborate a little. What do you see as soft 
power? We are looking at this great concept. It is quite hard to get hold of. 
Roger Gifford: For sure. It is the intangible that makes London an attractive place and gives 
us a good brand name. The City brand, I think, is very powerful. The City of London 
Corporation, which for centuries has been in the game of building up its international 
contacts and seeing London as an international trade centre, has done a huge amount to help 
that. The combination of lifestyle, the culture, the West End, the fantastic living conditions 
that people see here, plus benign trading and investing environments, have made it a good 
place to come. The English language, too, has played a part. If you like, it is a combination of 
factors. The English language is a soft power, I suppose, but it is hugely beneficial to what we 
do. It is the international language of finance. Where better to come than New York or 
London to do it? New York is a great place. It is a great financial centre, but from an 
international perspective London has benefited hugely. 
The Chairman: Is the sheer chance of our geographical position and the timing zone part 
of it as well? 
Roger Gifford: People say that, but I sometimes wonder why that does not apply to 
Frankfurt, Paris or Luxembourg. It certainly helps. The centre of East and West is very much 
in this time zone, in Europe. You cannot go to the middle of the Pacific Ocean, which would 
be the other place to do it, and run a finance centre.  
Q237  The Chairman: Those are the positive things, but you began quite rightly—or you 
put into your first answer—with the caution that we have to work to hold it that way 
because it could not stay that way for ever. What are the rocks beneath the water that you 
see? What are the dangers? 
Roger Gifford: Europe is undoubtedly a rock that we are standing on, and if we were to 
sever ourselves from it, that would be bad news for the City of London. Many firms have 
said over and again that they base themselves in London because that is where they can do 
their European operations from. These are time-zone operations. The American banks are 
some of the biggest employers in London. When I travel, I frequently take JP Morgan and 
Citibank with me. They are London employers. They base a lot of their international activity 
out of London. They do their American business out of New York. They do their 
international business, including in the Middle East and Africa, out of London, so they are 
terribly important to us. The international aspect is a key part and geographical location is 
very powerful. 
The Chairman: And yet it is not all sweetness and light with the rest of the European 
Union, is it? 
Roger Gifford: No, it is not. There are aspects, if we were to leave, about still being in a 
single market and a single trading bloc. I am sure that it could be made to work, or it might 
be made to work, but the risks and downsides are so great that we would hugely caution 
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against it and say, “For goodness sake, let’s find reform within the European institutions. 
Let’s get the euro back on track. Let’s make it a stable banking system. Let’s get the single 
supervisory mechanism in place. We want to be part of helping that to happen. Let’s 
consolidate the market into a real single market—it is only a patchy single market today—
and let Britain be part of it”. 
The Chairman: My colleagues must come in, but is there a single market in financial 
services at all at present? 
Roger Gifford: Yes, there is. In some areas of banking, there is a reasonably single market. 
You have the eurozone and the non-eurozone, but that is effectively related to the capital 
and to the currency. In banking, we can sell services to any country from London. You can 
do retail products, you can do investment products, you can lend money anywhere within 
the EU without any withholding taxes or other distinction. In some of the securities markets, 
there are some difficulties in trading but the MiFID, the latest round—the market and 
financial instruments directive—is addressing a lot of that. It has yet to come in fully, but it is 
coming. 
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean: I just wonder about this argument on Europe and that we 
have to look to Europe rather than globally. The arguments that you are deploying about 
having to be in there and the rest are the same arguments that the City deployed when 
joining the single currency was going to be inevitable. I think you would probably agree that 
had we joined the single currency, we would be in something of a mess now. I wonder 
whether this focus on Europe is not missing the opportunity for us to use our traditional 
global relationships to look beyond Europe, because although you are right about it being an 
open market, the business and the growth are elsewhere. 
Roger Gifford: That is absolutely right, but the euro argument and Europe are very 
different. When arguing to create the euro, we were looking at a system of currency that we 
thought from the very beginning was flawed politically in terms of fiscal and monetary policy. 
We did not believe that a currency that did not have the union of the Governments behind 
it would work, and I think we have been shown right on that. The discussion about Europe is 
quite different and is about whether we are part of the group 
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean: Are you saying that at the time the euro was created the 
City was campaigning against it? 
Roger Gifford: The City was very unsure about the euro. 
Q238   Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: A slightly off the wall question: when you turn up in 
one of your overseas missions, are any of the people you meet surprised that you are not a 
somewhat eccentric, blond haired, tousled fellow? 
Roger Gifford: They are. 
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: How do you explain that there is a mayor and a lord mayor? 
Roger Gifford: It is not difficult. The mayor is the mayor of the 32 boroughs of London. He 
looks after the infrastructure of the London metropolitan area. My primary role is that of a 
promoter of financial and professional services for the whole of the United Kingdom—we 
(myself, the last Lord Mayor David Wootton and the next Fiona Woolf) are just back this 
morning from Leeds, talking to Leeds Legal and Leeds and Partners. It is very much the 
whole industry rather than just the geographical segment that is London. 
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Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: You were talking earlier about the West End. It must be very 
difficult for you just to stick to talking about the financial aspect of the city. People must 
want to engage with you on other issues as well. 
Roger Gifford: Oh, indeed. As we are talking about soft power, I think that we talk a lot 
about the other bits of the city that give the financial proposition such value. Culture and the 
arts—the Barbican, the LSO and the GSMD—we are hugely proud of. The City of London is 
the third or fourth largest funder of the arts in the country. We are proud of that. That, plus 
emphasising the diversity, through to the churches and the buildings, is a very strong 
message. Of course, at the same time, we have great assets in the West End, and the 
National Theatre and the South Bank and so on as well. 
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: Perhaps I can widen the question a bit. Alex Salmond is in 
China at the moment—I do not know who they think they are meeting. I agree with you on 
Europe 100%, but does our current constitutional situation within the United Kingdom, 
where we have three devolved Administrations, England with a difficult constitutional 
arrangement and London with quite a lot of devolved powers not to the City but to the 
whole of London, create a confused image of who represents what one is travelling overseas 
or talking with people from overseas? 
Roger Gifford: I have not felt it. I know the confusion with the Mayor of London, but in 
practice it has never been an issue of any substance. On the Scotland/Wales/London/Britain 
discussion, I am not sure that people outside Europe really care or even notice very much. I 
have spent the whole year expecting to be attacked about the “British” financial crisis, but it 
has just not happened. People, for whatever reason, see Britain as a homogenous entity. It 
was very interesting being in Leeds. One of the main questions in Leeds was, “Why aren’t 
people coming up to Leeds? Why aren’t they coming and seeing us?”. I am not sure that 
people see a difference between London and Leeds when you work a thousand miles away. 
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: Does the same apply to Edinburgh? Do they see the 
difference? I see you were born in St Andrews. 
Roger Gifford: Yes, I was. I think that Scotland is seen as a separate issue. Scotland, England, 
Britain—they take a bit of explaining.  
Q239   Lord Forsyth of Drumlean: Just falling on that point about the financial crisis, you 
do not think that that has caused a reduction in Britain’s soft power? In one of our earlier 
sessions, the British Council listed all the things that it thought were great about Britain—we 
had the BBC and the theatres and so on—but it did not mention the City. When I 
challenged it on that, it said that the banking crisis had affected things. Do you think that we 
have been damaged? 
Roger Gifford: I think there has been pause for thought about financial services in every 
country in the world. No one has been untouched, even if some countries have come 
through it rather well. Canada, Australia, Scandinavia, Japan and the Gulf states have come 
through pretty okay, but each of those also had the questions at the time: are bankers over-
remunerated? Is the structure right? What should the capital levels be? Do we have a 
liquidity problem? Every country has been aware. When I said that I expected to be attacked 
about the financial crisis, with London seen as leading the way down to the pit of despond, it 
just has not been that; in fact, it has almost been the opposite. There is no comment about 
the banks that have been taken over by the Government, but there is on the whole 
admiration for the UK authorities for trying to get it right, trying to take the longer-term 
approach towards regulation and finding a 30-year solution rather than a quick fix. 
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Lord Forsyth of Drumlean: Do you think you get enough support from organisations 
such as the British Council and others? 
Roger Gifford: I would love to see a bigger British Council. I would love to see a British 
Council that did much more with the brand, the asset that we have. It does a lot in English 
language teaching. I would love to see it pushing culture and arts more than it does. Does 
that mean more money, or does it mean using the money that it creates from English 
language teaching more effectively? I would support that for sure. 
The Chairman: After the Lehman crisis, there was a lot of talk—indeed, there still is a lot 
of talk—about rebalancing the economy, implying that we were too reliant on financial 
services and that somehow we should do things, and by unspecified means, to change the 
balance more in favour of manufacturing and non-financial services. It is a paradox that you 
are before us tonight saying very confidently and rightly that financial services seem to have 
gone on the path to recovery and seem to be more dominant, if anything, than ever. So what 
do we say about rebalancing? 
Roger Gifford: I would say two things. I think that financial services have decreased in level 
since 2007, but in the City as a whole the job levels are now back to where they were in 
2007. We see fewer in structured derivatives and financial instruments but many more 
lawyers in the City. We estimate that something like 200 to 250 foreign law firms are now 
based around the City. You might wonder what they are doing [laughter]. There is a huge 
increase in arbitration and dispute resolution in that sector, but possibly fewer in the 
traditional banking area. The financial and professional services together are back up to the 
levels they were at, and that is not bad, of course. It is largely international business that they 
are doing rather than domestic business.  
When it comes to rebalancing, as the Prime Minister said today, we would like to see a 
north-south rebalancing as much as a financial services rebalancing. Are we taking people 
into financial services who could arguably have gone into engineering instead? I am not sure I 
see that. 
The Chairman: I have forgotten the number of Lord Mayor that you are.  
Roger Gifford: The 685th.   
The Chairman: For most of that time, London has been the magnet—the centre—of this 
kingdom, so when we talk about the north-south divide, are we really trying to defy the 
natural tendency for there to be one great wen, one great attractive centre, which London is 
and always has been, and probably always will be? 
Roger Gifford: In this day and age of better communication, videolinking and the like, we 
absolutely believe that Scottish financial services, law in Leeds, maritime in Liverpool, 
whatever it might be, have been very useful to London as adjunct services, to the extent that 
the Bank of New York Mellon, State Street and Citi all have major operations in southern 
Scotland. They are efficient, but they have also developed their own expertise and they have 
really good people coming out of Scottish universities and working for them there. That is a 
strong part of the City financial message. We would like to see more firms nearshoring, 
onshoring, with operations outside London. London is an expensive place to be, and if you 
are a major bank you might want to save costs today. JP Morgan is the largest non-
government employer in Dorset. It has a fantastic operation down there, with good, 
dedicated and loyal people who love JP Morgan, and we would like to see more of those 
around the country. Cardiff has done pretty well, Leeds is doing okay, Liverpool has been 
Roger Gifford, Lord of Mayor London – Oral evidence (QQ 236-245) 
411 
 
promoting itself tremendously, and Scottish financial services are great, they really are. They 
are thriving.  
Q240   The Chairman: I have one more question. Would anyone else on the Committee 
like to come in? Just looking ahead a little, we say that we have all this wonderful soft power 
in Britain and that we can deploy it successfully, and therefore that we may be a little 
complacent. Our feeling on the Committee is that there is a danger there that we want to 
point to and we want to see what things the Government should be doing to make sure that 
that danger is headed off and that we strengthen our position rather than weaken it. Do you 
have a little shopping list of things that you would like the Government to be doing that they 
are not doing? 
Roger Gifford: I would love to see ETQ—education, training and qualifications—given more 
prominence, as well as more business visas and getting people in more or facilitating that. 
We have a great brand-building ability through training people at our universities, and all 
around the world somebody is terribly proud to have been to a business school in 
Manchester or a university at Salford or wherever. British education is valued very highly. If 
we could promote more of that and get more people coming over, that would be a really 
good thing to do.  
Equally, we have in this country some of the best cultural and arts institutions in the world 
and at a higher concentration than Germany, France or America. If we could bring more 
international people in to give performances and be given training, that would be fantastic. 
We have started a new charity this year called the City Music Foundation, which is exactly 
for bringing people from overseas into London to train them and then send them home 
again, giving them performance opportunities in the UK. That kind of initiative will, I hope, 
lead to greater international through-put and more influence of our institutions around the 
world. 
I would love to see more people coming in, and I would love to see more training, more 
qualifications assistance and more school places made available. Education is very very 
powerful. This is always given as the example, but the King of Bahrain or the Emirate of 
Kuwait went to Sandhurst. It has lived with them for the rest of their lives, and it is 
tremendously useful for defence contracts later down the line, if I am allowed to say that. 
These are very useful contacts. 
Q241   Baroness Morris of Bolton: I have to declare an interest. I have just been to 
Jordan with the mayor, where I saw at first hand the very great soft power of the institution 
of the lord mayor. Can I just say that I agree with you entirely on education? The very first 
time I went to Kuwait I kept meeting people who said that they loved Dundee. I could not 
understand why they loved Dundee, not that there is anything wrong with Dundee, of 
course. It was just that they had all been to university in Dundee, and of course when they 
started to have their own companies they started to trade with Dundee and had a wonderful 
time. 
Roger Gifford: Dundee, by the way, has a fantastic new waterfront development plan, if you 
have not seen it. That soft power investment will be enormously valuable to that part of 
Scotland. It will be really powerful. 
Baroness Morris of Bolton: You just mentioned the British Council and that you would 
like to see it doing more. In our previous sessions, people talked about UKTI and that 
perhaps it concentrated too much on large companies and not enough on SMEs. Probably 
more than any other witness we are going to have in front of us, in your year as Lord 
Mayor—I do not know how many countries you have been to—you will have seen at first 
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hand the workings of the British Council and UKTI, and I wonder what your general overall 
feel is of whether we have the support that we need. Could we perhaps arrange it in a 
different way? 
Roger Gifford: I have been to about 30 countries this year, of which maybe 20-ish are 
emerging markets as opposed to 10 being European or Japan/Korea. The British Council and 
UKTI are very separate entities. I will take the second one first. UKTI is doing a fantastic job 
in many countries. In Lagos, Istanbul, Colombia and Mexico, for instance it was absolutely 
first class. The determination to find deals, to do them, to communicate, to connect, to push 
people has been really impressive. In one or two other countries, it has been less impressive. 
I would say that it is occasionally patchy, but on the whole it is a million times better than I 
remember it 15 years ago when I lived in Japan and was travelling around a bit then. I really 
think that government Ministers engaged in travelling, beating it (UKTI efforts) up wherever 
it goes and saying, “Come on”, have really motivated a new UKTI, and I think it is doing 
really well. It could be better in some areas, yes, but on the whole it is doing really well. 
The British Council, I feel, is just rediscovering itself a little. It is rolling out a new agenda, a 
new strategy, which is centred around English language teaching and then moving into other 
areas. I would love to see all grist to its mill. It was stronger perhaps, but now it is coming 
back, following the new Foreign Office approach overseas—becoming more engaged. I 
would love to see the British Council used more. In some areas, such as Nigeria, it is one of 
the primary educators of the English language. It would be great to see that everywhere. 
Q242   Lord Janvrin: It is perhaps slightly unfair to ask you this, given that your focus is on 
financial services, but we have heard endlessly that we have great soft power assets—better 
than the Germans et cetera—yet we still struggle to be the competitive exporting nation 
that we aspire to be. I know that the financial services are in a slightly different box here, but 
you have been saying how useful the soft power assets—the BBC, the English language, the 
British Council, culture et cetera—are. Why, then, do we still struggle to be really 
competitive in the world? 
Roger Gifford: I completely agree with you. The financial services are in a different category. 
We have the Prudential, Standard Chartered and HSBC all over the world. We have an 
English-based law firm in every city around the world—everywhere they can be. They can 
do better, they can do more, but on the whole they know what the market is and they are 
doing pretty well. When it comes to the trade side, we have also had the comment 
everywhere that British companies could do more and that there could be more of them. 
There are always one or two large ones. There is always Arup, Balfour Beatty, maybe Atkins 
and one or two others, but we have 10, 15 or 20 companies that do a lot of activity, 
whereas the Germans have 50 companies do a lot of activity. I think the answer is that we 
just keep beating on their doors and persuading and encouraging them to go abroad and do 
more. That, in combination with the soft power asset of people liking the UK, should be 
more powerful. I do think that we are already seeing a change and that it is different from 
even four or five years ago. There is a focus on this area and getting companies out more, 
UKTI is more focused on what it is doing, and I think that we will look back on a better 
export performance and see the results of the investments that are being made. But it is 
frustratingly slow.  
The second point I would make is that I do not think that the export figures always show the 
full picture. Jardines and Swire, for instance, are all over the Far East and are doing very 
successful business in Indonesia, Malaysia, Hong Kong, Vietnam and Taiwan. You do not see 
that in the export figures. It is not there, because they are not directly part of a UK export. 
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We should not discount the effect that many old fashioned trading companies have. It is 
probably not a major factor in the overall scheme, but it is definitely there.  
I am not sure I fully answered your question about why, with all the soft power that we 
have, we are not more competitive. 
Lord Janvrin: I do not know what the answer is. I am not sure there is an easy answer. I 
just wondered, looking from your unique perspective and having travelled a lot and seen the 
use of soft power, why we still struggle to complete with the Germans, who allegedly do not 
have the soft power assets that we have. 
Roger Gifford: Or indeed some of the Koreans. We really have to get better at it. There is 
no other answer. Have we been lazy? Have we been slow? Have we been reactive rather 
than proactive? All those are true. 
Q243   Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: I think the Lord Mayor’s comments on Dundee are 
very interesting and something that we should follow up. The waterfront has changed 
dramatically. The games industry is now centred in Dundee. “Grand Theft Auto”, which is 
taking the whole world by storm, comes from Dundee, and Abertay University is a world-
class university, as well as Dundee and St Andrews, of course. Dundee has also been put 
forward to be the City of Culture. I think there is a lag in perception; people still think of 
what it was like 10 or 20 years ago. But I want to ask you something completely different. 
Could we learn anything from Sweden? 
Roger Gifford: Yes, I think we can. I think we have learnt quite a bit from Sweden. The 
“Northern Forum” that has been established (by the Prime Minister) in the last few years 
has been really productive and really interesting. It is nice to look at a successful socialist-
capitalist country and ask whether we could be more like them. They have developed this 
over decades and have very specific reasons for the way they are, but there are aspects to 
look at, prisons for instance.  
Sweden has a very low prison population, because offenders are put back out into the 
communities. That is really interesting. Could we not emulate that more? 
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: But in terms of soft power? 
Roger Gifford: In soft power we beat them hands down, but they have some tremendous 
assets: health, the cleanliness of the country, clean tech. If you want an environmentally 
correct energy company, you can find it in Sweden. That might not be completely true, but 
that is what I would say.  
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: And IKEA. 
Roger Gifford: And IKEA, and Ericsson, and Volvo—“the safest car in the world”.  
The Chairman: Do you feel that the financial services part of the City is sufficiently geared 
up to conquer new pastures? Government leaders are talking about Islamic finance and 
Sharia procedures for governing finance. Our Chancellor is talking about making London the 
offshore centre for the development of the renminbi, as it gradually becomes an 
international currency. These are huge further areas to conquer. Do you feel that we are 
equipped to do that? 
Roger Gifford: Yes I do, absolutely. London does half the world’s global foreign exchange, 
so it is the perfect place to do RMB, and Luxembourg will not hold a candle to that.   
On Islamic finance, we have a very good opportunity as a country that can draw together 
the best practice from the Gulf states and from Malaysia and Indonesia to try to make an 
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international model on it. The problem with a lot of the Islamic finance in the Gulf states, 
and in Turkey and Egypt, which do quite a lot of it too, is that there is a lot of argument 
about what is exactly the right kind of law, what is Sharia law and what is not, which Malaysia 
does not have; Malaysia has a single Sharia board for the whole country. Between us and 
Malaysia, we can bring a standard and a way of doing Islamic finance that is acceptable to 
everybody and that could become a gold standard of how to do it. There is an opportunity 
there. It is still a very small part of the market. We are very hopeful and very optimistic, and 
it could grow significantly, but today it is still small, so we want to encourage it and see it 
grow. Let us watch that space.  
What for me is very attractive about Islamic finance is the discussion about healthy 
capitalism and moral banking. There is a lot in Islamic finance that is about participation, 
sharing profits and sharing risks, even if in practice it comes over a bit more like 
conventional banking actually. I said this to one Islamic banker recently, and he said, “It is just 
like conventional banking really”. But the discussion around it is very good. You discuss 
participation with your client, which is good and right and is one of the most attractive parts 
of it. Certainly if you speak to somebody who does Islamic banking, they are passionate 
about their relationship with the customer, and that has to be a good thing. I think we can 
learn from that. 
Q244  Baroness Armstrong of Hill Top: That brings me to my anxiety about the 
influence of the City. How can I put this? I am not against a successful banking industry. 
However, following the crash and what went on then, the City of London has a bit of 
catching up to do. I do a lot in the voluntary sector. I remember that one of the leaders of 
one of the collective voluntary organisations suggested, when there was all the row about 
bonuses, that maybe the bankers would do a little bit better if they gave some of their 
bonuses to—I do not know—the homeless. I cannot remember the exact proposal. They 
got the most vitriolic series of telephone calls and e-mails, which were abusive, quite 
honestly. You just sort of wondered where this culture had got to. Soft power depends on 
relationships at the end of the day and the nature of the relationships that you build. How 
do you find that, and how do you see people in the financial services industry tackling that? I 
like what you say about Islamic banking. I have some very good friends from Mombasa who 
talk to me about this a lot and how much our financial services would have benefited if they 
had had some of the humility that you have to have if you are going to say, “A tenth of my 
income has to go to the poor”, or whatever. That is what a good Islamic household would 
say. 
Roger Gifford: They do say that. They do not pay income tax. Taxes versus philanthropy is 
one of the major discussions of the past year. It is a really interesting relationship. Warren 
Buffett famously pays 18% income tax and he thought that he ought to pay 20% like his 
secretary—it was a few extra hundred million. You think, “Well, okay, if I was paying 18% 
income tax, I might have a different approach, too”. Leaving that aside, I completely agree 
with you about humility, about tackling the culture and about the need to reconnect with 
clients. The City is serving; it is not an end in itself. Adair Turner was right when he talked 
about socially useless instruments that were there for their own sake because they were 
theoretically and mathematically possible rather than being useful to the client. I completely 
agree. I am really sorry to hear about whoever it was who gave the charity an earful about 
bonuses. The response of the City has been completely to restructure the remuneration 
side, to the extent that it goes into future shares in the business and not just towards cash. I 
must say that I am hugely impressed by the number of banks and companies that come along 
the whole time and say, “This is what we’re doing in charity. This is the volunteering we’re 
doing”, and they put on a bit of paper the amount of things that they are doing for charity. 
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Now, does that represent a culture change in itself? No, it does not, but the more language 
we have around this, the more we can show the changes that have happened. There have 
been changes in management, in governance, and in capital and liquidity structures. There 
have been huge changes in remuneration structure which we think are producing a change in 
culture, too. 
Baroness Armstrong of Hill Top: Because that is what in the end will help your soft 
power. 
Roger Gifford: Yes, I agree. Soft power is about relationships and trust. If you lose trust, 
you lose a relationship and you lose the soft power. 
The Chairman: Do you think, Lord Mayor, that the Commonwealth and our membership 
of it have any additional contribution to make in this whole field? 
Roger Gifford: Yes, I do. I have been to four or five Commonwealth countries this year. I 
know that my predecessors went to six countries last year, and about six or seven the year 
before. The affinity that they feel with Britain is clearly a good thing. I think we could do 
more to focus on a Commonwealth trading, sales and export strategy. We have discussed it 
with the Commonwealth organisation and we always try to include a number of 
Commonwealth countries wherever we go. Nigeria and Ghana are good examples—I have 
been to Malaysia this year. There is always that feeling of inclusion and a willingness to do 
business. We could do more. 
The Chairman: You particularly mentioned trust, which is obviously a quality. 
Q245   Baroness Hussein-Ece: I would like to ask the Lord Mayor a slightly different 
question, although I was fascinated listening to the previous discussion. Do you think the 
financial institutions, or these very powerful people in the City, do enough to give back? The 
United States has a great tradition of philanthropy in the arts, of sponsorship and of giving 
the arts more of an opportunity. The arts in this country are huge. We have already heard 
about the artists, musicians, writers and screenwriters. We export a lot of that around the 
world hugely. We are a centre, a real hub, for that. Do you think that the financial services 
could do more to support that as a way of promoting soft power? 
Roger Gifford: Yes. They can always do more. It is very hard to sit as a judge in a moral 
sense of whether somebody gives enough. I do not think that that was the meaning of your 
question, but I think that it is very hard for anyone in the City of London Corporation to say 
whether you should be giving more. We can try to present the opportunities for giving and 
make it as attractive as possible to do so. In that respect, Americans are often held up as the 
pinnacle of giving. They pay much lower tax rates and have much better tax incentives to 
give, particularly in inheritance taxes. One should not look at this just in money terms, but 
there is that angle that makes it attractive to give. I find JustGiving a fantastic incentive to 
give. We can develop more ways of giving like that which will be helpful to people. Do the 
wealthy in our society give enough? Certainly, the figures suggest that arts organisations rely 
hugely on many people, banks and organisations in the City for their funding. We are very 
actively trying to encourage more. We have the Heart of the City organisation, we have the 
City philanthropy trust, we have had philanthropy seminars all year encouraging people to 
do more—crowdfunding, crowdgiving. I do not think that we are in a bad place. I think we 
can hit ourselves over the back too much on this. We are not in a terrible place, but of 
course we will try to do more. It is part of the changing culture that we want to see people 
being demonstrably involved in charity work. 
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The Chairman: Lord Mayor, we have been put in a bad place as a Committee because 
under the law of Sod there is a Division, which means that we have to end the hearing. I 
know that you have to go at 5.45 anyway. By the time we got back, it would be past your 
time here and we have placed great demands on you. We have had 40 minutes of your 
extremely illuminating comments. I personally would like to say that it seems to me that, as 
Lord Mayor, you have presided over a year of staggering improvement in your area where 
there have been many tribulations in the past. I suspect that you have played a key part in 
that, so we should congratulate you. We note that in a few days you will be passing the 
baton to the second lady Lord Mayor, I think, in history. We would like to wish you well. 
We apologise for a slightly curtailed meeting but we have to go and vote, and you have to go 
to other business. 
Roger Gifford: If I may, we have some material to send in which might illuminate some of 
the points more. 
The Chairman: That would be very helpful. 
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Roger Gifford, Lord Mayor of London – Supplementary written 
evidence 
 
I was grateful for the opportunity to provide evidence to your Committee on Soft Power 
and the UK’s influence so near to the conclusion of my term of office. 
 
The Division Bell curtailed the opportunity to complete our session but perhaps I might take 
this opportunity to make a few supplementary observations based on my experience of the 
last twelve months – which I think reflect the views of successive Lord Mayors, and I know 
are shared by my successor Fiona Woolf who begins her year as Lord Mayor on Friday.   
 
The Mayoralty 
 
The office of Lord Mayor is a prime example of the value and the virtues of soft power.  I 
stand in a line stretching back to 1189.  It is, now, an office with little formal executive 
power: we do not make policy decisions in the way ministers or business leaders do.  But 
the antiquity of the office, worn lightly, lends it an authority and an authenticity that 
relatively few other institutions can match.  It is also politically neutral – and works 
impartially and constructively with Governments whatever their party affiliations.   
 
That authority, authenticity and neutrality is I believe best deployed by using the convening 
power of the office to bring together a wide range of people and institutions, and to act as a 
focus for an equally wide range of activities - whether that is through the City’s networks of 
philanthropic activity and charity (livery companies and reserve forces associations in 
particular) or, increasingly, as a spokesman for the financial and business City.   
 
In this respect I believe that the office of the Lord Mayor is a powerful lever of soft power. 
The concept of the City encompasses not only the cluster of financial services based in the 
City of London, but also the whole range of assets based there, especially our heritage and 
our arts cluster centred around the Barbican.   
 
The City Brand 
 
And beyond that geography, the Lord Mayor as leader of the City speaks for the whole of 
the UK’s financial and professional services industry – one that is internationally owned and 
staffed, employs almost two million people and creates a tenth of our GDP.  The idea of 
“The City” is therefore a global brand – an asset for Britain and, dare I say it, Europe.  
 
The Lord Mayor promotes this City brand through advocacy at home, but also abroad - 
where each Lord Mayor spends around a quarter of their year in office batting for the City 
and for the UK in established markets and, increasingly, in the emerging markets of Africa, 
South America  and the Far East.  I attach a list of the visits undertaken in recent years, and 
those currently planned for next year.   
 
Overseas Visits 
 
This programme of overseas visits, on which the Lord Mayor usually works closely with an 
accompanying business delegation, is exactly about soft power.  My own experience is that 
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the Lord Mayor has a unique ability to open doors, to say things which perhaps a 
Government minister might not wish to say, and to spread the influence of Britain and our 
services industry.  This focal point for the interests of the UK’s financial and professional 
services sector is something that other financial centres do not have – but which many 
would love to emulate. 
 
It is difficult to estimate the exact outcomes of this work in terms of contracts won, and 
jobs and growth created but it can be noted that, as a percentage of GDP, financial and 
professional services have doubled in the last decade to some 15%  The significant benefits 
are also in the areas of your Committee’s inquiry: of influence, of long term relationships 
established and nurtured, of new relationships opened up, of British expertise showcased – 
the framework or background in which British business can go out and sell itself.   
 
Specific examples include:   
 
• leading and convening work with developing financial centres in building up their 
capacity in providing financial services, most notably in Moscow and Istanbul.  
This work is done ‘for free’ but is already leading to contracts for UK firms. 
 
• heading up the City of London Advisory Councils for China and India;  
 
• the City’s highly successful initiative in developing its own capacity as a centre for 
RMB trading;  
 
• promoting London as a hub for social investment – leading to the City’s own 
social investment fund and working closely with the City’s Policy Chairman in 
getting the tax, regulatory and legal framework for financial services right; 
 
• working closely with TheCityUK – as President of its Advisory Council, but also 
in promoting the City as a financial centre; 
 
• the whole panoply of the City’s charitable and philanthropic activities –over 100 
livery companies, the City churches and many other charities, not least the City’s 
own charity, the City Bridge Trust, which has just launched a new programme – 
“Investing in Londoners”, and makes grants of around £15 million each year;  
 
• encouraging City businesses to support the Armed Forces and the Reserves, an 
increasingly important part of what the City does and which has had particular 
prominence in the last year. 
 
UK Institutions 
 
The City of London works very closely with institutions such as UKTI and the British 
Council which, as I said, do an excellent job in opening doors for British business.   We see 
this as being increasingly important in our age of globalisation and instant communication. 
 
On the other hand, I have heard many comments in the course of the last twelve months 
that UK firms are not taking full advantage of the trade opportunities and that they are not 
as active or hungry for business as counterparts from some of our key competitors.  So 
there is much still to do. 
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I would be delighted to supply more information if that would be helpful as I believe that the 
work of your Committee will allow us to build more effectively on the openings that our 
successful deployment of soft power creates. We all look forward to assisting that process. 
 
6 November 2013 
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Professor Marie Gillespie and Dr Alban Webb, Open University – 
Written evidence 
 
The BBC World Service and British Council as Premier UK Soft Power Assets 
 
The focus of this submission is on the BBCWS and BC as premier UK soft power assets. 
This submission is based on research carried out at the Centre for Research on Socio-
Cultural Change (CReSC) at the Open University which is funded by the UK’s Economic and 
Social Research Council (www.cresc.ac.uk). It is written by Prof. Marie Gillespie and Dr. 
Alban Webb. It is our synthesis of the findings, relevant to this call for evidence, of a large-
scale collaborative research project on the BBC World Service conducted over the last 
decade96.  The wider research has involved over a dozen leading scholars, based in the UK 
and internationally, including Dr Ramy Aly, Dr Gerd Baumann, Prof. David Herbert, Dr Hugh 
Mackay, Professor Annabelle Sreberny, Dr Massoumeh Torfeh, Dr Andrew Skuse, Dr Jason 
Toynbee and Prof. Kath Woodward. More recently, Gillespie and Webb’s research  
develops a comparative analysis  of the changing cultural value of the BBC World Service 
(BBCWS) and the British Council (BC) and we include findings where relevant here.  
Page 1-7 summarise the key points of this submission. Pages 8-16 provide more extensive 
responses to those questions most relevant to our research. The endnotes provide details 
of key publications based on our research. The Appendix includes our response to the 
‘Public consultation on BBC Trust governance of BBC World Service, via an operating 
licence’ [not reproduced here] which is relevant to this submission. We also include two 
academic papers for your consideration:f: 
 Gillespie, M. and Webb, A., eds. 2012. Diasporas and Diplomacy: Cosmopolitan Contact Zones 
at the BBC World Service 1932-2012 London: Routledge. pp. 1-21 [not reproduced here] 
Gillespie, M., 2013 ‘BBC Arabic, Social Media and Citizen Production: An Experiment in 
Digital Democracy before the Arab Spring’. Theory, Culture and Society. Vol 29 No 3. pp 92-
131 [not reproduced here] 
 
SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE TO HOUSE OF LORDS SELECT COMMITTEE ON 
SOFT POWER AND THE UK’S INFLUENCE 
 
The meaning and importance of soft power 
• The term soft power is used in a confusing variety of ways and is often accompanied 
by a simplistic transmission model of communication whereby it is wrongly assumed 
that the message intended is the message received.  
• A major problem with the concept is its focus on the projection rather than 
reception of meanings in complex cultural and communication environments. 
• There is an urgent need to reframe and appraise uses of the term soft power and the 
policies and practices based on it and to devise suitable means and methods for 
assessing soft power projects.  
                                            
96  See project website http://www.open.ac.uk/researchprojects/diasporas/. The first research (2007-10) was funded by the 
Uk Arts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC) followed by a second round of AHRC funding for a project on ‘The Art 
of Intercultural Dialogue: Evaluating the Global Conversation at the BBCWS’. 
http://www.open.ac.uk/researchprojects/diasporas/news/public-policy-fellowship-at-the-bbc-world-service 
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• An overly instrumental view which views culture simply as a tool carries risks. Unless 
there is a genuine cultural experience and engagement, soft power projects are 
doomed to fail. 
• Influence is built up over time, via institutions like BBCWS Service and the BC and 
the trust and empathy that they create, channel and reproduce as a by-product of 
their essential work.   
• When soft power becomes the objective in its own right, it is liable to struggle or fail.  
• Investment in long term strategic soft power institutions is a much better way of 
maintaining UK influence in the world, especially in a digital age and era of austerity. 
• In this context it becomes imperative to understand how and why the BBCWS and 
BC matter for 21st Century – their role in democratization, development, civil 
society, diplomacy, human rights and security. 
• We are dismayed to find that in the call for evidence, academics are not featured as a 
group from whom the committee ‘is keen to take evidence’.  There is an over-
reliance on market research and concepts drawn from the literature on Public 
Relations in this domain.  
 
How important is a country’s soft power? What is the evidence that soft power 
makes a difference? 
• Our independent research over a decade provides abundant evidence that these 
organisations enable the UK to punch above its weight in the international cultural 
domain – for relatively little economic cost, the cultural and soft power gains are 
outstanding.   
• The trust, respect, empathy and loyalty built up over eight decades by BBCWS is 
now gravely endangered following devastating funding cuts following the 
Comprehensive Spending Review of 2010), that continue to have convulsive effects 
on the BBCWS and have all but eliminated its cultural programming.   
• Funding cuts reflect the present government’s lack of understanding of the historical 
and contemporary role that these organisations have played as the UK’s pre-eminent 
agencies of soft power. It is our hope that Lords Committee can exert some 
influence to redress this. 
• Awareness of the value of the BBCWS falls below the radar of the vast majority of 
British public and the risk is that when it comes under the licence fee, it will become 
even more vulnerable and exposed. 
• How these major shifts in finance and governance, technology and editorial focus play 
out will matter greatly for how Britain is perceived around the world and for its 
ability to influence by attraction – its exercise of ‘soft power’.  
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• We urge the House of Lords Committee to pay keen attention to these 
developments and we include with this document, our response to the Public 
Consultation on BBC Trust governance of BBC World Service, via an operating 
licence (see Appendix [not reproduced here]) which argues the case for more 
substantial protection of WS, its staff in the Language Services and its distinctive 
culture of broadcasting. 
• Our independent research makes visible the important  role played by successive 
waves of exiled, refugee, dissident, migrant and transnational intellectuals and writers 
who have helped to establish and renew the BBC’s reputation as one of the world’s 
most credible and trusted international broadcasters. We lose this soft power at our 
peril and once lost it will not be regained in a media saturated world where voices 
struggle to be heard. 
 
In a digitally connected world, is soft power becoming more important? If so, 
why, and will this trend continue? 
• BBC World Service and the British Council are becoming digital organisations and 
there is therefore an urgent need to re-think and re-formulate ways of working with 
overseas publics and the work of international cultural relations.  
• The key task is to devise appropriate new ways of working that build on the 
successes of the past and face to face interactions in order to engage new audiences.  
• Real-time quantitative or ‘big’ data’ on user activities presents real opportunities as 
well as challenges. In order to understand how soft power functions, we need to 
understand the quality of individual cultural experiences and how such experiences 
are valued. 
• But while the technologies may change the essential work of these organisations 
remains the same in communicating credible and independent news and providing 
opportunities for overseas groups to engage in meaningful ways with Britain and the 
world.  
• The ‘global conversations’ around BBCWS news and world events, cultural and 
artistic activities, facilitated by digital media demonstrate a level of trust which will be 
critical for both organisations to harness. However, a lot more investment in creating 
a social media strategy and means of assessment is required.  
• Digital media change the nature of trust in/resulting from cultural organisations as 
they can no longer exercise the same levels of control over narratives or audiences 
in specific geographic territories so we need to understand more about how trust 
and empathy are made, maintained and broken on line. 
• Soft power is more important in a digital age because issues of identity, trust, conflict 
and security take on new dimensions. And digital media have the power to shift the 
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narrative frame of governments and news agencies, to orchestrate mass protests and 
help to depose autocratic leaders.  
• Citizens and publics now expect credible and convincing explanations and 
appropriate evidence form governments and if they don’t get in mainstream media 
they look to social media.  
• Our and other research on social suggests that users are more likely to trust and 
believe their peers rather than politicians or media. 
 
Are the Government doing enough to help the UK maximise the extent of, and 
benefit gained from, its soft power? What more – or less – should the 
Government do to encourage the generation and use of soft power? 
• At a time of austerity it is sometimes difficult to look beyond economic imperatives. 
However, to assess the value of soft power in predominantly economic terms, as the 
British government is prone to do, reveals a deep misunderstanding about the nature, 
impact and efficacy of soft power activities. 
 
Are there spheres of influence in which the Government should do more to 
promote the UK?  
• Higher Education.  Current restrictions on studying in UK HE for overseas students 
are incomprehensible in terms of  UK soft power.   
• Disinvestment in arts education and funding and arts and cultural exchanges - is 
seriously damaging future possibilities for fostering a creative, multilingual Britain that 
is open to the wider world. 
• Cultural and Arts programming at BBCWS is a key area which can promote the UK. 
It is a well- known saying at BBCWS that ‘audiences come for news but stay because 
of the rich mix of drama, sports, music and other genres.’ Funding cuts mean that 
news is the chief focus. Arts, drama and culture are deemed by some as ‘soft news’ 
but without arts and cultural genres the Uk loses vital soft power tools.  
• The cosmopolitan work force, culture and ethos of the BBCWS and BC and the skills 
in translation (linguistic and cultural) of its workforce have much to teach other 
international organisations. This could be further exploited as part of UK soft 
power97. 
 
Can you give examples of where attempts to employ soft power have been 
unsuccessful, for instance because they delivered counter-productive results?  
                                            
97 For the cosmopolitan culture see Tales From Bush House. 2012. Eds. Ismailov, H., Gillespie, M., and Aslanyan, A. London: 
Hertfordshire Press ISBN 978-0-9557549-7-5 http://oro.open.ac.uk/36280/  and Writers at Bush House. Special Issue. 
Guest editor, Gillespie, M. Wasafiri : International Writing No 68 Winter 2011 
Professor Marie Gillespie and Dr Alban Webb, Open University – Written evidence 
424 
 
•  Soft power doesn’t respond to rigid objectives. It works best when institutions do 
what they do well.  
• Soft power is not part of the main objective or purpose of either the WS or the BC. 
It is a long term outcome and capability not short term objective.  
• Soft Power can be used to exert influence and deliver short term advantages in 
tactical ways and can exert the right kind of influence and pressure at critical 
moments and in an appropriate context (London Olympics 2012).  
• In the long term, to maintain their soft power, institutions have to carry out their 
activities in ways that people recognise as credible and valuable over a long period of 
time. 
 
What should the UK be aiming for in five years’ time in its possession and 
deployment of soft power and influence? 
• Long term and stable investment in key agencies of soft power is most important.   
• Investment in the evaluation of soft power and its cultural, diplomatic, and 
technological drivers and impact also needs more investment with a range of 
partners including (not excluding) academics. 
• A sense that UK soft power actors/agencies have an understanding of their 
relationship to each other and more an awareness of their mutual influence. This will 
require strategic oversight. Over the last decade attempts to build this capacity, 
especially in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, have suffered successive funding 
cuts to the detriment of UK public diplomacy. 
 
Soft power and diplomacy: How best should the UK’s foreign policy and 
approach to diplomacy respond to the new global communications environment, 
where social media have rapidly become prominent, where alternative media 
organisations (such as Al Jazeera) have multiplied in power and reach, and 
where the grips of traditional elites on the flows of information in their countries 
have weakened? 
• Communication and information must be credible and consistent. BBCWS has always 
had to face competition from other organisations and respond to new initiatives to 
some extent (satellite broadcasting and now digital media) but to maintain soft power 
the BBCWS must not and does not traduce its long established journalistic ethos by 
mimicking the likes of Al Jazeera in the same way that they didn’t mimic Goebbels.  
• Digital media provide a range of new opportunities. Traditional elites are no longer a 
discrete group. There are many new players and influencers in social networks that 
we need to understand. To do this, however, requires a commitment to investment 
in appropriate evaluative methodologies. Sadly this is not being done.  
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How can the UK promote its values abroad without being accused of cultural 
imperialism, propagandising, or hypocrisy? 
• It is the enactment of these values, for example the UK’s demonstrable commitment 
to freedom of speech, human rights and the rule of law that provide the most 
credible means with which to promote them. Good examples include: fair play during 
the London Olympics, the pedagogic rigour and conduct of British Council exams, or 
the reporting by BBCWS of division in British society on the question of military 
intervention in Syria. These are exemplary of the values the UK wishes to promote 
and which in some cases are embedded in the activities of UK soft power agencies. 
How people relate to, understand, engage with and trust UK soft power actors can 
be as important as the information/news/message they are conveying. How agencies 
of soft power exude and emanate values is the key to understanding how soft power 
works.  
 
Learning from others: Are other countries, or non-state actors, performing 
better than the UK in maximising the extent of, and their benefits from, their 
soft power resources? 
• It depends of the measure of success one chooses. It is clear, however, that others, 
especially the BRIC countries are investing a great deal more money and effort into 
their international media and public diplomacy agencies than the United Kingdom. 
 
Are there any soft power approaches used by other countries that are 
particularly relevant to the UK, with its institutional mix of public sector bodies, 
private sector enterprises, and civil society organisations? 
 
• Investing in arts and cultural programming to sit alongside the provision of news in 
international broadcasting has a long tradition in the BBCWS and delivered important 
soft power dividends in the past. For most of its life the BBCWS broadcast 
translations of great works of literature, show cased new musicians from all over the 
world, introduced overseas audiences to the arts in the UK. It is to the detriment to 
its soft power capability that this has more or less disappeared with arts and culture 
reported only as news with rare exceptions.  
• The provision of educational resources overseas must be a crucial part of the UK’s 
soft power strategy and the restrictions on international students studying in the UK 
should be lifted. 
 
 What is your assessment of the role played by the English language, and English-
language publications, in advancing the UK’s influence abroad, bearing in mind 
that English is the working language of the Commonwealth, which embraces 
roughly a third of the world’s population? What more can be done to leverage 
this? 
• UK Higher Education and the desire to learn the English Language go hand in hand 
and are vital to soft power.  
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• Promoting and teaching the English language is the primary mission of the British 
Council. Their offices and libraries around the world have been one of the most 
visible material markers of Britain abroad. Anything that weakens their ability to fulfil 
this mission depleted UK soft power.  
• The BBCWS is a major tool for promoting the English language alongside the BC. 
Both organisations are looking for new ways of working and partnering and the 
research partnership forged with the Open University - another tool of Uk soft 
power – is but one example of the potential of public/private partnerships to project 
the UK abroad via a judicious combination of culture and education – informing, 
educating and entertaining in the digital sphere. 
 
What is the long term impact of budgetary cuts to publicly funded bodies 
promoting British culture overseas? 
They will either become reliant on other sources of commercial funding which will inevitably 
influence their objectives and may result in conflicts of interest for UK soft power, or cease 
to have influence across a broad spectrum of activities and lack capacity for reach and 
engagement with overseas publics. 
 
EVIDENCE TO HOUSE OF LORDS SELECT COMMITTEE ON SOFT POWER 
AND THE UK’S INFLUENCE 
 
The meaning and importance of soft power 
• What is your understanding of ‘soft power’? What does it mean for the work 
that you do? 
‘Soft power’ is a useful shorthand term, when used in popular and public discourse, to refer 
to the various ways in which nation states deploy a variety resources (including arts, culture, 
education, sports and business) to project a positive national image overseas and 
communicate values which they seek to promote. It involves, in Joseph Nye’s terms, the 
power to influence by attraction – ‘to get what you want’.  
  
Nye appears to conflate the power of nation states and individuals. So while it is a useful 
shorthand term, from an academic perspective, it is a confused and confounding concept.  
Part of the problem is that use of the term soft power is often accompanied by a simplistic 
transmission model of communication – long since dismissed in academic studies of 
international communications.  
 
The assumption is that if policy makers can design the right ‘messaging’ strategy, strategic 
narrative or strategic script then audiences will receive it in a relatively unproblematic 
manner. Often, such narratives concern human rights, better governance, democratic 
principles, civic responsibilities and gender equity. A common assumption is that power lies 
in the hands of the media and the communicator to shape meanings. This ignores 80 years of 
audience research which shows that the messages intended and messages received are not 
equivalent and that the contexts of reception mean that audiences interpret messages and 
reshape meanings in very diverse ways. So a major problem with the concept is its focus on 
projection rather than reception.  
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The uncritical use, overuse and abuse of the term ‘soft power’ have reached new heights in 
recent times. It is used to refer to branding nations and places, marketing for sports events 
and religious groups, and public relations for celebrities, promoting gay rights and gender 
equality. ‘Soft’ is an adjective that is often used as a synonym for culture - soft power as 
opposed to hard, kinetic and military power and, as result of this, it seems always and 
inevitably to be a good thing. But is it? Any term that seems to convey something inevitably 
good is suspect and is doing a good deal of ideological work. Who can argue against using 
soft power instead of hard power? Even Jospeh Nye recognises some of the inherent 
problems with the term and has started using the term ‘smart power’ to overcome these 
difficulties and to argue the case for a strategic combination of soft and hard power. This not 
only  seems to be a rather simplistic way of communicating life and death issues but also the 
conceptual boundaries between soft power and public diplomacy and cultural diplomacy and 
soft power are unclear and this causes further confusion. 
 
Nevertheless academics, like Prof John Holden in a recent report for the British Council, 
deploy the term to argue that the UK risks losing out in the game of ‘influence and 
attraction’ and what he refers to as ‘the race to soft power in the 21st century.’98 This is an 
important report but it begs a number of questions about the kinds of data that are 
mobilised to evidence the success of soft power projects. There is a need for fresh thinking 
about new ways of working in the field of international cultural relations in a digital age. Not 
enough emphasis has been given to evaluating soft power projects and the best means and 
methods for doing so. And evaluation becomes even more important in a digital age of 
interactive and dialogic media which are transforming our ways of communicating. New 
forms of evidence, including ‘big data’ are being integrated into institutional processes of 
accountability, governance, strategy and development. 
 
Like it or not, soft power is a term with which we have to contend as actions and resources 
are deployed to increase and enhance it in our name. Politicians, policy-makers, academics 
and citizens alike need to understand the ideological work that the term and associated 
activities are doing in different zones of political and cultural activity. We also need to 
develop new ways of assessing the value of soft power initiatives in a digital world.  
At the Centre for Research on Socio-Cultural Change at The Open University, we are 
drawing on the findings of nearly a decade of research that we have conducted, from a multi-
disciplinary perspective – Social Sciences, Arts and Humanities) on the BBC World Service, 
as well as more recent work the British Council (see endnote 1).  
 
As two of the UK’s foremost ‘soft power’ international organisations, our current research 
investigates how influence, attraction and soft power are assessed and measured by these 
organisations and the UK government, the methods used and how various kinds of data are 
used to evince success or failure.  This is critical because both governments and mass media 
tend to understand and construct culture(s) in a colloquial sense, as a set of short-hand de-
contextualised traits, behaviours or attitudes that can ultimately be shifted. Such concerns 
open spaces for thinking about the cultural nuances that specific organisations such as the 
BBC World Service and British Council bring to the soft power agenda. 
 
This is part of a wider research project funded by the Arts and Humanities Research Council 
on Cultural Value.99 Its central goal is to rebalance our understanding of both the 
                                            
98 http://www.britishcouncil.org/press/changing-soft-power-report 
99 http://www.ahrc.ac.uk/Funded-Research/Funded-themes-and-programmes/Cultural-Value-Project/Pages/News.aspx 
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instrumental and intrinsic value of cultural organisations and their activities – the pendulum 
has swung too far towards government seeing culture in purely instrumental terms – and 
this is a risk that overuse of the term soft power. Our research shows that unless there is a 
genuine cultural experience, soft power projects are doomed to fail.  
 
We are interested in what culture can do for government but we argue that we must not 
lose sight of the actual experiences of culture (whether a film, a play or a news bulletin) in 
which meanings are made and remade, contested and rejected. Influence is built up over 
time, via institutions like BBCWS and BC and the trust and empathy that they create, 
channel and reproduce as a by-product of their essential work.  When soft power becomes 
the objective in its own right it is liable to struggle or fail. Investment in long term strategic 
soft power institutions is a much better way of maintaining UK influence in the world, 
especially in an era of austerity.  
 
This task of assessing the changing cultural value of the BBC World Service and the British 
Council becomes even more urgent as these organisations are facing a critical turning point 
in their 80 years’ history. These organisations and their activities are experiencing a sea 
change in funding, governance and technological innovation and this is reshaping how they 
operate in the international sphere as instruments of British Soft Power. As they become 
digital organisations, and as big data sets become available that make it possible to analyse 
the nature, scope, scale and quality of interactions between these organisations and their 
users and audiences, they can become more transparent and accountable. New data sets 
allow us to analyse information flows, the global communication networks in which users are 
embedded and the new kinds of influence and influencers at play in the new media landscape. 
In this context, it becomes imperative to understand how and why the BBCWS and BC 
matter for 21st Century – their role in democratization, development, civil society, 
diplomacy, human rights and security.  
 
The work of this committee is therefore of great interest to us as CRESC researchers. But 
we are dismayed to find that in the call for evidence, academics are note featured as a group 
from whom the committee ‘is keen to take evidence’. Why is this so? 
 
• How important is a country’s soft power? What is the evidence that soft power 
makes a difference? 
 
Our research has brought together international scholars and CRESC researchers to work 
collaboratively to examine and evidence diverse aspects of the BBCWS, for example, the 
evolution of World Music100, global sports101 and drama102 as well as a range of more 
conceptually focussed themes including diaspora nationalism103, religious fundamentalisms 
and trans-nationalism in online environments104, and the politics of translation105. We provide 
empirical case studies on a wide range of issues : from changing audience configurations  for 
BBWS from the 1930s onwards through to World War Two political satire and the 
problems of reporting Jewish persecution, to the historical role of the BBC and UK 
diplomatic relations in South Asia, the Middle East and Iran (see endnote 10). Much of our  
                                            
100 See: Toynbee, J. and Dueck, B., eds. 2011. Migrating Music London:Routledge 
101 See: http://www.open.ac.uk/researchprojects/diasporas/core-research/sports-across-diasporas 
102 See: http://www.open.ac.uk/researchprojects/diasporas/core-research/drama-for-development 
103 See: http://www.open.ac.uk/researchprojects/diasporas/core-research/diasporic-nationhood 
104 See: http://www.open.ac.uk/researchprojects/diasporas/core-research/religious-transnationalism 
105 See: http://www.open.ac.uk/researchprojects/diasporas/core-research/politics-of-translation 
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recent work has focussed on the way new interactive online media are transforming 
audiences, creating ‘digital diasporas’, and challenging established journalistic principles. All 
this research provides solid evidence that the soft power created and channelled by the 
BBCWS makes a huge difference for how the Uk is viewed, the values it seeks to promote 
and the trust and empathy the enjoys and imparts.  
 
Putting aside the conceptual difficulties with the term soft power itself, we argue that the 
work of the BBCWS and BC have been absolutely vital to UK soft power – to how the UK 
is seen abroad, the level of trust it enjoys and the attractions, for example, of the UK’s 
Higher Education, tourism and doing business in and with UK.  We also argue that the trust 
and respect for, empathy and loyalty to the UK built up over eight decades is now gravely 
endangered by the present government’s lack of understanding of the historical and 
contemporary role that these organisations have played as agencies of soft power. 
 
The BBC World Service, often referred to as the ‘voice of Britain abroad’, is very well 
known to over 192 million people around the globe who regularly tune in or log on to one 
of its 27 language services (plus English). But awareness and knowledge of BBCWS (as well 
as the British Council) fall below the radar of the British public, with the exception of 
intrepid travellers, digital natives, and insomniacs who listen to BBC Radio 4 in the darkest 
hours of the night when World Service programmes are broadcast. This is a shame because 
from April 2014, British citizens will pay for its services.  
 
Ongoing major changes in its governance, funding, and place in within the internal 
organisation of the BBC (it has been absorbed by BBC Global News, itself a division of the 
BBC News Group) pose significant threats to the distinctive voice, international perspective 
and unique cosmopolitan culture that makes BBCWS so successful. They also offer 
opportunities to deliver a more integrated news service with a stronger international 
perspective in domestic output utilising the skills and capacities of multi-lingual and 
cosmopolitan staff. How these shifts play out will matter greatly for how Britain is perceived 
around the world and for its ability to influence by attraction – its exercise of ‘soft power’. 
We urge the House of Lords Committee to pay keen attention to these developments and 
we include with this document, our response to the Public Consultation on BBC Trust 
governance of BBC World Service, via an operating licence (see Appendix [not reproduced 
here]). 
 
It seems to us deeply ironic that, at a time when rising powers of BRIC countries are 
investing in international broadcasting and public diplomacy initiatives to project their 
strategic narratives onto a world stage, Britain is disinvesting in its best soft power tools – 
the BBCWS and the BC. It could be argued that international broadcasters like BBC World 
Service, Deutsch Welle and France 24 are remnants of a bygone era – colonial relics and 
Cold War propaganda tools that have no place in a media-saturated, multi-polar world. But 
that would be to ignore a rich history of cultural encounters and translation activities that 
enabled the BBC to forge its own a unique brand of cosmopolitanism that sits very well 
alongside a benign patriotism – building trust and empathy for the UK among audiences.  
What is often forgotten in political debates is that for the last 80 years, the World Service 
derived much of its intellectual, creative and diplomatic significance from the diasporic 
broadcasters who have been at the heart of the BBC's foreign language service.  Refugee 
intellectuals, dissident poets and migrant artists have provided the essential skills and 
creative energies that power the BBC’s international operations. Yet, they have remained 
largely absent from the public understanding of the World Service.  Yet their diasporic 
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voices and the intimacy they create with audiences in imparting trusted information and 
news is critical to the WS’s soft power. 
 
We provide copious and ample evidence for these arguments in our book Diasporas and 
Diplomacy: Cosmopolitan Contact Zones at the BBC World Service 1932-2012 (introduction 
provided as Word document). This book, based on a decade of research, makes visible the 
role played by successive waves of exiled, refugee, dissident and migrant intellectuals and 
writers who have helped to establish and renew the BBC’s reputation as one of the world’s 
most credible and trusted international broadcasters. We lose this soft power at our peril 
and once lost it will not be regained in a media saturated world where voices struggle to be 
heard. And the independent academic assessment and current evidence that we have at our 
disposal, despite positive reports from the WS, suggest that the WS is bleeding audiences in 
key markets and as a result losing trust and empathy that has a long and rich legacy.  
 
Devastating funding cuts will impact over time but it will be too late then to restore lost 
trust. And even in flagship foreign language services like BBC Arabic, there is not adequate 
staff and resources (especially social media resources) to run an operation that can compete 
effectively in Middle East media markets. And yet for a relatively small sum of money, the 
WS delivers vital and enduring soft power benefits for the United Kingdom.  
 
• In a digitally connected world, is soft power becoming more important? If so, 
why, and will this trend continue? 
Both the BBC World Service and the British Council are investing digitally with the aim of 
engaging new audiences. For the World Service, the internet is as important as radio or 
television in key markets, and their purpose is to curate online audiences in a ‘global 
conversation’. The British Council increasingly uses the internet to share the UK’s ‘great 
cultural assets’ and so ‘build trust’ worldwide.  
 
Real-time quantitative or ‘big’ data’ on user activities present real opportunities as well as 
challenges in understanding how soft power functions in relation to the quality of individual 
cultural experiences and how such experiences are valued. But while the technologies may 
change the essential work of these organisations remains the same in communicating 
credible and independent news and providing opportunities for overseas groups to engage in 
meaningful ways with Britain and the world. Nevertheless, we will need to develop new 
methodological approaches to how trust and empathy are built online – such as the 
innovative and interdisciplinary evaluative research being conducted at the Open University 
in CReSC. 
 
Understanding the changing cultural value of the WS and BC through the lens of digital 
interactions is valuable because they can be tracked and analysed, offering unprecedented 
insights into users’ cultural experiences. Our research suggests that s ‘global conversations’ 
about news and world events facilitated by digital media demonstrate a level of trust which 
will be critical for both organisations to harness. However, a lot more investment in creating 
a social media strategy and means of assessment is required106.  
                                            
106  See the following special issues of refereed academic journals:  
‘The BBC World Service and the South Asian Diaspora’. Special issue. South Asian Diaspora. 2010. 2/1. Eds. Gillespie, M., 
Pinkerton, A., Baumann, G., and Thiranagama, S. 
The BBC World Service and the Greater Middle East: Comparisons, Contrasts, Conflicts. Special Issue. Middle East Journal 
of Culture and Communication. 2010. 3/2. Special issue: Eds. Sreberny, A., Gillespie, M. and Baumann, G., 
The BBC World Service, 1932-2007: Cultural Exchange and Public Diplomacy. Special Issue. Historical Journal of Film, Radio 
and Television 2008. 28/4. Eds. Gillespie, M., Baumann, G., and Webb, A. 
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Digital media change the nature of trust in/resulting from cultural organisations as they can 
no longer exercise the same levels of control over narratives or audiences in specific 
geographic territories107. Culture and geography are unbound in the digital domain which 
makes communication across cultural boundaries and ‘soft power’ influence more difficult to 
create and assess. New digital projects also involve trade-offs between fundamental 
organisational values. Peer-to-peer communication relies on recommendation, openness, 
transparency and engaging the individual in immersive and atmospheric experiences or as 
current WS editorial strategy puts it, ‘Living the Story’.  Traditional organisational values of 
impartiality, objectivity and distance are being challenged by new media. So this begs the 
question of what constitutes trust and empathy in digital domains? How are trust, empathy 
and intercultural understanding, reflective individuals and active global citizens nurtured via 
digital and social media? These are essential questions for anyone interested in soft power.  
Our current research contributes to understanding and researching cultural value in 
international organisations by combing quantitative and ‘big data’ analyses with culturally 
sensitive qualitative and ethnographic insights, bringing the bird’s eye view into dialogue with 
the snail’s eye perspective or in Weber’s terms, arriving at verstehen (understanding) by 
begreiffen (grasping the bigger picture). We hope to report on this project in March 2014 
just before the BBCWS comes under the licence fee. 
 
The extent and use of the UK’s soft power resources 
• What are the most important soft power assets that the UK possesses? Can we 
put a value on the UK’s soft power resources? 
 
Without doubt the BBC World Service and the British Council are among the most 
important soft power assets of the UK and we can and should put both an economic and a 
cultural value on these organisations – which is precisely what our current research is doing 
(as outlined above). 
 
How we ascribe value to the UK’s soft power resources is problematic, given the diversity 
of audience engagement with the narratives that are promoted. However, Soft power 
approaches are possibly most evident and measurable in the terrain of international 
development, where programs promoting rule of law, transitions to democracy or the 
observance of human rights speak to wider values that are espoused by the UK and are 
vigorously promoted. Often such programs are couched in terms of achieving a measurable 
behaviour change, which in turn is often expressed in terms of positive shifts in knowledge, 
attitudes and practices. Numerous DFID and FCO-funded BBC Media Action 
communication initiatives set clear objectives and define behaviour change targets 
(expressed as a % increase in positive attitudes, etc.) that are measurable. In a very direct 
way, development (though not couched in the language of soft power) provides an avenue 
for gleaning insights into how the value and impacts of soft power may be measurable108.   
• Are the Government doing enough to help the UK maximise the extent of, and 
benefit gained from, its soft power? What more – or less – should the 
Government do to encourage the generation and use of soft power? 
                                            
107 ‘BBC Arabic, Social Media and Citizen Production: An Experiment in Digital Democracy before the Arab Spring’. Theory, 
Culture and Society. Vol. 29. No 3. Gillespie, M. 2013.  
The BBC World Service, Twitter and the London Olympics: The Challenges of Social Media. Gillespie, M., Proctor, R., O 
Loughlin, B., Shreim, N. Aslanyan A., Targhi, M., Aslan, B., Dennis, J and Voss, A. (Available on request from 
marie.gillespie@open.ac.uk) 
108 See our book Drama for Development: Cultural Translation and Social Change. Eds. Skuse, A., Gillespie, M., and Power, G. 
New Delhi: Sage India. 
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At a time of austerity it is sometimes difficult to look beyond economic imperatives. 
However, to assess the value of soft power in predominantly economic terms, as the British 
government is prone to do, reveals a deep misunderstanding about the nature, impact and 
efficacy of soft power activities. There is too much short-term thinking and quick fixes. 
There are too many damaging cuts.  More strategic investment in the BBC World Service 
and British Council – especially in the sphere of arts and culture and in their digital and social 
media activities – is required. As they become digital organisations, BC and BBCWS are 
reconceiving their ways of working with international partners. They can deploy a wide 
range of soft power strategies that balance economic, strategic and cultural value – strategies 
that do not reduce culture to an instrument of policy.  
 
• Are there spheres of influence in which the Government should do more to 
promote the UK? Are there spheres in which the Government should do less? 
UK Higher Education - current restrictions  on overseas students coming to Uk to study 
need urgently to be revised. 
Culture and the Arts –current disinvestment in arts education and funding as well as in the 
kinds of arts and cultural exchanges for which the British Council are well known - is 
seriously damaging the ability to foster a creative cosmopolitan  Britain. Patriotic 
cosmopolitanism was amply demonstrated during the London Olympics 2012 but our 
research suggests that this stance of world openness and benign national pride was short 
lived. Government need to consider the long term effects of disinvestment in the arts and 
cultural sectors and find creative solutions to supporting non-commercial projects if UK soft 
power is to be maintained.    
 
Can you give examples of where attempts to employ soft power have been 
unsuccessful, for instance because they delivered counter-productive results?  
Soft power doesn’t respond to rigid objectives. It works best when institutions do what they 
do well. It is not part of the main objective or purpose of the WS or the BC, it is a long 
term outcome and capability. While Soft Power can be used to exert influence and deliver 
short term advantages at critical moments and in an appropriate context (London Olympics 
2012), in the long run, to maintain their soft power, institutions have to carry out their 
activities in ways that people recognise as credible and valuable over a long period of time. 
  
 
 
What should the UK be aiming for in five years’ time in its possession and 
deployment of soft power and influence? 
Long term and stable investment in key agencies of soft power is most important. 
Investment in the evaluation of soft power and its cultural, diplomatic, and technological 
drivers and impact also needs more investment with a range of partners including academics. 
A sense that UK soft power actors have an understanding of their relationship to each other 
and more awareness of their mutual influence. This will require strategic oversight. Over the 
last decade attempts to build this capacity, especially in the Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office, have suffered successive funding cuts to the detriment of UK public diplomacy. 
 
Soft power and diplomacy 
• How best should the UK’s foreign policy and approach to diplomacy respond to 
the new global communications environment, where social media have rapidly 
become prominent, where alternative media organisations (such as Al Jazeera) 
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have multiplied in power and reach, and where the grips of traditional elites on 
the flows of information in their countries have weakened? 
Communication and information must be credible and consistent. BBCWS has always had to 
face competition from other organisations and respond to new initiatives to some extent 
(satellite broadcasting and now digital media) but to maintain soft power, the BBCWS must 
not and does not traduce its long established journalistic ethos by mimicking the likes of Al 
Jazeera in the same way that they didn’t mimic Goebbels.  
Digital media provide a range of new opportunities. Traditional elites are no longer a 
discrete group. There are many new players and influencers in social networks that we need 
to understand. To do this, however, requires a commitment to investment in appropriate 
evaluative methodologies. Sadly this is not being done. For example, the vastly reduced 
staffing in audience research at the BBCWS is badly hampering its ability to get to grips with 
the new digital opportunities. This is an area that will become increasingly important and one 
where the UK cannot afford to loose traction. If it does the UK’s soft power capability will 
be seriously undermined. 
 
• How can the UK promote its values abroad without being accused of cultural 
imperialism, propagandising, or hypocrisy? 
It is the enactment of these values, for example the UK’s demonstrable commitment to 
freedom of speech, human rights and the rule of law that provide the most credible means 
with which to promote them(e.g. fair play during the London Olympics, the pedagogic rigour 
and conduct of British Council exams, or the balanced reporting by BBCWS of the divisions 
in British society on the question of military intervention in Syria are exemplary of the values 
the UK wishes to promote and which  are embedded in the activities of UK soft power 
agencies. In this context, how people relate to, understand, engage with and trust UK soft 
power actors can be as important as the information/news/message they are conveying. 
How agencies of soft power exude and emanate values provides a  key to understanding 
how soft power works for policy makers. 
 
Learning from others 
• Are other countries, or non-state actors, performing better than the UK in 
maximising the extent of, and their benefits from, their soft power resources? 
Depends of the measure of success one chooses. It is clear, however, that others, especially 
the BRIC countries are investing a great deal more money and effort into their international 
media and public diplomacy agencies than the United Kingdom. 
 
• Are there any soft power approaches used by other countries that are 
particularly relevant to the UK, with its institutional mix of public sector bodies, 
private sector enterprises, and civil society organisations? 
Investing in cultural programming to sit alongside the provision of news in international 
broadcasting has a long tradition in the BBCWS and delivered important soft power 
dividends in the past. For most of its life the BBCWS broadcast translations of great works 
of literature, show cased new musicians from all over the world, introduced overseas 
audiences to the arts in the UK. It is to the detriment to its soft power capability that this 
has more or less disappeared with arts and culture reported only as news with rare 
exceptions. The provision of educational resources overseas must be a crucial part of the 
UK’s soft power strategy and the restrictions on international students studying in the UK 
should be lifted. 
 
Aspects of soft power 
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What is your assessment of the role played by the English language, and English-
language publications, in advancing the UK’s influence abroad, bearing in mind 
that English is the working language of the Commonwealth, which embraces 
roughly a third of the world’s population? What more can be done to leverage 
this? 
UK Higher Education and the desire to learn the English Language go hand in hand and are 
vital to soft power.  
This is the mission of the British Council. Making it more difficult more overseas students to 
come to the UK and study is a major way in which UK soft power is being undermined. 
What is the long term impact of budgetary cuts to publicly funded bodies 
promoting British culture overseas? 
They will either become reliant on other sources of commercial funding which will inevitably 
influence their objectives and may result in conflicts of interest for UK soft power, or cease 
to have influence across a broad spectrum of activities and lack capacity for reach and 
engagement with overseas publics. 
 
September 2013 
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1. SUMMARY 
This is a cross-Whitehall response to the call for evidence from the House of Lords 
Committee on Soft Power and the UK’s influence, coordinated at the request of the 
Committee by the Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO). Contributing departments 
include FCO, Cabinet Office, BIS, UKTI, MoD, DfID and Home Office. The introduction sets 
out how we see UK power as a combination of soft and hard power used by Government 
to influence and attract in support of Britain’s interests. The case studies provide concrete 
evidence of this and reflect the themes and questions raised by the Committee. 
 
2. INTRODUCTION: UK SMART POWER 
 
I want the UK to look out, not in, and that is why for the first time in a decade UK foreign 
policy is on the advance. By 2015 we will have opened up twenty new diplomatic posts 
around the world, employed three hundred extra staff in the fastest growing regions of the 
world. We are having to make cuts in the UK, but this is something we are not cutting, 
we’re expanding. We’re now one of only three European countries to be represented in 
every single country in ASEAN and we have the largest diplomatic network in India of any 
developed nation. We are a global nation with global interests and a global reach, and if you 
think all of this is somehow an unashamed advert for the UK and UK business you’re 
absolutely right. Everything I do is about making sure we’re not just competing in that global 
race, but we’re succeeding in it. 
 
Prime Minister David Cameron’s speech to the World Economic Forum in 
Davos, 24 January 2013  
 
The UK has a wide range of assets that enable us to project influence overseas, often 
drawing on elements of both soft  and hard power, in a ‘smart power’  approach. As Figure 1 
shows, our soft power assets include the English language, heritage and culture – including 
the Monarchy – our science, engineering, technology and financial skills, our creativity and 
innovation, our historic universities, the arts, media and sport, as well as our citizens, our 
institutions, our strong democratic values and the sheer diversity of our society. While the 
Government cannot, and does not seek to, control all of these directly, it can support and 
harness their strengths, for instance through our international scholarships, aid programmes 
or collaboration with public diplomacy partners including the British Council. Our hard 
power includes the ability to impose sanctions or, as a last resort, to take military action.  
 
We don’t see these elements in isolation. The most widely accepted definition of soft power 
– ‘the ability to affect others through the co-optive means of framing the agenda, persuading, 
and elicit positive attraction in order to obtain preferred outcomes ’ – can be read as a neat 
definition of diplomatic activities writ large. But these various soft and hard instruments are 
all part of the UK’s foreign policy ‘toolbox’, to be drawn on as appropriate in the exercise of 
smart power, as illustrated in Figure 2. Our diplomacy needs to encompass the full range of 
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ways in which we can achieve influence in the world, recognising that the most powerful 
multipliers of UK soft power lie outside Government.   
 
The UK is one of the few countries that can turn the dial on some of the greatest 
international challenges of our time. We do this through framing the agenda, building 
partnerships and responding in an agile way to challenges as well as opportunities. Moreover, 
we do so in a way that has real impact: both the Somalia Conferences and the Preventing 
Sexual Violence Initiative have demonstrated our ability to mobilise the international 
community to take action that makes a difference on the ground. The 2012 Olympic and 
Paralympic Games were extraordinarily successful examples of the projection of British soft 
power. 
 
An outward-facing Britain is a safer and more prosperous one.  That is why, for the first 
time in decades, British diplomacy is on the advance. We have now opened or upgraded 13 
posts, increasing our presence in the emerging powers, and strengthened our existing Posts 
in Asia, Latin America and parts of Africa. We remain committed to our longstanding 
networks such as the Commonwealth. It is important that an outward facing UK is 
representative of the whole of the UK. The Government at Westminster co-operates with 
the Devolved Administrations in international activity as well as in the Administrations’ 
pursuit of their international priorities from supporting their international offices to working 
together in the run up to events such as the 2014 Commonwealth Games in Glasgow. 
 
We continue to explore new ways to inform and influence both our traditional partners and 
new audiences including civil society, businesses, pressure groups, UK citizens and diaspora 
communities. Our International Defence Engagement strategy is extending the reach of our 
defence diplomacy and our ability to exercise smart power.  We are ambitious about 
promoting the UK’s Prosperity. The GREAT campaign brings together our strongest soft 
power assets to promote UK trade, tourism inward investment and education.  To date, it 
has generated £500m in economic benefit to the UK. The FCO/BIS Science & Innovation 
Network seeks to maximise the impact of the UK’s strong capability in science and 
innovation. We are also extending our reach through digital diplomacy  and increased 
engagement with diaspora communities.  
 
Internally, we co-ordinate across-Whitehall through collective Government mechanisms 
which enable us to use our assets in an integrated way.  Overseas, our missions are 
responsible for articulating the overarching vision to local audiences. Through the ‘One 
HMG’ agenda, the Government ensures departments across Whitehall are united in their 
aims and activities in the UK and overseas. This unified approach is evident in the range of 
activity related to the Emerging Powers, including: an increase in the number of Chevening 
Scholarships to target countries; the on-going development of English language consortia to 
support British English language providers to win contracts; and a tourism push that will 
enable VisitBritain to increase substantially the number of visitors to the UK by 2020.  
 
Our approach is pragmatic.  The case studies in this paper give a snapshot, rather than an 
exhaustive account, of the extent and use of the UK’s smart power across our network and 
across the world. They demonstrate an agile, innovative approach to projecting Britain which 
celebrates our strengths and our partnerships. There is much to achieve, but we have shown 
time and again that the UK can set priorities, shape principles, lead by example and, most 
importantly, that we have the resources and political will to continue doing so. 
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‘I sometimes urge British diplomats to imagine that we had just woken up today to find our 
country had been planted in the world overnight, and that we’d been given 60 million 
industrious citizens, a language that is spoken throughout the world, a seat on the UN 
Security Council, membership of the European Union, NATO and the Commonwealth, a 
diplomatic network that is the envy of many nations, a nuclear deterrent, some of the finest 
Armed Forces in the world and one of the largest development programmes in the world, all 
of which we have in the United Kingdom. And on top of that, we had all the ingenuity, 
creativity and resilience that is such an ingrained part of our national character. We would 
rejoice in our good fortune, not be filled with gloom that others have strengths as well.’ 
. 
Foreign Secretary William Hague’s speech on rejecting decline and renewing 
Western diplomacy in the 21st century, 26 June 2013 
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CASE STUDIES: SOFT POWER IN ACTION 
 
3. SOFT POWER AND DIPLOMACY: USING OUR NETWORKS 
 
The UK lies at the centre of an increasingly networked world. Through our UN, EU and 
Commonwealth connections we are able to build powerful international coalitions to tackle 
injustice and the abuse of human rights, to promote the rule of law, freedom and democracy 
and to help build stability and prosperity around the world. 
 
THE PREVENTING SEXUAL VIOLENCE INITIATIVE (FCO)  
 
The Foreign Secretary has led an international campaign to end the culture of impunity for 
sexual violence in conflict. In May 2012 the Foreign Secretary, together with the Special 
Envoy of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Angelina Jolie, launched an initiative on 
Prevention of Sexual Violence in Conflict.  The international campaign aims to end the 
culture of impunity for sexual violence crimes and replace it with one of deterrence by 
building national and international capacity to tackle sexual violence in conflict.  
 
Working with the UN Special Representative for Sexual Violence, Zainab Bangura, and the 
Special Envoy, the UK has increased international focus on the eradication of sexual violence 
in conflict. We held a series of high profile events, including a projection of the PSVI 
campaign messages onto the Coliseum in Rome on International Women’s Day, a screening 
of the film In the Land of Blood and Honey (directed by Angelina Jolie) in Tokyo, and 
participation in the 16 Days of Activism Against Gender Violence in the UK.  The Foreign 
Secretary’s visit to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), with Angelina Jolie, generated 
extensive, positive UK and international media coverage – our FCO Storify page has the full 
digital story at http://storify.com/foreignoffice/this-week-at-the-foreign-office-
16/elements/f8fd39d6b6ca0f5d87c1f75e.  
 
The proactive use of our networks, including NGOs as well as the UK’s strong convening 
power, has resulted in further commitments from our international partners.  Under the 
UK’s leadership in April 2013 the G8 Foreign Ministers adopted a historic Declaration on 
Preventing Sexual Violence declaring that rape and serious sexual violence in conflict are 
grave breaches of the Geneva Convention - a vital step towards eradicating safe havens for 
perpetrators.  This international effort is accompanied by engagement with countries 
including Bosnia, DRC, Kosovo, Libya, Mali and Somalia, including joint funding with the UAE 
to support PSVI practical action in Somalia, to strengthen national capacity to investigate 
allegations of sexual violence and support survivors. On the Syrian borders alone UK 
experts have trained over 40 health care professionals and human rights defenders who are 
helping hundreds of Syrians including survivors of sexual violence.  
 
We have amplified our messages through an extensive digital diplomacy campaign.  During 
the UN Security Council Debate in June 2013, the hashtag #TimeToAct was used over six 
thousand times on Twitter, reaching an estimated five million accounts.  We built on this in 
the run up to the UN General Assembly with extensive social media activity, including 
launching a Thunderclap campaign which reached an audience of nearly 2.5million people, to 
encourage countries to support the new Declaration of Commitment to end Sexual 
Violence in Conflict which was endorsed on 24 September 2013 in New York by 119 
countries. The Declaration sets out out practical and political commitments to end the use 
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of rape and sexual violence as a weapon of war.  It is the clearest statement to date that the 
international community must and will confront these crimes. 
 
THE ABOLITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY (FCO)  
 
Our strong, persistent stance on UK values and work with external partners has helped us 
contribute to long-term progress on the abolition of the death penalty. International law 
does not forbid the use of the death penalty and states which retain the death penalty can be 
difficult to influence. Cooperating with external partners, including the Foreign Secretary’s 
expert sub-group on the death penalty as well as in-country organisations - means they can 
influence the opinion of foreign legislators, legal office holders and the general public, in ways 
which direct intervention by HMG could not. For instance, in 2012-13 we funded and 
facilitated visits by members of the All Party Parliamentary Group on the Death Penalty to 
the United States of America, the Caribbean and countries in South East Asia to promote 
abolition and share UK experience. 
 
Abolition is a long-term goal, but our approach is delivering results both at the UN and in 
individual countries. In 2012, 111 states (of 193 UN members) voted in favour of the biennial 
General Assembly resolution for a worldwide moratorium on the death penalty, compared 
with 109 in 2010, continuing a positive trend. Our projects have led to changes in different 
countries such as constitutional rulings reducing the number of offences for which the death 
penalty applies, alternative sentencing guidelines for prosecutors and judges, and trained 
capital defence lawyers.  
 
THE ARMS TRADE TREATY (FCO)  
 
Levering the UK’s convening power over a seven year period, we led international efforts to 
secure an international Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), including through engagement with non-
traditional allies, and the effective use of media.  On 2 April, 2013 we succeeded as 154 
states voted to adopt the ATT.  Civil society, governments and industry described this as a 
historic moment.   
 
The UK drew on its experience as an exporter to shape the ATT, listened to the developing 
world, to the priorities of the emerging powers and the needs of victims so that the treaty 
had broad appeal.  We formed new alliances to facilitate discussion across traditional 
regional and political boundaries, aiming to influence and persuade.  At the heart of this were 
the co-authors (Argentina, Australia, Costa Rica, Finland, Japan, Kenya and UK).  As 
representatives of every region, we designed and championed the UN process.  We used 
our global reach to influence others – from the EU to the African Union to the P5. 
 
Our partnership with a coalition of NGOs (the Control Arms Coalition) enabled us to 
amplify the message that the ATT matters to people as well as governments.  We 
campaigned from a shared platform and involved them in the work of our delegation.  The 
NGOs created and maintained momentum behind the ATT and our work with businesses 
gave us the expertise to design a Treaty that could be implemented.  Like the NGOs, they 
could influence countries that might not have listened to governments alone. 
 
Twitter was an effective way to spread our message via the hashtag #armstreaty.  The FCO 
Minister for the Middle East and North Africa, Alistair Burt, responded to a Twitter Q&A on 
the Arms Trade Treaty available on Storify at http://storify.com/foreignoffice/alistair-burt-
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twitter-q-and-a-on-arms-trade-treaty. The Foreign Secretary’s statement welcoming the 
adoption of the Treaty was circulated via Twitter and was re-tweeted 178 times.  
 
UK PRESIDENCY OF THE G8 2013 - THE TRANSPARENCY REVOLUTION 
(CABINET OFFICE)  
 
The UK is using its leadership of the G8 in 2013 to drive an ambitious push for greater 
transparency, freer trade and fairer taxes (the 3Ts). On 15 June, the UK hosted a high-
profile ‘Open for Growth’ event to catalyse a world-wide movement towards greater 
Transparency. The ‘Open for Growth’ event occurred before the main G8 summit, and our 
use of soft power here – including making use of our diplomatic network particularly with 
Africa governments, and engaging with a wide range of business and NGOs – helped pave 
the way for the high-ambition outcomes at the G8 Summit in support of UK values and 
economic interests. 
 
Developing countries, international organisations, business and civil society and G8 members 
participated at senior level, and launched ambitious individual and collective commitments on 
the 3Ts. The G8 digital platform provided live video streaming, accompanied with live 
tweeting from UK government accounts and the use of a unique hashtag for the event.  
 
One of the event’s themes was how to achieve greater transparency and accountability 
through the supply of government data and the use of digital technology. This resulted in 
commitments on open data which drive growth and innovation; release economic and social 
benefits; and promote new businesses and efficiencies. Mozilla launched a UK wide campaign 
to inspire a generation of young people to create, as well as use, digital technologies. The 
World Bank announced its ‘Open and Collaborative Private Sector Initiative’ that will use 
open data to accelerate support for economic growth. The Open Data Institute announced 
an Open Data Certificate which will rate or classify the quality of any dataset published on 
the internet/web and will be available to anyone to use. 
 
OPEN GOVERNMENT PARTNERSHIP (DFID) 
 
Building on the G8 summit, the UK is co-leading the Open Government Partnership (OGP) 
with the theme ‘Transparency Drives Prosperity’. This global collaboration between 
governments and civil society is working to promote greater transparency, accountability and 
economic growth. It was established in September 2011 and now has 58 member countries.  
 
To join, countries must meet its eligibility criteria covering budget transparency, asset 
declaration, freedom of information and citizen engagement.  Member countries must deliver 
National Action Plans setting out commitments to extend and deepen open government, 
developed  consultation with local civil society.    The OGP has achieved a lot in a short time, 
most notably in securing agreement from a large range of countries to agree to important 
principles about open government.   
  
The UK will host the next meeting in London in October 2013. OGP members will repledge 
their commitment to open government, announce new commitments and launch the OGP’s 
Independent Reporting Mechanism.  At the end of the Summit, the UK will hand over its lead 
co-chair role to Indonesia. 
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BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS (FCO)  
 
The UK is working towards more liberal market environments internationally in which 
commerce can flourish, which are stable and sustainable over the long term and where 
transparency, good governance and the rule of law prevail. Through an ambitious new 
Business and Human Rights Action plan, launched by the Foreign and Business Secretaries on 
4 September 2013, we will use our international reputation for high corporate standards and 
respect for human rights to help British companies succeed in a way that is consistent with 
our values.  
 
The UK is the first country to set out guidance to companies on integrating human rights 
into their operations. The Action Plan builds on a range of soft power assets including the 
global reach of UK companies, the UK’s vigorous pursuit of high corporate standards 
(exemplified by the Bribery Act 2010 and recent changes to the Companies Act) as well as 
the trust between HMG, companies and NGOs. This will support our efforts to strengthen 
and expand membership of the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights, which 
provide guidance for extractive companies to ensure that their security operations respect 
human rights, during our Chairmanship of the Initiative in 2014. We will also be founder 
members of the multi-stakeholder voluntary global oversight mechanism for Private Security 
Companies this September. 
 
Our promotion of business with respect for human rights will benefit UK prosperity. As the 
Business Secretary Vince Cable said at the launch ‘A stronger economy depends on 
investors, employees and the wider public having trust and confidence in the way companies 
conduct themselves both at home and abroad.’ Through the Action Plan, we will work 
towards the respect of human rights becoming a standard operating consideration of all UK 
companies.  
  
HUMAN RIGHTS IN COLUMBIA (FCO) 
 
UK lobbying over impunity in cases of violence against human rights defenders contributed 
to a decision to establish a new unit in the Columbian Prosecutor’s Office to investigate 
these crimes more systematically. The British Embassy in Bogota supported a project with 
the Public Prosecutor’s Office to establish regional working groups of human rights 
defenders and local civil servants to discuss threats and protection measures. Embassy 
officials have visited lawyers collectives, indigenous communities and victims groups to 
express support for their work. They have made representations on the cases of a number 
of Columbians in prison pending trial, including Liliany Obando, a trade unionist and human 
rights activist, who was released in March 2012. 
 
THE COMMONWEALTH (FCO)  
 
A strong Commonwealth is important to global prosperity and to the national interests of 
all its member states. The Commonwealth network, which has influence in nearly every 
international country grouping, is a key soft power vehicle for co-operation in a rapidly 
changing global landscape. Through the Commonwealth we are able to promote 
democratic values and good governance and, through mutual trade and investment, 
increase the prosperity of every Commonwealth member including the UK. 
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We support the Commonwealth to use its non-governmental networks for advocacy, 
consensus building on global issues, in facilitating South-South, North-South cooperation 
and making the voices of small and vulnerable states heard. We also aim to modernise the 
Commonwealth’s internal institutions and increase respect for its values to ensure the 
network endures and strengthens in influence. The new Commonwealth Charter is the 
most ambitious reform for more than a decade, and the culmination of a UK drive to 
support the Eminent Persons Group to identify necessary reforms and to build consensus 
within Commonwealth networks around change.   
 
The Commonwealth Games (CWG) will be held in Glasgow from 23 July to 3 August 2014.  
The CWG is traditionally preceded by the Queen’s Baton Relay (QBR), with a Baton passing 
through each of the 71 participating nations and territories before returning to Scotland for 
the Opening Ceremony.  The QBR is a unique soft power opportunity to promote the 
CWG, Glasgow, Scotland and the wider UK in each CWG nation, appropriately themed to 
focus on issues such as trade, education or tourism, or promoting the values of Britain and 
the Commonwealth. This public diplomacy campaign is now being developed by the FCO, in 
conjunction with UKTI, the Scottish Government and other Scottish stakeholders. 
 
You can see how the UK network celebrated Commonwealth Week 2013 on the 
FCOStorify page at http://storify.com/foreignoffice/celebrating-the-commonwealth 
 
FUTURE INTERNATIONAL LEADERS PROGRAMME (FCO)  
 
The FCO’s Future International Leaders Programme, launched in March 2013, promotes 
lasting partnerships with a new generation of talented people with the potential to become 
leaders with a direct impact on the UK’s global interests. There will be four visits in 2013/14 
and six per year from 2014/15. Each visit brings together ten Future Leaders from different 
countries including the Emerging Powers, members of the G8 and Australia and some high 
growth economies. Our two pilot visits in March and May 2013 brought 20 rising stars from 
18 different countries to the UK. There will be 3 further visits this financial year. Each visit 
includes a senior UK participant. Visit programmes showcase diverse aspects of the UK and 
includes high level engagement with government, Parliament, media, business, education and 
civil society. 
  
The benefits of the programme will emerge through building relationships over the  long 
term. The first  participants have already said they would be more likely to do business, or 
enter into partnerships, with the UK as a result of participation in the programme.  
 
As the number of alumni grows, we will strengthen and nurture this network to build lasting 
relationships and a continued exchange of knowledge between participants and the UK. 
 
UK DEFENCE DIPLOMACY: Western Balkans and the Middle East (MoD) 
 
The Government launched the UK’s International Defence Engagement Strategy (IDES) in 
February 2013. IDES is the means by which we use our defence assets and activities, short of 
combat operations, to achieve influence. We prioritise our effort on countries most 
important to our national interest and where we are most likely to achieve our security 
objectives. IDES aims to protect British citizens abroad, influence in support of UK national  
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interests, promote and protect UK prosperity, understand other nations’ security objectives, 
build international capability, capacity and will and deter threats to UK interests. 
 
The UK has developed engagement strategies with countries and regions where we have key 
security interests. The global network of over 117 UK Defence Attachés plays a critical role 
in delivering these strategies. For example, the UK is leading the ’Changing Perception‘ 
project in Serbia, a NATO-neutral Partner for Peace. Serbia is keen to play a role in 
international security by supporting EU and UN peacekeeping missions as a responsible 
international partner. The UK, through the Defence Attaché network, is working closely 
with the Serbian Government and military to help develop Serbia’s role in fostering regional 
and wider stability and security, and help change for the positive, the public’s negative 
mindset on working with NATO and within the framework of Euro-Atlantic cooperation.   
 
Senior UK military personnel are also working with the Kosovo Government and security 
forces to help build a civilian-led military administration based on international law, doctrine 
and standards. This is having a positive impact on Kosovo’s relationship with NATO, its 
approach to national and regional security issues and on the bilateral relationship between 
the UK and Kosovo. It is helping Kosovo develop into an effective Euro-Atlantic security 
supplier and partner in the region. 
 
Ten years ago the Peace Support Operations Training Centre was established in Sarajevo; 
this was a British concept which drew on multi-national donor funding support.   It is now 
regarded as one of the top five international training centres in the world, delivering high 
quality NATO and UN-accredited training, rooted in UK values and military ethos, to 
students across the Western Balkans. This has helped strengthen UK political and military 
influence in the region, created a more professional cadre of pro-NATO, pro-UK Bosnian 
officers and NCOs, improved cross-border relations as a result of joint training and enabled 
well trained Bosnian troops to share the burden of security duties in Helmand province. 
 
In February 2011 the UK appointed a Senior Defence Advisor to the Middle East to 
represent the UK's defence and security interests in the region. The Defence Advisor has 
established military links with Libya, UAE, Qatar, Jordan and, more recently, with the 
Egyptian Army - the first such high-level engagement with the Egyptian military for many 
years.  These links helped ensure successful engagement by the UK on Libya, alongside the 
UAE and Qatar and promote UK defence sales in the region, notably Typhoon aircraft.  
 
ENGAGEMENT WITH INTERNATIONAL MEDIA (FCO)  
 
The FCO’s International Media Officers (IMOs) work to influence, inform and facilitate 
reporting by international media based in London resulting in a positive perspective of the 
UK. The FCO is the only government department that has dedicated IMOs. 
 
The IMOs build strong relationships with the estimated 2000 London-based international 
correspondents, whose coverage of the UK will influence perceptions in their home 
countries. The media see the IMOs as facilitators - enabling journalists to reach a variety of 
sources, build up trust with contacts and develop a balanced view of the UK. These 
relationships are based on shared values of media freedom, democracy and freedom of 
expression. The IMOs share their expertise with other Government departments, arts and 
civic organisations and other who want to engage with London based international media.  
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This engagement leads to a positive loop of visits, briefings, and interviews which results in 
increased and sustained positive coverage about the UK and our institutions.  The IMOs 
promote a range of projects: the drive for prosperity; sporting opportunities created by the 
Olympics; regeneration in business parks and politics and peace in Northern Ireland.  
 
PAKISTAN ELECTIONS (FCO)  
 
The UK has a strong international reputation for its democratic values and well established 
electoral systems, which we have drawn upon to lobby for credible elections across the 
world, including in Pakistan. The elections in Pakistan on 11 May 2013 were a crucial 
milestone in the country’s democratic history, the first time that power was democratically 
transferred between one civilian government and another, after a full term.  
 
In advance of the elections, through co-ordinated cross-Government funding, the British 
High Commission in Islamabad helped the Election Commission develop a better electoral 
roll, linked to the national database. The roll now contains over 85 million registered voters, 
with 38 million unsubstantiated voters removed. We helped the Election Commission reach 
out to under-represented groups including minorities and women, produce codes of 
conduct, and train over 300,000 election officials. The UK funded Aawaz programme 
promoted and strengthened women’s and marginalized groups’ rights to active and safe 
participation in public events such as elections. We supplied international standard ballot 
boxes to allow more polling stations in remote areas. We helped Pakistani civil society 
observe every by-election and train over 43,000 domestic monitors to oversee these 
elections. 
 
During the elections we also supported the process through an election observation 
mission. Consisting of 25 observers, it was one of the largest international observation teams 
and was deployed throughout Pakistan. We also supported the EU Election Observation 
Mission and part-funded the Commonwealth’s election observers.   
 
The elections were among the most credible in Pakistan’s history, with a strong electoral 
register and the highest-ever number of women and new voters. Some 50 million people 
went to the ballot box. The part that the UK played in this, followed quickly by official visits 
to Pakistan by the Prime Minister, the first western head of state to do so after the election, 
the Development Secretary and Foreign Secretary, has created strong foundations on which 
to continue and build our engagement with the new Pakistan government. 
 
DIASPORA ENGAGEMENT (PAKISTAN)  (DFID) 
 
The UK has one of the world’s largest Pakistani diaspora communities. with around 1.2 
million people.  With strong family and business links in Pakistan, the diaspora  has an 
important voice in both the UK and Pakistan. DFID engages with  the diaspora, including 
journalists in a number of ways in order to increase awareness and understanding of UK aid 
to Pakistan and to identify areas for shared outreach activities to encourage support for 
development work.   
 
The Secretary of State for International Development has prioritised the Department’s work 
on community engagement, through for example, her recent attendance at a London 
diaspora event on minority rights in Pakistan. DFID regularly engage with community groups  
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including through the attendance of senior officials at diaspora outreach events in 
Birmingham and Manchester. 
  
DFID is exploring further opportunities to increase diaspora support for development in 
Pakistan, for example through donations or volunteering and is considering how to broaden 
existing initiatives, such as ‘UK Aid Match’, to make funding more accessible to UK diaspora 
organisations involved in development work in Pakistan.  
See more on DFID’s Storify page at: http://storify.com/DFID/pakistan-progress 
 
4. SOFT POWER AND HARD POWER: SMART POWER 
 
Our ability to solve the complex problems in today’s world and advance our values and 
interests will depend on how effective we are at using all our assets and partners both to 
coerce and to persuade. 
 
IRAN (FCO)  
 
Our dual track process of engagement and pressure on Iran combines the soft power of 
diplomacy and engagement with the hard power of economic sanctions in a smart power 
approach. Through this, we aim to achieve a negotiated settlement with Iran that addresses 
UK and international concerns about Iran’s nuclear programme. 
 
We work with the European External Action Service and the P5+1 (US, France, Russia, 
China, and Germany) to encourage Iranian engagement in meaningful talks. Through close 
cooperation with our partners and agreement on our collective aims and concerns we have 
maintained unity within the P5+1 and supported the process of engagement with Iran. While 
we are clear about the consequences of Iran not changing direction on their nuclear 
programme, we have also ensured that incentives are included in the P5+1 offer to Iran.   
 
Our use of digital diplomacy helps to frame the public narrative and influence public opinion 
both in the UK and abroad in support of our Iran policies. Our ‘UK for Iranians’ website 
provides detailed and up-to-date information on the UK position. We release regular 
statements on social media sites in both English and Farsi to disseminate our views to a wide 
and varied audience and to encourage public debate. 
 
The hard power element of our policy focuses on implementing restrictive measures against 
Iran, including an unprecedented round of oil and financial sanctions agreed by the EU in 
2012. These sanctions have brought the Iranians back into negotiations and have helped slow 
the nuclear programme. Reaching agreement on these sanctions required a concerted 
diplomatic effort: working with the EU; ensuring co-ordination between the EU and the US; 
engaging likeminded countries and lobbying countries, in the region and beyond, to amplify 
the effect of these measures. 
 
DEFENCE EDUCATION: UK Defence Academy (MoD) 
 
The UK has a strong international reputation for education, training and advice on the global 
challenges around defence, security and resilience. 
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Defence Education makes a relatively low cost contribution to International Defence 
Engagement, which offers a subtle, non-threatening and efficient way to gain access, insight 
and influence - contributing to HMG's overseas priorities including upstream conflict 
prevention and promoting the UK brand and values. It can also be used to promote 
important principles including: legitimate use of the military and other security organisations 
as a lever of civilian government; proportionate use of force; observance of human rights; and 
international humanitarian law. Our approach - how to think, not what to think - generates 
high demand for places on our courses, allowing us to influence future commanders and 
leaders in defence and wider government world-wide. For example, 1050 students from over 
90 countries attended Defence Academy courses in 2011/12 and the Defence Academy's 
Managing Defence in the Wider Security Context, an ‘expeditionary’ course, now has 4300 
cross-government alumni from 150 nationalities. International places at UK officer training 
academies at Dartmouth, Lympstone, Sandhurst and Cranwell continue to be oversubscribed 
and highly prized and, between them, can boast more than 30 alumni currently serving as 
Chiefs of Defence or Service Chiefs with civilian alumni having served as Heads of State or 
Ministers.  
 
The Defence Academy works with academic partners to offer a broad range of Defence 
Education opportunities including: counter corruption, cyber security, equipment acquisition, 
languages and cultural awareness, through to bespoke capacity-building programmes for 
individual countries. The Academy has developed strong relationships with its counterpart 
institutions around the world and is providing specific expertise to both existing and new 
military colleges in a number of countries. Taken together, this approach allows the UK to 
influence in support of UK national interests; understand other nations' security objectives, 
capabilities and intent; and build international capability, capacity and will. 
 
ANNUAL COUGAR DEPLOYMENT: Forward Deployment of the Response 
Force Task Group (MoD) 
 
Under the annual COUGAR deployment, elements of the UK’s high readiness Response 
Force Task Group (RFTG) undertake activities in support of regional security operations.  In 
2011, the RFTG undertook a series of demanding exercises throughout the Mediterranean, 
before events led to elements splitting off to support NATO operations to protect civilians 
in Libya. 
 
They also undertook exercises with Saudi Arabia, Oman and the United Arab Emirates 
which reinforced the UK’s commitment to, and strengthened the UK’s relationship with, our 
partner countries in the Middle East. Military exercises between the Royal Navy and 
Albanian armed forces (a new NATO member) reinforced our commitment to the NATO 
alliance.  The ‘smartness’ of the RFTG can be seen in its scalability and flexibility to move 
through the spectrum from soft to hard power when required.  The COUGAR 11 
deployment demonstrated that the UK retains the ability to contribute to current 
operations in Afghanistan whilst also preparing for contingent operations with a task group 
spread across several oceans.  Ultimately, hard power was used as the RFTG, then joined by 
other capabilities including a Trafalgar Class attack submarine, participated in NATO 
operations alongside our international allies.  This included commanding the first maritime 
strike missions by the Army’s Apache attack helicopters launched from the sea against 
military targets ashore, and the use of Tomahawk land attack missiles.   
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COUGAR 11 was followed in 2012 by COUGAR 12 which successfully demonstrated the 
UK’s post-Olympics contingent maritime capability, helped develop the UK / France 
Combined Joint Expeditionary Force, and facilitated regional engagement and capacity 
building in a number of countries including Albania, Algeria and Malta.  Elements of the RFTG 
participating in COUGAR 13 deployed mid August 2013 to the Mediterranean and East of 
Suez to undertake training, capacity building, engagement and reassurance with partner 
nations throughout the region, demonstrating the effectiveness of the UK’s maritime 
capability. 
 
UK VISA POLICY (Home Office)  
 
The UK’s visa policy aims to offer an  internationally competitive visa system while also 
controlling immigration and the movement of goods to protect the UK’s interests in support 
of both our prosperity and security objectives.  The Home Secretary has made it clear that 
the UK should provide a high quality visa service and customer satisfaction for those who 
want to come here legally.  
 
The UK Visa and Immigration Service has taken action to address concerns that the visa 
system is too slow or too difficult to use by providing greater choice to those requiring a 
visa.  A priority visa service is now available in over forty countries around the world in 
which customers get their visa decision in three to five days. In India we have launched a 
same-day Super Priority visa service which means that customers for visit visas can apply in 
the morning and get their visa and passport back by the close of the working day.   
 
We have launched a number of new services and improvements to meet the needs of key 
customer groups in China working with partners in and outside Government.  In response 
to feedback from travel agents, we made a number of changes to the application process, 
including simplified revised application forms and document requirements.  We also now 
offer extended opening hours in application centres and the option for customers to retain 
their passports during the application process to allow them to apply for a Schengen visa at 
the same time. We have worked closely with partners to review the existing visa service 
offering and to better promote it both in China and the UK, including promotional 
roadshows with leading tourism providers.  Early figures show a significant increase in the 
overall number of visitors to the UK from China.   
 
5. ASPECTS OF SOFT POWER: LEVERING OUR SOFT POWER ASSETS 
 
CULTURE AND HERITAGE 
 
The Government supports and promotes the UK’s cultural and artistic heritage through the 
British Council and other arm’s lengths bodies. Cultural exchanges and increased people to 
people links enable people from around the world to learn from and understand each 
others’ history and culture.  
 
CULTURAL EXCHANGE (DCMS) 
 
One of the highlights of the London 2012 Cultural Olympiad was the Globe to Globe season. 
It brought together 37 international theatre companies to perform all Shakespeare’s plays in 
37 different languages including Troilus and Cressida in Maori, The Tempest in Bengali and  
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Richard III in Mandarin.  UK excellence in digital technology is enabling theatres including the 
National Theatre and the Royal Opera House, museums and other cultural institutions to 
relay live performances to all points of the compass, from Shanghai to Santiago. 
 
As well as traditional international festivals, we are also building bilateral relations through 
longer seasons and years of culture focused on individual countries. For  2013, we have the 
UK-Qatar Year of Culture; 2014 will see the UK-Russia Year of Culture and in 2015, culture 
will be at the heart of the UK Year in Mexico.  Transform arts and creativity programme is a 
British Council initiative to strengthen bilateral relations, celebrate cultural and artistic 
dialogue between the UK and Brazil and bridge the four year period between the London 
and Rio Olympics. 
 
UK NOW (DCMS) 
 
In 2012, the British Council coordinated the UK Now, the largest ever festival of UK culture 
in China positioning the UK as China’s cultural partner of choice. The Chinese Culture 
Minister, Cai Wu described it as having deepened Sino-British cultural exchanges and moved 
bilateral cultural relations to a higher level.  
 
Over its nine month life UK Now provided a showcase for 776 UK artists to perform at 225 
events in all art forms which were seen by over four million people in 166 venues in 29 cities 
across China. UK Now events had 1.46 billion media impressions, and the website had 
710,828 unique visitors.   
 
THE CYRUS CYLINDER (DCMS) 
 
As custodians of the world’s art and cultural heritage, UK museums and galleries 
demonstrate universal values; the importance of scholarship to cultural relations and 
help enhance the UK’s international influence.  
 
During a period of challenging UK-Iran bilateral relations, the British Museum loaned the 
2600 year old Cyrus Cylinder to the National Museum in Tehran in 2010-11. The cylinder, 
which is often referred to as the first bill of human rights, is seen globally as a symbol of 
tolerance and respect for different people and faiths.  The original loan of three months was 
extended allowing over half a million Iranians to visit the exhibition.  
 
LITERARY FESTIVAL IN BURMA (FCO)  
 
We aim to transform the UK’s relationship with Burma through a public diplomacy campaign 
that focuses on soft power, complementing the hard power tools, including economic 
sanctions, we used during the years of Burma’s military regime. UK values, including freedom 
of expression, are at the forefront of our efforts.  
 
The support of the British Embassy and British Council in Rangoon for the inaugural 
Irrawaddy Literary Festival in January 2013, founded and directed by Jane Heyn, made a 
significant contribution to  the success of the Festival.  Aung San Suu Kyi was patron and 
several high profile international authors, including Vikram Seth and Jung Chang attended, as 
well as over one hundred of their Burmese counterparts and thousands of Burmese people.  
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The Burmese and international media viewed the Festival, which promoted English language 
and culture as well as freedom of expression, as a watershed moment, after Burma’s years of 
isolation. The Financial Times commented that it was a ‘potent sign of change in a country 
edging towards democracy’. The Daily Mail reported that ‘authors hailed the festival as a 
breakthrough for the country’s creativity, after years lost to censorship’.   Burmese Ministers 
have since said that the Festival had a significant impact in communicating a new era of 
freedom of speech. A second Festival is planned for 2014. 
 
ROYAL HERITAGE (FCO)  
 
The British monarchy is a unique soft power and diplomatic asset, embodying UK ideals of 
peace, friendship, freedom and tolerance. HM The Queen has made over 260 official visits to 
over 116 different countries during her reign as an unsurpassed Ambassador for the UK 
overseas and Head of the Commonwealth. She has promoted reconciliation on her visits to 
West Germany in 1965 and Japan in 1975; given encouragement to nations after profound 
change, such as her visit to Russia in 1994 and to South Africa in 1995. More recently, her 
historic State Visit to the Republic of Ireland in 2011, the first British Head of State to visit, 
was an opportunity to celebrate peace and reconciliation as well as the strong UK-Ireland 
relationship. 
 
The Royal Wedding in 2011 and the Diamond Jubilee celebrations in 2012 attracted 
thousands of visitors to the UK and showed the best of the UK’s heritage, culture and values 
to millions around the world, generating renewed respect and admiration for the Monarchy 
and strengthening the bonds of trust and friendship between the UK and our international 
partners. Events to mark the Diamond Jubilee weekend at over 100 overseas Posts attracted 
50,000 guests and resulted in media coverage reaching over 1 billion individuals.  
 
 
 
EDUCATION 
 
Education is the second most valuable global sector after healthcare. UK education exports 
were worth £6.6bn in 2011, three quarters of which were generated by international 
students studying in the UK. The Government's education strategy aims to help the whole 
UK education sector, which already enjoys a strong reputation overseas, respond to the 
growing international demand for secondary and higher education to contribute both to UK 
economic growth and to building global relationships and trust through educational 
partnerships. 
 
HMG SCHOLARSHIPS (FCO / DFID)  
 
Our scholarships programmes draw on UK expertise in education to help us build a strong, 
international network of friends of the UK who will rise to increasingly influential positions 
over the years. The Chevening programme (FCO), is offered to 118 countries, the Marshall 
(FCO) to US citizens and the Commonwealth (DFID) to all Commonwealth countries. They 
are key features of British soft power diplomacy and give scholars both a first class academic 
qualification and exposure to British values, culture and diversity.  
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Proactive engagement with former scholars and fellows builds lasting positive relationships 
that can support the achievement of HMG’s objectives.  
 
Chevening has built an influential alumni network of 42,000 scholars with large alumni 
communities in China, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Russia and South Korea.  
We intend to expand significantly the Chevening programme, particularly in the emerging 
powers. 
 
In an increasingly challenging bilateral environment the British Embassy in Buenos Aires 
places a high value on its network of Chevening alumni and has developed an impressive 
programme of engagement linking Embassy staff, alumni and other stakeholders. Many alumni 
have held senior positions including a provincial governor, the Economy Minister for Buenos 
Aires province, a National Congressional representative and a former National Economy 
Minister. Continued engagement with alumni therefore supports our access to decision 
makers and policy advice in a complex political context. Our ongoing investment in the 
scheme is a public commitment to strengthening links between people of both countries.  
 
The 1,500 Marshall alumni are a valuable network who support the UK’s political and 
business outreach in the US and help British officials in the US secure high-level access to 
senior US political and business leaders. 
 
Commonwealth Scholarships are part of the wider Commonwealth Scholarship and 
Fellowship Plan (CSFP), under which governments offer scholarships to citizens of other 
Commonwealth countries. It is one of the best recognised activities of the Commonwealth. 
There are over 800 UK Commonwealth Scholarships awarded annually and over 17,000 
members in an active alumni network. These include Heads of State, Prime Ministers and 
Cabinet Ministers, Ambassadors and High Commissioners, Central Bank Governors and 
Deputies and senior judicial figures. Other prominent alumni include the former Solicitor-
General of the UK and the current Governor of the Bank of England. 
 
EDUCATION AND THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE IN KAZAKHSTAN (FCO)  
 
There are many opportunities for the UK to engage with Kazakhstan through our soft 
power assets, particularly education and the English language. The Kazakhstani government’s 
decision to shift the medium of education from Russian to English and their hosting of the 
2017 World Expo and the 2017 Student Winter Games means, Kazakhstan says, that 30 000 
more English speakers will be needed for each event. The Joint Statement on a Strategic 
Partnership between the UK and Kazakhstan signed during the Prime Minister’s visit from 30 
June to 1 July 2013 includes a commitment to forging stronger educational and cultural links 
between the two countries building on the UK’s popularity as the principle western 
destination for Kazakhstani students going abroad in 2012.   
 
The BIS/UK Education Unit works with the British Embassy in Astana to support UK 
Education providers as they respond to business opportunities such as English Language 
Teaching; professional development; curricula design; publishing; education-standards; 
innovative equipment and technology. This had a swift, positive impact as a UK provider won 
a contract to establish schools of engineering in a network of new vocational colleges being 
set up across the country. This work is backed up by the Education is GREAT campaign 
which promotes UK education in Kazakhstan whilst working with the Home Office to allay  
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the concerns of genuine students about the visa process. New initiatives announced after the 
Prime Minister’s visit included support for links between young researchers in both 
countries, and a British Council MOU with the national teacher training agency to train 
hundreds of Kazakhstani teachers in the UK each year. The British Council is promoting the 
use of digital technologies, including an SMS ‘English Phrase of the Day’ subscription model 
with 50,000 subscribers.  
 
The Embassy also engages with Kazakhs who have previously studied in the UK, including 
through the British Alumni Club of Kazakhstan, increasing links between UK businesses and 
future political and commercial leaders in Kazakhstan. Partnerships with institutions such as 
the Centre for International Programmes, National Science Committee, the national TVET 
agency, Kasipkor Holding and the National University of the Arts have all been founded or 
grown on the basis of relationships with UK alumni.   
 
UK-INDONESIA DIKTI SCHOLARSHIPS (BIS) 
 
Capitalising on the UK’s excellence in education, the UK-Indonesia DIKTI programme is 
strengthening UK-Indonesia relations and positioning the UK as Indonesia's partner of choice 
in education. It is also promoting educational cooperation through training of up to 750 
permanent or prospective faculty members from Indonesian universities and administrative 
staff employed by DIKTI or Indonesian state universities.  
 
UK Minister for Universities and Science David Willetts and Indonesia's Education Minister 
Mohammad Nuh signed a joint statement on enhanced co-operation on education during the 
Prime Minister’s visit to Indonesia in April 2012. During the Indonesian President's State Visit 
to UK in October 2012, the Ministers signed a framework celebrating nine new long-term 
partnerships in higher education and committing to exploring potential skills and vocational 
education collaboration.  
 
One of the nine partnerships, the UK-Indonesia DIKTI scholarship programme, was officially 
launched on 1 June 2013 and will run for 5 years. To date, 77 UK Higher Education 
Institutions, across all academic disciplines and research areas have signed up. Up to 150 
Indonesian students will study for PhDs at UK universities each year, with the first students 
scheduled to arrive in January 2014. The Indonesian Government will cover the first three 
years of study, study with UK universities covering fourth year costs.   
 
BUSINESS, CREATIVITY & ENTERPRISE 
 
‘We possess the skills, creativity and and boldness of spirit... to continue that long history of 
innovation which has shaped Britain today... We have the largest creative industry in 
Europe... Our advanced materials sector is at the forefront of developments in global 
manufacturing... And we have the world’s largest  foreign exchange market, its biggest 
insurance market and one of the largest centres in the world for fund management and 
international legal services.’109 
 
 
                                            
109 Foreign Secretary William Hague’s British American Business Speech, 13 September 2013. 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/british-american-business-speech 
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UK INDUSTRIAL STRATEGY (FCO) 
 
In 2012 the Government launched a new Industrial Strategy to strengthen the 
competitiveness of key UK industrial sectors in a rapidly expanding and increasingly 
competitive global market place and to build new international business partnerships, in 
particular with the emerging economies. The Strategy is built around four core principles: 
long-term, in partnership with business, whole of Government approach and developing 
confidence to invest and 11 key sectors: life sciences; aerospace; nuclear; oil and gas; the 
information economy; construction; professional and business services, automotive; age-
tech; education and offshore wind energy. 
 
COMMERCIAL DIPLOMACY (FCO) 
 
Commercial diplomacy is central to the Government’s prosperity agenda, bringing together 
the Government’s international activity in support of the UK economy, aligning UK foreign 
policy goals with the Government’s overall objective of returning the UK to strong 
economic growth and using diplomacy to help create and promote the conditions for that 
growth through trade and investment.  
 
The FCO, BIS and UKTI work in partnership to help create and promote the conditions for 
growth through international trade and investment. Together they are able to support 
business by: providing high level political and economic analysis and access to decision-
makers around the world; identifying  new business opportunities; sharing intelligence and 
managing risk through expert knowledge of the local political and economic environment; 
using inward and outward high level visits to lobby on behalf of UK interests and trade 
opportunities; supporting UK trade missions around the world; and coordinating 
government relationships with key businesses to help remove barriers to international trade 
and investment.  
 
The British Embassy Abu Dhabi was instrumental in Shell winning a contract in the UAE 
worth £6bn for the development of the Bab sour gas field. UKTI and Political Teams 
coordinated closely with Shell to ensure that not only was the deal commercially right, but 
that it stacked up politically and that the right impact was made with key decision takers. 
The strong bid was supported by high level lobbying over a sustained period from FCO 
Ministers, as well as Lord Marland, Greg Barker (DECC) and Alan Duncan (DFID). 
 
Carillion plc has been awarded a major contract to construct the first phase of the re-
development of Battersea Power Station. British High Commission Kuala Lumpur, 
maximising on opportunities such as the Global Investment Conference on the eve of the 
London Olympics, the Royal Visit, and visits by the Prime Minister and Lord Marland, have 
helped cultivate a close relationship with SP Setia, part of the Malaysian Consortium that 
purchased Battersea Power Station, an investment worth up to £8bn. This enabled Carillion, 
who were introduced in November by UKTI Kuala Lumpur, to make a successful pitch to SP 
Setia’s top management team. 
 
The Prime Minister, Foreign Secretary and Business Secretary supported a sustained 
campaign coordinated by DfT, FCO, UKTI and the BE Moscow, resulting in easyJet launching 
its inaugural London-Moscow service. High-quality policy and legal advice, together with the 
FCO’s ability to identify lobbying opportunities, understand local institutional and regulatory  
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arrangements, and satisfy the demands of protocol, was crucial to Russia giving the go-ahead. 
easyJet’s CEO, Carolyn McCall hailed it a ‘historic day’ for the company, which has also 
launched a Moscow- Manchester service allowing a further 60,000 passengers a year take 
advantage of the first-ever direct scheduled link between the two cities, a massive boost to 
UK-Russia business.  
 
In Cameroon UK companies have been increasingly successful in either increasing market 
share (Guinness, Standard Chartered Bank) or winning new contracts. In the energy sector, 
and with support for over a year from BHC Yaoundé  Joule Africa signed an agreement with 
the Cameroon Government for a $1.2 bn 600 MW dam that will add 40% to domestic 
power and enable potential for power exports to Nigeria. This is outstanding progress for a 
project of this size in Central Africa and is a both testament to the dynamism and 
commitment of this UK company and high level support from the High Commission.  
 
BAE Systems signed a £2.5bn contract with the Omani Ministry of Defence to supply 12 
Typhoon and 8 Hawk aircraft. The Prime Minister visited Muscat to mark the occasion. 
Government to Government contacts were a critical part of the campaign. British Embassy 
Muscat and DSO coordinated closely with the company over three years to deliver a deal 
that will safeguard 6,000 UK jobs, and may open the door to further, even larger, contracts 
for Typhoon.  
 
Intervention by Lord Green during his visit to Russia in November and lobbying by British 
Embassy Moscow have strengthened ties between the British alcohol industry and the 
Russian Federal Alcohol Regulation service. As a result a licence was issued to Maxxium – an 
Edrington Group-Jim Beam joint venture - for extension of a warehouse to accommodate 
fast growth in business. Delay in securing a licence had been costing the company $1m in 
lost revenue and preventing it from expanding in the market. 
 
The FCO and UKTI healthcare teams have worked hand-in-hand to support British Telecom 
enter the healthcare market in China.  In April, BT signed a consultancy contract on hospital 
IT in Ningxia province that could be worth around £30m.  BT credited the Embassy FCO 
and UKTI healthcare team for building the vital local contacts and market knowledge to help 
secure this deal.  We now have a new Prosperity project where BT will partner with the 
Chinese government to help China integrate their health systems through innovative IT 
solutions.  Not only is this fulfilling a key demand of China’s health reforms, but we hope this 
project will also provide valuable new contacts and market intelligence to help BT secure 
further contracts. 
 
THE GREAT CAMPAIGN (FCO)  
 
The GREAT Britain campaign is the Government’s most ambitious international marketing 
effort to date. With support from some of Britain’s strongest soft power assets, GREAT 
showcases British excellence to encourage the world to visit, study and do business with the 
UK. The campaign enables our diplomatic network, as well as UKTI trade missions, 
VisitBritain and the British Council to promote the UK through a recognisable brand, 
advance our prosperity interests and support the London 2012 legacy. The campaign has had 
a significant impact internationally and is delivering a strong and measurable return on its 
first year investment of £37 million.  An independent evaluation of GREAT said that  
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campaign has generated around £550m worth of economic benefits to the British economy 
so far.  
 
GREAT resonates at posts and supports their prosperity and public diplomacy work. For 
instance, GREAT has led to UK-South Africa partnerships in youth development, education 
and culture through the British Council’s Connect ZA programme of cultural co-operation 
in 2014. Cape Town’s 2013 GREAT week in Cape Town included an Innovation is GREAT 
Supersonic Car Driving Experience to showcase the UK Bloodhound, and generated at least 
£80 000 in advertising value equivalent. In Colombia, this summer’s tour of a GREAT 
branded London bus to seven priority cities generated more than £150,000 in advertising 
value equivalent and promoted British business interests including the new UK Colombia 
Trade entity and British infrastructure expertise in Barranquilla. Visit Britain, in partnership 
with Sony Pictures, ran a ‘Bond is GREAT’ campaign to use the universal appeal of James 
Bond to boost tourism to the UK from key markets, resulting in over £3.5million worth of 
exposure for the GREAT Britain You’re Invited brand. As well as the support of the bond 
franchise, GREAT has attracted the active endorsement of over 150 world-renowned British 
companies and celebrities, including McLaren, Jaguar LandRover and British Airways, as well 
as David and Victoria Beckham, Sir Richard Branson and Sir Paul Smith. 
 
The Government has committed a further £30m to continue GREAT into 2014/15. This will 
drive the campaign forward in key markets where GREAT is performing well, particularly 
China, India, US and Brazil. Tourism activity will be extended to the Gulf, while trade and 
investment-focused activity will also target new emerging markets where GREAT can help 
the UK gain a competitive advantage, including Russia, South Korea, Mexico, Turkey, 
Indonesia, Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Romania.  Target return on 
investment for 2013/14 is anticipated to be 20:1.  
 
SCIENCE & INNOVATION 
 
The UK is a world leader in science and innovation, in space technology, aerospace and 
automotive engineering and one of the world’s top publishers of scientific papers.  
 
UK ADVICE TO JAPAN AFTER FUKISHIMA DISASTER (FCO / BIS) 
 
Following the Great East Japanese Earthquake and Tsunami in March 2011, the UK used its 
scientific expertise to advise the Japanese Government on action based on clear scientific 
evidence, resulting in stronger collaboration between the UK and Japan on science related 
issues.  
 
After the earthquake, the UK Government Chief Scientific Advisor (GCSA) swiftly gathered 
world-leading experts who determined that the evacuation of Tokyo was unnecessary. The 
UK was the first country to recommend that travel to Tokyo could resume and that 
business should return to normal. This third party endorsement of the Japanese 
Government’s advice, spread through social media, influenced the Japanese people’s 
perceptions of the situation and helped Japanese business stabilise and improved their 
manufacturing output.  
 
This swift, reasoned response and the impact of the communications provided by the GCSA 
was extremely well received in Japan, is still remembered, and enables us to speak with  
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authority on other science-related issues. This has opened the door to opportunities for UK 
plc to present our technologies, to the Toykyo Electric Power Company other Japanese 
utility companies, the sharing of which is being cemented by framework agreements between 
companies.  It has also laid the foundations for future research collaboration between the 
UK and Japan on nuclear safety and investment in UK-based research by Japanese companies. 
 
UK-SOUTH EAST ASIA INNOVATION FORUM (FCO / BIS) 
 
Through our Science and Innovation Network in Southeast Asia (SIN SE Asia), 
we raised awareness of UK strengths in innovation, design and technology so 
that the UK could benefit from the region’s shift towards more knowledge-based 
economies. 
 
With the British Council, SIN SE Asia arranged a high profile event, opened by Lord Green 
and his Singaporean counterpart, on innovation, design and technology as part of the UK 
Southeast Asia Knowledge Partnership.  The emphasis was on creativity, collaboration, the 
importance of small businesses and the role of UK and Singapore as hubs in their respective 
networks. The event brought together UK and regional participants including the 
Technology Strategy Board, McLaren Applied Technologies and Wing Commander Andy 
Green (holder of the World Land Speed Record and a member of the Bloodhound project 
looking to beat it), the Managing Director of Singapore’s Agency for Science Technology and 
Research, the CEO of their National Research Foundation and a Deputy Minister from 
Indonesia's Ministry of Research and Technology. 
 
GREAT branding helped achieve significant impact with good feedback from participants 
across the programme.  A joint op-ed by the ministers, together with an article on Andy 
Green in Singapore’s main newspaper, a BBC television interview and blog posts helped us 
to obtain extensive Singapore and regional impact. 
 
A partnership between McLaren and IO on data centres in Singapore was announced during 
the forum. There was also good take up of the education packs produced by Bare 
Conductive, one of the small UK businesses featured in the forum. 
Exhibition boards on UK innovation and the Bloodhound Driving Experience simulator are 
providing a helpful resource for sustained engagement.  We are following up on key 
opportunities for collaboration, particularly with TSB's catapult centres and the ‘Eight Great 
Technologies’. 
 
QUEEN ELIZABETH ENGINEERING PRIZE (FCO / BIS) 
 
Using our network of Science and Innovation Network (SIN) teams, we supported the 
November 2011 launch of the £1m Queen Elizabeth Prize (QEP) for Engineering. The award 
aims to recognise and celebrate outstanding advances in engineering that have changed the 
world and increase awareness of UK leadership and innovation in the fields of science and 
engineering.   
 
SIN teams supported international outreach by the Royal Academy of Engineering (RAEng) 
through: raising awareness with key local stakeholders; formation of a panel of high-calibre 
international judges; and by hosting a series of high-profile launch and celebratory events at 
Posts around the world. At a launch event in France, Rolls Royce Director R&D Rik Parker  
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spoke about the importance of industrial engineering and international cooperation to a 
high-level audience from industry, business, academia and CAC40 companies. UKTI and Rolls 
Royce representatives also used the launch to explore business opportunities with key 
engineering companies and buyers in France.  
 
Following the announcement that Louis Pouzin, a Frenchman, was one of the five winners of 
the Prize, with GSK and the National Council of Engineers and Scientists of France, SIN 
France organised a reception to focus on the next generation of engineers, attended by 
many young engineers and distinguished French scientists, including Claudie Haigneré, 
France’s first female astronaut. Sir Tim Berners-Lee (the UK winner) sent a video message 
highlighting the importance of engineering and of engaging future generations. The award, 
which was recognised as promoting and celebrating engineering as a career generated strong 
media coverage in France, including an article in the Economist.   
 
AID AND PEACEBUILDING 
 
The UK is one of the world’s leading nations in human rights and development and 
committed, through our aid programme, to improving the condition of humanity. 
 
O.7% COMMITMENT (DFID) 
 
The UK’s commitment to spend 0.7% of GNI on aid from 2013 is leading the way, 
encouraging others to fulfil their commitments and has been widely praised.  At the MDG 
Summit in New York in September 2010, UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon praised the 
UK's decision and urged others to meet their commitments, arguing that "we must not 
balance the books on the backs of the poor". The UK’s reputation as a major provider of 
very effective international cooperation has also led developing countries to encourage 
others to use it as a model.  Afghanistan’s Minister of Public Health recently wrote to his 
Indian counterpart to request that India collaborate with the UK on health issues in 
Afghanistan, modelled on the UK-India bilateral programme.  Ethiopia has also expressed an 
interest in working collectively with India and the UK, particularly in women’s 
empowerment. 
 
 
UK HUMANITARIAN AID (DFID) 
 
The UK’s tradition of providing high quality humanitarian aid reflects the strong commitment 
of the British people to helping those suffering from disasters. As a result, the UK is one of 
the most important global providers of humanitarian aid and has an enviable reputation for 
the speed, scale and effectiveness of our response to emergencies.  Much of our response is 
provided through British organisations with specialist skills but, unless there are specific 
security concerns, all UK-funded assistance is recognisable by the Union Flag logo 
introduced in 2012 which raises awareness of the UK’s contribution.  
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Here are examples of UK aid branding in use in humanitarian emergencies: 
 
 
DFID provided basic temporary but reusable 
shelter materials in response to the Pakistan 
floods in Sindh.   
 
 
  
 
In November 2012, in response to the drought 
that left some parts of Malawi facing a serious 
food crisis, the World Food Programme used UK 
funds to transport sacks of maize and peas across 
the country, and cobranded the sacks accordingly. 
Photo: Gregory Barrow/WFP 
An example of UK aid branding in a DFID-funded UN Farming and Agriculture Organisation 
(FAO) development programme in Somalia: 
 
A project that makes use of waste livestock 
bones, and trains Somali young women to make 
them into soap and sell them, creating jobs and 
income. 
 
 
USING AID TO INFLUENCE DEVELOPING COUNTRY GOVERNMENTS 
(DFID) 
 
A stable and predictable development partnership with developing countries is important in 
delivering results and supporting countries to achieve their priorities. However, in certain 
circumstances, the UK can also be influential by withholding or withdrawing aid in order to 
encourage changes in developing country government behaviours.   In Uganda, when 
evidence of corruption was uncovered involving the aid contributions of the UK and other 
countries, we suspended budget support, as did nine other budget support donors, and 
suspended other financial aid to government. This collective effort, in which the UK played a 
leading role, was influential in helping to drive forward a range of public financial 
management reforms by the Ugandan Government.  
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All donors retained the suspension for eight months, whilst they worked closely with the 
Government to develop a comprehensive plan to tackle corruption and restore confidence 
in the Government’s fiduciary systems. No donor has returned to General Budget Support 
and high level dialogue continues on a regular basis with the Government on corruption  
 
concerns Safeguarding against corruption – and taking action against it if uncovered - is a 
natural part of DFID’s application of due diligence in its use of public funds.   
 
 
MULTILATERAL AID REVIEW (DFID)  
 
The UK’s leadership in addressing multilateral effectiveness has significantly influenced 
approaches across the international community and increased the pressure on multilateral 
agencies to reform. The Multilateral Aid Review (MAR) was published by the UK 
Government in March 2011.  It provided, for the first time, a comprehensive and systematic 
assessment of the multilateral agencies funded by the Department for International 
Development.  Not only was this the first time that such an assessment had been published, 
it also had an important impact on funding decisions.The MAR led to an increase in interest 
in multilateral effectiveness among other donors. New assessments have been carried out by 
a range of Governments including Australia, Netherlands, Denmark, and Sweden, and 
assessments are planned or in progress in other countries too. 
 
TRANSPARENCY OF DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE (DFID) 
 
The UK has led efforts to increase the transparency of its development assistance and 
support our partners to do the same. Making information about aid spending easier to access, 
understand and use means that taxpayers in donor countries and citizens in partner countries 
can more easily hold governments to account for using funds wisely. It also helps reduce 
waste and opportunities for fraud and corruption. 
  
The Government introduced an Aid Transparency Guarantee (ATG) in June 2010.  In 2011, 
DFID published financial information and project documents for all new DFID projects to 
show why we have chosen a particular project; how it will be implemented; how much it will 
cost; what results we expect; and ultimately what has actually been achieved.  
DFID has led the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) – a multi-stakeholder 
initiative involving donors, partner countries, civil society organisations and other providers 
of development cooperation – which has developed and agreed a common, international 
open data standard for publishing detailed information on development flows. The standard is 
designed to make data easier for users to find, compare and re-use. Membership is now 37 
major donors and 22 endorsing partner countries. Over 175 organisations, including many 
UK and international civil society organisations are now using the standard. The Government 
has also built a new open data platform for development assistance, the ‘Development 
Tracker’ (http://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk), which uses IATI standard open data to present timely 
and detailed information on UK programmes and expenditure and will be available for others 
to use. In October 2012, DFID was ranked first (out of 72 organisations) in the 2012 Publish 
What You Fund Aid Transparency Index. 
 
SOMALIA (FCO)  
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Helping to bring peace and stability to Somalia after over twenty years of conflict is a top UK 
foreign policy priority.  Although the gains are fragile, there has been real progress in 
Somalia in recent months, and the UK has played a key role in supporting this. 
 
 
 
On 7 May 2013 the UK co-hosted the second international Somalia Conference in London in 
partnership with the Federal Government of Somalia. The goal of the Conference was to 
secure international endorsement and financial support for the Federal Government’s plans 
to improve security, increase access to justice, reduce poverty, strengthen public financial 
management and support economic recovery.   
 
The UK was able to convene high-level representatives due to the leading role we have 
taken on Somalia through our soft power influencing. For instance: we were the first EU 
country to reopen an Embassy in Mogadishu (in April 2013); we have led Somalia related 
work in the UN and EU; under the cross-government (FCO/DfID/MoD) Building Stability 
Overseas Strategy we have contributed towards the internationally shared objective of a 
stable, democratic Somali state, including through bilateral financial and technical support to 
the Africa Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM), the DfID Development Programme, and the 
humanitarian crisis response.  
 
The Conference put Somalia under the spotlight. Although it was not a pledging conference, 
international partners used the opportunity to pledge nearly $350m in new financial support 
to Somalia.  As a result, the Federal Government now has the plans, resources and 
international support it needs to make a difference to the lives of the people of Somalia, and 
is making progress on developing the cornerstones of a secure state.  
 
ARAB PARTNERSHIP (FCO / DfID)  
 
The joint FCO-DFID Arab Partnership (AP), set up in 2011, leads HMG work to support 
political and economic reform in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) with a particular 
focus on Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Morocco, Jordan and Algeria.   The Arab Partnership puts UK 
values as well as shared interests at the centre of our relationship with the MENA region. 
Whilst we are clear about UK values, including democracy, we don’t seek to dictate 
solutions. Instead, we partner with a wide range of actors on the ground who are leading 
reform, including parliamentarians, the judiciary, media and civil society organisations. We 
seek to deliver through long-term engagement – including through our £110m Arab 
Partnership Fund (2011-2015), and cooperation with partners in the EU and G8. The Arab 
Partnership Fund is divided into a £40 million Arab Partnership Participation Fund supporting 
political participation, public voice and good governance, and a £70 million Arab Partnership 
Economic Facility supporting economic reform. Throughout our work, we focus in particular 
on engaging the youth and women.  
 
Our funding for political reform has strengthened democratic institutions, particularly in 
areas where UK soft power is strong, such as the media and parliament. In Tunisia, we 
supported Electoral Reform International Service (ERIS) to raise levels of participation 
amongst first-time voters. Close to 23,000 students participated in extra-curricular training 
on the electoral process, democratic principles, voter awareness and citizenship. In 
Morocco, 1040 participants representing 270 NGOs and 217 local councillors participated in 
the compilation of recommendations on the upcoming organic law on local and regional 
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authorities. The Independent Commission for Aid and Impact (ICAI) recently reviewed the 
APPF, noting it as a swift and strategic approach to Arab Spring. 
 
 
 
 
 
SECURITY SECTOR REFORM: International Military Advisory & Training Team 
(MoD)  
 
Sierra Leone’s civil war, which began in 1991, ended in January 2002 after a decisive military 
intervention by the UK in 2000.  From the early stages of its engagement the UK provided a 
British Military Advisory & Training Team (BMATT) to help structure the Sierra Leone 
Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces.The BMATT was transformed into an International 
Military Advisory & Training Team (IMATT) in November 2000 with support from a number 
of Commonwealth countries, including Canada as the second largest contributor.  
 
By 2002 IMATT had 160 personnel, filling senior executive and command appointments in 
both the Ministry of Defence and Sierra Leone Armed Forces. Brigade Advisory and Support 
Teams were deployed to each of the three brigades and to Freetown Garrison with small 
teams based with each battalion.  A dedicated training team was located at Benguema to 
develop recruit, NCO and officer training. IMATT eventually covered all aspects of defence 
management, including personnel procedures, procurement and civil control of the Armed 
Forces. 
 
Gradually IMATT shifted from direct involvement in executive and command functions and 
delivery of advice and training to supporting the Horton Academy for officers and a reduced 
senior advisory role in the Ministry of Defence and the Joint Force HQ.  It also increasingly 
facilitated Peace Support Operations training.  As a result IMATT reduced to approximately 
35 personnel by 2012.  Following Sierra Leone’s third successful elections since the civil war 
IMATT was replaced by a nine-man International Security Assistance Team (ISAT) in April 
2013 with a smaller military component.  ISAT has a broader and more strategic security 
sector reform remit, including civil policing, and a regional role.   
 
Sierra Leone Armed Forces are now able to take part in international operations in Darfur 
with UNAMID and in Somalia with AMISOM.  Sierra Leone can take considerable pride in 
having moved from being a recipient of international peace missions to being a contributor.  
The Sierra Leone Armed Forces are also now one of the better respected organisations in 
Sierra Leone – a success largely attributed (by others) to the UK. 
  
REGIONAL CAPACITY BUILDING: British Peace Support Team (East Africa) (MoD) 
 
British Peace Support Team (East Africa) (BPST (EA)) was established in 2000 to train 
Kenyan units joining UN peacekeeping missions.  It established and built the Peace Support 
Training Centre, a Kenyan training institution for 50 students a year and the International 
Mine Action Training Centre (IMATC) in 2005 to train Kenyan and Rwandan de-miners.  
Rwanda was declared mine-free in 2008.  The Centre was later gifted to the International 
Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC) which, with BPST (EA) support and funding, is now an 
independent, internationally funded organisation training 2,600 students a year.   
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In 2005 BPST (EA) built the headquarters of the Eastern Africa Standby Force’s Coordinating 
Mechanism and Planning Element.  BPST (EA)’s current activity is focused on three main 
pillars: 
 
• Assisting with the development of the Eastern Africa Standby Force, and in particular 
the East Africa Standing Force, in order that they achieve full operational capability by 
2015. 
 
 
• Training troops for current Peace Support Operations, particularly AMISOM but also 
including UNAMID and UNMISS. 
• Improving a small number of regional institutions that support both current and future 
Peace Support Operations, through education and training. 
BPST (EA) also conducts a number of small-scale and low-cost activities such as MANPAD 
assessments on airports, physical security and stockpile Management courses in support of 
efforts to counter the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, Counter Improvised 
Explosive Devices (C-IED) training to security forces, and support to other government 
departments on a range of security activities in the region.   
 
Over BPST (EA)’s 12-year lifespan HMG has provided around £50m of funding from the tri-
departmental Conflict Pool.  The UK’s effort has helped East African states become better 
able to respond to security challenges within the region and to cooperate with the 
international community, contributing to the region’s stability and helping to prevent further 
conflict.  
  
SPORT 
 
FOOTBALL IN AFGHANISTAN (FCO)  
 
Drawing on the UK’s reputation for great football, the British Embassy Kabul supported the 
development of Afghanistan’s national football competition – the Afghan Premier League 
(APL) to help reinforce a shared national identity, promote ties between communities and 
build Afghan confidence in the political process and government. These outcomes contribute 
to the UK’s wider objective of a stable Afghanistan which is capable of managing its own 
security and delivering for its citizens.  
 
UK support has funded regional APL tournaments to increase involvement and engagement 
at the provincial level. We have also funded APL tournaments for women’s football teams 
and youth teams. This support is helping create credible and accessible Afghan role models 
in the form of sports personalities. These new footballers, who come from all parts of 
Afghanistan, not only provide a positive image for young people to aspire to, but also amplify 
key UK messages about the importance of political participation and transparency in public 
life. The APL is being used as a vehicle to communicate messages around the forthcoming 
elections, including the importance of voting. We also funded a Premier Skills project to 
train grassroots Afghan football coaches, delivered by the British Council and Premier 
League and involved an Everton coach and a former Crystal Palace player. 
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The APL has attracted participation from across Afghanistan with all major ethnicities 
represented. Two of the eight teams included Afghan refugees from Pakistan and Iran, 
demonstrating that football can successfully break down barriers and contribute to a more 
stable Afghanistan. The final game of the 2012 season attracted 10,000 spectators (5,000 in 
the Kabul Stadium and 5,000 watching from screens outside the stadium). Ten football clinics 
for over 1,000 school children (both boys and girls) were held in cooperation with the 
education departments of each province and involved the distribution of merchandise with 
messages around peace, unity, education and the dangers of drug use. We hope, through 
sponsorship revenues and ticket sales, that the APL will eventually become self-financing. On  
 
20 August 2013 the Afghan national football team played Pakistan for the first time since 
1977, this was also the first time Afghanistan had hosted an international football game for 
over ten years. The initiative was supported by the UK. The game was widely covered in 
local, regional and international media. The vast majority of reporting was positive, 
emphasising key messages of national unity and friendship. 
 
LONDON 2012 (FCO)  
 
The London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games were a unique opportunity to show the 
rest of the world the modern, open, inclusive and creative Britain of today, drawn from our 
rich culture and heritage. Key to the success of the Games is how we are able to build on 
the reputation the UK secured, not just for being able to put on a good show but also to 
deliver cutting-edge design, technology and innovation in infrastructure, transportation and 
security, management and organisational skills and social inclusion through multicultural 
volunteering and cultural programmes and championing the rights of the disabled 
to participate as equals in society.  
 
The hosts of future international sporting events are looking to the UK to provide the 
facilities and management. During the London Games over 100 Brazilian officials and 
administrators worked alongside the Games organisers and in Government Departments to 
learn from the UK how to deliver an Olympic and Paralympic Games. UK sporting, 
transport and security experts are working alongside the Brazilian authorities and over 37 
UK firms have won a total of £130 million through 62 sports contracts in Brazil as they 
prepare to host the 2014 World Cup and the Rio Olympic and Paralympic Games in 
2016. We are already well placed to make the most of the opportunities presented by 
Tokyo 2020, including on events infrastructure and security, communications, English 
language teaching and environmental issues. 
 
Having persuaded all 193 UN member States to co-sponsor the Olympic Truce Resolution - 
the first time in Olympic history - the UK has been working to embed the UK's Olympic 
Truce legacy in the UN and international Olympic Committee systems, you can see 
examples of our activity on the FCO Storify account at 
http://storify.com/foreignoffice/olympic-truce. Since the London Games we have worked 
closely too with the Russian authorities and Russian Olympic Committee to ensure that the 
commitments made under the Resolution are taken forward at the Sochi Winter Olympics 
in February 2014.  We are also using the opportunity of Sochi to raise broader human rights 
issues with Russia, including our concerns on Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Rights. 
 
The British Council, UK Sport and UNICEF are working together on International Inspiration, 
a legacy initiative to use sport, physical education and play to enrich the lives of 12 million 
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children in over 300 schools in 20 countries: Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Brazil, Ethiopia, Egypt, 
Ghana, Jordan, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mozambique, Nigeria, Palau, Pakistan, South Africa, 
Tanzania, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Uganda and Zambia, partnering with 287 UK 
schools.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
PROMOTING UK EXCELLENCE IN REHABILITATION TECHNOLOGIES 
THROUGH THE PARALYMPICS (FCO / BIS) 
 
Through the SIN and UKTI in France, we used the momentum of the Paralympic Games in 
2012 to successfully promote UK excellence in rehabilitation technologies.  
Working closely with Health Tech and Medicines Knowledge Transfer Network, the Royal 
Academy of Engineering, ESPRC and UKTI Life Sciences team, SIN France designed a series 
of complementary events, to attract international experts in rehabilitation technologies to 
UK excellence and expertise in this field.  
With SIN and UKTI partners, we identified and managed the international delegations at the 
Global Business Summit on Advances in Assistive Medical Technologies (including a visit to 
Stoke Mandeville Hospital), and organised an event the next day on how sport can drive 
engineering innovation, with presentations and discussions featuring key experts from UK 
and international academia and Industry. David Lidington, Minister for Europe (whose 
constituency includes Stoke Mandeville), gave the keynote address. Making the most of their 
‘global brand’, Stoke Mandeville is exploring opportunities to set-up a R&D centre around 
assistive medical technology.  
 
SIN Russia was also closely involved, bringing a select delegation of clinicians to the events. 
This has resulted in Russian interest in investing in UK biomechanics technologies. UK 
research centres are now connected via Brazilian experts to the Brazil 2016 Paralympic 
Games.   
 
As a result of this work, £60K investment was made in Imperial College technology designs 
and PhysioFunction’, one of the UK’s leading providers of specialist hands-on Neurological 
Physiotherapy and Rehabilitation Technology have agreed to deliver a set of rehabilitation 
master classes. 
 
6. LEARNING FROM OTHERS: SOFT POWER IN COLLABORATION 
 
SOFT POWER IN BRAZIL (FCO)  
 
Sharing our practical experiences on soft power with others helps us learn how to make the 
most of our assets and identify opportunities for future collaboration. For example, in March 
2013 an FCO-funded Wilton Park roundtable on ‘Applying Soft Power: the British and 
Brazilian perspectives’ took place in Sao Paulo. Attendees included senior political and 
cultural figures who discussed a range of issues from digital engagement, education and 
English Language Training to the role of the respective diaspora communities and the work 
of museums. The Brazilian Minister for Culture, Marta Suplicy, spoke about the diversity of 
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Brazilian culture and the need to broaden awareness of Brazil beyond football and carnival. 
She said that Brazil has much to learn about soft power from the UK.  
 
The conference had immediate impact, strengthening the Brazilian Minister of Culture’s 
focus on UK-links, including a stronger relationship with the Victoria and Albert Museum, as 
well as, new engagement with, amongst others, the Science and Natural History Museums 
and the Tate Gallery. The British Embassy in Brasilia is now working with Wilton Park to 
deliver a series of focussed on-line discussions covering education, language and museums to 
support a wide range of soft power work in Brazil from the GREAT campaign to education, 
science and sport. 
 
For another example of soft power collaboration with Brazil see DCMS’ Storify on Young 
UK athletes competing in Brazil as part of an exchange programme with the 2016 hosts 
http://storify.com/DCMS#stories.  
 
GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT PARTNERSHIPS PROGRAMME – WORKING 
WITH BRAZIL (DFID)  
 
The UK’s work with Brazil on nutrition demonstrates how the UK’s international 
engagement on development can move from aid to strategic partnership. Our strong 
partnership with Brazil to tackle undernutrition is important for a number of reasons. For 
example, Brazil itself has had great success reducing undernutrition, hunger and poverty; 
Brazil is a key influencer of other middle income countries who we want to encourage to 
scale up their efforts to tackle undernutrition; as the next Olympic host, there have been 
many opportunities to publicly engage with Brazil on this issue and so draw international 
attention to it. 
 
The UK used the opportunity of the London 2012 Olympics and its Presidency of the G8 to 
co-host two high profile events with Brazil, to mobilise international commitments to tackle 
undernutrition: the Olympic Hunger Event, on the day of the closing ceremony of the 
Olympics; Nutrition for  Growth: beating hunger through business and science on the 8 June 2013. 
At Nutrition for Growth 27 businesses pledged to improve the nutrition and consequently the 
productivity and heath, of over 927,000 members of their workforces in more than 80 
countries, see the Storify page at http://storify.com/DFID/nutrition-for-growth-beating-
hunger-through-busine. Brazil has committed to hosting a follow up event at the Rio 2016 
Olympics. 
 
 
UK-USA ENERGY RESEARCH COLLABORATION (FCO / BIS) 
 
Through our SIN in the USA, we successfully broadened UK-USA energy research 
collaboration beyond its previous focus on fossil fuel energy.  
 
The UK signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the US Department of Energy 
(DOE) in 1991  on research collaboration in energy and energy technologies. Over the first 
20 years of the agreement, the overwhelming majority of the work undertaken was in the 
area of fossil energy, with the US National Energy Technology Laboratory and the 
Technology Strategy Board funding nearly all the collaborative work. In 2009, we concluded 
it would be beneficial to the UK to broaden the scope of the MoU to facilitate joint working 
in a broader range of disciplines and technologies.  
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In April 2012, after a sustained campaign of relationship building and influencing, the 
US Secretary of Energy Steven Chu and the UK Secretary of State for Energy and Climate 
Change Ed Davey signed the expanded MoU. In late 2012, DOE issued their first ever 
international call for proposals, focusing on small and medium size reactors. SIN is currently 
exploring DOE-UK collaborations in high-performance computing, nuclear engineering, and 
frontier areas of energy science under the umbrella of the newly signed and expanded MoU. 
 
 
 
 
SCIENCE WITHOUT BORDERS (FCO / BIS)  
 
‘Science without Borders’ is a Brazilian Government flagship scholarship programme to send 
101,000 Brazilian students on undergraduate and PhD courses to study science, technology, 
engineering, mathematics as well as courses in the creative industries to universities around 
the world.   
 
We are using the UK’s excellence in education to strengthen UK-Brazil relations, to 
promote the programme through road show events around Brazil, GREAT campaign and 
other funds to help students understand what it is like to study in the UK. The Brazil SIN 
Network Brazil is supporting signing of cooperation agreements between UK and Brazilian 
universities to maintain the flow of students once the ‘Science without Borders programme’ 
ends.  
The UK was the first country to offer a centrally-managed placement service for Brazilian 
students (run by a discreet team at the UK HE International Unit). The British Council Brazil 
has run ‘crash courses’ for students whose level of English Language falls just short of the 
required standard for entry to the UK.   
Over 1000 Brazilian students from more than 100 Brazilian universities are now studying and 
living in the UK. A number of businesses are supporting the scheme, with placements and 
sponsorship: GlaxoSmithKline; General Electric; Harris Pye; BG Group; Unilever; Rolls 
Royce; Cisco; National Grid; Centrica. 
 
September 2013 
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Lord Janvrin 
Baroness Morris of Bolton 
Baroness Nicholson of Winterbourne 
Baroness Prosser 
Lord Ramsbotham 
________________ 
 Witnesses 
Maddalaine Ansell, Head of the International Knowledge & Innovation Unit (Global), 
Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, Hugh Elliott, Director of Communication 
and Engagement, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Barbara Hendrie, Deputy Director 
of Global Partnerships Department, Department for International Development, Andrew 
Mitchell, Director of Prosperity Directorate, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and 
Keith Nichol, Head of Cultural Diplomacy, Department for Culture, Media and Sport 
 
Q1  The Chairman: Good afternoon, everybody. On behalf of the Committee, I thank the 
witnesses for attending today. We are very pleased to have an opportunity to exchange 
thoughts and enlarge our own understanding of the subjects to hand, and to do so in the 
presence of five very senior members of the Administration, from four different 
departments. That is excellent. I will not list all your roles because they are on the paper in 
front of the Committee. Any enlargement of particular work or interests can come when 
you answer some of our questions, which I will proceed with in a moment.  
Before I do so, the Committee has to go through a necessary and important procedure, 
which is that each person who speaks in this first formal hearing of the Committee is obliged 
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to state their interests and the possible relevance of their interests to the work that the 
Committee is undertaking. This is a particular problem with this Committee because the 
scope of our international observance and involvement is very wide indeed. Nevertheless, 
that is necessary and therefore as the Chairman I must set the pattern by indicating that my 
interests and concerns are as in the Register of Lords’ Interests, and cover my advice to 
international Japanese companies, a big investment fund from Kuwait, the Chambers of 
Commerce, various energy groups and the Council of Commonwealth Societies. I am the 
president of the Energy Industries Council. I am also a personal adviser to the Foreign 
Secretary on energy security and give him advice on a personal basis from time to time—
whether he takes it is, of course, another matter. That is what I have to say before my 
questions to you now; other Members will be prefacing their questions with similar 
recitations, as they wish. 
My first question is aimed mostly at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. We are very 
pleased that we had the chance to meet you, Mr Elliott, when you talked to us informally at 
a private session about some of the broad questions arising from our interest in soft power 
and the UK’s influence around the world. You are now here in a formal role, so I will put a 
formal question to you—and to Mr Mitchell, and other members of the group if they wish to 
join in, but we shall be aiming questions at them specifically in due course so their time will 
come. Question: what is the standing of the whole concept of soft power in the work of the 
Government and of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office? Are all your departments—not 
just the FCO—conscious of this line of thought and the way in which it has developed in 
recent years? How much of a priority is soft power promotion for the Government, and 
where does it fit in to the phraseology and concept of the “global race”, which the Prime 
Minister was talking about today in fact, and many Ministers have spoken about, in which this 
country is now perforce involved more energetically and more critically than ever before? 
Perhaps I could start with you, Mr Elliott. 
Hugh Elliott: Thank you very much, my Lord Chairman. It is a pleasure to be back in front 
of the Committee in a formal capacity with my colleagues from the other three departments. 
If I might start by addressing the definition of “soft power”, which is such a slippery term in 
some respects, it is worth recalling that the definition most commonly used, given by Joseph 
Nye, is as, “the ability to affect others through the co-optive means of framing the agenda, 
persuading, and eliciting positive attraction in order to obtain preferred outcomes”. It is 
worth dwelling on that for a moment. In many respects, I think it would be widely agreed 
that that describes the core business of the Foreign Office writ large. That is very much 
what we as an organisation seek to do. It would be possible to frame an argument under 
which almost anything that the Foreign Office did constituted an exercise of soft power to 
some degree. I hope that some concrete, specific illustrations of that will come out in our 
session this afternoon. Particularly when we address some more specific strands, processes 
and campaigns through which soft power is addressed, it will be important to bear in mind 
that those are only elements of a much broader framework in which the whole of the 
Foreign Office’s activity is touched in one way or another.  
Specifically, the standing of soft power in the department is extremely high, we are 
extremely conscious of it in our work and it is a major priority for us. We believe that it is a 
central tool of our foreign policy and it is core to achieving the Government’s international 
objectives, which are to extend the UK’s influence, to promote international understanding 
through persuasion, and advance UK security and prosperity interests. The concept is 
threaded through our various departmental business plans and our individual country 
business plans through which work across government is brought together and articulated 
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overseas on a country-by-country basis. These business plans integrate the breadth of soft 
power and how it is expressed through not just our diplomacy but our science and 
innovation, trade and investment and other work through the Government.  
We believe that soft power works best as a tool for government when it is focused and 
tailored for specific regions, countries, themes or audiences as an integral part of policy. It 
brings together all our different elements of influence in pursuit of policy objectives that can 
unify. For example, we deliver soft power under that definition through our cross-
government conflict prevention work; through international development, which I am sure 
we will hear about more later; through education and culture; through parliamentary 
exchanges; through the work of the British Council and the BBC World Service; and 
through our work in promoting human rights, for example, through the Foreign Office’s Gulf 
initiative and Arab partnership, which are very specific examples of where we have sought to 
exercise influence. These cross-government efforts are aimed at strengthening regional 
security, at building commercial, economic, cultural and educational links and ties, and at key 
foreign policy priorities of the Government. I would like to mention that the visits by 
members of the Royal Family are instrumental in extending the UK’s influence overseas. 
A specific example of one campaign through which the Foreign Office has sought to change 
the international agenda through the exercise of its indirect influence and soft power would 
be the Foreign Secretary’s initiative on the prevention of sexual violence in conflict, which he 
launched on 29 May 2012. I will not go into the detail for reasons of time, but this has 
culminated already this year in a declaration by G8 Foreign Ministers. We have been working 
through political and diplomacy channels and in the area of capacity development to 
practically strengthen the ability of governments on the ground to address this and move the 
stigma from the victims to the perpetrators of sexual violence in conflict, which simply had 
not been addressed by the international community before but now has been brought right 
up the agenda. We have been able to do that because we have had the ability to direct and 
focus the influence and attraction that we have towards this very specific agenda. 
The GREAT campaign is another area that I am sure we will touch on, in which we have 
adopted very much a campaign approach to changing the dial. I would like to refer to the 
speech that the Foreign Secretary gave at the Lord Mayor’s Banquet just a couple of months 
ago because this sums up the definition of how we can best exercise our influence 
internationally and the credibility that we have to do this. He said: “Britain is a diplomatic 
and cultural power, and one of the few countries that can ‘turn the dial’ in world affairs. We 
are diplomatically active in most countries on earth, able to project military force if 
necessary, outward-looking and open in our disposition, and skilled at using our democratic 
institutions, our experiences, our language and our culture to work with other nations to 
help them overcome their problems”. As a broad introduction, I will leave it at that and 
perhaps my colleagues will continue if you would like answers from other departments. 
Q2  The Chairman: Thank you very much indeed. That was an excellent opening survey 
and indeed, as you say, an entrée to your other colleagues to expand on that very telling 
phrase, “a diplomatic and cultural power”—and presumably, we hope, a trading and business 
power as well. Still within the framework of this question, perhaps I could ask your colleague 
from the Foreign Office, Mr Mitchell, if he would like to add a few comments on that aspect. 
Andrew Mitchell: By all means. Thank you, Lord Chairman. To talk a little bit about the 
challenge, first of all, we recognise that sustainable economic growth in the United Kingdom 
will be delivered only through energetic action overseas. The United Kingdom is a strong 
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economy. What the Foreign Office is in a position to do, working with its partners overseas, 
is to help to create the global conditions for continued and sustained growth. Through our 
missions overseas, through the person of the head of mission, our work is about using 
political insight and influence to promote British business interests, to work for open 
economies, to combat protectionism, and to work to remove barriers to business, including 
weak governance, overregulation and corruption. We use that wide network and strong 
relationships to sustain an open, transparent, rules-based international economic system, and 
to advance international trade.  
You mentioned in your introduction that the Prime Minister had been speaking again today 
about the global race. Through the work that we do overseas, we recognise the importance 
of the British economy being competitive. We recognise that we need therefore to bring to 
bear all the assets of Government overseas. The heads of mission in our embassies and high 
commissions around the world are responsible for integrating that work. There will be a 
single business plan in every mission overseas, a very important aspect of which will be how 
we pursue our prosperity interests around the world, using and leveraging the various assets 
of other Government departments to good effect. As my colleague said, if one has been in 
that position of leveraging our assets overseas, there is no doubt that our credibility—the 
quality of the influence we are able to bear—is a function of Britain’s soft power. We are a 
member of multiple international institutions. We have genuine global reach as a nation. We 
are a member of a number of multilateral international organisations that help to extend and 
expand that reach. From our perspective in supporting British business overseas, that is a 
very important aspect of the way in which we exercise that soft power. 
The Chairman: That is the broad aims; we are obviously going to come on to the 
performance in a moment. 
Q3   Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: Chairman, perhaps I might pose a supplementary 
question to the two representatives from the Foreign Office, particularly to Hugh Elliott. I 
know that it is your job to be as positive as possible about all the things that you are doing. 
Did you not feel, in what you said to us, that you were sounding a wee bit complacent, that 
there is nothing more to be done? 
Hugh Elliott: Lord Foulkes, no, I did not. If I gave the impression of being complacent, I 
apologise. Absolutely not, this is an ever-changing panorama in terms of the context in which 
we have to adapt to successfully project and use soft power in order to achieve the 
outcomes that we want. I know that questions may be directed to us in the future around 
the digital revolution, which is a major challenge for the Government, as it is for all 
institutions, in having to adapt to a transformation of the way in which people communicate 
around the world. So absolutely not, we are by no means complacent—lots more to do. 
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: You spoke about our democratic institutions. Let us be self-
critical here. We know about some of our problems in our democratic institutions. Should 
we not be a bit more—not modest—careful in explaining what the United Kingdom and 
how we operate, and say that we have things to learn? The whole purpose of this 
Committee is not for us to say how wonderful we are and have been, but to find out how 
other countries are doing it and what new ideas there might be. Have you set your mind to 
that as well? 
Hugh Elliott: Absolutely. We are very conscious that the ability to exercise this sort of 
influence is very much a factor of one’s credibility as a nation. I referred to that before and I 
think it is a very important issue. One’s credibility is also determined by the nature of 
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positive bilateral relationships with important nations, as well as multilateral relationships, 
and those are achieved through understanding the interests and activities of others as much 
as of discussing one’s own. So I absolutely agree with you. 
The Chairman: I am going to be a slightly maddening Chairman, Lord Foulkes, and say that 
the thrust of your questions is absolutely right and we are going to come to the whole 
pattern of what is holding us back and what this Committee can contribute, but first, a 
smaller matter: did you have any interests to declare? 
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: Oh, yes, sorry. I should have said that right at the start. Apart 
from what is included in the Register, I am also president of the Caribbean Council but I am 
not paid for it. 
The Chairman: Still in the framework of this question—we were on the prosperity 
theme—perhaps I can turn to Maddalaine Ansell of BIS to ask how her department sees this 
whole concept. 
Maddalaine Ansell: Absolutely. We are very well aligned with the Foreign Office’s 
objectives in this. The overarching objective for the Department for Business, Innovation and 
Skills is to return the economy to growth, and we recognise that this needs to be export-
led. As part of that, we are working very closely with the Foreign Office; for example, on 
encouraging rules-based trade with other countries, particularly the emerging powers that 
do not necessarily have the same systems that we do. We also work very closely with the 
FCO on science, innovation and education, not only for the direct benefits that this brings to 
growth or education exports but for the soft power collateral benefit that we gain through 
that. 
Q4  The Chairman: Thank you very much. The words of the Foreign Secretary about 
diplomatic and cultural power were quoted. One of the phenomena that we will be looking 
at much more closely is the relationship between creativity and cultural activity and its 
consequent impact on business relations and other aspects of government. Perhaps Mr 
Nichol would talk to us for a moment about that. 
Keith Nichol: Thank you, Lord Chairman. This area of soft power certainly is a priority for 
my Secretary of State. She sees it as central to the DCMS agenda. I echo the points that 
were made about what the Prime Minister said about the global race. We know that other 
countries are increasingly seeking to deploy their soft power assets, so we are in a 
competitive situation. There is absolutely no scope for complacency. When we hear very 
positive messages about how the UK is perceived as a world leader in culture and the 
creative industries, that is reflected economically through the export of creative industries—
everything from fashion to film to broadcasting—but we cannot rest on our laurels.  
We have been given a terrific position by London 2012 and it is a key part of our Olympic 
legacy to deploy our cultural assets for the benefit of the UK as a whole. In doing so, we also 
promote the UK’s values around the world and we support our bodies in a way that is 
respectful of the arm’s-length principle. What we cannot do, for example, is direct our 
cultural bodies to go to Singapore and put on a show there, but we can align our activity 
with what they want to do. Working in partnership with the Foreign Office, the British 
Council and UKTI, we have an increasing alignment—a coalition, if you will—to pursue these 
activities in a way that benefits the UK collectively. 
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Reciprocity is absolutely vital here. This should not be just about us doing things to the rest 
of the world. It should be about us welcoming the best in contemporary culture from 
around the world to expose the UK audiences to that and, in doing so, build the trust that 
we need to have relations with countries for the future. 
The Chairman: Thank you. Finally, I will turn to the Department for International 
Development. Barbara Hendrie, you are a considerable and established expert in very 
important fields to do with development. You are an anthropologist, I think. In the halls and 
portals of DfID—where you have a very substantial budget, of course—how do you all react 
when the subject of soft power comes up? 
Barbara Hendrie: Thank you, my Lord Chairman. As you will know, DfID’s mission is 
focused on development and poverty reduction. When we think about our contribution to 
soft power, it is primarily through the impact and the results that we produce and the 
integrity of our development programme. We have had very positive feedback for DfID as a 
global leader in development, generated out of our commitment to reduce poverty and to 
reach the international target of 0.7% of gross national income provided as official 
development assistance. We will become the first G8 country to hit that target this year, as 
well as the first EU country110. Making good on our commitment may have, for example,  
translated into the Secretary-General asking Prime Minister David Cameron to co-chair his 
high-level panel on the post-2015 development agenda, which will basically set the global 
agenda for the new set of global development goals for the next generation. That panel has 
recently produced a very influential report. We feel that the capability of our development 
programmes generates soft power for the UK by enabling us to play a leadership role on the 
global development agenda. 
The Chairman: Thank you. I think that brings us to the end of round one. We have had all 
the departments now giving their overview. Perhaps Lord Forsyth will develop this theme. 
Q5  Lord Forsyth of Drumlean: Thank you, Lord Chairman. I declare my interests as on 
the Register. The only thing I can think of that is not on the Register is that I am a patron of 
a charity that helps women in India. We have heard phrases like “turn the dial”, “soft 
power”, “collateral benefit” and “rules-based trade”, and Barbara Hendrie has just told us 
how marvellous it is that we have such a fantastic input in terms of resources towards 
development programmes. Can you focus on the outputs and tell me specifically what your 
departments have achieved in enhancing the UK’s attractiveness and influence abroad and in 
furthering the UK’s priorities, and how you measure that? Perhaps you could give us some 
examples of successes and how they have been measured and of failures and how they have 
been measured. It is very difficult to believe that there are systems in place that look at 
effectiveness if you are not able to come up with examples of failures and how they have 
been turned round, as well as successes. 
The Chairman: Who would like to start? Mr Elliott? 
Hugh Elliott: I would be happy to kick off. Thank you, my Lord Chairman. In terms of what 
we have done to enhance the UK’s attractiveness and influence, and the extent to which we 
have achieved what we have set out to achieve, I would like to answer this in two parts, if I 
may. I am sure that my colleagues will have a lot to contribute. I go back to my first point, 
which is that when we are talking about projecting the UK overseas and the UK’s 
attractiveness and influence, we are talking about the whole broad range of the UK’s foreign 
                                            
110 The UK will not be the first EU country to reach the 0.7% ODA/GNI target. In 2012 and in previous years Denmark, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Sweden spent over 0.7% of their GNI as ODA 
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policy. I would refer the Committee to our annual report for 2011-12 and the annual report 
for 2012-13, which will come out shortly. I appreciate that that is just one part of the 
question— 
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean: Forgive me for interrupting you, but I am looking for 
specifics. For example, I am looking at the pound having fallen by about 25% and our exports 
remaining pretty well neutral. I am looking for specific examples of where you have achieved 
these objectives. 
Hugh Elliott: Absolutely. I was just about to come on to that. I just wanted to reinforce the 
point that the generic issue is important because a lot of activity goes on underneath that. I 
will give you one specific example which is perhaps illustrative of what goes on around the 
world in so many ways, in so many different places and by so many different posts. This is 
something that was carried out by our embassy in Mexico. The problem with Mexico was 
that the UK brand was relatively low and that in the UK people were partly ignorant of 
Mexico or had insufficient knowledge of it as a potential market. The problem was that we 
were not exporting as much as we should have been doing. We were not exploiting the 
potential of Mexico as a bilateral partner to the degree that we should have been.  
When we talk about the embassy, as I hope we will illustrate further on, we are talking 
across Government here, the embassy working as Government joined-up overseas. The 
embassy launched a campaign in 2012 to promote the UK in Mexico. I will not go through 
every detail, but there was a whole part of that campaign that had to address the problem of 
those perceptions. That was done partly through cultural visits and government visits; it was 
done partly through the blessing that was the Olympics last year, which gave us global 
projection and global visibility; and it was done partly through the GREAT campaign, which 
we will also hear about. In a nutshell, it was a sustained campaign, with top-level visits both 
ways—the Prime Minister to Mexico, the Mexican President to the UK—and a whole series 
of events, some of them quite small; for example, little things such as putting GREAT 
branding on the disabled entrance to the UK embassy. That was quite a small but totemic 
thing to happen in Mexico City and it is still there on the pavement.  
Cutting straight to the chase, what did that campaign achieve? The figures were that goods 
exports to Mexico went up by 13% from 2011 to 2012 to more than £1 billion, and that 
visitors to the UK increased by 7% to 84,000 in 2012. Those numbers may seem relatively 
small. What does “turn the dial” mean specifically? It means having that sort of impact in a 
relatively short space of time, and what we are doing around the world and focusing on 
priority markets and countries is to try to achieve that sort of specific objective. 
The Chairman: Lord Hodgson, would you like to pursue the same theme but still wider? 
Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts: I think that Lord Forsyth wants a follow-up. 
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean: I asked each department if they would answer the question. 
The Chairman: Fine. Which department do you want to focus on now? 
Q6  Lord Forsyth of Drumlean: I want to hear from all of them. Perhaps we should start 
with BIS. 
Maddalaine Ansell: Yes, of course. I can talk about some of the specific work strands that 
colleagues are leading on in this agenda. I might have to give the very specific achievements 
from my own area of science, innovation and education, because I will not otherwise have 
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the details at my fingertips. Among the things we do, we ensure that we take a leading role 
in delivering trade liberalisation agreements that suit UK interests, including mobilising the 
Government to support an EU-US trade agreement. A fairly recent achievement in that area 
is that UK retailers are now able to operate in India in a way that they were not able to a 
year or so ago. We also look to tackle market access barriers and threats to UK business 
investment, both through the EU and through bilateral dialogues and direct lobbying.  
Perhaps you would not usually describe this as a market access barrier, but one of the 
achievements we have made in Brazil is an agreement with FAPESP, which is the organisation 
that delivers research funding in the state of Sao Paulo, which is the most important state in 
Brazil for science funding. We agreed with FAPESP that it would use the same criteria as we 
do for allocating research funding. It is important to us that research funding is allocated for 
the most excellent research, decided by peer review. Some countries prefer to have a more 
top-down approach to allocating research funding. The achievement in Brazil was that by 
creating one single peer-review process involving Brazilian reviewers in a process that we 
would recognise, it has been possible for far more UK-Sao Paulo research to take place than 
would otherwise have been the case. We are currently following the same approach with 
the Ministry of Science and Technology in China, which also has quite a top-down approach, 
and we are looking to work with it to introduce peer-reviewing processes. 
Another kind of market barrier that we are working to address is around a mutual 
recognition of qualifications in the education field. We are working very closely at the 
moment with India and the United Arab Emirates, and we hope very soon to be working 
with Russia, to find ways in which we can mutually recognise each other’s qualifications, 
which makes it easier for students to study overseas and know that the degree they have 
achieved overseas will be recognised when they come back to the UK. 
BIS also does a fair amount of work supporting the activities of the G8 and the G20. Again, 
in my own area, we are working to deliver the G8 science ministerial on Wednesday. We 
are also looking to encourage open access and open data, and to see if we can work 
together to tackle problems such as antimicrobial resistance, all of which are important for 
soft power because they enhance the UK’s standing as a key science nation. We find that 
when countries are thinking about what areas they would like to work on with the EU, many 
of them think of science and education as important areas for engagement. 
BIS also works very closely with UKTI, which we co-sponsor with the Foreign Office. Again, 
I do not have the figures at my fingertips but I know that UKTI has quite a comprehensive 
set of targets for measuring trade increases that are brought about by its activity. 
Q7  The Chairman: That is an impressive list. Shall we just hear from DCMS on outputs? 
Keith Nichol: Thank you. Of course, the Olympics was not solely a DCMS project but 
across Government as a whole, but there were a couple of outputs from the Olympics; for 
example, the Cultural Olympiad and the demonstration of our world-leading arts and 
culture. Shakespeare’s Globe put on the “Globe to Globe” season during the Olympics: 
Shakespeare’s plays in 37 languages from 37 countries around the world. That has already 
stimulated both another Globe season this year, as well as all sorts of demand from around 
the world for partnerships with arts organisations during the Shakespeare 400th anniversary 
in 2016. Those partnerships are flourishing. It is not something that came to an end at the 
end of the Olympics. We hear from around the world that the Paralympics was a 
tremendous vehicle in helping to create a more enlightened attitude towards disability in 
several countries. Having the first Olympics where every country sent a woman athlete was 
an output that Ministers regard as very successful. 
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In a different area, you have the work of organisations such as the British Library or the 
British Museum in preserving the archaeological heritage of countries such as Iraq or other 
post-conflict states. That sort of thing does not get much publicity but it builds trust in these 
countries as they rebuild themselves, and helps the UK become a partner of choice for those 
countries.  
We have very clear figures on the outputs in terms of tourism. People do not come to this 
country for the weather; they come for our arts, culture and heritage. We see that 
specifically in not just increased numbers of visitors but increased visitor spend. In terms of 
economic growth, that is usually important. 
In China last year we had the biggest ever festival of UK culture in China. That built on the 
experience from the Shanghai Expo, where Thomas Heatherwick’s pavilion was voted by the 
Chinese public as the best national pavilion. He of course went on to create the Cauldron 
for the Olympics. He and other British architects and designers are winning multimillion 
pound contracts for major infrastructure projects around the world and we believe that our 
investment in culture and the creative industries is underpinning those successful bids for 
those contracts. 
A final positive example is the recent joint venture that was announced between Pinewood 
and Bruno Wu, a major Chinese film producer. We believe that our film tax credits were 
important in attracting the Chinese to that; not just the Chinese but other Asian producers 
and Hollywood as well. Again, we are in a competitive position there. 
You asked for failures. In terms of our values, we use sport in all sorts of multilateral 
contexts to tackle things such as racism in sport and anti-doping. That is where there is 
certainly no room for complacency. There are still examples of racism in sport in this 
country and we need to ensure that we have our own house in order as we try to 
encourage the rest of the world to a more enlightened place. 
The Chairman: I was very pleased to hear that about Shakespeare’s Globe—as a former 
director of Shakespeare’s Globe, I should perhaps have declared my previous interest. It is 
very interesting and raises all sorts of points that we are going to pursue later about the 
contact between government and the non-government sector. 
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean: Perhaps, Chairman, to save time, it might be easier for the 
departments to let us have a note along the lines of my question in due course. 
Q8  The Chairman: Certainly, we have had a long, long list of very useful items, which in 
due course we would like to see recorded in notes. Perhaps we can hear from Dr Hendrie 
as well on outputs. 
Barbara Hendrie: Thank you, my Lord Chairman. Of course, we primarily measure our 
achievements and our outputs in terms of development outcomes. We can give you detail 
about, for example, the numbers of bed nets, children immunised and people provided with 
emergency relief assistance globally. We would be very happy to provide that sort of 
information.  
In terms of soft power outcomes, of course this is not an explicit goal for the department; it 
is more of an indirect effect. But we do think that with the programme that we started in 
2010 with countries that we call emerging powers, we are generating real soft power 
benefits for the UK, particularly with countries such as Colombia, Mexico and China 
becoming interested in the UK model for how to establish a development co-operation 
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organisation. We have had requests for conversations, workshops and sharing of information 
where countries are looking to the UK example as one possibility of how they might 
structure such organisations; for example, Mexico is just setting up its own development co-
operation organisation. We are in conversation with Mexico at its request.  
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean: Sorry to interrupt you, but leaving aside emergency aid and 
immunisation programmes, you are looking at development aid. Surely in applying 
development aid, you try to advance the interests of British companies and so on, and have 
some degree of conditionality? 
Barbara Hendrie: Well, of course, UK aid is untied so we cannot give any special 
consideration to UK companies bidding for procurement contracts, for example. There is 
nothing to bar British companies from bidding and we do everything we can to make 
information available when those contracts are tendered, but our aid is untied so we cannot 
give special dispensation to UK companies. 
The Chairman: Perhaps I can just say to colleagues that if anyone wants to come in and 
make the discussion more flexible, I am very happy for them to do so.  
Q9  Baroness Nicholson of Winterbourne: Following the point that Lord Forsyth was 
making, the excellent outcomes that departmental representatives are telling us about are 
fully laudable. However, is it possible that they are a little bit as one would expect you to 
produce from your departmental responsibilities? Actually, what we are looking for is that 
extra called soft power, which is something over and above the normal daily routine as one 
would expect it. In your views, that may not be the case; you may feel that the departmental 
outcomes are reflected in some way or another in the soft power concept and therefore 
they qualify as soft power. Over and above that, I would like to know what evaluation 
mechanisms you are using, individually or together. How do the different departments 
correlate how soft power is being evaluated, by each department and collectively? Or is that 
not in fact possible and you merely quantify it as an extra piece of icing on your normal 
departmental cake? I have not yet been able to analyse that from the nice outcomes that 
have been presented. 
The Chairman: Would anyone like to have a go at that? Mr Elliott again? 
Hugh Elliott: I would be happy to kick off. I am sure that colleagues will have views. I think 
the underlying question is: is there an overarching articulated soft power strategy across 
Government covering all the potential areas of soft power? The answer is no; that does not 
exist.  
Lord Janvrin: Can I come in with question 7? 
The Chairman: We are going to come to co-ordination in more detail in a moment. If 
anyone has short questions now, that is fine. Sorry, were you in the middle of— 
Hugh Elliott: I certainly was, my Lord Chairman, but I am at the Committee’s disposal. 
The Chairman: Carry on, Mr Elliott, I am so sorry. 
Baroness Nicholson of Winterbourne: My question is on evaluation techniques.  
The Chairman: I see: evaluation, not co-ordination. 
Hugh Elliott: A broad, overarching, completely comprehensive strategy touching every issue 
of soft power does not exist. The Government have decided to focus in on specific areas 
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where there is indeed a great deal of collaboration and co-ordination across soft power, and 
I suspect that we will come on to some specific examples later around the emerging powers 
framework. I would also like to suggest that my colleagues talk a little bit about the GREAT 
campaign, which brings together a number of different elements of the UK’s soft power and 
how it is projected, and has some very hard metrics for how it is actually measured.  
I have two observations as to the underlying question. It is absolutely the case that the broad 
definition of soft power is so loose that it is an area where it can be difficult to apply very 
specific metrics. That is absolutely a fair comment. But when you focus it in on specific 
campaigns, it is absolutely possible to apply those metrics. Perhaps Keith would like to say a 
few words from the GREAT point of view. 
Keith Nichol: Thank you. The GREAT campaign is a marketing campaign across 
Government and a number of external agencies that was set up to coincide with the 
Olympics. We saw the Olympics as a terrific opportunity to market the UK more 
strategically. It has had until now three very clear pillars: one is around promoting more 
trade and inward investment, and there is a particular science and innovation angle to that; 
the second is around promoting more tourism to the UK; and the third is around promoting 
higher education. We want more students to come to the UK, not just because that has 
financial benefits but because it is one of the things that we know build trust in the UK 
among a generation that may include the future leaders of their countries. We are seeing 
both short-term outcomes and, I hope, longer-term outcomes from this. 
In terms of tourism, there is fairly robust analysis of the VisitBritain figures—which I am sure 
we can send to the Committee if that would be helpful—that where the GREAT campaign 
has focused on particular countries, there has been an increase in the number of visitors 
from those countries above and beyond what we would expect from normal business. The 
British Council has told us that in terms of international students considering a UK 
education, the GREAT campaign has helped to stimulate more positive views toward that. 
Again, because it started only last year, we do not yet have the actual outputs but we feel 
that we are moving in the right direction. In terms of free advertising for the UK and all its 
assets, from a £30 million investment in the entire campaign, we appear to have had 
advertising that would have cost the public purse £85 million had we chosen to commercially 
seek that visibility. This is all emerging after 12 months. UKTI is putting together clear figures 
on inward investment and exports. As the campaign continues, we believe that we are going 
to have some very crunchy evidence to point to. 
The Chairman: Several people want to come in this point. Lady Goudie? We will get to 
you eventually, Lord Hodgson. 
Q10  Baroness Goudie: I declare my interests that are on the Register. I am co-chair of 
the All-Party Group on Global Education for All, which is important to mention, because of 
the departments and those who are assisting us with that. I have only one short question, 
and it is to the Foreign Office, on the subject of co-ordination across departments. Was 
there not a recommendation by Lord Carter of Coles that there should be a soft power 
board within Government? I looked it up but could not find the membership of it, but it was 
a clear recommendation. It was quite some time ago but I found that it was still there in the 
Cabinet Office minutes. That would be rather vital to what we are talking about today, and 
to the future, because without that type of very senior co-ordination, certain things are 
going to get lost—not the main policy but a number of issues will get lost. 
The Chairman: Mr Elliott? 
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Hugh Elliott: Thank you very much, Lady Goudie, my Lord Chairman. Indeed, you are 
absolutely right, this goes back to the Wilton review back in 2002, which initially set up the 
Public Diplomacy Strategy Board, which the Carter review then assessed and decided to 
change its focus a little bit and turn it into the Public Diplomacy Board. This was indeed re-
set up in line with the Carter recommendations in 2006. It included several leading external 
thinkers in the area of soft power, including Simon Anholt, who produces the Nations Brand 
Index. The board served a valuable initial purpose in bringing together and giving direction to 
cross-Government soft power activities, especially around areas of best practice, but the 
decision that Ministers took over time was that the most important thing moving into the 
run-up to the Olympics was to focus on what was going to be a unique event and to focus 
what are always limited resources on making the very most out of that specific event. My 
colleague Andrew Mitchell, who was much more involved in the Olympics, might like to say 
a word or two about that. 
Andrew Mitchell: On the specific example of the Olympics, I should say that I was the 
Foreign Office’s Director for the Olympics and Paralympics in the run-up to the Games. The 
key point here is that this was a collaborative effort, not just across Government but with a 
variety of external agencies, the Mayor of London and, of course, LOCOG. We were in a 
position to build a campaign that was effectively an external campaign marketing Britain’s 
strengths in the context of the Olympics. This was led by the Foreign Office but co-
ordinated across Government, as I say. That campaign had a variety of features associated 
with it. At its heart was the desire to demonstrate that Britain is indeed not just a country of 
strong institutions but a modern, diverse, highly innovative society—one that brings together 
the best of traditional strengths of institutions with an ability to be relevant in the world 
today. In the context of that campaign, we had something like 1,500 events that we hosted in 
various places overseas. We developed a campaign that supported those events. We 
estimated at the time that something like 2 billion people were touched in some way by that 
global public diplomacy campaign; 70% of our posts took part in the campaign and we ran a 
number of global events, such as one in which we did 100 somethings on 100 days to go to 
the Olympics. This was an enormously successful campaign around the world. It was a 
relatively permissive environment in which to run a campaign of this kind because of course 
there was a tremendous amount of attention on the UK, but it was a very strong part of 
how we co-ordinated our public diplomacy efforts—our soft power efforts—in the run-up 
to the Olympics. 
The Chairman: Lord Janvrin, did you want to come in on this theme? 
Q11  Lord Janvrin: Yes, I would, but I had better do my interests. I am deputy chairman of 
HSBC Private Bank in the UK. I am on the board of trustees of a number of charities in this 
field, including the Royal Foundation, the Gurkha Welfare Trust, the Entente Cordiale 
Scholarships Trust, the National Portrait Gallery and Philanthropy Impact. I am on the 
advisory board of the UK India Business Council, and I am a former and now honorary 
member of the Queen’s Household. 
You said that there is no overall strategy but you have strategies in particular areas. I think I 
am right in saying that a business plan produced by the FCO some years ago talked in terms 
of producing an overall strategy. Is that now not the case and you are not going to try to 
draw the threads of soft power together in an overall strategy? If not, why not? The other 
element that I would like to come on to, but I do not know whether now is the time, is 
learning from other countries. But can I ask the overall strategy one, which is specifically for 
the FCO? 
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The Chairman: Yes, let us come on to other countries later. It is Mr Elliott yet again, but if 
anyone else wishes to come in, please do so. We want to keep this comprehensive. 
Hugh Elliott: In the interests of completeness, I will clarify for Baroness Goudie that the 
Public Diplomacy Board has since lapsed.  
The Chairman: Yes, that we understand. 
Hugh Elliott: The question about the intention to publish a soft power strategy goes back 
to my answer to the previous question. A great deal of work went on at official level in 2011 
across government departments—this was not just the Foreign Office, although the Foreign 
Office was leading the work; and it was not just across departments, it was with outside 
organisations, our arm’s-length bodies, academics, NGOs, business and the voluntary 
sector—looking at exactly this broad issue of soft power. Ministers having looked at this, the 
decision was that with the Olympics looming extraordinarily large we should indeed focus 
very much on the Olympics and getting the most out of the Olympics as the unique 
opportunity for soft power projection that the United Kingdom had at that point in time. As 
for the future, I cannot really speculate. 
Baroness Prosser: It is a fairly straightforward question, I hope, Lord Chairman. My 
interests are as recorded in the register of interests, but I should also mention that I am the 
secretary of the All-Party Group on Ethics and Sustainability in Fashion. My question goes to 
Mr Nichol. Was the UK’s reputation enhanced or damaged by the recent disaster in 
Bangladesh, both by the disaster itself and the positive response of some British companies, 
which has brought about quite a good result for lots of workers in Bangladesh? Not all 
British companies responded positively but the overall result has been quite helpful. Do you 
think that it impacted upon the view of the Bangladeshi people of the UK as a trader? 
Keith Nichol: It certainly shaped people’s perceptions in this country as well as in 
Bangladesh and around the world. If such a tragedy serves to bring to light the circumstances 
in which these textiles are created, that is a positive thing in the sense of learning from such 
a terrible experience. It illustrates a point that relates to Baroness Nicholson’s question 
about how we measure the impact of all of this. You are absolutely right. The reaction of UK 
businesses and companies in the fashion and textiles industry was, if anything, possibly more 
important than the Government’s response. That role of ethics in business is shaping how 
the UK is perceived around the world. We have to recognise the limits to the Government’s 
influence in all this. The Government can act in all sorts of ways to try to promote positive 
images of the UK but there are many external factors, including the role that business plays, 
that shape the way we are perceived around the world. 
Baroness Prosser: I think the view was that the Government’s response was pretty 
negligible, really; they hardly said a word, which was a bit of a shame. 
The Chairman: That is another question, I feel. Lord Ramsbotham? 
Q12  Lord Ramsbotham: Thank you, Lord Chairman. I declare only one interest that is 
not on the Register, which is that I am a former soldier and I was at one time involved with 
post-conflict reconstruction operations with and for the UN and the World Bank. Following 
on from what Lord Janvrin said about co-ordinating a part of the strategy, and also 
something you said at the beginning, Mr Elliott, about your responsibility for cross-
government conflict prevention, as I remember from my work at that time, intervention and 
post-conflict reconstruction somewhere was conflict prevention somewhere else. All the 
time we have been speaking, Afghanistan has been going through my mind, as indeed Iraq 
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has, because I always felt that with Iraq we never really co-ordinated the soft power and 
indeed a lot of the other economic development that we could have raised from our 
intervention and taken advantage of it. We have now got 2014 looming, and if we are not 
careful we will lose all the advantages that we have as a nation in Afghanistan. Who is 
actually co-ordinating what is going on? I know that the MoD training is part of the soft 
power development but who is actually co-ordinating it? 
The Chairman: Any offers? Mr Elliott again. 
Hugh Elliott: Thank you very much, Lord Chairman, Lord Ramsbotham. The co-ordination 
is done under the auspices of the National Security Council. It is important to say a few 
words about that, not just in respect of Afghanistan, where I know a lot of attention is being 
paid, as one would expect, to 2014 and to the whole range of areas in which the 
Government and the United Kingdom can effectively project soft power. More broadly than 
Afghanistan—and perhaps I should have mentioned this in the answer to Lord Janvrin—it is 
important to note that in terms of strategy around soft power, Ministers decided that rather 
than taking a completely global approach, the National Security Council would focus on key 
emerging powers and within that develop a specific strand around soft power. Perhaps my 
colleague Mr Mitchell would like to say a word or two about that. 
The Chairman: We had reports about 18 months ago that our military forces in 
Afghanistan were becoming more involved in—or Ministers thought that they should 
become more involved in—civil power, civic operations and social reconstruction. Where 
would that idea have come from and which department would have overseen any change of 
emphasis in the military’s role? 
Hugh Elliott: I imagine that would have been done under the auspices of the National 
Security Council but I am not an expert on this issue. Perhaps it would be acceptable to 
write to you and answer that specific question. 
The Chairman: Right, thank you. Sorry, you were just suggesting who should answer Lord 
Ramsbotham’s question. 
Hugh Elliott: Perhaps Mr Mitchell can talk a little bit about that. 
Andrew Mitchell: When we talk about the emerging powers and the work that we do in 
the Foreign Office, in co-ordination with others, in engaging with the emerging powers, I 
recognise that that is not the totality of our targets for soft power in the world. It is discrete 
from the question of how we engage in the context of Afghanistan, but it is worth noting 
that the National Security Council has indeed decided to form a co-ordinating sub-
committee on the emerging powers. This is part of the emerging powers initiative. Again, 
that broader emerging powers initiative is a response to the shift of power to the south and 
the east and the recognition that economic opportunity will increasingly come from a shift 
towards new export markets and new opportunities in those fast growing economies. As a 
consequence, the Foreign Office has undertaken a process of opening or upgrading 20 new 
embassies, consulates and trade offices in countries such as India, Brazil, El Salvador and 
Paraguay. We have upgraded or opened nine new posts, and we are working to upgrade 
further embassies and consulates in countries such as India, Liberia and Paraguay as part of 
an attempt to move our resources to those areas of the world where we feel that the 
combination of our ability to influence through soft power and by other means and to 
support our businesses is highest. There is also a dedicated emerging powers team within 
the Foreign and Commonwealth Office that supports that work, which is an innovation. 
Government (Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, Department for Culture, 
Media and Sport, Department for International Development and Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office) – Oral evidence (QQ 1-22) 
482 
 
As I mentioned, the work itself is co-ordinated through a sub-committee of the National 
Security Council that is charged with work on the emerging powers. This focuses on four 
strands of work: trade and investment; building alliances with the emerging powers to 
establish the rules-based international economic system that I talked about earlier; security 
issues; and cultural and people-to-people links. This is an exemplar of a project that the 
Government have undertaken, that they are co-ordinating across government, using the 
machinery of the National Security Council to do so.  
I will also say a word about how we co-ordinate overseas. Of course, the head of mission in 
any given country will have a business plan, which will integrate the various measures that 
are part of the work that the mission undertakes. That is a broad spectrum of activity from 
trade and investment targets, which will be written into the business plan, through to 
outcomes associated with, for example, defence diplomacy work or other aspects of the 
work that we do overseas. That mission will also have a set of communications objectives 
and a team supporting those communications objectives.  
To answer your question, in the context of Afghanistan, the Afghan-facing communications in 
Kabul are delivered by a cross-departmental British embassy communications team through 
a range of media. In Afghanistan social media is a particularly effective means of 
communicating with people: more than 32,000 people, including a high percentage of 18 to 
24 year-olds, are following the British embassy in Kabul’s Facebook page. The dedicated 
communications operation within the British embassy in Kabul integrates the various aspects 
of activity and support from other Government departments in delivering that 
communication. 
The Chairman: Lord Foulkes, you wanted to ask a question on this, and then I would like 
to bring in Lord Hodgson. 
Q13  Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: In answer to Baroness Goudie, you said that the Public 
Diplomacy Board has lapsed. In answer to Lord Janvrin, you said that the National Security 
Council has a sub-committee dealing with the emerging powers and co-ordinating that work. 
But that is not anything to do with the business plan for co-ordinating soft power in every 
country of the world, which is what was originally proposed in the FCO business plan for 
2010-12. What I do not understand is where you all meet together to discuss co-ordinated 
activity to put our soft power plans into action. Where do your Ministers meet together? 
Which fora do you meet in? 
Hugh Elliott: With regard to the business plan and the soft power strategy, as I indicated, 
Ministers decided to focus in on the Olympics— 
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: But they are past, the Olympics have finished. They have been 
finished for a long time. That is living in the past. 
Hugh Elliott: There is a great deal of work being done to make the most of the Olympic 
legacy. There is a great deal of business that is being done on the back of the Olympics. We 
believe that it is very important to make the most of that legacy. There are a number of 
other sporting opportunities that we can learn from on the back of the Olympics, such as 
the Commonwealth Games in Glasgow, where a great deal of work and collaboration is 
going on across Government and with the Scottish Government. That is an ongoing area, 
and Lord Coe would certainly take the view that we are only halfway there—10 years in, we 
have got another 10 years of work to make the very most of the Olympics in London. 
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: That is sport; that is only one aspect. 
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Hugh Elliott: That is one area. Another area where the Government get together to discuss 
and collaborate across government is in the National Security Council with regard to the 
emerging powers. Another area is around the GREAT campaign in order to project Britain 
overseas. Another area where Ministers decided that it was important for us to link up more 
and make the most of what Britain has to offer in order to project our soft power is around 
the education strand of the industrial strategy, which will be published in the near future. My 
answer is that there are a number of different areas in which this work is being taken 
forward in a highly co-ordinated way. 
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: But nowhere where all of them are being taken forward 
together.  
The Chairman: We are pursuing two strands here and, as Chair, I am trying to think how 
best to develop them. One is the co-ordination, which is not only transdepartmental but 
ministerial and indeed the Cabinet and the Cabinet committees are involved here. We will 
want to pursue that, possibly, and Baroness Prosser may have a question on that in a 
moment. First, can we pick up Andrew Mitchell’s comments earlier about emerging markets? 
There are reports—and indeed, ministerial utterances—indicating that our performance in 
emerging markets is not good, that we are behind the others; we have arrived and found the 
Germans already there, the French already there and so on. Lord Hodgson has great 
experience in this area and would like to pursue that. 
Q14  Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts: Chairman, I have to make the declaration: I 
have no interests to declare, except those that are in the Register, which I do not think are 
particularly relevant to our discussions here. In fact, probably the nearest I get to having 
something to declare is the fact that my wife is a member of the Foreign Secretary’s advisory 
panel on preventing sexual violence in conflict situations. The fact that I do not quite know 
what the title is shows that I am not absolutely close to it, but I probably should put that on 
the record.  
My question has largely been forked over in the questions we have had already. In particular, 
it deals with building our commercial economic interests in the light of the new emerging 
markets: Asia, Africa and Latin America. That is a pretty broad range, and although we have 
been told that we have a genuine global reach, should we not be finding some focus and 
some segmentation in order to increase our impact using the resources that we have? It may 
be that bilateral, non-official things can go on elsewhere but where should the Government 
be focusing in a slightly narrower way, bearing in mind that, as we have been told, what 
appeals in Paris appals in Riyadh? We have also heard about the success the Australians have 
had in building a relationship with Indonesia with student visas. There is a saying about 
marketing campaigns: if you throw enough mud against a wall, some of it will stick. One 
sometimes wonders if we are not just throwing mud at the wall and hoping that some of it 
will stick.  
The Chairman: I think we will ask BIS to start on that but, again, it covers all departments. 
Maddalaine Ansell: Yes. We do attempt to prioritise. Again, I will talk most specifically 
about education and science. In education, we took as our starting point the list of emerging 
powers developed by the National Security Council. Then we did some analysis looking at 
which of those countries had demographics that suggested that there would be an increasing 
demand of education and which of them had expressed the desire to increase the number of 
young people going on to tertiary education. We also thought about which of them indicated 
a willingness to work with the UK. From that, we developed a list of eight countries and one 
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region—the Gulf—in which we are prioritising our efforts to co-ordinate all the major 
players that represent the education sector so that we can go together and demonstrate the 
breadth and depth of the UK education system. Around the edges of that, many universities 
are pursuing their own niche interests according to their own business plans but we are 
focusing our co-ordinated government effort on those countries and markets. Most recently, 
David Willetts led what we call a system-to-system mission to Mexico and Colombia, where 
he talked about, for example, supporting them in the commercialisation of science, which is a 
key interest in both those countries; how we could support them to create government-
sponsored scholarship programmes; and how we could make it easier for them to send large 
numbers of their best students to the UK to study.  
On the science side, we are still going through the process, working with various learned 
people from the scientific community—the Royal Society, other learned bodies, the research 
councils, et cetera—to think about how we should prioritise in our scientific bilateral 
engagement. Here we are thinking about the importance of maintaining the excellence of the 
UK research base by working with the best in the world—so we should not forget our 
traditional partners such as the United States, France, Germany and Japan as we think about 
the emerging powers—as well as about the kind of engagement that we should have with 
different emerging powers. There are some, such as China, Brazil and India, that are 
excellent in many fields of research and we would want to work with them to maintain our 
own excellence, but there are others that I perhaps will not name here that are not so 
strong yet in science and research. We have done analysis around what it is about the UK 
that is attractive to them and what might be a golden key to unlock other kinds of 
engagement, and there we are thinking more about how we can support capacity-building or 
other kinds of scientific research collaboration. On the scientific side, it is still somewhat a 
work in progress but we are making quite good progress with our stakeholders. 
The Chairman: Lord Hodgson, do you want to pursue that? 
Q15  Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts: If the other departments think that they have a 
series of focused programmes, it would be helpful if we could know about them, in so far as 
we can, because otherwise we are going to be up here at 30,000 feet but what we are trying 
to do is get down to 500 feet to see some quite precise deliveries and results. If these are 
on the record it would be helpful for us to see them. 
The Chairman: Do you have a comment on that, Mr Mitchell? 
Andrew Mitchell: Would it be helpful for us to write or to answer now? 
The Chairman: Yes, it would be helpful to write. That is the way to do it, possibly. 
Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts: Yes, it would be very interesting to see whether all 
departments are concentrating on the same markets. 
The Chairman: Baroness Prosser, we have given this co-ordination issue quite a beating. Is 
there anything you want to add? There are examples of where one department seems to be 
working against another; for instance, in visas. 
Baroness Prosser: Hopefully rather quickly, Chairman, because we have already had a bit 
of a run round the bush with this. I got the impression that you were slightly defensive about 
co-ordination. I hope you are not going to be because it seems to me that unless there is an 
overarching view in Government as to what each of you is getting up to something is going 
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to fall between the gaps and/or one or t’other of you is going to be doing things that 
somebody else is doing, because they are all interrelated in very many ways. I was hoping 
that you were going to be able to tell us that there is some Government structure led by 
one or other of your departments that makes sure that that does not happen, but it appears 
that you are not able to say that. Perhaps you can enlighten us. 
Andrew Mitchell: I hesitate to refer to the National Security Council again but it is quite 
important to bear in mind how the National Security Council deals with particular questions, 
not so much thematically but, for example, looking at a relationship with a country with 
which we have a long, strong and deep relationship that spans the interests of multiple 
Government departments. It is in the National Security Council that that variety of interests 
is brought to bear. The intention that Ministers have in dealing with issues in that way is 
precisely the one that you identify: namely, to ensure that we are not dealing separately in 
silos with issues associated with each of those countries but that the relationship as a whole 
with that country is dealt with in one place by the entire ministerial team. Now, there are 
certain sub-committees of the National Security Council that take particular issues away and 
work on them in more detail, but again on the basis of co-ordination between Government 
departments. As the Foreign Office’s director for prosperity and broadly responsible for the 
global economy, I spend a significant amount of my time in co-ordination with other 
Government departments. Several of the units that I am responsible for are joint units with 
other Government departments. Co-ordination across Government is part of everything 
that I do and I could not do my job were I not co-ordinating with other Government 
departments. I would not underestimate the impact that the National Security Council has in 
defining the terms of that co-ordination. 
The Chairman: Does the NSC meet regularly? 
Andrew Mitchell: The NSC meets on a very regular basis, yes.  
The Chairman: What, once a month? 
Andrew Mitchell: I am not entirely sure; I would have to check that. But certainly the NSC 
and the various Cabinet committees and the NSC sub-committees meet on a very regular 
basis. They determine, for example, the pace and the scheduling of the work that we do on 
the emerging powers.  
The Chairman: Right, I think that we should move on because we have taken a lot of your 
time and you have been very forthcoming. Thank you very much. Baroness Morris, did you 
want to add a word? 
Q16  Baroness Morris of Bolton: Thank you. First of all, I declare my interests as set out 
in the Register. With relevance to this Committee, I am the Prime Minister’s trade envoy to 
Kuwait, Jordan and the Palestinian Territories. I am chairman of the Conservative Middle 
East Council. I travel extensively in the region and declare all my trips in the Register. I am 
chancellor of the University of Bolton, which confers degrees around the world. I am 
president of Medical Aid for Palestinians, president of the World Travel Market Advisory 
Council and, until recently, was a trustee of UNICEF UK.  
The Chairman: Thank you. 
Baroness Morris of Bolton: I think that covers it all. I would like to move to a part of the 
world where I hope we have a head start in soft power, and ask how your departments are 
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taking advantage of the UK’s relationship with Commonwealth countries. In relation to a 
question Lord Hodgson asked, Mr Nichol talked about the GREAT campaign and how it was 
having an impact on international students. But we know, particularly in India, that there was 
very much a message going out that the UK was closed for business, that you could not get a 
visa. The Lord Chairman touched on whether or not one department is sending out one 
message but a different message is being received from another. Perhaps you could 
specifically touch on that when you answer, please. 
The Chairman: After Mr Nichol, we will ask Dr Hendrie how DfID relates to the 
Commonwealth in particular, because it is a very important aspect.  
Keith Nichol: Thank you, Lord Chairman. In terms of our engagement with the 
Commonwealth, again working across Government, obviously we very much have one eye 
on the Commonwealth Games next year in Glasgow. All our sporting activity is very much a 
part of that. As with the Olympics, there will be a cultural festival around the 
Commonwealth Games. In that multilateral context, the sectors for which DCMS is 
responsible are very much joined up.  
In terms of individual countries within the Commonwealth—for example, India—it may not 
have received much attention when the Prime Minister went to India recently but the British 
Council is initiating a five-year programme of cultural exchanges with India under the title 
“Reimagine”, and that is very much what we are trying to do now in building on multiyear 
programmes rather than a single season or year of activity. It allows cultural organisations to 
plan a bit further ahead; for example, next year has recently been declared the UK-Russia 
Year of Culture and I am sure that it will be a tremendous success, but it is quite late in the 
planning cycle for a cultural body to develop a programme of activity for the next 12 
months. This “Reimagine” programme with India will cover a five-year period and we think 
that is a more sustainable way in which to build relationships. 
Baroness Morris of Bolton: But can you just touch on the student visas, because it is a 
terribly important part? Here we are: we are trying to encourage more students to come. I 
absolutely understand that we have to protect our country and make sure that the people 
who come are coming here for the right reasons. We had the GREAT campaign yet, very 
much in India particularly, the message went out to Indian students that the UK was closed 
for coming, and numbers dropped considerably in nearly all UK universities. 
Keith Nichol: I will make one point on that and, if I may, I think my BIS colleague may be 
able to enhance my answer. This is where it helps sometimes to look through the other end 
of the telescope. This cross-government co-ordination comes together in every country 
through our ambassador or high commissioner. In India, it is the high commission that brings 
together the visa services, the FCO team, the Intellectual Property Office, British Council 
and UKTI. In that challenge, which I do recognise around visas in India, it is our high 
commissioner’s role to address the perceptions around visas. 
Maddalaine Ansell: Yes, we very much recognise the issue of falling applications from 
Indian students following some of the unhelpful rhetoric. Under the GREAT campaign, the 
Indian high commission have bid for some funding in order to promote the message that 
international students are welcome to come to the UK, and that there is no cap on the 
number of legitimate students, and to explain the post-study work rules. We hope that will 
help to correct some of the amplification in the Indian press of some of the issues. 
Additionally with India, we have so far a rolling five-year programme called the UK-India 
Education and Research Initiative, where we work closely with the Indians to support 
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research collaborations, to work through issues like mutual recognition of qualifications, and 
also to deal with issues like that. We are about half way through the second five-year 
programme and just about to go into the evaluation of that to see whether it is something 
we should continue for a third term, should funding be available. 
Q17  The Chairman: Dr Hendrie, would you just like to comment, particularly on the 
Commonwealth aspect?  
Barbara Hendrie: Yes, thank you. We have a particular commitment to expand our support 
for 13 of the poorest Commonwealth countries, because some of the countries in the 
Commonwealth do face some of the biggest challenges on various dimensions of poverty. 
We will be increasing over the period to 2013/14 from £1.5 billion to £2.2 billion spend in 
Commonwealth countries. We also fund a number of different programmes run by the 
Commonwealth Secretariat, including core funding for the Commonwealth Secretariat itself. 
Total funding of Commonwealth programmes is in the order of £35 million. Within that, 
core support to the secretariat is about £11 million, so we have an expanding programme of 
inputs and development co-operation with Commonwealth countries and the secretariat. 
We are also working very actively to build development partnerships with South Africa and 
with India, where we are graduating, as you will know, our bilateral aid programmes, but still 
seeking to develop partnerships with those countries, particularly focused on third 
countries, mainly in sub-Saharan Africa and south Asia, where we would help provide a 
platform for India and South Africa to bring their own development expertise to poorer 
countries. So we are seeking to thicken the relationship there once our bilateral 
programmes close. 
Also, we work with the Commonwealth Secretariat to facilitate their engagement with 
different multilateral forums—for example, the G20. Alongside the Francophonie, we seek 
to enable the Commonwealth to engage with the development working group of the G20.  
Finally, we have been very active at the UN General Assembly in New York, to help broker 
a broader conversation—across Commonwealth countries in relation to the negotiations 
that will happen at the UN around the next development framework, including a common 
approach informed by our common history and values to development. 
Q18  The Chairman: Just to carry on from that, I am going to ask Baroness Goudie to ask 
another question, but the two are linked. The Commonwealth, after all, has got this working 
language, which is ours, and that contains its own attitudes and its own DNA, and ought to 
give this country, as Baroness Morris rightly said, a huge advantage in promoting our soft 
power relations with what is a third of the entire planet—two and a quarter billion people. 
At the same time, the connectivity is now absolutely total. It is not just a question of 
speaking the same language; it is instant and continuous connection at every point, every day, 
between every level of activity between all these countries. It is a vast new tableau. Are 
we—this is Baroness Goudie’s question; I must not put it for her, but that is where we are 
going. 
Baroness Goudie: I am very concerned. I do not think—I may be wrong—that we are 
communicating with all the countries that we should be communicating with. Also, thanks to 
technology now, we should be communicating with all the organisations—you have 
mentioned a few this afternoon; for example, there is the ILO, there are some of the 
organisations in Geneva, and some of the other organisations around the UN. Not only 
could we be selling our own ethical policy about how human rights should be run—about 
how the supply chain through these factories that Baroness Prosser has mentioned—by 
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asking countries and companies to sign up to the Athens agreement which this Government, 
through the Home Office, has been pushing, but by doing this we would be able to give a 
better chance for companies from the UK who are international to do trade with those 
countries. I know that you do not like the pushing of companies, but we have to do this, 
including when there is a chance to allocate our companies to the new up-and-coming 
superpowers and the BICS countries.  
At the same time, also around ethical matters, you were talking about selling education. It is 
not just senior education you need to be selling. We need to be selling the point of 
education of boys and girls, and also around violence. DfID is working with some NGOs, but 
we need to encourage the rest of the world to work with us through soft power. Australia 
in particular is doing a huge amount of work down in that part of Asia. We should be picking 
other parts of the BICS world—these other emerging powers—where we can work and we 
can then be seen to be offering something, and they will want to trade with us or buy from 
us in terms of our education, in terms of our law, in terms of how their parliaments should 
be run and so on. 
We have got this opportunity, through the new wave of technology, which is moving very 
fast. It is moving faster than we can actually keep up with, but we have to do it, because 
other people are in there already, or pushing themselves in there. 
The Chairman: This is a completely new world, is it not? 
Baroness Goudie: Absolutely. 
The Chairman: I would love to hear just a few comments from our team on that fact. Mr 
Eric Schmidt of Google told us that there are more mobile telephone subscribers on this 
planet than there are human beings. Work that one out. 
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: I have got three. 
Q19  The Chairman: This must change all your work in all your departments, and I think 
that Baroness Goudie has really put her finger on it. Who would like to comment? Mr Elliott 
again—let us start with the FCO. 
Hugh Elliott: I am very happy to kick off, my Lord Chairman. It is a fascinating and very 
wide-ranging question. I will attempt to give one illustration to talk to the issue of networks, 
partnerships, breadth of relationships and how we might articulate it and link it up with UK 
values, with a specific example around the arms trade treaty and how we are involved in that 
process, which is perhaps illustrative of the sort of way in which we are trying to make the 
link. Then I will speak briefly about what the Foreign Office is doing to integrate and 
professionalise ourselves in the use of— 
Baroness Goudie: And cluster bombs. You did a lot on cluster bombs. It made a big 
impact, the work you did on that.  
Hugh Elliott: —digital platforms.  
On the arms trade treaty, the campaign that the British Government led is a very good 
illustration of the power of relationships and networks, because it was an issue that, in a 
sense, was brought to us by the NGO movement, saying, “Why don’t you do more on this?” 
It was an issue on which we went abroad and looked at the sort of international 
partnerships and the sort of partners that we might have in order to help develop this in the 
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international agenda. We ended up with countries such as, from the top of my head,  Japan, 
Argentina and South Africa, countries with very different sorts of interest but a common set 
of goals on this particular issue, and with whom we decided that it would be important for 
us to lead.  
We collaboratively put together a process, recognising that an issue like this needed a lot of 
energy and oomph behind it, so it was a process that very much we were absolutely 
instrumental in leading. All the time, we were building relationships with business, with 
NGOs, with the voluntary sector a lot, and having a lot of discussions all along the way. And 
that was not just in the UK, but globally and—to the aspect of your question about United 
Nations institutions—obviously the United Nations was absolutely crucial to all this. 
In the end, cutting a long story short, that very open, collaborative, persistent, determined 
and focused approach, taking into account all those sorts of networks, did actually deliver a 
very concrete result in the form of the arms trade treaty, which was a tremendous success 
for all of those involved. I think that illustrates part of your point. 
Obviously the digital area is crucial now for being able to reach all the people who we need 
to reach, whatever country they are in. I shall just give you a few examples of how we in the 
Foreign Office are professionalising our implementation of our digital strategy. We have set 
up a special unit to help us to do this. To take social media as a leading example of how well 
we are doing this—we are probably doing it just about as well as anybody in the world; 
perhaps the United States is a little bit ahead, as it has considerable resources to do this—
we have 120 official Twitter channels around the world around our network and 120 
Facebook pages. All our Ministers are on Twitter. Fifty of our ambassadors, as the face of 
Britain overseas, are on Twitter in addition to the official embassy accounts, personally being 
involved and engaged with their constituencies. A particular example I would cite would be 
Lebanon, where our ambassador, Tom Fletcher, is extremely active in this area and reaching 
people whom traditionally diplomats might have struggled to reach. 
This requires a very considerable investment in upskilling and training. At our recent 
leadership conference that we hosted for all our ambassadors around the world in London a 
few weeks ago, we held a special training session for ambassadors, which was massively 
oversubscribed. There was huge interest in this. There is complete awareness this is just 
going to be a natural way in which we need to do business. This is all part of the 
implementation of the Foreign Office’s Digital Strategy, which was published at the end of last 
year in December 2012, which sets out—and we can provide the Committee with this if it 
would be of interest—a very detailed process of transformation of how we do foreign policy 
to ensure that we make the very most of social media in the ways that we have to reach 
different parts of the world. 
The Chairman: I think, actually, this Committee should be circulated, if possible, with that 
document, which is clearly on a central part of our thinking. 
Hugh Elliott: Certainly. 
Q20  The Chairman: Very well. Are there any other points anyone wants to make? Lord 
Janvrin, you wanted to come in particularly on the inward-facing aspect of the scene. Or— 
Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts: Promotion of cultural norms came up as part of your 
response to Baroness Goudie, and indeed as part of her question. This may sound a trifle 
uncompromising; it is not meant to be. I was in Rio the day that Jean Charles de Menezes 
was shot in the Tube here in London, and there was a stupendous amount of press coverage 
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in Brazil. My host, who was an Anglophile Brazilian businessman said, “It is because we are 
shocked that you haven’t lived up to your past standards, but it will die away because we 
believe generally in Brazil that British justice will be seen, there will be an investigation and 
the truth will come out. In any case, by the by, the Rio police shoot 1,000 people a year and 
nobody turns a hair.” But he went on: “Your reputation has been damaged by a completely 
different thing.” And I said, “Oh, what is that?” He said, “Your ambassador here is gay, and 
he has insisted on bringing his partner with him and he is being presented at events.” This is 
an unfortunate thing to say, but he clearly thought this was very, very serious in a 
conservative Catholic country. I understand our cultural norm—I am not resiling from it—
but we have to think about to what extent we wish to push it on to other people as part of 
our soft power developments. 
The Chairman: Can we generalise that question, rather than be specific? 
Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts: Of course. I am not trying to say— 
The Chairman: I would prefer it if we generalised. To what extent are we in danger of 
pushing and imposing our own values, which we adhere to and cling to very strongly, a little 
too readily on others? Can I put it in more general terms? What do you think? Is that a fair 
criticism, Mr Elliott? 
Hugh Elliott: I think it is very important that we do make the most of our values. We 
believe that British values are very strong, and we do not believe we should compromise our 
values in the exercise of our foreign policy. That said, of course we need to be sensitive to 
how, in seeking to achieve what we are trying to achieve, our actions come across in specific 
cultural contexts. 
Q21  The Chairman: Lord Janvrin, I have one more comment after you, but you ask the 
penultimate question.  
Lord Janvrin: I want to come back to the question of a wider strategy. Forgive me for 
doing so, but I think it is very important, and I will explain right at the end. I can see that in 
terms of interdepartmental co-ordination, it works probably extremely well through the 
National Security Council, et cetera—you have explained that. But you have also said—quite 
rightly in my view—that soft power is often about what other non-governmental agents do 
and how they join, if you like, in trying to support and indeed help the government policy, 
whether it be the arms trade treaty, et cetera. There is therefore in my view a government 
leadership role for a lot of non-governmental players and agents in this. I wonder whether, 
to have if you like the best leadership role, we need an overall strategy that people know 
about. In other words, this is not interdepartmental co-ordination; this is a leadership role. 
My question to you is: would you find it useful for this Committee to think in terms of an 
overall soft power strategy? 
The Chairman: There is a question. Would anyone like to start on it? Mr Elliott again, or 
Mr Mitchell, or the cultural side? 
Hugh Elliott: I would be happy to— 
Lord Janvrin: I would quite like to hear other people’s views as well. Poor Mr Elliott has 
been fielding— 
The Chairman: If I could just add: a number of other bodies, not just this Committee, are 
looking at very much that question as well. I think a report is about to come out from the 
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British Council on these things. The British Academy—or is it the Royal Academy?—is 
looking at them as well. There is a new sort of seriousness in international cultural relations 
which I think we have got to somehow reflect more effectively. I think a great deal hangs on 
your question, but it may not be possible to answer it in the last few minutes. 
Maddalaine Ansell: Could I give a short answer? A couple of years ago, the National 
Security Council Emerging Powers said that it would be very good if there were a sub-
committee involving the wider stakeholders around education and research. We set up such 
a sub-committee and looked at how we could co-ordinate across the piece our activities 
with those in universities, colleges, research councils, et cetera, and other Government 
departments. What we found was that the meetings happened, but they were not as focused 
as people would find most useful. What we ended up doing is splitting it, so we now have 
one that focuses on international education, and a different one that focuses more on 
science and research. I suppose for me one of the questions is whether it is actually more 
useful to take smaller topics rather than a whole piece, so that the stakeholders who turn up 
are interested in the whole of the meeting and feel that they have something to say, rather 
than are sitting there kind of silently while we are talking about trade aspects or cultural 
aspects, when in fact their area of expertise is science or education or arms trading. 
The Chairman: Right. Mr Nichol, do you want to add something? 
Keith Nichol: I think from a cultural perspective Lord Janvrin’s question is very much in sync 
with my Secretary of State. She has observed that, culturally, we have this fantastic web of 
activity all over the world. We have probably about 1,400 arts and cultural organisations 
active in all sorts of countries but, until very recently, we had no coherent sense of where 
they are going or what they are doing. So what we are trying to do now—I hope it is not an 
heroic exercise—is to start to map that activity and to see where it is possible to align it 
with wider HMG and UK interests. That is one way of aligning cultural activity among the 
cultural players with business. If we know that the Royal Ballet is going to be in Brasilia in 
2015, it may be that there are ways in which we can align that activity with trade and 
commercial activity in a way which makes the whole greater than the sum of the parts. In 
that respect, there is an opportunity to do that but, as I touched on earlier, we also have to 
respect the arm’s-length principle and not prescribe which cultural bodies go to which 
countries, so there is a balancing act for us there.  
Q22  The Chairman: That is a very useful and important answer. I am going to end, 
because we have had quite a session, with a question which probably lies on the frontiers 
between ministerial responsibility and official responsibility, and therefore you are perfectly 
entitled to duck it and say it lies on the other side of the fence. We have talked about all the 
tremendous efforts we are doing in all these fields—cultural, diplomatic, scientific, medical, 
educational—and it is very exciting and admirable, but we do also know that we have some 
pretty sour and difficult relations with some countries. Our Caribbean friends are forever 
raising the advanced passenger duty issue, and it is very sore and causes many problems. We 
only have to have a moment’s discussion with our Chinese colleagues here in town or 
anywhere and they will tell us that our links with the Dalai Lama are absolutely weakening 
and destroying everything. I do not want to go into these questions but just to ask you: is it 
the case that some of these hot political issues are making the projection of our soft power 
much more difficult? If it is, are we satisfied that there is the right feedback inside the 
Government between those of you who are trying to do this job and the political and 
diplomatic forces that sometimes seem to be working completely the opposite way? Does it 
worry you? 
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Andrew Mitchell: I am not sure which side of the line it really does fall on, but I will venture 
an answer. In so far as the way that we act in the world is consistent with our values and our 
principles, in a sense our role is to ensure that the work that we do takes account of the 
shocks and the various misdemeanours that this occasionally throws up. I would say that we 
do of course attempt to do that in the Foreign Office, and certainly as a former head of 
mission myself I certainly saw my role overseas as helping to anticipate the risks associated 
with that kind of a potential problem, and then to manage those risks once they had 
transpired. But if I can say that that is in the ordinary course of diplomacy—it has happened 
for 100 or 200 years and it will continue to happen—I guess it is about being true to your 
principles, sticking to your plan, and managing the impact that that has. 
The Chairman: I think that is a very fair reply to—I agree—a slightly difficult question. 
Have any of my colleagues got any final point they wanted to put? No? I think in that case I 
would like to thank all five of you very much indeed. You have been very forthcoming. It has 
raised perhaps rather more questions than it has all answered, but those are matters for us 
to pursue in this Committee in future sessions, so thank you all very much indeed. We are 
most grateful. Could you just leave, because we have got just two or three minutes of 
private deliberation. Could I ask colleagues to stay for a second? Thank you very much. 
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Government (Department for International Development) – 
Supplementary written evidence 
 
In the oral evidence session on June 10 2013, Lord Forsyth of Drumlean, asked under 
Question 5: “Can you focus on the outputs and tell me specifically what your departments 
have achieved in enhancing the UK’s attractiveness and influence abroad and in furthering 
the UK’s priorities, and how you measure that?”. In her answer, Barbara Hendrie said DFID 
would be able to supply detail of the development outputs it has achieved.  
 
This note provides information on the outputs of DFID’s aid programme. This illustrates 
DFID’s contribution to supporting the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals, a 
commitment set out in the Coalition Agreement. The information is taken from the DFID 
Annual Report and Accounts 2012-13 which were published and laid before Parliament on 
27 June 2013111.  
 
DFID’s impact on the attractiveness and influence of the UK abroad is an area of increasing 
interest to Ministers. The Department is therefore considering how to measure its 
contribution to ‘soft power’ in a more systematic way. 
 
DFID’s contribution to development outputs 
 
Chapter Two of the Annual Report presents the results achieved at each level of DFID’s 
Results Framework. Level two of the Results Framework measures DFID’s contribution to 
development results. The indicators at this level measure the outputs that can be directly 
linked to DFID bilateral programmes and projects and to its multilateral portfolio. A list of 
results at this level is presented in Table 2.1 of the Annual Report.  
 
Examples of DFID’s results up to and including 2012-13 are: 
 
• 30.3 million people with access to financial services, compared with 11.6 million up to 
2011–12;  
 
• 19.6 million people with access to a water, sanitation or hygiene intervention, compared 
to 13.8 million up to 2011–12;  
 
• 12.9 million children under 5 or pregnant women with nutrition programmes, compared 
to 5.5 million up to 2011–12;  
 
• 1.6 million births delivered with the help of nurses, midwives or doctors, compared to 
1.1 million up to 2011–12; 
 
• 22.4 million insecticide-treated bed-nets distributed, compared to 12.6 million up to 
2011–12; 
 
                                            
111 DFID Annual Report and Accounts 2012-13 are available online at the following link. A hard copy has been placed in the 
House Library.https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/dfid-annual-report-and-accounts-2012-13  
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• 22.8 million children immunised against preventable diseases, compared to 12.2 million 
up to 2011-12; 
 
• 8.7 million people reached with emergency food assistance. 
 
The UK has also made significant progress towards the 2015 targets which DFID set out in 
March 2011. Highlights include support for:  
 
• 33.4 million people to have choice and control over their own development (2015 
target, 40 million);  
 
• 6.1 million people with cash transfer programmes (2015 target, 6 million); 
 
• 5.9 million children in primary education per year (2015 target, 9 million);  
 
• 3.8 million people to improve their rights to land and property (2015 target, 6 million).  
 
DFID has developed and published methodological guidance112 on each indicator to help 
ensure consistency of measurement across countries and permit meaningful aggregation of 
results. The indicators included above reflect those outputs where it is possible to aggregate 
results across different countries. The indicators do not reflect all the results that DFID is 
delivering, and results that are vital to each country’s development may not be covered here 
simply because they cannot be aggregated across countries. Where multilateral results are 
included, these capture key outputs as reported by the multilateral organisations themselves.  
 
DFID’s operational effectiveness and performance against its Structural Reform Plan 
 
Level three of the Results Framework monitors how well the Department manages the 
delivery of results and ensures value for money. DFID reports regularly against the following 
performance areas:  
 
• Pipeline delivery: data on DFID’s pipeline of programmes (those programmes either 
approved or under design) to help assess whether DFID has sufficient good quality plans 
in place to ensure that it will achieve its results commitments; 
 
• Portfolio quality: a measure of the extent to which DFID’s interventions are on track to 
deliver their expected outputs and outcomes; 
 
• Monitoring and evaluation: data on the extent to which DFID is actively reviewing its 
programmes and learning lessons for the future; 
 
• Structural Reform Plan: data to assess how well DFID is delivering against its corporate 
objectives and areas prioritised by the Coalition Government. 
 
                                            
112 The methodology notes may be found here: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/dfid-annual-report-and-
accounts-2012-2013-methodology-notes  
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DFID’s Structural Reform Plan (SRP) is part of its Business Plan for 2012–15 which outlines 
the Coalition Government’s vision for development up to 2015.113 During 2012–13, DFID 
performed very strongly in implementing its structural reform priorities: 22 actions across all 
six Coalition priorities were completed over the course of the year, 20 completed on time 
and two actions completed in advance of their end dates. Further information on DFID’s 
performance against its SRP may be found on Table 2.3 of the Annual Report which is also 
attached to this note.   
 
July 2013 
 
  
                                            
113 The DFID Business Plan may be found here: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/department-for-international-
development-business-plan-2012-to-2015  
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Government (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) – Supplementary 
written evidence 
 
19 June 2013 
 
[Dear Lord Howell] 
 
Thank you for the opportunity to give evidence to the House of Lords Committee on Soft 
Power and the UK’s Influence on Monday 10 June. At that session I undertook to write to 
the Committee in response to Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts’ question (Question 15) 
concerning Departments’ focused programmes building our commercial and economic 
interests in the light of the new emerging markets. 
 
In answer to Question12 I referred to the Government’s emerging powers initiative to 
strengthen relationships with fast growing economies, coordinated through a sub-committee 
of the National Security Council, and to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s 
strengthening of its diplomatic network, deploying more staff to the fastest growing regions, 
upgrading existing posts and opening new ones.   An Emerging Powers Department has been 
set up in the FCO to support the cross-government initiative.  It works with overseas Posts 
and existing thematic/geographical structures in London to strengthen bilateral relations with 
the emerging powers. The Department helps to troubleshoot and support Departments 
across Whitehall to ensure that emerging powers are prioritised for funding, Ministerial 
visits, and in policy decisions. 
 
The Emerging Powers Department has a Programme Fund of around £500,000 for 2013/14 
that will be targeted at improving the UK’s bilateral relations with some of the world’s 
fastest growing economies. The fund covers projects that contribute to the four strands of 
the National Security Council’s Emerging Powers strategy: Trade and Investment; Promoting 
the Rules Based International Economic System; people to people links; and security.  The 
objective of the Emerging Powers Programme Fund is to help to strengthen our overall 
relationships with the emerging powers by building closer links between the people of the 
UK and the emerging power nations. In particular, we are looking to deepen and embed the 
UK’s links with current and future policy thinkers, decision-makers, role models and opinion 
formers – from young entrepreneurs and experts in new technology to influential talk-show 
hosts, sports stars, bloggers, cultural figures and diaspora leaders.  
 
A new programme set up by the FCO this year which will help strengthen links with the 
emerging powers is the Future International Leaders Programme.  It comprises visits to the 
UK for talented individuals from around the world, who have been selected for their 
potential to become internationally influential leaders in politics, civil society, international 
organisations, global business or the media.   The programme is a long-term investment in 
the UK’s relationships with key partners and an opportunity to engage with the leaders of 
tomorrow. During a group programme of about a week the visitors engage at a senior level 
with government, Parliament, media, business, education, the arts and civil society.  
 
I hope that this adequately answers the question as far as the Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office is concerned. Please do not hesitate to contact me if you require any further 
information. 
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Andrew Mitchell 
Prosperity Director 
 
21 June 2013 
 
[Dear Lord Howell] 
  
Thank you for the opportunity to give evidence to the House of Lords Committee on Soft 
Power and the UK’s Influence on Monday 10 June. At that session I undertook to write to 
the Committee to give further information on three issues. 
 
Firstly, Lord Forsyth of Drumlean asked about policy successes and failures by the Foreign 
and Commonwealth Office and how these were measured. Our recently published 
Departmental Improvement Plan, a copy of which is included with this letter, assesses our 
performance against key security, prosperity and consular policy priorities. As I mentioned at 
the evidence session, our Annual Report and Accounts 2012-2013 will give further details 
about our performance over the last financial year. You will be sent a copy of this when it is 
published, before the summer recess. 
 
You asked about the involvement of UK military in Afghanistan in civil power, civic 
operations and social reconstruction and which department would have overseen this. The 
UK military would tend to term such activities as stabilisation operations.  Such operations, 
as they exist in Afghanistan, are primarily conducted by the Military Stabilisation Support 
Group (MSSG) which has supported the UK led Provincial Reconstruction Team’s (PRT) 
efforts in Helmand since 2006.  
 
MSSG is coordinated by the Ministry of Defence and is formed from both regular and 
reservist forces.  It has supported the PRT and the UK Stabilisation Advisors in each district 
of Helmand Province working with the local Afghan authorities to help develop Afghan 
capacity to build their own infrastructure, government institutions, public services and 
economic development.  This is an invaluable part of the UK’s integrated approach to 
supporting the long term success of Afghanistan.  MSSG’s stabilisation support activities have 
drawn down in line with the change in the role of UK forces from combat to providing 
training and support for the Afghan National Security Forces as the ANSF have progressively 
assumed lead responsibility for Afghanistan’s security.  
Finally, you asked also for a copy of the FCO’s Digital Strategy, published in December 2012, 
which is included with this letter. The strategy sets out how we will expand our use of digital 
technology both in the delivery of services, particularly consular whilst continuing to provide 
face to face support to British nationals most in need, and in policy formulation, including 
delivering more open policy and transparency. 
 
I hope this is of some help to you and the Committee. Please do not hesitate to contact me 
if you require any further information or assistance. 
I am copying this letter to Susannah Street, Clerk to the Committee, and Úna Ryan, Foreign 
and Commonwealth Office Select Committee Liaison Officer. 
 
Hugh Elliott 
Director 
Engagement & Communication      
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Government (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), Baroness 
Prashar, H.E. Mr Carlos dos Santos, High Commissioner for the 
Republic of Mozambique – Oral evidence (QQ 152-164) 
 
Evidence Session No. 8    Heard in Public   Questions 152 - 164 
 
MONDAY 14 OCTOBER 2013 
 Members present 
Lord Howell of Guildford (Chairman) 
Baroness Armstrong of Hill Top 
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock 
Baroness Goudie 
Baroness Hussein-Ece 
Lord Janvrin 
Baroness Morris of Bolton 
Baroness Nicholson of Winterbourne 
Lord Ramsbotham 
________________ 
 Examination of Witnesses 
Paul Arkwright, Director of Multilateral Policy, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 
Caitlin Jones, Head of the Commonwealth Team, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 
Baroness Prashar, House of Lords, and HE Mr Carlos dos Santos, High Commissioner 
for the Republic of Mozambique 
 
Q152   The Chairman: Thank you all very much for coming before the Committee this 
afternoon. We are very grateful to you. I should start with a formal point. A note on the 
declared interests of the Committee is, I think, in front of you. I hope it will help you to 
understand where our interests lie and the issues that we are pursuing. This is quite a short 
session. We want to focus on two major issues, although there are many subordinate 
aspects to them, in relation to the Commonwealth. The first is what value you see to 
member countries, particularly to this country because we are a UK Committee in the 
British Parliament, of the promotion of interests, reputation, so-called soft diplomacy, trade 
and other interests by being members of the Commonwealth. How does it help the 
members, and how does it help this member in particular? 
The second issue, which flows from that, is what soft power, or diplomatic influence and 
pressure, do you think the Commonwealth as an institution and an organised membership of 
53 countries—I think it is 53 as of this morning—has in the world and what weight it carries. 
So there are two questions. If we can, let us stick mainly to the first one first, giving in 
particular your very expert views on how Britain fits into this nowadays first. We will then 
move on to the broader question of the Commonwealth’s own weight and effect in world 
affairs. That is my menu. Who would like to volunteer to start? If there is no volunteer, I 
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shall name one of you. Shall we start with Baroness Prashar, because she has been involved 
in these things for a long time? 
Baroness Prashar: Thank you, Lord Chairman. I thought you might point your finger at me 
first. First, I am very glad that you are looking at this particular issue: “The role of the 
Commonwealth in relation to Britain’s soft power”. Let me first say what I think soft power 
is. For me it is a kind of purposeful engagement to attract and influence in order to shape 
the environment in which we are operating. The world is changing, and fast. The situation is 
very fluid, and it is becoming a world of networks. In that sense, Britain has to find its place 
in that landscape and decide how we engage with this changing world. To me, the 
Commonwealth is essentially a network organisation. Its strength is that it is not just an 
intergovernmental organisation; it is a Commonwealth of people. You will see from my kind 
of engagement that it has been mainly through civil society organisations. Therefore Britain 
can engage on a whole range of issues, may they be cultural, diplomatic, trade, business, 
educational, through the Commonwealth. I would like to see Britain playing a much more 
proactive role. Having said that, I am conscious, Lord Chairman, that you have been quite 
active in promoting that.  
I do think that there is ambivalence on the part of the UK about the Commonwealth, which 
is partly a certain diffidence about the post-colonial legacy but also because we do not want 
to be seen as the place where the secretariat is and as a dominant body in that. I think the 
time has come to do what I have called an unsentimental review of what the Commonwealth 
has to offer and demonstrate how we can begin to engage with it. I am conscious that the 
Royal Commonwealth Society, where I was a chairman and then a president—of course, you 
are now the president—has produced reports trying to identify where trade is a big factor in 
a number of the emerging economies within the Commonwealth. Secondly, there are certain 
advantages to the Commonwealth, and we began to demonstrate where the Commonwealth 
adds value. It seems to me that we have to look at those. I will come in later questions to 
the sort of engagement and reform that is necessary and where Britain can play a role in 
engaging with the Commonwealth, in a positive way, in order to make sure that the right 
kind of reform takes place, so that the Commonwealth’s potential can be fully realised.  
The Chairman: Thank you. That is very helpful indeed. We have two representatives from 
the Foreign and Commonwealth Office here. Mr Arkwright, your overview, your bailiwick I 
suppose, is of course multilateral organisations generally, of which the Commonwealth is 
clearly one. Is it just one, or is it rather more special? 
Paul Arkwright: It is different. I think it is special, if I can put it that way. To pick up what 
Baroness Prashar said, it is a unique organisation that has particular core values that are 
spread throughout the countries that are represented there and that are, I think, a very 
powerful vehicle for us, the UK, to spread those core values. I would pick up what Baroness 
Prashar was saying about the people-to-people links. It is important at an intergovernmental 
level, as we will see that at the coming CHOGM in Sri Lanka, but perhaps more important 
than that it is important because it brings people together in different fora, whether in the 
youth forum, the people’s forum or the Commonwealth Business Council—trade is another 
area. It provides a kind of facilitation role for bringing people together, and I think that when 
you bring people together on the basis of those core values, something very powerful can 
happen. What is important, and again I agree with Baroness Prashar, is that we the UK have 
a very clear understanding of where our role in that can add value. We can come on to 
discuss particular examples of that. 
I would describe the Commonwealth as an organisation, among the many that I cover in my 
current role. 
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Q153   The Chairman: Thank you. High Commissioner, in this first part of the discussion 
we are discussing Britain’s affairs more. Perhaps you are not quite as familiar with the 
Commonwealth, but you have been an ambassador in all sorts of countries in Europe and 
your country is a marvellous example of somewhere that after all was not part of the 
original old British Empire link at all, or of the British Commonwealth. Yet you have not only 
adhered to the Commonwealth but proved to be extremely dynamic and influential, and we 
all watch with great admiration as Mozambique advances its position in the world. How do 
you see yourselves in the Commonwealth? What gain are you getting? Give us a little 
glimpse of how you see us as well. 
Mr Carlos dos Santos: Thank you very much, my Lords. Let me start by saying how grateful 
and appreciative we are to be invited to this Select Committee and to be involved. We value 
your work on soft power. We think it is a very important concept, as developed by 
Professor Joseph Nye. We are looking for the more positive side of soft power, because it 
can also be used on the other side to get things the wrong way.  
For Mozambique, being part of the Commonwealth is, I think, special. We find a new 
identity, which we did not have before, of belonging to an association that is based on the 
common values of development, democracy, the rule of law and human rights, that we share. 
We also value the fact that the diverse membership of the Commonwealth is recognised as a 
wealth in the organisation, in the sense that small and large countries, developed countries 
and less developed countries work together in solidarity. There is concern for the most 
vulnerable states. We have a focus on small states, in the strategic plan that we have been 
discussing, and we have a very particular focus on specific areas.  
Mozambique values work in the social area as well, and we have made this vehemently clear 
in discussions on the strategic plan. Some countries were saying that education and health, 
for instance, should be outsourced because we do not have competencies in the 
Commonwealth, and we said no. We think that is very well appreciated by many in the 
Commonwealth, and is concrete; the Commonwealth can be identified with scholarship and 
other educational programmes. We value the focus on youth, which is very important, and 
gender issues. We also value the Commonwealth Foundation work with civil society; it is 
quite involving.  
We think the UK has done a great deal in the area of soft power. I was just reading some 
notes, in preparation for this meeting, which say that the UK is actually considered to be on 
top of the soft power index. If the UK continues to do the sort of cultural things that it has 
done in the past and does things in a way that attracts people to UK universities and things 
like that, the UK will continue to be a valued partner. In the Commonwealth, everyone, 
including Mozambique, wants to be a very good partner of the UK because of what it has to 
offer.  
I would just like to add the caveat that I added to my notes when I was preparing for this 
meeting, which is the issues linked to immigration policies and the way the UK deals with 
students who are candidates for universities here. If this is not done properly, it will 
decrease UK’s attractiveness, and it is starting to be like that. I was not thinking of the good 
news that came from Beijing—that there will be a facilitation of visas—when I was jotting 
down my notes, but that is a good approach: facilitating people to come here and welcoming 
them. Of course, you do not want to attract terrorists or other such people, but the 
majority of people who come to the UK are good people, so they should be welcomed. 
Those would be my initial reactions. 
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The Chairman: Thank you very much indeed for that. I am going to come to Caitlin Jones 
in a moment as well—our fourth witness today—but there are some questions first. Lord 
Foulkes wanted to intervene. 
Q154   Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: Thank you, Lord Chairman. I wonder whether, 
perhaps on both sides of the table, we are being a bit starry eyed about this. Let me mention 
four things. The Gambia has just announced that it is leaving the Commonwealth. I have just 
come back from the CPA conference in Johannesburg, and we saw really very strong 
tensions between the old and the new Commonwealth. At CHOGM, issues are going to be 
raised about human rights in Sri Lanka. The OAU has just said that African countries are no 
longer going to pay attention to the International Court of Justice. Surely we have to be a bit 
more realistic and imaginative and take a different approach from what you suggest. Do you 
not think you have been a little complacent and taken things rather more rosily than the 
reality of what is happening in the Commonwealth now? 
The Chairman: Caitlin Jones, you are on the front line of this. Would you like to answer 
it? 
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: That is the easy question.  
Caitlin Jones: I take the easy ones. 
The Chairman: Then I am going to bring in others as well. Would you like a shot at that 
question first? 
Caitlin Jones: Thank you Chairman. Lord Foulkes, you make very good points, of course. 
Every organisation faces challenges and differences of opinion between member states, and 
the Commonwealth is not unique in that at all. The important thing is that the 
Commonwealth can come together and work together to address the issues that it faces. 
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: How? 
Baroness Goudie: They are certainly not doing that now.  
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: All of you have said that you can do that, but you have not 
given us specific examples. 
Caitlin Jones: I will, if I may, take the example of the CPA conference, which of course I was 
not at. I understand that some very knotty issues were addressed at that conference, and 
that there were some very frank debates on a number of difficult issues. I am aware of those 
debates travelling as a thread through a number of layers of the Commonwealth. We have 
discussed the layers that exist in the multilayered organisation. The fact that those debates 
exist in the CPA conference, in different parts of civil society and at the intergovernmental 
level, and are taken forward is very important, because they touch every level. We would 
not expect to make a difference overnight on the knottiest issues. We have to be realistic 
about the fact that we cannot create change overnight on many of these very ingrained 
cultural issues, but we can work together, slowly and surely, to address them and to talk 
about them in an open space. That is what the Commonwealth provides. 
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: I will just give you an example. If I had been on your side of 
the thing, I would have said that one of the first things the Government should do, if they 
are making it easier for rich Chinese to come into Britain, is to make it easier for poor 
people from the Commonwealth to come into Britain to study at universities, instead of 
making some of the difficulties that exist. Some Caribbean countries have to travel to 
another country to get a visa to come to the United Kingdom.  
Baroness Armstrong of Hill Top: Not just in the Caribbean. 
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Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: Could I just get an answer on specific things, such as visa 
liberalisation? Would that not be helpful, for example? 
The Chairman: What do we say about visa liberalisation, which has been raised by the 
High Commissioner as well? Might that be specific to the Commonwealth, or is that an 
impossible idea? 
Baroness Prashar: Can I just come in here? I think your point about liberalisation and visa 
issues is very important. I agree with you, because if we think that the Commonwealth is a 
family—if I may say so, High Commissioners are not Ambassadors; it is a family—it is 
important that Britain is seen to be treating the Commonwealth citizens on the basis of 
equality. That is very true.  
On your earlier point about us being starry eyed, I am not sure that we are, because the 
issues that you raise about Gambia, CHOGM, and of course the tension between the old 
and the new Commonwealth over human rights issues are very relevant, but we should not 
let those issues cloud our judgment about the Commonwealth’s potential. You say you 
cannot, but I feel very strongly that we need to reform the institution, which I can come to 
later. The point was made earlier that these issues and tensions are as in any other 
organisation. Look at the United Nations: what about the Security Council meetings and so 
on. This is something of a feature: the fact that there is a forum through which these issues 
are being discussed is very important. You have to go beyond the issue and ask why Gambia 
has pulled out. There may be other reasons that one needs to look at. People play politics 
with that. It is true that the Commonwealth’s moral authority may be seen to be under 
siege, given CHOGM and Sri Lanka, but this is why it is all the more important to 
demonstrate why the Commonwealth is important and why it is a platform. I am very 
anxious that we do not use the current difficulties to destroy a platform, a network, that in 
my mind is a network of the future even though it might have been created in the last 
century, and to lose it. Therefore Britain should engage with it very positively. 
On the point about the tension between the old and the new Commonwealth, when I was in 
Perth about two years ago, it was clear to me that human rights issues were more about 
language. Human rights issues were seen to be an imposition by the west.  
Baroness Goudie: I am sorry, but I find that quite unacceptable. 
Baroness Prashar: Could you just let me explain what I am saying?  
Baroness Goudie: I do not see that. 
The Chairman: We must allow the witness to speak. 
Baroness Goudie: I am sorry. 
Baroness Prashar: When you look at human rights development, the issues are all 
interrelated. I just think that we have to begin to look at these issues. That is why the 
Commonwealth provides the dialogue and a place where these things can be discussed. 
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: There was not much of a dialogue. 
The Chairman: I must let other people ask questions. We have limited time. Lord Janvrin 
is next on my list. I am sorry, but we must do it this way. Then it is Baroness Goudie. 
Q155   Lord Janvrin: It may allow a development of this. I wanted to explore, Baroness 
Prashar, your point that the institution needs reforming, what you meant by that, and how 
the UK could get more out of it. I would also like to ask the Foreign and Commonwealth 
representatives to respond to those ideas, and to answer the point that many commentators 
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feel that to some extent the Commonwealth works better at a sub-government level, at a 
civil society level, and that that is where the networking and the connections really happen. If 
that is the case, what is the Government’s policy to encourage that? First of all, I would like 
to hear your point about reform, Baroness Prashar, because I think I might share some of 
your views. 
Baroness Prashar: I think you are absolutely right. I would like to see a lot more 
engagement with the civil society organisations, because the Commonwealth has myriad 
professional civil society organisations and I am not sure that they are supported and 
engaged with. The Commonwealth Foundation does some good work, as do the 
Commonwealth Magistrates and Judges Association and the Nurses Federation, but they are 
very much starved of resources and proper engagement. If you call it a network and it is a 
people’s Commonwealth, it is very important that the focus is not just on the 
intergovernmental machinery but that we make sure that we make the non-governmental 
organisations, the civil society organisations, more effective. That is the area where I would 
like to see a shift in emphasis. 
The Chairman: Would Paul Arkwright or Caitlin Jones like to comment on 
Commonwealth reform? 
Lord Janvrin: Particularly on that point, which I confirm now that I share. 
Paul Arkwright: The point about the sub-governmental level? 
Lord Janvrin: Yes, and how you can do more to encourage those sub-governmental 
networks. 
Paul Arkwright: First of all, I think we are doing quite a lot to encourage those networks, 
both through support for the youth forum that I mentioned and through the people’s forums 
and getting civil society acting together, but I would perhaps challenge the premise that 
nothing useful can be done at governmental level. This comes to Lord Foulkes’ question 
about what the point is when you have these serious clashes, which I saw evidence of, I have 
to say. I was at the United Nations during the General Assembly week and I attended the 
Commonwealth Foreign Ministers meeting. Some of you might have been to them. There 
was a sharp exchange there between certain people who you might describe as on the side 
of the values argument and those who might be described as on the side of the development 
argument. I would argue that the two are very closely connected. I saw it for myself, Lord 
Foulkes, and I know exactly what you are talking about. Does that invalidate the 
Commonwealth as a forum in which you should discuss these issues? I would say not. In fact, 
the Commonwealth provides the forum for—let us be explicit here—the Canadian Foreign 
Minister to criticise the Sri Lankan Foreign Minister and to do so in very direct terms. I 
would say that there is a usefulness in that which is not undermined by the fact that these 
are very sharp exchanges.  
Coming back to the reform point—I also have a point to make about visas; I am collecting a 
few of these issues—there was out of Perth/CHOGM a reform programme which the 
Secretary-General of the Commonwealth was asked to pursue. He is doing so, and we are 
supporting and encouraging him to move faster with that reform programme. We do think 
there are areas in which we can improve the efficiency and the effectiveness of the 
organisation, and we are working with the Commonwealth Secretariat in order to do that 
very directly. 
Can the organisation be better aligned to what the UK would consider to be its core 
priorities? I would argue yes, on the basis of a relatively short period in this job. How can we 
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go about doing that? We do that by force of argument, by ensuring that we get the right 
people in those positions, by pushing that reform agenda, and by using those sub-
governmental levels which you talk about—the civil society, the NGOs, the CPA and 
others—frankly to shout very loudly from the sidelines if they are not very happy with the 
way it is going. So I would say that we all have a collective responsibility to push that, 
particularly with the CPA, in which I know many of you are involved. 
The Chairman: Baroness Goudie, you wanted to come in on the earlier question. Would 
you like to go quickly on that?  
Baroness Goudie: This question is very simple. In terms of soft power, most people who 
do not know the Commonwealth around the world—NGOs and others in America and 
Canada that one comes across—see the Commonwealth as part of Britain, so their 
perception of our soft power and where we stand on human rights as well as trade and 
corruption is that we should be giving leadership. An example of this was the 
Commonwealth meetings last year on mental health and so on in which the Caribbean 
countries of the Commonwealth did not want to give a lead and were looking to Britain and 
other countries to deal with the problems for which they needed funding. The perception of 
us around the world is that we should be trying to persuade these countries that they need 
to take leadership themselves but in the correct way. Do you see where I am coming from 
and how it affects our position as a country? 
Paul Arkwright: I do. I will respond to that, Lord Chairman, if I may. I agree with you, and it 
should not be the UK that visibly leads in all these areas. It should be the UK that 
encourages others to do that and, if I may say so, encourages not just what someone here 
described as the old Commonwealth but other countries. It is an argument that we need to 
take to those countries. It is in their interests, frankly, that we pursue some of the values 
referred to—human rights, good governance, democracy, building democratic institutions. It 
is incumbent upon us not just the Foreign Office or the Government but everybody who has 
an interest in the Commonwealth to continue to make those arguments. I think we are 
making good steps forward. If you look at the Commonwealth’s recent electoral observation 
and monitoring in Sierra Leona, Kenya and other places, you will see that we have had 70 
recent electoral observation missions. They are doing some really good work, and the 
reports that are coming out are making specific recommendations on how to get it better 
the next time around. With respect to the question, “Is it all negative?”, the answer is no it 
is not. Some very positive things are coming out of it which I think we need to celebrate. 
The Chairman: Baroness Nicholson, the floor is yours. 
Q156  Baroness Nicholson of Winterbourne: I fully subscribe to the point made at the 
beginning by Paul Arkwright that the Commonwealth is an organisation with particular core 
values. I therefore fully agree with the High Commissioner’s point that membership gives a 
new identity to countries that join and reinforces the identity of countries that are members. 
My two questions are designed to support those points rather than degrade them. First, 
what activities are undertaken, similar to, say, those of the EAS, to reinforce those core 
values in different nation states that belong to the Commonwealth? I have not noticed—it 
may just be my lack of observation or perhaps lack of involvement—on the ground in 
different nations that belong to the Commonwealth that the EAS is a mirror of what one 
would hope the Commonwealth would be doing. In other words, that is weekly meetings, 
discussion of what is happening in a country and how everything is working. The 
Commonwealth has core values: the fundamental freedoms, the free market, the rule of law 
and the fight against corruption. It reinforces those in its own meetings collectively. What is 
happening one layer further down in each Commonwealth nation? Are the Commonwealth 
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nations coming together everywhere every week, like the External Action Service of the EU 
does? In other words, what are we doing to reinforce those values, if the committee agrees 
that this is the great strength of the Commonwealth? Secondly, it is of course good to 
support those values. That assists countries in improving their economy, way of life and the 
quality of the citizens’ life. That is what the core values are for, everywhere. But, in a word, 
what are we doing to support assistance to help countries earn a living better? Are we, the 
other wealthy nations, following a sort of “Lomé-cum-Cotonou” model? Do we have we a 
deliberately prioritised programme to assist the poorer nations of the Commonwealth to 
get the contracts they need to get their arguments forward in the World Trade 
Organisation, for example, or with the World Bank or IMF? What have we got going that 
actually reinforces the great strength of the Commonwealth? That strength is to help others 
earn a living and help the quality of life of the citizens. It comes together to do that, in a 
different bloc than the other blocs that exist—I believe the Commonwealth is one of the 
very earliest blocs of rule. Those are my questions. How are we reinforcing these two key 
things? 
Q157  The Chairman: The first question, which was very acute, strays slightly into the 
broader question that we will come to halfway through, which is what the Commonwealth 
itself could do. The second question is absolutely spot on. What is in it for our different 
member states? Can I ask the High Commissioner what he feels about this? Does he feel 
that Mozambique has forces working for it in the Commonwealth structure? Also, while 
reinforcing Baroness Nicholson’s question, what does he feel about British leadership? Is 
leadership quite the phrase in a networked world? Are there leaders any more or is it more 
of a sort of a network where we are all in this together rather than too busy leading each 
other? 
Mr Carlos dos Santos: Thank you very much, my Lord. Well, what does Mozambique see 
as things that are concrete and done by the Commonwealth? On the issue of values, I would 
just say governance, improving the rule of law and human rights. We are enjoying very 
concrete benefits. Just to give you one example, earlier this year we had the Minister of 
Justice visiting London and she requested a meeting with the department that deals with 
legal issues at the Commonwealth Secretariat. She had a meeting there and agreed with the 
Commonwealth Secretariat to assist Mozambique specific areas of the justice system. Earlier 
on in the year, we had a seminar jointly conducted by the Commonwealth Secretariat 
Human Rights Unit and Ministry of Justice in Mozambique to deal with prison issues there. 
We invited other countries from the region to be part of that workshop. That is building 
capacities. There is also the role of CMAG—the Commonwealth committee of Foreign 
Ministers that deals with issues of core values. There is an expression today in the 
Commonwealth that a country has been “CMAGed”. That means it has violated the 
principles and values of the Commonwealth. No country wants to be CMAGed. There is a 
consciousness developing that countries value the work that that group does. As discussed 
in Perth, the idea is not to police the countries but to help them make sure that they comply 
with the values. 
On the development side, just another very concrete example is that we had the natural 
resources unit within the Secretariat go to Mozambique. That was initiated by the High 
Commission here. I spoke to them. They sent us some staff specialised in natural resources. 
As you know, Mozambique has just discovered natural gas in huge quantities. The country 
can have a big leap in terms of development, but only if we manage those resources right. 
This unit is working with the Government to assist in building their capacities to understand 
how you manage oil and gas and negotiate contracts. These are very basic things and are a 
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given in other countries of the Commonwealth but they are not a given in Mozambique. 
They are very important things. 
I have just one last point to conclude on. We have a problem of knowledge of what the 
Commonwealth is doing and can do. The problem is within the Commonwealth but even 
more so outside it. This has been identified as a problem. The Secretary-General has been 
asked to make sure that what the Commonwealth does is better known within the 
Commonwealth—in the countries of the Commonwealth—and outside it. He is working on 
a way of dealing with those issues. 
The Chairman: That is very important and leads us on to the discussion in a moment. 
Baroness Armstrong of Hill Top: Does the Commonwealth Secretariat have a formula 
that is working to help individual nations gain contracts and have their arguments with the 
IMF and all the rest of it? Have we got that system going? If not, why not? 
The Chairman: Yes, I think that is absolutely the right question. 
Mr Carlos dos Santos: They may not have a system like that but some things have gone 
right. I am thinking of the issue of debt. The issue of external debt has been a big challenge 
for many developing countries. Mozambique has qualified for HIPC-1 and HIPC-2, and has 
come to some sustainable levels of debt because of systems and software developed within 
the Commonwealth. Those are being used today by the Ministry of Finance and the Central 
Bank of Mozambique. That is one of the good things that the Commonwealth has developed. 
But I agree with you that if we could have more consensus in terms of negotiating 
international trade with the WTO, the World Bank and the IMF, building the capacities of 
developing nations in these areas, we would benefit more. 
Q158   Baroness Morris of Bolton:  Thank you very much everybody. My question is 
rather picking up from what Baroness Goudie and Baroness Nicholson were saying, and also 
what Baroness Prashar and Paul were saying about encouraging networks. I was rather 
struck when reading all the various materials sent to us for today by Kamalesh Sharma’s 
letter to the FT in response to Gideon Rachman’s article. Mr Sharma said: “Our 
Commonwealth soft power and behind the scenes contributions can often be at risk of 
negative judgment in the short term”. With hard power, when you are doing something you 
shout about it so that the whole world knows—otherwise there is no point doing it. With 
soft power, there is this whole interconnection of little things. Baroness Nicholson said that 
she had not noticed what was happening. I keep hearing about all these wonderful things that 
are happening. What can we do to make soft power more visible? Then, sometimes, we will 
not have these tensions as to whether we are doing the right thing. 
The Chairman: I suppose we are doing our bit by having this committee. 
Baroness Morris of Bolton: We are. I wondered particularly what the Commonwealth 
was doing. 
The Chairman: That is the cry: that it is very hard to fit this soft power into the modern 
world and the modern media. Do any of our witnesses have some bright ideas on that? 
Baroness Prashar: I think this is a real dilemma because it is very difficult to measure the 
impact of soft power. By its very nature it is long term, through engagement. As I said, you 
build trust over a period of time. You create an environment in which other things can 
happen. If I may make another point, it is important that we do not also lose sight of the fact 
that the soft power is exercised in terms of values, again through the civil society 
organisations. I can give you examples of a range of projects where people come together. 
One example: the Royal Commonwealth Society has had its essay competition for years. 
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That is a good way of inculcating values. There are a whole range of projects that I will not 
go into. Also, taking your point about leadership, in a networked world you can take 
leadership but it is more about mutual learning and reciprocity. In a way, it is about co-
operation and engagement. That is a different way of influencing and attracting each other. 
You have to understand that. A simple thing would be, that it is important to identify areas 
where you can communicate that better and get a better understanding. If I may say so, your 
Select Committee is a good example of that, where people begin to recognise that these 
things are very important and see the strength of some of these organisations who work 
below the radar in doing all this good work. We want to make sure that, sometimes, you 
have to raise your head above the parapet and make statements. Countries join the 
Commonwealth because it is an aspiration to imbibe those values. It is a journey. But with 
those that join the club and then do not comply with the rules of the club, certain action has 
to be taken. That is the way that you begin to illustrate where the power lies. 
The Chairman: Paul Arkwright, you wanted to speak on this as well. 
Paul Arkwright: Yes, and with your permission I will go back to Baroness Nicholson briefly, 
then I will come to Baroness Morris’ points. There are a number of areas. First, the 
Commonwealth and the External Action Service of the European Union are two very 
different animals. For example, you talked about weekly meetings. I assume you mean of EU 
ambassadors in particular countries, which does happen. I was an ambassador in the 
Netherlands. We did not meet as a Commonwealth group. The Commonwealth as such 
does not have that kind of convening practice, although we got together for Commonwealth 
Day. Once a year, the Commonwealth ambassadors in that particular country would get 
together. The fact that we were in the Commonwealth together gave me a connection with 
a number of other Commonwealth ambassadors based in The Hague, which I used. I used it 
more on an ad hoc basis. The convening power of the Commonwealth could be used better 
but we are using it. The High Commissioner mentioned debt. I would also mention trade, 
where there is a Commonwealth business council, the Commonwealth Business Forum. I 
would mention advocacy in the G20 context. Before the G20 summit in St Petersburg, 
Commonwealth issues were raised through the Commonwealth Secretariat very directly. 
There is very practical assistance such as an anti-corruption unit in Botswana. In Barbados 
we have helped to establish a national human rights institution. There are lots of good 
examples but, coming to Lady Morris’ point, they are often beneath the radar. It is a very 
good question: how do we raise their profile? I see you have a hashtag for this committee so 
Twitter is obviously one means by which you could do that. I would also say CHOGM. 
CHOGM will attract the world’s attention. It might attract it in ways that the 
Commonwealth might not be particularly comfortable with but it will attract the world’s 
attention. Around CHOGM and what is happening next month in Sri Lanka there are a 
number of extremely worthwhile activities going on. If we are clever, we could make the 
most of the spotlight that the world will put on CHOGM to widen the scope of journalists’ 
interest and say, “That is all very interesting. You are interested in human rights violations by 
the Sri Lankans, how about coming to the youth forum?” 
The Chairman: Before we go on, is it correct that the Chinese are sending a very large 
business delegation to Colombo, as are the Japanese, the Qataris and the UAE?  
Paul Arkwright: I am told by Caitlin that that is correct. I do not have the numbers but they 
are particularly interested in the business forum, so the trade element of this is something 
that they are very well tuned into. 
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The Chairman: Because of time, we must move on. Baroness Hussein-Ece has been 
waiting very patiently and then we will have Lord Ramsbotham, and then I want to change 
the tone a bit. 
Q159   Baroness Hussein-Ece: Thank you, Lord Chairman. We have touched on what I 
was going to ask. Baroness Prashar at the beginning said the world is changing around the 
Commonwealth and power is shifting very much in different directions. The landscape 
around the Commonwealth is pretty much changed. How well do you think the 
Commonwealth has dealt with the new rising powers? We have touched on China but there 
is Brazil, Turkey and other countries like that. How well is the Commonwealth linking in, 
networking and working with these new powerful countries? 
The Chairman: Who would like to go first on that big idea? High commissioner, please. 
Mr Carlos dos Santos: Thank you very much. One way that I know is that the Secretary-
General of the Commonwealth is mandated by the board of governors to go to the 
meetings of the G20. This is where Commonwealth interests are brought to the fore by the 
Secretary-General. That is the main forum, I would say, although there could be others. 
Certainly, the Commonwealth Business Council is one way—the delegations go to it 
because they attach great importance to what the council discusses.  
If I may, Lord Chairman, I would like to speak about the meeting of the group of 
ambassadors and Paul’s response. I would add that, although we do not have these meetings 
of ambassadors around the world, we have the board of governors here, which meets 
regularly. Also, the board has an executive committee that meets even more regularly, 
between board meetings. Perhaps we should give it more substance and find ways of bringing 
more issues to the board and the executive committee. Moreover, the Commonwealth 
Foundation has the governors meeting—these are all the high commissioners here in 
London. Mozambique is a member of the board of governors at the foundation and a 
member of the grants committee, which each year selects projects from around the 
Commonwealth, involving inventions by youth. The last one that we voted as the number 
one project was from Kenya. A young man had invented a light bulb that can be produced in 
Kenya. It is now being used for education in the evening, which was not previously possible 
in villages. It is easy to work with and it was his invention. We are looking at the possibility 
of multiplying that to the rest of Kenya and other countries. This was just one of the 
projects.114 We had projects for Africa, Asia and the Pacific. I think that this is a wonderful 
thing. These committees are working here in London. Perhaps we could look at the 
possibility of having meetings elsewhere, but there is already a vehicle that is being used. 
Q160  Lord Ramsbotham: This relates to what others have been saying. I must admit 
that I was interested in the High Commissioner’s comment about prisons. As Chief 
Inspector of Prisons here, I am involved with the International Centre for Prison Studies and 
the human rights management of prisons, which is very much soft power oriented. My 
interest is taking the question of soft power and British influence and saying that the 
Commonwealth is a soft power organisation. All that you have said about values is really 
about the values that the Commonwealth is spreading and of which we are now a part—we 
must think of ourselves as a part and a member of the Commonwealth. Therefore, my 
question is directed particularly at the High Commissioner. Is there anything that you think 
we in the United Kingdom should be doing—you have mentioned visas and students, both of 
which subjects have come up before—to increase the UK’s contribution to the soft power 
exercised by the Commonwealth? 
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Mr Carlos dos Santos: Yes, definitely. One of the great things that the UK can do is help to 
build capacities in countries for the justice system, for police and for prisons. It should work 
with other Governments to strengthen Commonwealth capacities in these areas. In the 
Commonwealth, when we speak about good governance and democracy, we tend to look at 
CMAG and say, “Which countries are breaching the values?” But we could do better by 
focusing on the things that we can do within the framework of building capacities to prevent 
violations from happening. When you work on prevention, probably you will not have the 
same publicity as when you work on a country’s violations, but it is definitely much better. I 
would agree with Baroness Prashar that this is not about the UK leading; it is about the UK 
showing readiness to work with others in a Commonwealth of equals and saying, “We want 
to be part of this association and make a positive contribution”. I think that that would be 
very much appreciated.  
Baroness Prashar: I think that it is not so much about what Britain can do. The question for 
me is what Britain can do to increase the capacity of the Commonwealth so that the 
Commonwealth as an organisation can work better. It is not just a bilateral relationship with 
other countries; it is about the contribution that we can make where we engage with the 
Commonwealth as an institution or a network. 
Lord Ramsbotham: And where we are a member. 
Baroness Prashar: Yes, we are a member. What contribution can we make as a member to 
increase the Commonwealth’s capacity, whether through professional and non-governmental 
organisations or at governmental level? We can play a pivotal role without showing 
leadership in the sense that we own it. An important thing about the Commonwealth is that 
every member is equal, so it is about mutual learning. It is important that we increase the 
capacity of the organisation. I want to underline that the organisation is under-utilised and 
has enormous potential. It is in desperate need of reform and change and it needs to be 
repositioned. The UK can play an important role in partnership with other bodies. It can do 
that by listening to members and their needs and by focusing on areas that are a priority for 
the members. 
Q161  The Chairman: In the last 10 minutes, let us see whether we can raise the issue to 
the global level. There have been a number of questions about how the Commonwealth as 
an institution fits into this new global order. Later, the Committee will look at how the EU 
fits into this new global order and radiates its soft power, but where do our witnesses think 
the Commonwealth as an institution—with its secretariat, its mighty membership, its history 
and its hope for the future—would be most effective in influencing world affairs? Mr 
Arkwright, would you like to start on that? 
Paul Arkwright: Thank you very much, Lord Chairman. I would focus on young people. I 
would point out that 60% of the population of the Commonwealth, which is 2.2 billion, are 
currently under 30. I would focus the efforts on young people for several reasons. The first 
is that they are the future—that is an obvious point. Secondly, they are much more tuned in 
to the digital age than, at least, I am, although I cannot speak for others in this room. Thirdly, 
through education—getting education right and helping people through education—you can 
indeed make a difference in the world. We are doing that in different ways. If you bear in 
mind that every year almost 1,000 people from the Commonwealth get scholarships to 
come and study in this country, you can see that we are actually making a difference, both 
through the Chevening scholarship and through the Commonwealth Fund. 
The Chairman: Is that a two-way process? Are there scholarships around the 
Commonwealth for British students as well? 
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Paul Arkwright: Do we pay for British students to go and study in Commonwealth 
countries? Is that your question? 
The Chairman: No, it is whether other parts of the Commonwealth offer scholarships 
that we take up, just as we offer scholarships that they take up. 
Paul Arkwright: I do not know the answer to that question. I will have to come back to you 
on that, unless Caitlin knows. 
Caitlin Jones: Yes, there are opportunities for British students to study abroad, particularly 
for Masters degrees, as I understand it, in other Commonwealth countries. 
The Chairman: Sorry, I just interrupted. Carry on with what you were saying. 
Baroness Armstrong of Hill Top: Can they get visas? 
Paul Arkwright: Can who get visas? Those who have received scholarships? 
Baroness Armstrong of Hill Top: Commonwealth students coming here. 
Paul Arkwright: Yes. 
Baroness Armstrong of Hill Top: Always? 
Paul Arkwright: I cannot speak for every single Commonwealth scholar. One question that 
has come up is whether it is right to differentiate students, businesspeople or other people 
coming to the UK because they are Commonwealth citizens. The policy of the Government 
up to now has been that, on trade, for example, we are focused on individual bilateral trade 
relationships—for example, with India and with the emerging powers. I think that it is fair to 
say that there is probably an unconscious bias towards those countries with which trading is 
easier. Nobody has so far mentioned the English language as probably the biggest and most 
powerful tool of soft power that the UK can profit from. To answer your question about 
how we can make the difference, there are elements in all of that on which we can focus. 
Youth, education, scholarships and building capacity in those areas are, to my mind, one way 
in which we can really make a difference for the future. 
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: I am very glad that Mr Arkwright mentioned language, as I 
had written it down. I am glad that he is focusing on examples, because the difficulty that we 
have had with all the witnesses is in getting them to think about specific examples. One of 
the best examples is happening in Glasgow next year—the Commonwealth Games. 
Paul Arkwright: Indeed. I am coming to them.  
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: Sport is one. Education is another. Before I went to South 
Africa, I went to Lesotho, where I found out that there is a wonderful link between Wales 
and Lesotho. All these young pupils had been to Wrexham and were back in Lesotho singing 
the Welsh national anthem in Welsh. This is fantastic. These are the practical things that we 
want you to suggest more of—in education, in the arts and in music—rather than theoretical 
comments. Have you any more? 
Paul Arkwright: Caitlin has a book full of them that we can send you. I totally agree with 
you. The Commonwealth Games are a powerful example of that. The Queen’s baton relay, 
which has just started off, will travel through all 71 territories that are participating in the 
Games. Somebody made a rather unkind comparison between the wonderful event of the 
lighting of that baton with what happened in Sochi when the fire went out, but I will not go 
there. I think that this is a very important point. Linking the Commonwealth Games, the 
sporting activities, the youth and indeed business—we are looking at how we can develop a 
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business forum round the Commonwealth Games next year in Scotland—is another element 
that we need to look at. 
The Chairman: I think that Lord Foulkes’s question is really clarifying the whole point of 
this theme. In the Commonwealth, even if its heads of government occasionally clash, the 
elbows, feet and arms of government and the non-governmental activities continue to 
integrate at a great speed, driven by the interests of the people, rather than by the interests 
necessarily of the formal structures of government. It is a fascinating theme. 
Q162   Baroness Nicholson of Winterbourne: Just a very quick question to Mr 
Arkwright. The high commissioner has elaborated clearly and constructively the formatting 
of the current Commonwealth strength, which is more or less based in London. My 
questions earlier were about outreach, strengthening the Commonwealth in the member 
states and collectively in the regions of the member states. Mr Arkwright, has the Foreign 
and Commonwealth Office sufficient capacity to support a stronger Commonwealth? 
The Chairman: That is a question for Mr Arkwright and Caitlin Jones. 
Baroness Nicholson of Winterbourne: Because as you so rightly said, the EU obviously 
starts from a different base, which is the free market. The Commonwealth began from a 
sharing of common values and is doing a wonderful job. But in order for common values to 
be continued, you have to earn a better living for example, and you have to come together 
more frequently to share common values and to discuss problems such as justice and prison 
problems but also earning a living, contracts, the IMF and so on. That surely can be 
progressed further only on the ground floor in the countries and in the regions. Who is 
going to support that? Do you have the capacity in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 
or has that side got a little weak? 
Paul Arkwright: Well, I am a new director. I have been in the job for about six weeks, and I 
have an excellent team, led by Caitlin, of course, in the Foreign Office, who Lord Howell and 
others will know, who is running the team and working very hard towards CHOGM and Sri 
Lanka. I would say on the question of what is being done on the ground that we are of 
course represented by high commissions and high commissioners on the ground in 
Commonwealth countries. In my experience of travel around those countries, we are very 
well served by the people who are there and who take the Commonwealth extremely 
seriously as an institution and make the most of it. I know that Caitlin wants to come in on 
that. 
Caitlin Jones: If I may, Lord Chairman. The first thing I would say is that we would always 
like to do more, and within limited resources we do as much as we can. Under this 
Government the network has been strengthened, and we have seen new offices open in 
places around the Commonwealth, such as Hyderabad and Chandigarh, and I know that 
UKTI has strengthened offices in Commonwealth countries and in cities across the 
Commonwealth.  
What I would bring out is that the work that we do on the Commonwealth is not limited to 
the work that my team does with high commissions in Commonwealth countries. We have a 
thematic approach, which means that all the work is mainstreamed throughout the FCO. 
We have a prosperity directorate that takes forward prosperity issues with our high 
commissions across the Commonwealth, and more broadly of course. Climate change issues 
are taken forward by a climate change team, and human rights issues are taken forward by 
human rights teams. We have a number of streams and strands going on that are not 
confined to my team; they are mainstreamed across the FCO, and a lot of valuable work 
goes on. 
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Baroness Nicholson of Winterbourne: So in a sense the Commonwealth gets lost in 
the wash. I do not mean that in destructive way at all. 
The Chairman: Lord Janvrin desperately wants to get in. We have two more minutes. 
Q163   Lord Janvrin: I have a question about trade and the Commonwealth Business 
Council. One of the reports I read said, I think, that inter-Commonwealth trade was rising 
faster than extra-Commonwealth trade. Perhaps I am straying back into the question: what is 
in it for Britain? My questions are these. How effective is the Commonwealth Business 
Council in promoting trade within the Commonwealth? Could it be more effective? Could 
the UK contribute in some way to using the organisation more effectively in trade terms? 
Q164  The Chairman: Can I add to that a last question? Could we hear from Mozambique 
how the business side of things is really helped by Commonwealth membership? Let us 
spend the last few minutes on that. 
Mr Carlos dos Santos: Thank you very much for that important question. It may be difficult 
to actually pinpoint the exact benefits that came directly from the Commonwealth as such, 
but as we in Mozambique work with the Commonwealth Business Council we benefit a lot. 
My President was here last year, and we organised a big round table and a lunch with 
businesses from the UK and elsewhere but based in London. It was a very successful meeting 
that generated lots of contacts with our business people from Mozambique. Subsequently, 
we agreed to have a forum in Mozambique. I went back to Mozambique with the 
Commonwealth Business Council, and we had a business conference there that again was 
opened by the President of the country. It has generated a lot of interest from businesses 
based in the UK. I have always said that people in the Commonwealth did not go to 
Mozambique to look for businesses only because they did not know what Mozambique had 
to offer. These fora provide an opportunity for them to know that they can make good 
business there and make a lot of money. So these kinds of interaction are happening, and I 
know they have happened with Ghana and other countries. Then you have the ones at 
summit level. Whenever we have the Heads of Government Summits (CHOGM) we also 
have a business forum where you have heads of state from different countries of the 
Commonwealth interacting with business leaders, and I think it has been a very good 
experience. It was good in Perth. My President has accepted the invitation to be at the 
business round tables again in Colombo. So quite a lot is being done, even if we do not have 
any other formal network that will tell you that this is a result of the work of the 
Commonwealth Business Council or other things combined. 
The Chairman: I think we are going to make that the last word, because we have run out 
of time. The high commissioner has struck the final note. As they say, money is not 
everything but it helps. Growth and prosperity are not everything in the Commonwealth as 
values, but it certainly helps to have a prosperous group of nations. That is our interest and 
it is the interest of the whole Commonwealth. You have been marvellous witnesses. Thank 
you very much indeed. I am sorry that we do not have more time. We are extremely 
grateful to you for your insights. 
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[Dear Lord Howell] 
 
I write further to my appearance on 14 October at the Committee on Soft Power.   I 
apologise for not writing earlier, but as I am sure you will understand, the Commonwealth 
Heads of Government Meeting has taken up much of our time over the last month.   
 
When I appeared before the committee I made a remark that my colleague, Caitlin Jones, 
had a “book full” of examples which we could share with the committee.  I should like to 
clarify that this was not a physical book and was more of a reference to several examples of 
Soft Power that we had prepared ahead of the evidence session.   
 
I attach a paper which lists several of these examples which I hope help to inform the work 
of the Committee.  
 
Paul Arkwright 
Director, Multilateral Policy Directorate  
 
COMMONWEALTH SOFT POWER CASE STUDIES 
 
Human Rights  
 
Soft Power tools do not always work in enforcing human rights standards.  But there are 
some examples of good use of Soft Power.  For example: 
 
‐ The Commonwealth supports member states in their ratification, adoption or to 
suggest improvements in human rights instruments.  
‐ It provides assistance to key institutions including the police, government 
departments, national human rights institutions and civil society organisations, to 
improve their capacity to monitor and protect human rights.  
‐ The Commonwealth recently supported a train the trainer workshop for prison 
officials in Mozambique and helped produce a ‘Human Rights in Prison Management’ 
manual. 
‐ The Commonwealth has provided technical assistance to Barbados to establish a 
National Human Rights Institution.  
 
The UK values in particular the democracy and governance work which the Commonwealth 
undertakes to support members’ prosperity and development.  Election Observation is a key 
example of Commonwealth soft power making a difference.  The Commonwealth has 
observed over 70 elections since 1990.  This year, it has taken part in monitoring at national 
elections in Kenya, Pakistan, Rwanda, Swaziland, Maldives and Cameroon, and 
provincial elections in northern Sri Lanka. We were particularly pleased that the 
Commonwealth was able to observe the latter – the fact of the elections was important, and 
it was also important that the international community was able to observe.   
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Observers’ reports cover administration and voting arrangements and give useful 
assessments of how successful these were. These assist us by giving an impartial indication of 
the quality of elections, and identifying weaknesses and issues to be watched in future votes.  
 
Commonwealth Day  
A key example of the Commonwealth using soft power was through the launch of the 
Commonwealth Charter, signed by Her Majesty The Queen, on Commonwealth Day on 11 
March 2013.  The Charter sets out in a single document the values of the Commonwealth. 
In the UK, debates took place in both Houses of Parliament, and we were in touch with a 
number of Commonwealth organisations, civil society and youth to promote the Charter 
and raise the profile of the Commonwealth. Notably, we worked with the Royal 
Commonwealth Society to raise awareness among young people in the UK of the Charter 
by using their digital platform and providing teaching materials.  We also asked our High 
Commissions overseas to use the opportunity to promote the Commonwealth. In addition 
we encouraged Commonwealth members to promote the Commonwealth Charter, and the 
Secretariat asked that debates take place in parliaments across Commonwealth during that 
week.  
 
We intend to use the next Commonwealth Day on 10 March 2014, where the theme will be 
“Team Commonwealth”, to promote the Commonwealth Games in Glasgow.   
 
Sport/Commonwealth Games/Queens Baton Relay 
Using sport as a tool for peace and development is well documented.  It is a universal 
language that contributes to educating people on the values of respect, diversity, tolerance 
and fairness.  The Commonwealth Games (CWG), to be held in Glasgow from 23 July to 3 
August 2014 is a great example where the Commonwealth as an organisation brings 
together its members as one, under the banner of sport.  
 
The CWG is traditionally preceded by the Queen’s Baton Relay (QBR).  The Baton is now 
passing through each of the 71 participating nations and territories before returning to 
Scotland for the Opening Ceremony.  The QBR is a unique soft power opportunity to 
promote the CWG, Glasgow, Scotland and the wider UK in each CWG nation, 
appropriately themed to focus on issues such as trade, education or tourism, or promoting 
the values of Britain and the Commonwealth.  
 
The Commonwealth Games like the London Olympic and Paralympic Games is a unique 
opportunity for the UK Government and other key stakeholders to maximise trade and 
investment opportunities, develop global business partnerships and seek new and 
innovative solutions to deliver sustainable economic growth.  HMG and the Scottish 
Government will be hosting a Commonwealth Games Business Conference on 22-23 July in 
Glasgow to build on this.   
 
Cyber 
At CHOGM in Perth, Heads agreed to help improve international security through 
improved legislation and increased capacity to address cyber crime and other cyber space 
security threats. This included through the Commonwealth Internet Governance Forum’s 
Cyber Crime Initiative (CCI), which helps build capacity and helps facilitate partnerships on 
cyber crime. This was reaffirmed at CHOGM in Colombo. 
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Heads mandated work within the Commonwealth on cyber crime.  The Secretariat’s 
programme of work includes; effective co-operation within the commonwealth and globally 
to develop, monitor and update their expertise in policy, law enforcement, prosecution and 
prevention of cybercrime; each member state to develop and maintain an effective national 
strategy to co-ordinate efforts to prevent and combat cybercrime; the creation of special co-
operative relationships among the smaller developing countries to build law enforcement 
and preventive capacity; develop effective prevention strategies in co-operation with the 
private sector and civil society; encourage Commonwealth countries to bring their laws into 
line with the Commonwealth Model Law and the Harare Scheme and to accede, where 
practicable, the Budapest Convention.  The Commonwealth’s work on cyber has helped 
improve good governance and promote best practice on cyber throughout its member 
states.  
 
Making the most of the Commonwealth’s emerging powers 
The Commonwealth contains several fast growing economies among its members and we 
are using all the networks / organisations and tools at our disposal to increase UK 
engagement with them.  The fact that some of these are Commonwealth members means 
that we already have a head start.  Some examples: 
 
• The UK has a global reputation for excellence and world class expertise in 
a wide range of sectors which can complement the fast growing 
economies.  In Malaysia for example, around 48,000 Malaysians take UK 
qualifications, which around 14,000 are studying in the UK.  A decade after 
Nottingham University established a campus in Malaysia, more than 60 UK 
educational institutions have established ties with Malaysian counterparts.  Newcastle 
University opened a Medical School in Malaysia in 2011, while Southampton 
University opened an engineering campus there in 2012. 
• Commonwealth and Chevening scholarships. The Scholarships are an 
important element in Britain’s public diplomacy effort and bring young professionals, 
who have already displayed outstanding leadership talents, to study in the UK. The 
objective of the Chevening programme is to support foreign policy priorities and 
achieve FCO objectives by creating lasting positive relationships with future leaders, 
influencers and decision-makers.  Between the two schemes, the UK sponsors nearly 
a 1000 Commonwealth scholars to study in the UK each year.   [Over 150 
Chevening scholarships to Commonwealth citizens in 2013-14 and around 800 
Commonwealth scholarships per year]. 
• On 18 October, 12 Chevening Scholars from the Commonwealth will be presented 
to Her Majesty at Buckingham Palace as part of the Centenary of the 
Association of Commonwealth Universities.  
• Over 600 new education and research partnerships have been established with 
India since 2011 as part of the UK India Education and Research Initiative (UKIERI). 
• Under the GREAT campaign the FCO, UKTI and the British Council are working in 
partnership to attract high-achieving Indian undergraduates to British 
universities focusing on: law, medicine, engineering and life sciences - fields where the 
UK leads in higher education facilities.  
• UKTI Education (formerly known as the Education UK Unit) is a key component of 
the Governments International Education Strategy.  This team has been set 
up jointly by BIS and UKTI to help the UK education and training sector win business 
overseas, particularly in relation to high value opportunities.  Work is currently 
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underway to identify and prioritise further target markets, based on initial 
assessments of high value opportunities including East Africa, India, Malaysia, and 
South Africa.  A number of other Commonwealth markets may become priority 
markets for UKTI Education in coming months. 
• As part of the Emerging Powers Initiative, we have invested in some of the 
Commonwealth countries who are Emerging Powers through our Network Shift to 
increase the number of staff in our embassies (i.e. India). We have also invested in 
those countries that are EPs to develop our soft power. In India, South Africa and 
Nigeria we have provided grant funding to build business networks through our 
British Chambers of Commerce. The Chevening programme has funded a South 
African scholar to work on a huge cutting-edge commercial project on a British car, 
Bloodhound SSC, which is designed to go faster than the speed of sound; we have 
done GREAT events and a GREAT week in South Africa around this project. We 
have funded a project with the Nigerian MFA to take diplomats from every region in 
Nigeria to the UK to help train them in how diplomats in the UK operate. In India, 
we funded a Young Leaders Retreat in Mumbai which was a seminar to develop 
future leaders and give them an understanding of what leadership is.  
 
28 November 2013 
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Lord Forsyth of Drumlean 
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock 
Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts 
Lord Janvrin 
Baroness Morris of Bolton 
Lord Ramsbotham 
________________ 
Examination of Witness 
Mark Harper MP, Immigration Minister, Home Office 
Q260   The Chairman: We have been joined now by Mark Harper, who is Immigration 
Minister at the Home Office. We are very grateful to him for being with us today. I have to 
say formally that the declared interests of this Committee are on the bits of paper in front of 
you. If we have a vote, which I do not think is likely, we might have to interrupt for five 
minutes. As you probably know, we in this Committee are seeking to formulate views and 
report on the deployment of so-called soft power and the promotion of Britain’s influence 
and attractiveness throughout the world, and hence, we hope, to fulfil our national aims of 
increased prosperity, an effective contribution in the outside world and security. We have 
had a great number of comments from many witnesses about the impact of immigration and 
visa policies on this issue. I shall begin with an obvious question, and please then feel free to 
elaborate on it. Do you feel that it is part of your job to promote the UK’s image abroad? 
Does that come on to your desk? 
Mark Harper MP: I think it does, Chairman, and thank you for inviting me to come and give 
evidence. The objective of our visa and immigration policy is twofold. It is to support both 
our prosperity agenda—and the Home Office is just as much signed up to that as any other 
department—and the countervailing security agenda to stop immigration and crime and to 
stop people coming here who are doing so for the wrong reasons. It is about balancing the 
two and ensuring that we deliver on both those objectives. We have also been very clear, 
and the Home Secretary and I and other Ministers take every opportunity to make this 
point, that people wanting to come to Britain as visitors or to be here lawfully and not 
breach immigration rules are very welcome. We try to put service improvements in place 
and make it as easy as possible. To that extent, yes, it is our job to go out there and sell our 
message and take every opportunity, both domestically and overseas, to say that Britain is 
open for business and that people are very welcome here if they want to come and play by 
the rules. 
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The Chairman: But do you feel that we are getting this balance quite right? Why has 
witness after witness spoken about the way in which the visa policy makes this country less 
attractive? We have had some very strong language. Very senior journalists, editors and 
opinion-formers have talked about our policy being “suicidal”, which was one word that was 
used. Another was a “crime”. It was very strong language indeed. I do not endorse that kind 
of strong language in any way, but the feeling runs deep that we are striking a wrong note. 
How do you feel that the case for having the right balance can be better promoted? How 
would you put it? 
Mark Harper MP: I certainly think that some of those who have given evidence to you are 
people who philosophically do not think that we should have any visas at all. The 
Government’s view is that if we had no visas for anyone at all and anyone in the world could 
come to Britain without any control at all, that would be very damaging to us. I 
fundamentally do not agree with one of the journalists who said that the concept of having 
visas was a crime—that is a rather foolish statement. I would counter that one of the 
difficulties here is about the difference between reality and perception. One of the things 
that I ran into when I initially came into this job last year was our decision to revoke the 
sponsor licence of London Metropolitan University, which was absolutely the right decision 
to take because it was not meeting its sponsorship requirements. However, that was not 
necessarily reported in a very balanced way across the world. Coming into this job, I was a 
conscious that we do not just have to make the right decisions but that we have to think 
about how we communicate not just to a domestic audience but to an international one. 
One of the things I have tried to do over the past year is to think through some of our 
communications. If we think that something might be sensitive in a particular country, for 
example, we talk to our embassy in that country, get some advice and think about how it will 
play. And we do not just take decisions; we think about how they will play. A lot of the 
concerns that have been expressed to you are concerns that have been expressed to me, 
but when you actually probe the evidence it does not support them. However, it is the case 
that people think some of those things, and there is a gap between perception and reality. 
One of the reasons why I was pleased to come and give evidence was to try to deal with 
some of the reality versus some of the perceptions that people have. 
Q261  Baroness Morris of Bolton: Mark, thank you very much. You mentioned the 
embassies, and you said that when you think something sensitive might come up you will 
communicate with the embassy. We all hear horror stories of fairly high-level people who 
do masses of business in the UK but who cannot get in, and I am sure that that would 
happen however perfect the system was. However, I wonder whether that could not be 
better mitigated. Given that our embassies know people, perhaps they could be given a way 
of doing the initial screening. That has been taken away now from some of our ambassadors, 
has it not? I wondered why that was. Perhaps it might be a good thing to bring that back. 
Mark Harper MP: There are a couple of issues there. One is that there is a formal process 
where we work with UKTI to look at valuable and high-value businesses that we want to 
have relationships with so that we build a very good relationship with them. There is that on 
a formal basis. Your specific issue about the extent to which we deal with our posts abroad 
has been raised with me on a couple of visits, and I have asked for some work to be done to 
see whether we can formalise the process. Where an ambassador or a High Commissioner 
is aware of particular individuals who have either a business or a diplomatic relationship, 
although they are not a formal diplomatic person, perhaps we ought formalise their ability to 
feed that into the decision-making process, either to factor it into the decision or to ensure 
that if there is any legitimate reason why we would not want that person to come to Britain, 
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there is a good process for handling the communication. I have asked for some work to be 
done on that. That is a very sensible point that has been raised with me in posts overseas. 
The Chairman: So Minister, aside from the extremists who do not want any visa control 
at all, where is the aggro coming from? It really is rather strong. Is it to do with the cost of 
the visa, as once witness was suggesting, with the arrangements in the hinterland and the 
difficulties of applying for visas from some countries, or just the fact that too many people 
want to come here because they are attracted by our universities, our tourism and so on? 
Surely you must have a view of why the aggro is there, and therefore some targets for how 
to ameliorate it. 
Mark Harper MP: I think it is probably worth disaggregating the two segments. On the one 
hand you have visit visas—that is, visas for people coming here as tourists or business 
visitors. I think that our performance on those is very strong. Of course many countries do 
not require visas to come here for those two purposes; in many countries we have non-visa 
nationals, and they can come to Britain for visits without getting these in advance. However, 
for countries where we insist on a visa in advance for good reason, our global performance 
is very good. We grant 89% of visas that are applied for, and in China it is even higher than 
that. We grant 94% of those visas within our 15 working-day target—in fact the average 
globally is to grant a visa in eight days—and that performance compares very well with our 
competitors. On that side of the shop, the tourist and business visitors, we offer a very good 
regime, and I think I am right in saying that over the past year that has been increasingly 
recognised. We have done a lot of work, for example, with partners involved in attracting 
Chinese business and visitors to the country, and although we have not dealt with all their 
complaints, we have made considerable progress. You will have seen the announcement that 
the Chancellor made on a recent visit about working closely with partners in China on 
simplifying the process for those who wish to have both a UK and a Schengen visa. 
Baroness Armstrong of Hill Top: So why do you get proportionately so few Chinese 
tourists, given the increase that there has been in Chinese tourism?  
Mark Harper MP: We have had very significant growth. In the past quarter, for example, 
we have had 150,000 applications, an increase of 40%. Our overall performance is very 
strong. It depends on the numbers that you are looking at. The numbers that are often 
quoted are simply not sustainable. The idea that France gets seven and a half times more 
visitors than we do, which I have seen quoted, is simply not supported by the evidence. They 
issue broadly the same number of Schengen visas that we do, while the exit data from China, 
where they ask people exiting China which country they are going to, suggest that we get a 
broadly similar number of visitors. That huge disparity is just not supported by the evidence. 
There is some tourism survey data, which are often used but are not particularly robust or 
arrived at with good methodology. The data suggest that we are actually performing very 
well and seeing strong growth in Chinese students, Chinese business visitors and tourists. 
That does not mean that there is not more to do. There is. I have met the retail sector and 
representatives of Chinese businesses in both the finance sector and the manufacturing 
sector in order to talk through some of the things that we can do to solve some of the 
second-order problems. The feedback is that we have a pretty good visa system both for 
visit visas and for work and study. 
Baroness Armstrong of Hill Top: We are in a parallel universe, then.  
Mark Harper MP: Well, there is a difference between what you sometimes read in the 
newspapers, the “death by anecdote” story— 
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Q262  Baroness Armstrong of Hill Top: We are just talking about the evidence that we 
have had from a range of people, not just from newspapers—I do not think that I have heard 
the extreme language that the Chairman was talking about. There is hardly a single witness 
who has not talked about a visa problem.  
Mark Harper MP: But can you suggest for me what the problem is, though—a factual 
problem as opposed to someone’s assertion? 
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean: What are the numbers of Chinese tourists and businessmen 
going around the world, and what percentage of them actually come to Britain?  
Mark Harper MP: Let me run through what I have in front of me because I am not going to 
make numbers up. If I do not have some of the figures, obviously I will write to the 
Committee. Our visa service in China had 300,000 visa applications and granted 96% of 
them, so 96% of Chinese people who apply for a visit visa get one. We saw a 22% growth in 
numbers between August 2012 and July 2013, 40% in the past quarter. Our average 
processing time is less than seven days.  
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean: May I just stop you there? How many Chinese people are 
travelling as tourists? Is it not tens of millions?  
Mark Harper MP: It is. 
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean: Is 300,000 not rather a small proportion? 
Mark Harper MP: No, because the overwhelming majority of Chinese who travel overseas 
do not go further than Hong Kong or Macau. If you look at the exit data from China, a 
significant proportion of people travel to Hong Kong and Macau and another significant 
proportion to Asia. If you look at those who travel further afield, the number of visitors who 
come to the United Kingdom is broadly comparable to those who come to similar-sized 
European countries. There is not a massive disparity. 
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean: Could you let us have the actual numbers? 
Mark Harper MP: Let me write to you with those particular exit data, and I shall set out to 
you our view of the comparative data. 
Q263  The Chairman: Perhaps we had better go straight on to the Schengen issue and 
the ameliorations that have been suggested. Can you explain to us what those are and how 
they are going to affect things? 
Mark Harper MP: Yes, there are a number of things that we have done in China to speed 
up the overall process. We have more visa application centres than any other European 
country. We have also looked at some of our premium services, to pick up Baroness 
Morris’s point, for some of those high-end customers. We have had success recently with 
some very significant investments in the UK where we delivered a very high level of 
customer service to some very significant business visitors, which got some very positive 
feedback. The specific issue that the Chancellor announced on his visit was around making 
the process much more straightforward for someone who wants to apply for a Schengen 
visa and a UK one; we will allow them to apply on a single Schengen form with a very small 
extra amount of UK information. We now allow a passport pass-back process where they 
can effectively get their visas at the same time, and we are working with some commercial 
partners in China so that from the customer’s point of view it will be a relatively seamless 
process to make one application and then receive a visa for both the United Kingdom and 
the Schengen countries. That is what we are working on at the moment with commercial 
partners, and we are hoping to have something rolled out next year.  
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Baroness Armstrong of Hill Top: And will that extend beyond China? 
Mark Harper MP: That is what we are aiming for at the moment because that is where the 
specific issue has been raised. Clearly, anything that we roll out in one country we look at 
rolling out elsewhere. For example, we are planning to roll out the one-day service that the 
Prime Minister announced on his visit to India earlier this year, which has been very 
successful, in China and a number of our other high-growth markets across the world. 
When we try things in various locations and they work, we look at rolling them out to our 
high-growth markets across the world. 
Lord Ramsbotham: To follow up what you just said, you have told us about your great 
success but it is not just journalists who have complained; universities, businesses and indeed 
everyone who has come here has complained about the visa process—the bureaucracy, the 
time, the cost and just the image that it gives all make it difficult. You have talked about your 
success, but they would not say this to us unless they had concrete evidence of the opposite. 
I have always had a suspicion about the UK Border Agency as an organisation that what it 
says is not actually always what it does. I am not just being critical about this, but it is hugely 
important that we should have the image right. 
Mark Harper MP: No, I agree with you. I found this disconnect rather frustrating when I 
started to do this job. It is absolutely true that lots of people say lots of unhelpful things, but 
when you meet them and challenge them on the evidence, they do not have the facts to 
support their assertions. The point that I have made to some of them when I have had this 
conversation with education providers and universities is that when they have said publicly 
that everything is dreadful, they then sound surprised that people have listened to the fact 
that they said that everything was dreadful and think that it is, when the evidence is that it 
actually is not, and that is not helpful. Our visa performance for visit visas is actually very 
competitive globally, and you can find people who compare and contrast that. We have seen 
an increase in the number of students coming to universities. We have seen an overall fall in 
the number of visas issued to students because we have taken nearly 700 sponsors off the 
register, as there was significant abuse, but we have seen growth in the number of students 
coming to universities. We have seen very strong growth from particular countries, such as 
China. Over the past year we have made significant strides in working with universities in 
what they call a partnership approach, where the relationship between us and the university 
sector has improved hugely. I have met Universities UK, the Russell Group and a number of 
others to work on some improvements to the performance. I think they would agree that 
we have seen an improvement over the past year in the way we have worked with them. 
We have delivered some changes to the policies, and I think we have made a significant 
improvement in the way we deal with students coming to the UK. This is an area where I 
always like to focus on the facts. I am not disagreeing with you—I know what the evidence 
to the Committee has been because I have heard a lot of it myself—but when you actually 
unpick it and challenge people on the assertions that they have made, the evidence does not 
always back up what they are saying. I am not saying that we are perfect—of course we are 
not; there is a lot of room for improvement—but some of the things that people assert are 
simply not true, or the assertions are not backed up by hard evidence. If there are facts that 
people can point out, I am happy to improve them, but we have to deal with facts and 
evidence, not just perceptions. 
Lord Ramsbotham: Given that they have come to us, obviously hoping that we will help 
to improve things, I think it is important that we resolve this before our report is published.  
The Chairman: Sorry, there is a long queue of people wanting to speak. We must take 
turns. Have you finished, Lord Ramsbotham? 
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Lord Ramsbotham: Absolutely.  
Q264  Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: Minister, you have asked four times for facts. Why do 
people in Lesotho have to go to Pretoria to get visas? 
Mark Harper MP: In most countries we have visa application centres. There are some 
countries where we do not have a visa application centre, and people have to come to 
register their biometrics before we allow them to come to the United Kingdom. 
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: Why do people in Caribbean countries all have to go to a 
central point? I could go through country after country where you have to travel miles. 
Sometimes you have to fly from one island to another to get a visa, or go by horseback, 
because our embassies do not all issue them. 
Mark Harper MP: It is a balance between the cost of running the operation— 
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: But you said you did not know of any problems. You said you 
did not know of any examples. I have given you some. 
Mark Harper MP: If we start from the proposition that there are some countries where 
we have a visa requirement, which we have for good reason, then clearly we have to run 
that in an efficient manner. It is not possible for us to have a visa application centre where 
someone can give their biometrics in every single town and village of every single country, so 
there is a balance and we look at the volume of applications— 
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: I am not saying that they should be in every town and village.  
Mark Harper MP: We look at the number of applications and locate those visa application 
centres. We have a bigger network of those than many other countries. 
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: With respect, you are not helping the Committee. The 
Committee is trying to find ways to improve the situation. We are explaining all the 
problems. One of the ways of improving it would be to give European Union posts a 
consular responsibility to issue visas. That is quite possible, but the Government are setting 
their face against it. Why? That would improve the situation. 
Mark Harper MP: Do you mean that we should allow the European Union posts to make 
decisions about who we issue visas to? 
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: No, to deal with application procedures. Do you ever go 
abroad and see what is actually happening on the ground? 
Mark Harper MP: I do. I go to our visa posts on a number of occasions. We are certainly 
open to working in partnership with our European partners for visa application centres. One 
of the things that we are looking at in China, for example, is whether there is some mutual 
benefit in working with our European partners on sharing some commercial partners. 
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: To be honest, I am not so worried about China as some of 
my colleagues are. I am worried about some of the developing countries, like Lesotho, some 
of the Caribbean countries, some of the Asian countries or some of the other African 
countries where, in order to get a visa, they have to travel miles or even into other 
countries. I think you ought to go out and have a look at it. I did in Lesotho. That was a 
good example. I travelled with the Deputy High Commissioner, who took the machine all 
the way from Pretoria to issue visas. That was a positive thing, the kind of thing that we 
should be encouraging, but you are not—you are always defending the status quo. 
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The Chairman: We want to move on. Just one question on this, en passant: do you 
consult your opposite numbers at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office about this 
problem, which is obviously theirs as much as yours? 
Mark Harper MP: I do. I have frequent meetings with colleagues from the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office, both formal and unofficial. If I pick up concerns from countries, I 
pass them back to colleagues and we have a discussion about them to see whether there are 
improvements that can be made. 
Q265  Lord Forsyth of Drumlean: Have you had an opportunity to look at the UK 
China Visa Alliance’s written evidence to the Committee? 
Mark Harper MP: I have.  
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean: That has some numbers in it. Can I just remind you of what 
they are? It said in its evidence to us that France attracts up to seven and a half times more 
Chinese visitors than Britain, that the Home Office’s figures show that the maximum number 
of Chinese visitors to the UK in 2011-12 was 210,400, and that in the same period the 
Schengen area issued 1.185 million visas—six times more. It pointed out that visitors with a 
Schengen visa can visit any of the 26 member states in Europe, and that only 85% of those 
Chinese tourists coming to Europe apply for a British visa, and therefore we lose out. You 
said in answer to an earlier question that the bulk of the Chinese tourists are going to Hong 
Kong and the others to Asia, but those who are going to Europe visit more than one 
country. The Chancellor’s initiative is very welcome, whereby there will be some 
arrangements through selected travel agents, but do you agree with these numbers that 
were included in the evidence or not? 
Mark Harper MP: We do not agree with the number that seven and a half times more 
Chinese visitors go to France than in the UK. That is simply not supported either by the 
number of visas issued or by the Chinese exit data. 
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean: You mean Schengen visas? 
Mark Harper MP: Yes.  
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean: But Schengen visas enable people to travel to any country in 
Europe. 
Mark Harper MP: But just because they are able to do so does not mean that they do. 
There is no hard evidence that that is what they do at all. 
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean: Some 1.185 million Schengen visas are issued, as against 
210,000 for the UK. 
Mark Harper MP: Yes, but that is 1.1 million Schengen visas spread over all the countries in 
the European Union, not just one or two of them. 
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean: But you can visit 26 member states with a Schengen visa. 
Mark Harper MP: Yes, but if you compare us to comparable countries, the numbers are 
not significant. If you look at the number of Chinese visitors who go to France, that is not 
significantly different from the number of visitors who come to United Kingdom. 
Q266  Lord Forsyth of Drumlean: The evidence we were given was that if you have a 
Schengen visa you can visit 26 European countries—there are a lot more of them. If you 
want to visit France and Germany, you can do that. The evidence also said that most visitors 
travelled to more than one country, having travelled half way around the world, but if they 
want to come to Britain they have to apply for a separate visa, and only 85% of the cohort of 
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people who get as far as Europe do so. We are therefore losing out. Do you agree with 
that? 
Mark Harper MP: We agree that it would be better if more people could apply for both. 
That is exactly why we have put in place the process that is under way that will make it 
easier for people to apply for both a UK and a Schengen visa. However, we do not agree 
with the statistic that suggests that the difference is of an order of magnitude of seven and a 
half times. I have heard that statistic before; when we ourselves have had a debate with the 
UK China Visa Alliance, it has put that number to us and we have said that we do not think 
it is supported by the evidence. Clearly, if you take the whole of the number of countries in 
the rest of the European Union that are in Schengen, which is a significantly larger number of 
people than the United Kingdom, it is not a fair comparison to ask whether more people go 
to that group of countries than come to the United Kingdom. 
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean: It is not an argument about fairness; it is about people having 
the ability to come to Britain as easily as they can go to other European countries. 
Mark Harper MP: Correct, and we can be compared to comparably sized European 
countries. For example, the number of Chinese visitors who go to France is not significantly 
different from the number of Chinese visitors who come to the United Kingdom, which 
does not suggest that there is any massive disadvantage in the fact that we are not in 
Schengen. 
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean: How do we compare with Belgium? 
Mark Harper MP: I do not know because I have the France numbers in front of me. 
The Chairman: If you are Chinese with the wonderful prospect of travelling to Europe and 
you are applying for a visa, is it more difficult to apply for one of ours than it is to apply for 
one—a Schengen visa, of course—to France or Germany? Is the administrative form-filling 
more formidable for us, or is it just about the same? 
Mark Harper MP: No, it is not. It is about the same. One of the things that we have done 
is change some of our requirements over the last year. We have made it simpler and more 
straightforward in the number of documents that we ask for and in the length of the form, 
so actually it is not more complicated at all. In fact, we have made the process more 
comparable, which makes it possible for us now to make the system effectively seamless for 
people to apply for both together. That is what we are working on at the moment. 
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean: Do you agree that only 6% do apply for both together? 
Mark Harper MP: Apparently that is the number, yes.  
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean: Given the attraction of London and the reputation of Britain, 
if you have come to Europe, does not the fact that only 6% apply suggest to you that there is 
a big hole? 
Mark Harper MP: It would clearly be advantageous if more people came here. What we 
are really interested in is the number of people who come here and what they spend when 
they are here. Of course the tourists who come to just the United Kingdom stay here for 
the whole of their trip. The danger if we have to work it both ways is that we might get 
some extra visitors who come here for a short period as part of a wider European tour, but 
the flipside is that those who come here for the whole of their visit might not stay here for 
very long and might go to other European countries as well. So there is a downside to this, 
but it would be helpful if people applied for both visas, which is why we are putting in place 
the process which the Chancellor announced on his visit. 
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Q267  Lord Janvrin: You said right at the beginning that there is a reality perception 
problem, which is patently obvious from the line of questioning. What are you doing about 
the perception problem? Are you running a major communications campaign? How does it 
relate to the GREAT campaign that we have heard a lot of? We keep being told that there is 
a disconnect within government here.  
Mark Harper MP: There are two things. First, the Home Office is very much involved in 
the GREAT campaign, and we have co-ordinated our messaging. For example, we have put 
some extra communications resource in place in China, and we are using our marketing and 
communications as part of the GREAT campaign. Our stuff is branded in the same way, and 
we are working closely with other government departments to have consistent messaging. 
We do not have separate messaging: we have messaging that is consistent as part of the 
GREAT campaign.  
The second part of the approach is to work with organisations in the UK that do some of 
the communications. Since I have been doing this job I have had a lot of contact with the 
university sector, with the retail sector as I said, with the business sector and with various 
groups focused on specific countries to deal with some of the real problems and with some 
of the perceived problems, so that we can communicate. 
Let me give you an example on universities. I think it is fair to say that we did a better job of 
communicating the end of the previous post-study work arrangements than we did 
communicating what are very good arrangements that replace them. If you are a university 
student in Britain and you are a graduate, it is actually very straightforward to stay here. If 
you have a graduate-level job paying just over £20,000 a year, you can stay in the United 
Kingdom. I do not think that we necessarily landed that argument well enough. I think we did 
a very good job of communicating the change to the previous regime, but I do not think we 
did a good enough job at communicating this. We have worked with the university sector 
and large employers at improving the way in which we communicate that. That was a 
particular issue in India, for example. Many students come from India and want or need to be 
able to work afterwards. We have seen a significant growth in the most recent UCAS 
numbers—a 12% increase—in the number of Indian applications, so I think we are starting to 
get that message over, but that is a good example of where we perhaps did not 
communicate that we had changed the approach and people went away with the idea that it 
was more difficult to stay in Britain to work post-university study, which of course is not the 
case.  
Baroness Armstrong of Hill Top: There are other reasons for people to come to this 
country than to spend money. I know that we want them to, but there are other reasons. I 
recently did some work with the Tanzanian parliament, and there was great anger there 
because they felt that Britain did not really want to know them because they have to go to 
Nairobi for their visas. I have also done some work in Kenya, and there again they are 
looking much more to other models because they think that the British Commonwealth has 
lost what it means to them, and a lot of that talk is about visas. If this is about perception, do 
you see any of your role as doing work with Commonwealth countries on our mutual 
responsibility and so on? Soft power is about influence. You get influence partly through 
trade but partly through other things. We are about to have the Commonwealth Heads of 
Government conference. That will not be an easy conference. Does the Home Office see 
any of its role as supporting the Commonwealth and its aims and objectives, or does it see 
that as having nothing to do with visas? 
Mark Harper MP: I think we do see ourselves as part of the Government’s joined-up 
approach. We have been involved in the discussions running up to the Commonwealth 
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Heads of Government Meeting. There are some discussions on the agenda about visas, and 
we have been involved in that process. We clearly have to balance both the reason why we 
have visas—there are security challenges in immigration and asylum and so forth—with our 
absolute focus on the prosperity agenda as well and making sure that people come here to 
trade and on reputation as well. Where we have real issues, we absolutely want to deal with 
them, and we have to balance those objectives. If we have real issues that people are raising 
with us, we absolutely see it as our role to deal with those, and we take the meetings with 
Commonwealth partners very seriously. I have met a number of High Commissioners and 
members of their Governments since I have had this role, and I will continue to do so.  
The Chairman: Has the issue of distinct treatment for categories of Commonwealth 
visitors ever been discussed, or, more narrowly, has the issue been discussed of a special 
kind of treatment for those who are actually subjects of Her Majesty the Queen: that is, 
citizens of the 16 realms in the Commonwealth that come under our monarchy? 
Mark Harper MP: Not as a class, no, but we look at our visa requirements for visit visas on 
the basis of things that I have set out. We judge those country by country rather than as a 
class.  
Q268  Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts: Just by way of introduction, you said that 
communication was very important, and I suspect that your issue about post-study work 
options needs communicating closer to home, because unless I completely misunderstood 
what was said to us an hour ago, we were told that the post-study work option system was 
not working well and was a major disincentive. My question relates to the quality of the 
experience for students. It seems to me that our soft power does very well if it is good but 
very poorly if it is poor. Quite a lot of the Universities UK research that it has done on 
domestic undergraduates is completely at odds with the anecdotal evidence that you get 
from talking to students about the quality of the experience that they have. Do the 
Government look at, consider and see whether we are getting the right values, the right 
experience, the right life for people when they come here for three years or for whatever 
period they come for as students from overseas? 
Mark Harper MP: I do not think that we commission specific research. We have a dialogue 
with Universities UK, we talk to them about the experience of students, and we look at the 
feedback that we get from other organisations, but I do not think that we have gone out and 
done any ourselves formally. I will check that point and write to the Committee. Clearly we 
want the experience of applying for the visa and the experience that they get at the border 
when they arrive to be good, and we have put a lot of effort into making sure that we 
deliver a good experience at the ports. We have made a huge improvement compared with 
where we were last year in driving down queuing. We now process 99.6% of passengers 
through our airports within our service standards, which is not the position we were in last 
year before the Olympic and Paralympic Games. We have put a lot of work into that and 
into their experience when they are here. I think we are focused on that and we want them 
to have a good experience. We want them to be able to stay here. For students who want 
to say here to work in a graduate-level job and to start their own business, we have some 
schemes now for graduate entrepreneurs so that they can stay, and we want to expand 
those. We want students who have bright ideas and want to run businesses, to grow them 
and to employ people, and we want them to stay in the United Kingdom rather than go 
elsewhere. 
Q269  Baroness Morris of Bolton: Thank you very much. That is really good news on 
the graduate entrepreneurs. On the graduate-level jobs, I heard a story the other day about 
a very talented young woman who had graduated and gone to one of the top law firms. She 
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had gone into a job where she was being paid over £30,000 a year, but it was not classed as 
a graduate-level job because of the structure within that firm, and therefore she could not 
stay. I obviously realise that there has to be a benchmark, but I just wonder whether there is 
room for common-sense application to individuals. It seems to me that when you have a 
very rigid scheme, very talented people could slip through for a whole host of reasons.  
Mark Harper MP: We keep that sort of thing under review. The Migration Advisory 
Committee looks at a lot of detailed work on, for example, occupations where there are 
shortages and where employers do not have to do a resident labour market test, and we 
look at a lot of that sort of information at a very detailed level. It sounds to me as though we 
need to go away and look at the detail of that example, because it seems to me that a job 
that is paying a woman £30,000 a year pretty much is a graduate-level job. If you have the 
specifics of that, I will happily take that away. 
Baroness Morris of Bolton: I will try to remember who told me.  
Mark Harper MP: But yes, we do need to be sensible. I know that you were given evidence 
earlier, but there is a balance here between not changing the rules every five minutes and 
reflecting where people think there are problems. Three years ago when we changed the 
routes for working, for study and for families to the United Kingdom, that was clearly a big 
change in our approach. We have tried to keep the broad approach consistent since then, 
but we do of course want to change the rules in detail where specific issues are flagged up. 
There is always a balance here between consistency and not changing the rules but 
responding to genuine issues that are raised with us. Each time the rules have been changed 
since I have been doing this job, we have made changes to reflect feedback from universities 
and businesses, and we have made some tweaks to the rules on the length of time people 
can stay here for and on some of the language abilities to try to fit better with the 
requirements. So it is a balance between consistency and reflecting change where change is 
required. 
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean: Can I just ask you about the front window for Britain when 
people arrive at the ports, the airports or wherever? I think you said that you were meeting 
98.6%— 
Mark Harper MP: 99.6%. 
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean: —99.6% of your standards. I will spare you the anecdotal 
stories of waiting in queues at Edinburgh and London airports to get into the country as an 
EU citizen. Are you satisfied with these standards? My impression, certainly, travelling 
around the world is that in Asia the airports are just so efficient. In the UK, the process of 
getting through immigration or security is so much more of a hassle. Even within the UK, 
you have different standards. Some require you to take your laptops out and put them 
through security, others do not. Given the areas of responsibility that you have for 
immigration—and, I think, for security, although that might be another department—are you 
satisfied that we are as good as we should be in the way we greet people when they arrive 
or leave this country, because it is very, very evident that we are way behind the curve 
compared with many, many other countries round the world? 
Mark Harper MP: I will not question your point about how we compare with others. Are 
we as good as we should be? Probably not. There are clearly different areas of responsibility, 
though. On the issue of security, which is led by the Department for Transport, there are 
responsibilities that airports have to deliver. That is one of the challenges for us: having a 
good relationship with the airport operator and having a joined-up approach. Let me give 
Government (Mark Harper MP, Home Office) – Oral evidence (QQ 260-273) 
530 
 
you an example. What passengers are really interested in is how quickly they can get off the 
plane and get out of the airport. 
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean: Exactly. 
Mark Harper MP: That means joining up the processes. Last year during the Olympic and 
Paralympic Games, we put a huge amount of resource into processing people very quickly at 
one of our airports. All that happened then was they backed up in the baggage hall and did 
not leave the airport any quicker. So we have to work with airports on delivering a good 
service. We had challenges during the summer with some airports simply not being big 
enough to deal with the volume of passengers at peak time. For example, at some airports 
when we have a student surge and a significant number of students arrive, we fully staff every 
desk that is at the airport but the airport is simply not large enough to deal with that peak. I 
am confident that we are doing what we can, but there is a limit to what we at the Home 
Office can do to improve that experience. 
Q270  Lord Forsyth of Drumlean: Minister, could I suggest that you take a day off and 
arrive unannounced? It is certainly not my experience that when you arrive at the airport, 
every desk is occupied and there are no queues. It may be that I am just very unlucky, but 
the anecdotal evidence—I know you have statistical evidence—simply belies that. The story 
that one hears from businessmen and others is that you throw in particular is just one of the 
worst places, and that increasingly people are looking to Schipol and other airports because 
of that experience. 
Mark Harper MP: I can assure you that when I travel I do not say who I am. I go through 
the normal process; I am not sufficiently senior to get whizzed through the VIP bits of 
airports, so I see what it looks like from the customer’s end. I have to say that my 
experience has often been very positive. I have been dying to spot a problem and be able to 
wander up and suggest that it be fixed, but I have yet to find one. In terms of evidence, take 
Heathrow: we had some issues there when I started this job. It was off the back of the 
Olympics. The relationship was not as good as it could have been but it is much better now. 
Heathrow is very pleased with our performance, and that is not just our statistical 
evidence—if you look at the work that Heathrow does in surveying its customers about 
their perception of their experience, the immigration bit of the journey through the airport 
is actually now rated as pretty good. 
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean: How long do you have to wait to be rated as pretty good? 
Mark Harper MP: That is about what the customers’ perception is. Our service 
standards—I will give you a rough idea but I will write to the Committee with the exact 
numbers—is that the service level for an EEA passenger is that they wait for no longer than 
25 minutes, and for a non-EEA passenger it is 45 minutes. However, the average waiting 
times for EEA passengers, for example, are below 10 minutes. However, I will write to the 
Committee with the facts and the average data, particularly for Heathrow.  
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean: And would you be able to provide us with data on what 
other countries are able to achieve in that respect? 
Mark Harper MP: I may be able to if they are published. I do not have them if they are not, 
but there may be some published data. I will look for you. However, I will certainly give you 
the data that we have for Heathrow on what our performance is. I think it is now a lot 
better than it was; we have put a lot of effort into it and recruited extra border force 
officers. Our relationship with the major airports is very good, and we want to work with 
them in partnership to welcome more people to Britain. So we have been working closely 
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with Heathrow and Gatwick, putting in place more e-gates for EEA passengers, for example, 
so you do not have to wait for a border force officer. We have just launched our registered 
passenger scheme to replace the IRIS technology, which is now out of date, for regular non-
EEA travellers to Britain, who will now be able to use the EEA process and gates to get a 
faster customer experience. We are also working with airlines on a strengthened fast-track 
process for their most valued customers. 
Q271  Lord Janvrin: Can I come back to students, particularly the bogus student visas? 
Has that been dealt with successfully, in your view? If so, do you feel that there has been any 
knock-on effect on genuine student applications because of what you have had to do to 
clamp down on the bogus ones? 
Mark Harper MP: We now have just under 700 fewer sponsors on the sponsor register, 
so that is partly where we have declined someone’s application and partly where they have 
chosen not to reapply. That has meant that the overall number of students has gone down. 
When we looked at the evidence, the risk was in the privately funded colleges. Publicly 
funded FE colleges were less of a risk and universities were a very low risk, so we have 
prioritised universities in our arrangements and we have seen quite strong growth in the 
numbers coming to our universities. That is what we want to continue doing. We have 
worked closely with universities on specific issues regarding them, and we have a good 
process now. They are keen that we do not make significant changes. They feel that the 
process works and they want to work with us on what is called a co-regulation approach, 
where we can raise issues with each other and deal with particular day to day issues that 
they have. I think that they are broadly content with where policy is and do not want to see 
any radical changes to it. 
The Chairman: Do you think, Minister—we are coming to the end; we have kept you 
here for almost an hour—that the high mood of the Olympics last year has been somewhat 
tarnished since then by the continuous commentary on our visa restrictions, or is that 
unfair? 
Mark Harper MP: I am not quite sure. This is a difficult issue. Ministers always take care, 
even when we are talking about some of the tough decisions that we have to take when 
dealing with abuse, to put it in the context of welcoming people to Britain who are coming 
here for the right reasons. We have those balanced messages but they do not always get 
reported. We cannot always control that, even though we try extremely hard. Some of the 
commentary is not helpful. I have commented to the university sector, for example, that if 
they think there are genuine issues, they should please raise them with us privately, and we 
will see whether we can resolve them. If, having raised them with us privately, they feel that 
we have ignored them or not taken any notice, they should feel free to criticise us, but it is 
not very helpful if the first place you go for criticism is to have a dialogue in the pages of 
newspapers or on television, because that is a self-fulfilling prophecy for bad news. I think 
that we now have some of those organisations in a better place where they feel that we 
have a better relationship and can have some of those discussions privately and be more 
joined up on having a very positive message for the outside world’s consumption. We have 
made some progress there. Do I know what it looks like overall? No, I do not have a very 
good sense of what the overall view is as perceived by, if you like, the audience. There are 
certainly some areas where there have been unfortunate messages overseas in reporting. As 
I said, the London Metropolitan case was one where in retrospect we could have thought a 
little more carefully about the impact on the students and how that might be perceived. But I 
think that we have learnt from that and if we ever have to do it again we will deal with the 
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students in a way that will help international perception. There are some learnings for us 
there. 
Q272  The Chairman: This is really the final question, which we have already heard about 
in this Committee in the previous session earlier today. Would dealing with the student 
issue in a more sensitive and attractive way include taking the student sector out of the total 
immigration figures, an idea that has been put forward by some? 
Mark Harper MP: There are two issues here. First of all, I think that that argument started 
because people thought that if we did not count the numbers we would somehow have a 
different policy. However, because we have now managed to persuade people that the policy 
is actually fairly good—if you get your place in university, you can speak English and you can 
pay the fees, you can come here; it is not actually that hard—I think that people see that 
there would not be a different policy whether or not you count the numbers. The second is 
that it is a fact that students who come to Britain for more than a year are migrants. They 
have an impact on public services and are no more or less migrants than people who come 
here to work, for example. We should count them; our overseas competitors all do.  
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: But 98% of them go back after they have finished their 
course. We heard that evidence earlier on.  
Mark Harper MP: I am afraid I do not know where that evidence has come from. It is not 
entirely true. The most recent evidence from the Office for National Statistics, which has 
just started asking people who are here when they leave—the previous set of statistics was 
the first one—showed a much lower number of students leaving than you might have 
expected based on the number who arrived three or four years ago, so I am not sure that 
that is right. I am not disagreeing with you that that is the evidence that you have been given, 
but I do not know what the basis is for asserting that 90% of the students who come to 
Britain leave. 
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: What is the percentage that go back?  
Mark Harper MP: The honest answer is that we do not know, and neither do the 
universities. That is one reason why we have asked the ONS to improve the data on 
tracking people who leave the UK and seeing how many students leave, and it is doing so. 
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean: If you do not know, how do you know you have a problem? 
Mark Harper MP: The evidence that the ONS has published this year suggests that it is 
nowhere near that number of students who leave. However, we do not have brilliant data 
and we need to improve them. The ONS is now starting to collect those data, which will 
give us a better picture, but the universities do not have very good data either. The point is 
that our overseas competitors count students as migrants. The definition of a migrant, as 
you know— 
Baroness Armstrong of Hill Top: Who does?  
Mark Harper MP: They all do. All our competitors count— 
The Chairman: Including America?  
Mark Harper MP: Yes, they do, they count them as migrants. The definition of a migrant is 
someone who changes their place of residence for more than a year, and that is why all our 
overseas competitors count students as migrants in their statistics. 
Q273  The Chairman: One final, final question, Minister, as we are a Committee 
concerned with the deployment of soft power and influence abroad: do you and your 
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department get together and consider the impact of the policies being pursued before 
trailing or developing them? Obviously we have in mind the “Go Home” vans, which did not 
make a tremendously good international impression. 
Mark Harper MP: We do think about the impact of them, yes. That particular one was a 
very clear message aimed at people who were in the UK illegally. I do not think asking 
people who are here illegally to return to their country of origin is an unhelpful message at 
all. It sends a message that if you want to come to Britain, obey our rules and follow our 
laws, you are incredibly welcome, but you are not welcome here if you are going to break 
our rules. I think that is a very good message, but the Home Secretary and I made it clear 
that the results of the pilot were not as successful as one would have hoped and we will not 
be repeating that aspect of it. It is worth saying, of course, that the rest of the pilot, which 
involved advertisements and surgeries working with community groups, was actually quite 
successful, more successful than the advertising, and those parts of the work will continue. 
We have published all that information, and I think that there is a copy in the Libraries of 
both Houses. 
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: I was tempted, Chair, to ask the Minister whether he is 
enjoying his current job more than trying to reform the House of Lords, but I thought you 
would rule that out of order so I will not. 
The Chairman: Completely out of order but noted. Judging by the smile on the Minister’s 
face, he obviously finds this much easier. Minister, for an hour you have answered our 
questions very robustly. Like many, you have the most ministerial task of balance. In a sense, 
you walk a tightrope and you have to do so with great skill, which I have to say you have 
done during this session. We are very grateful to you and have learnt from you, and maybe 
you have a sense of our concerns in this Committee as well. Thank you very much indeed. 
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1. Many thanks for inviting me to give evidence to the Committee on Soft Power and the 
UK’s influence on 11 November.  
 
2. As I said at the time, we should ensure that the debate about the impact of immigration 
policy and visas on the UK’s economic interests is based on factual evidence rather than 
on anecdote. It is important that everyone here in the UK does not exacerbate myths 
and negative perceptions by using misleading data which doesn’t help the UK’s cause. 
The messages are simply relayed directly into the markets we are targeting and given 
extra credence from having originated in the UK.  
 
3. So I’d like to take the opportunity provided by this letter to set out some of these facts 
and ensure that we promote the positive immigration and visa offer that we have for 
legitimate travellers and migrants. The Home Office wants to play our part in attracting 
more tourists, businesses and investors to the UK and will continue to work closely with 
partners to ensure that we do so. We have many positive relationships which we want 
to continue to build on.  
 
Chinese visitor numbers to the UK 
 
4. We had a discussion about the claim that over seven times as many Chinese visit France 
than the UK, a figure quoted in the evidence provided by the UK China Visa Alliance and 
used frequently elsewhere. We think this number has been calculated by taking the 
French government statistic that France received 1.4 million tourist arrivals from 
Chinese nationals in 2012115 and then dividing it by the number of UK arrivals (but we 
are unsure exactly what UK figure is being used116).  
 
5. To start with, the 1.4 million figure is not credible in the light of wider statistics. For 
example, the whole of Schengen issued just 1.18 million visit visas to Chinese in 2012117 
so it seems highly unlikely that these figures accurately reflect the number of visitors to 
France that year, even allowing for visits to France by holders of Schengen visas issued by 
other countries. Furthermore, in 2012 the UK issued 210,000118 visit visas to Chinese 
nationals compared to 277,000119 visit visas issued by France to Chinese nationals in the 
same year, nothing like seven times as many. In addition, Chinese exit data on first 
destinations for Chinese travelling abroad (and the one set of figures which are directly 
comparable across all destinations) actually shows that UK was the top European 
destination in 2010 and second only to Italy in 2011120. This may in part reflect Chinese 
                                            
115 DGCIS: http://www.dgcis.gouv.fr/files/files/directions_services/etudes-et-statistiques/etudes/tourisme/2013-07-4pages-
28.pdf 
116116 Arrival data actually shows that there were 224,600 Chinese visitor arrivals in the UK in 2012 which, even if 
comparing this with the unlikely 1.4 million figure, would not equate to 7.5 times as many: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/immigration-statistics-quarterly-release Admissions Table ad_03 and ad_03_o 
117 http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-visas/visa-policy/index_en.htm   
118 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/tables-for-immigration-statistics-april-to-june-2013 Table be_06_q_o. Note 
that UK visitor figures do not include student visitors. 
119 http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-visas/visa-policy/index_en.htm   
120 Top 20 Chinese outbound destinations, 2011 (EU countries shaded) (see table on next page) 
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travel routes into Europe, rather than visitor destinations, but again does not suggest 
such a disparity as claimed. 
 
6. It is also often claimed that France is gaining market share quicker. Again, the same 
statistics do not support this. The growth in visitor visas issued to Chinese nationals in 
the UK has been broadly the same as that for France over recent years. Chinese visitor 
visa numbers increased by 36% for the UK and 39% for France from 2010 to 2012121. 
The French and UK share of the total Schengen and UK visas issued have both remained 
steady122 (albeit that visa numbers will not necessarily be exactly comparable, reflecting 
differences in national systems). The Chinese exit figures quoted in paragraph 4 above 
also show the growth of numbers travelling to the UK to be greater than those travelling 
to France between 2010 and 2011. Taken together, these statistics do not support the 
claim that French market share is outpacing the UK’s.  
                                                                                                                                        
1 Hong Kong 28,320,700 +22.60% 
2 Macao 19,765,300 +22.70% 
3 South Korea 2,367,800 +20.30% 
4 Taiwan 1,845,000 +11.00% 
5 Malaysia 1,737,800 +68.10% 
6 Japan 1,627,900 -17.30% 
7 Thailand 1,522,600 +50.10% 
8 USA 1,360,400   +26.30% 
9 Cambodia 1,215,500 +231.00% 
10 Vietnam 1,141,500 -5.70% 
11 Singapore 1,004,200 +21.60% 
12 Russia 809,600 +13.90% 
13 Australia 652,300 +19.60% 
14 Indonesia 578,600 +23.40% 
15 Italy 381,200 +40.20% 
16 UK 376,200 +20.40% 
17 Canada 369,800 +20.90% 
18 Germany 334,000 +16.40% 
19 Mongolia 325,500 +43.70% 
20 France 321,200 +17.50% 
 
Source: 2011 Chinese Tourism Industry Statistical Report 
121 Visit visas issued by the UK and selected Schengen countries, 2010-2012 
 2010 2011 2012 % growth 2010-11 
% growth 
2011-12 
% growth 
2010-12 
UK 154,533 198,577 210,344 28.5 5.9 36.1 
France 198,898 237,679 277,099 19.5 16.6 39.3 
Germany 184,374 208,287 236,258 13.0 13.4 28.1 
Italy 151,547 230,166 268,348 51.9 16.6 77.1 
Total Schengen 778,501 1,026,171 1,185,569 10.0 15.5 52.3 
Total (UK plus 
Schengen) 
933,034 1,224,748 1,395,515 31.3 13.9 49.6 
Percentage of total 
by country 
UK – 17% 
Fra – 21% 
Ger – 20% 
Italy – 16% 
UK – 16% 
Fra – 19% 
Ger – 17% 
Italy – 19% 
UK – 15% 
Fra – 20% 
Ger – 17% 
Italy – 19% 
   
Source: Home Office Immigration Statistics (UK data), European Commission (Schengen countries) 
122 Also see table above.  
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7. This does not mean we are complacent – we want to continuously improve our visa 
operation both in China and globally. We have announced significant enhancements to 
our visa operation in China recently – a pilot to better join up the UK and Schengen 
application process, a new 24 hour visa service to be launched by the summer of 2014 
and expansion of our VIP mobile visa service. Our average processing time in China 
during the first half of 2013 was under seven days against our target of 15 days, despite a 
30% increase in applications. We grant 96% of applications we receive. As the UK China 
Visa Alliance themselves acknowledge, the performance of the visa service is not the main 
problem123. Instead they say it is that not enough Chinese are applying for a UK visa. As 
recent polling suggests124, Chinese preferences for travel within Europe depends on a 
wider range of factors beyond visa issues. We all, government as well as the business, 
education and tourism sectors, need to work together to promote all aspects of the 
fantastic offer which the UK provides.  
 
Visa application points overseas 
 
8. The Committee also heard evidence about applicants (in Lesotho specifically) having to 
travel to other countries to make a visa application. The UK has a market leading 
number of visa application points around the world - over 200 (and over 300 if you 
include application points using foreign government facilities in the US and elsewhere). 
We have 12 in each of India and China alone (compared to three or four on offer from 
most of our competitors). 
 
9. We can’t have a visa application point everywhere, so our global visa network operates a 
“hub and spoke” model, with the location of our visa application centres (VACs) 
determined by demand, cost and convenience to the customer. Following the recent 
successful procurement of a new tender to manage VACs, we will be further expanding 
the number of application points over the coming year.  
 
10. In particular, the Committee discussed application points in Africa. There are 30 
application points across the region and five decision making hubs. The location of the 
application points have been selected to maximise value for money whilst ensuring 
customer convenience. In a small number of locations, applicants are required to travel 
across borders to submit an application. However the visa operation does seek to 
expedite consideration of these cases to ensure they are still determined within our 
published customer service standards. For example in Lesotho we receive 250 
applications a year and customers have the option of applying either at any of the VACs 
in South Africa or directly at our in-house application point in Pretoria. A similar position 
exists for applicants from Swaziland.  
 
11. We recognise the commercial importance of Africa and are working with UKTI and the 
Foreign & Commonwealth Office to promote growth by ensuring access to the UK 
through our visa service including expanding new premium and priority services. At the 
same time, we are also required to manage the potential risks of illegal immigration and 
                                            
123 Paragraph 21 of UKCVA evidence to the committee: “the main issue is not the under-performance in terms of 
processing and issuing visas”.  
124 IPSOS MORI polling indicates that Chinese nationals appear to prefer Paris as a place to do business, live and to visit, 
compared to other European locations. See slide 33: http://www.ipsos-mori.com/Assets/Docs/Events/Ipsos-Top-Cities-
September-2013.pdf 
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crime emanating from some regions – overall the continent sees some of our highest visa 
refusal rates.  
 
Graduates 
 
12. Other evidence to the Committee cited the end of the Post Study route as being the 
cause of many talented graduates not able to remain in the UK at the end of their 
course. In fact the UK has a highly competitive offer to international students even if, as I 
mentioned in my evidence, there remains more to be done to ensure this is 
communicated effectively.  Against this background, I thought it might be helpful to set 
out the current options for students to stay on in the UK to work after their studies.  
 
• Students who obtain a graduate level job125 earning £20,300 or more may remain 
after their studies on a Tier 2 work visa.  There is no limit on the number of these 
places, which are exempt from the cap on economic migrants.  Their employers do 
not need to test the UK labour market before employing former international 
students, provided the job is at the right skills level and paid an appropriate UK salary 
for their occupation.  We have set the salary level at only the 10th percentile of UK 
earnings for each occupation, for these new entrants to the labour market – 
compared with the 25th percentile for migrants who have not studied in the UK.  
 
• Graduates who wish to undertake a period of professional training relating to 
their degrees, before pursuing a career overseas, may do so by switching into an 
appropriate Tier 5 scheme.  This is not a route to permanent stay, but there are no 
salary requirements (other than National Minimum Wage).  In October we expanded 
this provision to include corporate internships. 
 
• Students completing a PhD or other doctoral qualification at a UK university can 
stay for a year under the Tier 4 Doctorate Extension Scheme.  This scheme was set 
up in April, and allows completing students to work, gain experience in their chosen 
field, or set up as an entrepreneur, again with no limit on numbers.  
 
• Graduates who wish to stay to develop a business idea can do so under the 
Graduate Entrepreneur scheme, the first in the world of its kind.  All they need 
is an endorsement from their Higher Education Institution that they have a genuine 
and credible business idea, to have graduated, and to have enough funds to support 
themselves.  The scheme also provides an easier route to switch into the main 
Entrepreneur category, which leads to settlement.  In April this year we doubled the 
number of places on the scheme, creating an additional 1,000 new places for those 
who have completed an MBA in the UK or abroad.  
 
13. While they are studying, university students can gain paid work experience in casual jobs 
or on formal work placements, and they can also undertake internships. All university 
students whose course lasts a year or longer are given leave lasting four months beyond 
the end of their course, during which they can make arrangements to stay under one of 
the post-study work schemes.  
                                            
125 A graduate level job is a job skilled to NQF (National Qualification Framework) level 6 or above as set out in the Home 
Office Codes of Practice for Skilled Workers available at: 
http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/sitecontent/documents/employersandsponsors/pointsbasedsystem/cop-skilled-
workers.pdf. 
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14. Under the previous system, all graduates could obtain two years’ unconditional access to 
the labour market, enabling those taking even short courses to stay on in low-skilled 
work.  Our new, more selective approach has cut out this abuse while enabling the 
brightest and best students, who can contribute the most to our economy, to stay to 
take skilled jobs and develop a career. 
 
Counting students as migrants 
 
15. The Committee was provided with evidence that 98% of students leave the UK and 
there was therefore a strong argument for not counting students within the net 
migration figures.  
 
16. Firstly, the best evidence currently available suggests that significant numbers of students 
are staying on in the UK.  The number of migrants entering the UK for formal study 
trebled between 2001 and 2011 to 250,000 a year, but the latest Office for National 
Statistics (ONS) net migration statistics show that the numbers of non-EU nationals 
leaving the UK is not increasing.  This suggests that large proportions of those students 
are still in the UK. 13% of those given settlement in 2009, and 16% in 2010 and 2011 – 
around 20-24,000 people each year – originally came as students.  
 
17. The Home Office’s series of reports on The Migrant Journey aim to improve our 
understanding of migrants coming to the UK, their countries of origin, their purpose for 
migrating and how long they stay. These remain the most complete picture of the 
behaviours over a five year period of those who have come to the UK on student and 
other visas. The Third report126 shows that 25% of students who came to the UK in 
2004 were still here legally in 2009.  For migrants arriving in 2005 and 2006, a similar 
proportion of those who entered as students remained in the UK after five years – 21 
percent and 18 per cent respectively were still legally in the immigration system in 2010 
and 2011. The figures of course do not capture any that may have remained unlawfully. 
 
18. Improvements to ONS methodology mean that the net migration statistics now include 
data on the number of students leaving the UK.  These statistics, available for the first 
time in August, showed an estimated 49,000 non-EEA students left the UK in 2012 
compared with 139,000 who arrived during the same year 127. Further analysis of these 
statistics will make it possible, in due course, to determine with greater certainty how 
many students fall into this category, and how many stay for longer periods.   
 
19. Secondly, the UN’s definition of net migration includes all migrants changing their place 
of residence for 12 months or more.  This acknowledges that all migrants, students 
included, have an impact on communities, services and infrastructure for the time they 
are here.  Of course, net migration measures the difference between the number of 
people coming to the UK and the number leaving, so where students return home after 
their studies, their impact on long-term net migration is minimal.  Improvements to ONS 
methodology will make it possible, in due course, to determine with greater certainty 
how many students fall into this category, and how many stay for longer periods.   
 
                                            
126 https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/143930/horr69-report.pdf 
127 http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/publications/re-reference-tables.html?edition=tcm%3A77-320130 see Table 4 
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20. It was claimed in evidence to the Committee that the US excludes students from its net 
migration figures. This is not the case. ONS have now published guidance that makes 
clear that the claims that students are excluded from net migration in ‘competitor 
countries’ are unfounded128. 
 
Research into the experience of international students in the UK 
 
21. I informed the Committee that I did not think the Home Office had done any research 
into the experience of international students at UK universities and that is correct. 
However in September, the Department of Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) 
published a report on the wider benefits of higher education, which included some 
material on students’ experiences129.  It found that: “The overwhelming majority of alumni 
are very positive about their experience, and consider that the mix of skills and experiences 
gained during their UK study period directly contribute to enhanced career progression and 
wider personal development.” 
 
Border queues 
 
22. We publish our performance in processing passengers at the border on the website130. 
The service standards for queuing times at the UK border are that 95% of European 
Economic Area (EEA) passengers should queue for no longer than 25 minutes; and 95% 
non-EEA passengers no longer than 45 minutes. The most recently published figures 
confirm that queue performance at national level is 99.6% (Quarter 1 of 2013/14). 
 
23. The most recent data for Heathrow (October 2013) shows that 100% of EEA and 
99.73% on non-EEA passengers passed through the queues within their respective 25 
minute and 45 minute targets. The average queuing time for EEA passengers at 
Heathrow was two minutes and five minutes nationally. For non-EEA passengers these 
figures were six minutes and seven minutes for Heathrow and nationally respectively. 
 
24. Non EU Travellers who have previously benefitted from using IRIS may be eligible to use 
our new Registered Traveller Scheme.  This commenced on 24 September 2013 and will 
allow pre-approved travellers who meet certain criteria to gain expedited entry to the 
UK.  
 
25. Initially passengers meeting the following criteria will be able to apply for the Registered 
Traveller Scheme: 
• previously registered to use IRIS; and 
• from the United States, Canada, Japan, Australia or New Zealand; and 
• someone who has completed a minimum of four trips to the UK in the last year; and 
• a short term visitor to the UK aged over 18. 
 
26. The ePassport Gates use facial recognition technology to compare the faces of 
passengers to images held in their biometric ePassports in addition to biographical and 
                                            
128 See page 15, para 3.13: http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/guide-method/method-quality/specific/population-and-
migration/international-migration-methodology/long-term-international-migration---frequently-asked-questions.pdf.  
129https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/240407/bis-13-1172-the-wider-benefits-of-
international-higher-education-in-the-uk.pdf. 
130 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/clearance-of-passengers-at-the-border-within-published-standards 
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security checks. They provide passengers with a secure, self-service alternative to the 
conventional manual control and do not require pre-enrolment.   
 
27. Any adult UK or European Union/European Economic Area national with a biometric 
chipped passport, issued since 2006, can continue to cross the UK Border automatically 
by using the ePassport Gates. The system is designed to process high volumes of 
legitimate travellers allowing us to deploy Border Force Officers to other areas of risk 
whilst maintaining the security of the UK border. 
 
28. To date, over 25 million passengers have used the ePassport gates at 15 air terminals 
since they were installed between 2008 and 2010. Passenger numbers are increasing with 
over 10 million passengers using them in the past year and over 1 million a month during 
the summer (June – September). 
 
29. We have now agreed the design and supply of the second generation of ePassport Gates 
that will have a one-stage process, intended to provide a faster and simpler passenger 
experience.  The first installation of these took place in Gatwick South Terminal and 
became operational on 31October 2013. 
 
30. ePassport Gates will be introduced, replaced or their numbers increased where there is 
a clear and quantified business need and benefits established.   
 
Mark Harper MP 
 
3 November 2013 
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Lord Foulkes of Cumnock 
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Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts 
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________________ 
Examination of Witnesses 
Rt Hon Maria Miller MP, Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport, Department 
for Culture, Media and Sport, and Rt Hon Michael Fallon MP, Minister for Business and 
Enterprise, Department for Business, Innovation and Skills 
 
Q329  The Chairman: Good afternoon. You are two extremely busy Ministers, and the 
affairs with which you are concerned are also the matters of great interest to this 
Committee. Our remit is Britain’s influence overseas and the deployment of so-called soft 
power in all its meanings. We are extremely grateful to you for being with us. I should just 
formally say that I have to state that the clear interests of the Committee are before you, so 
you know where we are all coming from. If we have a Division, we will have to break for five 
minutes, but let us hope that we do not. Could I begin with a rather obvious question, but a 
big one? It covers both the briefs and concerns of both your departments. In your case, Mr 
Fallon, you cover the work of more than one department. I do not know how you have time 
to do it but you do. The creative industries are said to produce 10% of our export 
earnings—about £36 billion, which is enormous; and you, Secretary of State, are on record 
as saying—I will get your actual words to quote back to you, if I can find them—“we are 
using our arts and culture as a calling card, as a foot in the door, when we are trying to land 
trade deals abroad”. All that means, I think, is that you see yourself as part of the spearhead 
of the whole international image and trade business that puts you right at the forefront. I will 
start with you, Secretary of State, if I may, and then I will come to the Minister of State. Is 
that the way you see it? 
Maria Miller MP: Yes, Chair, that is very much the way we see it in our department. 
Culture, heritage, sport and the creative industries are a very important part of our 
economic growth story, both at home and abroad, particularly the use of culture and 
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heritage as a way of engaging with both established markets and the new and developing 
markets that we are developing those trading links with. I saw this very much at play last 
week in a trade delegation to China, at which we had 120 people—the largest ever trade 
delegation to China—which had a very healthy cohort of creative industries and a 
programme with a very strong series of cultural meetings to ensure that we were both 
supporting British cultural activities in China and encouraging more Chinese cultural activity 
at home. 
The Chairman: Would it be right to say that there are three legs to it? First, the creative 
arts themselves are huge export earners. Secondly, the proposition, which the British 
Council, among others, has put to us, is that activity on the creative arts leads to big trade 
deals of business. Thirdly, it all adds up to making Britain an attractive place in which people 
want to invest their money. Is that a reasonable division of the possible goals and objectives 
of your work? 
Maria Miller MP: Yes, although I would go one step further and say that a great deal of 
what I am trying to do in my department is to build the reputation of the country abroad, 
both through the direct work that we do as a department and in support of other cultural 
institutions. I could draw on my recent visit to the US to bring that to life. The British 
Museum has supported the Cyrus cylinder by going not only to the very far flung corners of 
the world but to the Getty Museum in the US to continuously underpin our reputation as a 
strong country in the US and to build that trust. This is about building reputation but it is 
also about building brand trust. Ultimately, as we face an increasingly global business 
environment, we have to view our British brand as something that we build and guard 
jealously. Part of that is building the trust in our brand, and culture and heritage are ways in 
which we can build trust in our brand, which I think has a very strong reputation 
internationally.  
The Chairman: In a sense, one can almost see a bridge growing between you and the 
Minister, because it sounds as though you are in the same business in a way. Would it be 
fair, Minister of State, to say that that is so, and do you have lots of meetings with the 
Secretary of State and her Ministers about these common aims, which are to promote 
British industry, business and exports around the world? 
Michael Fallon MP: Good afternoon. The Secretary of State has put it extremely well: this 
is about building trust in a global trading environment that is increasingly competitive. We 
have a very strong brand in Britain, and it is absolutely right to use every means we can to 
draw attention to it. It of course gets you in the door, but it does not guarantee the contract 
or anything like that. Companies still have to get on and do that, but cultural activity and 
artistic exchange are all part of making other countries aware of the attraction of doing 
business with Britain and making them feel better about us. The word “trust” probably hits it 
on the head. It is extremely important.  
The Chairman: Of course, this is in a sense an enormous family. The other day Keith 
Nichol, head of cultural diplomacy in your department, remarked that there were 1,400 arts 
and cultural organisations. How on earth do you shepherd them all together, or do you not 
try? 
Maria Miller MP: Those 1,400 institutions—I am sure there are many more—do not 
necessarily look to our department for support and help in the work that they are doing 
overseas. It is important that they have autonomy. The work that they are doing is hugely 
important and is very much driven from their ethos and objectives as independent 
organisations, but those that have public funding attached to them in some shape or form 
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have a great understanding of the need to work together wherever possible. When I became 
Secretary of State just over a year ago I asked to see a list of the activities that might be 
happening in different countries, and it became apparent that it was not necessarily 
something that was regularly pulled together. So in the past 12 months we have established a 
system, which we will roll out as of April, for pulling together the huge array of activities of 
our cultural institutions, whether it is the British Museum, the Hallé orchestra, the 
Birmingham symphony orchestra and every organisation in between, to try to get a feeling 
for what activities are going on in which country, so that we can not only support them as 
Ministers but play them into the work that we are doing to develop those countries as 
trading partners. 
Q330   The Chairman: This is a question which you are both bound to answer with a yes, 
but do you feel that you both get enough support from the Cabinet and other departments 
and from the National Security Council and other co-ordinating machinery in government 
that realise that this new era of huge emphasis on the softer and more powerful influences 
on our exports and interests is growing apace? 
Maria Miller MP: I think I could answer for both departments and say yes, because we 
work jointly through the GREAT campaign programme board. I chair that, but we have 
representatives from UKTI, BIS and a whole host of organisations, including our tourism 
organisation VisitBritain, to come together to make sure that our approach in this area is co-
ordinated. Of course each department will have its own objectives, but we can come 
together with an understanding that, particularly through the GREAT marketing campaign 
for Britain, our objectives can very much go together and we can have a common marketing 
approach. 
The Chairman: Is that the way it looks from BIS as well, Minister? 
Michael Fallon MP: Yes. If I may say so, since I was last in government about 20 years ago 
the Whitehall departments are far more joined up now. We have more Ministers who are 
common to both departments. We have more organisation partnerships between industry 
and government and involve Ministers from more than one department. The Creative 
Industries Council, for example, involves Ministers from DCMS and from BIS. It is more 
joined up. 
The Chairman: Can we move on to the image side of this, as we have touched on the 
GREAT Britain campaign? 
Q331  Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: Chair, could I ask a follow-on question, because I am 
still not absolutely clear how it is co-ordinated within government? When we started taking 
evidence, it was suggested that the National Security Council had a role. Then we got lots of 
evidence that the Foreign Office was at the front, because it was the department that had all 
the embassies overseas. Then we were told that the GREAT campaign programme board, 
which you chair, co-ordinates it across Whitehall. I am not just talking about the marketing 
campaign; I am talking about the whole idea of the development of soft power and using it 
right across the board. How is that co-ordinated?  
Maria Miller MP: You are right that the National Security Council takes a clear interest. I 
have certainly attended meetings and talked about soft power, but if you are looking for one 
fulcrum where Ministers come together on a practical working level and agree objectives 
and focus it really is through the GREAT programme board. That is not to say that every 
aspect of UKTI, DCMS or FCO activity is agreed through that meeting, but it gives us the 
opportunity to come together and see where our shared objectives are and to co-ordinate 
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them. Hugo Swire is our Foreign Office Minister on it and is a hugely important part of the 
work that I do overseas, as indeed are UKTI, Lord Green and VisitBritain. For me—I cannot 
speak for others—the GREAT programme board is a way of coming together. Of course, 
you are never going to have one place where every detail is discussed, but that is where we 
really get that common understanding of how we can work together. 
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: I know that Michael says that things have changed over the 
years in government and that there is much more co-ordination. My recollection, however, 
was that the officials play a part in putting up the agenda, putting forward ideas and so on. 
We had evidence last week from the guy in charge of the GREAT campaign. He had a 
minder with him, Mr Aiken, who is head of government propaganda—sorry, public relations. 
Who comes forward with the ideas? 
Maria Miller MP: I think you will find that this is very ministerially led. You can hear the 
passion from me on my side about the role of DCMS and culture in the soft power agenda. 
But of course it is multifaceted. Education is a critical part of this. If you talk to David 
Willetts, he will of course talk to you about some of the work that he has been doing on the 
educational side of things. You can talk to UKTI and now Lord Livingston.  
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: But that is the point: it is so multifaceted that we are not 
quite clear how everything is brought together. The GREAT programme committee does 
not seem to bring together all the aspects of our image overseas and the Foreign Office. 
Maria Miller MP: With respect, it does, and of course this is a very new approach. Britain 
has not really marketed itself in such a cohesive way before. Conrad Bird, who is our 
campaign manager, if you like, and is probably the person you were referring to, is helping us 
operationally to develop the campaign on the ground, but I think you will find that this is 
very much led by Ministers because of the great belief and understanding that to be able to 
be successful in overseas markets we have to be able to market ourselves successfully and 
that a great deal of the work that is being done by our cultural institutions softens the 
ground and makes sure that our reputation and levels of trust are high. Equally, the work 
that is being done by educational establishments overseas has a very powerful role to play, 
and if you are looking for a simple answer you will not find it. It is a multifaceted approach 
that really shows the commitment at a very senior ministerial level for all departments to 
play their role in the economic growth of this country, and that at the heart of that 
economic growth is our export focus, particularly into new markets. It is complicated and is 
dealt with by many Ministers, but that is quite deliberate. 
The Chairman: Image and perception are what I want to move on to now, and indeed a 
lot of other things as well. Baroness Nicholson will start on that. 
Q332   Baroness Nicholson of Winterbourne: Thank you very much. I was pleased to 
see that the Chinese Government supported global time and so identified tourism and 
overseas study, and Britain being suitable for both those things, so congratulations on those 
points at least. Are we making the maximum use of outside opportunities through the 
department? I am thinking particularly of our membership of UNESCO, where we have a 
tremendous friend in the Director-General, Irina Bokova, who visited a few days ago and has 
just been reappointed and re-elected for the next four years. In UNESCO, Britain having one 
of the prime languages, we have major opportunities. I wondered whether in fact more 
people around us would somehow maximise our unique heritage, cultural, English language, 
educational, BBC and British Council opportunities. Is there more that the department can 
do? 
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This is a question for Michael Fallon on the same point. It was a little sad to see that the 
Chinese Government chose to make that statement during the time that our Prime Minister 
was taking one of our very best and biggest delegations to China. Is there a way in which we 
can use such delegations or other such activities not just to counter such statements that 
promote our business and industry excellence much more powerfully than we have done so 
far? 
Maria Miller MP: I also noted the article that you referred to. I just say carefully that the 
Prime Minister had meetings with both the Premier and the President of China the previous 
day, so I think our relationship with China goes to a little more than just tourism and 
education. Although both of those are very important, the fact that we landed £6 billion of 
trade deals during that delegation’s three-day visit gives you some indication of the growing 
power of the business relationship between China and Britain at a fundamental level—
important deals, including those with JCB and Rolls-Royce. That is not to take away from the 
importance of tourism and education, because of course the way in which individuals first 
build their relations or their trust in a country can often be through a visit or learning a 
language. Those are very important ways to build soft power between our two nations. 
You raised the issue of the role of third-party organisations in building a strong brand for 
Britain around the world. You raise an important point. If you were going to invent a brand 
called Great Britain, you would want one that had one of the most important languages in 
the world, English, associated with it. You would want one that had some of the most 
incredibly established and iconic cultural institutions, like the British Museum, the British 
Library and the V&A. You would also want to give it membership of wonderful organisations 
like UNESCO and the United Nations. That is part of who we are as a nation, although I 
think it is important that as a nation we also stand by ourselves and are able to be 
individualistic, as well as part of larger groups and bodies. That would be my perspective. 
The Chairman: Minister of State. 
Michael Fallon MP: It was a curious quotation that the UK was only suitable for tourism 
and overseas study in the week in which the Prime Minister and his delegation absolutely 
underlined that the United Kingdom is suitable for investment. We saw major trade 
contracts signed, as the Secretary of State said, but also, I think, the beginnings of a much 
more intense period of investment by the Chinese here in Britain in our infrastructure, not 
least in our civil nuclear programme, coming in as partners behind EDF in the new reactor at 
Hinkley Point C, offering to participate in our railway infrastructure in High Speed 2 and 
getting involved in a whole series of other infrastructure projects from ports through two 
airports. So it was a curious quotation not really borne out by the facts. 
The Chairman: Why do you think he said it? Had we irritated the Chinese in some way?  
Michael Fallon MP: It was not said by the Government. Perhaps the Secretary of State can 
comment because she was there, but it was not said by the Government. It was a remark in 
one of the papers, the Global Times. I think those papers are all quite close to the 
Government, but it certainly was not an official remark. 
Maria Miller MP: I think that the wonderful reception that the entire delegation received 
was probably a strong indicator of a very good and growing relationship. We had a very 
successful visit and I think that the facts from the visit probably speak louder than words in 
an article. 
Baroness Nicholson of Winterbourne: Michael is commenting on the reality. We are 
talking about what came across, which was not that hard reality. How can we deflect those 
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negative images and put the positive image forward? That is really what the question is 
about. 
Michael Fallon MP: It is through intense work. It is through deepening the relationship and 
intensifying the trade flows in either direction. Taking 130 companies to China is certainly a 
mark of how seriously we take that particular market. The Prime Minister’s visit followed 
the Chancellor's visit the month before. Before that, the Energy Secretary was there, and so 
on, so there is fairly intense engagement now with China to build up our trade and make it 
very clear to the Chinese that they are welcome investors here in the United Kingdom. I do 
not think that we would be deflected by the odd critical remark. 
The Chairman: Lord Ramsbotham, you wanted to come in on this? 
Lord Ramsbotham: No, I wanted to comment earlier. 
The Chairman: We have already touched on the Great Britain aspect and have had some 
very useful evidence before the committee about it. That is co-ordinated at the Cabinet 
Office, is it not? 
Maria Miller MP: Yes, I chair the GREAT programme board. 
The Chairman: Sorry, the GREAT programme. 
Maria Miller MP: Yes, the secretariat is through the Cabinet Office, I think.    
The Chairman: Do you find that there is a good balance between us telling us what the 
world what we can do and us puffing up our reputation a bit? Is there a danger on that 
second front? 
Maria Miller MP: It is interesting, is it not? We have a great British tradition of being 
understated. One could look at the GREAT campaign and think that that may be slightly at 
odds with that. I think that in a global market, you have to be prepared to put forward an 
extremely positive profile for our country. I think the days are gone when we can be shy and 
understated. We have to be proud, as I think people are in our country, of what we stand 
for, whether it is our technological innovations, scientific prowess, our educational expertise 
or our culture and our heritage. 
Q333  Baroness Nicholson of Winterbourne: Does the Secretary of State see a useful 
way in which Britain could play a far more prominent role in UNESCO? We removed 
ourselves from UNESCO for a while, but we are now back and UNESCO has welcomed us 
back. Can the Minister perceive a way for us to provide a much bigger image for Britain 
through a much greater intervention in UNESCO's work internationally? Would be in our 
interests to do so? 
Maria Miller MP: I think it is in our interests to make sure that, when we are projecting a 
reputation or our brand image internationally, we are clear that it is Britain that we are 
selling. That is important. If we are members of other organisations, whether it is the EU or 
UNESCO, that can always be of benefit, but ultimately the campaign that we are projecting is 
in support of our individual country’s trade. It is important that we have that single-
mindedness, albeit knowing that in any campaign we will have comments from various 
quarters. I certainly recognise that some people find our campaign to be quite up front, and 
it is quite deliberately designed to be that. 
Baroness Armstrong of Hill Top: We were discussing with people from the GREAT 
campaign how much it benefited them that this was driven by government, because much of 
the evidence that we have had, for example from Joseph Nye, who worked out the whole 
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concept of soft power, is that organisations such as the BBC are really powerful 
internationally in influence about Britain precisely because they are not government-run. 
How are you making sure in your department that you get that balance right, and what has 
your experience been of whether something that you say as a government Minister helps or 
hinders our influence with particular countries? 
Maria Miller MP: I think Baroness Armstrong has absolutely hit the nail on the head: it is 
getting that balance right. You draw on the example of the BBC, and I think you are right. 
There is a great deal of evidence that suggests that people's knowledge of the BBC adds to 
their positive image of Britain. Whether or not what they have seen on the BBC has been 
positive or negative about the Government really does not matter. They know that the BBC 
is independent, and that says a lot about our country, so the profile of BBC is incredibly 
important. 
I do not think that an organisation such as the BBC could or should be masterminding a 
campaign for selling Britain as an entity abroad. I know from talking to Tim Davie that he is 
very supportive of our GREAT campaign and is working closely with my colleague, Ed 
Vaizey, on a new board that is looking at cultural exports, so we are working very closely 
with the BBC in that respect. I think there is a very real and important role for government 
to carefully support the promotion of our country abroad. You are right that we have to do 
that with great sensitivity. Certainly when I am looking at our cultural organisations, I very 
much respect, first and foremost, that it is their agenda abroad that is most important. As 
that fits into what the Government are doing, it fits in, but it is not driven by the 
Government. 
The Chairman: No. But you think, Secretary of State, because you said so, that the BBC 
has damaged itself a bit by some of its recent scandals. 
Maria Miller MP: But I think you have to take a far longer view of the BBC. It is an 
organisation of the most incredible credentials. Of course, organisations will go through a 
tough patch, and it has been going through a very difficult period. I hope it is coming through 
that now. None of us should underestimate the importance of the BBC as part of who we 
are as a nation. I am sure that any problems that it has been experiencing in recent months 
and years will be things of the past very soon. 
Q334   The Chairman:  Time is of the essence, and I want to move on to hard results of 
all this: namely, our exports. Are exports doing better? Yes. Are they anywhere near good 
enough and ahead of the game? No. Minister, this is your main concern. I hope it does not 
keep you awake at nights, but I am certain that it is the first thing you think about in the 
morning. How do we turn these great soft power assets that we have into earnings and 
prosperity? Are we doing enough and where should we be doing more? 
Michael Fallon MP: I think we can always do more. There has been a much tighter focus 
now on where we can do more to strengthen our performance in some of those emerging 
markets where traditionally we have not been doing particularly strongly but where we now 
are. You see that across the board, not simply in trade delegations led by the Prime Minister 
or the Deputy Prime Minister but a much more intensive effort by UKTI in some of those 
markets, which is already beginning to yield results. We have seen some quite encouraging 
increases in the share of our trade with China, Russia, Brazil, and so on, which I think show 
that where there is greater focus, results will follow. 
In many cases, of course, they have followed from the exercise of soft power. When I was in 
Brazil recently, it was the delivery of London 2012 that opened almost every door. I saw the 
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reputation that Lord Coe, for example, already has in Brazil—he has been visiting quite a 
number of times since the Olympics—in how to organise a major world-scale event. So soft 
power certainly helps 
Maria Miller MP: May I say, Lord Howell, that I, too, if I were lying awake at night, would 
be worrying about whether or not what we are doing is actually landing trade deals? 
Although there are many reasons why we support culture and heritage in our country, 
because it is who we are as a nation, it is also very important to me that we are supporting 
the work of the BIS department. For me, as a Minister responsible for tourism in the 
Government, I am also looking to make sure that we are landing hard results there. We are 
seeing even now, in these difficult economic times, tourism rising by 6% in numbers and 11% 
in value. You can see that there are fruits of our labours already. 
The Chairman: Lord Foulkes, did you want to pursue the export side of things? 
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: No, I was going to ask about tourism. 
The Chairman: That comes a little later, so I think we will leave that for the moment. 
Q335  Lord Ramsbotham: I must admit that I am still slightly confused about this. When 
we had people from the Foreign Office here and we were talking about the UKTI, they said 
that each of their embassies overseas was home to every ministry from London that was 
coming through, and they were helping them to follow their own particular aspect in the 
country concerned. I have to say that we did not form a very favourable impression of 
UKTI’s skills, abilities or numbers. Indeed, it appeared that there was a disconnect because it 
did not have the contacts in the countries concerned compared, for example, to Germany, 
which had a huge number of people who were able to help their businesses. Then we heard 
that the NSC was co-ordinating. Now, Secretary of State, you are the co-ordinator of the 
GREAT campaign and it seems that everything is emanating from there. Where does the 
Foreign Office and UKTI fit into all that, and what you are co-ordinating? 
Maria Miller MP: I will answer first. My colleague may want to follow up. I think it is 
reasonably straightforward in its structure. Our embassies are obviously ultimately our sales 
team on the ground. They work with UKTI and have representatives from UKTI to convert 
those sales leads into practical deals and contracts. In terms of marketing support, that is 
where the GREAT campaign comes in, and you cannot have a marketing campaign that is not 
joined up with your sales campaign: UKTI and the FCO. It is very much as it would happen in 
a private sector organisation. We come together around a table as equals. I chair the 
meeting because it is convenient for me to do that, but people around the table each have an 
individual role, whether that is UKTI in developing the business leads, the FCO in the 
knowledge on the ground, or my department, DCMS, with its tourism or cultural 
responsibilities. You have a number of people here who have skin in the game. Of course it 
will be that way because we are undertaking a highly complex activity, but I have to say, 
having spent 20 years in marketing and advertising before becoming a Member of Parliament, 
that that very much echoes my experience in the private sector 
Lord Ramsbotham: But who masterminds the policy that the United Kingdom is following 
with, say, Brazil, in enhancing marketing and other opportunities? 
Maria Miller MP: The trade deals that are to be followed and pursued? 
Lord Ramsbotham: No, our whole soft power approach to Brazil. Who will do what to 
enhance our national reputation in Brazil and so on? 
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Maria Miller MP: The person most responsible is of course the ambassador on the ground, 
who is the person who masterminds what is happening in market, whether it is in Brazil or 
any other country. Then, of course, I will be looking very closely at the sort of activities we 
have going on in Brazil to understand where our cultural organisations are putting their 
weight. Obviously it is for cultural organisations to decide what activities they put on. One of 
my visions for my department is for us to be able, where possible, to augment that in future, 
but at this point it is very much driven by the cultural organisations that have for many years 
been undertaking activities in these markets. I give you an example. In Brazil, the Science 
Museum is working with the Brazilian Government post the Olympic Games in the 
establishment of a science museum in Brazil. That is driven by the Brazilian Government but 
is enormously helpful to the relations between our two countries. 
I think that what has been an organic process to date will increasingly become something 
that we will want to try to augment, if it is strategically appropriate to do so. 
The Chairman: Minister, do you want to comment on that? 
Michael Fallon MP: Yes. Brazil is a very good example of a country where we have 
intensified our effort. You can say that we should have done that years ago, and so on, but 
we have certainly done it now. We have increased the number of UKTI people in post. 
There are ministerial visits extremely regularly. I was there in September as part of the UK-
Brazil energy dialogue that we now conduct, seeing more opportunities for British 
companies that have developed techniques in the North Sea to assist in the development of 
the deeper waters off the Rio basin. There is another potential co-operation in nuclear—
Brazil is building a nuclear station at the moment—and in shale, which it is also examining, 
and there are well established British companies in Brazil, notably BG Group. My experience 
is that the small and medium-sized British companies that have been out in Brazil recently 
have nothing but praise for UKTI and the efforts that have been made there. 
If you are implying that we as a country were a bit slow off the mark in tackling some of 
those emerging markets 10 or 15 years ago, that is possibly true, but Brazil is certainly a key 
target market now. 
Maria Miller MP: If I may slightly broaden the comment that I made earlier, think about the 
way we are now using years of culture to throw a spotlight on to markets. At the moment, 
we have the UK-Qatar year of culture. Next year, we will have the Russian year of culture. I 
signed a cultural agreement with the Chinese last week. That provides a little more of what I 
think you are looking for, which is a more structured approach to our cultural engagements. 
We see that as an increasingly important tool. 
Q336  Baroness Hussein-Ece: Are you satisfied by the United Kingdom's ability to invest 
in and establish cultural programmes and institutions in the way in which China, which we 
were just talking about, and others such as France, Germany and Japan are doing? Is there a 
view that we do not need to do that because we already have very good links with many 
Commonwealth countries, for example, or is it because of a resource issue that we are not 
doing as much as other countries? Surely by putting so much emphasis on China we might 
now be accused of neglecting other markets—emerging powers in Africa, for example, 
which we have heard a lot about? I should be interested in your views on that. 
Maria Miller MP: I think the important thing is to recognise how much activity is already 
going on in a unilateral way between our prestigious organisations in the UK and 
organisations abroad. The Committee should not be concerned that there is an over-
dominance of any one particular country. I am very struck by how organisations such as the 
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British Museum, the British Library and the Victoria and Albert Museum have developed 
their reputations, rightly so, in a great number of both emerging and established markets, 
whether that is Brazil, Russia, India and China or beyond. They have done incredible work 
developing those relations over many years. 
Of course, we would all want that work to go even further. It is now a great source of 
revenue for organisations providing consultancy for the development of new cultural 
institutions in the Middle East, China, Russia or elsewhere. It would be good to see that 
influence developed further into new markets. Of course, we are focused at this time on 
how we can use soft power particularly for the development of trade links, so inevitably that 
will draw us to certain markets. 
Q337  Baroness Hussein-Ece: I am sure you are asked a lot about visas, given that you 
have a dual role, wearing a tourism hat as well one for culture. We have heard a lot about 
this. It keeps coming up time and time again. I am sure that people have made 
representations to you. Do you have views on this? Are you making representations about 
the fact that visa restrictions are making it difficult for people who want to come over 
legitimately on, say, cultural exchange? It is sending out a negative message that we are not in 
fact open for business in the way that we could be. Are you making representations on that? 
Maria Miller MP: I think we have already announced a great number of improvements in 
our visa regime to make sure that it is exactly as you would want it to be—to be 
welcoming—but equally to get the balance right, because people want to have secure 
borders as well. I spent an important period of last week in China working with the Chinese 
media to underline the already announced reforms of our visa regime to give same-day 
turnaround for visas and the fact that 97% of Chinese people applying for visas get them. 
There is a lot of misinformation around, anecdotal information, which one has always to 
counter. That was an important part of the work that I was doing there: making sure that 
our visa regime really supports both tourism and business and cultural travel. 
The Chairman: Does the visa issue come across your desk as well, Minister of State?  
Michael Fallon MP: Yes, it certainly does, and the Secretary of State is right: there may 
have been some misconceptions about just how difficult it is to get a visa. We have done a 
lot of work in BIS, particularly on the student side, to clarify that genuine students are 
extremely welcome in this country. They are not being capped; we have made that very 
clear to countries that particularly want to share in our higher education. On the business 
side, there are some caps on skilled migration, but again I think they are reasonably generous 
and we continue to encourage companies to send their best and brightest people here. I 
think we now have a regime that is reasonably stable, although I certainly accept that where 
there are misconceptions we must work harder to tackle them. 
The Chairman: I am now in a dilemma, because we do not have much time and I want 
Baroness Nicholson to pursue particularly hot issues of ethics, human rights and so on. Do 
you want to ask that question now?  
Baroness Nicholson of Winterbourne: Yes, very much so. 
The Chairman: Lord Hodgson wants to get in—on this subject? 
Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts: One quick question. We hear about discussion of 
BRICs but beyond that, it sounds quite serendipitous: the British Museum is doing this, the 
British Council is doing that. Would we do better if we provided more focus for what are 
inevitably limited resources to achieve better trade and economic benefit for this country? I 
understand that you pick up the BRIC countries because they are self-selecting, but beyond 
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that, is there to somebody to sit down and say, “This is an interesting area. We ought to be 
getting involved”? If so, who does it and how is it done? 
Michael Fallon MP: Perhaps I could start on that on the trade side. Yes, we do look at 
trade patterns, the potential of markets. The Trade Minister, Lord Green, did this when he 
took up his appointment. I think today is his last day in office. I am sure you will want to wish 
him well in his retirement. That is exactly what he did when he started in office three years 
ago. They reviewed all these markets. They looked at those where less attention was being 
given and that could do with some more resources, and others where the effort could be 
scaled back. You have to prioritise where you have your UKTI presence and where you are 
spending money on trade fairs, supporting exhibitions, and so on. That is done every so 
often at the top of the Government. I am sure that tomorrow's Trade Minister, Lord 
Livingston, will want to have another look to see whether the effort is being directed best. 
Maria Miller MP: On my side of the discussions, I just underline that a great deal of this 
activity is happening anyway, often without public money involved, because it is funded by 
the receiving country. It is really important to understand that. I go back to my earlier 
comment about how we are increasingly using years of culture and cultural agreements to 
provide the sort of focus that I think you are asking for. By signing an agreement with a 
country, one can highlight to cultural institutions that it is a focus and somewhere where 
there will be reciprocity in cultural exchange. 
Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts: But if I asked to you to list your top 10 priorities, 
would they be the same as BIS’s? 
Maria Miller MP: They would be very similar. This is what we do on the GREAT 
programme board. They will not be exactly the same, because tourism figures are still driven 
hugely by countries with which we still have strong trading links, such as the US, Germany 
and France. We get huge numbers of tourists from there, so for me it is important to keep 
those figures strong. 
The Chairman: Watching the clock all the time, Baroness Nicholson, would you like to 
ask about human rights, corruption and other awkward issues? 
Q338   Baroness Nicholson of Winterbourne:  Thank you very much, chairman. 
Minister Fallon, a number of our competitors do not have to accommodate themselves to 
the rigours of our Bribery Act or to our human rights reputation and legislation here in 
Britain. Some of our other competitors should but maybe do not pay quite as much 
attention to either issue as we do. Yet when we sell to countries that may not have 
established democracy, the rule of law and the private sector to the extent that we and 
other western democracies do, there is naturally an outcry. How do you resolve that 
dichotomy? Is it possible for you to argue that the free market and the private sector bring 
rigorous rules of ethics and constitutional requirements? Do you see this as a growing 
problem or one where we can somehow square the circle? 
Michael Fallon MP: I do not see it as a growing problem, and I do not, with respect, see it 
as quite the dichotomy that you see it as. To my mind, whether it is bribery or human rights 
abuse, these are both barriers to business, to growth and to our own security and 
prosperity. Doing business in the right way in these countries benefits them, and benefits us 
in the end, so I do not see these as choices that we have to make. We send out very clear 
messages about the standards that we expect of our companies in these third markets, and 
of course we have the new bribery legislation, which makes it very clear that bribery of the 
kind that may have occurred in the past will be punished. We have some very clear guidance 
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on that. So I would hope that the shadier competitors who you are suggesting do not pay as 
much attention to these areas as we do would recognise that it is in the long-term interest 
of the world trading system and of the western developed countries themselves that we 
ensure that we have very strict guidance on human rights. 
There are examples of sectors where there is very strong public concern. I deal with one of 
them: the licensing of arms exports. We probably have stricter guidelines than many of our 
competitors, even inside the European Union, on the rules and circumstances in which we 
will sell arms to other countries —and defence is a very important industry in this country. If 
occasionally we lose out as a result, so be it. I would rather be on the side of having the 
stricter rules than those that are laxer.  
Baroness Nicholson of Winterbourne: But given the enormous growth of corruption 
and the black market and more around the globe today, are the Government doing enough 
to try to combat that in a way that would assist British business? It is galling when our 
competitors win hand over fist with ever growing bribery. What more can we do? 
Michael Fallon MP: Well, we are signatories to the various conventions. The United 
Nations convention against bribery and the OECD bribery convention required us to 
criminalise the bribery of foreign public officials, and we do our best to make sure that other 
countries, having signed these conventions, live up to them. It is extremely important for a 
country that has a very strong tradition of the rule of law and respect for human rights that 
we are not just seen to be the good guys but that we are the good guys. That in itself will 
encourage better standards of behaviour internationally. 
The Chairman: Baroness Goudie, did you want to come in on this? 
Baroness Goudie: On human rights? Yes. Baroness Nicholson asked some of the 
questions. We do have a very strong reputation on human rights, and I feel that sometimes 
we trade those down, for example over the Dalai Lama in China, and in Russia where we 
have been dealing with them but are not being up front on where we stand as a country. 
When we are here we say one thing, but when we are in their countries we say another. I 
think the issue of China and the Dalai Lama was very clear. China has been difficult with 
companies from other countries wanting to trade with them, and if they are seen to be 
dealing with the Dalai Lama, or even some people from Burma, they are quite difficult with 
those companies. I can give evidence about that.  
Michael Fallon MP: I think you have put that perfectly fairly. The Chinese have made their 
position very clear on discussions with the Dalai Lama, but those discussions did take place 
between our Prime Minister, and indeed previous Prime Ministers, and the Dalai Lama. 
When our Ministers are in Russia, they raise human rights issues alongside trading issues, 
and there are other fora in which we can encourage the raising of standards more generally. 
We saw that at the G8 summit in Northern Ireland, where quite important agreements 
were reached on the transparency of extractive industries and the need to make sure that 
multinationals paid their tax properly. 
Baroness Goudie: It is just that sometimes these things get swept under the carpet. We 
see them in the press here, but what happens after the visits? I know about the Northern 
Ireland G8, because I was privileged to be involved in that, but it is on the recent visits, both 
to Russia and to China, where I do not feel we took them up strongly enough. 
Maria Miller MP: Perhaps I could interject. Obviously one has to be very sensitive about 
how these things are handled in market and with the organisations one might be meeting. I 
can tell the Committee that I met human rights organisations and social enterprise 
Government (Rt Hon Maria Miller MP, Department for Culture, Media and Sport and 
Michael Fallon MP, Department for Business, Innovation and Skills) – Oral evidence (QQ 
329-342) 
553 
 
organisations partly funded by the British Council while I was in Beijing and Shanghai. It might 
not be something that I particularly wanted to draw attention to last week, but I have 
certainly been speaking about it since. It is important that we do that, and Ministers do that 
on all their visits because it is not an either/or, as the Minister has already said. It is part of 
the price of doing business and part of the way we get a successful global approach to 
business that it is done in an ethical way that pays due respect to human rights.  
Q339   Lord Janvrin:  I want to come back to what is probably government co-ordination 
but by a rather indirect route. If you were looking ahead at the lessons to be drawn from 
the GREAT campaign or whatever it is, how would one want to do this soft power 
projection in five years’ time?  Would you say that things like visa policy, scholarship policy, 
our aid policy and perhaps local government and their effect on diasporas and the social 
media et cetera, which will be increasingly important in the future, should all be part of the 
way in which we look at the GREAT campaigns of the future? If we do that, do you really 
think that we have the mechanism in place in government to work that kind of approach? 
Maria Miller MP: The answer is yes, it should be done in that way. I think we are at the 
vanguard of the way in which we are operating as a Government now, which is in a much 
more cohesive way, bringing different departments together through the GREAT campaign 
and being more co-ordinated than ever before. That is not us saying it in government; that is 
others saying domestically and in overseas markets that the GREAT campaign is giving us a 
way of being much more co-ordinated than ever before and probably more than any other 
country, the evidence being that the French Government are, I understand, quite keen for us 
to brief them on the way we are running our campaign at the moment—something I am not 
sure we will be doing very rapidly.  
You are right that if you are truly going to look ahead and see ways in which you can make it 
easier for people to buy into Britain, to understand the value of Britain and to grow their 
trust in Britain, then of course what you are saying is absolutely right: it needs to be drawn 
together into a single-minded campaign. I would add one further element to your very 
sensible list, which included visas and education, and that is reciprocity. It cannot be a one-
way street. Whenever you are building a brand like this, it has to be a two-way street. It is 
just as much about bringing cultural experiences and tourism from abroad into Britain to 
make sure that that trust in our country is deep. 
The Chairman: Lord Hodgson and Lord Foulkes both want to catch my eye. Then I want 
to spend the last few minutes on tourism, which requires hours rather than minutes, but 
that is all we have.  
Lord Janvrin: Can I just finish this question? I just wanted to press you on whether this 
should simply rest with the GREAT campaign or whether it should be taken to a higher 
level. Is it really part of the central co-ordination of our security policy and our wider foreign 
policy, or should it be left, without disrespect, at the marketing level? 
Maria Miller MP: The involvement of the Foreign Office in the GREAT campaign is already 
there and is integral. I understand the point you are making, and I will not take offence from 
it. Of course as a country we should be very consistent in the way we present ourselves, 
and this campaign gives us the opportunity to do that. We are breaking new ground here, 
and I think we are doing it extremely well. I think that what you are outlining as your vision 
is certainly a very credible way forward in the future. 
Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts: I just wanted to ask Michael Fallon a question, further 
to his brave speech about bribery and good conduct having its own reward. If we get too far 
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ahead of the herd, we impose a disadvantage on ourselves in the sense that our bribery 
arrangements now, which unlike any others, including the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, do 
not require any other country to take responsibility for its agents, whether or not employed. 
All I wanted to ask you was whether we cross-check where the rest of the herd are and 
make sure that we are not too far ahead and therefore imposing a disadvantage on 
ourselves. 
Michael Fallon MP: I have not cross-checked in exactly that kind of way, but I have looked 
in some detail at whether or not the Bribery Act is now creating more of a burden on our 
business than it anticipated. The answer is that there have been relatively few cases under 
the Bribery Act so far. There was an issue about the guidance when it first came in. Possibly 
a number—how can I put this—of law firms and consultancies saw the opportunity to hold 
conferences and to slightly panic people into thinking that they had to do a lot more than 
they were actually already doing. We have commissioned, jointly with the Ministry of Justice, 
a survey of small businesses to see whether the Bribery Act is inhibiting small businesses 
from developing their export ambitions, because that would clearly be serious. You make a 
very fair point about cross-checking with some of our major competitors, and I am happy to 
look into that.  
Q340   Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: I just wanted to follow up Lord Janvrin’s excellent 
question and ask the flipside of it. How do you involve the devolved Administrations in the 
GREAT campaign, and generally, in everything? You are Welsh, I think, although you do not 
sound it. 
Maria Miller MP: I was brought up in south Wales, absolutely, so I have a great affinity 
particularly to the Celtic fringe. 
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: How do you involve the devolved Administrations? 
Maria Miller MP: Through the VisitBritain campaign and through VisitBritain. VisitBritain 
obviously covers selling Britain abroad. 
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: I do not just mean tourism; I mean right across the board. 
Maria Miller MP: Whether it is through tourism or any other aspect of our activities 
abroad, we involve the devolved Administrations in the usual way. Obviously culturally I 
want our Welsh cultural organisations or Scottish or Northern Ireland cultural organisations 
to be as involved as any other in painting a picture of what Britain is doing abroad. We do 
that as a department in the usual course of doing business. That obviously then feeds 
through into our work in the GREAT campaign. 
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: Do you think it confused the message for Alex Salmond to 
take a separate trade mission to China? 
Maria Miller MP: Obviously it is for the Scottish Government to decide whether that is 
what they want to do. Perhaps that question is more for my colleague than for me to 
answer in relation to trade delegations, but certainly Scottish cultural institutions— 
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: I am not worried about culture; that is all right. 
Maria Miller MP: —do their own thing when it comes to going abroad, as well as working 
with English institutions as well.  
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: I have my Better Together pen here. We have been in this 
Committee for an hour and it is only now that we have mentioned Wales and Scotland. That 
is really quite astonishing when both of you represent the Government of the whole of the 
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United Kingdom, yet the Scottish Government are doing their own thing again and again on 
so many things that are United Kingdom competency. 
Maria Miller MP: Having very recently spent a very enjoyable day in Wales talking to them 
about Swansea’s recent bid for the UK City of Culture 2017, I would say that I take very 
seriously the support and the work that we do with both Cardiff and Edinburgh.  
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: There is no referendum coming up in Cardiff. 
The Chairman: I can see the discussion opening out in quite interesting directions but not 
the ones for which we have very little time. We must just pursue this huge industry of 
tourism, which falls with the Secretary of State, and let us hear some questions on that. 
Q341   Baroness Armstrong of Hill Top: Despite what you said before, we have had 
evidence that people’s perceptions and reception of the visa policy has been that we have 
been very confused in this country. They have had one message from one part of 
government and another message from another part of government, and that has been 
damaging. Many of us individually, rather than in the Committee, have heard that from 
education people, business people and certainly from countries. Was that simply a failure of 
policy co-ordination, was it that people have not understood the policy, or is that your 
department might have done more to mitigate confusion within government? 
Michael Fallon MP: There is no confusion within government. Obviously government 
departments will come at this issue from different perspectives. Some government 
departments, such as the Home Office, are charged with the security of the United Kingdom 
and are part, as we all are, of our overall commitment to making sure that immigration is 
managed properly. There are obviously tensions there between that policy and the policy of 
open tourism and open student entry. 
Baroness Armstrong of Hill Top: Can I give an example, then? There is the whole issue 
of tourism and people moving both ways. You have said that that is very important, 
Secretary of State. Charges at airports were raised by the tourist group that came before us 
as a very serious problem for soft power. George and I have also had raised by developing 
countries their anger that visas are dealt with in countries in such a way that people have to 
travel and spend a lot of money to get a visa. All this makes them feel, “Britain does not 
want to know us any more”. 
Maria Miller MP: Inevitably, we will have to continue to look at issues of passenger duty 
and visa availability to make sure that we get that right, but I think the figures speak for 
themselves. We see that even in difficult economic times, not just for Britain but for many 
other countries from which tourists come to this country, we have seen a 6% growth in 
numbers, particularly in the post-Olympic period. It is always said that when you host an 
Olympic Games, tourist figures can go down around it. In Britain, that did not happen. 
Baroness Armstrong of Hill Top: Despite Boris. 
Maria Miller MP: I hear what the noble Lady says, but the figures suggest that we have 
more people coming in and that they are spending even more money—11% growth in value. 
Let me be very clear: we and the Home Office continually keep the visa regimes under 
careful scrutiny to ensure that they are working in the way they should. I was particularly 
pleased to see the announcements made by the Chancellor during his recent visit to China 
on piloting a common gateway for our visa with the Schengen visas so that we can simplify 
the process for people who are visiting our country. It is really important to be welcoming, 
as the noble Lady says. 
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Q342  The Chairman: We are in extra time, and we will get one final question from the 
chairman. It is this: do either of you find that our membership of the Commonwealth is 
important in shaping our export effort, our reputation around the world and our attraction 
as an investment centre? Who would like to start? 
Michael Fallon MP: Perhaps I should start. Yes, the Commonwealth is important. It is a 
sizeable trading bloc on its own, with 15% of world value. It is not as big an export market 
for us as the European Union, and of course we do not have total competence over trade. 
We cannot negotiate directly with the Commonwealth, because that competence now 
belongs to the European Union. Indeed, three members of the Commonwealth are members 
of the European Union as well. The Commonwealth also contains some very fast-growing 
economies that are certainly important to us in our focus on trade. It is an area to which in 
recent years, under recent Ministers, we have started to give more attention, and I think 
that should continue. 
The Chairman: Before the Secretary of State adds to that, is it not a fact that the great 
growth area for British earnings overseas has been in services? The EU is pretty patchy when 
it comes to a single market in services. In fact there is not much of a single market at all. As 
we have heard from the Secretary of State, we have had fantastic growth in our creative arts 
earnings overseas. These are surely things where we can look beyond the European Union 
and deal directly with the great new markets of Asia, including the Commonwealth. Is that 
not the new picture? 
Michael Fallon MP: Yes, but I do not think it is a choice, with respect, Lord Howell. Of 
course we are trying to complete those bits of the internal market in services that are yet to 
be complete, notably in energy, and looking to ensure that we have a proper internal market 
in digital services, which is very important for our businesses. But that does not stop us 
focusing on services to some of the countries that you have mentioned. A lot of those are 
not simply straightforward services, if I can call tourism that, but business services. They are 
selling our expertise. They are selling professional services, business to business services, in 
which I think we have a very strong hand to play. 
Maria Miller MP: I would say that soft power is all about building our understanding, 
influence and reputation within countries. With Commonwealth countries, we have the 
unique starting point of a very close relationship from the outset. When it comes to the soft 
power agenda, the Commonwealth nations offer a unique opportunity for us, whether in 
tourism—I look at countries such as Canada and Australia, which are still very large tourism 
markets for us—or through unique events such as the Commonwealth Games in Scotland 
next year, which will give us an opportunity to see the Commonwealth at its best, bringing 
many nations together in Scotland at a very important time in its history and showing that it 
is a pivotal part of this unique union. I very much hope that it remains that way. 
The Chairman: That final answer pleases the chairman, so that is always a useful note on 
which to end. Inevitably, there are things that we have not covered in the time available, but 
you have given us a very clear picture of your awareness in both your departments, or the 
two or three departments that you cover, of the importance of the deployment of our soft 
power assets. That is very helpful, so I thank you on behalf of the committee for giving us 
your time. We are very grateful to you. 
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During the evidence session which I attended with the Rt. Hon Maria Miller on 9 
December I said I would respond with further information to a question asked by 
Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts . The relevant extract from the Committee’s 
transcript is attached and I do apologise for the delay in replying. 
 
The UK is not alone in making bribes paid to agents an offence. The US Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) also captures payment to agents.  
  
The United Kingdom is signatory to the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign 
Public Officials in International Business Transactions (OECD Bribery 
Convention) and the UN Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC). The 
Conventions require, in only slightly different terms, the bribes given directly or 
through intermediaries should be an offence. The OECD Bribery Convention will 
soon have 41 signatories and UNCAC has 140. 
  
Section 7 of the Bribery Act 2010 includes a failure to prevent offence. Companies 
can be prosecuted for failure to prevent "a person associated" and that could be an 
agent or other intermediary. There is defence if companies have in place adequate 
procedures to prevent bribery. 
  
The OECD Bribery Convention has a mechanism for monitoring and follow-up which 
is conducted by the OECD Bribery Working Group (on which BIS lead). The Group 
carry out a programme of systematic follow-up to monitor and promote the full 
implementation of the Convention. The reports and enforcement data are available on 
the OECD website. 
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Q368  The Chairman: Ministers, good morning and thank you very much for being with 
us and for finding time out from your busy schedule. I should just say as a formality that you 
have in front of you a list of the declared interests of this Committee, which may or may not 
be helpful to you. I do not think there will be any Divisions, but if there were we would have 
to stop for five minutes. 
It is really very fortunate for us and extremely useful that we have two senior Ministers from 
two huge central departments of state. We found in our evidence to this Committee—and 
this is the 23rd public hearing we have had—that the business of defence and the business of 
carrying out our international foreign policy are increasingly intertwined and wrapped up in 
the whole task of building our strategic narrative, using power and persuasion, and 
protecting our interests as our main policy thrusts. We feel that a new landscape has 
emerged in which these things have become even more closely woven together than ever 
before. It is excellent for us that we have the two of you from the two departments. 
I will start with some questions mostly to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office Minister of 
State, Hugo Swire. Then I shall come to Dr Murrison. We will find that these things weave 
together as we go along. My first question is one to which both departments could 
contribute a view, please. We are looking out on to a world of a great shift of power with 
the emergence of vast new regional powers in Asia, Africa, the Middle East and Latin 
America. We are looking out on a world where there has been huge empowerment of the 
public, of lobbies, of non-state actors and of total connectivity through mobile telephones. In 
fact, there is a completely new international landscape.  
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Question 1 is a strategic question: how generally have the two departments adjusted to this 
huge change, which every witness who has come before us has confirmed is very big? In fact, 
we are more and more impressed with the size of the shift that has taken place. Perhaps I 
may start with Mr Swire and how you think, from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s 
point of view, you see that change and what is happening in the Foreign Office to meet it.  
Hugo Swire MP: Can I say at the outset, Chairman, that I very much welcome appearing 
before your Committee and the work that you are undertaking. It is timely and I look 
forward to your reports with considerable interest. We do not pretend to have a monopoly 
of wisdom on these matters. I think there has been significant shift, which I will attempt to 
articulate. I am sure that we have got things right in some places and can do better in others.  
To respond to your question straightaway, there has been a huge shift in power and 
emphasis. The Foreign Office has responded to that with the rather unattractive phrase 
“network shift”. What is network shift? It is the redeployment of resources within a very 
tight spending envelope to better reflect the priorities of these markets, the emerging 
powers the BRICS: Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. There, we have created 
additional positions in 23 emerging markets. We have put over 183 staff in front-line jobs in 
the emerging powers, which will rise to 300 extra staff in more than 20 countries by 2015. 
We have been reopening embassies, which I do not think has necessarily come across. We 
have upgraded or opened 20 embassies.  
My responsibilities are rather strange geographically. They range from the Falklands and Latin 
America, central America, across to India and all the way down Asia, south-east Asia and the 
Pacific. I inherited the Commonwealth brief in excellent shape, if I might say so, from my 
predecessor. I will come back to the Commonwealth in a minute. In the past year, I have 
opened an embassy in El Salvador, which we did not have. We have eight131 people: the 
Americans have 800132. I was able to say at the opening, in front of the American 
ambassador, that it clearly takes 800 Americans to do what eight British people can do. I 
have opened an embassy in Port au Prince in Haiti. We have opened a consulate in Recife, 
Brazil. A few months ago, I opened an embassy in Asunción, Paraguay. These are all rather 
positive moves. 
Our engagement in that part of the world really flows from the Foreign Secretary’s speech 
at Canning House when he said that our retreat from Latin America was over and that we 
were seeking to re-engage with the region. I think that has had real resonance. For those of 
you who follow these matters, I think you would agree that we are perceived to be back and 
in business in some of these highly important, existing and emerging markets, Brazil being the 
largest but other markets coming on tap hugely. Mexico is absolutely key, as well as Panama. 
There are all these other opportunities for British businesses. 
How have we done this? We have reprioritised and reduced some of our secondary posts, 
particularly in Europe, where we already have representation through other means. We are 
reopening the FCO language school. It is almost staggering to believe that it was ever closed. 
We are reopening it so as to better train our diplomats in foreign languages. We are 
opening a diplomatic academy. We are also trying to make certain that a lot of our 
ambassadors going to post are seconded to private businesses so that they get some feel of 
private business. I was amused rather by our colleague Ken Clarke telling me when we were 
in Chile that he remembers 30 or 40 years ago going on a mission to, I think, South Korea. 
There were some businessmen there and the ambassador was throwing a reception. He 
                                            
131 Note by witness: The correct number six. 
132 Note by witness: The correct number is 600. 
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asked the ambassador whether he could bring some of these business men and women along 
to the reception and was told most certainly not. The diplomatic world, the Ferrero Rocher 
gilded world, was certainly not going to be contaminated by vulgar commerce. I suggest that 
anyone heading up any post making that distinction today would be looking for alternative 
employment, and rightly so.  
I have talked about the network shift, but there has been a mental shift as well within the 
Foreign Office. We are asking these people to do jobs that very often they did not come 
into the Foreign Office to do—I think on the whole that most of them get it—underpinned 
by the GREAT campaign, which we will no doubt talk about more in the future.  
Africa is another market where we are doing much more joined up with DfID and there are 
others. That is not to say that we are ignoring our traditional friends. For instance, the 
Commonwealth is hugely important. The Foreign Secretary has said that he wants to put the 
C back into the FCO. I hope that we will get an opportunity to put some flesh on the 
Commonwealth issues of the day. We very much welcome the fact that your colleague Lord 
Marland is taking on the chairmanship of the Commonwealth Business Council. I was in 
Glasgow on Monday looking around the sites for the forthcoming games next year, which 
are very exciting. The timing is interesting, coming as it does. We are going to have a big 
British business presence there as well as a Scottish presence. It is not trying to replicate the 
British business embassy that we had during the Olympic Games because we do not need to 
have an embassy in our own country, so it will not be called an embassy, it will be called a 
business centre. It will be an opportunity to get more trade discussions going on, because 
we know that it is better for Commonwealth countries to trade with each others. There are 
huge savings in rationality, et cetera. That is important, as is working with the regions. Co-
ordinating that better is important. On the whole, you are witnessing the early days of an 
enormously significant shift. 
If I can end by quoting Ken Clarke again in an NSC meeting we had yesterday in Downing 
Street on the emerging powers, he said that no Government have ever attempted to 
approach all this in as co-ordinated a way as we are currently doing. That is why we clearly 
have not got everything right. It is very early days. 
Q369   The Chairman: Thank you. There are a lot of points that we will want to come 
back on there. That was a very good initial overview. Can I ask Dr Murrison how the 
Ministry of Defence’s new strategic narrative, if those are the words for it, or the network 
shift, is working out? We have had a lot of evidence to this Committee, written and verbal, 
that, to put it bluntly, war is not what it was. The conduct of our security and defence 
operations needs to be interwoven with our foreign and international policy, and civilian 
activity, as never before. How is that coming through in the Ministry of Defence? 
Dr Andrew Murrison MP: Thank you, my Lord, and good morning everyone. Can I start by 
agreeing wholeheartedly with Hugo Swire? From my own observation over the past 12 
months travelling around the world quite a lot—not quite as much as Hugo but nevertheless 
quite a lot—I saw a sea change in Britain’s diplomatic effort, which is now geared very much 
around commerce and the prosperity agenda and with a mind to collocation wherever it is 
expedient to do that. That is a really positive development. I certainly do not recognise the 
Ferrero Rocher characterisation that I thought I was going to be expecting when I took up 
this role. We need to understand that our missions abroad are very much business focused, 
which is a very good thing indeed. 
In terms of the contribution that defence makes, you are absolutely right that we must be 
wary of trying to fight the last war. I think that JFC Fuller at the beginning of the last century 
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predicted the change of warfare as he then knew it. He was right, only he was several 
decades premature. We need to be ever so slightly wary about suggesting that we will not 
be required to do what you and I might recognise as war fighting in the foreseeable future. 
That would be a very risky proposition to sign up to, but I think we have to make plans for a 
pacific future in which our military is engaged in upstream conflict prevention and with 
partner nations. Indeed, we do that already. We are in the van of that among nations. I am 
thinking particularly of the international defence engagement strategy that you will know was 
launched in February 2013. I am thinking of Future Force 2020, the reconfiguration of the 
British Army, which is very much about adaptable forces focused on regions of the world 
where we think we need to exert influence and where we need to skill our people in order 
to engage in those parts of the world. 
I think we are very mindful of a future in which we are not actively engaged in what you and 
I would see as conflict but rather in prevention. Everything that the MoD has been engaged 
in over the past several months has been geared towards trying to configure ourselves for 
that scenario. 
The Chairman: Thank you very much. A new mindset, a sea change—those are big and 
exciting words. We have a lot of questions, and Lord Foulkes is ready to put the first one. 
Q370   Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: Can I say first that I have been forced into a position 
of having to praise the present Government for reopening embassies in places such as El 
Salvador and Haiti in particular. I am very pleased at that. We have had a lot of 
representations, however, about problems with visas, particularly examples of people from 
Lesotho having to go to Pretoria to get them and people from Tanzania having to go to 
Nairobi. This is causing some problems. What can be done to make it easier for people to 
get here—not just students but a whole range of people? 
Hugo Swire MP: I think you make an extremely good point. I do not think there has been a 
failure of communication, but possibly we have allowed commentators to paint the visa 
regime as more of a problem than it actually is. You only have to look at the newspapers this 
morning to see the very large level of immigration that there has been in this country over 
the past decade. I think it was incumbent on this Government to get a grip of our border 
controls and to work out who is here and who is coming here. I think that on the whole it is 
working. The majority of people getting visas in China, for instance, get them very quickly. 
I think we did send mixed signals, particularly over student visas, when we were trying to 
tighten up on some of the courses here, which were frankly incredible. We wanted to stress 
that anyone coming to a credible course could still come. But I think that there was a bit of 
push-me pull-you going on.  
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: We keep getting China quoted to us, but I am more 
concerned about Africa and Latin America, one of your areas. I am not talking about people 
coming to live here. I am talking about people visiting here—businessmen and tourists 
coming here—and not being able to get visas in their own country. 
Hugo Swire MP: I agree. That is something that we are looking at. I will give you an 
example from that part of the world. I was in Santo Domingo in the Dominican Republic and 
one of the Ministers wanted to come here to see me. He was going to have to send his 
passport to Miami. He wanted to go elsewhere and was unable to travel during that period. 
That is plainly ridiculous. We are trying to look at ways of doing more with the mobile 
biometric visa collection service. I was talking yesterday to the new Foreign Minister of the 
Maldives. This is another issue for them. We have taken a machine—it is probably no bigger 
than a briefcase—and they can gather the information there. 
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The overarching thing has to be security and to work out who is coming here, but we need 
to work harder with our Home Office colleagues to ensure that it is easier to get people 
coming here, particularly Ministers, high-level businessmen and so forth, as well as tourists. 
The Chairman: Can we just widen this a bit? On Monday, we had a video-conference with 
the US Under-Secretary of State, in which she said that the United States employs 3,540 
public diplomacy and public affairs officers and that all US embassies have expertise in public 
diplomacy and dealing with all these problems, including visas, as well as dealing with the 
general public. She went on to say that they have been trained in the US Government’s 
Foreign Service Institute in public diplomacy, social media and online business contact. Do 
we have the same kind of dedication? Do we have the same kind of staffing? Is that our story 
as well? 
Hugo Swire MP: We certainly do not have the same levels of staffing as the Americans. Nor 
would you expect us to. We have tried to rationalise the visa system with a hub and spoke 
system. For instance, a lot of visas now can be done in Manila. 
The Chairman: I was going wider than visas. 
Hugo Swire MP: It seems to me that actually training people and diplomats should be about 
the public interfacing with the public. That is what diplomats do. That should be their default 
position. I take on board what you say, and maybe when we set up this diplomatic academy 
that should be one of the courses that people should subscribe to. 
Q371   Baroness Morris of Bolton: I thank you both for very good opening statements 
and both departments for their activity. I do an awful lot in the Middle East and I know that 
everyone is very pleased with our interaction there. I missed the last three or four meetings 
of this Committee because I have been employing, I hope, soft power either here or in the 
Middle East. To pick up on Hugo’s point of business people at embassies, the only people I 
met at the embassy in Kuwait were business men and women. I think things have very much 
changed. 
I am slightly concerned about the follow through. We are very good at big gestures, such as 
our GREAT campaigns and opening new embassies, but given that we have depleted 
resources and constrained budgets, which is why we now have to “network shift”, I slightly 
worry that we might raise expectations in some of our more traditional markets. Do we 
follow through when there are really good companies that want perhaps to trade? Do we 
have the resources to ensure that that happens? 
Hugo Swire MP: Thank you for that. I have been reading the reports of this Committee and 
saw that John Major thought that the Foreign Office should have a far larger budget. Who 
am I to gainsay John Major? But I think the chances of us getting that in the immediate future 
are somewhat limited, so we must make do with what we have and deploy our resources as 
best we can. 
In a sense the follow through blurs over into the Venn diagram that is the FCO and UKTI. 
Of course, we have a new head of UKTI—we may say something about that in a minute—
with Lord Livingston. I think that Stephen Green did a remarkable job and we should pay 
tribute to the work that he did. One of the things that Stephen has started, which we are 
rolling out even more now, is the transference of much of what UKTI has historically done 
to chambers of commerce in effect. Frankly, the great thing that has dogged this country in 
exports is that we do not have compulsory subscription to local chambers of commerce as 
they do in Germany, which in turn funds huge offices abroad. We are seeking to replicate 
that in our own way so that our chambers of commerce overseas will do a lot of the work, 
Government (Rt Hon Hugo Swire MP, Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Dr Andrew 
Murrison, Ministry of Defence) – Oral evidence (Q368-383) 
563 
 
the gestation work, that UKTI has historically done. That would leave UKTI to do the more 
strategic work on tariff reform, the big issues, the work that you need for FTAs and things 
like that. The follow through will therefore work better.  
I just got back from the biggest ever trip taken by any Prime Minister anywhere, certainly 
from the UK, to China. We went to three cities in about three days. About 140 companies 
came with us. Talking to them was very interesting. Reading the press about that visit when I 
got back, it did not seem to bear any resemblance to what had been done. Interestingly, just 
as an aside, not only did a lot of companies forge incredibly useful contacts with businesses 
that will need to be followed through, there was a sort of in-house business exchange going 
on on the plane going there and on the plane coming back between companies that did not 
know each other. It all helps. We have to do more. We have to reach the significant targets 
that we have set ourselves. We are falling some way short. Of course, we are dependent on 
the global market economy. For instance, if we are doing badly in Europe, why? Is it because 
there has been a recession in Europe? 
To answer the question, yes, it is very good taking a trade mission and introducing them, but 
how do you follow that through? At the end of the day it is up to the company, but that 
company needs assistance from UKTI or, in turn, these new chambers. I think that that will 
get better. 
Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts: Slightly following on from Baroness Morris’s question, 
when we open an embassy—I share the enthusiasm for us putting our footprint on the 
ground—do we set a minimum level of people and effort that we will commit to that 
embassy? I ask that because I have an interest in Madagascar, so I was very interested to see 
that we opened an embassy there, but I then discovered that it was an office in the Germany 
embassy with a single person. That seems to me to be almost worse than doing nothing 
because it looks as though we are a subset of Germany. What sort of analysis do we do 
before we open them? Do we say that we have to have so many people on the ground to 
make it worth while? 
Hugo Swire MP: I am loath to disagree with Lord Hodgson but I could not disagree more 
on that. It is much better that we have a representation than no representation. Let me give 
you an example. Port au Prince is not a colonnaded, white regency building with a staff of 60; 
it is one person who is a chargé who used to work in Santo Domingo embedded in the 
Canadian embassy. In answer to your question, the question has to be: is it better to run 
Haiti and Port au Prince, particularly given the huge divisions which have emerged on the 
immigration issue between the Dominican Republic and Haiti, with our own man in Port au 
Prince, or is it still better to run it from Santo Domingo? I would argue that it is better to 
have our own man, small that it may be. Actually, it is the thrust of the Foreign Office, 
because we cannot be everywhere with the resources we have. We are seeking to do much 
more of this around the world with our traditional allies, the Canadians and the Australians. 
Where they do not have representation, we are inviting them to come on to our campus 
and we will go places where we cannot have representation on to theirs. It seems to me that 
that is a good use of taxpayers’ money to raise British visibility at very little additional cost. 
Q372  Lord Forsyth of Drumlean: We have had some evidence that the GREAT 
campaign has taken resources at the expense of the FCO’s public diplomacy efforts. Is that 
really sensible given your opening statement and the general agreement that there is about 
the importance of this? Secondly, going back to Lord Foulkes’s question on visas, on which 
we have had considerable representations, you say that you are addressing the problem and 
that you hope that technology might provide a solution. Is there a timetable and is there a 
set of areas of concern which it is proposed will be addressed by a particular time, or is just 
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something that is under review and which will just continue to be important but at the 
expense of the urgent? 
Hugo Swire MP: To take your second question first, it is constantly under review. It is an 
ongoing discussion. 
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean: When I was a Minister, when we said that it is constantly 
under review, that meant that we were not going to do anything about it. It may have 
changed. 
Hugo Swire MP: Many things have changed, and not all for the best either. When I say that 
it is constantly under review, I am not giving a Sir Humphrey answer—at least I hope I am 
not. I genuinely mean that this is an ongoing dialogue between ourselves and the Home 
Office. It is something in which the Prime Minister takes a very keen interest. Do not forget 
that all our efforts to co-ordinate these matters—I go back to what Ken Clarke said—this is 
the first time that any Government have attempted to co-ordinate these measures. These 
are chaired at National Security Council meetings by the Prime Minister. The issue of 
immigration was raised again with him here and the Home Secretary sitting opposite him. 
We are trying to fine-tune our offer. It is rather like constituents, of which you had many 
Michael, so you will remember that they are only too quick to tell you what you have not 
done. They never write to say what you have done. At least mine do not but perhaps yours 
did. The answer is that it is a better situation than probably is known. We need to publicise 
the achievements that we have made but we always need to make improvements and it is 
not something we are being shy about doing. We really need to get this right. 
In one of your earlier Committee reports, I read about the GREAT campaign having sucked 
funding. It does not quite work like that. We had to have cuts in the Foreign Office. The 
money we had to reduce did not go into the GREAT campaign. The GREAT campaign has 
been hugely successful, and I can say that from practical experience. It is quite interesting and 
encouraging when you go to anywhere in the world where we are promoting the UK with 
similar posters and a similar campaign. I was at Bloomingdales in New York and it was 
blasted all over with the GREAT campaign. I most recently launched a pharmaceutical 
company in Mexico City surrounded by the GREAT campaign. I have done Hamleys in Kuala 
Lumpur with the GREAT campaign. Wherever you go, you have this extraordinary theme. 
We are now being asked by other countries, not least Japan and others, to tell them how we 
have done it, and I have instructed officials to give erroneous information. We certainly do 
not want them to emulate. It has been a huge success, which is precisely why we are going 
to continue with the GREAT campaign to 2016. The annual funding between 2014 and 2016 
will be increased by 50%, which is up from £30 million to £45 million. That is in recognition 
of jobs and growth. I will not break down how we quantify this and how we study it but it is 
deemed to be a hugely successful campaign. 
I asked my officials to print out when some next big things are. Unfortunately, I think your 
report is coming out in early March. But if you were minded to delay it—let me make clear 
that I am not volunteering funding from the Foreign Office for this—your Committee could 
do a lot worse than see a major trade expedition branded under the GREAT campaign in 
action. There is one between 10 and 13 March for the luxury retail food and drink market, 
which, looking at the Register of Members’ Interests, might appeal to some of you who have an 
interest in those markets anyway. It is in Hong Kong and Macao, and I think it would be 
incredibly useful for your Committee members to see for themselves how we do this. I hope 
that you would be extremely impressed by what we do and why we have given it additional 
resources.  
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On the back of that, we have also created these business ambassadors and ministerial trade 
envoys, some of whom are in this room, and more are to be announced shortly. Also, for 
instance, in my part of the world, Lord Puttnam does Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam. He has 
been there. Baroness Bonham-Carter has been doing some very good work in Mexico. 
There is a real combined Team UK effort going on, and it probably is more co-ordinated by 
three things. It is co-ordinated ultimately by the Prime Minister chairing the NSC meetings. 
Our one yesterday was on emerging powers. The heads of post locally, the ambassadors, 
have responsibility for that. The GREAT campaign on whose board I sit is chaired, as you 
know, by the Culture, Media and Sport Secretary. It is pretty co-ordinated, and that is 
before we talk about what we are doing for companies that are in the UK and about inward 
investment. 
The Chairman: We want to come on to this co-ordination question. Lord Janvrin wants 
to talk about the GREAT campaign, and perhaps Baroness Nicholson wants to talk about the 
same thing. 
Baroness Nicholson of Winterbourne: I will come after. 
Lord Janvrin: I might get on to co-ordination through the GREAT campaign.  
The Chairman: Well, both you and Baroness Nicholson want to talk about co-ordination. 
In fact, we all do. 
Q373   Lord Janvrin: You have rightly, in my view, expressed satisfaction with what the 
GREAT campaign has been doing and the co-ordination that that has brought within 
Whitehall. My question really looks further ahead at whether you think the Whitehall 
machine is looking wider and beyond the usual suspects of UKTI, the MoD, the Foreign 
Office or DCMS to, for example, local government dealing with diasporas or education 
obviously dealing with students and issues around that. Do you think that on the back of the 
GREAT campaign you can see a wider need to co-ordinate our soft power assets better? 
Hugo Swire MP: We can always do better, but I do not think that we are doing too badly.  
Let me give one example where I have been unhappy, and we are doing something about it, 
which kind of answers your question on soft power and education.  We have the Marshall 
scholarship programme, the Commonwealth scholarship programme and the Chevening 
scholarship programme.  The Chevening alumni make up about 40,000 to 50,000 people 
around the world. The Chevening scholarship is a one-year postgraduate programme, and is 
incredibly important. Some posts have historically been better than other posts at 
maintaining a database of who these people are.  That seems to me to be criminal neglect. 
To misquote the Jesuits, “Give me a boy at seven and I will give you the man”. If you have 
someone in the UK for a year, on the whole they feel benign towards the UK for the rest of 
their lives.  They rise up in whatever sector of society—civil society, politics, sport or 
business—and you have them, so you need to keep them.  We are in competition with 
America and other countries that throw more resources at this than we do.  I have asked 
the Foreign Office to do a piece of work on a co-ordinated secretariat for Chevening.  I 
want to have a Chevening tie, and a Chevening scarf for the ladies, to brand it more, and to 
keep in touch with these people around the world.  I want the Foreign Secretary to do a 
video, or whatever the modern equivalent is—not a selfie—to tell them what Britain is doing 
and to bind them in. That seems to me to be a co-ordinated approach—soft power at its 
best. Also, there has been a steady decrease in the number of Chevening scholars, and it is 
looking worse.  I want that trend reversed and to increase the numbers to pre-2010 levels. 
Government cannot do that alone; that has to be done through the public-private 
partnership, as it were. Every company I speak to, in all the markets, agrees to do something 
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with Chevening scholars.  It is not the same as writing a cheque, I grant you. Some 
companies, such as HSBC, do a great job, while others are rather slow to come forward and 
many simply have not been asked. I think that we can dramatically increase the Chevening 
scholarship programme by getting in more private funding.  We can better co-ordinate it and 
keep in touch.  That is one small example of where we can polish what we have been doing 
historically. If you transpose that to other areas of what we are doing, that seems to be the 
way in which we should be thinking.   
The Chairman: Baroness Nicholson, you would very much like to bring in the military side 
because the co-ordination there is crucial. 
Q374   Baroness Nicholson of Winterbourne: Just to take you back a moment, 
Minister, you raised the question of stronger links with our older allies.  In fact, you were 
referring to two of the most prominent and powerful members of the Commonwealth. Is 
now the moment, therefore, for the FCO—to take the “C” in its title—to turn up the 
volume and talk up the Commonwealth? There are magnificent opportunities, as you rightly 
identified already, with those two, but there are others.  What about India?  What about 
some of the other major elements of the Commonwealth. Is not now the moment for the 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office to push for the Commonwealth to be much more widely 
recognised, supported and understood and therefore co-ordinated with the Foreign Office?  
We get few mentions of the Commonwealth in anything public that the FCO says. 
You also commented on one of our newer, slightly more recent very strong allies in 
Germany, perhaps our best ever ally in the European Union. Another one might be 
Denmark. Germany is so large and wonderful, yet we do not have the same chamber system 
as Germany; we have a very different one that is much more voluntary and very sporadic.  
While trade missions are wonderful theatre and provide a fantastic splash for the United 
Kingdom—I have watched them, they are magnificent—it is the follow up, as Baroness 
Morris has said, that is so important.  While chambers of commerce are very useful, we just 
do not have the German system on which we can rely because we do not have the same 
society.  What else are you thinking of that a prosperity campaign might in fact promote? 
Hugo Swire MP: On the issue of the Commonwealth, it is worth pointing out that two of 
the BRICS are Commonwealth countries—India and South Africa. We do an enormous 
amount with India, where we have created 38 new posts.  If you put India and South Africa 
to one side, as I said in my opening remarks, there are studies that show that intra-
Commonwealth trade is both easier and more cost-effective for companies. The 
Commonwealth is something that we take enormously seriously on a whole range of issues.  
I very much welcome the energy that Lord Marland will bring to the business side of the 
Commonwealth.  His first opportunity to do something big will be in Glasgow in July.   
We need to constantly remind ourselves that of course we have a special responsibility in a 
sense for the Commonwealth but at the end of the day we are an equal member of what is a 
voluntary organisation.  I am absolutely convinced that we have to tread a very careful line 
by not stepping over the mark and being seen to instruct or dominate the Commonwealth. 
Baroness Nicholson of Winterbourne: Just as a supplementary, I did not mean that.  
How can we use the Commonwealth for trade and aid? 
Hugo Swire MP: There is a national fault-line in the Commonwealth, it is worth pointing 
out, which has been recognised by Lord Howell, between what I call the traditional old 
partners—New Zealand, Australia, Canada and us; we saw the most recent evidence of that 
at CHOGM last month—and the newer Commonwealth countries that want a slightly 
different vision of the Commonwealth.  They are much keener to talk about development 
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and so forth, rather than trade. We need to refocus it. We need strong leadership in the 
secretariat, and I think Britain has a role to play. 
I am constantly interested in articles in the papers suggesting that the Commonwealth can 
replace the EU as a trading bloc.  That is patent nonsense; the strength of the 
Commonwealth is in addition to the EU.  We live in a world of multifora membership.  We 
have ASEAN and the Pacific Alliance.  Every country is a member of many different 
organisations and the Commonwealth has to earn its place among them.  It has no absolute 
right.  That is something I am taking extraordinarily seriously and am bringing various people 
together in the not too distant future to have a deep dive on the Commonwealth on how 
we can get it back on course.  That is a very interesting point—I will put it no stronger than 
that.   
The Chairman: I want to bring in Dr Murrison, who has been sitting here very patiently.  
We have had a lot of evidence on the soft power implications for the conduct and 
disposition of our very considerable military budget.  Any questions on that from colleagues 
would be welcome as this is an area we want to develop.   
Q375   Baroness Goudie: I would like to talk about co-ordination between the Foreign 
Office, the military and DfID.  These are three very important parts of Britain’s soft power, 
working in parts of the world where, without our soft power, people would not survive.  I 
worry about the co-ordination in particular with the Ministry of Defence, where there is the 
Foreign Office and DfID and sometimes the EU Commission, which has huge budgets, 
working with NGOs and others.  There does not always seem to be joined-up writing with 
the Ministry of Defence.  It is really important, because the work being done prior to the 
terrible atrocities over the past 10 or 15 years was very much soft power.  How are you co-
ordinating all three and some of the huge budget from the European Commission that is 
being spent alongside DfID and the FCO?  If may not be possible to say just now, but what 
about long-term planning, because it is huge money and it can make huge change?  I am very 
much in favour of what is happening, but I want to see that it is all joined up much better and 
that the NGOs are not duplicating some of the work that they are doing. 
Dr Andrew Murrison MP: Shall I kick off? I am delighted to have the opportunity to talk on 
that very important point.  The starter for 10 probably is the International Defence 
Engagement Strategy, which was published in February of this year. It was a joint FCO-
Ministry of Defence effort and is owned jointly by those two departments of state.  I would 
resist the characterisation that you have proposed.  From my own observation, the FCO 
and the MoD work very closely together, both informally at ministerial level and at official 
level.  I am thinking of things like the Building Stability Overseas Strategy as an example of 
where officials work at a high level to ensure that DfID, the FCO and the MoD are hand in 
glove. I simply do not recognise the separateness that you are suggesting.   
Baroness Goudie: I have seen some things on the ground so this is not hearsay.   
Dr Andrew Murrison MP: I do not doubt that.  All I can do is to report my experience. 
Baroness Goudie: Of course.  I am not arguing with you. I am just saying that I am not 
talking just from sitting here. 
Dr Andrew Murrison MP: All I can do is agree that it is important that we do things in a 
joint way.  That goes for government overall.  I reach back to my earlier point about the 
collocation of government departments abroad, which I have seen happening and which, to 
my great surprise, was not already happening. That is quite an extraordinary thing that is 
now being remedied, which is clearly right.  
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I should like to touch upon the point made by Baroness Morris about the follow through of 
the GREAT campaign.  Businesses that I have talked to, which tend to be in the defence and 
the security arena, are very positive about the way in which the Government are promoting 
British interests abroad.  The defence and security sector tends not to be particularly 
forward in praising anybody, frankly, but it has been forthright in its welcome for a changing 
attitude by Ministers on promoting British security and defence deliverables abroad.  That 
has been quite gratifying and I believe it to be genuine.  I will give the example of Libya, 
which I have visited three times in the past 12 months. It is clear that one of the attractions 
of the UK as a business partner in that country, which is clearly rebuilding itself after 
Gaddafi, is that we are in it for the long term.  That is our pitch. It appears to be very 
welcome by the country as a reason for engaging with the UK and not with our competitors.  
Your point was very well made, and I am very pleased to note from my observation that that 
appears to be what is happening. 
Hugo rightly rattled off a list of educational deliverables.  Their importance cannot be 
understated, and I am pleased to pitch in with the defence contribution.  You will be aware 
of the work of the Defence Academy, in particular its high-profile courses.  A number of 
heads of state and heads of service have had experience of training in this country, and we 
have to understand that some of these countries have societies where the military plays a 
more prominent role than it does in this country. It is important that we make sure that that 
is not neglected in the future. I would also point out the large number of senior foreign 
personalities who have been through Dartmouth, Cranwell and Sandhurst.  Sometimes I 
think that we fail to properly recognise the importance of what we do as a matter of 
routine.  I am very pleased that defence is playing its part in making sure that those who can 
be expected to assume prominent roles in their societies in the future have a relatively 
benign view of the UK. Although Sandhurst, Cranwell and Dartmouth may at the time seem 
to be quite rough and ready, and you might expect the graduates of those academies to take 
a dim view of some of the robustness that has traditionally been associated with them, 
uniformly you can expect them, on talking to them some 20 or 30 years later, to recall their 
time in the UK with pride and satisfaction. We have to assume therefore that there is a 
significant benefit for the UK that is entirely uncosted, appears on nobody’s balance sheet 
but is vital nevertheless. 
Q376  The Chairman: That is very interesting. Moving on to the combat area of military 
operations, we have had evidence from both sides of the Atlantic that nowadays the 
purposes of conducting military operations have to be interwoven with civilian efforts more 
intimately than ever. You are dealing not just with other states but with all kinds of non-state 
actors. You are dealing with a totally connected set of fragmented enemies. The whole scene 
has changed. At what level are you able to discuss that with your Foreign Office colleague or 
with other members of the Government, and what conclusions are you drawing? 
Dr Andrew Murrison MP: I agree entirely. The exposition is in the way in which the Army 
is reconfiguring itself as a result of Future Force 2020. That is very much cognisant of the 
importance of engaging upstream. It follows that there will be a further skillset that members 
of the Ministry of Defence—soldiers, sailors and airmen—are going to have to assume if 
they are to engage in the world we envisage going forward. I am thinking of things like 
language skills and cultural awareness. I think that we are very sensible to the likely 
developing defence and security scene in the future.  
In terms of engaging with other government departments, all I can do is draw you back to 
my earlier remarks about the close working relationship we have with relevant departments, 
in particular the FCO and DfID. 
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Hugo Swire MP: May I come in, Chairman, on three things? First, to go back to Baroness 
Nicholson’s point earlier, which ties in with business trips abroad, their validity and the 
follow through, she is absolutely right about Germany. I said at the beginning that we do not 
have the luxury of compulsory chambers of commerce membership, which is why we are 
seeking to replicate them in our own way abroad. I read an article in the Spectator a few 
months ago questioning the validity of these trips. It is not something I recognise. I have 
personally, standing in a room with a business and the President of a country, been able to 
unlock problems that have dogged that particular business for many years. Ministerial 
engagement on these trips is hugely valuable. We are going to do more of them and they are 
going to be bigger and glitzier. We reckon that that is the way in which we can penetrate 
these markets. 
My colleague made a point about collocation earlier. It was something of a surprise to me. I 
do not think that it is too well known that what has happened right across the board is that 
you have this emergence of all kinds of departments having their unilateral representation in 
some of the capitals of the world. They very often employ local people on different terms, 
which exacerbates inherent tensions. You have people from DECC doing climate change. 
You have huge DfID organisations; and you have the military. You might say that I would say 
that anyway. My view is that the people who own the UK abroad are the FCO and everyone 
should come under our compound as closely on our terms as possible. That is not 
universally popular but we are beginning to do that and so better co-ordinate where 
possible.  
If your Committee wanted to look at a country that is almost a template of how we are 
trying to work closely with DfID, the MoD and the FCO and align our shared interests, you 
could do worse than look at Burma. Burma has elections coming up in 2015. There are 
constitutional issues that currently prevent Daw Aung San Suu Kyi from standing. We are 
working in the international fora to try to get Burma to accelerate the speeding up of its 
constitution. The Speaker has been there. We have had its clerks over here learning how to 
draft legislation. This country is emerging from the dark shadows of an autocracy into what 
we hope will be a democracy. We have appointed a military attaché there at the request of 
Aung San Suu Kyi to liaise better with the military, which incidentally still has a guaranteed 
25% of the parliamentary seats. They have that block which in itself is a problem. We are 
one of the biggest bilateral aid donors now in Rakhine, which I was the first western Minister 
to go to. I am going to Kachin quite soon. We have had more ministerial visits there. I have 
taken a trade mission there. All the different disparate arms of UK plc are trying to help 
Burma along the way. I think that that is a pretty good example of cross-ministerial and 
cross-departmental co-ordination.  
Q377  The Chairman: This is a message that we have had from several other witnesses as 
well. Of course, it has an enormous implication flowing from it. Are we able to deliver the 
embassies on site in the various countries where the ambassador is required to be almost a 
polymath, co-ordinating the interfaces between cultural, creative, military and business 
activities locally on a more and more intense scale? Are our embassies all around the world, 
not just the hot areas such as Myanmar and Burma, being built up to cope with this new 
degree of a wider range of diplomacy and activity than ever before? Embassies cannot cope if 
they have to cut down their entertainment budget the whole time or weaken their travel 
and that side of things. They must be free to operate in a much bigger scene than hitherto. Is 
that recognised? 
Hugo Swire MP: It is certainly recognised. Would it not be nice not to have to operate 
within the spending envelope that we do out of necessity? I raised this question with some 
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officials yesterday. I said that I was not aware of any post around the world being unable to 
do something. Eyes were slightly rolled heavenwards and it is obviously not a view that some 
officials share. Certainly, the embassies that I have come across—I do not say this glibly—are 
working extraordinarily hard. I preface my remarks at the outset by saying I think that we 
are asking our diplomats to do many things that they did not come into the Diplomatic 
Service to do.  On the whole, they are doing it extremely well. 
I should mention the support level put into the Prime Minister-led visit to China the week 
before last. What I had not realised, because no one said, is that the entire office was 
suffering from the Norovirus. That was not mentioned and they responded magnificently. 
Trying to co-ordinate 140 to 150 businessmen all over the place, the Prime Minister, the No. 
10 press pack and all the other Ministers was a most remarkable achievement. They did it 
extraordinarily well. My sense is that when you press the button, they respond pretty well. 
Of course, they will always want more resource. They have had pay constraints, which has 
an effect on morale. I think that some of the progress up the ladder at the Foreign Office 
needs to be looked at in terms of human resource and career management. All those issues 
are important. To answer your question, we are asking them to do a lot more than they 
have ever been asked to do. It is putting some under strain but on the whole they are 
responding magnificently.  
The Chairman: How many one-man or one-woman embassies do we have—that is, one 
UK person? 
Hugo Swire MP: Let me give you an example as I gave to Lord Hodgson. Port au Prince is 
one. In fact, it has been joined now by DfID in the same small office. But one is better than 
none. 
Baroness Morris of Bolton: I completely agree with Hugo on trade missions. I think they 
are wonderful things and should continue. 
Hugo Swire MP: Perhaps you should declare your interest.  
Baroness Morris of Bolton: I declared my interest right at the beginning as a trade envoy. 
Having seen first hand, the great good that the trade missions do, they should continue. I 
want to pick up on something that you both mentioned about languages. Andrew mentioned 
it and Hugo said that the language school has been reopened. We have all heard stories of 
someone who speaks Arabic or whatever being deployed in other parts of the world and 
people being deployed to countries where the ambassador and the main staff do not speak 
the language. I know that that was a particular way of going about recruitment in the Foreign 
Office and that it was open to anyone to apply. I wonder whether there is going to be a shift 
in that. With reopening the language school and assuming that someone will go there to 
learn a particular language, will there then be every effort taken to deploy that person to 
where they have a particular skill? 
Hugo Swire MP: I am not sure that I share your concern. Historically, you always had the 
Arabists, the others and those who went to Beirut and learnt Arabic and so forth. I think 
that has gone. I think people move around much more. People constantly go on language 
courses before they deploy so that they at least have a grasp of the language. We have many 
more people pre-deployment speaking Mandarin, for instance, than we have ever had. The 
diplomat rising up through the Foreign Office in a sort of silo—you are an Arabist, so you 
will always serve in Middle Eastern embassies—has gone. I am not an expert in this field, but 
recruitment right across the Civil Service seems to have changed. We have people coming 
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into the Foreign Office. I do not know whether that is a good or a bad thing. I am not sure 
that we have not along the way lost something. That is what concerns me. 
Dr Andrew Murrison MP: Defence attachés are an important part of our effort abroad. I 
have to say that we recognise the situation that Baroness Morris is describing and have 
decided that as part of our reconfiguration we should enhance the foreign service element of 
our primarily officer’s career streams. We do not have the resources to do it in the 
elaborate way that the Americans do, for example, but we can reconfigure the defence 
attaché post so that it is seen less and less as an end of career post before you retire and 
more something that is inculcated throughout an officer’s working life. That might mean that 
he or she might expect to have a series of posts in various ranks proceeding to the most 
senior appointments for our most elaborate missions abroad. That really presupposes that 
we can inculcate language training and cultural awareness in people at a young age. That is 
woven into our thinking on the adaptable forces brigades that will be assigned to various 
parts of the world that are important to us.  
People will have that exposure throughout their careers, which means, we hope, that their 
senior people will be more adept than they are at the moment at occupying senior roles and 
that we will not, in quite the same sort of way, have to put huge effort into these folks right 
at the tail-end of their career. For difficult languages and difficult parts of the world, we will 
potentially be investing 18 months of training to enable them to do a two and a half or three 
year appointment right at the end before they leave the service. 
Q378  Baroness Nicholson of Winterbourne: I have a couple of questions for Dr 
Murrison please. First, I have been very pleased, as I am sure we have all been, to see that 
we have been paying much attention and putting more finance behind looking after wounded 
soldiers and wounded former soldiers. How can you ensure that that continues? Is this 
merely an on the margins effort because of all the celebrations that are coming up and so on 
with the First World War? Given that so many more of our soldiers now survive thanks to 
in-theatre immediate surgery and the magnificent survival rate that was not true before, how 
can you embed in the thinking of British culture and successive British Governments, not just 
this one, that we must look after our wounded soldiers and former soldiers? Can you say 
that? Is there a reputational issue as well as a pure clinical and psychological issue? 
The second question is perhaps slightly different. NGOs these days talk a great deal about 
“humanitarian space”, which means separation in the field from the military in any sense. 
From the way you are looking, I see that that has not quite crossed your desk. I wonder 
whether you have any comment on that. 
Dr Andrew Murrison MP: I can certainly comment on it. Perhaps I can articulate some 
frustration that defence has with the issue that you describe in your last point. Of course, 
the Armed Forces do a lot of humanitarian work. Perhaps I can suggest that some of the 
things that we do add far more to the sum total of human happiness than the efforts of some 
other organisations that would say that they are entirely pacific and would rather not work 
with soldiers, sailors and airmen. I am thinking of disaster relief. I am thinking particularly of 
the Philippines recently where we performed magnificently. There is a sense of frustration 
for Ministers, bordering on annoyance, that this idea should have some sort of purchase. 
Baroness Nicholson of Winterbourne: I agree. 
Dr Andrew Murrison MP: Of course, the incentive is to comply with our 0.7% ODA target, 
complying with  the OECD’s ODA requirements. Much of what we do is not ODA-able, 
which is annoying, given my previous remarks. We cannot count much of this stuff towards 
the targets that we have been set. I see no prospect in the immediate future of persuading 
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the OECD to recognise the importance of the work that men and women in uniform do in 
the cause of humanitarian relief and development. That is a pity. I think that filters down to 
soldiers, sailors and airmen themselves, who are very pleased in this modern world to be 
doing that kind of work. They see that as part of the deal. Indeed, it is sold to them when 
they join up that they will be doing this sort of thing. Then they find that they are not 
perhaps being given the recognition on the ground from other agencies. 
Q379  Baroness Nicholson of Winterbourne: Do you have any suggestion as to how 
this Committee might propose that that recognition could be obtained and flaunted? 
Dr Andrew Murrison MP: I think you can comment in general terms about the frustration 
that we feel, and hopefully you will share, that this is an issue. The solution is in the hands of 
organisations such as the OECD with the various humanitarian organisations. I have to say 
that we are working hard to build bridges with those organisations, some of which are 
culturally not exactly on the same wavelength as defence. But when organisations of that 
sort see our people in action on the ground, talk to them and have dealings with them, they 
realise that these people are concerned about the welfare of humanity, want to do good 
work and, indeed, find that an important intrinsic part of their work as members of the 
Armed Forces. We can break down the cultural barriers that often exist between defence 
and the various NGOs. We are actively seeking to do that in the way that we approach 
humanitarian situations. It would be a very good thing if you are able to underscore that in 
your report.  
Baroness Nicholson of Winterbourne: But one cannot expect the OECD to promote 
the cause of the good work of the British Army. Do you not have any suggestions for us that 
we could undertake from the United Kingdom? 
Dr Andrew Murrison MP: No, I think it would be reasonable for the OECD to reflect on 
the important work that men and women in uniform do, not just in the UK but through the 
European Union, the UN and all manner of partner nations, and perhaps have a rethink as to 
how the cause of peace and prosperity can be advanced best. Very often that is by deploying, 
for example, a squadron of Royal Engineers to build a bridge or to engage in flood relief, as 
they have been doing recently. Those sorts of things are vital. They need people of that sort. 
At the moment, there appears to be a cultural resistance on the part of elements of the 
international community towards the recognition of the part that men and women in 
uniform play. I think that that is a great pity. 
The Chairman: Briefly, can you say something on Baroness Nicholson’s second question? 
Dr Andrew Murrison MP: There were two bits to it: disabled soldiers and World War I. 
You are tempting me to stray off the subject of today’s meeting. As you know, I can talk at 
great length about disabled soldiers, but I will confine my remarks to how this affects our 
international reputation. In this country, we have adopted a model of the military covenant 
that complies with what you might call the no-disadvantage precept that is shared by most 
countries internationally—not America, which goes for what you might call the “citizen-plus” 
model, meaning that as a member of the Armed Forces you can expect rather more than 
you can as an ordinary citizen. Our model is that if you are injured in the service of your 
country, you will suffer no disadvantage as far as we can possibly make it so.  
Baroness Nicholson of Winterbourne: Why do we not have the American model? 
Dr Andrew Murrison MP: That is probably for another day. 
Baroness Nicholson of Winterbourne: No, there will not be another day. This is the 
evidence. 
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Dr Andrew Murrison MP: Chairman, if you would like me to talk at length on that I would 
be happy to, but I fear you may not have time to explore it entirely. I will exemplify the no-
disadvantage thing by referring to two reports that I wrote before I became a Minister: A 
Better Deal for Military Amputees and Fighting Fit, which are about amputees and those who 
had suffered the mental consequences of conflict. I wrote those reports expecting them to 
go the way of most reports that are written for government—into the long grass. They have 
both been implemented by this Government, for all intents and purposes completely and 
fully. I think that gives you a sense of the importance that the Government attribute to 
making sure that, so far as we can, we comply with the no-disadvantage model that has been 
adopted by the majority of our partners internationally. 
You mentioned World War I. Again, I am more than happy to talk at length on this subject 
as the Prime Minister’s special representative. Lord Foulkes has heard me talk about this 
before but perhaps I could come back to that unless you particularly want me to pursue it 
now. 
Hugo Swire MP: It is worth saying that the first service of commemoration will take place 
in Glasgow Cathedral. It is a Commonwealth service on 4 August. 
The Chairman: That is over and above the Commonwealth observance on 
Commonwealth Day in Westminster Abbey. 
Hugo Swire MP: That is separate. 
The Chairman: We are running out of time. We have more questions. Lord Hodgson has 
to go so he wants to put a question quickly, and then I will call Lord Forsyth. 
Q380  Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts: I apologise for having to leave. I have some 
amendments coming up at 11.35 am. I just want to talk about the World Service. We have 
heard a lot of evidence about the World Service from people who have written and spoken 
about it to us. Obviously it is about to go through a change in its funding mechanisms, and 
the Parliamentary Questions I put down about ministerial responsibility post the change 
obviously means that it is going to DCMS, but the nature of the answer was that clearly, 
Minister, you will be looking over the shoulder of DCMS in any actions that the World 
Services takes.  
Could you update us on where we are with the negotiations and whether you are satisfied 
that the new funding arrangements will be sufficient for the World Service to play the clearly 
important role that our evidence suggests it does? 
Hugo Swire MP: Yes, I will. It will move off our books, as it were, in April 2014, but we will 
continue to work together. The Foreign Secretary, not me, will retain a governance role for 
the World Service and we will continue to collaborate. I think that it is very timely. To 
answer your question on whether funding can be guaranteed directly, it has always been my 
view, and was when I was Shadow Culture Secretary, that the universal taxation, which is 
the licence fee, is more than enough to pay for a robust World Service. We shall have to 
keep the BBC up to the mark on that. 
In the past couple of days, in an Urgent Question I was pressed on DPRK and the situation 
there with regards to the World Service and broadcasting. It is something that I know has 
been followed by many of your Lordships. At the end of the day we can suggest to the BBC 
what it does but we cannot insist. I think that that is the best way to put it. It is editorially 
independent and makes its own decisions, which is exactly how it should be.  
Do I think that the World Service is a useful tool? Yes I do. Am I nervous about the financial 
withdrawal by the FCO of it? I am not particularly. Do I think that we need to be vigilant in 
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ensuring that it does what it should say on the tin? Yes, I do. I think that none of us in this 
Committee or in either House would want to see a diminution in the role played by the 
World Service. 
Q381   Lord Forsyth of Drumlean: My question is on precisely this topic. Why are the 
Government content to see a very respected global brand, the BBC, overtaken by CNN, Al 
Jazeera and others, which have the advantage of having some recourse to private capital, 
instead of taking a view, “Well, we have to run this”, rather as we used to do with the old 
nationalised industries on the basis that the budget is allocated and has to be seen in the 
overall context of public expenditure? The opportunities for growth and developing the 
brand are therefore limited, and a certain culture comes in from that sort of funding. Why is 
it considered absolutely sacrosanct that the BBC World Service should not be run on a 
more commercial basis with all the advantages that that would bring to Britain—independent 
of government but at the same time exploiting its brand? 
When the Minister says that the Government cannot tell the BBC what to do, that is one of 
the reasons why it is so successful. It is seen to be independent of government. Could we 
not be more ambitious in developing this brand and move away from the idea that it all has 
to be paid for by the licence payer?  
Hugo Swire MP: Tempting though the invitation is to stray on to territory that was once 
familiar to me, I will try to constrain my remarks. I think that the BBC has some very 
commercial interests. The list of production companies and other TV companies that the 
BBC owns or has shares in is absolutely extraordinary. There has been tremendous mission 
creep by the BBC. The BBC has a huge amount of money and is in an unique broadcasting 
position, unlike any commercial broadcaster. It has guaranteed income year on year. It is not 
predicating its programming on advertising in a competitive falling and squeezed market for 
advertising. The BBC has the luxury of being able to plan ahead because it knows pretty 
much the spending envelop that it has. 
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean: I am talking about the BBC World Service and the 
opportunities there could be to develop that service. Whatever the BBC has, it is 
undoubtedly falling behind other international news agencies, which seems to me to be a 
huge loss for Britain as a whole. 
Hugo Swire MP: I think that Al Jazeera is a remarkably good station. It is very interesting 
for those of us who follow things in that part of the world. Do I have an in-principle 
objection to the World Service taking on some kind of sponsorship of broadcasting? 
Inherently, no, I do not, but it is not my call and these matters are best addressed to the 
chairman of the BBC Trust, Lord Patten. 
Q382  Lord Janvrin: I want to ask Dr Murrison a question about public duties in their 
widest sense. Are they seen to be part of our public diplomacy, if you like? I am thinking, for 
example, of soldiers marching around changing the guard et cetera as part of tourism 
attractiveness. Are ship visits abroad co-ordinated with the GREAT campaign? In other 
words, is there a link with some MoD public duties—I am not talking about participation in 
World War I commemorations, et cetera—as part of the public diplomacy side, or is it a 
difficulty for the MoD to find people to do it? 
My last question is to both of you. Should there be a Minister of soft power, and, if so, in 
which department should he or she be? 
Dr Andrew Murrison MP: Well, it sounds like a very attractive and tempting appointment. 
We would probably have to fight over that. I suspect that it follows what Hugo said, with 
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which I agree. The FCO is the lead in matters that relate to things outwith the territory of 
the United Kingdom, so we all doff our hat to the FCO. In defence, we implement the 
national security strategy through military tasks. There are a number of them and they are 
reasonably well known. It is probably true that the sorts of things we have been discussing 
today have always happened, only they have not really been described as anything 
particularly. The Navy, of which I used to be a member I am pleased to say, has been doing 
defence engagement for ever. Clearly, it sends ships abroad, and wherever those ships go 
hopefully we do work that is well regarded in the host nation. That is generally is the case 
but not always. That has been so historically and, I would hope, uniformly today. 
When I was appointed a little over a year ago, my first job was to fly out to Cartagena in 
Colombia to join HMS “Dauntless”. We had what amounts to a trade fair on the back of 
that ship. It was a very early demonstration to me of the way in which defence assets can be 
used to project British influence abroad and extend in this case to the prosperity agenda. It 
was not simply about selling things but about talking to key figures in that country, a country 
that is important to us. That gives an example of how we use our assets wherever we can. 
We very much view engagement and the public duties that you describe as part of what we 
do, even if sometimes they are not clearly enunciated in the formulaic tasking that we 
receive. 
Of course, ceremonial contributes to a military task, and I would not characterise it as 
tourism, as such, although I understand your point. 
Lord Janvrin: Nor would I, but it contributes. 
Dr Andrew Murrison MP: Of course it does and very importantly too. I do not want to be 
too sniffy about it. I think tourism is an important part of what we do nationally and in 
attracting wealth to this country. I would not want to downplay it in any way. But the 
ceremonial of course extends far beyond that. I think it is important for domestic 
consumption and domestic appreciation just as much as it is for the tourism receipts to 
which you refer.  
Of course, we are committed to the SDSR process. We will repeat this exercise after the 
election in 2015 and we are preparing for it now. Apropos my earlier remarks about soft 
power and yours about representational duties, you can probably expect—perhaps your 
report might like to reflect on this—that these sorts of things will have an even more 
prominent part than they did in SDSR 2010. 
Q383  The Chairman: We have come almost to the end, but that is a very important 
point. Will the SDSR replay, or continuation or renewal, be co-ordinated by the National 
Security Council with all the other soft power interests of the Government and other 
departments? Is that what will happen? 
Dr Andrew Murrison MP: Yes. Defence technically is not in the lead in this, but it will have 
a very large part to play. The sorts of things that we have been discussing will certainly 
inform what we hope will emerge in 2015. It is worth pointing out that SDSR 2010 was, if 
you like, the bedrock SDSR. We needed to do this. The 2015 SDSR will of course take 2010 
as the reference point and build upon it, so it is unlikely to be quite as fundamental as the 
one we had three and a half years ago. 
The Chairman: Is that even though the world has changed in the ways you have both 
described quite dramatically since? 
Dr Andrew Murrison MP: The world has changed of course. The world will always change. 
However, some of the changes we might have reasonably anticipated in 2010 and therefore 
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factored into our long-term thinking, so the 2015 SDSR is likely to take account of those and 
update them, and certainly tweak around the edges where it is necessary because of things 
that have happened that we had not foreseen in 2010. But I do not think that you would 
expect us to engage in the kind of wholesale review that you saw in 2010. 
The Chairman: We are in extra time.  
Hugo Swire MP: Does Lord Janvrin want me to comment on those things? Ceremonial 
state visits and ships visits are hugely important. There are those who still bemoan the fact 
that perhaps one of the greatest vessels in every sense for the projection of soft power was, 
of course, the royal yacht. Many consider that to be an absence from our armoury of soft 
power instruments. 
As regards inward state visits, I am very passionate about ceremonial. I speak with all the 
authority of someone who went the wrong way on Changing the Guard once, so I know a 
bit about that. It is hugely important. It is part of what makes us different and what we do 
better than any other country. You only have to be on a state visit: you, of course, have 
been involved in many. A few weeks ago, President Park of South Korea was hugely 
impressed. It is something we do remarkably well. We also did the Korean war memorial. 
That buys us a lot back in the host country. Any attempt to reduce that, although I hope 
there will be no attempt to reduce it, would be shooting ourselves in the foot. 
Should there be a Minister for soft power? Soft power is like breathing. It is what we do. It is 
our natural default position. Ultimately, the Minister for soft power is the primus inter pares. 
It is the Prime Minister. He is the one who chairs the NSC, which brings all these arms 
together. That is where it should reside. But all Ministers should get out of bed in the 
morning thinking soft power. After all, what is soft power? Hard power is sending in the 
military. Soft power is everything else. That is what we are trying to do. 
The Chairman: Lord Foulkes? 
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: No, it is okay. 
The Chairman: That is very considerate. We have kept you here for more than an hour 
and a quarter. You are very busy people. We are extremely grateful to you for the 
illumination that you have cast on the scene. There are many more questions that we could 
go on asking but we must obey the demands of time and let you go. Thank you very much 
indeed. 
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Government (Justine Greening MP, Secretary of State, Department 
for International Development) – Supplementary written evidence  
 
Thank you for asking me to provide written evidence, following the oral evidence session of 
18 December with Rt Hon. Hugo Swire MP and Dr Andrew Murrison MP.   
The Armed Forces carry out fantastic work and make an important contribution to 
development and conflict prevention. The Building Stability Overseas Strategy, jointly owned 
by MOD, DFID and FCO, recognises this contribution and underlines the importance of 
taking an integrated approach.  As I am sure you can appreciate, there are times, however, 
when it is neither appropriate nor practical to put military boots on the ground – this can 
include in fragile and conflict-affected states.  Humanitarian space needs to be protected as 
humanitarian access is fundamental to ensuring those affected by disasters are assisted and 
protected. 
DFID works extremely closely with the MOD both strategically and operationally and where 
appropriate, the Armed Forces can provide essential support in humanitarian response. For 
instance, following Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines, at DFID’s request the MOD provided 
2 Royal Navy vessels and 11 military aircraft, which were critical to the success of the UK 
effort. The work done by the Royal Navy meant that assistance got through to where it was 
needed, at a time when the humanitarian community could not, which included helping to 
save two lives.  The Armed Forces’ support complemented the16 UK Aid cargo flights, the 
25 DFID humanitarian staff deployed alongside military personnel, as well as the DFID staff 
also fully involved in the operations room in London.   
Since 2007, this nature of co-operation has been codified in a Memorandum of 
Understanding which sets out how DFID and UK forces will work together.  Its main 
principles are that DFID will lead the UK’s response to overseas disasters; that it can ask 
MOD for military support if necessary, although it is clearly understood that UK defence 
requirements take precedence; and that DFID will cover the additional costs incurred by the 
MOD in assisting a humanitarian operation.   
DFID requests the support of MOD in response to a natural disaster and complex 
environments in accordance with United Nations guidelines, known as the “OSLO” 
guidelines.  Those guidelines stipulate that support should be provided in line with the 
humanitarian principles of impartiality, neutrality, humanity and independence.  Furthermore, 
they also state that military assets should be requested only where there is no comparable 
civilian alternative.  This implies that the military asset must be the only way of meeting the 
particular need and its use should be last resort.   
Regarding the “recognition” of military effort on development by the international 
community, Dr Murrison is right that the custodian of the definition of Official Development 
Assistance (ODA) is the OECD.  All UK Official Development Assistance respects and 
reports against the strict international OECD definitions of what counts as aid.  The OECD 
says that the main objective must be to “support the economic development and welfare of 
developing countries”.  The UK Government will stick to this absolutely while working 
through the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) to advance the debate on 
development finance.   Following the last OECD-DAC High Level Meeting in December 
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2012, and the publication of the High Level Panel Report, development finance has moved up 
the agenda.  As the UK became a 0.7% donor in 2013, we are well positioned to contribute 
to and shape this debate (in the OECD-DAC) on modernisation of the ODA concept; and in 
the United Nations on the post-2015 development financing framework.   
I hope that you find this response clarifying and useful. 
 
24 January 2014 
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Government – (Rt Hon Hugo Swire MP, Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office) – Supplementary written evidence 
 
Thank you for giving me the opportunity to give evidence to the Lords Select Committee on 
Soft Power and the UK’s Influence, on 18 December, and for your subsequent letter of 7 
January 2014.  I promised to follow up on various points raised by the Committee. 
 
You asked for a breakdown of current UK Ambassadors and High Commissioners, 
according to (i) gender, (ii) educational background, and (iii) ethnicity. 
 
The answers to your specific questions are: 
(i) Of the 159 Ambassadors, High Commissioners, Heads of International 
Organisations and Governors of Overseas Territories, 129 were male and 30 
(19%) were female.  In July 2013, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office Board 
committed to improve this total and agreed a target to increase the number of 
female Heads of Posts (currently 38 including subordinate posts) by 24 over the 
next 4 years. 
 
(ii) The educational background of any member of staff is a voluntary declaration, and 
we do not have reliable and comprehensive data that we can share with the 
committee. 
 
(iii) Ethnicity is a voluntary declaration.  Of the officers that have made a declaration, 
approximately 3% have declared that they are from a BME background. 
 
You also asked for data on the number of posts currently open, how many UK based 
members of staff are currently distributed across those posts and what proportion of posts 
operate with the very small, small, medium or large UK based staffing levels.  Attached is a 
detailed list of the posts that are currently open, as well as the two posts that are currently 
suspended and have no staff, together with the total number of UK based members of staff 
from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in post.  The numbers listed are accurate as of 
31 December 2013.  In all these posts, there will also be a combination of locally engaged 
staff and UK based staff from partners across government.   
 
Of the posts that have 5 or less UK Based staff, these are broken down as follows: 
 
Number of UK Based staff Number of posts 
1 32 
2 38 
3 27 
4 15 
5 15 
 
1 February 2014 
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Annex A - List of overseas posts and number of FCO staff in each post. 
 
Country/Territory Name of Post Type of Post UK Staff 
Ivory Coast Abidjan British Embassy 5 or Less 
United Arab Emirates Abu Dhabi British Embassy 14 
Nigeria Abuja British High Commission 24 
Ghana Accra British High Commission 10 
Pitcairn Islands Adamstown Resident Representative 5 or Less 
Ethiopia Addis Ababa British Embassy 23 
India Ahmedabad British Trade Office  No UK Based or UK Based 
              recorded  elsewhere 
Egypt Alexandria British Consulate General 5 or Less 
Algeria Algiers British Embassy 8 
Spain Alicante British Consulate  No UK Based or UK Based 
               recorded elsewhere 
Saudi Arabia Al-Khobar British Trade Office 5 or Less 
Kazakhstan Almaty British Embassy Office 5 or Less 
Jordan Amman British Embassy 28 
Netherlands Amsterdam British Consulate General 5 or Less 
Anguilla Anguilla Governor 5 or Less 
Turkey Ankara British Embassy 20 
Turkey Antalya British Consulate  No UK Based or UK Based 
              recorded elsewhere 
Madagascar Antananarivo British Embassy 5 or Less 
Ascension Island Ascension Island Administrator 5 or Less 
Turkmenistan Ashgabat British Embassy 5 or Less 
Eritrea Asmara British Embassy 5 or Less 
Kazakhstan Astana British Embassy 5 or Less 
Paraguay Asuncion British Embassy 5 or Less 
Greece Athens British Embassy 10 
United States Atlanta British Consulate General 5 or Less 
Kazakhstan Atyrau British Trade Office  No UK Based or UK Based 
              recorded elsewhere 
New Zealand Auckland British Consulate General 5 or Less 
Iraq Baghdad British Embassy 20 
Azerbaijan Baku British Embassy 8 
Mali Bamako British Embassy 5 or Less 
Brunei Darussalam Bandar Seri Begawan British High Commission 5 or Less 
India Bangalore British Deputy High Commission 5 or Less 
Thailand Bangkok British Embassy 17 
Bosnia and Herzegovina Banja Luka British Embassy Office  No UK Based or UK Based 
               recorded elsewhere 
Gambia Banjul British High Commission 5 or Less 
Spain Barcelona British Consulate General  No UK Based or UK Based 
              recorded elsewhere 
China Beijing British Embassy 63 
Lebanon Beirut British Embassy 11 
Serbia Belgrade British Embassy 9 
Belize Belmopan British High Commission 5 or Less 
Germany Berlin British Embassy 18 
Switzerland Berne British Embassy 5 or Less 
Spain Bilbao British Consulate    No UK Based or UK 
                 recorded 
l h  Kyrgyzstan Bishkek British Embassy 5 or Less 
Colombia Bogota British Embassy 19 
France Bordeaux British Consulate    No UK Based or UK 
B d        recorded elsewhere 
United States Boston British Consulate General 5 or Less 
Montserrat Brades Governor 5 or Less 
Brazil Brasilia British Embassy 15 
Slovakia Bratislava British Embassy 5 or Less 
Barbados Bridgetown British High Commission 5 or Less 
Australia Brisbane British Consulate No UK Based or UK Based 
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   recorded elsewhere 
Belgium Brussels British Embassy 5 or Less 
Romania Bucharest British Embassy 7 
Hungary Budapest British Embassy 5 or Less 
Argentina Buenos Aires British Embassy 12 
Burundi Bujumbura British Liaison Office No UK Based or 
UK B d                  recorded 
elsewhere 
Egypt Cairo British Embassy 20 
Canada Calgary British Consulate General 5 or Less 
Australia Canberra British High Commission 12 
 
Annex A - List of overseas posts and number of FCO staff in each post. 
Country/Territory Name of Post Type of Post UK Staff 
South Africa Cape Town British Consulate General 5 or Less 
Venezuela Caracas British Embassy 6 
Morocco Casablanca British Consulate General 5 or Less 
Saint Lucia Castries British High Commission 5 or Less 
India Chandigarh British Trade Office 5 or Less 
India Chennai British Deputy High Commission 5 or Less 
Thailand Chiang Mai British Consulate No UK Based or 
UK Based 
d d 
 
United States Chicago British Consulate General 5 or Less 
Republic of Moldova Chisinau British Embassy 5 or Less 
China Chongqing British Consulate General 6 
Sri Lanka Colombo British High Commission 9 
Guinea Conakry British Embassy 5 or Less 
Denmark Copenhagen British Embassy 5 or Less 
Greece Corfu British Vice Consulate No UK Based or 
UK Based 
d d 
 
Senegal Dakar British Embassy 5 or Less 
Syria Damascus British Embassy No UK Based or 
UK Based 
d d 
 
United Republic of Tanzania Dar Es Salaam British High Commission 6 
United States Denver British Consulate General 5 or Less 
Bangladesh Dhaka British High Commission 20 
Qatar Doha British Embassy 11 
United Arab Emirates Dubai British Embassy 21 
Ireland Dublin British Embassy 8 
South Africa Durban British Trade Office No UK Based or 
UK Based 
d d 
 
Tajikistan Dushanbe British Embassy 5 or Less 
Germany Dusseldorf British Consulate 5 or Less 
Russia Ekaterinburg British Consulate General 5 or Less 
Iraq Erbil British Consulate General 5 or Less 
Sierra Leone Freetown British High Commission 7 
Botswana Gaborone British High Commission 5 or Less 
Occupied Palestinian territories Gaza British Information Services Office No UK Based or 
UK Based 
d d 
 
Cayman Islands George Town Governor 5 or Less 
Guyana Georgetown British High Commission 5 or Less 
Gibraltar Gibraltar Governor 5 or Less 
India Goa British Tourist Assistance Office No UK Based or 
UK Based 
d d 
 
Democratic Republic of the Congo Goma British Embassy Office 5 or Less 
Turks and Caicos Islands Grand Turk Governor 6 
Mexico Guadalajara British Trade Office No UK Based or 
UK Based 
d d 
 
China Guangzhou British Consulate General 8 
Guatemala Guatemala City British Embassy 5 or Less 
Bermuda Hamilton Governor 5 or Less 
Vietnam Hanoi British Embassy 8 
Zimbabwe Harare British Embassy 12 
Cuba Havana British Embassy 5 or Less 
Finland Helsinki British Embassy 5 or Less 
Greece Heraklion, Crete British Vice Consulate No UK Based or 
UK Based 
d d 
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Vietnam Ho Chi Minh City British Consulate General 5 or Less 
China Hong Kong SAR British Consulate General 21 
Solomon Islands Honiara British High Commission 5 or Less 
United States Houston British Consulate General 5 or Less 
India Hyderabad British Deputy High Commission 5 or Less 
Spain Ibiza British Consulate No UK Based or 
UK Based 
d d 
 
Pakistan Islamabad British High Commission 58 
Turkey Istanbul British Consulate General 13 
Turkey Izmir British Consulate No UK Based or 
UK Based 
d d 
 
Indonesia Jakarta British Embassy 18 
Saint Helena Jamestown Governor 5 or Less 
Saudi Arabia Jeddah British Consulate General 5 or Less 
Occupied Palestinian territories Jerusalem British Consulate General 13 
 
Annex A - List of overseas posts and number of FCO staff in each post. 
Country/Territory Name of Post Type of Post U
 
 
South Africa Johannesburg British Trade Office 6 
South Sudan Juba British Embassy 5 
 
 
Afghanistan Kabul British Embassy 71 
Nigeria Kaduna British Liaison Office No UK Based or 
UK Based 
d d 
 
Uganda Kampala British High Commission 10 
Pakistan Karachi British Deputy High Commission 5 
 
 
Nepal Kathmandu British Embassy 5 
 
 
Sudan Khartoum British Embassy 10 
Ukraine Kiev British Embassy 10 
Rwanda Kigali British High Commission 5 
 
 
Jamaica Kingston British High Commission 9 
Democratic Republic of the Congo Kinshasa British Embassy 6 
India Kolkata British Deputy High Commission 5 
 
 
Malaysia Kuala Lumpur British High Commission 11 
Kuwait Kuwait British Embassy 10 
Bolivia La Paz British Embassy 5 
 
 
Nigeria Lagos British Deputy High Commission 8 
Pakistan Lahore British Trade Office No UK Based or 
UK Based 
d d 
 
Spain Las Palmas British Consulate No UK Base  or 
UK Based 
d d 
 
Afghanistan Lashkah Gar Provincial Reconstruction Team No UK Base  or 
UK Based 
d d 
 
Malawi Lilongwe British High Commission 5 
 
 
Peru Lima British Embassy 5 
 
 
Portugal Lisbon British Embassy 5 
 
 
Slovenia Ljubljana British Embassy 5 
 
 
United States Los Angeles British Consulate General 5 
 
 
Angola Luanda British Embassy 5 
 
 
Zambia Lusaka British High Commission 5 
 
 
Luxembourg Luxembourg British Embassy 5 
 
 
France Lyon British Trade Office No UK Based or 
UK Based 
d d 
 
Spain Madrid British Embassy 13 
Spain Malaga British Consulate No UK Based or 
UK Based 
d d 
 
Bahrain Manama/Bahrain British Embassy 5 
 
 
Philippines Manila British Embassy 9 
Mozambique Maputo British High Commission 5 
 
 
France Marseilles British Consulate No UK Based or 
UK Based 
d d 
 
Australia Melbourne British Consulate General 5 
 
 
Mexico Mexico City British Embassy 17 
United States Miami British Consulate General 5 
 
 
Italy Milan British Consulate General 5 
 
 
Belarus Minsk British Embassy 5 
 
 
Somalia Mogadishu British Embassy No UK Based or 
UK Based 
d d 
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Liberia Monrovia Political Office 5 
 
 
Mexico Monterrey British Trade Office No UK Based or 
UK Based 
d d 
 
Uruguay Montevideo British Embassy 5 
 
 
Canada Montreal British Consulate General 5 
 
 
Russia Moscow British Embassy 29 
India Mumbai British Deputy High Commission 7 
Germany Munich British Consulate 5 
 
 
Oman Muscat British Embassy 13 
Kenya Nairobi British High Commission 46 
Italy Naples British Trade and Investment Office No UK Based or 
UK Based 
d d 
 
India New Delhi British High Commission 39 
United States New York British Consulate General 5 
 
 
Cyprus Nicosia British High Commission 9 
Mauritania Nouakchott Implant in EC Delegation (laptop 
diplomat) 
5 
or 
 
United States Orlando British Consulate No UK Based 
or UK 
 
 
 
Japan Osaka British Consulate General 5 
r 
 
 
Annex A - List of overseas posts and number of FCO staff in each post. 
Country/Territory Name of Post Type of Post UK Staff 
Norway Oslo British Embassy 6 
Canada Ottawa British High Commission 9 
Spain Palma British Consulate No UK Based or 
UK Based 
d d 
 
Panama Panama City British Embassy 5 or Less 
France Paris British Embassy 23 
Thailand Pattaya British Consulate No UK Based or 
UK Based 
d d 
 
Australia Perth British Consulate No UK Base  or 
UK Based 
d d 
 
Cambodia Phnom Penh British Embassy 5 or Less 
Montenegro Podgorica British Embassy 5 or Less 
Haiti Port au Prince British Embassy 5 or Less 
Nigeria Port Harcourt British Liaison Office No UK Based or 
UK Based 
d d 
 
Mauritius Port Louis British High Commission 5 or Less 
Papua New Guinea Port Moresby British High Commission 5 or Less 
Trinidad and Tobago Port Of Spain British High Commission 5 or Less 
Portugal Portimao British Consulate No UK Based or 
UK Based 
d d 
 
Brazil Porto Alegre British Commercial Office No UK Base  or 
UK Based 
d d 
 
Czech Republic Prague British Embassy 5 or Less 
South Africa Pretoria British High Commission 21 
Kosovo Pristina British Embassy 7 
India Pune British Trade Office No UK Based or 
UK Based 
d d 
 
Democratic People's Republic of 
Korea 
Pyongyang British Embassy 5 or Less 
Ecuador Quito British Embassy 5 or Less 
Morocco Rabat British Embassy 12 
Burma Rangoon British Embassy 9 
Brazil Recife British Consulate General No UK Based or 
UK Based 
d d 
 
Iceland Reykjavik British Embassy 5 or Less 
Greece Rhodes British Vice Consulate No UK Based or 
UK Based 
d d 
 
Latvia Riga British Embassy 5 or Less 
Brazil Rio De Janeiro British Consulate General 5 or Less 
Saudi Arabia Riyadh British Embassy 19 
Italy Rome British Embassy 10 
United States San Francisco British Consulate General 5 or Less 
Costa Rica San Jose British Embassy 5 or Less 
El Salvador San Salvador British Embassy 5 or Less 
Yemen Sana'a British Embassy 13 
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Spain Santa Cruz de Tenerife British Consulate No UK Based or 
UK Based 
d d 
 
Chile Santiago British Embassy 7 
Dominican Republic Santo Domingo British Embassy 5 or Less 
Brazil Sao Paulo British Consulate General 5 or Less 
Bosnia and Herzegovina Sarajevo British Embassy 6 
United States Seattle British Government Office No UK Based or 
UK Based 
d d 
 
South Korea Seoul British Embassy 18 
China Shanghai British Consulate General 11 
Singapore Singapore British High Commission 14 
Macedonia Skopje British Embassy 5 or Less 
Bulgaria Sofia British Embassy 6 
Croatia Split British Consulate No UK Based or 
UK Based 
d d 
 
Russia St. Petersburg British Consulate General 5 or Less 
Falkland Islands Stanley Governor 5 or Less 
Sweden Stockholm British Embassy 10 
Fiji Suva British High Commission 5 or Less 
Australia Sydney British Consulate General 5 or Less 
Bangladesh Sylhet British Deputy High Commission No UK Based or 
UK Based 
recorded 
elsewhere 
Taiwan Taipei British Trade & Cultural Office 7 
Estonia Tallinn British Embassy 6 
Uzbekistan Tashkent British Embassy 5 or Less 
 
Annex A - List of overseas posts and number of FCO staff in each post. 
Country/Territory Name of Post Type of Post UK Staff 
Georgia Tbilisi British Embassy 5 or Less 
Iran (Islamic Republic of) Tehran British Embassy No UK Based or UK 
Based 
d d 
 
Israel Tel Aviv British Embassy 11 
Netherlands The Hague British Embassy 8 
Mexico Tijuana British Trade Office No UK Based or UK 
Based 
d d 
 
Albania Tirana British Embassy 5 or Less 
Japan Tokyo British Embassy 22 
Canada Toronto British Consulate General 5 or Less 
British Virgin Islands Tortola Governor 5 or Less 
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Tripoli British Embassy 16 
Tristan Da Cunha Tristan Da Cunha Administrator No UK Based or UK Based 
recorded 
elsewhere 
Tunisia Tunis British Embassy 10 
France UK Delegation to Council of 
E  
International Organisation 
D l  
5 or Less 
France UK Delegation to the Organisation 
for 
Economic Cooperation & 
Development 
International Organisation 
Delegation 
5 or Less 
Austria UK Delegation to the Organisation 
for 
     
International Organisation 
Delegation 
7 
Belgium UK Joint Delegation to NATO International Organisation 
D l  
15 
Switzerland UK Mission to the Office of the 
United 
N  
International Organisation 
Delegation 
21 
United States UK Mission to the United Nations, 
New York 
International Organisation 
Delegation 
34 
Austria UK Mission to the United Nations, 
Vienna 
International Organisation 
Delegation 
7 
Switzerland UK Permanent Representation to 
the 
Conference on Disarmament 
International Organisation 
Delegation 
No UK Based or UK 
Based recorded elsewhere 
Belgium UK Permanent Representation to 
the 
E  U  
International Organisation 
Delegation 
86 
Mongolia Ulaanbaatar British Embassy 5 or Less 
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Malta Valletta British High Commission 5 or Less 
Canada Vancouver British Consulate General 5 or Less 
Holy See Vatican City British Embassy 5 or Less 
Seychelles Victoria British High Commission 5 or Less 
Austria Vienna British Embassy 15 
Laos Vientiane British Embassy 5 or Less 
Lithuania Vilnius British Embassy 5 or Less 
Poland Warsaw British Embassy 7 
United States Washington British Embassy 45 
New Zealand Wellington British High Commission 7 
Namibia Windhoek British High Commission 5 or Less 
Cameroon Yaounde British High Commission 5 or Less 
Armenia Yerevan British Embassy 5 or Less 
Croatia Zagreb British Embassy 5 or Less 
Greece Zakynthos British Vice Consulate  No UK Based or UK Based 
        recorded elsewhere 
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‘Great Britain’ Campaign – Oral evidence (QQ 310-328) 
 
Evidence Session No. 19 Heard in Public   Questions 310 - 328 
 
MONDAY 2 DECEMBER 2013 
Members present: 
Lord Howell of Guildford (The Chairman) 
Baroness Armstrong of Hill Top 
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean 
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock 
Baroness Goudie 
Lord Janvrin 
Baroness Nicholson of Winterbourne 
Lord Ramsbotham 
________________ 
Examination of Witnesses 
Conrad Bird, Director of GREAT Britain Campaign in the Prime Minister’s Office, and 
Alex Aiken, Executive Director for Government Communications, Cabinet Office 
 
Q310   The Chairman: Gentlemen, we are grateful to you for being with us. I ought to 
begin by saying just as a formality that you have in front of you a list of the interests that 
have been declared, which should give you a flavour of the interests of the members of this 
Committee. I should also say that if a Division is called, we will have to adjourn for a few 
minutes. Let us hope that that does not happen. Thank you very much again for agreeing to 
be with us. We are coming towards the end of a long series of hearings on an immensely 
wide range of related topics in relation to the remit of this Committee, which is Britain’s 
influence overseas and the deployment of its so-called soft power. I have put in the word 
“so-called” deliberately because the concept is a broad one and goes out into many other 
fields of soft, smart and hard power. That is our scene, and we would be extremely grateful 
if you could fill us in on your views, particularly of how the GREAT campaign fits into this 
broader scene. However, to start at a more general level, how do you see the whole 
campaign relating to public diplomacy’s efforts? We have had evidence from one expert 
saying that it is not what you say but what you do. We have had evidence, which we will 
come to towards the end of our discussion, that there is always a problem of credibility—of 
how much one blows one’s own trumpet. There are also problems of strategy. We will 
come to all that, but perhaps we can start by directing the question to Mr Bird, who is in 
charge of the GREAT campaign, and if Mr Aiken would care to give us some background or 
chip in, he should do so. The question is: how does the GREAT campaign fit in with the 
broader aims of our diplomacy?  
Alex Aiken: Thank you very much. You are absolutely right that Conrad leads the GREAT 
campaign, although it may be helpful to explain to the Committee that as the director of 
Government Communications, I have the responsibility of overseeing the strategy, 
management and professional leadership over the whole of government communications. 
The GREAT campaign is a flagship campaign in terms of its impact, which I hope we will be 
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able to demonstrate to you over the next hour or so. What you have heard from the 
Foreign Office in writing and from Hugh Elliott, who is the director of communications at 
the Foreign Office, will help to set the context to that. In terms of public diplomacy, Conrad 
is best placed to respond to the Committee.  
Conrad Bird: In terms of how the GREAT campaign fits with the broader aims of the UK’s 
public diplomacy effort, while it fits, it is more focused than the entire public diplomacy 
campaign. It has much more measurable economic outcomes and it is aimed at specific 
audiences in specific countries. The target audience has mainly been tourists and travel 
agents, potential investors and potential students. It carries many of the same assets as a 
public diplomacy campaign but it is more targeted at certain audiences in certain countries in 
order to get a demonstrable and measurable effect, which is more jobs and growth for the 
UK.  
The Chairman: And why now? Why do we feel we need this sort of operation? Has 
something changed in the world that was not the case under previous Governments?  
Conrad Bird: Certainly the GREAT campaign is part of the Government’s prosperity 
agenda, which for those who know the Foreign Office is now one-third of its objectives. It 
has come from the economic crisis that has underlined the need for Britain to export more 
and to be able to bring in more foreign direct investment, tourists and students. But also we 
had a strategic opportunity in 2012 in the form of the Olympics and the Diamond Jubilee, 
which gave us a global platform and a once in a generation time when the eyes of the world 
were looking at us. The combination of the opportunity in 2012 and issues around the need 
to export more generally actually brought about the GREAT campaign.  
The Chairman: What I am getting at behind my question is really whether there is a new 
audience, a new context in which Britain has to put forward its case in order to persuade 
people to invest in Britain, buy British, and regard this country as an attractive place to come 
to. Have things changed in some fundamental way?  
Alex Aiken: I think it is worth noting something that we are all aware of, which is that the 
world has changed. As some of your previous witnesses have said, we live in a social 
networked world and therefore the growth in and the power of marketing communications 
is such that it makes sense to develop those tools in order to create digital, evaluated 
campaigns that help to support the traditional sources of public and international influence 
and power.  
Q311   The Chairman: That is very helpful indeed. You would both accept, would you 
not, that this is not the totality of the Government’s soft power story and that it is not 
confined to the Cabinet Office or to the Foreign Office? We have had people connected 
with other departments talking about their interface with the changing nature of the wider 
world.  
Conrad Bird: It is certainly part of, but not the entire story, of the Government’s soft 
power assets. I have seen in previous evidence the value of the English language and our 
cultural institutions. There are so many aspects to British soft power and influence. This 
campaign sometimes showcases some of our soft power assets. We are very strong on our 
cultural heritage as a tourist destination and we are very strong on our education assets to 
attract more students. We talk about our innovation and the tax regime in the UK in order 
to attract investors. So, yes, it overlaps with some of the soft power activities, but with the 
discernible aim to showcase the best that Britain has to offer in order to try and drive the 
measurable delivery of more jobs and growth into the UK.  
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Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: I am a bit unsighted about it. Can you explain whose idea it 
was and who decided on the title?  
Conrad Bird: It came about probably in January and February 2011 when we were looking 
at 2012 as an opportunity. We very much saw the need for a combined strategy to see if we 
could pull together all the Government’s international promotional efforts under one brand 
or umbrella. 
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: Was that in the run-up to the Olympics? 
Conrad Bird: Yes, in the run-up to the Olympics and looking forward to the opportunity 
that we would have. A team of cross-government people looked at the merits of a variety of 
alternatives to try to create a brand that we could use to maximise the economic legacy of 
the Olympics and take advantage of that moment in time. That was how the idea of the 
GREAT Britain campaign was born. I have seen some of your notes, which suggested 
alternative titles. We were very keen not to try and present this as a kind of Cool Britannia 
because we wanted to stress— 
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: That was too Blairite, was it?  
Conrad Bird: No, it was because we wanted to stress the strengths of Britain’s heritage. 
We did not want to throw the baby out with the bathwater. We wanted to show 
everything: modern Britain when it was relevant and ancient Britain when that was relevant. 
That was done in order to attract people to this country. That was the idea behind the 
campaign. 
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: We will be asking some questions in detail later about the 
nature of the campaign. When you were discussing what the title should be, was it thought 
that it might sound a bit too imperialistic?  
Conrad Bird: Given the way the campaign is constructed, very often you do not see Great 
Britain. The message we are trying to promote is this: heritage is great in Britain, culture is 
great in Britain, music is great in Britain. We are taking certain provable messages that we 
know that our audiences find desirable in these areas and promoting them. Rather than 
promoting something called “Great Britain”, we are promoting the assets of heritage, 
culture, innovation and sport. It is an important difference. We are saying that Britain is a 
great place to invest in, to visit, to study in, and to do business with British companies. We 
are not saying that Britain is great but that Britain has great features which the audience, 
when they are showcased to them, find desirable and that encourages them to come here. 
We see that as an important difference.  
Q312   Lord Forsyth of Drumlean: You mentioned that you see this campaign as being a 
way of exploiting—perhaps exploiting is the wrong word—building on the Olympic Games. 
Can you tell us a bit about what you are doing in similar regard to the Commonwealth 
Games?  
Conrad Bird: Yes. Overseas, we are celebrating the Commonwealth Games as a great 
sporting occasion, and our posts around the world are referring to it as such.  
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean: Is that it? 
Conrad Bird: We are also hosting a business embassy in Glasgow that is particularly related 
to an event on inward investment around the Commonwealth Games.  
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean: So would it be fair to say that not the same effort is being 
put into promoting Great Britain in the context of the Commonwealth Games in Glasgow as 
there was to the Olympic Games in London?  
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Conrad Bird: I think so, yes, we are slightly dialling that down. There are other aspects of 
Britain that we will be working on next year and over the coming years.  
Q313   Baroness Goudie: We see now that the campaign was launched in 2011 and I 
think you have funding until 2016. How do you see the beginning, the middle and the end of 
the campaign? How are you measuring it? Do you have somebody in all the major embassies 
around the world as your main contact?  
Alex Aiken: At the moment we have established the campaign in around 80% of the 
embassies around the world. We are working on the remaining 20%, but as you can imagine, 
we do not have a GREAT presence in some countries because it is not appropriate. Syria 
would be an example. We have gradually built the campaign up. It is at the disposal of 
ambassadors and high commissioners around the world, and that is important because it is a 
tool for them. It is not something that we impose on them. It is something that they can use, 
and there are some very good case studies showing how it has been used to build trade, 
tourism and educational links around the world. In terms of the timeline, one thing I am 
determined to do is to make sure that the campaign continues for as long as it is useful. The 
constant monthly evaluation of the campaign helps us to understand what works and build 
organically on that. My professional view is that a campaign of this type should run for at 
least a decade or more in order to have a maximum impact and to learn the lessons. I think 
that it has worked pretty well during the years that Conrad has been overseeing the delivery 
of it.  
The Chairman: If I am the ambassador of a medium-sized country and I get word from 
London that the GREAT campaign is on, is not one of my thoughts going to be, “Well, these 
are all the things I am here to do already. I have to promote my country, make contacts, 
practise cultural diplomacy, and put my back into commerce in the form of business deals by 
accommodating visiting Ministers”. That is something that ambassadors have to do. “Now 
they are telling me to do some campaign as well”. I am deliberately putting the bad side, but 
perhaps you can respond with the good side.  
Conrad Bird: Okay, I will put the good side. I think that many ambassadors see it as an 
opportunity. We have to divide the mechanism of the campaign in a number of ways. First, 
there are the great funded markets, which are the BRICs—Brazil, Russia, India and China. In 
France, Germany and the Gulf we do some tourism work. Then there are five emerging 
markets—Mexico, Indonesia, Poland in emerging Europe, Turkey and South Korea. Those 
are markets that are being identified and assessed on their potential for return and they 
receive the bulk of the GREAT funds. There is also a smaller innovation fund for other 
markets with strong ideas to bid for. Most recently, Malaysia put in a good pitch for an idea 
around a British retail week that had a very good return on investment. Then you have the 
other countries. They have the benefit of being able to draw upon the central assets, the 
free to use assets, which we have created for the campaign. Given that one-third of 
ambassadors’ objectives in every country are on prosperity, they see the campaign as a good 
toolkit to help them to achieve their objectives on prosperity by assisting in aspects of 
education marketing and tourism. This really does fit with ambassadors’ strategic objectives 
at post. They do not see it as an extra burden but as a useful high-impact toolkit of free 
assets that they can use to achieve their own objectives.  
The Chairman: We are getting into the structure here, and we wanted to talk about that.  
Q314   Lord Ramsbotham: I am interested in the formulation of the policy. Who lays 
down the policy that is going to be followed in a particular country? As we have heard, it is 
not just about the ambassador. Other ministries are frequently involved in doing their bit, 
‘Great Britain’ Campaign – Oral evidence (QQ 310-328) 
590 
 
having been co-ordinated by the ambassador. How is all this pulled together so that there is 
a coherent direction?  
Conrad Bird: The governance of the GREAT campaign really reflects that question. There is 
a GREAT programme board, which is chaired by Maria Miller, the Secretary of State at the 
Department for Media, Culture and Sport. It is attended by senior officials from the Foreign 
Office, VisitEngland and VisitBritain, UKTI, the British Council and UKVI. The Treasury and 
BIS are there, along with other representatives such as London & Partners. All the objectives 
and policies on trying to promote Britain’s growth are co-ordinated through that board and 
then assisted and delivered at post. 
Lord Ramsbotham: That direction does not conflict with direction from the Foreign 
Office. Does it go through the Foreign Office?  
Conrad Bird: The Foreign Office is a key partner of the GREAT campaign. It is a financial 
contributor to it and it is a delivery partner in actually delivering at post. The Foreign Office 
is absolutely key to the campaign. Certainly when we are working with ambassadors, we 
always say that they are central to the delivery of the campaign at post, and therefore we 
work very closely with them.  
Alex Aiken: For example, GREAT was an integral part of the diplomatic excellence 
conference held in London earlier this year, when the ambassadors and high commissioners 
return for briefings and so on. You heard from Hugh Elliott about the story in Mexico where 
the ambassador used the GREAT campaign successfully to drive up inward investment to the 
UK. That was one example that was spoken about from the platform at the conference. 
Certainly my sense from attending that conference was that the campaign is something that 
the Foreign Office and ambassadors fully embrace.  
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: Just to make a point on Mexico, investment was on its way 
up anyway. How can you prove that the GREAT campaign was the factor that made it rise a 
bit further?  
Alex Aiken: I think it is worth saying that the ambassador was clearly prepared to talk to 
other ambassadors at the conference about the GREAT campaign because he believed that it 
was an asset in driving up inward investment and the reputation of the UK. That is one piece 
of evidence, but Conrad can talk in more detail about the evaluation of the campaign.  
Conrad Bird: We are very careful on evaluation. It would be easy to try to overclaim for 
the campaign, so in a sense we follow the money. When you have specific GREAT-funded 
events that can yield a return, whether those are foreign direct investment leads or where 
we use GREAT money to tackle new markets, that is the real tracking that we do. For 
instance, this year for our half-year evaluation we can see that UKTI has generated 350 new 
investment leads directly from GREAT-funded activity. Yes, it can be against a background 
that is very strong, but we are looking at particular events where we can prove that the 
contacts made have actually delivered an inward investment lead that could then be turned 
into an inward investment deal. 
Q315  Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: Can you sympathise with us as members of this 
Committee? Everyone is coming along and telling us how wonderful everything is and how 
Britain is brilliant. You are telling us that the GREAT campaign is the bee’s knees. Could you 
be Maoist just for a few minutes? Where is it not successful, and why? 
Conrad Bird: Certainly. When we look back we can see that this is the first time that any 
country has tried to combine all four strands of this effort, so we are bound to have 
experienced failures or made mistakes on the way. 
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Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: Give us a few examples. 
Conrad Bird: Let me give you a few examples then. The first thing is the funding cycle. 
When it started the feeling was that the campaign was just for 2012. That prevented us from 
really engaging with private sector businesses and cultural organisations that have a four to 
five-year planning cycle. They saw this as a campaign that might last only a year, so some of 
our relationships with them were quite transactional rather than long-term and strategic. 
We have corrected that as we have got more certainty. We have set up a great private 
sector partners’ board with major businesses that are really engaging in the campaign and 
contributing cash, and in kind—real money into the campaign. So the first thing I would say is 
that the set-up of the campaign felt short-term and therefore we were not able to commit 
as much. 
Equally, I would say that the application of the brand in countries has not been of the highest 
quality in every market. I have seen errors. I have seen some less than excellent application. 
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: Give us a name.  
Conrad Bird: Do I have to name names?  
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: Yes, why not?  
Conrad Bird: Okay, let me be honest. I remember being woken up early one Sunday 
morning by a DCMS press officer who said that the Mail on Sunday was on the line because 
we had spelt Brecon Beacons wrongly in one of our big countryside ads.  
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: Shocking. 
Conrad Bird: It is shocking. I am sorry about that. It appeared on a poster in a New York 
subway train. Only three ever appeared, but one was spotted by a member of the public 
who felt that he ought to alert the Mail on Sunday. So there are minor mistakes in the whole 
thing. 
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: I am personally not too worried about the Mail on Sunday, 
but in other parts of the world it is not as effective as in others. 
Conrad Bird: When we launched the first tranche of the campaign, we launched it into 
markets such as Japan, Canada and Australia. Certainly in Japan we found that as a campaign 
it was not having as much of a return on investment as in places like China, Hong Kong and 
India, because Japan is a very expensive media environment and the Japanese people did not 
respond as well to the brand. That does not mean that we do not do GREAT activity in 
Japan any more, but in terms of the amount of money invested in the tourist campaign in 
Japan versus the return on investment of potential visitors coming in, it was one of the less 
successful countries that we aimed at, so we shifted. 
The Chairman: We might return to that, but for the moment Baroness Goudie wants to 
come back again. 
Q316   Baroness Goudie: I just wanted to come back and talk about the groupings of 
countries that you were working with. You did not mention Brussels, which I personally 
think is quite important, or the grouping together of the ASEAN countries, which are really 
important to us, especially with the way everything else is going in trade. You talked about 
Syria. What we are doing with refugees and in other work is part of soft power, and I would 
have thought that the GREAT campaign has a role in working with these countries in that 
way just as much as it does in trade with other countries. We have put in, and will continue 
to give, large amounts of aid to the refugees in Syria, Jordan and Lebanon and elsewhere, 
including here. 
‘Great Britain’ Campaign – Oral evidence (QQ 310-328) 
592 
 
Also, are we liaising with the UN, because there are trade issues around the UN as well, 
where there are great gatherings regularly? Also, there are some big international gatherings 
coming up and our government Ministers are going to be there, along with other Prime 
Ministers. There again, are we going to be having some meetings on the side, which other 
countries are beginning to have, with what in political terms we would call it the fringe? 
Around all these gatherings now, Governments around the world are supporting a fringe. 
Alex Aiken: These are all important issues, but let me reassure you that Syria, the plight of 
the refugees and Britain’s help to those refugees are absolutely central to government 
communications as a whole. That is included in the work that I co-ordinate on behalf of the 
Foreign Office, DfID and the Ministry of Defence. I hope that we have been seen to do the 
right thing and to have been as comprehensive as we can in the very difficult situation there.  
Baroness Goudie: Absolutely. I am not questioning that, but I think it is also part of this. 
You say that Syria does not warrant being around the GREAT campaign, but I think it does 
as much as other countries do. Others might disagree with me, but that is my view. 
Conrad Bird: Can I try to answer that? When we kicked this campaign off, we had a limited 
budget. It is a lot of money, and we take it very seriously and track it very closely, but to put 
it into context, the initial budget was £37 million. That is a large sum, but to undertake a 
major global advertising marketing campaign, it is really quite small. Our competitors are 
spending much more than us even on tourism. I can share some figures with you in a 
moment. It meant that we had to focus very tightly in the first instance on the countries that 
would give us the greatest economic return. I go back to that point about focusing on the 
countries with great funded activity but then inviting other countries to take advantage of 
the assets. 
There is a big dilemma and a big discussion here: do you spread the jam too thin and allow 
all 30 - 40 countries to have a small amount of budget, or do you try to focus and make an 
impact in some of these very large, very important countries such as China, India, Russia and 
Brazil? We decided to focus the limited resources on a few key countries to try to get the 
maximum return, while inviting other countries to be able to participate in the campaign but 
using what I would call their “business as usual” budgets.  
The Chairman: You mentioned tourism twice. Of course, the tourist agencies and 
authorities have their own campaigns around the world, so the GREAT campaign rather 
supplemented these, did it? 
Conrad Bird: Certainly the VisitBritain campaign did. VisitBritain is a key delivery partner, 
and the GREAT campaign has supplemented its work and worked much more with it. It 
continues to do its marketing and promotional activity, much of it joint-funded, but it uses 
the GREAT-funded funds to promote much more widely the image work that it does. 
Q317   Lord Forsyth of Drumlean: I am sure that the GREAT campaign is doing a great 
job, but listening to this I cannot help thinking that this is just displacement activity. I am very 
out of date now, but I remember the days when William Hague was the Welsh Secretary 
and I was the Scottish Secretary, and we would find ourselves bumping into each other in 
Japan, where he was trying to persuade people to locate in Wales and I was trying to 
persuade people to locate in Scotland. I watched an advert on the television the other day 
from VisitScotland, which seemed pretty close to a campaign for independence actually. 
There is the London Tourist Board and all these agencies. We have ambassadors all over the 
world whose budgets are being cut because the Foreign Office budget is being cut, and it 
seems to me that this GREAT campaign is simply taking money away from established 
activities and channelling it in a particular direction that is decided according to the 
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committee and the brand, but it is not really adding any value, is it? It is just displacing other 
activity and, because of the control of the funding, forcing organisations to do things that 
they might not otherwise do. I am sure you have an answer to that.  
Alex Aiken: As someone who has come to the campaign in the last year, I should say that it 
is important to remember that while we are here representing the organisation of the 
GREAT campaign, all the partners that Conrad referred to earlier come voluntarily to the 
GREAT campaign board meetings, which I attend. They do not need to come. There is also a 
private sector element to it. These people come together voluntarily, and they believe that 
there is worth in coming together. You have heard from people such as Mary Rance and 
Professor Riordan, who have said that GREAT is beginning to bear fruit because it is more 
than the sum of its parts. 
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean: We have heard that assertion, and I have no doubt that it is a 
great networking organisation, but my question was about added value and whether it is just 
displacing other activities in a way that might be inefficient and not actually directly informed 
in the way our ambassadors on the ground would be. 
Conrad Bird: First of all, ambassadors are very involve in it, but I would go back to the 
metrics and say that this campaign has so far in its first year delivered a return of over £500 
million for Britain from £37 million. That is a straight economic return from that. We can go 
through that in a moment.  
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean: Sorry to interrupt you, but if you are going to quote a figure 
like that, what is the equivalent figure for our ambassadors or the other organisations that 
are involved in promoting Britain? 
Conrad Bird: I am not sure that I can answer that question. They promote Britain through 
their personal influence, but these are funds which they now use to promote Britain, so this 
is part of their effort as well. 
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean: Yes, but—sorry to go on about this, Chairman—our 
embassies are given budgets and they promote Britain. If you are going to make a calculation 
based on the project that you have promoted and which that produced that, surely you have 
to look at the other side of the balance sheet, which is what they achieve using the budgets 
they have. If you have not done that, how do you know that you are adding value? 
Conrad Bird: First of all, it is not “you”. One of the strengths of this campaign is genuinely 
that it is not as centralised as it sounds. It is a really cross-government effort, and is unique 
in that. The number of organisations with different objectives have come together to use this 
and work it very hard indeed. It is extraordinary. One of the things that research among 20 
embassies recently reported was that one of the most valuable aspects of the GREAT 
campaign was the way it unified at post the efforts of the British Council, the UKTI, the 
ambassadors, the Foreign Office, VisitBritain and UKVI. They actually said that this has pulled 
together groups of people with a focused effort to try to make a difference, so I would say 
that this helps them to do their job much more effectively, and they recognise that. 
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean: So you would say that the resource that is being put in here 
compensates for the fact that the Foreign Office budget and the British Council budget are 
being cut. 
Alex Aiken: Well, we live in an age of austerity. I am aware of that as the head of a 
government communications service that spent £1 billion in 2010. We spend £500 million 
today, and part of that is the GREAT campaign. That is still a significant sum. Nevertheless, 
we are all aware that we have to work very hard to get extra value from taxpayers’ pounds, 
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and that is what we are about. Obviously the Foreign Office must speak to how they 
measure the outputs and outcomes from their work, but we were tasked with measuring 
the GREAT campaign, which is why we focus on the figures from our campaign. 
Q318   Baroness Nicholson of Winterbourne: Thank you very much. Mr Bird, I have a 
couple of questions. Do you have the capacity, the competence, the power to ensure that 
the template that you have created at the top is replicated at the bottom on the ground in 
country? Where I go I see a lot of fragmentation of British effort from the different 
ministries in several big countries. In one in particular, which is one of yours, DfID has a 
different office from the embassy, for example. Do you have the capacity to make the 
template go right down, and if so, how is that working?  
A parallel question. As we are all aware, Britain’s great trade and investment are largely 
powered by the small to medium-sized enterprises. You have naturally, I feel sure, tapped 
the classic pioneering big companies of Britain, which are always willing to respond to 
government and to try to put some funding in and be helpful. That is really just skimming the 
surface of the companies that are already hugely successful and very powerful. What about 
tackling the SMEs, which are 95%, if I remember correctly, of British business? 
Conrad Bird: I am happy to answer both questions, if that is okay. To the first question, on 
whether I have the capacity to deliver the template, the answer is yes - in theory. There is a 
branding template that is flexible but certain parts of which are rigid—the use of the union 
Jack and so on—and all those departments, UKTI, the Foreign Office and so on should apply 
it consistently on the ground. DfID is an interesting one. It has just begun to come into the 
campaign because it has more of a business focus in certain of its activities. It has talked 
about the innovation that British companies can bring in to help some of the world’s poorest 
people. DfID has quoted some lovely examples. As a department, it was not part of the main 
caucus going forward, but is coming in on certain messages—as, incidentally, are other 
departments. For instance, Defra, which is interested in and tasked with exporting food and 
drink, has begun to join the campaign. So we are beginning to see more departments with an 
international remit actually joining the campaign where that is appropriate for them. So, yes, 
I have a certain amount of control. It is carrot and stick because the campaign is good 
looking and of high quality, and when it is used we know it is effective. Also when it is used, 
people know that you gain extra power from the consistency of the effort. It is a good 
substitute for, frankly, some of the less high-quality vehicles that are used. Ministers going 
around will always come back to me and say, “That was brilliant there, but I noticed that 
when I went to one country I did not see the full application of the GREAT brand”. I will 
then take that on board and try to encourage those posts to do it. So I have a certain 
amount of control over that.  
In terms of the SMEs, you are so right. SMEs are vital and we have some major sponsors on 
board. Major companies have supported us. However, two things are happening. First, you 
may have just seen a campaign in the UK kicking off to encourage British SMEs to take 
advantage of exporting services and trade missions that UKTI offers in order to go to some 
of the markets with which we are involved. So we are trying to recruit SMEs and get them 
to grow, get themselves ready for exports and go to our markets. Equally, we showcase 
some of the most fantastic work by SMEs. I think of the lovely example of a small company in 
Cornwall called Tregothnan, which is the only grower of tea in this country, and it is 
exporting that tea to China. It is not a large company but we showcase it. We say that that is 
fantastic. There is an amazing watch designer called Roger Smith, who is almost a one-man 
band and has produced a beautiful watch. Every single bit of it has been handcrafted, and it is 
an example not just of a fantastic watch but of British craftsmanship and creativity. We take 
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something such as that and try to showcase it around the world. So we are equally keen to 
showcase the best that Britain has to offer, whether it be from big companies or smaller 
companies. We are very mindful of that need to encourage the, I think, one in five 
companies that export and get that figure down to one in four—that vital figure where we 
can encourage British SMEs to become more productive and competitive by exporting. So 
we are very supportive of them as well as the large companies. Actually, we tend to support 
the SMEs more, while we tend to try to work with the larger companies on jointly funded 
exercises. However, SMEs go along on trade missions.  
The Chairman: We have talked a bit about the structure and budget of the campaign. 
Lord Ramsbotham, did you want to pursue the structure issue more, or do you feel that we 
have covered it?  
Q319  Lord Ramsbotham: I think that we have covered it, but there is one aspect that I 
would like to explore. Very early on we heard that the NSC was, if you like, the directing 
agent of soft power. We are slightly surprised, because inevitably if the NSC is known to 
have been doing that propaganda, other things begin to creep in. We had an interesting 
discussion about how the European effort was co-ordinated in a way that was all working in 
Europe, and the NSC was able to do the same sort of co-ordination with other countries. 
However, what is the relationship between your campaign and what the NSC is doing as a 
sort of national programme, rather than the sort of things that you are trying to produce?  
Conrad Bird: To be honest, I left the Foreign Office some time ago, so I am not sighted on 
the NSC’s control over soft power strategy. I certainly think, though, that it is where it is. 
GREAT is only a small component of Britain’s soft power strategy in that whole area. I 
should emphasise that. I understand soft power and see it as a much broader piece than the 
GREAT campaign fulfils. Therefore, many of the people who might be on the NSC might be 
aware of the GREAT campaign and its economic aims, although it may not be part of the 
NSC’s other security aims. 
Lord Ramsbotham: But you do not see yourself as part of the NSC empire in all this? You 
do not see yourself as one of the soft power tools that the NSC is deploying, or do you? 
Alex Aiken: I sit on both groups: the GREAT board and the comms group, which helps the 
NSC with its communications, and the two agendas are very different. I cannot recall an 
element of overlap at the communications level. 
The Chairman: Baroness Armstrong, do you want to pursue this or come on to the 
broader question of propaganda and other things? 
Baroness Armstrong of Hill Top: Yes I wanted to come on to that. 
The Chairman: In that case, we will leave that for the moment. I will move on to Lord 
Janvrin, who wanted to go further on the money issue.  
Q320  Lord Janvrin: I want to probe a bit more on evaluation and how you are measuring 
it. You said you had some figures, and in particular you mentioned £500 million as a figure of 
the return on the £37 million spent on the campaign. Can you go into a little more detail on 
that? How do you measure success in the education field, given some of the issues that arise 
there? 
Conrad Bird: I am very happy to do that. In evaluation there are a number of phases and we 
always have to look backwards. The £550 million refers to the official launch of the 
campaign, which is when it arrived on the streets in February 2012 and measured up to 
March 2013, and we then move on to the next year. That £550 million was made up of three 
key component measures in just the markets we mentioned. There was £300 million in 
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relation to a VisitEngland campaign, a “staycation” campaign in which we encouraged UK 
citizens to stay in the UK during the Olympics. That yielded £300 million of value. Some 
£200 million was from VisitBritain tourism activity, which again was generated over that 
period of time. UK Trade and Investment estimates that approximately 30 inward 
investment leads were generated from the initial GREAT campaign activities, which looked at 
something like £70 million. This is where those figures came from.  
Moving forward, we estimate that for the £30 million budget this year the return on 
investment should be nearer to between £600 million and £800 million. That is what we are 
projecting. It is made up of a combination of inbound tourism, inward investment, supporting 
British companies overseas and encouraging students to come to the UK. This measurement 
is difficult, but on the tourism side these are National Audit Office-audited models that we 
are using to evaluate whether people who have been attracted towards Britain or are 
considering it as a destination have seen the GREAT campaign and whether as a result they 
are more likely to come and visit. That is how we measure all those areas. On the inward 
investment side, we ask them, “Where did you hear of us? What attracted you?”.  
On the point about promoting GREAT, we talk as if the campaign is right up there but it is 
actually very much couched in fact. When we make claims about, for instance, our cultural 
heritage, inward investment and how easy it is to set up a business here, they are always 
backed up in the body copy and the facts that go with it.  
Baroness Armstrong of Hill Top: How, then, are you actually evaluating it? It would 
seem to be incredibly costly. Either you are interviewing every tourist who comes here and 
asking them, “Did you come because you saw the GREAT campaign or because you were 
visiting Auntie Joan in wherever, or because you wanted to see a Shakespeare play, or 
because there was a good deal from your travel agent?”. It does seem to be incredibly 
difficult to assess why tourists come to this country and put it down to one cause. I will 
come on to students in a minute.  
Conrad Bird: It is, but this is standard advertising practice. First of all, we do not interview 
every person coming in. This is modelled on focus groups in the marketplaces. 
Baroness Armstrong of Hill Top: Focus groups, rather than— 
Conrad Bird: I am talking about 1,000 people. When I say focus groups, it is larger than that. 
It is sampling. We are working out the consideration of coming to the UK among those 
people who have and have not seen the advertising. Then we see how that comes through in 
terms of where those visitors are coming from and their average spend per visit, which 
VisitBritain knows and has models for, such as the Chinese, and we calculate on that basis. 
So there is an element of modelling in it, but the IPS survey backs up the bigger results as 
they come in. We have to estimate, which is why these are NAO-audited models to assist us 
in this process. 
Alex Aiken: We would not want to leave you with the impression that it is done just on 
sampling. Every event that the GREAT campaign undertakes is evaluated at that level, and 
then our partners will report to us on particular activities. For instance, the Football is 
GREAT campaign generated around 600,000 visits to marketing channels. That is another 
part of the evaluation that is put in place. 
Baroness Armstrong of Hill Top: I find that incredible because, for example, I go to 
Zanzibar for different reasons, sometimes for a holiday but also to look at Voluntary Service 
Overseas projects. I see written up in small letters stuff about how wonderful Arsène 
Wenger is. I talk to children who know more about the details of Manchester United than I 
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do, and I am a football fanatic. I do not believe that their parents or whoever are interested 
in coming to this country only because they have seen the Football is GREAT! campaign. 
Actually, when I have been in Zanzibar I have seen no GREAT campaign issues. Zanzibar may 
be a bad example because not many will come from there to this country.  
Conrad Bird: And the campaign would not claim credit for that. Simon Anholt’s point about 
nation branding is right: we have an incredibly powerful nation brand called “brand UK”. 
GREAT is not saying that it is a nation brand, but we are taking some of the very strong 
components of that nation brand, magnifying them and showcasing them in various 
destinations.  Britain exists and will carry on existing way beyond the GREAT campaign. 
However, we are claiming that by using advertising models, standard models of destination 
advertising the GREAT brand has pulled in the amount of income to which I referred. 
However, no country advertising itself can claim that advertising alone is making this country 
the destination, because the country is attractive in itself.  
Lord Janvrin: I just wanted to come back on the education issue and how you measure it. 
Have you run up against issues around visas for students and so on in opposition to what 
you are trying to do, and have you had any input into that policy debate? 
Conrad Bird: Education is interesting. If you take the recording of tourist figures, they come 
in quite early. You can do something and measure it a year later. From talking to the British 
Council I can say that its cycle of evaluation takes longer. We do not know but we have not 
claimed any education figures, as yet, for the campaign. We do have some very interesting 
points. For instance, in India, despite all the challenging marketing conditions, the latest on 
the ground intelligence from UCAS shows a 19% year-on increase in the number of 
applications, while the British Council has reported a 12% year-on increase. GREAT can 
claim credit for some of that, because in the same way as Britain is a tourist destination, 
many of those education numbers will be generated by GREAT-funded activities marketing 
themselves to potential students, going to big trade fairs, talking to parents and working in 
that way. In China, for instance, we have a specific boarding school campaign that is totally 
GREAT-funded because GREAT can take activities that people want to do to new places and 
support them. The boarding school campaign in China has so far directly engaged 105,000 
individuals within our target audience in direct face to face activity, conducted a large 
amount of online activity and worked with media outlets to promote Britain. In the same 
way in which you can market a destination, you can also market the UK as a place to study. 
That is very much a strong component of our campaign. However, that £550 million figure 
does not at the moment contain a really accurate calculation of the education numbers, as 
yet.  
Q321   Baroness Armstrong of Hill Top: Given that we have received a fair amount of 
evidence from other people on the impact of visas on education exchanges and visits, I just 
wanted to ask whether that has been a problem for the embassies?  
Conrad Bird: It certainly has; perceptions of the British visa regime have damaged our 
activities overseas in places such as India and China. We know that. We see it through the 
papers and so on. That is why, from the very beginning, UKVI has been part of the campaign. 
We cannot reflect on policy but we can communicate very strongly to change those 
perceptions. I was interested to see that very early on in the campaign in China. All the 
partners, including UKVI, work with the British Council, the Foreign Office, UKTI and 
VisitBritain, to take the visa message around 16 cities, a kind of road show, to explain the 
ease of access and so on in relation to this. Yes, we are trying to communicate the positive 
aspects of the visa regime as best we can.  
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Lord Forsyth of Drumlean: I am sorry to be terrier-like on this issue, but I am struggling 
with it. You quoted some figures on visits to Britain which you then turned into value that 
had been added as a result of the campaign. I guess you cannot give me the information off 
the top of your head, but there is the organisation VisitEngland and the organisation 
VisitBritain, both of which have budgets. Are they using the same focus groups or whatever 
you call them to evaluate their activities and the return on their budgets? How do they 
compare with yours? If you do not have that information, could you let us have a note 
setting it out? It strikes me as quite bizarre to say that all these tourists came to the 
Olympics because of our efforts and this particular programme.  
Conrad Bird: We are not saying that. We are deliberately not saying that.  
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean: What are you saying then? 
Conrad Bird: We are saying that many tourists came to Britain as a result of the Olympics. 
It was a fantastic and absolutely brilliant moment and it certainly changed and enhanced our 
reputation overseas. We have seen that through Anholt figures that show that our natural 
beauty goes up and actually the quality of our welcome goes up. The Olympics are a very 
important brand. 
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean: In answer to Lord Janvrin’s question you said that you had 
created this return by attracting these people to Britain.  
Conrad Bird: Yes. The Olympics attracted many millions of people to Britain.  
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean: Forget the Olympics. 
Conrad Bird: No. The Games absolutely did attract those people to Britain. That is what we 
have measured. Those people saw the advertisements and we have traced them through the 
sampling and the focus groups. They said that as a result of seeing the GREAT campaign they 
were more attracted to the UK, and in time some of them came to the Games. We can 
track those people as a result of seeing the GREAT advertisements.  
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean: How does that compare with the activities of VisitScotland, 
VisitEngland and VisitBritain?  
Conrad Bird: First of all, VisitBritain’s activity is GREAT activity. When VisitBritain does its 
international research, it is tracking it. I know you are confused and I apologise for the 
complexity here. VisitBritain is a fully signed up partner to the GREAT campaign, so when it 
advertises it uses the GREAT brand, and the returns you see are the result of GREAT 
activity.  
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean: But they are not using your budget, they are using their 
budget, are they not?  
Conrad Bird: No. The budget goes to VisitBritain. When we talk about a centralised 
budget— 
Q322  Lord Forsyth of Drumlean: That is confusing the picture. What I am trying to 
establish here is what value is added by the GREAT campaign. You are saying, “These 
tourists came to Britain and spent this amount and therefore we added such and such a 
value, and we know that because we have done the research with the focus groups”. I want 
to know whether VisitEngland is doing exactly the same evaluation and are you able to 
demonstrate that you add value over and above what would have happened if VisitEngland 
had put its advertisements in Zanzibar or wherever?  
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Conrad Bird: Quite right. Perhaps I may make the distinction. The money that VisitBritain 
got from the GREAT campaign is used overseas. VisitEngland’s money was actually used to 
promote England as a tourist destination to people within Britain. That is how it is tracked 
there, and that was money made for the GREAT campaign. VisitEngland was using the money 
for a domestic staycation campaign to try and ensure that citizens stayed in the UK during 
the Olympics. VisitBritain’s money was used to promote Britain abroad to encourage 
tourists to come to the UK.  
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean: VisitEngland presumably does not spend all its budget on 
encouraging people to stay at home. Does it not use some of the budget to persuade people 
to come from overseas?  
Conrad Bird: They should do that through VisitBritain. VisitEngland does not do 
international advertising. They are different.  
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean: You have the advantage over me on this. VisitBritain does do 
promotions of Britain in that it shows Shakespeare, Anne Hathaway’s cottage and all that 
stuff in order to encourage people to come to Britain.  
Conrad Bird: Which is GREAT-branded.  
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean: Which is GREAT-branded. Are you taking credit for the 
money that VisitBritain spends as part of the value that is added by GREAT Britain?  
Conrad Bird: We are only taking credit in these figures for the money that the GREAT fund 
gives VisitBritain to do that.  
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean: I am asking this: if you take the money that you give from the 
GREAT fund and compare the value added using your evaluation methods, and you apply the 
same thing to VisitBritain, what is the difference?  
Conrad Bird: The difference is that some of their tactical activity is slightly more effective 
than GREAT activity at the moment.  
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean: What is tactical activity?  
Conrad Bird: I am sorry. It means some of their other activities. They do joint-funded 
activity as well. We give them GREAT-funds for activity and the return on investment has 
been around 8:1 to 10:1 in the launch phase. Some of the other activity that they do, which 
is still GREAT-branded but it is joint-funded, is actually more effective than that. But 
VisitBritain would say that you have to do both your image and your tactical work together.  
The Chairman: I think we ought to leave it there for the moment.  
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean: Perhaps I may ask one more question to be sure that I 
understand this. So you are saying that they get a better return on the money than the 
GREAT campaign funding.  
Conrad Bird: In some areas, yes, but they would also say that you cannot go into new 
markets only with tactical work. You need to promote your country in the way of GREAT, 
in an image way, in order to generate awareness so that you can convert that with tactical 
work.  
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean: Can you give us a note on all this?  
Conrad Bird: Yes, of course.  
Q323   Baroness Nicholson of Winterbourne: It is possible that Lord Forsyth may 
have caught you on a hook, but my suggestion would be that it is because you are swimming 
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in the wrong pool. The purpose of the GREAT Britain campaign as identified in our 
paperwork by, I suspect, you is that it showcases Britain’s capabilities by promoting and 
enhancing Britain’s reputation. But you are using judgment criteria, as has been obvious over 
the past five minutes, which are the same judgment criteria for other parts of the system 
that are not designed to fulfil your requirements: that is, the requirements of the GREAT 
campaign. I know how difficult it is to justify promotional campaigns and therefore how easy 
it is to grasp at something tangible and say, “This shows that it was worth while”. But that is 
difficult because those tangible items are already being grasped by every other department, 
rightly or wrongly. Have you put your mind and your team’s mind to identifying new ways of 
classifying results? In other words, I would suggest that you are identifying success or failure 
by the criteria that are used by other departments, which have different types of objective 
and different budgets and which may or may not therefore be able to claim them. I often 
think that they should not, incidentally, but that is a different point. It usually happens when 
the Prime Minister heads a big delegation, and UKTI will claim that the big contract that has 
been signed is due to them. That is very rare. It has usually been worked on for about five 
years by the company in question, like Marks & Spencer in China, for example. Are you 
falling into that trap, and if that is the case, which as I listen to you I feel may be the case, 
why have you not worked out, given the capacity and the knowledge base you have in your 
team, ways of really identifying where promotional campaigns can show benefit? There must 
be some new ways.  
Conrad Bird: That is really helpful. Thank you. When we set this campaign up, we were very 
sure that we had to show a return on investment for it. In the first stages we had money and 
we allocated that money to certain departments so that they could continue their work 
under the GREAT banner, and then we tracked their return on investment on it. We were 
really quite strict on that economic return because we need to be able to persuade the 
Treasury and others to continue with this campaign based on an economic return. As we go 
forward, the point about reputation is really well made because there is a reputational effect 
on top of this. We are pushing preceptions. 
Baroness Nicholson of Winterbourne: It seems to be at the heart of what the campaign 
is for. 
Conrad Bird: We are driving people’s perceptions for a reason. I think that the two are 
linked. The reason we are trying to drive people’s perceptions of the UK in a positive 
direction is in order to gain an economic return.  
Baroness Nicholson of Winterbourne: But it takes time. 
Conrad Bird: Yes, it takes time. This is the really good point that you made. As I say, when 
the campaign was kicked off, it felt as if it was on an annual cycle. Now that we have more 
strategic certainty, we are able to concentrate more on influencing people beyond just an 
annual cycle, which is a far more sensible way to do it. We are looking at changing 
perceptions over time by working with cultural organisations that have three to four-year 
planning cycles. We are working on events and activities that can push our reputation in 
order to gain economic returns over time. 
Baroness Nicholson of Winterbourne: Are they the sort of modus operandi that the 
Committee is looking for?  
Conrad Bird: I am sorry. 
Baroness Nicholson of Winterbourne: Is this not what we are searching for from you? 
What are these classifications and identifications?  
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Conrad Bird: We are building those metrics now. Let us remember that the original metrics 
were around economic return, but we are looking at metrics such as whether we can 
calculate the influence over time that organising GREAT events can have over people in the 
building of relationships. We are looking at some of what I would call initially softer but very 
important metrics going forward. 
Baroness Nicholson of Winterbourne: But given that the purpose of your effort is to 
build reputation and make Britain better known, as it were—you have chosen certain 
countries, but that is just a matter of choice—why did you not build this in at the beginning? 
I think you must feel, at least from some of my colleagues on this Committee, that we have a 
marginally questioning view as to whether your analysis of economic return from other 
ministries is honestly justified or can actually be analysed at all. We have to ask whether the 
ministries would be spending the money in other ways. I think it is quite hard for you to 
justify that, but there would be no difficulty, I suggest, if you came to us with a classification 
of the soft things that you are in fact trying to do. Why did you not have all that sorted out 
at the beginning? 
Conrad Bird: First of all, on your comments about the difficulty of justifying figures. We take 
all the data we get back from working with departments and we audit them externally to 
make sure that they are robust. I am pretty comfortable with the figures, which have been 
through the audit procedure and are as real as we can make them. On the reputation point, 
we do have perception studies, and again those relate to the economic return. Something 
that we have been doing more recently with UKTI is measuring how perception of the UK 
relates back into economic returns. I think that we are making efforts in that direction.   
Q324   Lord Janvrin: I want to pursue this a little further, but with a general question and 
a request for a bit of detail on that last point. I am possibly in a minority—I do not know—
but I wish the GREAT campaign had been around when I was serving overseas a long time 
ago because it would have provided a much needed focus, which is something the 
Committee has discussed in other contexts. If you were looking at starting out again, or if 
you were to design a “son of GREAT” campaign, or the next phase, what are the key 
lessons? You have mentioned the importance of taking a longer term perspective and not a 
one-year funding cycle. Have you formed any conclusions about, for example, using social 
media and that kind of activity? I do not think that that plays a part in your overarching 
effort, but perhaps you will correct me. Secondly, this whole point about metrics around 
influence is actually what soft power could well be about. I will be interested if you could 
explain what you are doing in trying to measure perceptions of influence in this way.  
Conrad Bird: On the digital side, we did not really talk about the channels that we use, but 
digital is at the heart of this campaign; not just because so many tourists seek holidays online, 
but because in business and so on it is a vital, everyday tool. Digital is at the heart of this. 
We have Facebook pages with over 2 million visitors. On our tourist sites we include 
education, and the British Council also has Facebook pages. So we use social media a lot. 
The more we can get people to engage with each other and interact with our campaigns, the 
more effective they will be. It is at the heart of the campaign.  
On the metrics of influence, I have read much of the evidence and heard Jonathan McClory 
and so on talking about this. It is not something that I have seen coming through in many of 
the notes about any organisation that has managed to, in granular detail, calculate return on 
influence. How do you create influence? When I was at the Foreign Office, I remember 
finding it a very difficult thing to analyse. We can do general perception. We can do the 
Anholt surveys and the soft power surveys. We know that Britain is a soft power 
superpower. We are third or fourth in the nation brands index. This is good global stuff. 
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How you then assess that, work out an activity and then try to measure influence from it is 
very difficult. I know from the Chevening programme that when you interrogated people 
about it, they all said, “Yes, it sort of works but we find it difficult to analyse how”. I think 
that you can do it around positive perceptions versus negative perceptions. We do that in 
terms of analysing press clippings about certain activities that we have done and can see 
positive versus negative sentiments. I think you also have to rely on anecdotal information. 
For instance, there was a very good quote from one of our senior officials in China who was 
talking to an official who said, “I did not realise that you were such a creative nation. I 
thought that you were a nation that was backward-looking, not very innovative and so on. 
Actually, in the Olympics, the Shanghai expo and the GREAT campaign, your creativity is 
coming to the fore”. Those perceptions really matter and we can try and work in areas 
where you gather anecdotal information that shows senior influences and perceptions are 
changing. It is a really tough area to measure and evaluate. You make a very good point. It is 
tough to measure the economic return but it is at least tangible. These are robust figures 
and give you a good idea of return on investment. However, we would be neglectful as we 
go forward if we did not try to make an effort to work out the return on influence, which is 
something that we are trying to work on. It really does need some thought and I would 
welcome the Committee’s thoughts on your understanding of soft power and, most 
importantly, the measurements of soft power in granular detail, and how we can incorporate 
that into the GREAT campaign. It is a really tough area.  
Q325  The Chairman: There is one final question on the structure side before we come 
on to a final issue.  You are presumably mobilising a great deal of talent from outside. As we 
know, you mentioned the Shanghai Pavilion, which was brilliant. Are you using one particular 
advertising agency and one promotion and PR agency or a whole range of agencies, or 
indeed none?  
Conrad Bird: First, when we talk about mobilising talent from outside, you are totally right. 
Over 150 businesses and celebrities have supported this campaign. That has been 
fantastically helpful. They have given cash, they have given in kind, and they have given advice 
to help us build this and extend its reach. In terms of using agencies, we kicked off the 
campaign with one advertising agency. In terms of the centre, we have moved towards using 
a different company, which is more around creative services offering design, branding, digital 
and so on. 
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: Which company? 
Conrad Bird: The company that we worked with at the very beginning was called Mother, 
the advertising agency that came up with the name, GREAT. Today we are using a company 
called Radley Yeldar, which is a full-service, creative design agency.  
Baroness Armstrong of Hill Top: Where are they from? 
Conrad Bird: They are both London agencies—British agencies, I must say. That is for my 
team’s central GREAT campaign activity, and obviously other partners will use their own 
agencies, but we try to share as much of the agency resource as possible for cost efficiency’s 
sake.  
The Chairman: I am going to ask Baroness Armstrong to open up the final question on 
credibility. We have heard a lot from Professor Nye and around the world on how these 
campaigns do or do not convince.  
Q326  Baroness Armstrong of Hill Top:  First, soft power is most effective when it is 
not seen as the propaganda of government. We benefit because our BBC and the British 
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Council are not seen internationally as arms of government, whereas the GREAT campaign 
is driven and controlled by government. Do you see that as a disadvantage? I add a very 
small rider: I come from the north-east.  
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: The north-east of England. 
Baroness Armstrong of Hill Top: I hope you can hear that. I do not think that the 
GREAT campaign reflects the regions and so on of the country. We had a fantastic campaign 
in the north-east, the Passionate People campaign, which was seen as most effective, 
certainly on tourism, but we had to drop it because the Government did not want regions 
and regionalism. The GREAT campaign is now the only thing that we can work through. 
Does this not deny that we are a country of enormous diversity and variety, and that that is 
part of our strength, too? 
The Chairman: Right. That is a challenge.  
Conrad Bird: Shall I try to answer those two questions? Would you mind, Alex, or do you 
wish to kick off? 
Alex Aiken: You kick off. There are some things I can add. 
Conrad Bird: The first thing is whether this is seen as a government campaign. We do not 
claim that it is not, but if you look at the images and the way it has been set up, it seems to 
be slightly distant from government for two reasons. First, we do not have government 
logos or crests all over it. We use the union flag, which is the most powerful icon overseas, 
and therefore it is seen as being, if you like, on behalf of Britain. Equally, all the businesses 
that support this—the great brands of McLaren, Aston Martin and Jaguar Land Rover—are 
willing to wear this brand, if you like, and put it on their products help to take this out of the 
government campaign sphere and into much more national parlance. That is really important. 
It does not strictly feel like a government campaign; it feels like a national campaign on behalf 
of the people and the businesses of Britain. 
In terms of the regional side, we were very careful from the beginning when using this 
campaign to reflect the strengths of all of Great Britain.  
Baroness Armstrong of Hill Top: It does not come across. 
Conrad Bird: Have you seen all the advertisements that we use overseas, because we use 
everything? 
Baroness Armstrong of Hill Top: We have just been looking at them here. 
Conrad Bird: We use the Scottish countryside. 
Baroness Armstrong of Hill Top: You use the DNA single from Newcastle, basically as 
Newcastle has done all the work, but it does not say Newcastle, it says Britain. 
Conrad Bird: It is important. How do people overseas see us? We are trying to sell Britain 
against France, the USA, and Germany. These are our competitors, and to attract them to 
this country and to aspects of this country we have to try to present a strong, compelling, 
unified image that can draw them in to come to this country. We reflect education in the 
north-east, business in Wales, the countryside in Wales, and our Thomas Heatherwick-
designed Routemaster bus, which is branded Great Britain and Northern Ireland, is going 
around the world at the moment reflecting the best that Britain has to offer. We do try to 
reflect and represent all the strengths that Britain has in all dimensions across this area.  
Having said that, we are not claiming to represent all of Britain in its entirety, because we 
are trying to promote the strengths of Britain in order to gain an economic return on that, 
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so we are trying to work with messages and images that we know from research will be the 
most powerful and that will convert our audiences to come and to invest, visit or study in 
the UK.  
Equally, there is a problem of capacity. If we had a bigger team, there would be thousands of 
Great British images out there. There is so much. The story has not been told yet. It is an 18 
month-old campaign. We have a long way to go, and we have hundreds and thousands of 
stories that we have not told yet that we intend to tell over time. It is simply a matter of 
time and capacity rather than intent. 
Baroness Armstrong of Hill Top: It looks very London-based and very London-centric.  
Alex Aiken: We hear what you say, but I will seek to reassure you. I have just noted here 
that part of our new Exporting is GREAT campaign highlights how we are building success 
from Durham to Dubai. That is one example of how we recognise that it is a UK campaign, 
but fundamentally it is aimed at overseas audiences, and we need to get that core message 
across because of the competition that is out there. 
Q327   Baroness Nicholson of Winterbourne: How does DfID fit into that? The 
purpose of DfID is not to make an economic return for the UK, nor, in that sense, to 
enhance our reputation. The purpose of DfID is to help the poor overseas. 
Conrad Bird: That is its purpose but there are certain images – not many that they have 
used – on reputation to talk about British companies and organisations that have done 
amazing things to assist the poor overseas. It sometimes uses those as placards or posters in 
its offices around the world.   
Baroness Nicholson of Winterbourne: You mean that you are promoting individual 
companies’ corporate social responsibility actions. Is that a good idea? Is it harmful for the 
company? Must you particularise between one company and another company? Surely that is 
not the right way for your campaign to go. 
Conrad Bird: I think we have used a couple of examples for DfID where we are talking 
about, for instance, an innovative designer of wheelchairs. It made special, robust 
wheelchairs that were cheap, low cost and robust for getting over poor terrain for disabled 
people overseas. That was a way of showcasing a small company that was doing great good. 
We were happy for that to be used.  
Baroness Nicholson of Winterbourne: So that is not DfID, that is a company that is 
making a profit, which is perfectly accurate, and why not?  
Conrad Bird: But DfID used the message in its offices throughout the world. 
Alex Aiken: It was supported through the UK Government by the humanitarian innovation 
fund on that basis. I was at DfID on Friday, and it recognises that it has a role in the GREAT 
campaign, although inevitably its main focus is elsewhere. 
Baroness Nicholson of Winterbourne: But is it not a role in which DfID is therefore 
using the funding given to the poor to promote the work of DfID.  
Alex Aiken: No, I do not think that that is right. It is absolutely focused, as you said, on its 
main objective, which is to help minimise and where possible end extreme poverty.  
Q328  Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: I have two very quick questions. Much to my surprise, 
you have not mentioned, at least I have not heard you mention, the Diamond Jubilee and the 
Royal Family. Why?  
Baroness Armstrong of Hill Top: He mentioned it at the very beginning. 
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Conrad Bird: I am happy to mention that. 
Alex Aiken: The Royal Family are important. 
Conrad Bird: The Royal Family have been very helpful in assisting this campaign, not just 
through the Diamond Jubilee. Prince Harry attended an event we held in Rio, up Sugar Loaf 
Mountain, to help support the campaign when we launched it in Brazil. It was very powerful 
indeed.  
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: Maybe I was not listening properly. Lastly, if this Committee 
comes out with recommendations for reorienting the campaign, are you prepared to look at 
them? 
Alex Aiken: Absolutely, and Conrad would and he ultimately reports to me. He does an 
excellent job. This Committee’s work is important to us. Soft power is important to us. I 
have an interest in cross-government, and in preparation for this hearing I talked to my 
colleagues at DfID and the Foreign Office and so on. I say, “This is an interesting area. What 
are we doing?”. I was not intimately aware of the concepts around soft power. I know a little 
more about it now, although not as much as you, and the Foreign Office idea of smart 
power. You have my assurance as the head of government communications that we would 
respond. It will be debated at the directors of communications’ meetings and in the groups 
that we have for these areas. This campaign is young, organic and growing, but we need the 
benefit of all citizens and Peers of the realm in order to make it successful. If there is an area 
in which you say, “Look, you need to think again”, we will absolutely think again.  
Conrad Bird: That is the magic bullet.  
The Chairman: There we are that is part of our homework and task for the future. 
Gentlemen, we have kept you longer than I had planned but it has been extremely 
interesting. You have robustly answered many, many questions. Some of us who are really 
long in the tooth can remember the post-war campaign, “All that’s best in Britain”—you may 
remember that—with a picture of a Standard Vanguard. Shortly after that, I am afraid, the 
British motor industry virtually disappeared, although now it has come back. Shortly after 
that we had problems outwith the control of government, not entirely unlike the groundnut 
scheme and other things that did not help our reputation. But this time we must ride over 
the difficulties. You are obviously putting determined efforts into doing that and displaying an 
attractive and persuasive image of this country. We thank you for what you are doing and 
for coming to see us, and we are grateful for the information you have given us. Thank you 
very much.  
Conrad Bird: Thank you very much. 
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‘Great Britain’ Campaign – Supplementary written evidence 
 
This submission meets the Committee’s request for follow up information on the metrics 
used to analyse impact of the GREAT Britain campaign following the appearance of witnesses 
Alex Aiken and Conrad Bird on 2 December.  It also seeks to explain further the 
incremental nature of the benefit which derives to the UK from use of the campaign and 
adds more evidence on Mr Aiken’s and Mr Bird’s contention that the campaign delivers 
additional economic outcomes for the country, rather than supplanting existing activity.  
 
The Committee had a particular interest in understanding the metrics around the £500 
million of tourism economic benefits attributed to the campaign to date by VisitBritain and 
VisitEngland. The Committee was also keen to understand the additional value brought by 
GREAT to the ‘business as usual’ activities of both organisations. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Monitoring, evaluation and the focus on return on investment (“ROI”) are core principles in 
the running of the GREAT campaign. This degree of focus on results and the requirement 
for the FCO, British Council, UKTI, VisitBritain and other departments to work together 
with a single brand and purpose is new. 
 
HM Treasury have scrutinised and approved the GREAT (‘Five Case’ Green Book compliant) 
Full Business Cases133 for both 2013/14 funding and the subsequent 50% increase in funding 
for the two-year period 2014-16.134 This is significant as HM Treasury’s due diligence 
provides an authoritative external level of appraisal and endorsement to the overall 
campaign and to the evaluation and therefore to the impact methodologies used to measure 
its success.135  
 
Further evidence of the campaign’s effectiveness can be seen in the willingness of other 
British brands to become closely associated with GREAT. For example, it is highly significant 
that the campaign secured the participation and endorsement of David Beckham for both 
2013/14 and 2014/15 at no cost, alongside strong financial and in-kind commitments from 
leading global companies such as HSBC, PricewaterhouseCoopers, WPP and Jaguar Land 
Rover.  
 
Finally, the GREAT campaign has been externally evaluated as having positively influenced 
global perceptions of the UK. For example, a recent international assessment of the most 
valuable nation brands ranked the UK in fourth place globally (up from fifth in 2012 and 
overtaking Japan), with GREAT cited as a contributory factor as it is “fast becoming 
                                            
133 HM Treasury’s ‘Five Case’ Green Book compliant Full Business Case covers five detailed areas (Strategic; Economic; 
Commercial; Financial; and Management). For further information, please see: 
   https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/220541/green_book_complete.pdf 
134 A 50% increase in funding of the GREAT campaign to £45 million per annum for 2014/15 and 2015/16 was announced in 
the Autumn Statement in December 2013. For further information, please see: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/263942/35062_Autumn_Statement_2013.pdf 
135 Indeed, the tourism evaluation methodologies applied by both VisitEngland and VisitBritain are standard industry methodologies 
that have been applied by both organisations over several years. Evaluation of GREAT is simply a subset of existing evaluation work 
undertaken by both organisations. The standard methodologies applied, which have been historically reviewed by the National Audit 
Office, are recognised across the tourism sector as appropriate.    
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recognised as a gold standard in nation branding.”136 Furthermore, GREAT has won both 
international and domestic awards (including the latest Civil Service ‘Growth Award’), has 
attracted the focus of academic papers and is receiving growing levels of attention from 
other governments worldwide keen to understand and replicate GREAT’s innovative and 
long-term approach to influencing investment, trade, tourism and education markets within a 
fast-changing and highly competitive global environment.  
 
 
2. Overview of evaluation of the GREAT campaign 
 
GREAT has become one of the Government’s most intensely evaluated initiatives. 
Measurement and evaluation of the campaign is undertaken at three distinct levels: 
 
a) at individual department/partner level. This comprises: 
− dedicated evaluation and monitoring teams in each organisation that use proven 
methodologies to track and analyse the economic returns of their marketing 
activites in their respective sectors (for example, both VisitBritain and VisitEngland 
have specialised teams that use methodologies previously approved by the 
National Audit Office to assess the economic benefits from tourisim campaigns); 
and  
− Ambassador-led governance teams consisting of all other government 
deparment/partners at Post who assess GREAT bids for funding, approve them at 
a local level and present them centrally to London for a second level of scrutiny. 
 
b) at a central aggregated level. This comprises: 
− monthly summaries of outcomes of individual events (including foreign direct 
investment leads and support given to British companies seeking to export); 
− aggregation of the value of private sector support and celebrity endorsement; 
− regular Return On Investment analysis 
 
c) at an overall Governance level. This comprises: 
− final level of scrutiny of individual financial bids from the Senior Responsible 
Officer for the GREAT campaign in Cabinet Office and sign-off from the GREAT 
Programme Board chaired by the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport; 
and 
− detailed independent scrutiny by HM Treasury. This work includes a cost-benefit 
analysis  that considers the range, timeframe and level of economic benefits 
(including analysis on the different components of the campaign). 
 
To ensure that GREAT continues to be externally validated as ‘best practice’, a core 
objective of the campaign is to work closely with the National Audit Office to obtain their 
independent sign-off on all GREAT evaluation methodologies. Indeed, in a recent 
assessment137 of wider government support to UK exporters (‘Supporting UK Exporters 
Overseas’), the National Audit Office commented on GREAT as being an example of good 
practice: 
 
                                            
136 Source: Brand Finance, 2013. Please see: 
http://www.brandfinance.com/images/upload/brand_finance_nation_brands_2013.pdf 
137 Source: “Supporting UK Exporters Overseas”, National Audit Office, October 2013. 
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“The GREAT campaign requires a more quantified approach to reporting than other 
growth-related activities. Posts must demonstrate the benefits of their planned events 
and specify a forecast rate of investment. The central GREAT team are assessing 
whether they can quantify the benefits further. They are encouraging posts to think 
more about the outcomes of their events, rather than the inputs/outputs. This is a shift 
in thinking for posts and could be a valuable basis on which to build further ways of 
demonstrating the value of the FCO’s wider work to promote exports.” 
Source: National Audit Office, October 2013 
 
 
3. VisitEngland evaluation of economic benefits 
 
The strongest formal evidence of the economic additionality of GREAT to date has been 
through VisitEngland’s detailed economic analysis of its 2012 ‘Holidays at Home are GREAT’ 
staycation campaign.138  
 
Using NAO-approved tourism evaluation methodologies, VisitEngland calculates the 
economic benefits from domestic tourism by using an ongoing ‘brand tracker’ survey 
(currently conducted by TNS, an independent external party). The two main elements of 
VisitEngland’s evaluation are an assessment of the great2012offers.com and visitengland.com 
websites and an evaluation of its television advertising campaign among a wider audience of 
domestic holiday takers.  
 
Typically, VisitEngland would expect a 20:1 return on investment according to its standard 
evaluation methodologies. VisitEngland’s GREAT campaign secured a 60:1 return in 2012 and 
was the most successful campaign that the organisation has ever run. For an investment of 
£5 million, VisitEngland secured incremental tourist expenditure of £300 million – assuming 
that VisitEngland would typically expect a £100 million return for the £5 million (assuming 
the average 20:1 return), then the additional incremental benefit of GREAT over normal 
‘business as usual’ activity was £200 million in 2012 alone. 
 
The results from VisitEngland’s GREAT campaign are based on additional expenditure in the 
economy as a direct result of the organisation’s specific GREAT promotional activities only. 
The evaluation methodologies applied by VisitEngland ensure that any economic impact 
attributed is not double-counted and is not as a result of other marketing campaigns or 
other expenditure. 
 
4. VisitBritain evaluation of economic benefits 
 
The £200 million economic benefit generated by international leisure tourism through 
GREAT in 2012/13 has also been calculated using core evaluation methodologies previously 
approved by the National Audit Office and recognised as standard across the tourism 
industry.  
 
VisitBritain calculates the economic benefits from international leisure tourism attributed to 
GREAT using an ongoing ‘brand tracker’ survey of international travellers in 12 target 
                                            
138 Please see: http://www.visitengland.org/marketing/HAHAG/results.aspx  
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markets139 (the survey is conducted independently by Ipsos MORI, a third-party research 
organisation and comprises polling of 1,000+ individuals in each market). 
 
The ROI is calculated140 by assessing the differences in ‘intention to travel’ in the target 
audience between those that saw GREAT advertising and those that did not. VisitBritain 
adopts a conservative approach to calculating the ROI by: 
 
• limiting its economic modelling to ‘leisure’ visitors only (and excluding other 
categories such as ‘business visitors’ or  ‘people visiting friends and family’);  
• limiting its economic modelling to people living within just 10 miles of each target city 
(although the campaign will inevitably reach further as it had a strong digital 
component); and 
• limiting its economic modelling to the ‘uplift in visits’ only. 
 
VisitBritain’s ROI calculations also take account of key factors such as deadweight, the 
counterfactual position and competitor analysis. The results from VisitBritain’s GREAT 
campaign are based on additional expenditure in the UK economy as a direct result of the 
organisation’s specific GREAT promotional activities only. The evaluation methodologies 
applied by VisitBritain ensure that economic impact attributed is not double-counted and is 
not as a result of other marketing campaigns or other expenditure. 
 
 For VisitBritain, the initial 2012/13 GREAT brand campaign delivered an 
immediate ROI of 8:1, in addition to building longer-term awareness of 
the brand. For example, in March 2013, VisitBritain’s GREAT image 
advertising was the second ‘most likely’ to be spontaneously recalled 
amongst target audiences (up from fifth before the launch of the GREAT 
campaign). The GREAT campaign has also achieved a 50% increase in 
recall amongst people that were shown advertising materials (with 72% of 
recent international travellers recalling the campaign in March 2013). 
Indeed, this level of recall exceeds the norm of other international 
tourism brand campaigns that have been evaluated by Ipsos MORI. 
 Finally, it is important to note that 2012/13 has been a record year for 
international tourism into the UK. The latest official data from the Office 
for National Statistics shows that in the first ten months of 2013, the 
number of holiday visitors to the UK were up by 6% on the same period in 
2012 (which itself was a record year).141 Expenditure by international 
tourists during the first ten months of 2013 increased by 12% year-on-year 
to £17.8 billion.  
 Indeed, VisitBritain highlighted the pivotal role that GREAT has in 
converting potential tourists into actual visitors to the UK:  
                                            
139 Source: VisitBritain/Ipsos MORI, 2013. Estimated return based on potential incremental expenditure by ‘leisure visitors’ 
only to the UK from the following GREAT-targeted cities: Beijing, Berlin, Los Angeles, Mumbai, New Delhi, New York, 
Paris, São Paulo, Shanghai, Sydney, Tokyo and Toronto. The survey interviewed over 15,000 people over a 12-month 
period. The analysis also indicated that had the GREAT campaign not taken place, there would have been a potential 
downturn in leisure visitors to the UK from GREAT markets resulting in an estimated ‘counterfactual’ of approximately 
£465 million. 
140 The methodology utilises the ‘average spend per visitor’ for each market as defined by the ‘International Passenger 
Survey’ undertaken by the Office for National Statistics (which surveys between 700,000 and 800,000 people each year in 
order to produce estimates of tourism expenditure in the UK).  
141 Importantly, the data showed particularly strong growth across ‘Rest of the World’ markets, which reported a 12% 
year-on-year increase in visitors to the UK for the first ten months of 2013. 
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 “Not only are we seeing strong growth figures from our established 
markets, but also from new growth markets, such as China, South Korea 
and Mexico. Huge events have showcased Britain on a global stage as a 
great place to holiday, study, invest and do business – and these figures 
show that our GREAT campaign has helped turned spectators into 
visitors. As a result, Britain is on course to attain the highest spend from 
international visitors in its history by the end of the year.”  
 
December 2013 
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Soft Power and the UK's Influence 
 
The first decade of the 21st century has provided plenty of evidence of the importance in 
politics and geopolitics of the power of persuasion and the declining effect of the use of 
military and political compulsion.  The symptoms of the trend are clear in the stories of Iraq 
and Afghanistan, in the relative helplessness of outside powers trying to address the 
instability in the Middle East and in the continuing commentary on the declining global impact 
of the United States and Europe. 
 
The causes that underlie the symptoms reflect shifts in the global distribution of power since 
the end of the Cold War and the consequences of the spread of freedom and equal 
opportunity.  The ingredients of this remarkable period of change include: 
 
- the moral force of the concept of self-determination and political independence, established 
by the Charter, declarations and operations of the United Nations and encouraged by 
American support for democracy and individual freedom;  
 
- the growing power of the people's voice, given strength by the increasing pervasiveness of 
open communications channels and by the widespread promotion of individual rights; 
 
- the resulting focus in politics and society on ethnic, religious and political identity and the 
increasing trend for moral and political legitimacy to reside in the wishes of the people of a 
particular locality; 
 
- the openness and global comprehensiveness of economic exchange and opportunity and 
the rapid expansion of methods of doing business internationally; 
 
- the deepening distaste among both governments and individuals for war and the use of 
military force, in a reaction against the legacy of the 20th century, against the increasing 
destructiveness of modern weaponry and against the uncontrolled human rights and 
humanitarian consequences of warfare. 
 
The accumulated effect of these trends has been to counter the image and actuality of a 
Western advanced industrial elite and to accelerate the chances for a much wider range of 
countries of advancing their economic interests.  This has generated two principal 
consequences: 
 
a) There are far more genuinely independent actors on the global stage, going beyond 
governments to multinational companies, civil society, small groups whether benign or 
malign in character, all the way to powerful individuals.  While most people are still 
struggling to comprehend the arrival of multipolarity in geopolitics, the reality is already 
moving beyond a multipolar stage to one of uncontrollable diversity and localisation. 
 
b) The main criterion for the strength and impact of a modern state or society has become 
economic rather than political/military performance. This stems from the unacceptability of 
the use of political or military weight to impose solutions in a highly competitive world, and 
Sir Jeremy Greenstock – Written evidence 
612 
 
the growing respect for those who take responsibility for their own development in a 
meritocratic and egalitarian environment.  Leading by example in the economic sphere 
works, where attempting to do the same in the military or political sphere does not. 
 
When it comes to the UK, the following points are important: 
 
- economic health, not to say dynamism, through competing in a fair and law-abiding way for 
globally available opportunities, becomes paramount; 
 
- any reliance on attributes or privileges derived from the past decrease in effect with time; 
 
- our connectedness to most parts of the world, through history, trade, membership of 
institutions and good diplomacy, remains a strong advantage, as does our familiarity with the 
increasing complexity, diversity and vulnerability of the digital universe; 
 
- the attractiveness of the UK in cultural or presentational terms is increased by its 
acceptance of an equal and meritocratic world, by consideration for other cultures and for 
those in less advanced stages of development and by perceptions of the contributions the 
UK makes to global problem-solving; 
 
- where the UK is compelled to make choices, for instance in a regional crisis, its adherence 
to the principles of international behaviour and its ability to win the backing of mainstream 
international opinion become more important in a world in which legitimacy has a concrete 
force. 
 
We undoubtedly have a number of things running in our favour.  The widespread use of the 
English language, however much influenced by the cultural power of the United States, gives 
us a distinct advantage.  The example and longevity of our principal institutions, the 
monarchy, Parliament, the law, the City and the best of our media, exercise an influence well 
beyond the Commonwealth.  Our capacity in international forums to help solve problems, 
find compromises and negotiate texts is seen as constructive.  Our general professional 
competence is admired, though only against the background of widespread incompetence 
elsewhere. 
 
We also carry some handicaps. The most significant is our lack of robust economic health 
and commercial dynamism.  We gain surprisingly few image points for innovation and 
technology, in spite of the reality of considerable capability in these fields.  It may be the 
marketing.  We are also seen as relying on privilege, something that stems from our 
continuing permanent membership of the UN Security Council, our role in NATO and the 
Commonwealth and perhaps most significantly from our almost obsessive relationship with 
the US.  On this last point, while we should assign high priority to the quality of Anglo-
American relations, we should be aware enough of the occasional differences in the mindset 
and values of our two peoples not to be afraid of taking a distinctive position when it reflects 
our national interest and character better. 
 
The importance of soft power lies not in its superiority to hard power, as though there was 
a binary choice, but in its indispensability in 21st century geopolitics as a corollary of hard 
power.  For the reasons given above, relying primarily on hard power reduces the impact 
and acceptability of a state's policies.  But soft power, the capacity to persuade and attract, is 
insufficient on its own to promote and defend national or group interests.  In certain critical 
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circumstances, it can too easily be ignored.  The story of the EU in modern times illustrates 
that. 
 
It is the balanced combination of hard and soft power that is most effective.  Speak 
persuasively, but carry a big stick.  The UK has been notable, at least before it began to 
reduce its armed forces to too low a quantity, for creating as good a balance in that respect 
for its size of population as any country.  Our armed forces and our diplomatic skills are 
equally professional. Our willingness to choose either dialogue or hard action gains respect, 
at least when the choice is well judged by international norms.  The BBC, the British 
Council, the British arts world and UK sport, together with other aspects of our culture and 
presentation, are world class when properly resourced. 
 
I hope that the Committee will, above all, pay attention to the maintenance of this balance 
and to the need for both sides of it to be adequately cared for. 
 
17 September 2013 
 
 
